THE

INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
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INVASION OF THE CRIMEA

ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN

BY

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Of all the impulsions which brought on the war of 1853, there was hardly any one more effective than the fatal voice from this island, which invited the Russian assailant to take heart and cross the border by causing him to imagine that he had nothing to fear from England; and now once more private citizens boldly planting themselves athwart the path of their own Government, have been cheering Russia into the mood for subversive enterprises. But there, the parallel ends, and there, also, a wide contrast begins; for, though credulously listened to at St Petersburg, the Peace Party men of 1853, who made bold to lay England's abdication at the feet of the Czar, had no following to support their pretensions; whereas the denouncers of last autumn have not only proved their strength, but perhaps, one may say, gained their victory—a victory over their country, and in that
sense, over themselves; for at a moment when the State was pursuing its accustomed policy, they interposed with a mind to shackle it, and I think it is in vain to deny that during a period of several months the State was shackled accordingly.

The truth is, that from the time when observers, unallured by the charm of the East, began to cast critical glances at the polity of the Ottoman Empire, no one well—without smiling—could say it was otherwise than grievously bad, and not many could even see in it the germs of a much better system; so that, when superadded to the spectacle of public bankruptcy, and the other abundant proofs that there were of Turkish misgovernment, the outrages committed last May in a part of what some called ‘Bulgaria,’* gave such weight, power, and substance to indignant denunciations of the Sultan’s rule, that a mass of opinion in this country was brought into harmony with that of the great Russian people; the distant multitudes of the East and of the West being thus, as it were, ‘made kin’ by the touch of a human feeling. Despite intervening distance, the two multitudes were both alike moved by the same pity, the same anger, the same longing to inflict retribution, the same scorn of any cold policy or any unwelcome prudence that seemed standing in the way of their vengeance.

The Russian multitude, as I have shown, were not without means of pressing their entreaties upon the

* The outrages occurred in villages occupied by Bulgarians, but situate far south of the Balkan, in the country we call Roumelia.
Czar, and pressing them, too, with great force; * still they necessarily uttered their prayer in general terms, saying only, if so one may speak, that they were ready and eager to begin and carry through a crusade. But in England, the angry denouncers got a tighter grasp of the subject. Including amongst them great numbers of gifted, well-informed men, with the prince of all orators at their head, they really were not common throngs, but thousands and thousands of Foreign Secretaries, free from any tough doubt about anything, and they entered upon the duties of the invaded Department with minds unhampered by the traditions of Office, nay even so unhampered by Policy that, if reminded by some grey-headed clerk of the connection between Turkish 'independence' and the burning question of 'the Straits,' they all said there was nothing in that. They undertook a grave task.

To endeavour to govern the progress of domestic legislation by loud utterances of the public voice—this, we know, is a business familiar enough in our islands; but what the angry myriads last year undertook to do was something of deeper moment. Roused by just indignation, and helped a little, it seems, by an almost 'syn-orthodox' section of our Anglican Church, but without the least aid from their temporal institutions, Queen or Parliament, or Army or Navy, they undertook—undertook in a few autumn weeks—to change, nay even reverse, the once settled policy of England; and, the time, as I have shown,

* Vol. I. p. xii. et seq.
being ripe, they did much towards achieving their purpose. They certainly so far achieved it, that, under the impulsion they gave, Lord Salisbury—side by side with Ignatieff—was apparently busied for weeks in assailing that very ‘independence of the ‘Ottoman Empire’ which England had long held to be a blessing—a blessing so rich as to be worthy of being fought for, and conquered at a huge cost of life and treasure.

In the counsels of men numbered by myriads, there could not but be a diversity of opinion. Some would have liked that England should concur with Russia, or any other Power that might like such a service, in putting force upon the Sultan, that is, making war against him. Many more, however, desired that, instead of helping to assail Turkey ourselves, we should ‘leave her to destruction,’ or in other words, stand by approving, whilst Russia destroyed or maimed the victim. We were to form, with other like-minded nations, what in the days of pugilism used to be called a ‘ring,’ with the understanding, however, that, this time, our vows were to be for the assailant against the assailed—for the strong and against the weak. There was a general impression in the assembled crowds, that, when England engaged in the Crimean war, she must have been yielding to the impulse of some strange and misplaced affection which we bore towards the Ottoman race, and accordingly the thousands came forward with great zeal to protest that, never, never, never again should this country fight
for the Turks. Certainly, if any statesmen had ever engaged their country in war to please the Turks, or were plotting to do so last autumn, it might have been well to denounce a policy so romantic, or rather grotesque; but whoever may do me the honour to read these pages, will see that our people were engaged in the war of 1854, by what—whether rightly or not—appeared to be the dictates of policy, reinforced, it is true, by their own warlike ardour, and especially—as this volume shows—by their craving for an adventurous enterprise. Of course, when under those motives, our people had determined to fend off Russia from lands in which the Sultan held dominion, they endeavoured to make the best of the mates with whom simple Geography told them they must needs be co-operating; but no one surely imagines that Lord Palmerston, or the statesmen of his day, ever dreamed of going to war for the sake of any Mahmouds, or Osmans, or Mustaphas. That there were ways of maintaining the policy without resorting to arms, I labour to show, and succeed, as I think, in my effort; but to decry the policy, because it involved alliance with the ill-governed, ill-governing Turks, is much like insisting that Wellington should have abandoned Hougoumont to Napoleon, because the owner of the farm was a Papist.

Still it is vain to deny that, whether wisely or otherwise, a vast proportion of our citizens did in fact make a public vow against all idea of going to war for the sake of the Eastern Question; and, since England can:
scarce take up arms without the general concurrence of her people, the effect of this protest was to place the power of the country in a state of abeyance. Apart from any logical or rhetorical merit it may have, the cogency of any lecture inflicted by one State on another must depend upon the supposition that it can, if it will, at its own chosen time, adduce 'the last reason of kings,' and to send England into a great diplomatic arena, after the scenes of last autumn, was to send her disabled. If our Government, under the stress of such circumstances, had consulted the dictates of a seemingly becoming, though really perhaps false dignity, it must needs have fallen back upon a policy of inaction, and determined, though watchful reserve.

I have said that by the causes assigned, the feelings of the two angry multitudes of the East and of the West, were brought into harmony; but in one respect during the autumn, our English denouncers and their gifted, impetuous leader struck deeper against the cause of peace than Russia up to that time had done, for they were the first to contend that the country of the Bulgarians—ground including a great part of Roumelia—must be wrested from Turkish governance; and, if it be true that agreement upon other subjects of difference substantially lay within reach, we shall have to confess that the single question which has been threatening and still threatens to prove insoluble without a resort to arms was one furnished—not by Russia but—England.

It so happened, however, that, besides the policy or
the freak of 'leaving the Turks to destruction,' the English multitude had highly approved another and less bloody expedient. They proposed in effect that the Turks should be scolded out of their country, some thinking that the victorious tongues should drive off all the Ottomans bodily, others saying with a thoughtful air of moderation that, if all the rulers, high and low, were extirpated, the Turks of private life might perhaps be allowed to remain. 

Whether in a spirit of grim cynicism, or to show men the consequences of their interposition, our Prime Minister heard the prayer of his people, consented to try their expedient, and sent England into the Council of assembled Europe with free scope to use her tongue, but prevented from even seeming to be potentially belligerent by the staring Neutrality badge which our citizens had affixed to her shoulder. The Turks, seeing the badge, declined to be talked out of Europe; and, whatever be the effect of this resolve upon their own destinies, they have at all events maintained for the moment that 'independence of the Ottoman Empire' which our statesmen were accustomed to prize and to cherish with infinite care, and have done this too at a time when the pressure which tried their firmness was in part applied by Lord Salisbury.*

As a lever for wrestling from the Sultan the govern-

* It was distinctly for the 'independence' of the Ottoman Empire that the Crimean war was waged. See 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. i. cap. xvii. The integrity of the empire was effectually vindicated by Austria.
ment of his own provinces, the Conference has failed; and yet in other and better ways it has perhaps done much good. It has apparently brought about a better understanding than before between the Powers represented at Constantinople, and more especially between Russia and England, has given a strong impulsion to the minds of those Turkish statesmen who are intent upon reforming the polity of the country, and then also by the mere effect of delay, interposed at an opportune time, it has averted war—averted war for the moment, but perhaps for weeks, perhaps even happily for a period much further prolonged.
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CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.

CHAPTER I.

The Emperor Nicholas still sought to prolong the ambiguity of his relations with Turkey. On the 31st of October, Count Nesselrode issued a Circular to the representatives of Russia at foreign Courts, in which he declared that, notwithstanding the declaration of war, and as long as his master’s dignity and his interests would permit, Russia would abstain from taking the offensive, and content herself with holding her position in the Principalities until she succeeded in obtaining the satisfaction which she required.* This second endeavour to contrive a novel kind of standing-ground between real peace and avowed war was destined, as will be seen, to cause fresh discord between Russia and the Western Powers.

* ‘Eastern Papers,’ part ii. p. 228.
The negotiations for a settlement were scarcely interrupted, either by the formal declaration of war or by the hostilities which were commenced on the banks of the Danube; and the Conference of the four Powers represented at Vienna had just agreed to the terms of a collective Note, which seemed to afford a basis for peace, when the English Government gave way to the strenuous urgency of the French Emperor, and consented to a measure which ruined the pending negotiations, and generated a series of events leading straight to a war between Russia and the Western Powers.

In the month of September, some weeks before the Sultan’s final rupture with the Czar, the pious and warlike ardour then kindled in the Turkish Empire had begun to show itself at Constantinople. A placard, urging the Government to declare war, was pasted on one of the mosques. Then a petition for war was presented to the Council, and to the Sultan himself, by certain muderris, or theological students. The paper was signed by thirty-five persons of no individual distinction, but having the corporate importance of belonging to the 'Ulemah.' Though free from menace, the petition, as Lord Stratford expressed it, was worded in 'serious and impressive terms, implying a strong sense of religious duty, and a very 'independent disregard of consequences.' The Ministers professed to be alarmed, and to believe that this movement was the forerunner of revolution; and Lord Stratford seems to have imagined that their alarm was genuine. It is perhaps more
likely that they were skilfully making the most of these occurrences, with a view to embroil their maritime allies in the approaching war, and that when they asked the Ambassadors to take part in measures for the maintenance of public tranquility, their real desire was to see the fleets of France and England come up into the Bosphorus. They well knew that if this naval movement could be brought to pass before the day of the final rupture between Russia and the Porte, it would be regarded by the Czar as a flagrant violation of treaty.

A curious indication of the sagacity with which the Turkish Ministers were acting is to be found in the difference between their language to the English Ambassador and their language to M. de la Cour. In speaking to Lord Stratford they shadowed out dangers impending over the Eastern world, the upheaving of Islam, the overthrow of the Sultan’s authority. Then they went straight to M. de la Cour and drew a small vivid picture of massacred Frenchmen. They did not, said M. de la Cour, conceal from him ‘that the persons and the interests of his countrymen would be exposed to grave dangers, which they were sensible they were incapable of preventing, by reason of the want of union in the Ministry and the threats directed against themselves.’* This skilful discrimination on the part of the Turkish Ministers seems to show that they had not at all lost their composure.

* ‘Eastern Papers,’ part ii. p. 115.
Either by their real dread, or by their crafty simulation of it, the Turkish statesmen succeeded in infecting M. de la Cour with sincere alarm. He was easily brought to the conclusion that 'the state of the Turkish Government was getting worse and worse; and that matters had got to such a state as to cause dread of a catastrophe, of which the inhabitants, Rayahs or Europeans, would be the first victims, and which would even threaten the Sultan's throne.'* He called upon the English Ambassador to consult as to what was best to be done; and both he and the Austrian Internuncio expressed their readiness to join with him in adopting the needful measures.

Lord Stratford does not seem to have suspected that the use which the Turkish Ministers were making of their divinity students was in the nature of a stratagem; but, assuming and believing their alarm to be genuine, he was still proof against the infection, and retained his calm. Indeed, he seems to have understood that a cry for war on the part of the religious authorities was a healthy sign for the Empire. He expressed to his colleagues his readiness to act in concert with them; but he said he was reluctant to take any step which was not clearly warranted by the necessities of the case, and that he desired to guard against mistake and exaggeration by gaining a more precise knowledge of the grounds for alarm. He deprecated any joint interference with the Turkish Government, and was still less inclined

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 115.
to join in bringing up the squadrons to Constantinople without more proofs of urgent peril than had been yet obtained; but he suggested, as an opinion of his own, that the representatives of the maritime Powers should obtain from their respective Admirals such an addition of steam-force as would secure them from any immediate attack, and enable them to assist the Government in case of an outbreak threatening its existence, without attracting any unusual attention, or assuming an air of intimidation.* This was done.† A couple of steamers belonging to each of the great Western Powers quietly came up to Constantinople. Tranquillity followed. Every good end was attained without ostentation or disturbance—without the evil of seeming to place the Sultan's capital under the protection of foreign Powers—and, above all, without breaking through the treaty of 1841 in a way which, however justifiable it might be in point of international law, clearly tended to force on a war.

But the moderate and guarded policy of Lord Stratford at Constantinople was quickly subverted by a pressure which the French Emperor found means of putting upon the advisers of the Queen. Of course, an understanding with a foreign Power is in its nature an abatement of a nation's free agency; and a statesman may be honest and wise

* The steam-force of the maritime Powers already in the Golden Horn consisted of vessels which had passed the Dardanelles by virtue of exceptions contained in the treaty of 1841.
† 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 121.
in consenting to measures which have no other excuse than that they were adopted for the sake of maintaining close union with an ally. England had contracted a virtual alliance; and when once she had taken this step, it was needful and right that she should do and suffer many things rather than allow the new friendship to be chilled. But this yoke was pressed hard against her. It was not the wont of England to be causelessly led into an action which was violent, and provoking of violence. It was not her wont to rush forward without need, and so to drive through a treaty that many might say she broke it. It was not her wont to be governed in the use of her fleets by the will of a foreign Sovereign. It was not her wont to hear from a French Ambassador that a given movement of her Mediterranean squadron was "indispensably necessary," nor to be requested to go to such a conclusion by "an immediate decision." It was not her wont to act with impasioned haste, where haste was dangerous and needless. It was not her wont to found a breach with one of the foremost Powers of Europe upon a mere hysterical message addressed by one Frenchman to another. But the French Emperor had a great ascendant over the English Government; for the power which he had gained by entangling it in a virtual alliance was augmented by the growing desire for action now evinced by the English people. He knew that at any moment he could expose Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues to a gust of popular disfavour, by causing it to be
known or imagined that France was keen, and that England was lagging behind.

When M. de la Cour's account of his sensations reached Paris, it produced so deep an impression that the French Emperor, either feeling genuine alarm, or else seeing in his Ambassador's narrative an opportunity for the furtherance of his designs, determined to insist, in cogent terms, that the English Government should join him in overstepping the treaty of 1841, and ordering the Allied squadrons to pass the Dardanelles and anchor in the Bosphorus. On the 23d of September, Count Walewski had an interview with Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon at the same time; and then, after speaking of the crisis at Constantinople which M. de la Cour's despatch had led the French Government to expect, he said that his Government thought it 'indispensably necessary that both fleets should 'be ordered up to Constantinople;' and his Excellency added 'that he was directed to ask for the 'immediate decision of Her Majesty's Govern- 'ment, in order that no time might be lost in 'sending instructions to the Ambassadors and 'Admirals.'*

Now, at the time of listening to these peremp- tory words, the English Government had received no account from their own Ambassador of the apprehended disturbances; but they knew that the fleets at the mouth of the Dardanelles, being already under orders to obey the requisitions of

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 114.
the Ambassadors, could be instantly brought up to Constantinople without any further orders for that purpose being sent from home. Moreover, the very despatch which brought the alarm showed that the Ambassadors knew how to meet the danger, and that they had already called up that portion of the fleet which they deemed it prudent to have in the Golden Horn. From first to last the power which France and England had entrusted to their representatives at the Porte had been used with admirable prudence; and it is hard to understand how it could have seemed right to withdraw, or rather supersede, the discretion hitherto committed to the Ambassadors, by sending out an absolute order for the advance of the fleets. As it stood, the fleets would go up the moment they were wanted; and what the French Emperor now required was that, whether they were wanted or not, and in defiance of the treaty of 1841, they should immediately pass the Dardan-elles. Either the Queen’s Government had lost its composure, or else, when they gave way to this demand of the French Emperor, and consented to a needless measure which operated as a sharp provocative of war, the Queen’s Government went through the bitter duty of taking a step not right in itself, but forced upon them by the stringency of the new alliance.

* Needless, because the authority to call up the fleets when they were wanted was already vested in the Ambassadors.

† Lord Palmerston personally approved the measure; and, indeed, if he had not done so, one can hardly believe that he
‘I told Count Walewski,’ says Lord Clarendon, ‘that no intelligence of the nature referred to by M. de la Cour had been received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and that so long as the Porte did not declare war against Russia, and desire the presence of the British fleet, it was the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to observe the treaty of 1841; but Lord Aberdeen and I concurred in stating to Count Walewski that, under such circumstances as those reported by M. de la Cour, the provisions of any treaty must necessarily, and as a matter of course, be set aside.’ And then, unhappily, Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon went on to tell Count Walewski ‘that they would without hesitation take upon themselves to agree to the proposal of the French Government that the Ambassadors should be instructed to call up the fleets to Constantinople for the security of British and French interests, and, if necessary, for the protection of the Sultan.’

In compliance with the promise thus obtained would have allowed the Cabinet to be thus pressed, and apparently guided by the French Emperor.


In the opinion of Lord Stratford, this violent and inevitably perturbing measure was unnecessary. After saying that he had been content with the plan of calling up three steamers from each of the squadrons, he writes:—‘I am still of opinion that assistance thus limited would have answered every purpose, unless, indeed, the Ottoman squadron had taken part against the Sultan, which was a very extreme case to suppose. I wished to save Her Majesty’s Government from any embarrassments likely to accrue from a premature passage of the Dar-
from him, Lord Clarendon on the same day addressed a despatch to Lord Stratford, saying, 'Your Excellency is therefore instructed to send for the British fleet to Constantinople'—thus depriving the Ambassador of the discretion which had hitherto been used with singular care and wisdom, and with great advantage to the public service. What makes the course of the English Government the more extraordinary is, that they rushed into the hostile policy which is involved in this stringent order to Lord Stratford without having received any despatch of their own from Constantinople, and without any knowledge of the events which had been occurring except what was conveyed by a telegraphic message from a French Ambassador to his own Government. If the English Ministers had paused five days,† they would have received Lord Stratford's calm despatch, showing that he looked with more pleasure than alarm upon the petition of the theological students, and that he knew how to avail himself of force without using violence. If they had waited four days more,‡ they would have found that the hour was at hand when the

*danelles by Admiral Dundas's squadron, and at the same time to take precautions adequate to the appearance of danger. t did not form my opinion in this respect without taking the opinion of Her Majesty's senior officer in command in the Bosphorus.' 6th October 1853. Ibid. p. 188.

† i.e., till 28th September. Ibid. p. 121.
‡ i.e., till 2d October. Ibid. p. 127.
fleets might enter the Dardanelles without any violation or seeming violation of treaty; and, in fact, it happened that this ill-omened order for the entry of the squadrons into the Dardanelles was carried into effect at a moment when a delay of less than twenty-four hours would have made their entry clearly consistent with a due observance of the treaty of 1841; for they entered the Dardanelles on the 22d, and on the following day the Sultan, being then at war with Russia, was released from the engagement which precluded him (so long as he was at peace) from suffering foreign fleets to come up through the Straits.

Baron Brunnow remonstrated in strong terms against the entry of the fleets into the Dardanelles as a breach of the treaty of 1841; but although he was well answered by Lord Clarendon so far as concerned the mere question of right, no endeavour was made to mitigate by words the true import of the measure; and, in truth, it was of so hostile a nature as not to be susceptible of any favourable interpretation; for although the apprehension of disturbances at Constantinople might be a sufficing ground for the step, the order to the Ambassadors was not made dependent upon the occurrence of any such disturbances, nor even upon any alleged fear of them, but was peremptory and absolute in its terms, and was made applicable, not to such a portion of the naval forces as might be requisite for ensuring
the peace of the city, but to the whole of the Allied squadrons.

When the tidings of this hostile measure reached St Petersburg, they put an end for the time to all prospect of peace; and even Count Nesselrode, who had hitherto done all he could venture in the way of resistance to his master, now declared with sorrow that he saw in the acts of the British Government a 'settled purpose to humiliate Russia.' He spoke in sorrow; and his thoughts, it would seem, went back to the times when he had sat in great councils with Wellington. 'He spoke,' says Sir Hamilton Seymour, 'with much feeling of the horrors of war, and particularly of war between two powerful countries — two old allies like England and Russia—countries which, whilst they might be of infinite use to one another, possessed each the means of inflicting great injury upon its antagonist; and ended by saying that if, for any motives known to him, war should be declared against Russia by England, it would be the most unintelligible and the least justifiable war ever undertaken.' *

The Czar received tidings of the hostile decision of the maritime Powers in a spirit which, this time at least, was almost justified by the provocation given. In retaliation for what he would naturally look upon as a bitter affront, and even as a breach of treaty, he determined, it would seem, to have vengeance at sea, whilst vengeance

at sea was still possible; and it was under the spur of the anger thus kindled that orders for active operations were given to the fleet at Sebastopol.* The vengeance he meditated he could only wreak upon the body of the Turks, for the great offenders of the West were beyond the bounds of his power.

It was long believed in England that the disaster of Sinope was a surprise stealthily contrived by the Emperor Nicholas, and it is certain that the event fell upon the maritime Powers as a sudden shock; but it is not true that concealment was used by Russia. On the contrary, it seems that the attack was preceded by a long-continued ostentation of naval force. In the middle of the month of November, and at a time when the Allied Squadrons were anchored in the Bosphorus, the Sebastopol fleet came out, and was ranged in a kind of cordon stretching from north to south across the centre of the Black Sea. So early as the 20th of November the Russian cruisers captured the Medora, a Turkish steamer;†

* This conclusion is drawn from dates. The hostile resolution of the Western Powers was known to the Czar a little before the 14th of October, and about the middle of the following month the Black sea fleet was at sea. If allowance be made for distance and preparation, it will be seen that the sequence of one event upon the other is close enough to warrant the statement contained in the text. In the absence, however, of any knowledge to the contrary, it is fair to suppose that the Czar remembered his promise, and did not sanction any actual attack upon the enemy unless his commanders should be previously apprised that the Turks had commenced active warfare.

† 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 315.
and about the same time they boarded a merchantman, and relieved the captain of a portion of his cargo and of the whole of his cash;* and the Russians were so far from entertaining any idea of secrecy or concealment, that they seem to have hailed neutral merchantmen for the purpose of inquiring about the French and English fleets in the Bosphorus, and asking 'exultingly' if the captures which the Russian fleet had effected were known at Constantinople.†

Full ten days‡ before the fatal 30th of November, a Russian force of seven sail and one war-steamer was cruising in sight of Sinope, and hovering over the Turkish squadron which lay there at anchor. An express despatched from Samsoon by land on the 22d, bore tidings of this to Lord Stratford, and it must have reached him, it would seem, by the 25th or 26th. On Wednesday the 23d, the Commander of the Turkish squadron descried a Russian force of seven sail and two steamers coming down under a north-east wind towards Sinope. The Turkish ships were cleared for action, but after some manœuvring, the Russian force stood out to windward and gained an offing. On the following day six Russian ships of the line, with a brig and two steamers, again made their appearance; and three of them, under easy sail, stood towards the port of Sinope until the evening. 'In fine,' writes the

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 316. † Ibid. p. 315. ‡ Ibid. So early as the 22d, the appearance of the squadron was described as having occurred 'some days back.'
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Turkish Commander, 'six sail of the line, a brig, and two steamers, are constantly off the port above mentioned, and at one time they lie-to, and another they beat about. From six to eight frigates and two steamers have been seen off the port of Bartin and Amasbre, and this news is 'certain. Besides, the great naval port of the enemy is near. He may therefore receive reinforcements, or attack us with fire-ships. That being the case, if reinforcements are not sent to us, and our position continues the same for some time—may God preserve us from them!—It may well happen that the Imperial fleet may 'incur disasters.*

The power and habit of concentrating all energy in a single channel of action, was one of the qualities which gave force and grandeur to Lord Stratford in the field of diplomacy, but it also seems to have had the effect of preventing him from casting a glance beyond the range of his profession; and it is curious that, when the exigencies of the time called upon him to perform duties not commonly falling within the sphere of a diplomatist, his mind refused to act. England and France, without the wholesome formality of a treaty, had glided into an engagement to defend 'Constantinople, or any other part of the Turkish territory, whether in Europe or in Asia, that 'might be in danger of attack.'† So much of this grave duty as consisted in originating a resolve to put forth the naval strength of the Allies remained

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 313.  † Ibid. p. 143.
committed to the two Ambassadors, but it was of course understood that any plans for active measures would be concerted between them and the Admirals; and since the nature of the duty which they might be called upon to undertake was known of course to the Admirals, it was evidently incumbent upon them, as well as upon the two Ambassadors, to take measures for ascertaining whether the Russians were preparing to operate against the coasts of Turkey. Moreover, the English Ambassador had been instructed by his Government that, 'if the Russian fleet were to 'come out of Sebastopol, the fleets would then, as 'a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus;'* and, implicitly, this instruction required that measures should be taken for ascertaining whether the Czar's naval forces were in harbour or at sea, for, supposing them to have gone to sea, that was an event which (according to the orders from home) was to be the ground of a naval operation.

Yet, not only were no measures taken for ascertaining the truth, but the rumours of great naval operations in the Black Sea, and the despatch of the 22d, announcing that the Russian squadron was hovering over Sinope, and even the despatch containing the touching appeal of the Turkish Commander at Sinope, all alike failed to draw men into action. This last despatch was communicated to Lord Stratford on the 29th. Even then an instant advance of the steam squadrons might not have been altogether in vain, for though

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 143.
the attack commenced on the 30th, the Russian fleet did not quit Sinope until the 1st of December. Yet nothing was done. Nothing but actual intelligence of the disaster was cogent enough to lift an anchor. What Lord Stratford says of the causes of all this inaction ought to be stated in his own words. Writing on the 4th of December, he says: 'Rumours of Russian ships of the line being at sea have occasionally prevailed for some time. 'Uncertainty of information, a wish to avoid as long as possible the chances of a collision, the arrival of a new French Ambassador, and the state of the weather, were natural causes of demur in coming to a decision as to sending the squadrons into the Black Sea at this time of the year.'* But even supposing that there were reasons which justified hesitation in sending the squadrons to sea, the Home Governments of the Western Powers were entitled to ask why some humbler means of ascertaining the truth were never resorted to, and why no measures followed upon the receipt of the alarming despatch from Samsoon, or even upon the appeal for help which had come from the Turkish Commander at Sinope.

On the 30th of November, Admiral Nachimoff, with six sail of the line, bore down upon the Turkish squadron still lying at anchor in the port of Sinope. There was no ship of the line in the Turkish squadron. It consisted of seven frigates, a sloop, a steamer, and some transports. The

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 311.
Turks were the first to fire, and to bring upon their little squadron of frigates the broadsides of six sail of the line; and although they fought without hope, they were steadfast. Either they refused to strike their colours, or else, if their colours went down, the Russian Admiral was blind to their signal, and continued to slaughter them. Except the steamer, every one of the Turkish vessels was destroyed. It was believed by men in authority that 4000 Turks were killed, that less than 400 survived, and that all these were wounded.* The feeble batteries of the place suffered under the enemy's fire, and the town was much shattered.* The Russian fleet did not move from Sinope until the following day.*

This onslaught upon Sinope, and upon vessels lying in port, was an attack upon Turkish territory, and was therefore an attack which the French and English Ambassadors had been authorised to repel by calling into action the fleets of the Western Powers. Moreover, the attack had been impending for many days, and all this while the fleets of the Western Powers had been lying still in the Bosphorus within easy reach of the scene of the disaster. The honour of France was wounded. England was touched to the quick.

CHAPTER II.

Either from sheer want of forethought, or else in tenderness to the feelings of men who shunned the bare thought of a collision, the Governments of France and England had omitted to consider the plight in which they would stand, if, under the eyes of their naval commanders, a Russian Admiral should come out from Sebastopol and crush a Turkish squadron in the midst of the Black Sea. It is true that this was not the event which had occurred, for the onslaught of Sinope was 'an attack upon Turkish territory;' and was therefore within the scope of the instructions from home. But it is also true that the Governments of Paris and London had not committed, either to their Ambassadors or their Admirals, any power to take part in a naval engagement against Russia upon the open sea; and it was obvious that this chasm in the instructions furnished a ground of palliation to the Ambassadors and the naval commanders; for after all the angry negotiations that had taken place between Russia and the Western Powers, a French
or an English Admiral might naturally be loth to go watching the movements of a fleet which, so long as it was upon the open sea, he was not empowered to strike, and might be honourably reluctant to move out into the Euxine and run the risk of having to witness a naval engagement between the ships of the Czar and of the Sultan, without being at liberty to take part in it unless it chanced to be fought within gunshot of the Turkish coast. But exactly in proportion as this excuse for the Ambassadors and Admirals was valid, it tended to bring blame upon the Home Governments of France and England. The honest rage of the English people was about to break out, and there were materials for a rough criticism of men engaged in the service of the State. Some might blame the Home Government, some the Ambassador, some the Admiral; but plainly it would fare ill with any man upon whom the public anger might light.

On the 11th of December the tidings of Sinope reached Paris and London. The French Government felt the bitterness of a disaster 'endured as it were under the guns of the French and English fleets.'* In England, the indignation of the people ran to a height importing a resolve to have vengeance; and if it had clearly been understood that the disaster had resulted from a want of firm orders from home, the Government would have been overwhelmed. But the very weight and force of the public anger gave the

* M. Drouyn de Lhuys. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 299.
Government a means of eluding it. The torrent had so great a volume that it was worthy to be turned against a foreign State. The blaming of Ministers and Ambassadors and Admirals, and the endless conflict which would be engendered by the apportionment of censure, all might be superseded by suggesting, instead, a demand for vengeance against Russia. The terms of Count Nesselrode's Circular of the 31st of October* had given ground for expecting that, until provoked to a contrary course, the Czar, notwithstanding the Turkish declaration of war, would remain upon the defensive; and the people in England were now taught, or allowed to suppose, that Russia had made this attack upon a Turkish squadron in breach of an honourable understanding virtually equivalent to a truce, or, at all events, to an arrangement which would confine the theatre of active war to the valley of the Lower Danube. This charge against Russia was unjust; for after the issue of the Circular, the Government of St Petersburg had received intelligence not only that active warfare was going on in the valley of the Lower Danube, but that the Turks had seized the Russian fort of St Nicholas, on the eastern coast of the Euxine, and were attacking Russia upon her Armenian frontier. After acts of this warlike sort had been done, it was impossible to say, with any fairness, that Russia was debarred from a right to destroy her enemy's ships; and it must be acknowledged also,

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 226.
as I have already said, that the destruction of the
Turkish squadron at Sinope was not a thing done
in stealth. But the people of England, not know-
ing all this at first, and hearing nothing of the
Russian fleet until they heard of the ravage and
slaughter of Sinope, imagined that the blow had
come sudden as the knife of an assassin. They
were too angry to be able to look upon the
question in a spirit of cold justice. It was
therefore an easy task to turn all attention from
the faults of public functionaries and fasten it
upon a larger scheme of vengeance. Ministers,
Ambassadors, and Admirals, went free, and in a
spirit of honest, inaccurate justice, the Emperor
Nicholas was marked for sacrifice. This
time, it
was his fate to be condemned on wrong grounds;
but his sins against Europe had been griev-
ous, and the rough dispensations of the tribunal
which people call 'opinion' have often enough
determined that a man who has been guilty of
one crime shall be made to suffer for another.
There were few men in England who doubted
that the onslaught of Sinope was a treacherous
deed.

When first dealing with the question that had
been raised by this naval attack on the Turks,
our Government took it for granted that the
fleets of the Western Powers would forthwith
enter the Euxine, and considered that the in-
structions addressed to the English Admiral on
the 8th of October would be still a sufficient
guide, if they were now reinforced by enjoining
him to prevent the recurrence of a disaster such as that of Sinope.

But on the 16th of December the Emperor of the French once more approached the Government of the Queen with his subtle and dangerous counsels. The armed conflict of States in these times is an evil of such dread proportions that it seems wise to uphold the solemnity of a transition from peace to war, and to avoid those contrivances which tend to throw down the great landmark; for experience shows that statesmen heartily resolved upon peace may nevertheless be induced to concur in a series of gentle steps which slowly and gradually lead down to war.

The negotiations for a settlement between Russia and Turkey had not only been revived, but were far from being at this time in an unpromising state; and it is probable that if Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone had been called upon to say whether they would observe peace faithfully, or frankly declare a war, they would scarcely have made the more violent choice. But the alternative was not presented to the minds of the Queen's Ministers in this plain and wholesome form.

The ingenious Emperor of the French devised a scheme of action so ambiguous in its nature that, at the option of any man, it might be called either peace or war, but so certain nevertheless in its tendency, that the adoption of such a course by the maritime Powers would at once blot out all fair prospect of maintaining peace in
Europe. He proposed to give Russia notice 'that France and England were resolved to prevent the repetition of the affair of Sinope, and that every Russian ship thenceforward met in the Euxine would be requested, and, if necessary, constrained, to return to Sebastopol; and that any act of aggression afterwards attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag would be repelled by force.'* This proposal involved, without expressing it, a defensive alliance with Turkey against Russia; and if it were adopted, the Emperor of Russia would have to see his flag driven from the waters which bounded his own dominions. It was so framed that Lord Palmerston would know it meant war, whilst Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone might be led to imagine that it was a measure rather gentle than otherwise, which perhaps would keep peace in the Euxine. Indeed, the proposal seemed made to win the Chancellor of the Exchequer; for it fell short of war by a measure of distance which, though it might seem very small to people with common eyesight, was more than broad enough to afford commodious standing-room to a man delighting as he did in refinements and slender distinctions.

The Emperor of the French pressed this scheme upon the English Cabinet with his whole force. He not only urged it by means of the usual channels of diplomatic communication, but privately desired Lord Cowley to recommend it in

the strongest terms to the favourable attention of Her Majesty's Government as a measure incumbent upon himself and them to take; and he avowed 'the disappointment which he should feel if a difference of opinion prevented its adoption.' This language is cogent—it is also significant; and, to one who can read it by the light of a little collateral knowledge, it may open a glimpse of the relations subsisting between the French Court and public men in England.

On the 17th, the English Government had taken a step in pursuance of the moderate decision to which the Cabinet had come; but on the following day they were made acquainted with the will of the French Emperor. It would seem that there was hesitation in the Cabinet (as well there might be)—hesitation lasting fully two days; but those members of the Government who would have liked to maintain their former decision, had against them our angry people, now joined in their impatience by the French Emperor, and apparently about to be led by one whose power within the last few days had seemed to be rising high. It was at a meeting of the Cabinet on Thursday the 22d, that the proposal of the French Emperor closed in like a net round the variegated

† So late as the 20th, and when within forty-eight hours of the decision, which went in an opposite direction, Lord Clarendon evidently believed that the former determination of the Government would be maintained. See post in footnote, p. 36, an extract from his despatch of the 20th.
group which composed what remained of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry when their strongest man had been taken from them, and gathered them all together in its supple folds. Some submitted to it for one reason, and some for another; but the pressure of the French Emperor was the cogent motive which governed the result. Still, this time, though the pressure was inflicted by the hand of a foreign sovereign, it was after all from the English people themselves that the French Emperor drew his strongest means of coercion. Their indignation at the disaster of Sinope made him sure that he could bring ruin on Lord Aberdeen's Administration by merely causing England to know that her Government was shrinking from the hostile scheme of action which he had proposed.

The result, however, was that now, for the second time, France dictated to England the use that she should make of her fleet, and by this time perhaps submission had become more easy than it was at first. The Ministry, with much openness, acknowledged that they were acting without the warrant of their own judgment, and in deference to the will of the French Emperor.

'The Government,' said Lord Clarendon, 'having announced that the recurrence of a disaster such as that of Sinope must be prevented, and that the command of the Black Sea must be secured, would have been content to have left the manner of executing those instructions to the discretion of the Admirals, but they attach so much im-
portance not alone to the united action of the two Governments, but to the instructions addressed to their respective agents being precisely the same, that they are prepared to adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by the 'Government of the Emperor.' * With the addition of a proviso that for the present the Sultan should be engaged to abstain from aggressive operations on the Euxine, instructions exactly in accord with the French Emperor's proposal were forthwith sent out to the Bosphorus, and at the same time the French and English representatives at St Petersburg were ordered to communicate this resolution to Count Nesselrode.

But who was the statesman removed by some cause from our Cabinet before the critical day, and who again was the statesman then seen to be so clothed with power that the very apprehension of having him for an adversary weighed heavily on the decision of that Thursday (the 22d of December)? The two were one. Only a few days before, Lord Palmerston had been a member of the Government. Thinking fit, and intending to meet the desire of the Tuileries for a close and concerted action between France and England, he in those days had power, great power over Louis Napoleon; and, unless for some reason of his own, he would hardly, I think, have allowed the French Emperor to press indecorously upon any Cabinet to which he himself belonged, still less to apply such a pressure with the object of making it

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 321.
reverse a decision already taken. Notwithstanding Lord Palmerston’s subsequently expressed assent to the decision of the 22d of December,* there is room, as I think, for surmising that, if his tenure of office had remained uninterrupted, our Cabinet would have stood by its former resolve, and refused to break up the negotiations then almost ripe for agreement by an act which had the strange quality of being even more offensive than war. At all events, it is certain that, if only for his power of controlling the French Emperor, and maintaining with him that kind of concert which English statesmen might approve, Lord Palmerston had been a great source of strength to the Government. On the other hand, it seemed plain that if Lord Palmerston were to be undergoing political banishment at a time when his late colleagues could be accused of flinching from the task of avenging Sinope, the support of an indignant people, connecting every symptom of Ministerial tameness with his exclusion from office, would make him more powerful than the Queen’s Government.

Now unfortunately it happened, though for reasons which cannot yet be disclosed, that some days before the ill-omened Thursday, Lord Palmerston was driven from office. Of the justice or propriety of the measure thus taken against him no one yet can be invited to judge, because its

* In a letter to his brother, published in Mr Evelyn Ashley’s most interesting book.
grounds are withheld.* What we all may know is that he found himself compelled to resign; that the Queen accepted his resignation; and that the Council-day on which he would have to deliver up the seals of office was duly fixed. But no sooner had all this been done, than a sense of Lord Palmerston’s immense sterling worth as a

* They were even withheld, one may say, from the faithful Baron Stockmar; for the Prince Consort’s letter to him on the subject was not a real and thorough disclosure. Whether the curious outcry of those days against ‘Prince Albert’s interference’ was in any way connected with the transactions above stated, I do not undertake to say; but it followed them with a very close step. The outcry was one wrongly, nay, almost absurdly directed, and was utterly silenced upon the meeting of Parliament in 1854, by Lord Aberdeen and other public men, who spoke out with unshrinking clearness upon what had seemed until then a tender and delicate subject.

In saying that the outcry was wrongly or absurdly directed, I am far from meaning to represent that it was baseless; for I think, on the contrary, that transactions appearing to have resulted from the hostility of the Crown to Lord Palmerston in the five or six middle years of this century, were a very fit subject for public inquiry, and in the meantime for that healthy, wise uneasiness which awakens the care of Parliament. What Parliament ought to have asked, and ought to have taken care to learn, was—not whether the Prince Consort, or any other ‘Private Secretary,’ or friend or courtier, had been giving counsel to the Queen, but—whether any of her constitutional advisers had been guilty of undue complacency to the Crown, or of intriguing against a colleague.

If the life of the late Prince Consort in 1853 should be unreservedly imparted to the public, the ‘grounds’ above referred to as wanting will not fail to appear. The December of 1853 was a critical month in the Prince Consort’s political life.

† A difference with his colleagues on the question of ‘Reform’ was assigned by Lord Palmerston as a ground for his resignation (see the explanations in Hansard at the opening of the
colleague, and, along with that also, the thought of what might be his strength as an adversary, broke in upon the minds of the Cabinet Ministers still remaining under Lord Aberdeen; and they, some of them, likewise perceived that his withdrawal had destroyed the equilibrium hitherto maintained in a Government formed by coalition. These last members of the Cabinet, with the assent of some of their colleagues, effected, as it were, an insurrection against the power which had driven Lord Palmerston from office. They urged his restoration; and to the grievous mortification of those who had compassed his fall, it proved on the whole impracticable to resist their demand. Lord Palmerston, I believe, took no part in preparing the counter-movement which thus overcame his assailants, and at first, perhaps, knew nothing of it;* but, when the progress of the measure was at length made known to him, he did not thwart its completion. Liking work in the public service, and desiring, of course, so

session of 1854); and in his mouth the explanation was a fair one, because the 'difference' in question had been brandished against him in such way as to compel him to retire from the Government. (See Lord Palmerston's letters in Mr Evelyn Ashley's book.) But in the midst of those anxious December days when England was fast driving towards war, how came it to happen that a 'difference' on the then flat subject of poor old 'Reform' was so used as to become the means of driving Lord Palmerston from office? That is the step of which I say in the text that the 'grounds are withheld.'

* The Prince Consort writes as though he believed that Lord Palmerston had himself originated the movement for effecting his restoration to office, but my information does not warrant me in acceding to His Royal Highness's idea.
much power as would make his labours effective, he yet was so free from all jealous, all ‘vaulting’ ambition, as to be proof against the mighty temptation which seemed to be dangled before him by his sudden exclusion from office;* and being moreover quite capable—perhaps almost scornfully capable—of forgiving personal injuries, he good-naturedly consented to withdraw his resignation, returning thus to the Home Office and the Cabinet as though little or nothing had happened to vary his political life.†

How the course of events might have run, if no enmity, whether righteous or otherwise, had chanced to be assailing the strongest member of the Government at the critical time of Sinope—that, of course, is a question which can only be approached by conjecture; but those who best knew Lord Palmerston will incline to believe that a proposal for bringing England into a state of virtual war with Russia would have been dealt with by him in the Cabinet upon its own merits, without a suggestion of any such motive as the

* If proposing vigorous measures against Russia whilst out of office, Lord Palmerston would have had the advantage of acting in virtual concert with the French Emperor, and of being at the same time supported, with great force, by our vehement people at home. It is probable that in such circumstances, and armed with the public favour, acquired by his exclusion from office, he could hardly have helped becoming Prime Minister in the first month of the then approaching session

† If the operation was effected en règle, the acceptance of the resignation, I suppose, must have been first withdrawn, or treated as incomplete, and then the Minister could withdraw his resignation.
one his late colleagues avowed.* At all events, we now see that the ill-omened decision of the 22d of December took place within the brief period of Lord Palmerston's exclusion from the Cabinet.†

* See Lord Clarendon's avowal, cited ante, pp. 26, 27.
† There was a widespread belief that if Lord Palmerston had not been driven from the Foreign Office, the war would have been prevented. Of this the Prince Consort was aware. He writes, I see, to Baron Stockmar on the 19th of October: 'The Palmerstonian stocks here have gone up immensely, people saying that if he had been at the F. O., he would, by his energy, have brought Russia to reason.'—'Life of the Prince Consort,' vol. ii. p. 524.
CHAPTER III.

After much labour, the representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople had agreed upon a scheme of settlement which they deemed likely to be acceptable to the Emperor Nicholas, and they pressed its adoption by the Porte. The warlike spirit of the Ottoman people had been rising day by day, and it became very hard and dangerous for the Government to venture upon entertaining a negotiation for peace. But Lord Stratford had power over the minds of Turkish Statesmen; and he exerted it with so great a force that, although it was now impossible for them to obey him without the risk of having to face a religious insurrection, they obeyed him nevertheless. The fury of the armed divines insisting upon the massacre of worldlings, was less terrible to them than the anger of the Eltehi. To his will they bent. Not only the Turkish Cabinet, but even the Great Council of State, was brought to accept the terms proposed.* The difficulty, nay the peril of life, which

* The terms were finally accepted on the 31st of December 1853. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 362.
had thus been encountered by the Turkish Ministry for the sake of making peace with Russia—the success achieved at Sinope—and some victories gained over the Turks on the Armenian frontier,—all these were circumstances tending to assuage the mortification inflicted upon the Czar by the failure of Prince Mentschikoff's mission. Again, it had long been plain that the time was ill-fitted for the promotion of any scheme of Russian ambition; and it was known that the English Ambassador had brought the Turks to the utmost verge of possible concession. Moreover, terms of arrangement, agreed to by the Turkish Government, were about to be pressed upon the Czar with all the authority of the four great Powers. It might seem, therefore, that all things were conducing towards an amicable settlement. Nor was this hope at all shaken when the Government of St Petersburg was made acquainted with the first and unbiassed decision to which the English Government had come after hearing of the disaster of Sinope. Apprised by his private letters of the tenor of this decision, Sir Hamilton Seymour gathered or inferred that the Admirals of the Western Powers, being enjoined to prevent the recurrence of an attack like the attack of Sinope, would assert the command of the Black Sea; and when he imparted to the Russian Government the impression thus produced on his mind, his communication was received in a wise and friendly spirit by Count Nesselrode; for after hearing that the Western Powers would be likely
to assume the command of the Black Sea, the Count expressed his belief that the Russian fleet would, in consequence of the advanced season, be little likely to leave Sebastopol; and he then went on to suggest that, if the Russians were to be hindered from attacking the Turks, it would be fair that the Turks should be restrained from molesting the coast of Russia. The rest of the conversation related to the pending negotiations; and, upon the whole, it was plain that the first decision of the English Cabinet was looked upon as the natural result of the engagement at Sinope, that it would certainly not lead to a rupture, and that at length the Russian Government was in a fit temper to receive the proposals for peace which the four Powers (with the concurrence, this time, of Lord Stratford, and with the extorted assent of the Turks) were now again bringing to St Petersburg. But whilst this fair prospect was opened by the unceasing toil of the negotiators, there were messengers then journeying from Paris and from London to the Court of St Petersburg; and they carried an announcement that the Western Powers were resolved to execute the harsh and insulting scheme of action which (in the absence of Lord Palmerston, and during the period of his exclusion from office) had been forced upon the acceptance of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet by the Emperor of the French. Of course it was not to

* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 359.
† Commentators have denied that Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet was pushed from the paths of peace by the urgency of the
be expected that the friendly spirit in which the Russian Government had received the first and unbiased decision of the English Cabinet would French Government. With proofs of what I have said about this, the volume, I think, abounds; but see in particular the avowal in distinct terms by Lord Clarendon, ante, p. 27. For those who like to see facts and dates put closely together, it may be convenient to glance at the following statement of the way in which the lever acted upon England between Tuesday the 20th and Saturday the 24th of December:

Tuesday, 20th Dec.—Our Government having just determined that no special instructions to the Admirals were necessitated by the disaster of Sinope ('Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 304), and having up to this day resisted the French proposals, Lord Clarendon is able to write of 'the unabated desire for peace by which the British Government will be animated' [i.e., peace between Turkey and Russia], and to assure Lord Stratford that the course which he was 'taking with a view to the adoption by the Porte of pacific counsels is in accordance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government as being calculated to prepare the Porte to give a favourable reception to the proposals which have been forwarded from Vienna.'—‘Eastern Papers,’ part ii. p. 320.

Thursday, 22d Dec.—The Government no longer resists the pressure applied (some of the words inflicting the pressure are given in the text), and adopts the French proposals.

Saturday, 24th Dec.—Lord Clarendon announces to Lord Cowley the adoption by our Government of the French proposals, and adds:—'Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to adopt the course which the honour and dignity of the country prescribe; but at the same time they do not disguise from themselves that it may at no distant period involve 'England and France in war with Russia.'—Ibid. pp. 221, 222.

Thus, in the interval of three clear days between Tuesday the 20th and Saturday the 24th, there is a transition from peaceful language, and from obviously strong hopes of even
even for one moment survive an announcement of the scheme which only some ten days later our Government had been brought to adopt. It was one thing for the Western Powers to enforce the neutrality of the Black Sea, and another and a very different thing to announce to the sovereign of a haughty State that, even although he might be bent on no warlike errand, still, upon the very sea which washed his coast—upon the very sea which filled his harbours—he was forbidden to show his flag.

On the 12th of January 1854, the Emperor Nicholas was forced to hear—to endure to hear—that, upon peril of an unequal conflict with the combined fleets of the Western Powers, every ship that he had in the Euxine must either be kept from going to sea, or else must sail by stealth, and be liable to be ignominiously driven back into port. The negotiation, which had seemed to be almost ripe for a settlement, was then ruined. The Emperor Nicholas did not declare war against the Western Powers; but, as soon as he received the hostile announcement in a form which he deemed to be official, he withdrew his representatives from Paris and London. The Governments of France and England followed his example; and on the 21st of February 1854, the diplomatic

ending the then existing war between Turkey and Russia, to a very close prospect of a new war—a war involving England and France; and the three days' interval in which this momentous change took place was marked by but one event—by the determination of the Cabinet (on Thursday the 22d) to adopt the French proposals.—Note to 4th Edition, 1863.
relations between Russia and the Western Powers were brought to a close. Moreover, the Czar prepared to undertake an invasion of the Ottoman dominions.

On the 4th of January 1854, the fleets of England and France moved up and entered the Euxine.
CHAPTER IV.

In a military point of view, and upon the supposition of there being no understanding between Russia and Austria, the seizure of the whole of Wallachia by a Russian army is a dangerous measure; for, after reaching Bucharest, the line of occupation has to bend at right angles, ascending the northern bank of the Danube between an enemy expectant and an enemy already declared, till at length it touches the frontier of the Banat, at a distance from Moscow of not less than a thousand miles. To be in fitting strength at a point thus situate would imply the possession of resources beyond those which Russia could command.

The General at the head of the Turkish army was Omar Pasha; and it chanced that he was a man highly skilled in the art of bringing political views to bear upon the operations of an army in the field. He perceived that by protruding his forces into Western, or Lesser Wallachia, the Emperor Nicholas was not only distending imprudently his line of communications, but com-
mitting in other ways a great strategic fault; and he also inferred that political reasons and imperial vanity would make the Czar cling to his error. He also knew that, for the rest of that year, the Czar, being kept back by the engagements which he had taken, by his fear of breaking with the four Powers, and above all, by the insufficiency of his means, would abstain from any further invasion of Turkey, and would even be reluctant to alarm Europe by allowing the least glimpse of a Russian uniform to appear on the right bank of the Danube. Omar saw that the river had thus become a political barrier which protected the Turks from the Russians, without protecting the Russians from the Turks. He could, therefore, overstep the common rules of the art of war; and disporting himself as he chose on the line of the Danube, could concentrate forces on his extreme left, without any fear for his centre or his right.

Therefore, in the early part of the autumn, a large portion of the Turkish army was quietly drawn to Widdin, a town on the right bank of the river, in the westernmost angle of Bulgaria; and, on the fifth day from the declaration of war, Omar Pasha was over the Danube, entrenching himself at Kalafat, and so established that he faced towards the east, and confronted the extreme flank of the intruding army.* From that moment Nicholas ceased to be the undisturbed holder of the territory which he had chosen to call his 'material

* 23th October 1853. The declaration of war became absolute on the 23d.
‘guarantee.’ His pride was touched. Tortured by the thought that his power to hold the pledge was challenged by a Turkish officer, he began to exhaust his strength in efforts to assemble a force at the westernmost point of his extended flank. This was the error which Omar Pasha wished him to commit. At the close of the year, the Czar had succeeded in pushing a heavy body of troops into Lesser Wallachia; and in the beginning of January the lines of Kalafat were attacked by General Aurep. The struggle lasted four days, but it ended in the retreat of the Russian forces; and considering the vast distance between the lines of Kalafat and the home of the Russian army, it may be inferred that this fruitless effort of imperial pride must have worked a deep cavity in the military strength of the Czar.

Moreover, Omar Pasha took another, and a not less skilful advantage of the political considerations which prevented the Russians from passing the Danube; for, during the winter, he fleshed his troops by indulging them with enterprises against the enemy’s posts along the whole line of the Lower Danube from Widdin to Rassova; and since these attacks were often attended with success, and could never be signally repressed by an enemy who had precluded himself from the right of crossing the river, they gave the Turks that sense of strength in fight which is at the root of warlike prowess.

Early in the winter, the Emperor Nicholas came to understand the fault he had committed
in prescribing the Danube as a boundary—a boundary to be observed by himself, without the least right for expecting that it would be observed by his adversary. So now he would do the contrary of what he had done. Because he had committed a military fault in forbidding himself from all enterprises against the slowly assembling forces of the Porte in 1853, he would now, in 1854, undertake an invasion which must bring him into conflict with the gathered strength of the Ottoman Empire, and that, too, when it had become certain that the armed support of France and England would not be wanting to the Sultan. But perhaps, after all, it was hardly tolerable for a haughty monarch to have to stand passive under the insulting coercion which was now to be applied to him by the Western Powers; and the Czar, having no means of hostile action against the territories or the ships of either France or England, could only strike at his greater foes by striking at the ally whom they had undertaken to befriend. Upon the whole, therefore, he could not so school himself as to be able to abstain from attempting an invasion of Turkey; but the wholesome trials which he had now undergone had so far disciplined his spirit that at length, after bitter anguish, he felt and acknowledged to himself the want of a firm adviser.

Russia owned a great General who had never sanctioned by his counsels the error of the previous year; and now—baffled—agitated—driven hither and thither by alternating impulses till his...
brain had become a guide more blind than chance—\textit{the Czar abated his personal claims to the conduct of a war, and came for help and counsel to the veteran Paskievitch. The evil was almost beyond the old man’s hope of cure; for how could Russia march upon Constantinople—nay, how in strict prudence could she march upon the Balkan whilst England and France were in full command of the Euxine? But was the Czar then simply powerless against Turkey? Had his million of soldiers been torn from their homes in vain? Had he not busied himself all his days in organising armies and reviewing drilled men, and grinding down his people into the mere fractional components of an army, until the very faces of soldiers in the same battalion were brought to be similar and uniform? Had his life been utter foolishness, and was the labour of his reign so barren that he could not now make a campaign against the simple Turks, who never took pains about anything until the hour of battle? Had he not spoken in the counsels of Europe as though he were a potentate so great that the Empire of the Ottomans existed by force of his magnanimity? And now, had it come to this, that at the mere bidding of the Western Powers and without their firing a shot, he was to stand arrested in the presence of scoffing Europe like a prisoner who had delivered his sword?}

\textit{Well, Paskievitch, in a painful, soldierly way, could tell him what would be the least imprudent plan for attacking the inner dominions of the}
Sultan. The principles of the art of war have a great stability; and although there is an infinite variety in the methods of applying them, it results that the invasion of one nation by another is repeatedly undertaken upon the same accustomed route.

By the route which Paskievitch recommended, the invader crosses the Danube in the neighbourhood of its great bend towards the north; makes himself master of Silistria; encounters and overcomes the assembled strength of the Ottoman Empire in front of the great intrenched camp of Shoumla; then, advancing, forces the difficult passes of the Balkan as best he may; marches upon Adrianople; and thence on—thence on, if he can and dares—to the shore of the Bosphorus. Erivanski * could hardly have believed that his master's military power was equal to so great an undertaking as that; but if it succeeded only in some of its early stages, diplomacy might come to the rescue of the Czar, as it had done in 1829; and the plan had this in its favour, that it placed a broad tract of country between Austria and the right flank of the invading army, and another though less extended territory between its left flank and the fleets of the Western Powers.

But in the counsels of a wise and faithful soldier there is a pitiless candour—a dreadful precision. He comes in his hard way to weights, and to numbers, and to measurements of space and of

* This was Paskievitch's title: it denoted that he was the conqueror of Erivan, a province conquered from the Persians.
time. Without mercy to the vanity of his suffering master, Paskievitch defaced the cherished form of the 'material guarantee,' by insisting that the Czar should cease from trying to hold the Principalities entire, and that all his forces should be quickly withdrawn from the Lesser Wallachia. This done, he promised the Czar an invasion of the Ottoman Empire; but the carrying of the enterprise beyond the valley of the Danube was to be only upon condition that Silistria should fall, and should fall before the 1st of May.*

So now the streams of battalions rumoured to be setting in upon the Lower Danube from the confines of All the Russias woke up the mind of Europe, and portended a great invasion.

* My knowledge of the counsels tendered to the Emperor by Paskievitch is derived from papers in the possession of the late Lord Raglan.
CHAPTER V.

It has been seen that without treaty, and without the advice or knowledge of Parliament—nay even, perhaps, without a distinct conception of what it was doing—the English Government had been gradually contracting engagements which were almost equivalent to a defensive alliance with the Sultan. France, by virtue of her new understanding with England, had come under the same obligations; and now that an invasion of the Ottoman Empire was threatened, it became necessary that the Western Powers should take measures for its defence. At first, however, their views were limited to the defence of the Sultan's home territories, and especially those which gave the control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Two Engineer officers—Colonel Ardent on the part of France, and Sir John Burgoyne on the part of England—were despatched to Turkey, with instructions to report upon the best means of aiding the Sultan to defend his home dominions; and almost at the same time it was agreed between the two Western Powers that each of them should
prepare to send a small body of troops into the Levant.

The English force was collected at Malta. Of the Ministers who joined in adopting this measure, some foresaw that the few battalions which they were despatching to the East were the nucleus of an army which might have to operate in the field; but others looked upon them as a force intended to support our negotiations. This ambiguity of motive was a root of evil; for the collateral arrangements which are requisite for enabling an army to live, to move, and to fight, bear a vast proportion to the mere business of collecting the men; and there is always a danger that a body of troops, sent towards the scene of action with a diplomatic intent, will be unsupported by the measures which are requisite for actual war, and yet, upon the rupture of the negotiations, will be prematurely hurried into the field. On the other hand, the councillors of a great military State are so well accustomed to know the cost and the labour which must precede the advance of an army, that the mere protrusion of a body of well-equipped troops, unsupported by the collateral appliances of war, does not tell upon their minds as a proof of an intention to act. By despatching a few battalions to Malta, without instructing commissaries to go to the Levant and begin buying up the agricultural wealth of the country, we not only subjected our troops to the danger of their being brought into the field before supplies were ready, but also convinced the Russians that we could not:
be sincerely intending to engage in a war. Moreover, the slenderness of the addition which the Government proposed to make to our army tended to prolong the Czar’s fond confidence in the weight and strength of the English Peace Party; and perhaps this dangerous error was strengthened, if Baron Brunnow was able to tell him that, in proposing to the Cabinet a material increase of our land-forces, the Duke of Newcastle stood almost alone.

The Prime Minister’s continued persistency in the use of hurtful language was another of the causes which still helped to keep the Czar blindfold. Lord Aberdeen abhorred the bare thought of war; and he would not have suffered his country to be overtaken by it, if the coming danger had been of such a kind that it could be warded off by hating it and shunning its aspect. But it is not by intemperate hatred of war, nor yet by shunning its aspect, that war is averted. Almost to the last, Lord Aberdeen misguided himself. His loathing of war took such a shape that he could not and would not believe in it; and when at last the spectre was close upon him, he covered his eyes and refused to see. Basing himself upon the thoughtless saying of a statesman, who had laid it down that there could be no war in Europe when France and England were agreed, he seems to have imagined that, although he was suffering himself to be drawn on and on into measures which were always becoming less and less short of war, still he could maintain
peace by taking care to be always along with the French Emperor; and he so clung to the paradise created by a false maxim that he could not be torn from it. He would not be roused from a dream which was sweeter than all waking thoughts; and even now, to any man to whom he chanced to speak, he continued to say that there could not, there would not be war. Coming from a Prime Minister, such words as these did not fail to have a noxious weight with many who heard them. Baron Brunnow, we have seen, had looked deeper even at a much earlier period, and now again, no doubt, he took care to warn his master that Lord Aberdeen was under a passionate hatred of war which deprived him of his competence to speak in the name of his country: but by other channels the words of our Prime Minister were carried to the Emperor of Russia, and, being very welcome to him, and coinciding with his long-cherished notions, they tended to keep him in the perilous belief that Lord Aberdeen was speaking with knowledge, and that England, still clogged by her Peace Party, was unable to go to war.
A new opportunity of making his way back to peace was now thrown away by the Czar. The exigencies of a throne based upon the deeds of the 2d of December were always driving the French Emperor to endeavour to allay the remembrance of the past by creating a stir in Europe, and endeavouring to win celebrity. When Europe was quiet, he was obliged, for his life's sake, to become its disturber; but when it was at war, or threatened with war, he was willing, it seems, to take an exactly opposite method of attaining the required conspicuousness; for he was not a blood-thirsty nor even a very active-minded man, and there seems no good reason to doubt that, having brought Europe to the state in which it was at the close of January, he was sincere in the pacific step which he then took. At a moment when war was already kindled and seemed to be on the point of involving the great Powers, the odd vanity and the theatric bent which had so strangely governed his life might easily make him wish to come upon the scene and bestow the
blessing of peace upon the grateful, astonished nations. On the other hand, an English Minister would be careless of this kind of celebrity, and, so that peace could be restored to Europe, would be well pleased that the honour of the achievement should seem to belong to the French Emperor.

There is no reason to doubt that the English Government assented to the somewhat startling plan under which the French Emperor conceived himself entitled to speak for the Queen of England, as well as for himself; and certainly the licence, however strange it may appear, was in strict consistency with the spirit of the understanding which seems to have been established between the two Western Powers.*

On the 29th of January the French Emperor addressed an autograph letter to his 'good friend' of All the Russias. The letter in many parts of it was ably worded, and moderate in its tone, but it was mainly remarkable for the language in which the French Emperor took upon himself to speak and even to threaten war in the name of the Queen of England. After suggesting a scheme of pacification, he said to the Czar: 'Let your Majesty adopt this plan, upon which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly agreed, and tranquillity will be re-established and the world satisfied. There is nothing in the plan which is

* See the inferred purport of this understanding as stated in Vol. I. of 'The Invasion of the Crimea,' pp. 350, 351 of the Cabinet Edition.
unworthy of your Majesty—nothing which can wound your honour; but if, from a motive difficult to understand, your Majesty should refuse this proposal, then France as well as England will be compelled to leave to the fate of arms and the chances of war that which might now be decided by reason and justice. * The French Emperor permitted himself to write this at a time when, so far as is known, no threat like that which he chose to utter in the name of the Queen had been addressed by the English Cabinet to the Court of St Petersburg.

With the feelings which might be expected from them, English Ministers of State have generally been slow to use threatening words; and they have been chary, too, in putting forward the name of their Sovereign. Our Government could not have been willing that England should be thrust upon the attention of the world in a way which the too fastidious Court of St Petersburg would be sure to regard as grotesque. No one can doubt the pain with which the members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet must have seen the French Emperor come forward upon the stage of Europe, and publicly menace the Emperor of Russia in the name of their Queen. The process by which they were brought to suffer this is unknown to me. What seems probable is that a draft of the letter was submitted to them, accompanied with significant representations of the

* 'Annual Register,' 1854.
importance which the French Emperor attached to it, and that the Cabinet yielded to the pressure, because it feared that resistance might chill the new alliance, and might even perhaps cause it to be suddenly abandoned for an alliance between Russia and France.

The letter proposed an armistice, in order to leave open a free course for negotiation. It would seem that, in a military point of view, an armistice for a limited period, commencing in the early days of February, could not have been inconvenient to a Sovereign whose main difficulty at that time lay in the immense marches which he had to effect within his own dominions; and, on the other hand, to any one acquainted with the French Emperor's personal weakness, it was obvious that by a little harmless play upon his vanity, Russia might hope to obtain a great diplomatic advantage, and to effect a decorous escape from her troubles. But the Czar was not politic; and, instead of seizing the proffered occasion, he not only rejected the overture, but aggravated his refusal by an unwise allusion to the French disasters of 1812.

In his quest after this sort of fame the French Emperor was not without rivals. We have seen the share which the English Peace Party had had in misleading the Emperor of Russia, and tempting him to become a disturber by withdrawing the wholesome fear which deters a man from venturing upon outrage. Certain brethren of the
Society of Friends, who had been prominent members of this Party, now thought it becoming or wise to proceed to St Peters burg and request the Emperor of all the Russias to concur with them in preserving Europe from the calamity of war.

A little later, and the Czar would have stamped in fury and driven from his sight any hapless aide-de-camp who had come to him with a story about a deputation from the English Peace Party; for the hour was at hand when his curses were about to fall heavy on the men who had led him on into all his troubles by pretending that England was immersed in trade, and resolved to engage in no war.* But at this time his hope of seeing our Government held back by the Peace Party had not altogether vanished, and he resolved to give this strange mission a genial welcome.

Of course, the political conversation between the booted Czar and the men of peace was sheer nothingness; but what followed shows the care with which Nicholas had studied the middle classes of England. When he thought that the first scene of the interlude had lasted long enough, he suddenly said to his prim visitors, 'By the by, do you know my wife?' They said they did not. The Czar presented them to the Empress. She charmed them with her kindly grace. They came away sor-

* The scene of violence here prospectively alluded to will be mentioned in a later volume: it occurred in the autumn.
rowing to think that their wrong-headed countrymen in England should be seeking a quarrel with so good and well-meaning a man as friend Nicholas Romanoff; but perhaps what more than all else laid hold of their hearts, was the thought that the Czar called his Empress so naturally by her dear homely title of wife.
CHAPTER VII.

Welcome or unwelcome, the truth must be told. A huge obstacle to the maintenance of peace in Europe was raised up by the temper of the English people. In public, men still used forms of expression implying that they would be content for England to lead a quiet life among the nations, and they still classed expectations of peace amongst their hopes, and declared in joyous tones that the prospects of war were gloomy and painful; but these phrases were the time-honoured canticles of a doctrine already discarded, and they who used them did not mean to deceive their neighbours, and did not deceive themselves. The English desired war; and perhaps it ought to be acknowledged that there were many to whom war, for the sake of war, was no longer a hateful thought. Either the people had changed, or else there was hollowness in some of the professions which orators had made in their name.

When, by lapse of years, the glory of the great war against France had begun to fade from the daily thoughts of the people, they inclined to look
more narrowly than before into the origin of taxes, and were not unwilling to hear that their burthens were the result of wars which might have been easily avoided. Moreover, it chanced that from after Marlborough's time downwards, or, at all events, from after the period of Chatham's ascendancy, the wars in which England found herself engaged had been originated and conducted for the most part under the auspices of the Tory party; and it followed naturally that the Whig or Liberal party, being in antagonism to the party which had long kept the country under arms, should charge itself with the duty of expressing a just hatred of all wars which are needless or unjust. If speakers, in the performance of this duty, often used extravagant or fanatical language, they did not perhaps mean to inculcate much doctrine, but rather to display the vehemence of their hostility to the opposite faction. The applause which greeted these denunciations had the same meaning. On the other hand, the Tories declared that they did not yield to their adversaries in hatred of all needless wars; and thus, for near forty years, there was a chorus and an anti-chorus engaged in a continual chant, and denouncing wars in the abstract at times when no war seemed impending. To men skimming the surface of English politics it was made to appear that the people had a rooted love of peace.

These signs of a peaceful determination had increased in abundance after the great constitu-
tional change which obliged the old ruling classes to share their power with the people at large; and thence it was inferred that the desire of England to remain at peace was not the mere whim of any Administration or of any political party, but was based upon the solemn determination of the whole people; and it has been seen that the Emperor Nicholas had deliberately founded his policy upon this belief. A deeper knowledge might have taught him that a fiery, generous people is more quick to plunge into war than a cold, worldly, politic oligarchy; and that, even if the policy of England were as much under the control of the masses of the people as he believed it to be, there would be all the more likelihood of her being prone to take up arms; because in States which are much under the governance of the democratic principle, a proposal to make war against the foreigner is often resorted to by one of the contending factions as a stratagem for baffling the others. But these truths lay below; and what appeared upon the surface of English politics was a sincere devotion to the cause of peace. Over and over again it was laid down, with the seeming concurrence of unanimous thousands, that war, if it were not for mere defence, was not only foolish, but was also in a high degree wicked.

But the English can hardly ever be governed by a dogma; for although they are by nature wise in action, yet, being vehement and careless
In their way of applauding loud words, they encourage their orators, and those also who address them in writing, to be strenuous rather than wise; and the result is, that these teachers, trying always to be more and more forcible, grow blind to logical dangers, and leap with headlong joy into the pit which reasoners call the Absurdum. Then, and not without joyous laughter, reaction begins.

All England had been brought to the opinion that it was a wickedness to incur war without necessity or justice; but when the leading spirits of the Peace Party had the happiness of beholding this wholesome result, they were far from stopping short. They went on to make light of the very principles by which peace is best maintained, and although they were conscientious men, meaning to say and do what was right, yet, being unacquainted with the causes which bring about the fall of empires, they deliberately inculcated that habit of setting comfort against honour which historians call 'corruption.' They made it plain, as they imagined, that no war which was not engaged in for the actual defence of the country could ever be right; but even there they took no rest, for they went on and on, and still on, until their foremost thinker reached the conclusion that, in the event of an attack upon our shores, the invaders ought to be received with such an effusion of hospitality and brotherly love as could not fail to disarm them of their enmity,
and convert the once dangerous Zouave into the valued friend of the family.* Then, with great merriment, the whole English people turned round, and although they might still be willing to go to the brink of other precipices, they refused to go further towards that one. The doctrine had struck no root. It was ill suited to the race to whom it was addressed. The male cheered it, and forgot it until there came a time for testing it, and then discarding it; and the woman, from the very first, with her true and simple instinct, was quick to understand its value. She would subscribe, if her husband required it, to have the doctrine taught to charity children, but she would not suffer it to be taught to her own boy. So it proved barren. In truth, the English knew that they were a great and a free people, because their fathers, and their fathers' fathers, and all the great ancestry of whom they come, had been men of warlike quality; and deeming it time to gainsay the teaching of the Peace Party, but not being skilled in dialectics and the use of words, they unconsciously came to think that it would be well to express a practical opinion of the doctrine by taking the first honest and fair opportunity of

* I have no copy of this curious pamphlet before me, but it has been quoted (I believe by Lord Palmerston) in the House of Commons, and therefore the passage alluded to in the text might no doubt be found in Hansard. The writer, I remember, went further than is above stated. He argued that the French people would be so shamed by the kindness shown to their troops that they would never rest until they had paid us a large pecuniary indemnity for any losses or inconvenience which the invasion may have caused.
engaging in war. Still, the conscience of the nation was sound, and the men were as well convinced as ever of the wickedness of a war wrongly or wantonly incurred. They were in this mind: they would not go to war without believing that they had a good and a just cause, but it was certain that tidings importing the necessity of going to war for duty's sake would be received with a welcome in England.

Therefore when the people gradually came to hear of the fierce oppression attempted by Prince Mentschikoff, and the wise, firm, moderate resistance of the Turks, they believed that there might be coming in sight once more that very thing for which they longed in their hearts—namely, a just cause of war. And when at length the seemingly unequal conflict began, the bravery of the Turks on the Danube, and the skill of their General, quickly roused that sympathy which England hardly ever refuses to a valiant combatant who is weaker than his foe; but when they came to know of the catastrophe of Sinope, and to hear of it as a slaughter treacherously and stealthily committed upon their old ally by an enemy who had engaged to observe neutrality in the Euxine, they were inflamed with a desire to execute justice, and nothing was now wanting to fill the measure of their righteous anger except a disclosure of the Czar's cold scheme for the spoliation of the 'sick man's' house.

* The erroneousness of this impression has been already shown. See ante, pp. 13 and 14.
But after all, and especially in questions of foreign policy, the bulk of a nation must lean for guidance upon public men; and unless it appear that there were statesmen deserving the ear of the country who faithfully tried to make a stand against error and failed for want of public support, it is unfair to charge the fault upon the people.

There were two Statesmen high in office, and high in the confidence of the nation, who, more than most other men, were known to be attached to the cause of peace. To them every man looked who desired that his country should not be drawn into war without stringent need.

The impression produced upon the Court of St Petersburg by the heedless language of our Prime Minister has been already described; but the effect which he wrought upon the public mind of England by remaining at the head of the Government is still to be shown. Lord Aberdeen's hatred of war was so honestly and piously entertained, and was, at the same time, so excessive and self-defeating, that in one point of view it had the character of a virtue, and in another it was more like disease. His feelings, no less than his opinions, turned him against all war: but against a war with Russia—our ally in great times against Napoleon—he was biassed by the impressions of his early life; and perhaps, too, he had a dim foresight of the perils which might be brought upon Europe by a forcible breaking-up of the ties established by the Congress of Vienna and riveted
by the Peace of Paris.* In an early stage of the dispute, he resolved that he would not remain at the head of the Government unless he could maintain peace; and he anxiously sought to choose a moment for making his stand against the further progress towards war. Far from wishing to prolong his hold of power, he was always labouring to make out when, and on what ground, he could lay down the burthen which oppressed him. Every day he passed his sure hour and a half in the Foreign Office, and came away more and more anxious perhaps, but without growing more clear-sighted. If he could ever have found the point where the road to peace diverged from the road to war, he would instantly have declared for peace; and, failing to carry the Government with him,

*I believed—and so wrote in former editions—that Lord Aberdeen was also biased by the feelings of mutual esteem existing between the Emperor Nicholas and himself; but this was an error; for, although it is true that the Emperor Nicholas was accustomed to be loud and constant in his expressions of regard for Lord Aberdeen, the imperial esteem was not reciprocated. In his anger at the terms which Russia extorted from the Porte at the conclusion of the war, Lord Aberdeen, on the 13th of December 1829, wrote a private letter to Lord Heytesbury, at St Petersburg, which contained this passage:—'Notwithstanding our opinion of the falsehood and ambition of the Emperor Nicholas and of his Government, our desire to avoid any misunderstanding is as sincere as if we believed them to be possessed of honesty and principle.' And more than twenty years afterwards, when out of office, Lord Aberdeen wrote thus:—'I have never been an admirer of the Russian Government and policy, and although the Emperor has been personally very gracious to me of late years, I believe he has always thought me an enemy at heart, as indeed from former experience he had some right to do.'
would have joyfully resigned office, and for his deliverance would have offered up thanksgiving to Heaven. But his intellect, though not without high quality in it, was deficient in clearness and force. In troubled times it did not yield him light enough to walk by, and it had not the propelling power which was needed for pushing him into opportune action. In politics, though not in matters of faith, he wanted the sacred impulse which his Kirk is accustomed to call 'the word of quickening.'* Lord Clarendon's polished despatches so forced his approval that he could never lay his hand upon one of them and make it the subject of a ministerial crisis. Yet day by day, without knowing it, the Prime Minister was assenting to a course of policy destined to end in a rupture. Lord Clarendon's pithy phrase was less applicable to the country at large than to the Prime Minister. It was strictly true that Lord Aberdeen drifted.† He steadfastly faced towards peace, and was always being carried towards war.

* In the course of the ceaseless consultations about poor dear England which were carried on between the two intelligent Germans, the Prince Consort and Baron Stockmar, Stockmar lays it down that the Queen's Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, was wanting in 'the productive energy which can develop a great luminous thought.'—'Life of the Prince Consort,' vol. ii. p. 543.

† Mr Gladstone, this year (1876), made a speech showing that Lord Clarendon's famous expression was applied by him only to the latter—and almost formal—stages by which the country passed into a state of war; but I do not think that people have ungenerously sought to use Lord Clarendon's phrase as a confession. The truth is that, in reference to much of what is narrated in this History, the verb 'to drift' is so closely apt that—having once been uttered—it could not but fasten.
He remained at the head of the Government; and, the papers being withheld from Parliament, the country was led to imagine that all which it was possible to do or suffer for the sake of peace would be done and suffered by a Cabinet of which Lord Aberdeen was the chief.

But there was another member of the Cabinet who was supposed to hold war in deep abhorrence. Mr Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer; and since he was by virtue of his office the appointed guardian of the public purse, those pure and lofty principles which made him cling to peace were reinforced by an official sense of the harm which war inflicts by its costliness. Now it happened that, if he was famous for the splendour of his eloquence, for his unaffected piety, and for his blameless life, he was celebrated far and wide for a more than common liveliness of conscience. He had once imagined it to be his duty to quit a Government, and to burst through strong ties of friendship and gratitude, by reason of a thin shade of difference on the subject of white or brown sugar. It was believed that, if he were to commit even a little sin, or to imagine an evil thought, he would instantly arraign himself before the dread tribunal which awaited him in his own bosom; and that, his intellect being subtle and microscopic, and delighting in casuistry and exaggeration, he would be likely to give his soul a very harsh trial, and treat himself as a great criminal for faults too minute to be visible to the naked eyes of laymen. His friends lived in dread...
of his virtues as tending to make him whimsical
and unstable; and the practical politicians, con-
ceiving that he was not to be depended upon for
party purposes, and was bent upon none but lofty
objects, used to look upon him as dangerous—used
to call him behind his back a good man—a good
man in the worst sense of the term. In 1853 it
seemed only too probable that he might quit office
upon an infinitely slight suspicion of the warlike
tendency of the Government; but what appeared
certain was, that if, upon the vital question of
peace or war, the Government should depart by
even a hair's-breadth from the right path, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer would instantly re-
fuse to be a partaker of their fault. He, and he
before all other men, stood charged to give the
alarm of danger; and there seemed to be no
particle of ground for fearing that, like the Prime
Minister, he would drift. The known watchful-
ness and alacrity of his conscience, and his power
of detecting small germs of evil, led the world to
think it impossible that he could be moving for
months together in a wrong course without know-
ing it.

Now, from the beginning of the negotiations
until the final rupture, Lord Aberdeen continued
to be the Prime Minister, and Mr Gladstone the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. The result was that,
during the session of 1853, and the autumn which
followed it, the presence of these two Ministers in
the Cabinet was regarded as a guarantee of the
peaceful tendency of the Government; and when,
after the catastrophe of Sinope, it became hardly possible to doubt that war was at hand, the continuing responsibility of these good men seemed to dispense the most anxious lovers of peace from the duty of further questioning; for if Lord Aberdeen continued to head the Ministry which was leading the country into war, people thought he must have attained a bitter certainty that war was needed; and, on the other hand, it was clear that Mr Gladstone, remaining in office, and taking it upon his conscience to prepare funds for the bloody strife, was giving to the public a sure guarantee that the enterprise in which he helped to engage the country was blameless at the very least, and even perhaps pure and holy. It was thus that the conscience of the people got quieted. It was a hard task to have to argue that peace could be honestly and wisely maintained when Lord Aberdeen was levying war. None but a bold man could say that the war was needless or wicked whilst Mr Gladstone was feeding it with his own hand.

It was thus that, by the course which Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone had been taking, the efforts of those who loved peace were paralysed. No doubt a cold retrospect, carried on with the light of the past, may enable a political critic to fix upon more than one occasion when, holding the opinions which they did, these two Ministers might have resolved to make a stand for peace; and it is believed that, long before his death, Lord Aberdeen saw this and grieved: but if any man...
will honestly recall the state of his own feelings and opinions in the year 1853, he will find perhaps that he himself at the time was carried down by the flood of events; and when he has submitted to this self-discipline, he will be the better able to understand that others, though honest and able, might easily lose their footing. At all events, the errors of Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone, if errors they were, were only errors of judgment. The scrupulous purity of their motives has never been brought into question.

But if these were the causes which inclined the bulk of the English people to desire or to assent to the war, they hardly yield reasons sufficing to show why the lesser number of men, who honestly thought that peace ought to be maintained, should suffer themselves to be overpowered without making stand enough to prove that they clung to their old faith, and that England, however warlike, was, at all events, not of one mind. The hottest defenders of the war-policy could hardly refuse to acknowledge that there was much semblance of reason on the side of their adversaries. No one could say that the interest which England had in the perfect independence of the Ottoman Empire was so obvious and so deep as to exclude all questioning; and even if a man were driven from that first ground, still, without being guilty of paradox, he might fairly dispute, and say that the independence of the Sultan was not really brought into peril by a form of words which, during some
weeks, had received the approval of every one of the five great Powers.

But if these views were only plausible, there was another which was sound. It could be fairly maintained that the intrusion of Russia into two provinces lying far away on the south-eastern frontiers of Austria was no cause why England alone, nor why England and France together, should undertake to stand forward and perform, at their own charge and cost, a duty which attached upon Austria in the first place, and next upon Europe at large.

Of course, the actual and immediate success of any such struggle for the maintenance of peace was grievously embarrassed in the way already shown, by the course which had been taken by Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone; but it is not the custom of the English to be utterly disheartened by political losses; and it happened that outside the Government Offices the cause of peace was headed by two men who had been powerful in their time, and who retained the qualities of mind and body by which, in former years, they had gained a great sway.

Mr Cobden and Mr Bright were members of the House of Commons. Both had the gift of a manly, strenuous eloquence; and their diction, being founded upon English lore rather than upon shreds of weak Latin, went straight to the mind of their hearers. Of these men the one could persuade, the other could attack; and, indeed, Mr Bright's oratory was singularly well qualified for prevent-
ing an erroneous acquiescence in the policy of the day; for, besides that he was honest and fearless—besides that, with a ringing voice, he had all the clearness and force which resulted from his great natural gifts, as well as from his one-sided method of thinking—he had the advantage of being generally able to speak in a state of sincere anger. In former years, whilst their minds were disciplined by the almost mathematic exactness of the reasonings on which they relied, and when they were acting in concert with the shrewd traders of the north who had a very plain object in view, these two orators had shown with what a strength, with what a masterly skill, with what patience, with what a high courage, they could carry a great scientific truth through the storms of politics. They had shown that they could arouse and govern the assenting thousands who listened to them with delight—that they could bend the House of Commons—that they could press their creed upon a Prime Minister, and put upon his mind so hard a stress that, after a while, he felt it to be a torture and a violence to his reason to have to make stand against them. Nay, more: each of these two gifted men had proved that he could go bravely into the midst of angry opponents—could show them their fallacies one by one—destroy their favourite theories before their very faces, and triumphantly argue them down. Now, these two men were honestly devoted to the cause of peace. They honestly believed that the impending war with Russia was a needless war. There was no
stain upon their names. How came it that they sank, and were able to make no good stand for the cause they loved so well?

The answer is simple.

Upon the question of peace or war (the very question upon which more than any other a man might well desire to make his counsels tell) these two gifted men had forfeited their hold upon the ear of the country. They had forfeited it by their former want of moderation. It was not by any intemperate words upon the question of this war with Russia that they had shut themselves out from the counsels of the nation; but in former years they had adopted and put forward, in their strenuous way, some of the more extravagant doctrines of the Peace Party. In times when no war was in question, they had run down the practice of war in terms so broad and indiscriminate that they were understood to commit themselves to a disapproval of all wars not strictly defensive, and to decline to treat as defensive those wars which, although not waged against an actual invader of the Queen's dominions, might still be undertaken by England in the performance of a European duty, or for the purpose of checking the undue ascendancy of another Power. Of course, the knowledge that they held doctrines of this wide sort disqualified them from arguing with any effect against the war then impending. A man cannot have weight as an opponent of any particular war if he is one who is known to be against almost all war. It is vain for him to offer
to be moderate for the nonce, and to propose to argue the question in a way which his hearers will recognise. In vain he declares that for the sake of argument he will lay aside his own broad principles and mimic the reasonings of his hearers. Practical men know that his mind is under the sway of an antecedent determination which dispenses him from the more narrow but more important inquiry in which they are engaged. They will not give ear to one who is striving to lay down the conclusions which ought, as he says, to follow from other men's principles. He who altogether abjures the juice of the grape cannot usefully criticise the vintage of any particular year; and the man who is the steady adversary of wars in general, upon broad and paramount grounds, will never be regarded as a sound judge of the question whether any particular war is wicked or righteous, nor whether it is foolish or wise.

It must be added that there was another cause which tended to disqualify Mr Bright from taking an effective part in the maintenance of peace. For one who would undertake a task of that kind at a time when warlike ardour is prevailing in the country, it is above all things necessary that he should be a statesman so truly attached to what men mean when they talk of their country, and so jealous of its honour, that no man could ascribe his efforts in the cause of peace to motives which a warlike and high-spirited people would repudiate. Mr Bright sincerely desired the wel-
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fare of the traders and workmen of the United Kingdom; and if he desired the welfare of the other classes of the people with less intensity, it may fairly be believed that to all he wished to see justice done: so, if this worthy disposition of mind were equivalent to what a man calls his 'love of his country,' no one could fairly say that Mr Bright was without the passion. But in another, and certainly the old and the usual sense, a man's 'love of his country' is understood to represent something more than common benevolence towards the persons living within it. For if he be the citizen of an ancient State blessed with freedom, renowned in arms, and holding wide sway in the world, his love of his country means something of attachment to the institutions which have made her what she is—means something of pride in the long-suffering, and the battle, and the strife which have shed glory upon his countrymen in his own time, and upon their fathers in the time before him. It means that he feels his country's honour to be a main term and element of his own content. It means that he is bent upon the upholding of her dominion, and is so tempered as to become the sudden enemy of any man who, even though he be not an invader, still attempts to hack at her power. Now in this the heathen, but accustomed sense of the phrase, Mr Bright would be the last to say that he was a lover of his country. He would rather, perhaps, acknowledge that, taking 'his country' in that sense, he hated it. Yet at a time when the spirit
of the nation was up, no man could usefully strive to moderate or guide it unless his patriotism were believed to be exactly of that heathen sort which Mr Bright disapproved. Thus, by the nature of his patriotism, no less than by the immoderate width of his views on the lawfulness of wars, this powerful orator was so disabled as to be hindered from applying his strength towards the maintenance of peace.

The country was impassioned, but it was not so mad as to be deaf to precious counsels; and a statesman who had shown by his past life that he loved his country in the ancient way, and that he knew how to contemplate the eventuality of war with a calm and equal mind, might have won attention for views which questioned the necessity of the war then threatened; and if, in good time, he had brought to bear upon his opinions a sufficing power and knowledge, he might have altered the policy of his country.* But outside the Cabinet the real tenor of the negotiations of 1853 was still unknown; and Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone consenting to remain members of a

* This was in print before that curious and interesting confirmation of my statement—my statement of the relations between the Peace Party and their country—which Mr Cobden has since given to the world. Mr Cobden has said that at the time of the war neither he nor Mr Bright could win any attention to their views; and he added that he (Mr Cobden) will never again try to withstand a warlike ardour once kindled, because, when a people are inflamed in that way, they are no better than 'mad dogs.'—Speech in the autumn of 1862. He sees no defect in the principles of a Peace Party which is to suspend its operations in times of warlike excitement.
war-going Government, and Mr Cobden and Mr Bright being disqualified for useful debate by the nature of their opinions, no stand could be made.

By these steps, then, the English people passed from a seeming approval of the doctrines of the Peace Party to a state of warlike ardour; and it was plain that, if the Queen should send down to the Houses of Parliament a message importing war, the Royal appeal would be joyfully answered by an almost unanimous people.
CHAPTER VIII.

When the English Parliament assembled on the 31st of January, there was still going on in Europe a semblance of negotiation; but amongst men accustomed to the aspect of public affairs, there was hardly more than one who failed to see that France and England had gone too far to be able to recede, and that, by the very weight of their power and its inherent duties, they were now at last drawn into war. This condition of things was fairly enough disclosed by the Queen's Speech, and Parliament was asked to provide for an increase of the military and naval forces, with a view to give weight to the negotiations still pending. But the English Government was not suffered to forget its bond with the French Emperor; and the Prime Minister, whilst still indulging a hope of peace, consented to record and continue the error which had brought him to the verge of war. It seems that for good reasons it was of some moment to the French Emperor to be signally named in the Queen's Speech; and Lord Aberdeen again submitted to a form of words
which carefully distinguished the posture of France and England from that of the four Powers. The Queen was advised to say: 'I have continued 'to act in cordial co-operation with the Emperor 'of the French; and my endeavours in conjunc- 'tion with my Allies to preserve and to restore 'peace between the contending parties, although 'hitherto unsuccessful, have been unremitting.'

Like the similar paragraph which had marked the Royal Speech at the close of the preceding session, this phrase, strange as it was, gave a true though somewhat dim glimpse of the policy which was leading England astray. In principle she was marching along with all the rest of the four Powers, and yet all the while she was engaged with the French Emperor in a separate course of action. If the aims of Austria and Prussia had been seriously at variance with those of the Western Powers, this difference might have been a good reason for separate action on the part of France and England. But the contrary was true. So deep was the interest of Austria in the cause, and so closely were her views approved by Prussia, that although for several months France and Eng- land had been pressing forward in a way which seemed to endanger the coherence of the quad- ruple union, still even this dangerous course had hitherto failed to destroy the unanimity of the four Powers. If the French Emperor sought to use his alliance with England as a means of strengthening his hold over France, and if Eng- land was beginning to love the thought of war for
war's sake, Austria, from motives of a higher and more cogent sort (for she saw her interests vitally touched, and her safety threatened), was eager and determined to take such steps as might be needed for delivering the Principalities. Prussia agreed with her. It was nothing but the impatience and forwardness of France and England which relieved Austria from the necessity of taking the lead; for the wrong which had to be redressed was one from which she of all the great Powers was the most a sufferer; and she had the concurrence of Prussia not only in regard to the existing state of things, but even as to the ulterior objects of the war which her resolve might bring upon Germany.

The proofs of all this abound. By the repeated words of responsible statesmen, by despatches, by collective notes, by protocols, by solemn treaty of offensive and defensive alliance against Russia, by peremptory summons addressed to the Czar, and, finally (so far as concerns Austria), by the application of force, the German Powers disclosed and executed their policy; and the policy which they so disclosed and executed was the same policy as had been avowed by the Western Powers. It has been seen that in that early period of the troubles, when the Czar had scarce yet crossed the Pruth, Austria took upon herself to endeavour to form a league for forcing the Czar to relinquish the Principalities;* and from that hour down to

the time when Nicholas gave way and re-entered his own dominions, her efforts to bring about this end were unceasing and restless.

Of the spirit in which Austria was acting through all the early stages of the negotiations, many a proof has been already given. With time, her impatience of the Czar's intrusion upon her southern frontier increased and increased. It is true that she did not desire war: she anxiously wished to avoid it. She wished, if it were possible, to achieve the end without war, but to achieve it she was resolved; and if a vestige of the mediating character which had belonged to her in the summer of 1853, or her legitimate anxiety to spare the Czar's personal feelings, was a motive which tended to soften her language, it did not deflect her policy. Count Buol declared that although, in treating with Russia, 'more management of terms' * was required from Austria than from the Western Powers, the objects sought by all the four Powers were the same, and that they ought to be compassed by 'a general concordance in the way of putting them forward.' † But even the notion of using a gentler form of expression than the one employed by the Western Powers was quickly abandoned, and Austria found no difficulty in adopting the exact words of the collective Note framed by Lord Clarendon in concert with the French Government. So anxious was Austria to remain on the same ground with the rest of the four Powers, that she came into every term of

the firm and wise scheme of action laid down by
Lord Clarendon on the 16th of November,* and
bitterly offended the Czar by agreeing, at Lord
Clarendon's instance, that the Porte should not be
even asked to accept any condition which it
had already rejected, and by affirning the de-
termination of the four Powers to intervene in
any settlement of the dispute between Russia
and Turkey.

Prussia also gave her unreserved adhesion to
the plan of action laid down by Lord Clarendon,
and to the measures resulting from it. † By the
Protocol of the 5th of December 1853 both
Austria and Prussia joined with the Western
Powers in declaring that the existence of Turkey
in the limits assigned to it by existing treaties
was one of the necessary conditions of the Euro-
pean equilibrium.

By the Protocol of the 13th of January the
four Powers recorded their approval of the terms
agreed to by the Turkish Government, and re-
solved to submit them to the Court of St Peters-
burg. At the very time when the English Govern-
ment were framing the Speech from the Throne
which ostentatiously separated France and England from the rest of the four Powers, the two
great Courts of Germany were sending back Count
Orloff and Baron Budberg to St Petersburg, with
not only a decisive refusal to promise neutrality,
but also a plain avowal that Prussia and Aus-

† Ibid. part ii. p. 263. ‡ Ibid. p. 296.
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Triumph intended to remain faithful to the principles which the four Powers had adopted in concert. Prussia told Baron Budberg that she should have to devise means without Russia for maintaining the equilibrium of Europe. In significant words, the Emperor Francis Joseph told Count Orloff that he should have to be guided by the interests and the dignity of his Empire.

It is said that, by the tidings which forced him to know that he was alienated from the Austrian Emperor, the Czar was wounded deep. He had conceived a strong affection for Francis Joseph, and wherever he went he carried with him a small statuette which recalled to his mind the features of the youthful Kaiser. It would seem that his affection was of the kind which a loving and yet stern father bears his son, for it was joined with a sense of right to exact a great deference to his will. Nicholas had been strangely slow to believe that Francis Joseph could harbour the thought of opposing him in arms; and when at last the truth was forced upon him, he desired that the marble should be taken from his sight. But he did not, they say, speak in anger. When he had spoken, he covered his face with his hands and was wrung with grief.

What we are showing just now is the complete union of opinion which was existing between England and the two great Courts of Germany on the 31st of January 1854, and in order to this, we have already referred to a variety of diplomatic transactions coming down to the time in question;
but the policy of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin at the close of the month of January is to be inferred, of course, from the transactions which followed this date, as well as from those which preceded it; and therefore it seems convenient to go forward, as it were, a few paces in advance of the general narrative, so as thus to bring under one view the grounds on which I assert that our Government was well supported in its policy by Prussia as well as by Austria.

Day by day the joint pressure of the four Powers became more cogent. By the Protocol of the 2d of February the four Powers unanimously rejected the counter-propositions made by Russia. On the 14th of March both Austria and Prussia addressed circulars to the Courts of the German Confederation, in which they pointed out that the interests in question were essentially German interests, and that the active co-operation of Germany might be needed. On the 18th of March the King of Prussia asked his Chamber for an extraordinary credit of thirty million of thalers; and he at the same time declared that he would not swerve from the principles established by the Vienna Conference, and would faithfully protect every member of the Confederation who, at an earlier moment than Prussia, might be called on to draw the sword for the defence of German interests.

Nor were these bare words. Austria, it has been already said, was so placed that, whatever dangers she might draw upon her other frontiers,
she could act with irresistible pressure upon the invader of the Principalities. On the 6th and 22d of February she reinforced her army on the frontier of Wallachia by 50,000 men, and thus placed the Russian army of occupation completely at her mercy. On the day when she sent that last reinforcement into the Banat, she had grown so impatient of the further continuance of the Russians in the Principalities that she actually pressed France and England to summon Russia to quit the Principalities under pain of a declaration of war, and undertook to support their summons.* Prussia was approving; and on the 25th, Baron Manteuffel wrote to Count Arnim at Vienna 'on the subject of a more decided policy which it was supposed the Austrian Government was about to adopt in the affairs of the East, and expressed the satisfaction of the Prussian Government at the interests of Germany on the Danube being likely to be so warmly espoused.'† On the 2d of March the French Emperor had so little doubt of the concurrence of Austria and Germany, that he announced it in his speech from the Throne. 'Germany,' said he, 'has recovered her independence, and has looked freely to see whither her true interests led her. Austria especially, who cannot see with indifference the events going on, will join our alliance, and will thus come to confirm the morality and justice of the war which we undertake. We go to Constantinople with Germany.'

* 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 53.  
† Ibid. p. 60.
On the 20th of March the four Powers were so well agreed that, when Greece sought to make a diversion in favour of Russia, the representatives of Austria, Prussia, France, and England, all joined in a collective Note, which called upon the Greek Government, in terms approaching menace, to give way to the demands of the Porte. On the very day which followed the English declaration of war, the Emperor of Austria appointed the Archduke Albert to the command of the forces on the frontier of Wallachia, and at the same time the 'Third Army' was put upon the war footing. A little later,* the Emperor of Austria ordered a new levy of 95,000 men for the defence of his frontiers. Later still, but within one day† of the time when France and England were making their alliance, Austria and Prussia joined with France and England in a Protocol, which not only recorded the fact that the hostile step then just taken by France and England was 'supported by Austria and Prussia as being founded in right,' but went on to declare that, 'at that solemn moment the Governments of the four Powers remained united in their object of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, of which the fact of the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is and will remain one of the essential conditions;' and that 'the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is and remains the sine qua non condition of every transaction having for its object the re-establishment of peace between the

* May 15. † April 9, 1854.
"belligerent Powers." Finally, the Protocol stipulated that none of the "four Powers should enter into any definitive arrangement with the "Imperial Court of Russia which should be at variance with the principles declared by the "Protocol without first deliberating thereon in "common."*

On the 20th of April Austria and Prussia contracted with each other an offensive and defensive alliance, by which they guaranteed to each other all their respective possessions, so that an attack upon the territory of one should be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory, and engaged to hold a part of their forces in perfect readiness for war. By the Second Article they declared that they stood "engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and to consider themselves bound accordingly for the mutual repulse of every attack on any part whatsoever of their territories; likewise, also, in the case where one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the others, obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interests."†

By the Additional Article they declared "that the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the territories on the Lower Danube, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, by imperial Russian troops, would endanger the political, moral, and material interests of the

* "Eastern Papers," part viii. p. 2. † Ibid. part ix. p. 3.
whole German Confederation as also of their own States, and the more so as Russia extends her warlike operations on Turkish territory;’ and then went on to stipulate ‘that the Austrian Government should address a communication to the Russian Court, with the object of obtaining from the Emperor of Russia the necessary orders for putting an immediate stop to the further advance of his armies upon the Turkish territory, as also to request of His Imperial Majesty sufficient guarantees for the prompt evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, and that the Prussian Government should again, in the most energetic manner, support these communications.’ Finally, the high contracting parties agreed that, ‘if, contrary to expectation, the answer of the Russian Court should not be of a nature to give them entire satisfaction, the measures to be taken by one of the contracting parties, according to the terms of Article II. signed on that day, would be on the understanding that every hostile attack on the territory of one of the contracting parties should be repelled with all the military forces at the disposal of the other.’ *

Of the intent and the meaning of this treaty, and the use which Austria and Prussia were about to make of it, no doubt could exist. Failing the peremptory summons which was to be addressed to Russia, the forces of Austria alone were to execute the easy task of expelling the

* ‘Eastern Papers,’ part x.
troops of the Czar from the Principalities; and in order to withstand the vengeance which this step might provoke, Austria and Prussia together stood leagued.

By the Protocol of the 23d of May, the four Powers declared that both the Anglo-French treaty and the Austro-Prussian treaty bound the parties, in the relative situations to which they applied, to secure the same common object—namely, the evacuation of the Principalities and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.*

Now the mind and the solemn determination of Austria and Prussia being such as are shown by the Protocol of the 9th and the treaty of the 20th April, where was there such a difference of opinion—where was there even such a shadow of a difference—as to justify the Western States in pushing forward and separating themselves from the rest of the four Powers? The avowed principles and objects of the four Powers were exactly the same. If they had acted together, the very weight of their power would have given them an almost judicial authority, and would have enabled them to enforce the cause of right without wounding the pride of the disturber, and without inflicting war upon Europe.

Was Austria backward? Was she so little prone to action that it was necessary for the Western Powers to move to the front and fight her battles for her? The reverse is the truth. The Western Powers, indeed, were more impatient

than Germany was to go through the forms which were necessary for bringing themselves legally into a state of war, but for action of a serious kind they were not yet ready. Whilst they were only preparing, Austria was applying force. On the 3d of June, with the full support of Prussia, she summoned the Emperor Nicholas to evacuate the Principalities. Her summons was the summons of a Power having an army on the edge of the province into which the Russian forces had been rashly extended. Such a summons was a mandate. The Czar could not disobey it. He could not stand in Wallachia when he was called upon to quit the province by a Power which had assembled its forces upon his flank and rear. He sought, indeed, to make terms, but the German Powers were peremptory. On the 14th Austria entered into a convention with the Porte, which not only legalised her determination to drive the Russian forces from the Principalities, and to occupy them with her own troops, but which formally joined Austria in an alliance with the Porte against Russia; for, by the 1st Article of the convention, the Emperor of Austria 'engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in case they are required, the number of troops necessary to attain this end.'* And since Russia could not invade European Turkey by land without marching

* 'Eastern Papers,' part xii.
through the Principalities, this undertaking by Austria involved an engagement to free the Sultan's land frontiers in Europe from Russian invasion. Exactly at the same time * Austria and Prussia addressed notes to the Powers represented at the Conference of Bamberg, in which the liberation of the commerce and navigation of the Danube was held out to Germany as the object to be attained.

Austria was upon the brink of war with Russia, was preparing to take forcible possession of the Principalities, and had despatched an officer to the English headquarters with a view to concert a joint scheme of military operations, when the Czar at length gave way, and abandoned the whole of the territory which, under the nauseous description of a 'material guarantee,' had become the subject of war. Other causes, as will be seen, were conducing to this result; but none were so cogent as the forcible pressure which Austria had exerted, by first assembling forces in the Banat and then summoning the Czar to withdraw from the invaded provinces.

Of course, when the object which called forth the German Powers was attained, and when it transpired (as it did at the same time) that the Western Powers were resolved to abandon the common field of action, and to undertake the invasion by sea of a distant Russian province inaccessible to Austria and Prussia, then at last, and then for the first time, the German Powers found

* 14th and 16th June.
that their interests were parting them from the great maritime States of the West; for in one and the same week they were relieved from the grievance which was their motive for action, and deprived of all hope of support from the Western Powers; but it is certain that from the moment when the Czar first seized the Principalities to that in which he recrossed the Pruth, the determination of Austria to put an end to the intrusion was never languid, and was always increasing in force. It is certain, also, that up to the time when the relinquishment of the Principalities began, there was no defection on the part of Prussia;* and that the minor States of Germany, fully alive to the importance of a struggle which promised to free the great outlet of the Danube from Russian dominion, were resolved to support Austria and Prussia with the troops of the Confederation.†

* Prussia began to hang back, it seems, on about the 21st of July (‘Eastern Papers,' part xi. p. 1); and this was exactly the time when her interests counselled her to do so; for by that day she knew that the deliverance of the Principalities was secured and in process of execution, and had also, no doubt, learned of the determination of the Western Powers to move their forces to the Crimea, thereby uncovering Germany. Austria, with similar motives for separation, was less inclined to part from the Western Powers. See her Note of the 8th August 1854, and the various diplomatic transactions in which she took part down to the close of the war.

† 20th July 1854. The relinquishment of the Principalities virtually began on the 26th of June—the day when the siege of Silistria was raised—and before the end of July the Russian forces had quitted the capital of Wallachia. On the 2d of August they repassed the Pruth.
As soon as the Principalities were relinquished by the Czar they were occupied by Austrian troops, in pursuance of the convention with the Porte; and thus the outrage, which during twelve months had disturbed the tranquillity of Europe, was then at last finally repressed.
CHAPTER IX.

For the sake of bringing under one view the course of action followed by the German Powers down to the moment when their object was achieved by the deliverance of the Principalities, it has been necessary, as we have said, to go forward in advance of the period reached by the main thread of the narrative. The subject thus quitted for a moment and now resumed is the policy which was disclosed by the English Government upon the opening of Parliament.

Distinct from the martial ardour already kindled in England, there had sprung up amongst the people an almost romantic craving for warlike adventure, and this feeling was not slow to reach the Cabinet. Now, without severance from the German Powers, there could plainly be little prospect of adventure; for, besides that the German monarchs desired to free the Principalities with as little resort to hostilities as might be compatible with the attainment of the end, it was almost certain that the policy of keeping up the perfect union and co-operation of the four Powers
would prevent war by its overwhelming force. Like the power of the law, it would operate by coercion, and not by clangour of arms. This was a merit; but it was a merit fatal to its reception in England. The popularity of such a policy was nearly upon the same modest level as the popularity of virtue. All whose volitions were governed by the imagined rapture of freeing Poland, or destroying Cronstadt and lording it with our flag in the Baltic, or taking the command of the Euxine, and sinking the Russian fleet under the guns of Sebastopol; all who meant to raise Circassia, and cut off the Muscovite from the glowing South by holding the Dariel Pass, and those also who dwelt in fancy upon deeds to be done on the shores of the Caspian;—all these, and many more, saw plainly enough that separation from the German Powers and alliance with the new Bonaparte was the only road to adventure. Lord Aberdeen was not one of these, but it was his fate to act as though he were. He was not without a glimmering perception that the firmly maintained union of the four Powers meant peace;* but he saw the truth dimly; and, there being a certain slowness in his high intellectual nature, he was not so touched by his belief as to be able to make it the guide of his action. He seems to have gone on imagining that, consistently with the maintenance of a perfect union of the four Powers there might be a separate and still more perfect union between two of them,

* 129 Hansard, p. 1050.
and that this kind of alliance within alliance was a structure not fatal—nay, even perhaps conducive—to peace.

And, after all, England was not free: she was bound to the French Emperor. No treaty of alliance had been signed, but the understanding disclosed in the summer of the year before was still riveted upon the members of the English Government. They had been drawn into a weighty engagement in 1853, and now they had to perform it. In the midst of perfect concord between her and her three allies, England had to stand forward with one of them in advance of the rest, and thus ruin that security for the maintenance of peace which depended upon the united action of the four great Powers. As the price of his consenting to join reluctant France in an alliance with Turkey, the French Emperor was justly entitled to insist on the other terms of the bond, and not only to be signally coupled with England in a course of action which was to separate her from the great German States, but to have it blazoned out to the world beforehand that, distinctly from the concord of the four Powers, the Queen of England and he were acting together. The Royal Speech of January 1854 was as clear in this as the Speech of the previous August. Both disclosed a separate understanding with the French Emperor. In both, as any one could see who was used to State writings, the mark was set upon England with the same branding-iron.
To a man looking back upon the past, it seems strange that a Cabinet of English Statesmen could have been led to adopt this singular policy. It would seem that, with many of the Cabinet, the tendency of the measures which they were sanctioning was concealed from them by the gentleness of the incline on which they moved; and if there were some of them who had a clearer view of their motives, it must be inferred that they acted upon grounds not yet disclosed to the world. Of course, what the welfare of the State required was a Ministry which shared and honoured the public feeling, without being so carried down by it as to lose the statesman’s power of understanding and controlling events. But this was not given. Of the bulk of the Cabinet, and possibly of all of them except one, Lord Clarendon’s pithy phrase was the true one. They drifted. Wishing to control events, they were controlled by them. They aimed to go in one direction; but, lapsing under the pressure of forces external and misunderstood, they always went in the other.

The statesman who went his own way was one whose share in the governance of events was not much known. He was supposed to be under a kind of ostracism. He had not been banished from England, nor even from the Cabinet; but, holding office under a Prime Minister whose views upon foreign policy were much opposed to his own, and relegated to duties connected with the peaceful administration of justice, it seemed to the
eye of the common observer that for the time he was annulled; and the humorous stories which floated about Whitehall went to show that the deposed Lord of Foreign Affairs had consented to forget his former greatness and to accept his Home Office duties in a spirit of half-cynical, half-joyous disdain, but without the least discontent. And, in truth, he had no ground for ill-humour. In politics, he was without vanity. What he cared for was power, and power he had. Indeed, circumstance as he was, at the time when he chose to accept the Home Office, he must have known that one of the main conditions of his ascendant in foreign affairs was the general belief that he had none. The light of the past makes it easy to see that the expedient of trying to tether him down in the Home Office would alleviate his responsibility and increase his real power. To those who know anything of Lord Palmerston’s intellectual strength, of his boldness, his vast and concentrated energy, his instinct for understanding the collective mind of a body of men and of a whole nation, and, above all, his firm robust will; nay, even to those who only know of his daring achievements—achievements half peaceful, half warlike, half righteous, half violent, in many lands and on many a sea—the notion of causing him to be subordinated to Lord Aberdeen in Foreign Affairs seems hardly more sound than a scheme providing that the greater shall be contained in the less. Statesmen on the Continent would easily understand this, for they had lived for
many a year under the cares brought upon them by his strenuous nature; but up to the time I am speaking of, he had not been called upon to apply his energies in any very conspicuous way to the domestic affairs of England. Besides, he had been more seen in his own country than abroad, and for that very reason he was less known, because there was much upon the mere outside which tended to mask his real nature. His partly Celtic blood, and perhaps too, in early life, his boyish consciousness of power, had given him a certain elation of manner and bearing which kept him for a long time out of the good graces of the more fastidious part of the English world. The defect was toned down by age, for it lay upon the surface only, and in his inner nature there was nothing vulgar nor unduly pretending. Still, the defect made people slow—made them take forty years—to recognise the full measure of his intellectual strength. Moreover, the English had so imperfect a knowledge of the stress which he had long been putting upon foreign Governments, that the mere outward signs which he gave to his countrymen at home—his frank speech, his off-hand manner, his ready banter, his kind, joyous, beaming eyes—were enough to prevent them from accustoming themselves to look upon him as a man of stern purpose. Upon the whole, notwithstanding his European fame, it was easy for him at this time to escape grave attention in England.

He was not a man who would come to a subject with which he was dealing for the first time.
with any great store of preconceived opinions, but he wrote so strenuously—he always, they say, wrote standing—and was apt to be so much struck with the cogency of his own arguments, that by the mere process of framing despatches he wrought himself into strong convictions, or rather perhaps into strong resolves; and he clung to these with such a lasting tenacity that, if he had been a solemn, austere personage, the world would have accused him of pedantry. Like most gifted men who evolve their thoughts with a pen, he was very clear, very accurate. Of every subject which he handled gravely, he had a tight, iron-grasp. Without being inflexible, his will, it has been already said, was powerful, and it swung with a great momentum in one direction until, for some good and sound reason, it turned and swung in another. He pursued one object at a time without being distracted by other game. All that was fanciful, or for any reason unpractical—all that was the least bit too high for him or the least bit too deep for him—all that lay, though only by a little, beyond the immediate future with which he was dealing—he utterly drove from out of his mind; and his energies, condensed for the time upon some object to which they could be applied with effect, were brought to bear upon it with all their full volume and power. So, during the whole period of his reign at the Foreign Office, Lord Palmerston's method had been to be very strenuous in the pursuit of the object which might be needing care at any given time without suffer-
ing himself to be embarrassed by what men call a "comprehensive" view of our foreign policy; and although it was no doubt his concentrative habit of mind and his stirring temperament which brought him into this course of action, he was much supported in it by the people at home; for when no enterprise is on foot, the bulk of the English are prone to be careless of the friendship of foreign States, and are often much pleased when they are told that by reason of the activity of their Foreign Secretary they are without an ally in Europe.

Other statesmen had been accustomed to think that the principle which ought in general to determine the closeness of our relations with foreign States was 'community of interests'; and that in proportion as this principle was departed from under the varied impulses of philanthropy or other like motives, disturbance, isolation, and danger would follow; but Lord Palmerston had never suffered this maxim to interfere with any special object which he might chance to have in hand at the moment, nor even with his desire to spread abroad the blessings of constitutional government.

As long as Lord Grey was at the head of the Government, the energy of the Foreign Office was kept down; and even after the first five years of Lord Melbourne's Administration, the disruption towards which it was tending had made so little way, that when in 1840 the Ottoman Empire was threatened with ruin by France and her Egyptian
ally, Lord Palmerston, with a majority of only two or three in the House of Commons, but having a bold heart and a firm, steady hand, had been able to gather up the elements of the great alliance of 1814, and to prevent a European war by the very might and power and swiftness with which he executed his policy; but at the end of eleven more years, when his career at the Foreign Office was drawing to a close, his energy had cleared a space round him, and he seemed to be left standing alone.*

His system by that time had fairly disclosed its true worth. Pursued with great vigour and skill, it had brought results corresponding with the numerous aims of its author, but corresponding also with his avowed disregard of a general guiding principle. Without breaking the general peace of Europe, it had produced a long series of diplomatic enterprises, pushed on in most instances to a successful issue; but, on the other hand, it had ended by making the Foreign Office an object of distrust, and in that way withdrawing England from her due place in the composition of the European system; for the good old safe clue of 'community of interests' being visibly

* It is not forgotten that during a large portion of this last period Lord Aberdeen was at the Foreign Office, but he was of course much bound by what his predecessors had been doing before him; and, speaking roughly, it may be said that, from the spring of 1835 until the close of 1851, our foreign policy bore the impress of Lord Palmerston's mind. In the period between November 1830 and the autumn of 1834, it was much governed by the then Prime Minister, Lord Grey.
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discarded, no Power, however closely bound to us by the nature of things, could venture to rely upon our friendship. States whose interests in great European questions were exactly the same as our own, States which had always looked to the welfare and strength of England as main conditions of their own safety, found no more favour with us than those who consumed much of their revenue in preparing implements for the slaughter of Englishmen and the sinking of English ships. They were therefore obliged to shape their policy upon the supposition that any slight matter in which the Foreign Office might chance to be interesting itself at the moment—nay, even a difference of opinion upon questions of internal government (and this, be it remembered, was an apple which could always be thrown)—would be enough to make England repulse them. From this cause, perhaps, more than from any other, there had sprung up in Germany that semblance of close friendship with the court of St Petersburg which had helped to allure the Czar into dangerous paths.

From the Emperor Nicholas Lord Palmerston was cut off, not only by differences arising out of questions on which the policy of Russia and of England might naturally clash, but also because he was looked upon as the promoter of doctrines which the Court of St Petersburg was accustomed to treat as revolutionary. Even to Austria, although we were close bound to her by common interests, although there was no one national
interest which tended to divide us from her, he had in this way become antagonistic. He had too much lustiness of mind, too much simplicity of purpose, to be capable of living on terms of close intelligence with the philosophical statesmen of Berlin. To the accustomed foreign policy of French statesmen—in other words, to the France that he had been used to encounter in the Foreign Office—he was adverse by very habit. He spurned the whole invention of the French Republic. But his favourite hatred of all was his hatred of the House of Bourbon.* In short, by the 1st of December 1851, though still at the Foreign Office, he had become isolated in Europe. But fortune smiles on bold men. The next night Prince Louis Bonaparte and his fellow-venturers destroyed the French Republic, superseded the Bourbons, and suppressed France. Plainly this Prince and Lord Palmerston were men who could act together—could act together until the Prince should advise himself to deceive the English Minister. Not longer: not an hour beyond the time when the momentous promise which was made, if I mistake not, before the events of December, should remain unbroken.

So when the Czar began to encroach upon the Sultan, there was nothing that could so completely meet Lord Palmerston’s every wish as an alliance between the two Western Powers, which should toss France headlong into the Eng-

* This feeling probably drew its origin from the business of the ‘Spanish Marriages.’
lish Policy of upholding the Ottoman Empire; and the price of this was a price which, far from grudging, he would actually delight to pay; for, desiring to have the Governments of France and England actively united together for an English object—desiring to prevent a revival of the French Republic—and, above all, to prevent a restoration of the House of Bourbon—he was only too glad to be able to strengthen the new Emperor's hold upon France by exalting his personal station, and giving him the support of a close, separate, and published alliance with the Queen of England. And in regard to the dislocation which such a new policy might work, he seems not to have set so high a value upon the existing framework of the European system as to believe that its destruction would be a portentous evil. If he thought it an evil at all, he thought it one which a strong man might repair.

Lord Palmerston had been at the head of the Foreign Office during so many years of his life, and he had brought to bear upon its duties an activity so restless, and (upon the whole) so much steadfastness of purpose, that the more recent foreign policy of England, whether it had been right or whether it had been wrong, was in him almost incarnate. It was obvious, therefore, that whilst he was in the Cabinet, he would always be resorted to for counsel upon foreign affairs by any of his colleagues who were not divided from him by strong difference of opinion, by political antagonism, or by personal dislike. Again, it was
scarcely wise to believe that the relations which had subsisted between Lord Palmerston and the President of the French Republic would be closed by the fact that they had led to Lord Palmerston’s dismissal from the Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs. On the contrary, it was to be inferred that communications of a most friendly kind would continue to pass between the French Emperor and an English Minister who had suffered for his sake; and the very same manliness of disposition which would prevent him from engaging in anything like an underhand intrigue against his colleagues, would make him refuse to sit dumb when, in words brought him fresh from the Tuileries, an ambassador came to talk to him of the Eastern Question—came to tell him that the new Emperor had an unbounded confidence in his judgment, wished to be governed by his counsels, and, in short, would dispose of poor France as the English Minister wished.

Here, then, was the real bridge by which French overtures of the more secret and delicate sort would come from over the Channel. Here was the bridge by which England’s acceptance or rejection of all such overtures would go back to France.

Thus, from the ascendancy of his strong nature, from his vast experience, and from his command of the motive power which he could bring at any moment from Paris, Lord Palmerston, even so early as the spring of 1853, was the most puissant member of Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet; and when,
with all these sources of strength, he began to draw support from a people growing every day more and more warlike, he gained a complete dominion. If, after the catastrophe of Sinope, his colleagues had persevered in their attempt to resist him, he would have been able to overthrow them with ease upon the meeting of Parliament.

Therefore, in the transactions which brought on the war, Lord Palmerston was not drifting; he was joyfully laying his course. Whither he meant to go, thither he went; whither he chose that others should tend, thither they bent their reluctant way. If some immortal were to offer the surviving members of Lord Aberdeen's Government the privilege of retracing their steps with all the light of experience, every one of them perhaps, with only a single exception, would examine the official papers of 1853, in order to see where he could most wisely diverge from the course which the Cabinet took. Lord Palmerston would do nothing of the kind. What he had done before he would do again.

Lord Palmerston's plan of masking the warlike tendency of the Government was an application to politics of an ingenious contrivance which the Parisians used to employ in some of their street engagements with the soldiery. The contrivance was called a 'live barricade.' A body of the insurgents would seize the mayor of the arrondissement, and a priest (if they could get one), and also one or two respectable bankers devoted to the cause of peace and order. These prisoners, each
forced to walk arm-in-arm between able-bodied combatants, were marched in front of a body of insurgents, which boldly advanced towards a spot where a battalion of infantry might be drawn up in close column of companies; but when they got to within hailing distance, one of the insurgents gifted with a loud voice would shout out to the troops: 'Soldiers! respect the cause of order! 'Don't fire on Mr Mayor! Respect property! 'Don't level your country's muskets at one who 'is a man and a brother, and also a respectable 'banker! Soldiers! for the love of God don't 'imbrue your hands in the blood of this holy 'priest!' Confused by this appeal, and shrinking, as was natural, from the duty of killing peaceful citizens, the battalion would hesitate, and meantime the column of the insurgents, covered always by its live barricade, would rapidly advance and crowd in upon the battalion, and break its structure and ruin it. It was thus that Lord Palmerston had the skill to protrude Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone, and keep them standing forward in the van of a Ministry which was bringing the country into war. No one could assail Lord Palmerston's policy without striking at him through men whose conscientious attachment to the cause of peace was beyond the reach of cavil.

In the debates which took place upon the Address, the speeches of the unofficial members of Parliament in both Houses disclosed a strange want of acquaintance with the character and spirit of the negotiations which had been going on for
the last eight months. Confiding in the peaceful tendency of a Government headed by Lord Aberdeen, and having Mr Gladstone for one of its foremost members, Mr Bright, in the summer of 1853, had deprecated all discussion; and, under his encouragement, the Government, after some hesitation, determined to withhold the production of the papers. With the lights which he then had, Mr Bright was perhaps entitled to believe that the course he took was the right one, and the intention of the Government was not only honest, but in some degree self-sacrificing; for it cannot be doubted that the disclosure of the able and high-spirited despatches of Lord Clarendon would have raised the Government in public esteem. It is now certain, however, that the disclosure of the papers in the August of 1853 would have enabled the friends of peace to take up a strong ground, to give a new turn to opinion whilst yet there was time, and to save themselves from the utter discomfiture which they underwent in the interval between the prorogation and the meeting of Parliament.

The Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen was not famous for its power of preventing the leakage of State matters; but the common indiscretion by which simple facts are noised abroad does not suffice to disclose the general tenor and bearing of a long and intricate negotiation. Besides, in the absence of means of authentic knowledge, there were circumstances which raised presumptions opposite to the truth. Of course the chief of these was
the retention of office by two men whose attachment to the cause of peace was believed to be passionately strong; but it chanced, moreover, that publicity had been given to a highly-spirited and able despatch, the production of the French Foreign Office; and since there had transpired no proof of a corresponding energy on the part of England, it was wrongly inferred that Lord Aberdeen's Government were hanging back. Accordingly, Ministers were taunted for this supposed fault by almost all the speakers in either House. What the Government were chargeable with was an undue forwardness in causing England to join with France alone in the performance of a duty which was European in its nature, and devolving in the first instance upon Austria. What they were charged with was a want of readiness to do that which they had done. Therefore every one who spoke against the Ministry was committing himself to opinions which (as soon as their real course of action should be disclosed) would involve him in an approval of their policy.

But now at last, and within a day or two from the conclusion of the debate on the Address, some of the papers relating to the negotiations of 1853 and the preceding years were laid upon the table of both Houses. As soon as the more devoted friends of peace were able to read these documents, and in some degree to comprehend their scope and bearing, they began to see how their cause had fared under the official guardian-
ship of Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone. They began to see that for near eight months the Government had been following a course of action which was gently leading towards war. They did not, however, make out the way in which the deflection began. They did not see that the way in which the Government had lapsed from the paths of peace, was by quitting the common ground of the four Powers for the sake of a closer union with one, and by joining with the French Emperor in making a perverse use of the fleets.

Mr Cobden fastened upon the 'Vienna Note,' and, with his views, he was right in drawing attention to the apparent narrowness of the difference upon which the question of peace or war was made to depend; but he surely betrayed a want of knowledge of the way in which the actions of mankind are governed when he asked that a country now glowing with warlike ardour should go back and try to obtain peace by resuming a form of words which its Government had solemnly repudiated four months before. Of course this effort failed: it could not be otherwise. Any one acquainted with the tenor of the negotiations, and with enough of the surrounding facts to make the papers intelligible, may be able to judge whether there were not better grounds than this for making a stand against the war. The evil demanding redress was the intrusion of the Russian forces into Wallachia and Moldavia; and it would seem that the judgment
to be pronounced by Parliament upon a Government which had led their country to the brink of war should have been made to depend upon this question:

Was it practicable for England to obtain the deliverance of the Principalities by means taken in common with the rest of the four Powers, and without resorting to the expedient of a separate understanding with the French Emperor?*

It may be that to this question the surviving members of Lord Aberdeen’s Administration can establish a negative answer, but in order to do this they will have to make use of knowledge not hitherto disclosed to Parliament.

A belief, nay, even a suspicion, that there was danger of a sudden alliance between the French Emperor and the Czar, would gravely alter the conditions upon which Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet was called upon to form its judgment; but, so far as the outer world knows, no fear of this kind was coercing the Government. Upon the papers as they stand, it seems clear that, by remaining upon the ground occupied by the four Powers, England would have obtained the deliverance of the Principalities without resorting to war.

* It will be interesting to know what light the further researches of the Prince Consort’s biographer may be able to throw upon this stage of the transactions.
CHAPTER X.

The last of the steps which brought on the rupture between Russia and the Western Powers was perhaps one of the most anomalous transactions which the annals of diplomacy have recorded. The outrage to be redressed was the occupation by Russia of Wallachia and Moldavia. Of all the States of Europe, except Turkey itself, the one most aggrieved by this occupation was Austria. Now Austria was one of the great Powers of Europe. She was essentially a military State; she was the mistress of a vast and well-appointed army; she was the neighbour of Russia. Geographically, she was so placed that (whatever perils she might bring upon her other frontiers) her mere order to her officer commanding her army of observation would necessarily force the Czar to withdraw his troops. On the other hand, France and England, though justly offended by the outrage, and though called upon in their character as two of the great Powers to concur in fit measures for suppressing it, were far from being brought into any grievous stress by the occupation of the
far-distant Principalities; and moreover, the evil, such as it was, was one which they could not dispel by any easy or simple application of force.

It was in this condition of things that Austria suddenly conveyed to France, and through France to England, the intimation of the 22d of February. In conversation with Baron de Bourqueny, Count Buol said: 'If England and France will fix a day for the evacuation of the Principalities, the expiration of which shall be the signal for hostilities, the Cabinet of Vienna will support the summons.' The telegraph conveyed the tenor of this intimation to London on the same day. Naturally, it was to be expected that Austria would join in a summons which she invited other Powers to send; and to this hour it seems hardly possible to believe that the Emperor of Austria deliberately intended to ask France and England to fix a day for going to war without meaning to go to war himself at the same time. Lord Clarendon, however, asked the question. Apparently he was not answered in terms corresponding with his question, but he was again told that Austria would 'support' the summons. Then, all at once, and without stipulating for the concurrence of the Power which was pressing them into action, the Governments of France and England prepared the instruments which were to bring them into a state of war with Russia.

Austria at this period had plainly resolved to go to war if the Principalities should not be relin-

* 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 53.
quished by the Czar; but, before she could take the final step, it was necessary for her to come to an understanding with Prussia. This she succeeded in doing within twenty-four hours from the period of the final rupture between Russia and the Western Powers; but France and England could not bear to wait. The French Emperor, rebuffed by the Czar in his endeavour to appear as the pacificator of Europe, was driven to the opposite method of diverting France from herself; and, although the crisis was one in which a little delay and a little calmness would have substituted the coercive action of the four Powers for an adventurous war by the two, he once more goaded our Government on, and pressed it to concur with him in sending forthwith to Russia a hostile, imperative summons. M. Drouyn de Lhuys declared that, in his opinion, the sending of the proposed summons was a business which 'should be done immediately, and that the two Governments 'should write to Count Nesselrode to demand 'the immediate' withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Principalities—'the whole to 'be concluded by a given time, say the end of 'March.' *

It must be owned, however, that the English people were pressing their Government in the same direction. Inflamed with a longing for naval glory in the Baltic, they had become tormented with a fear lest their Admiral should be hindered from great achievements for want of the mere legal

* 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 53.
formality which was to constitute a state of war. The majority of the Cabinet, though numbering on their side several of the foremost statesmen of the day, were collectively too weak to help being driven by the French Emperor, too weak to help being infected by the warlike eagerness of the people, too weak to resist the strong man who was amongst them, yet in one sense alone. It is likely enough that statesmen so gifted as some of them were, must have had better grounds for their way of acting than have been hitherto disclosed; but to one who only judges from the materials communicated to Parliament, it seems plain that at this time they had lost their composure.

By the summons despatched on the part of England, Lord Clarendon informed Count Nesselrode that, unless the Russian Government, within six days from the delivery of the summons, should send an answer engaging to withdraw all its troops from the Principalities by the 30th of April, its refusal or omission so to do would be regarded by England as a declaration of war. This summons was in accordance with the suggestion of Austria; and what might have been expected was, that the Western Powers, in acceding to her wish, should do so upon the understanding that she concurred in the measure which she herself proposed, and that they would consult her as to the day on which it would be convenient for her to enter into a state of war; in other words, that they would consult her as to the day on which a continued refusal to quit the Principalities should
bring the Czar into a state of war with Austria, France, and England. Instead of taking this course, Lord Clarendon forwarded the summons (not as a draft or project, but as a document already signed and complete) to the Court of Vienna, and it was despatched by a messenger, who (after remaining for only a 'few hours' in the Austrian capital) was to carry on the summons to St Petersburg. Therefore Austria was made aware that, whether she was willing to defend her own interests or not, England was irrevocably committed to defend them for her; and instead of requiring that Austria should take part in the step which she herself had advised, Lord Westmoreland was merely instructed to express a hope that the summons 'would meet with the approval' of the Austrian Cabinet, and that their opinion of it would be made known by Count Buol to the Cabinet of St Petersburg. Such a step as this on the part of Austria was preposterously short of what the Western Powers would have had a right to expect from her, if they had been a little less eager for hostilities, and had consulted her as to the time for coming to a rupture.

Of course, the impatience of France and England was ruinous to the principle of maintaining concert between the four Powers, and yet had not the merit of springing from any sound military views. It is true that the Western Powers were sending troops to the Levant, and fitting out fleets for the Baltic; but there was nothing in the state of their preparations, nor in the position
of the respective forces, which could justify their eagerness to accelerate the declaration of war.

It chanced that, simultaneously with the arrival of the English messenger at Vienna, there came thither from St Petersburg the counter-propositions of Russia. Count Buol saw the importance of disposing of these before the summons went on to St Petersburg; so, after persuading Lord Westmoreland to detain the English messenger, he instantly assembled the Conference of the four Powers. By this Conference the counter-propositions of Russia were unanimously rejected,* and the bearer of the summons carried this decision of the four Powers to St Petersburg, together with a despatch from the Austrian Government, instructing Count Esterhazy to support the summons, and throwing upon Russia the responsibility of the impending war.† The despatch, however, fell short of announcing that the refusal to quit the Principalities would place the Czar in a state of war with Austria as well as with the Western Powers. Prussia supported the summons in language corresponding with the language of the Vienna Cabinet. Baron Manteuffel's despatch to St Petersburg 'was drawn up in very pressing language. It urged the Russian Government to consider the dangers to which the peace of the world would be exposed by a refusal, and de-

* 'The Conference unanimously agreed that it was impossible to proceed with those propositions.'—Protocol of Conference of March 5. 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 80.
† 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 64.
clared that the responsibility of the war which 'might be the consequence of that refusal would rest with the Emperor.' *

The summons addressed by France to the Russian Government was in the same terms as the summons despatched by Lord Clarendon, and was forwarded at the same time.

After receiving the summons of the two Governments, Count Nesselrode took the final orders of his master, and then informed the Consuls of France and England that the Emperor did not think fit to send any answer to their notes. A refusal to answer was one of the events which, under the terms of the announcement contained in the summons, was to be regarded by the Western Powers as a declaration of war. This refusal was uttered by Count Nesselrode on the 19th of March 1854. The peace between the great Powers of Europe had lasted more than thirty-eight years, and now at length it was broken.†

* 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 72.
† A writer in one of the Reviews said that the state of war did not begin until the declarations of the Western Powers were issued; but that is a mistake. What brought the Western Powers into a state of war, was the Czar's refusal to answer the summons; for the moment that refusal was given, it became, in the mind of the Western Powers, as announced by the express words of their summons, a constructive declaration of war by Russia. The English summons had these words: 'The British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, is compelled to declare to the Cabinet of St Petersburg, that if . . . [see the summons at length in the Appendix], the British Government must consider the refusal or the silence of the Cabinet of St Petersburg as equivalent to a declaration of war.'—'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 61.—Note to 4th Edition.
On the 27th of March a message from the Emperor of the French informed his Senate and Legislative Assembly that the last determination of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had placed France and Russia in a state of war. In his Speech from the Throne at the opening of the session* he had already declared that war was upon the point of commencing. 'To avoid a conflict,' he said, 'I have gone as far as honour allowed. Europe now knows that, if France draws the sword, it is because she is constrained to do so. Europe knows that France has no idea of aggrandisement; she only wishes to resist dangerous encroachments. The time of conquests has passed away, never to return. This policy has had for its result a more intimate alliance between England and France.' It is curious to observe that only a few hours after the time when England became inextricably engaged with him in a joint war against Russia, and in the same speech in which he announced the fact, the French Emperor acknowledged the value and the practicability of the wholesome policy which he had just then superseded by drawing the Cabinet of London into a separate alliance with himself; but when he was declaring, in words already quoted, that 'Germany had recovered her political independ-ence, that Austria would enter into the alliance, and that the Western Powers would go to 'Constantinople along with Germany,' he had the happiness of knowing that the baneful summons

* March 2.
which was to bring France and England into a separate course of action, and place them at last in a state of war, had been signed by the English Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was already on the way to St Petersburg.*

On the same 27th of March a message from the Queen announced to Parliament that the negotiations with Russia were broken off, and that Her Majesty, feeling bound to give active aid to the Sultan, relied upon the efforts of her faithful subjects to aid her in protecting the states of the Sultan against the encroachments of Russia.

On the following day the English declaration of war was issued. The labour of putting into writing the grounds for a momentous course of action is a wholesome discipline for statesmen; and it would be well for mankind if, at a time when the question were really in suspense, the friends of a policy leading towards war were obliged to come out of the mist of oral intercourse and private notes, and to put their view into a firm piece of writing. It does not follow that such a document ought necessarily to be disclosed, but it ought to exist, and it ought to be official. In the summer of 1853 the draft of a document, fairly stating the grounds of that singular policy of alliance within alliance which was shadowed out in the Royal Speech at the close of the session, would have been a good exercise for the members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, and would

* The messenger had reached Berlin on the day of the French Emperor's Speech from the Throne.
have protected them against that sensation of 'drifting,' which was afterwards described by the Foreign Secretary. It is known that when the English declaration announcing the rupture with Russia was about to be prepared, it was found less easy than might be supposed to assign reasons for the war. The necessity of having to state the cause of the rupture in a solemn and precise form, disclosed the vice of the policy which the Government was following; for it could not be concealed that the grievance which was inducing France and England to take up arms was one of a European kind, which called for redress at the hands of the four Powers rather than for the armed championship of the two.*

Of course the difficulty was overcome. When the faith of the country was pledged, and fleets and armies already moving to the scene of the conflict, it was not possible that war would be stayed for want of mere words. The Queen was advised to declare, that, by the regard due to an ally, and to an empire whose integrity and independence were essential to the peace of Europe, by the sympathies of her people for the cause of right against injustice, and from a desire to save Europe from the preponderance of a Power which had violated the faith of treaties, she felt called upon to take up arms, in concert with the Emperor of the French, for the defence of the Sultan.

* The Queen's advocate conceived that upon the papers as first supplied to him he could not frame a proper Declaration of War, and required further instructions from the Government.
On the 11th of April the Emperor of Russia issued his declaration of war. He declared that the summons addressed to him by France and England took from Russia all possibility of yielding with honour; and he threw the responsibility of the war upon the Western Powers. It was for Central and Western Europe that diplomacy shaped these phrases; but in the manifesto addressed to his own people the Czar used loftier words. 'Russia,' said he, 'fights not for the things of this world, but for the Faith.'* 'England and France have ranged themselves by the side of the enemies of Christianity against Russia fighting for the Orthodox faith. But Russia will not alter her divine mission; and if enemies fall upon her frontier, we are ready to meet them with the firmness which our ancestors have bequeathed to us. Are we not now the same Russian nation of whose deeds of valour the memorable events of 1812 bear witness? May the Almighty assist us to prove this by deeds! And in this trust taking up arms for our persecuted brethren professing the Christian faith, we will exclaim with the whole of Russia with one heart, 'O Lord our Saviour, whom have we to fear?' "May God arise and His enemies be dispersed!" †.

On the fourth day after the delivery of the message which placed Russia in a state of war with France and England, Prince Gortschakoff passed the Lower Danube at three points, and,

* 23d April.  † 21st February.
CHAP. X.

Treaty between the Sultan and the Western Powers.

entering into the desolate region of the Dobrudja, began the invasion of Turkey.*

Nearly at the same time France and England entered into a treaty with the Sultan, by which they engaged to defend Turkey with their arms until the conclusion of a peace guaranteeing the independence of the Ottoman Empire and the rights of the Sultan, and upon the close of the war to withdraw all their forces from the Ottoman territory. The Sultan, on his part, undertook to make no separate peace or armistice with Russia.†

On the 10th of April 1854 there was signed that treaty of alliance between France and England which many men had suffered themselves to look upon as a security for the peace of Europe. The high contracting parties engaged to do what lay in their power for the re-establishment of a peace which should secure Europe against the return of the existing troubles; and in order to set free the Sultan’s dominions, they promised to use all the land and sea forces required for the purpose. They engaged to receive no overture tending to the cessation of hostilities, and to enter into no engagement with the Russian Court, without having deliberated in common. They renounced all aim at separate advantages, and

* 24th March. By thus passing that part of the river which encloses the Dobrudja, a general does not effect much. He must cross it at and above Rassova before he can be said, in the military sense, to have ‘broken through the line of the Danube.’

† 10th of March.
they declared their readiness to receive into their alliance any of the other Powers of Europe.

This great alliance did not carry with it so resistless a weight as to be able to execute justice by its own sheer force, and without the shedding of blood; but it was a mighty engine of war.
CHAPTER XI.

The train of causes which brought on the war has now been followed down to the end. Great armies kept on foot, and empires governed by princes without the counsel of statesmen, were spoken of in the outset as standing elements of danger to the cause of peace; and their bearing upon the disputes of nations has been seen in all the phases of a strife which began in a quarrel for a key and a trinket, and ended by embroiling Europe. Upon the destinies of Russia the effect of this system of mere personal government has been seen at every step. From head to foot a vast empire was made to throb with the passions which rent the bosom of the one man Nicholas. If for a few months he harboured ambition, the resources of the State were squandered in making ready for war. If his spirit flagged, the ambition of the State fell lame, and preparations ceased. If he laboured under a fit of piety, or rather of ecclesiastic zeal, All the Russias were on the verge of a crusade. He chafed with rage at the thought of being foiled in diplomatic strife by the second Canning; and in-
stantly, without hearing counsel from any living man, he caused his docile battalions to cross the frontier, and kindled a bloody war.

Nor was the personal government of the Emperor Francis Joseph without its share of mischief; for it seems clear that this was the evil course by which Austria was brought into measures offensive to the Sultan, but full of danger to herself. More than once, in the autumn of 1852, Nicholas and Francis Joseph came together; and at these ill-omened meetings, the youthful Kaiser bending, it would seem, under a weight of gratitude, overwhelmed by the personal ascendancy of the Czar, and touched, as he well might be, by the affection which Nicholas had conceived for him, was led perhaps to use language which never would have been sanctioned by a cabinet of Austrian statesmen; and, although it is understood that he abstained from actual promises, it is hard to avoid believing that the general tenor of the young Emperor's conversations with Nicholas must have been the chief cause which led the Czar to imagine that he could enter upon a policy highly dangerous to Austria, and yet safely count upon her assent. The Czar never could have hoped that Austrian councillors of state would have willingly stood still and endured his seizure of the country of the Lower Danube from Orsova down to the Euxine; but he understood that Francis Joseph governed Austria, and he imagined that he could govern Francis Joseph as though he were his own child.
Even in Prussia, the policy of the State seemed to be always upon the point of being shaken by the fears of the King; and although, up to the outbreak of the war, she was guilty of no deflection,* it is certain that the anticipation of finding weakness in this quarter was one of the causes which led the Czar into danger.

In France, after the events of the 2d of December, the system of personal government so firmly obtained, that the narrator—dispensed from the labour of inquiring what interests she had in the question of peace and war, and what were the thoughts of her orators, her statesmen, and her once illustrious writers—was content to see what scheme of action would best conduce to the welfare and safety of a small knot of men then hanging together in Paris; and when it appeared that, upon the whole, these persons would gain in safety and comfort from the disturbance of Europe, and from a close understanding with England, the subsequent progress of the story was singularly unembarrassed by any question about what might be the policy demanded by the interests or the sentiments of France. Therefore the bearing of personal government upon the maintenance of peace was better illustrated by the French Government than by the Emperor Nicholas; for in the Czar, after all, a vast people was incarnate. His ambition, his piety, his anger, were in a sense the passions of the devoted mil-

* It was more than three months after the outbreak of the war that Prussia faltered.
lions of men of whom he was indeed the true chief. The French Emperor, on the contrary, when he chose to carry France into a war against Russia, was in no respect the champion of a national policy nor of a national sentiment; and he therefore gave a vivid example of the way in which sheer personal government comes to bear upon the peace of the world.

Perhaps if a man were to undertake to distribute the blame of the war, the first Power he would arraign might be Russia. Her ambition, her piety, and her Church zeal were ancient causes of strife, which were kindled into a dangerous activity by the question of the Sanctuaries, and by events which seemed for a moment to show that the time for her favourite enterprise against Constantinople might now at last be coming. Until the month of March 1853, these causes were brought to bear directly against the tranquillity of Europe; and even after that time, they were in one sense the parents of strife, because, though they ceased to have a direct action upon events, they had set other forces in motion. But it would be wrong to believe that, after the middle of March 1853, Russia was acting in furtherance of any scheme of territorial aggrandisement; for it is plain that by that time the Czar's vague ambition had dwindled down into a mere wish to wring from the Porte a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey. He had gathered his troops upon the Turkish frontier, and it seemed to him that he could use their presence
there as a means of extorting an engagement which would soothe the pride of the Orthodox Church, and tighten the rein by which he was always seeking to make the Turks feel his power. The vain concealments and misrepresentations by which he accompanied this effort of violent diplomacy were hardly worthy to be ranked as exercises of statecraft, for in reality, they owed their origin to the clashing impulses of a mind in conflict with itself.

Originally, the Czar had no thought of going to war for the sake of obtaining this engagement, and least of all had he any thought of going to war with England. At first, he thought to obtain it by surprise; and, when that attempt failed, he still hoped to obtain it by resolute pressure, because he reckoned that if the great Powers would compare the slenderness of the required concession with the evils of a great war, there could be no question how they would choose.

As soon as the diplomatic strife at Constantinople began to work, the Czar got heated by it; and when at length he found himself not only contending for his Church, but contending too with his ancient enemy, he so often lost all self-command, that what he did in his politic intervals was never enough to undo the evil which he wrought in his fits of pious zeal and of rage. And when, with a cruel grace, and before the eyes of all Europe, Lord Stratford disposed of Prince Mentschikoff, it must be owned that it was hard for a proud man in the place of the Czar to have
to stand still and submit. Therefore, without taking counsel of any man, he resolved to occupy the Principalities; but he had no belief that even that grave step would involve him in war; for his dangerous faith in Lord Aberdeen and in the power of the English Peace Party was in full force, and grew to a joyful and ruinous certainty when he learned, that the Queen's Prime Minister had insisted upon revoking the grave words which had been uttered to Baron Brunnnow by the Secretary of State. This illusory faith in the peacefulness of England long continued to be his guide; and from time to time he was confirmed in his choice of the wrong path by the bearing of the persons who represented France, Austria, and Prussia at the Court of St Petersburg; for although in Paris, in London, in Vienna, in Berlin, and in Constantinople the four great Powers seemed strictly united in their desire to restrain the encroachments of the Czar, this wholesome concord was so masked at St Petersburg by the courtier-like demeanour of Count Mensdorf, Colonel Rochow, and M. Castelbajac, that Sir Hamilton Seymour, though uttering the known opinion of the other three Powers as well as of his own Government, was left to stand alone.

After his acceptance of the Vienna Note, the Emperor Nicholas enjoyed for a few days the bliss of seeing all Europe united with him against the Turks, and he believed, perhaps, that Heaven was favouring him once more, and that now at last 'Canning' was vanquished; but in a little
while the happy dream ceased, and he had the torment of hearing the four Powers confess that, if for a moment they had differed from Lord Stratford, it was because of their erring nature. Then, fired by the Turkish declaration of war, and stung to fury by the hostile use of the Western fleets which the French Emperor had forced upon the English Government, the Czar gave the fatal orders which brought about the disaster of Sinope. After his first exultation over the sinking of the ships and the slaughter, he apparently saw his error, and was become so moderate as to receive in a right spirit the announcement of the first decision that had been taken by the English Cabinet when the news of the catastrophe reached it. But only a few days later, he had to hear of the grave and hostile change of view which had been forced upon Lord Aberdeen's Government by the French Emperor, and to learn that, by resolving to drive the Russian flag from the Euxine, the maritime Powers had brought their relations with his empire to a state barely short of war. After this rupture, it was no longer possible for him to extricate himself decorously, unless by exerting some skill and a steady command of temper. He was unequal to the trial; and although, in politic and worldly moments, he must have been almost hopeless of a good result, he could not bear to let go his hold of the occupied provinces under the compulsion of a public threat laid upon him by England and France.

With the conduct of the Turkish Government
little fault is to be found. It is true that, in the early stage of the dispute about the Sanctuaries, the violence of the French and the Russian Governments tormented the Porte into contradictory engagements, and that the anger kindled by these clashing promises was one of the provocatives of the war; but from the day of the delivery of the Bethlehem key and the replacement of the star, the Turkish Government was almost always moderate and politic—and after the second week of March 1853 it was firm; for the panic struck by Prince Mentschikoff in the early days of his mission was allayed by the prudent boldness of Colonel Rose, and the Czar with all his hovering forces was never able to create a second alarm.

It has been seen that, by their tenacity of all those sovereign rights which were of real worth—by the wisdom with which they yielded wherever they could yield with honour and safety—by their invincible courtesy and deference towards their mighty assailant—and at last and above all, by their warlike ardour and their prowess in the field—the Turks had become an example to Christendom, and had won the heart of England. And although it has been acknowledged that some of the more gentle of these Turkish virtues were contrived and enforced by the English Ambassador, still no one can fairly refuse to the Ottoman people the merit of appreciating and enduring this painful discipline.

Besides, there was a period when it might be supposed that the immediate views of the Turkish
Government and of the English Ambassador were not exactly the same; for as soon as the Turkish statesmen became aware that their appeal to the people had kindled a spirit which was forcing them into war, it of course became their duty to endeavour to embroil the other Powers of Europe; and they laboured in this direction with much sagacity and skill. They saw that if they could contrive to bring up the Admirals from Besica Bay, the Western Powers would soon get decoyed into war by their own fleets; and in order to this, we saw Reshid Pasha striving to affect the lofty mind of Lord Stratford by shadowing out the ruin of the Ottoman dominion; then, mounting his horse, going off to the French Ambassador, and so changing the elevation of his soul, whilst he rode from one Embassy to the other, that in the presence of M. de la Cour he no longer spoke of a falling empire, but pictured to him a crowd of Frenchmen of all ranks cruelly massacred, on account of their well-known Christianity, by a host of fanatical Moslems. And, although the serenity of Lord Stratford defeated the sagacious Turk for the time, and disappointed him in his endeavour to bring up more than a couple of vessels from each fleet, still in the end the Turkish statesmanship prevailed; for M. de la Cour, disturbed by the bloody prospect held out to him, communicated his excitement to the French Emperor, and the French Emperor, as we have seen, then put so hard a pressure upon Lord Aberdeen as to constrain him to join in breaking through the treaty
of 1841; and since this resolve led straight into the series of naval movements which followed, and so on to the outbreak of war, the members of the Sultan’s Cabinet had some right to believe that, even without the counsels of the great Ambassador, they knew how to govern events.

In so far as the origin of the war was connected with Count Leiningen’s mission, Austria is answerable; and although it must needs be true (for so she firmly declares *) that the Czar’s reiterated account of his close understanding with her in regard to Montenegro was purely fabulous, she still remains open to the grave charge of having sent Count Leiningen to Constantinople armed with a long string of questionable claims, yet debarred by his orders from all negotiation, and instructed to receive no answer from the Turkish Government except an answer of simple consent or simple refusal. This offensive method of pressing upon an independent Sovereign was constantly referred to by the Czar as justifying and almost compelling his determination to deal with the Sultan in a high-handed fashion; and in this way

* I have a statement to this effect. To those who have not been called upon to test the relative worth of statements coming from different parts of Europe, it may seem that I am facile in accepting this one; and the more so when I acknowledge, as I do, that surrounding facts give an appearance of probability to the opposite assertion. The truth is, that, like our own countrymen, the public men of Austria are much accustomed to subordinate their zeal for the public service to their self-respect. To undertake to disbelieve a statesman of the Court of Vienna, is the same thing as to undertake to disbelieve an English gentleman.
(even upon the supposition of there being no pernicious understanding between the two Emperors) Count Leiningen's mission had an ill effect upon the maintenance of peace.

Again, Austria must bear the blame of employing servants who, notwithstanding the firm and right part which she took in the negotiations, were always causing her to appear before Europe as a Power subservient to the Czar; and especially she ought to suffer in public repute for the baneful effect produced at St. Petersburg when the Secretary of her Legation appeared at the solemn thanksgivings which the Czar and his people offered up to the Almighty for the sinking of the ships and the slaughter of the Turks at Sinope.

There is also a fault of omission for which it would seem that Austria is chargeable. The interests of Austria and England, both present and remote, were so strictly the same, that for the welfare of both States there ought to have been going on between them a constant interchange of friendly counsels. Our statesmen are accustomed to proffer advice without stint to foreign States, but it is remarkable that their frankness is not much reciprocated by words of friendly counsel from abroad. Yet there are times when such counsels might be wholesome. It would surely have been well if Austria had advised the English Government not to quit the safe, honest ground held by the four Powers, for the sake of an adventure with the new Bonaparte. There is no trace of any such warnings from Vienna; and indeed it
would seem that Austria, tormented by the presence of the Russian forces on her southern frontier, was more prone to encourage than to restrain the imprudence of her old ally.

These were the faults with which Austria may fairly be charged. In other respects she was not forgetful of her duty towards herself and towards Europe; and it has been seen that, from the day when the Czar crossed the Pruth down to the time when he was obliged to relinquish his hold, Austria persisted in taking the same view of the dispute as was taken by the Western Powers, and was never at all backward in her measures for the deliverance of the Principalities.

In the nature and temperament of the King of Prussia there was so much of weakness that his Imperial brother-in-law was accustomed to speak of him in terms of ruthless disdain; and it seems that this habit of looking down upon the King caused the Czar to shape his policy simply as though Prussia were null. When he found his Royal brother-in-law engaged against him in an offensive and defensive alliance, he perhaps understood the error which he had committed in assuming that the policy of an enlightened and high-spirited nation would be steadily subservient to the weakness of its Sovereign; but, until he was thus undeceived, or, at all events, until the failure of Baron Budberg's mission in the beginning of 1854, he seems to have closed his eyes to all the long series of public acts in which Prussia had engaged, and to have cheated himself into the
belief that she would never take up such a ground as might enable Austria to act freely on her southern frontier, and so drive him out of the Principalities. And although, until after the outbreak of the war between Russia and the Western Powers, Prussia did not at all hang back,* it is nevertheless true that the Czar's policy was shaped upon a knowledge of the King's weak nature. Therefore the temperament and mental quality of the Prussian monarch must be reckoned among the causes of the war.

Prussia also, in the same degree as Austria, must bear the kind of repute that was entailed upon her by the conduct of her Secretary of Legation at St Petersburg, for he also sanctioned by his presence the thanksgivings offered up for Sinope.

Another fault attributable to Prussia was her invincible love of metaphysical or rather mere verbal refinements. When this form of human error is brought into politics it chills all human sympathies, and tends to bring a country into contempt, by giving to its policy the bitter taste of a theory or a doctrine, and so causing it to be misunderstood. An instance of this vice was given by the First Minister of the Prussian Crown, in a speech of great moment which he addressed to the Lower Chamber on the 18th of March 1854. After an abundance of phrases of a pacific tendency, Baron Manteuffel said that Prussia was resolved 'faithfully to aid any member of the Confederation.

* The state of war began on the 19th of March. Prussia first began to hang back about the 21st of July. See ante.
tion who, from his geographical position, might feel himself called upon sooner than Prussia to draw the sword in defence of German interests.' Now this, to the ear of any diplomatist, foreshadowed, or rather announced, an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria against the Czar for the delivery of the Principalities; and accordingly, the alliance so announced was actually contracted by Prussia some four weeks afterwards. But, in the minds of the common public, a disclosure couched in this diplomatic phraseology was smothered under the intolerable weight of the pacific verbiage which had gone before; and the result was, that a speech which announced a measure of offence and hostility to Russia was looked upon as the disclosure of a halting, timid, and worthless policy.

But, except upon the grounds here stated, there was no grave fault to find with the policy of Prussia down to the outbreak of the war between the Czar and the Western Powers. Distant as she was from the scene of the Czar's encroachment, she was nevertheless compelled, as she valued her hold upon the goodwill of Germany, to be steadfast in hindering Russia from establishing herself in provinces which would give her the full control of the Lower Danube; and up to the time of the final rupture, she always so accommodated her policy to the views of the Western Powers as to be able to remain in firm accord with them, both as to the adjudication of the dispute between Russia and Turkey, and as to the
principles which should guide the belligerents in the event of their being forced into a war by the obstinacy of the Emperor Nicholas.

Of course the Czar's relinquishment of the Principalities took away from Prussia, as well as from Austria, her ground of complaint against the Czar, and with it, her motive for action. Nor was this all; for by determining to quit the mainland of Europe and make a descent upon a remote maritime province of Russia, the Western Powers deprived themselves of all right to expect that Austria and Prussia would favour a scheme of invasion which they did not and could not approve. Down to the time when the Czar determined to repass the Pruth, the policy followed by Prussia as well as by Austria was sound and loyal towards Europe.

The German Confederation was brought into the same views as Austria and Prussia; and thus, so long as the object in view was the deliverance of the Principalities, the whole of Central Europe was joined with the great Powers of the West in a determination to repress the Czar's encroachments. I repeat that the papers laid before Parliament have not yet disclosed the ground on which the English Government became discontent with this vast union, and was led to contract those separate engagements with the Emperor of the French which ended by bringing on the war.*

* This was published in 1863, but writing now in 1876, I may still say that the blank remains; the actual truth being
The blame of beginning the dispute which led on to the war must rest with the French Government; for it is true, as our Foreign Secretary declared, that 'the Ambassador of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the status quo in which the matter rested; and without 'political action on the part of France, the 'quarrels of the Churches would never have 'troubled the relations of friendly Powers.'* For this offence against the tranquillity of Europe the President of the Republic was answerable in the first instance; but it must be remembered that at the time France was under a free Parliamentary Government; and it is just, therefore, to acknowledge that the blame of sanctioning the disinterment of a forgotten treaty more than a hundred years old, and of violently using it as an instrument of disturbance, must be shared by an Assembly which had not enough of the statesman-like quality to be able to denounce a wanton and noxious policy. It was the weakness of the gifted statesmen and orators who then adorned the Chambers that, like most of their countrymen, they were too easily fascinated by the pleasure of seeing France domineer.

But at the close of the year 1851, the France known to Europe and the world was bereaved of apparently that the separate engagements with France were either entered into quite wantonly, or else as means judged to be needful for preventing the French Emperor from throwing himself into the arms of Russia.

* See 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. i. pp. 43 to 50 of Cabinet Edition.
political life; and thenceforth her complex interests in the affairs of nations were so effectually overruled by the exigency of personal considerations, that in a little while she was made to adopt an Anglo-Turkish policy, and, as the price of this concession to the views of our Foreign Office, the venturers of the 2d of December were brought under the sanctions of an alliance with the Queen of England. It has been seen that, by superseding that conjoint action of the four Powers which was the true safeguard of peace and justice, the separate compact of the two became a main cause of the appeal to arms. Moreover, it has been shown how, when once he had entangled Lord Aberdeen's Government in this understanding, the French Emperor gained so strong a hold over it that he became able to guide and overrule the counsels of England even in the use to be made of her Mediterranean fleet; and how thenceforth, and from time to time, he so used the English navy as well as his own, that at the moments when the negotiations seemed ripe for peace they were always defeated by an order sent out to the Admirals. The real tendency of this perturbing and dislocating course of action was concealed by the moderation which characterised the French despatches, and, in another and very different way, by the demeanour of the personage who represented the French Government at St Petersburg; so that, at the very times when Lord Aberdeen was brought to consent to a hostile and provoking use of our naval forces, he was able
to derive fatal comfort from the language of the French diplomacy; and, whenever the grave tone of Sir Hamilton Seymour was beginning to produce wholesome effect at St Petersbourg, his efforts were quickly baffled by the prostrations of his French colleague.*

It was thus that, by generating the original dispute—by drawing England from the common ground of the four Powers into a separate understanding with himself—by causing a persistently hostile use to be made of the fleets—and, finally, by his ambiguous ways of speaking and acting—the French Emperor came to have a chief share in the kindling of the war.

The stake which England holds in the world makes it of deep moment to her to avert disorder among nations; and, on the other hand, her insular station in Europe, joined with the possession of more than sufficing empire in other regions of the world, keeps her clear of all thought of terri-

* For those who have not had ample means of becoming acquainted with the doubleness which characterises the French Emperor's habits of action, it will be hard to believe in the extent to which his Envoy at St Petersburg was suffered to carry his adulation of the Czar. At the very time when the French Emperor was pushing our Government into the adoption of a measure of vengeance barely short of flagrant war, his Envoy, M. Castelbajac, although he could not actually attend the public thanksgivings for Sinope in the Cathedral, did nevertheless permit himself to wait on the Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, and tender his congratulations for the slaughter of the Turks at Sinope, and the sinking of their ships. It is believed that he expressly desired to tender these his congratulations to the Czar 'as a Christian, a soldier, and 'a gentleman.'—Note to 4th Edition.
torial aggrandisement in this quarter of the globe. And, although it is the duty of all the rest of the great Powers as well as of England to endeavour towards the maintenance of peace and order, yet, inasmuch as there is no other great State without some sort of lurking ambition which may lead it into temptation, the fidelity of the Continental guardians of the peace can always be brought into question. Suspicions of this kind are often fanciful, but the fears from which they spring are too well founded in the nature of things to be safely regarded as frivolous; and the result is, that the great island Power is the one which, by the well-informed statesmen of the Continent, is looked to as the surest safeguard against wrong. Europe leans, Europe rests, on this faith.

So, the moment it is made to appear that for any reason England is disposed to abdicate, or to suspend for a while, the performance of her European duties, that moment the wrong-doer sees his opportunity and begins to stir. Those who dread him, missing the accustomed safeguard of England, turn whither they can for help, and, failing better plans of safety, they perhaps try hard to make terms with the spoiler. Monarchs find that to conspire for gain of territory, or to have other princes conspiring against them, is the alternative presented to their choice. The system of Europe becomes decomposed, and war follows. Therefore, exactly in proportion as England values the peace of Europe, she ought to abstain from every word and from
every sign which tends to give the wrong-doer a hope of her acquiescence.

This duty was not understood by the more ardent friends of peace; and they imagined that they would serve their cause by entreating England to abstain from every conflict which did not menace her own shores—nay, even by permitting themselves to vow and declare that this was the policy truly loved by the English race. Moreover, by blending their praises of peace with fierce invective against public men, they easily drew applause from assembled multitudes, and so caused the foreigner to believe that they really spoke the voice of a whole people, or at all events of great masses, and that England was no longer a Power which would interfere with spoliation in Europe.

The fatal effect which this belief produced upon the peace of Europe has been shown. But the evil produced by the excesses of the Peace Party did not end there. It is the nature of excesses to beget excesses of strange complexion; and just as a too rigid sanctity has always been followed by a too scandalous profligacy, so, by the law of reaction, the doctrines of the Peace Party tended to bring into violent life that keen warlike spirit which soon became one of the main obstacles to the restoration of tranquillity. Therefore England, it must be acknowledged, did much to bring on the war; first, by the want of moderation and prudence with which she seemed to declare her attachment to the cause of peace—and afterwards by the exceeding eagerness with which she coveted the strife.
It was the plain duty of England to take part in preparing resistance to the encroachment of the Czar; and her errors lay—not in the object, but—in a choice of wrong means for attaining it; for she rejected the course of action which must have peacefully accomplished her purpose, and adopted a turbulent plan distinctly leading to war. In other words, she went wrong, because she suffered herself to be drawn away from that common ground taken up by the four Powers which imparted a bloodless coercion of Russia, and adopted instead that separate understanding with one of them which induced the appeal to arms.

To distribute the blame attaching upon England amongst her public men is not a very difficult task.

Loving peace, with a purity of motive and a devotedness of heart which no man has ever questioned, Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone had the misfortune to remain members of a Government which went out of the safe paths of peace. They went wrong; and, although it is true they went wrong at a slow rate, they continued their deviation during a period of eight months; so that at last, to their grief and dismay, they found they had been leading the country into a cruel war. Deceived by the crude notion that France and England, acting together, could secure peace, they did not understand that the way to maintain or restore the tranquillity of Europe was to hold to the alliance of the four
Powers, and to avoid impairing it by a separate understanding with one of them. For want of this guiding principle, they always failed to see the point at which they could make their stand, and they never could choose the day on which it would become them to retire from office. So they lingered on in a Cabinet which was becoming more and more warlike, and their presence there was in two ways hurtful to the cause of peace; for even the more earnest friends of peace were quieted by seeing that the trusty champions of the cause were still members of the Government, and at last, when they could no longer help seeing that this same Government was going to a rupture with the Czar, the more rational of them thought that there must really be some great State necessity for a war in which Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone were reluctantly engaging their country. Moreover, there was a great and good portion of the community who, retaining their theoretic disapproval of a needless war, were nevertheless fired with a secret longing for the clash of arms; and these men were relieved from the pain of a conflict between duty and inclination by finding that for the righteousness of the impending war Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone were their sponsors.

It has been seen that, by his continuance in office, Lord Aberdeen kept alive in the mind of the Emperor Nicholas that dangerous notion which has often been a source of European troubles.
—the notion that England would not go to war; and the Czar's belief on this subject was so dear to his heart, that perhaps nothing short of the resignation of the Prime Minister could have undeceived him. Still, to a common observer, it would seem that some effort might have been made to disperse his error; and that, as the danger was caused in great measure by the lasting effect of old impressions upon the mind of the Emperor Nicholas, a special mission to St Petersburg might have been usefully resorted to as a means of rousing the Czar to a sense of what might be expected from England. Nothing of this kind was done; nothing was done to break the fatal smoothness of the incline.

But if the cause of peace was harmed by ill-judging friends in the Cabinet, it was brought to sheer ruin by the disqualification which our country inflicted upon its popular leaders as the punishment of their former excesses.

Mr Cobden and Mr Bright, as we have seen, had shut themselves out from the counsels of the nation. They were powerless. By their indiscriminate denunciations of war in general, they had destroyed the worth of any criticism they could bring to bear upon the pending dispute. Their arguments, however well pruned and shaped out to suit the occasion, were sure of being treated by an English audience as the offspring of their doctrines; and, their doctrines being repudiated, they could make no good use of their privilege of speech. It was impossible
to consult with them upon the question whether the country was bound in honour to take up arms for the Sultan, because they had spent their lives in teaching that the country could never be bound in honour to take up arms for anybody. If they had not thus disqualified themselves for useful argument, they would surely have been able to make a becoming stand against what Count Nesselrode called 'the most unintelligible 'war' ever known. But because they had been extravagant before, therefore now they were null; and because they were null, the cause entrusted to their hands was brought to destruction.

The Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen was answerable for the strange course of action which brought England to cast aside the blessings ensured by the unanimity of the four Powers for the sake of what might be hoped from a separate understanding with France; and although it is true that this policy, because novel, rash, and adventurous, was highly approved by our people then glowing with warlike ardour, and seeking for fields of enterprise, one never ought to allow that in questions of high policy, the complicity of the public has power to absolve. A minister who has fashioned out a new policy leading his country into a war ought to be able to show—not necessarily that the policy was a wise one (for man is of an erring nature), but—that at the time of its adoption there were better grounds than its mere popularity for believing it to be right. That some such grounds exist may be
fairly imagined by those who have heard of the ability and the varied experience of the members of Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet; but hitherto, so far as I know, these grounds have not been disclosed.

Apart from the general policy of quitting the concord of the Four Powers for the sake of a warlike alliance with Louis Napoleon, blame attaches in a more special form upon Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet for yielding up its own better judgment under pressure from the French Government, and consenting to those hostile movements of the Allied fleets which baffled the patient labours of diplomacy, and twice rekindled the strife. When the warlike spirit in England had once arisen, the French Emperor knew that he could at any moment subject Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet to an access of popular disfavour by causing or allowing it to appear in England that the Government of the Queen was less eager than himself in the defence of the Sultan; and it is true, therefore, that although the hand which touched the lever was foreign, the instrument of pressure was English. It is probably true, also, that the pressure was never inflicted without the consent of at least one great English Statesman. Still, because this facile yielding to the French Emperor in the use of naval forces was popular, or rather was a means of avoiding unpopularity, the propriety of it is not the less in question. It is possible, however, that the hitherto unknown grounds on which the separate understanding with France
may come to be defended, will extend to justify the plan of deferring in naval transactions to the Emperor of the French, and consenting at his instance to make our fleet an instrument for the disturbance of the pending negotiations.

In so far as concerns the general policy of the Government in these transactions, the merits of Lord Clarendon must be tried, of course, by the tests applicable to the whole body of the Cabinet; but it has been seen that, personally, he was not blind to the danger of allowing the Czar to continue in his belief of England's insuperable peacefulness; and that his firm, wholesome words had already flown off towards St Petersburg, when unhappily they were arrested and revoked at the instance of Lord Aberdeen. Lord Clarendon's despatches were written with so much of grace and vigour, and in a tone so fair and manly, that any one who is familiar with them will understand something of the process by which the Prime Minister was from time to time forced into what may be called 'a one by one approval' of these able writings, and in that way hindered from finding the happy moment in which he could establish his divergence from the governing minds of the Cabinet, and effect his retreat from office.

Looking back upon the troubles which ended in the outbreak of war, one sees the nations at first swaying backward and forward like a throng so vast as to be helpless, but afterwards falling slowly into warlike array. And when one begins to
search for the man or the men whose volition was governing the crowd, the eye falls upon the towering form of the Emperor Nicholas. He was not single-minded, and therefore his will was unstable, but it had a huge force; and since he was armed with the whole authority of his Empire, it seemed plain that it was this man, and only he, who was bringing danger from the North. And at first, too, it seemed that within his range of action there was none who could be his equal; but in a little while the looks of men were turned to the Bosphorus, for thither the Czar's ancient adversary was slowly bending his way. To fit him for the encounter, the Englishman was clothed with little authority except what he could draw from the resources of his own mind and from the strength of his own wilful nature. Yet it was presently seen, that those who were near him fell under his dominion, and did as he bade them, and that the circle of deference to his will was always increasing around him; and soon it appeared that though he moved gently, he began to have mastery over a foe who was consuming his strength in mere anger. When he had conquered, he stood, as it were, with folded arms, and seemed willing to desist from strife. But also in the West there had been seen a knot of men possessed, for the time, of the mighty engine of the French State, and striving so to use it as to be able to keep their hold, and to shelter themselves from a cruel fate. The volitions of these men were active enough, because they were toiling for their lives. Their
efforts seemed to interest and to please the lustiest man of those days, for he watched them from over the Channel with approving smile, and began to declare, in his good-humoured, boisterous way, that so long as they should be suffered to have the handling of France, so long as they would execute for him his policy, so long as they would take care not to deceive him, they ought to be encouraged, they ought to be made use of, they ought to have the shelter they wanted; and, the Frenchmen agreeing to his conditions, he was willing to level the barrier—he called it, perhaps, false pride—which divided the Government of the Queen from the venturers of the 2d of December. In this thought, at the moment, he stood almost alone; but he abided his time. At length he saw the spring of 1853, bringing with it grave peril to the Ottoman State. Then, throwing aside with a laugh some papers which belonged to the Home Office, he gave his strong shoulder to the levelling work. Under the weight of his touch the barrier fell. Thenceforth the hindrances that met him were but slight. As he from the first had willed it, so moved the two great nations of the West.
CHAPTER XII.

When it had been resolved that the French and the English forces already despatched to the East should be raised to a strength which might enable them to be more than auxiliary to the defence of the Turkish dominions, the French Emperor named an officer to the command of his army in the field, and the General who was to have charge of the Queen's land-forces had already been chosen. It seems right for me now to say something of these two commanders; and, the better to make each of them known, I am willing to speak of some of the transactions which brought them together between the time of their meeting in Paris and the day when they received their instructions for the invasion of the Crimea.

The officer entrusted with the command of the French Army in the East was a Marshal of France, and was the person before spoken of who had changed his name from Le Roy to 'St 'Arnaud,' and from James to 'Achilles.' He impersonated with singular exactness the idea which our forefathers had in their minds when
they spoke of what they called 'a Frenchman;' for although (by cowing the rich, and by filling the poor with envy) the great French Revolution had thrown a lasting gloom on the national character, it left this one man untouched. He was bold, gay, reckless, and vain; but beneath the mere glitter of the surface there was a great capacity for administrative business, and a more than common willingness to take away human life. In Algerine warfare he had proved himself from the first an active, enterprising officer, and in later years a brisk commander. He was skilled in the duties of a military governor, knowing how to hold tight under martial law a conquered or a half-conquered province. The empire of his mind over his actions was so often interrupted by bodily pain and weakness, that it is hard to say whether, if he had been gifted with health, he would have been a firm, steadfast man; but he had violent energies, and a spirit so elastic that, when for any interval the pressure of misery or of bodily pain was lifted off, he seemed as strong and as joyous as though he had never been crushed. He chose to subordinate the lives and the rights of other men to his own advancement; therefore he was ruthless, but not in any other sense cruel. No one, as he himself said, could be more good-natured. In the intervals between the grave deeds that he did, he danced and sung. To men in authority, no less than to women, he paid court with flattering stanzas and songs. He had extraordinary activity of body, and was
highly skilled in the performance of gymnastic feats; he played the violin; and, as though he were resolved in all things to be the Frenchman of the old time, there was once at least in his life a time of depression, when (to the astonishment of the good priest, who fell on his knees and thanked God as for a miracle wrought) he knelt down and confessed himself, seeking comfort and absolution from his Church.

He went through more than one career in the army, first entering it in 1816 as a sub-lieutenant of the Royal Guard, but soon plunging into a course of life which was of such a kind as to cause him to cease from being an officer. He kept away from France for many years, and became acquainted with several languages. For a long time he was in England, and he spoke our language very well; but in later years he was accustomed to be silent in regard to the time of his exile, and there is no need to lift the veil which he threw over this part of his life.

When the Revolution of 1830 broke out, he returned to France, and being then thirty-three years of age, he again entered the French army as a sub-lieutenant. He wrote some stanzas to Meunier, and gained a step by it. 'Tell me, after 'that,' said he, 'that songs are good for nothing!' His next enterprise was in prose. It chanced that Bugeaud, then the General in command of the district, had printed a small military work on the camping of troops. St Arnaud or Le Roy (for the time of the change of name is not certain)
translated the book into several languages, and presented the fruit of his labour, with, no doubt, an appropriate letter of dedication, to the General. Bugeaud was pleased; and from that time until his death he never lost sight of the judicious translator. St Arnaud was immediately put upon the General's staff; and soon became one of his aides-de-camp. When the Duchess of Berri fell a prisoner into the hands of the Government, M. St Arnaud, whose regiment was on duty at the place of her detention, found means to make himself useful to the Government without incurring the dislike of his captive; and he seemed to be in a fair road to promotion. But again the clouds passed over him.*

In 1836, being then near forty years of age, he began yet another career by entering the 'Foreign Legion,' then serving in Algeria, with the rank of lieutenant. Every man of the corps, St Arnaud said, had passed through a wild youth;‡ but with comrades of that quality a man might entertain better hopes of regaining renown than with a mere French regiment of the line; and St Arnaud at this time made a strong resolve. He said, 'I will be remarkable, or die.' And he re-

* It must not be inferred that in the interval between September 1835 and November 1836 his name was (for the second time) out of the Army List. He seems to have been employed at that time in the 'Gymnase Militaire' ('Lettres du Maréchal de St Arnaud,' vol. i. p. 92).

† 'Jeunesse orageuse.' I translate this by the words, 'wild youth;' but I believe the phrase, in the mouths of Frenchmen, generally implies that the things done by the person spoken of are of a less venial kind than my translation would imply.
mained so faithful to this his covenant with himself, that even by acute illness he could not be kept out of action. When he lay upon the sick-bed, if it chanced that the Arabs or the Kabyles were offering any prospect of a fight upon ground within reach of the hospital, he almost always managed to drag his helpless, tortured body towards the scene of the conflict; and this he would do, not with an idea of being able to take an active part, but simply in order that the list of officers present might not fail to comprise his name. At the storming of Constantine, however, he really helped to govern the event; for when a great explosion took place, and many were blown into the air, the French soldiers ran back with a cry that all was ruined; but Bedeau and Combes, withstanding the madness of the common terror, strove hard to rally the crowd; and St Arnaud having with him in his company of the Legion some bold reckless outcasts of the North, he bethought him of the shout, very strange to the ears of Frenchmen, which he had heard in other climes. Skilled in the art of imitation, he uttered the warlike cry. Instantly from the Northmen around him, whether Germans, or Swedes, or English, Scots, Irish, or Danes, there sprang their native 'Hurrah!' and with it came the thronging of men who must and would go forward. It was mainly the torrent of this new onslaught by St Arnaud and his men of the 'stormy youth' which carried the breach, and brought about the fall of the city.
Even if, for the recruiting of his health, he were passing a few weeks of holiday in France, he would still seek personal distinction with a singular strength of will. If, for instance, there chanced to be a fire at night, he would fly to the spot, would scale the ladders, mount the roof and contrive to appear aloft in seeming peril, displayed to a wondering crowd by the lurid glare of the flames. Then he would disappear, and then suddenly he would be seen again suspended in the air, and passing athwart the sky that divided one roof from another by the help of a rope or a pole.

In the early part of his service in Algeria, his old patron, General Bugeaud, was in command there, and was still a warm friend to him. Of course this circumstance helped to open a path for him; and the result was that, first by acts of bravery and vigour, and then by a display of administrative ability, the all but desperate lieutenant of the Foreign Legion rose in eight years to be entrusted with a General's command.* In 1845 he commanded in the valley of the Chelif; and he was so dire a scourge to the neighbouring tribes, that the force which obeyed his orders was called the 'Infernal Column.'

When first I saw him in that year he was moving with his force to wreak vengeance on a revolted tribe, and he was to march five weeks deep into the desert. He spoke with luminous force, and with a charming animation; and it seemed to me, as we rode along by the side of the heavy-laden

* But up to that time with the rank of Colonel only.
soldiery, that the clear incisive words in which he described to me the mechanism of the 'movable column,' were a model of military diction; but his keen, handsome, eager features so kindled with the mere stir and pomp of war—he seemed so to love the swift going and coming of his aides-de-camp, and the rolling drums, and the joyful appeal of the bugles—he was so content with the gleam of his epaulettes, half-hidden and half-revealed by the graceful white cabaan—so happy in the bounding pride of his Arab charger—that he did not seem like a man destined to be chosen from out of all others as the instrument of a scheme requiring grave care and secrecy. Yet of secrecy he was most capable; and at that very time he had upon his mind,* and was concealing, not from me only (for that would be only natural), but from every officer and man around him, a deed of such a kind that few men perhaps have ever done the like of it in secret.

We saw that, before the December of 1851, the enterprising and resolute Fleury was in Algeria, seeking out a fit African officer, who would take the post of Minister of War, with a view of joining the President in his plans for the overthrow of the Republic. Monsieur St Arnaud formerly Le Roy had not so lived as to occasion any difficulty in approaching him with dishonouring proposals; and there was ground for inferring that

* The act here alluded to is spoken of further on. It took place about six weeks before the time when I first saw Colonel St Arnaud.
he might prove equal to the task which was to be set before him. The able administrator of a great district in Algeria might be competent to head a department. The commander of the 'Infernal Column' was not likely to be wanting in the ruthlessness which was needed; and if his vanity made it seem doubtful whether he was a man who could keep a secret, there was a confidential paper in existence which might tend to allay the fear.

St Arnaud had warmly approved the destruction of life which had been effected in 1844 by filling with smoke the crowded caves of the Dahra; but he had sagaciously observed that the popularity of the measure in Europe was not co-extensive with the approbation which seems to have been bestowed upon its author by the military authorities. These counter-views guided M. St Arnaud. In the summer of 1845 he received private information that a body of Arabs had taken refuge in the cave of Shelas. Thither he marched a body of troops. Eleven of the fugitives came out and surrendered; but it was known to St Arnaud, though not to any other Frenchman, that five hundred men remained in the cave. All these people Colonel St Arnaud determined to kill, and so far, he perhaps felt that he was only an imitator of Pelissier;* but the resolve which accompanied the formation of this scheme was original. He

* It is believed, however, that Pelissier left open some of the entrances to the cave, and that he only resorted to the smoke as a means of compelling the fugitives to come out and surrender.
determined to keep the deed secret even from the troops engaged in the operation. Except his brother, and Marshal Bugeaud, whose approval was the prize he sought for, no one was to know what he did. He contrived to execute both his purposes. 'Then,' he writes to his brother, 'I had all the apertures hermetically stopped up. I made one vast sepulchre. No one went into the caverns; no one but myself knew that under there, there are five hundred brigands who will never again slaughter Frenchmen. A confidential report has told all to the Marshal, without terrible poetry or imagery. Brother, no one is so good as I am by taste and by nature. From the 8th to the 12th I have been ill, but my conscience does not reproach me. I have done my duty as a commander, and to-morrow I would do the same over again; but I have taken a disgust to Africa.'*

The officer who could cause French soldiery to be the unconscious instruments for putting to death five hundred fugitive men, and who could afterwards keep concealed from the whole force all knowledge of what it had done, was likely to be the very person for whom Fleury was seeking. He was brought back to Paris, and made Minister of War, with a view to the great plot of the 2d of December. France knows how well, sooner or later, he answered to Fleury's best hopes. He kept his counsel close until the appointed night,

* St Arnaud's Letters, published by his relatives after his death.
and then (whatever faltering there may have been between midnight and three in the morning) he was out in time for the deed; and before the daylight came he had stabbed France through in her sleep.

Amongst men who make a great capture, there will often spring up questions concerning the division of the spoil. When he helped to make prize of France, St Arnaud of course got much; but his wants were vast, and he had earned a clear right to extort from his chief accomplice, and to go back again, and again, and yet again, with the terrible demand for 'more!' He was in such a condition of health as to be unfit to command an army in the field; for although, during intervals, he was free from pain and glowing with energy, he was from time to time utterly cast down by his recurring malady. It is possible that, notwithstanding his bodily state, he may have sincerely longed to have the command of an army in a European campaign; but whether he thus longed or not, he unquestionably said that he did; and the French Emperor took him at his word, consenting, as was very natural, that his dangerous, insatiate friend should have a command which would take him into the country of the Lower Danube. Apparently it was not believed that, in point of warlike skill, M. St Arnaud was well fitted to the command; for the French Emperor, as will be seen, resorted to the plan of surrounding him with men who were virtually empowered to guide him with their overruling counsels.
To try to understand the relations between the allied Generals of France and England, without knowing something of the repute in which Marshal St Arnaud was held by his fellow-countrymen, would be to go blindfold; and a narrator keeping silence on this subject would be hiding a fact which belongs to history, and a fact, too, which is one of deep moment, and fruitful of lessons. Paris stripped of the weapons which kill the body, and robbed of her appeal to honest print, was more than ever pitiless with the tongue; and M. St Arnaud being laid open by the tenor of the life that he had led, his reputation fell a prey to cruel speech. The people of the capital knew of no crime too vile to be imputed to the new Marshal of France now entrusted with the command of her army in the field. Yet, so far as I know, they failed to make out that he had ever been convicted, or even arrested, on a criminal charge; and when I look at the affectionate correspondence which almost through his life M. St Arnaud seems to have maintained with his near relatives, I am led to imagine that they at least—and they would have been likely to know something of the truth—could have hardly believed his worst errors to be errors of the more dishonouring sort. Therefore there is ground for surmising that the Marshal was a man slandered. But in these times the chief defence against slanders upon public men is to be found in the award that results from free printing; and the right of free printing in France
Marshal St Arnaud, with his own midnight hand, had stealthily helped to destroy. Whether he was a man bitterly wronged by his fellow-countrymen, or whether what he suffered was mere justice, the state of his repute in the spring of 1854 is a thing lying within the reach of historical certainty. He had an ill name.

But State policy is a shameless leveller—is a leveller of even that difficult steep which seems to divide the man of high honour from those of mean repute. The plotters of the 2d of December had overturned the social structure of France. They had stifled men's minds, and had made their eloquence mute. They had forced those who were of high estate by character, or by intellect, or by birth, or by honourable wealth, to endure to see France handled at will by persons of no account, and to submit to be governed by them, and to pay taxes into their hands, and to maintain them in luxury, and in all so much of pomp as can be copied from the splendour of kings. The new Emperor could not but know that he was breaking down yet another of the world's barriers, and was carrying subversion across the Channel, when he contrived that all Europe should see him presenting his fellow-venturer of the December night to the appointed commander of an English army.

But when he knew who the English General was to be, he might well give the rein to his cynical joy. He could have been sure that the General placed in command of our army would
be an officer of unsullied name; but he who had been chosen was one whose life was mixed with history—the friend, the companion of Wellington. It is true this Englishman was known to be very simple, very careless of self—a man hardly capable of imagining that he could be humbled by obeying the orders of his sovereign; and it is true also that the mass of the English people, being eager in the war, and little used to lay stress, as the French do, on the impersonation of a principle, were blind to the moral import of what their Government was doing. But the French Emperor understood England; and he remembered that his coming guest was one of a great and powerful body of nobles, who were proud on behalf of this favourite member of their class, and fenced him round with honour. For the levelling of these heights, and for the bringing down of those in Europe who were tall with the pride which sustains man's old strife between good and evil, no dreamer could dream of a solemnisation more signal than the coming together of Marshal Le Roy St Arnaud, and him whom old friends still called Lord Fitzroy Somerset. The French Emperor knew that the mind of Germany and France would be swift to interpret this public contact, and would see in it the terms of a great surrender.

I conceive that in these latter times the scale upon which we measure warlike prowess has been brought down too low by the custom of awarding wild violent praise to the common
performance of duty, and even now and then to actual misfeasance; so, if I keep from this path, it is not because I think coldly of our army or our navy, but because I desire—as I am very sure our best officers do—that we should return to our ancient and more severe standard of excellence. There is another reason which moves me in the same direction. Not only is the utterance of mere praise a lazy and futile method of attempting to do justice to worthy deeds, but it even intercepts the honest growth of a man's renown by serving as a contrivance for avoiding that labour of narration upon which, for the most part, all lasting fame must rest.

Too often the repute of a soldier who has done some heroic act is dealt with by a formal report declaring that he has been 'brave,' or 'gallant,' or 'has conducted himself to the perfect satisfaction of his commanding officer.' The cheap sugared words are quickly forgotten, and nothing remains; whereas, if his countrymen were told, not of the mere conclusion that a man had done bravely, but of the very deed from which the inference was drawn, the story, however simple, might dwell perhaps in their minds, and they might tell it to their children, and the soldier would have his fame. Now, this history will virtually embrace the whole of the short period in which Lord Raglan's quality as a General was tried: and it seems to me, therefore, that if in narrating what happened I can reach to near the truth; if I give honest samples of what our
General said, and of what he wrote—of his manner of commanding men, and his way of maintaining an alliance; if I show how he dealt with armies in the hour of battle, and how he comported himself in times of heavy trial,—his true nature, with its strength and with its human failings, will be so far brought to light that I may be dispensed from the need of striving to portray it; and, contenting myself with speaking of some of the mere outward and visible signs which showed upon the surface, may leave it to his countrymen to ascend, by the knowledge of what he did, to the knowledge of what he was. Where I think Lord Raglan's measures were right, I suppose I shall allow my belief to appear; and where I think they were wrong, I shall be likely to speak with an equal freedom: but it is not for me, who am no soldier, to undertake to compute the great account between the English people and a General who commanded their Queen's army in the field. Still, it must be remembered that the less I take upon myself in this regard, the graver will be the task of those who read. When the countrymen of Lord Raglan shall believe that they have in their hands sufficing means of knowledge, they will pass judgment,—not, as I should, with the slender authority of a single bystander, but with the weight of an honest nation, in time of calm, judging firmly, yet not ungenerously, the career of a public servant.

Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards Lord Raglan, was a younger son of the fifth Duke of Beaufort,
and of a daughter of Admiral Boscawen. He was born in 1788. He entered the army in 1804. In 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley, upon sailing for Portugal, attached the young Lord Fitzroy Somerset to his staff;* and during his career in the Peninsula he kept him close to his side first as his aide-de-camp, and then as military secretary. Between the time of the first restoration of the Bourbons in 1814, and the flight of Louis XVIII. in the spring of the following year, Lord Fitzroy Somerset was secretary of the Embassy at Paris. It was during this interval of peace that he married Emily Wellesley, a daughter of the third Earl of Mornington, and a niece of the Duke of Wellington. When the war was renewed, he again became military secretary and aide-de-camp to the Duke of Wellington, and served with him in his last campaign. At Waterloo—he was riding at the time near the farm of La Haie Sainte—he lost his right arm from a shot. But he quickly gained a great facility of writing with his left hand; and, the war being ended, he resumed his function as secretary of Embassy at Paris. There he remained until 1819. He then returned to England, and became secretary to the Master-General of the Ordnance. In 1825 he went with the Duke of Wellington to St Petersburg as secretary of Embassy. In 1827

* Lord Fitzroy Somerset was not introduced to Sir Arthur Wellesley until just as he was starting for the Peninsula. Sir Arthur Wellesley and Lord Fitzroy Somerset sailed in the same ship, and they worked together at the Spanish language.
he was appointed military secretary to the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, and there he remained until the death of the Duke of Wellington in 1852. After that event he was made Master-General of the Ordnance, was appointed a Privy Councillor, and raised to the peerage. In February 1854 he became a full General.

Thus, from his very boyhood until the autumn of 1852, Lord Fitzroy Somerset had passed his life under the immediate guidance of the Duke of Wellington. The gain was not without its drawback; for in proportion as the great Duke's comprehensive grasp and prodigious power of work made him independent and self-sufficing, his subordinates were of course relieved from the necessity, and even shut out from the opportunity, of thinking for themselves; but still, to have been in the close presence and intimacy of Wellington from the very rising of his fame in Europe—to have toiled at the desk where the immortal despatches were penned—to have ridden at his side and carried his orders in all the great campaigns—and then, when peace returned, to have engaged in the labours of diplomacy and military administration under the auspices of the same commanding mind,—all this was to have a wealth of experience which common times cannot give.

But for more than thirty years of his life Lord Raglan had been administering the current business of military offices in peace-time, and this is a kind of experience which, if it be very long pro-
tracted, is far from being a good preparative for the command of an army in the field; because a military office in time of peace is impelled by its very constitution to aim at uniformity; and, on the other hand, the genius of war abhors uniformity, and tramples upon forms and regulations.

An armed force is a means to an end—the end is victory over enemies; and this is to be achieved, partly indeed by a due use of discipline and method, but partly also by keeping alive in those who may come to have command, a knowledge and love of war, and by cherishing that unlabelled, undocketed state of mind which shall enable a man to encounter the unknown. In England, however, and in most of the great States of Europe, the end had been so much forgotten in pursuit of the means, and the industry exerted in the regulation of troops in peace-time had become so foreign to the business of war, that the more a man was military in the narrowed sense of the term, the less he was likely to be fitted for the perturbing exigencies of a campaign. In one country this singular perversity of busy, 'cold, formal man,' had been carried so far, that an army and a war had been actually treated as things antagonistic the one to the other; for the late Grand Duke Constantine of Russia once declared that he dreaded a war, because he was sure it would spoil the troops, which, with ceaseless care and labour, he had striven to bring to perfection.
It is to be observed also, that partly from the way in which our military system was framed, and partly from political causes, the sympathy which England ought ever to have with her troops had been materially lessened after the first few years of the peace. The Duke of Wellington, dreading lest our forces should be dangerously reduced by the House of Commons, made it his policy to withdraw the army as much as possible from public observation. This method had tended still further to dissociate the country from its armed defenders: but naturally the Duke of Wellington's view was law; and it became the duty of those who were employed in the military administration, not to cause the country to practise itself heartily for the eventuality of another war, but simply to maintain, as far as they could, a monotonous quiet in the army. For half a lifetime Lord Fitzroy Somerset was engaged in preventing and allaying discussion, and making the wheels of office run smooth. Against the baneful effect of this sort of experience, and against the habit of mind which it tended to generate, Lord Raglan had to combat with all the fire and strength of his nature.

When Lord Raglan was appointed to the command he was sixty-six years old. But although there were intervals when a sudden relaxation of the muscles of the face used to show the impress of time, those moments were few; and, in general, his well-braced features, his wakeful attention, his uncommon swiftness of thought, his upright,
manly carriage, and his easy seat on horseback, made him look the same as a man in the strong mid-season of life.

He had one peculiarity which, although it went near to being a foible, was likely to give smoothness to his relations with the French. Beyond and apart from a just contempt for mere display, he had a strange hatred of the outward signs and tokens of military energy. Versed of old in real war, he knew that the clatter of a General briskly galloping hither and thither with staff and orderlies did not of necessity imply any momentous resolve,—that the aides-de-camp, swiftly shot off by a word like arrows from a bow, were no sure signs of despatch or decisive action; and because such outward signs might mean little, he shrank from them more than was right. He would have liked, if it had been possible, that he and his army should have glided unnoticed from the banks of the Thames to their position in the battle-field. It was certain, therefore, that although a French General would be sure to find himself checked in any really hurtful attempt to encroach upon the just station of the British army, yet that if, as was not unnatural, he should evince a desire for personal prominence, he would find no rival in Lord Raglan until he reached the enemy's presence.

He was gifted with a diction very apt for public business, and of a kind rarely found in Englishmen; for though it was so easy as to be just what men like in the intercourse of private
friendship, it was still so constructed as to be fit for the ear of all the world; and whether he spoke or whether he wrote—whether he used the French tongue or his own clear, graceful English—it seemed that there had come from him the very words which were the best and no more. It was so natural to him to be prudent in speech, that he avoided dangerous utterance without seeming cautious or reserved.

He had the subtle power to draw men along with him. To say that he was persuasive might mean that he could adduce reasons which tended to bring men to his views. His was a power of another sort, for without pressure of argument, his mind by its mere impact broke down resistance for the moment; and although the easy graciousness of his manner quickly set people free from all awkward constraint, it did not so liberate men's minds that, whilst they were still in his presence, they at all liked the duty of trying to uphold their own opinions against him. This dominion, however, was in a great degree dependent upon his actual personal presence; for, with all the power and grace of his pen, he could not, at a distance, work effects proportioned to those which he wrought when he dealt with men face to face.

It is plain that, in one respect, his empire over those who were in his presence was of a kind likely to become dangerous to him in the command of an army, because it prevented men from differing from him, and even made them shrink
from conveying to him an unwelcome truth. Indeed, after the death of the Duke of Wellington, the proudest Englishman, if only he had intellect and a little knowledge of his country's latter history, had generally the grace to understand that, unless he too were a soldier who had taken his orders from the lips of Sir Arthur Wellesley, he could hardly be the equal of one whose mere presence was a record of England's great days. Thence it followed that, without pretension on the one side or servility on the other, men who were with him had a tendency to become courtiers. It was in vain that, so far as it had to do with their personal contentment, his manner placed men at their ease; there was some quality in him, or else some outward circumstance—it was partly, perhaps, the historic appeal of his maimed sword-arm—which was always enforcing remembrance, and preventing his fusion with other men.

In truth, Lord Raglan's manner was of such a kind as to be, not simply ornament, but a real engine of power. It swayed events. There was no mere gloss in it. By some gift of imagination he divined the feelings of all sorts and conditions of men; and whether he talked to a statesman or a schoolboy, his hearer went away captive. I knew a shy, thoughtful, sensitive youth, just gazetted to a regiment of the Guards, who had to render his visit of thanks to the military secretary at the Horse Guards. He went in trepidation; he came back radiant with joy and wholesome
confident. Lord Fitzroy, instead of receiving him in solemn form and ceremony, had walked forward to meet him, had put his hand kindly on the boy's shoulder, and had said a few words so cheering, so interesting, and so free from the vice of being commonplace, that the impression clung to the lad, shaping his career for years, and helped to make him the man he was when he was out with his battalion in the winter of the first campaign.* From the same presence the foremost statesman of the time once came away saying, that the man in England most fitted by nature to be at the head of the Government was Lord Fitzroy Somerset; and he who so judged was himself a Prime Minister.

The enemies of the Imperial Government in France had long made it a reproach against the English that they were joining in close alliance with the midnight destroyers of law and freedom; but when Lord Raglan came to Paris—when he went to the Tuileries—when he was presented by the Emperor to Marshal St Arnaud,—the notion that such things could be was a very torment to those of the Parisian malcontents who chanced to know something of the English General:—

'You English are a robust, stirring people, and perhaps every man of you imagines that he covers himself with dignity and grandeur by trampling upon the feelings of the rest of

* The young officer here alluded to is no more, and I may venture to name him—Alexander Mitchell of Stow, who served in the Grenadier Guards.
mankind; but surely those men wrong you who call you a proud people. Pride causes men to stand aloof, as we do, from that which is base; and if ever again we call you haughty islanders, you may silence the calumny by reminding us of this 13th day of April in the year of grace 1854. It was not enough that, for the sake of this silly war, you should ally yourselves body and soul to "Monsieur de Morny's Lawgiver," and that you should suffer him to drag you down into close intercourse with persons whom the humblest of us here decline to know; but now, as though you really wished that your dishonour should be made signal in Europe, you send hither your General to be presented by "this French Emperor," as you call him, to his henchman, Mr Le Roy St Arnaud, and the man whom you choose out for this great public sacrifice is Fitzroy Somerset, the friend and companion-in-arms of your Wellington. You say that Lord Raglan cares not with whom he associates, so that he is under the orders of the Queen whom he serves, and in the performance of a public duty; but because he, in the loyalty, in the high-bred simplicity of his nature, is careless and forgetful of self—is that a reason why you should fail to be proud for him—why you should forget to be careful on his behalf? If the modesty of his nature hindered him from seeing the momentous significance of his contact with the people who have got into our palaces, ought you not to have interposed to prevent him from
incurring the scene of to-day. We imagined
that you knew how to honour the memory of
your Wellington, and that, after his death, when
you looked towards Fitzroy Somerset, or spoke
to him, or listened to his words, you looked and
spoke and listened like men who remembered.
Him, nevertheless, you now offer up. To have
brought you down to this is a great achievement
—the realisation of what they call here a "Na-
"poleanic idea!" The prisoner of St Helena is
avenged at last. We are classic here, and we
strike commemorative medals. You will soon
see the honoured image of your Fitzroy Somerset
undergoing presentation at the Tuileries. Al-
ready our artists have caught some glimpses of
him, and they declare it is the colouring, the
glow of the complexion, which makes him look
so English, and that in bronze he will be grandly
Roman. Those noble lineaments of his, that
upright manly form—nay, even the empty sleeve
which speaks to you of your day of glory—will
worthily signify what England was; and then
the effigy of our counterfeit Caesar receiving the
homage of a stainless Englishman, and joining
him hand to hand with Mr Le Roy St Arnaud,
this will show what England is. We hear that
you are well pleased with the prospect of all
this, and that, far from shrinking, your "virtuous
"middle classes," as you call it, is going into a
state of coarse rapture. For shame!

Lord Raglan, all unconscious of exciting this
kind of sympathy in the heart of the angry
Faubourg, had left England on the 10th of April 1854; and on the following day both he and His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge were received in state at the Tuileries. The presence of a member of our Royal Family was welcome to the new Emperor: he understood its significance. The Parisians love to see a momentous idea so impersonated as to be visible to the eyes of the body; and when their monarch attained to be seen riding between the near kinsman of the English Queen and the appointed commander of her army in the field—when on a bright spring day he showed his guest some thirty thousand of his best troops in the Champs de Mars, and the scarlet of the ancient enemy sparkled gaily by the side of the blue and the gold—the people seemed to accept the scene as a fitting picture of the great alliance of the West. Almost for the first time in the history of France, the accustomed cheers given to the Head of the State were mingled with cheers for England.

But now the time for concerted action had come; and though France and England were already allied by such bonds as are made with parchment and wax, it remained to be seen whether the great rivals could act together in arms. The conjuncture, indeed, drew them towards each other; but it was certain that the coherence of the union would greatly depend on one man. It might seem that he who had first sworn to maintain the French Republic, and had afterwards destroyed it by stealth in the night-
time, would not be much trusted again by his fellow-creatures; but the alliance rested upon ground more firm than the trust which one Prince puts in another. It rested—not, indeed, upon the common interests of France and England, for France, as we have seen, was suppressed—but upon the prospect of personal advantage which was offered to the new French Emperor by an armed and warlike alliance with England. It being clear that the alliance was for his good, and that, for the time, he had really the control of France, the only remaining question was, whether he would pursue what was plainly for his own advantage with steadiness and good sense. Upon the whole, it seemed likely that he would; for, though he was not a man to be stopped by scruples, he did not discard the use of loyalty and faithfulness, where loyalty and faithfulness seemed likely to answer his purpose; and there was a persistency in his nature which gave ground for hoping that, unless he should be induced to change by some really cogent reason, his steadfastness would endure. Moreover, as we have seen, he had the faculty—very easy to apply to geometry, but harder to use in politics—the faculty of keeping himself awake to the distinction between the Greater and the Less; and he did not forget that, for the time, the alliance with England was the greater thing, and that most other objects belonged to the category of the Less. These qualities, supported by good-humour,
and often by generous impulses, went far to make him an ally with whom (so long as he might find it advantageous to remain in accord with us) it would be possible, nay easy, and not unpleasant to act.

Lord Raglan submitted to the publicity and ceremonial visits forced upon him during the days of the 11th and 12th of April, and at one o'clock on the 13th he had a private interview with the French Emperor at the Tuileries. The Emperor and the English General were not strangers to one another. They had been frequently brought together in London; and, indeed, it was by Lord Fitzroy Somerset that the heir of the First Napoleon, deeply moved by the historic significance of the incident, had been brought to Apsley House and presented to the Duke of Wellington. The Emperor showed Lord Raglan the draft of the instructions which he proposed to address to Marshal St Arnaud.

It may be said that at this hour Lord Raglan began to have upon him the weight of that anxious charge which was never again to be thrown off so long as life and consciousness should endure. He had charge on behalf of England of the great alliance of the West; and since it happened that, in this the outset of his undertaking, he followed a method which characterised his relations with the French from first to last, there is a reason for now pointing it out. It seemed to him that in the intercourse of two proud and sensitive nations
undertaking to act in concert, one of the chief dangers lay in that kind of mental activity which is generated by the process of arguing. He made it a rule to avoid and avert all needless discussion; and he regarded as needless, not only those discussions which spring out of abstract questions, but many also of those which are generated by men's anxiety to provide for hypothetical conjunctures. He was very English in this respect, and he was no less English in the simple contrivance by which he sought to ward off the evil. Whenever there seemed to be impending a question which he regarded as avoidable, he prevented or obstructed its discussion by interposing for consideration some practical matter which was more or less important in its way, but not unsafe. And now, when there was perhaps some fear that questions of an embarrassing and delicate kind might be raised by the pondering Emperor, Lord Raglan kept them aloof by engaging attention to the choice of the camping-ground best suited for the two armies. He seems to have succeeded in confining all discussion to this one safe and practical subject.

When the Emperor at length brought his guest back into the outer room, there were there assembled Prince Jerome, the Duke of Cambridge, Marshal Vaillant the Minister of War, Marshal St Arnaud, and Lord De Ros. The vital business of making arrangements best fitted to prevent collision between the armies was anxiously weighed. Marshal Vaillant, laborious, well in-
structured, precise, and rather, perhaps, fatiguing in his tendency to probe deep every question, strove hard to anticipate the eventualities likely to occasion difficulty in the relations of the two armies, and to force a clear understanding beforehand as to the way in which each question should be dealt with. This he endeavoured to do by putting it to St Arnaud in a categorical way* to say what solution he proposed for each of the imagined problems; but St Arnaud, it then appeared, was hardly more fond than Lord Raglan was of hypothetical questions, for after a little while, his endurance of Vaillant’s interrogatories came to an end; and he answered impatiently, and in a general way, that when the conjunctures arose, they would be met, as best they might, by the concerted action of the Generals.

The period of the great French Revolution has gathered so much of the mellowness of age from later events, that it seems like a disturbance of chronology to be bringing into the joint council of France and England, in the year 1854, a brother of the first Napoleon. Yet Prince Jerome was one of the speakers, and he spoke with sound judgment upon the great problem of how France and England should act together in arms. He spoke, as might be expected, with less sagacity when the subject of ‘The Turks’ floated up into notice. The whole French people, and many

* The French verb ‘poser’ would describe Marshal Vaillant’s labours; the English verb active ‘to pose’ would describe the effect upon the patient.
even of the people of this country, imagine that the wisdom and power of man are tested by his proximity to the newest stage of civilisation: and from those whose minds are in that state, the true worth of the Osmanli, whether in policy or in arms, must always be hidden. If he sustains reverses, their minds are satisfied, for in that case, their little equation appears, as they would say, to 'come right;' but, on the other hand, his success disturbs their most deep-set notions of logical sequence; and now, after all Omar Pasha's achievements on the Danube, it seemed to be the impression of Prince Jerome and the French Marshals that the Turkish General would be a source of trouble and anxiety to the alliance. They looked upon the events which had been occurring as accidental and anomalous, and tending to produce a wrong conclusion. The Russians, as they well knew, had carried the industry of military preparation to the utmost verge of human endurance. The Turks had provided themselves with a powerful field-artillery, had kept their old yatagans bright, and had cherished their ancient love of war; but, for the rest, they had trusted much in Heaven. Yet during some six or seven months these pious, improvident, warlike men had been getting the better of drilled masses. Their success seemed to carry a dangerous lesson; and the French Councillors thought it so important for the Turks to be broken in to the yoke of a newer civilisation, that they even said it might be advantageous for Omar
Pasha to undergo the discipline of a few wholesome reverses.*

From all he observed in the course of these interviews, Lord Raglan was led to believe in the stability of the Emperor's character, and the value he set upon the alliance.

After a few days, the arrangements detaining Lord Raglan in Paris were complete, and he took his departure for the East.

The joint occupation by French and English troops of the ground on the shores of the Dardanelles had yielded the first experience of the relations likely to subsist between the armies of the two nations when quartered near to each other. It quickly appeared that the troops of each force could be cordially good-humoured in their intercourse with those of the other. Canrobert, Bosquet, and Sir George Brown, all destined to take prominent share in the coming events, made a kindly beginning of acquaintance amid the early difficulties and discomforts of Gallipoli; and upon the departure of Sir George Brown from the Dardanelles, there occurred one of those opportunities for the display of good feeling on which the French are accustomed to seize with a quickness, tact, and grace belonging to no other nation. Sir George Brown was to bring up with him to headquarters two of the English regiments; and the

* Some might imagine that this hope must have been expressed in jest, but that is not the case. Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless certain that this view was gravely put forward.
French—spontaneously, as it appeared, and from a simple impulse of goodwill—came down to aid in the embarkation. They set themselves to the work with all that briskness and gay energy by which the French soldiery convert an operation of mere labour and industry into a cheerful and animating scene. The incident in itself was a small one; but, viewed as a sign of things to come, it had greater proportions. It was accepted at the time by Lord Raglan as a happy omen—an omen which seemed to promise that the alliance of the West would hold good.

But whilst the soldier was giving the best of sanctions to the great Alliance, the Marshal of France was putting it in jeopardy. M. St Arnaud had not been long on the shores of the Bosphorus when he entered upon a tempting scheme of ambition. General Bosquet, despatched to the headquarters at Shumla, had brought back accounts, which the Marshal at first could hardly credit, of the good state and apparent effectiveness of the Turkish troops; and it was then, perhaps, that St Arnaud first thought of the step which he afterwards took. He conceived the idea of obtaining the command of the whole Turkish army. The effect which this united command would have upon the relations between the French and the English General was obvious. The English General, with his strength of some twenty-five thousand men, had always foreseen that he was likely to be somewhat embarrassed in having to claim due consideration for a force which was less by
one-half than the army sent out by the French; but if Marshal St Arnaud should be at the head, not only of his fifty thousand French, but of the whole force of Turkey, it would obviously become very hard, nay, even unfitting, for the English General to maintain an equality in council with one who, in this case, would command altogether nearly two hundred thousand men. Marshal St Arnaud pressed his demand with the Ministers of the Porte at Constantinople, and he seems to have imagined that he had obtained their assent to his demand. If, indeed, they did really give a seeming assent to the proposed encroachment, they could hardly have meant it to take effect. They perhaps put their trust then where they had put their trust before. They knew that Lord Stratford was at Therapia, and they might well believe that he would make the elaborate world go back into chaos before he would suffer the armies of the Caliph to pass, like the contingent of some mere petty Christian State, under the orders of a French Commander.

On the 11th of May, Marshal St Arnaud called upon Lord Raglan, and stated, in the course of conversation, that the Turkish Government had determined to place Omar Pasha's army under his (the Marshal's) command; and that he was then going to Reshid Pasha in order to have the matter finally settled. Lord Raglan merely said he believed the British Ambassador was not aware of the arrangement. On the 13th, Marshal St Arnaud sent to propose that Lord Raglan would
meet him at Lord Stratford's, and intimated that he had an important communication to make. It was arranged that the English Ambassador should receive the Marshal alone, 'in order;' as Lord Stratford almost cruelly expressed it—'in order to make his acquaintance,' and that afterwards Lord Raglan should join them.

It jars upon one's love of fair strife to see Marshal St Arnaud brought in cold blood into the presence of the two men whom he ventured to encounter; into the presence of Lord Stratford prepared and calmed by his foreknowledge of the intrigue—and of Lord Raglan, roused by his sense of the danger which threatened the alliance. But the interview took place. The Marshal went to the English Embassy, and the operation of 'making his acquaintance' was carried into full effect. Imagination may see the process—may see the light, agile Frenchman coming gaily into the room, content with himself, content with all the world, and charmed at first with the sea-blue depth of the eyes that lightened upon him from under the shadow of the Canning brow, but presently beginning to understand the thin, tight, merciless lips of his host, and then finding himself cowed and pressed down by the majesty and the graciousness of the welcome; for the welcome was such as the great Eltechi would be sure to give to one who (for imperative reasons of State) was to be treated as his honoured guest, but who was also a vain mortal, pretending to the command of the Ottoman army, and daring
to come with his plot avowed into the very presence of an English Ambassador. Afterwards Lord Raglan came into the room, and then the Marshal began upon the business in hand. He said he had required, and the Turkish Government had consented, that Omar Pasha should be placed under his orders; that a brigade of Turkish infantry and a battery of artillery should be incorporated into each of the French divisions; that fifteen hundred of the Bashi-Bazouks should be dismounted, that their horses should be turned over to the French troopers, and that the Bashi-Bazouks should be paid (it was not said by whom), and then be sent back to their homes.

If this proposal had been then for the first time made known to Lord Stratford, his fiery nature would scarcely perhaps have suffered him to hear with temper; but he had been prepared by Lord Raglan for what was coming, and he seemed all calm and gentleness. After hearing the proposal with benign attention, he quietly asked the Marshal whether he had cognisance of the tripartite treaty; and then, turning to a copy of the treaty which happened—not at all by chance—to be lying within his reach, he read aloud the fourth article: an article which proceeds upon the assumption that the three armies would be under the orders of distinct commanders. The Marshal—ready perhaps to encounter the more obvious arguments against the expediency of the plan—was scarcely prepared for this quiet reference to the terms of the treaty. Lord Raglan
then said that he thought a good deal of inconvenience might result from the adoption of the Marshal's plan; that Omar Pasha was the ablest of the Turkish generals; that his services had been recognised by the grant of the rank of Generalissimo and the title of Highness; and that to deprive him of the superior command, and to dismember his army, at a moment when it was in presence of the enemy, would not only lower him in the estimation of those who looked up to him with confidence, but would probably induce him to throw up his charge in disgust, and declare that he would not suffer himself to be degraded.

But both Lord Raglan and the English Ambassador were gifted with the power which is one of the most keen and graceful of all the accomplishments of the diplomatist—the power of affecting the hearer with an apprehension of what remains unsaid. It is a power which exerts great sway over human actions; for men are more cogently governed by what they are forced to imagine than by what they are allowed to know. 'The Marshal,' Lord Raglan wrote, 'saw that our opinions were stronger than our expression of them.' He gave way. He immediately declared that, far from wishing to diminish the consequence of Omar Pasha, he was anxious to add to it, to uphold him to the utmost, and to increase his importance; and he added that he saw the propriety of deciding nothing until after a conference with Omar Pasha. By the time that St Arnaud
passed out of the Embassy gate his enterprise was virtually abandoned.

Some good perhaps resulted from the attempt to bring the Ottoman army under French command. Of all the faults tending to impair the value of Lord Raglan's advice to the Home Government, there was none more grave than his want of power to appreciate warlike people belonging to an earlier state of civilisation than that to which he had been accustomed in his later years; and although nothing could ever soften his antipathy towards Turkish Irregulars of all kinds, and especially to the Bashi-Bazouks, he was by this incident drawn more than ever towards the Turkish Generalissimo, and he always thenceforth did his best to defeat any plan which tended to narrow the sphere of the Pasha's authority.

So great was the elasticity of Marshal St Arnaud's mind, that, far from remaining cast down under the discomfiture which he had undergone, he very soon entered upon a scheme yet more ambitious than the first. It seems he had become possessed with the idea that great achievements were within his reach, if only he could add to the powers which he already wielded the occasional command of English troops. He proposed that, when French and English troops were acting together, the senior officer, whether he chanced to be French or English, should take the command of the joint force; and although this proposal was so expressed that it might be re-
regarded as applying only to the command of detachments, it was surmised that (M. St Arnaud's military rank being higher than that of Lord Raglan) the control of the whole British force was the object really in view.

The experience of the conference at the British Embassy had proved the good sedative effect of a dry document; and as the instructions addressed to the English General chanced to contain some words directing him to take no orders except from the Secretary of State,* the clause was happily put forward by Lord Raglan as an impediment to the proposed plan. Marshal St Arnaud gave way, and thenceforth desisted from all further prosecution of his scheme.

So skilful was the resistance opposed to these enterprises of M. St Arnaud, and the character of the Marshal was so free from all admixture of spite and bitterness, that their frustration did not create ill-feeling. It was plain, however, that recurrence to projects of this sort would be dangerous to the alliance; and when the French Emperor knew that these schemes had been tried and defeated, he forbade all attempts to revive them.

Hitherto the cause which had been threatening the cohesion of the Alliance was M. St Arnaud's ambition. The next obstruction which Lord Raglan had to deal with was one of a very different kind. Checked, as is supposed, by the au-

* The clause, I imagine, had been introduced in order to negative the supposition that the Ambassador at Constantinople was to have the control of the military operations.
Authoritative counsels sent out to him from Paris, Marshal St Arnaud suddenly announced that, for some time to come, the French army could not be suffered to move towards the seat of the war.

The measures for sending up the British forces to Varna were in progress, and the Light Division had been already despatched, when, at eleven o'clock at night, Colonel Trochu presented himself at the British headquarters, and requested an immediate interview with Lord Raglan. The name of Colonel Trochu will recur in this narrative, for he was an officer of great weight in the councils of the French army. He had come from France so lately as the 10th of May, and although his nominal office was simply that of first aide-de-camp to Marshal St Arnaud, it was known that he came out fully charged with the notions and the wishes of the French Emperor. Colonel Trochu was a cautious, thinking man, well versed in strategic science, and it was surmised that it was part of his mission to check anything like wildness in the movements of the French Marshal.*

He stated that he had been sent by Marshal St Arnaud to request that Lord Raglan would postpone any further movement towards Varna, until the Marshal should have an opportunity of satisfying himself that any considerable portion of the French army was in a condition to take the field.

Up to this moment no doubt had been entertained of the forwardness of the French prepara-

* Modérer la foudre de M. le Maréchal.
transactions; and Lord Raglan, much astonished, expressed strong objection to the proposed delay.

Colonel Trochu replied that, upon his arrival in the Levant, he had gone to Gallipoli in order to see what degree of forwardness the preparations of the French army had really attained; and he had come, he said, to the conclusion that the French army was not as yet so equipped and provided as to render it practicable, with anything like common prudence, to attempt operations against the enemy. He went on to justify his conclusion by details, showing the deficiencies under which the French army laboured; he said that he had communicated the result of his inspection and the opinion which he had formed to Marshal St Arnaud, and that Marshal St Arnaud, entirely adopting that opinion, had sent him to the English headquarters in order that he might prevail upon Lord Raglan to suspend the intended movement.

Lord Raglan observed that great inconvenience would result from the proposed suspension of the movement; that the movement was one actually proposed by the French and English commanders to Omar Pasha, and by him, as well as by the Turkish Ministers, entirely approved; and that thus the French and the English commanders stood pledged to Omar Pasha, and to the Porte, at a moment, too, when much anxiety existed for the fate of Silistria. Colonel Trochu admitted all this; but he again urged the necessity for delay.
The interview lasted till an hour after midnight, and Colonel Trochu's request was followed up on the ensuing day by written communications from the French Marshal. But the importance of these discussions was superseded by a further and more perilous change in the French counsels.

At seven o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 4th of June, Marshal St Arnaud called upon Lord Raglan, and announced that he had determined upon an entirely new plan of operations for his army. Instead of moving his force to Varna, as had been agreed, he had resolved, he said, to send there only one division, and to place all the rest of his army in position—not in advance, but in rear of the Balkan range. He was to have his right resting on the sea at Bourgas; his headquarters were to be at Aidos; and he hoped, he said, to be able to establish himself there by the third week of June. He invited Lord Raglan to conform to this plan, and to take up a position at Bournabat, a part of the proposed position which was the most remote from the sea.

Thus, at a time when the eyes of all Europe were upon Silistria and the campaign on the Danube, it was proposed that the armies of the Western Powers should take up a mere defensive—a timidly defensive—position, placing all Bulgaria, a part of Roumelia, and the whole range of the Balkan, between them and the scene of conflict! What made the matter still more grave was this, that Marshal St Arnaud did not come to consult. He had already adopted this almost
incredible plan, and his troops were then actually in march for the new position.

It might now, indeed, seem that those were right who had deemed the great alliance of the West to be impracticable. For all the purposes of the campaign the proposed plan would have caused the armies of the two Western Powers to become simply null. Lord Raglan at once declared his entire disapproval of it.

Tied, perhaps, to this singular plan by the counsels which Trochu had brought him, Marshal St Arnaud, for the time, did not yield. But the English General, as I have already said, had a quality which made it difficult and painful for men to maintain a difference with him whilst they were in his presence. St Arnaud was under this stress; and as though he shrank from the ascendancy of Lord Raglan, and sought a respite from the effort of having to oppose him in oral discussion, he imagined the idea of bending over a table and writing down what he had to say. This he did; and when the writing was finished, he left it with Lord Raglan. But the Marshal seems to have inwardly determined that Colonel Trochu, who had probably suggested this new plan of campaign, should himself be made to bear the pain of further sustaining it; for he took his leave, saying that the Colonel should be sent to Lord Raglan on the following day.

In this curious paper, written by St Arnaud in Lord Raglan's presence, the Marshal said the great advantage of the French and English having
only one division each at Varna would be, that they would not get entangled prematurely in hostile operations; for with such a small force no one could taunt the Western Powers for not marching to relieve Silistria, or for not giving battle to the Russians; whereas, argued the Marshal, if the Allies were present in greater strength, it was to be feared that they might suffer themselves to be carried away by the Turks. 'It is important,' said the Marshal, 'not to give battle to the Russians, except with all possible chances of success, and the certainty of obtaining great results.' Then, after describing the supposed advantages of his intended position in rear of the Balkan, the Marshal reverted to his dread of being carried forward by the warlike Turks. 'We must not,' said he, 'lose sight of this; that we are here to aid the Turks—to succour them, to save them—but not by following their plans and their ideas. It is evident that Omar Pasha has no other idea, but that of drawing on the allied army to give battle to the Russians, and to relieve Silistria. The safety of Turkey is not in Silistria; and it is necessary to aid and succour the Turks in our own way.'

No one perhaps will now defend a plan of campaign which was to place the allied armies of the Western Powers in a position some hundreds of miles from the scene of any conflict, and to withdraw them from the very proximity of the Ottoman generalissimo for fear of his warlike counsels. Still, such justice as is due must be rendered to
the French strategists. France and England had sent to the East that portion of the two armies which consists of combatants; but neither of the Western Powers had hitherto constituted on the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus that vast accumulation of stores, of munitions of war, and means of transport which would enable it to live, to move freely, and to fight. Both the armies had means of subsistence for the next few days, and were so equipped as to be able to fight a battle on the beach; but neither army had, nor could have for many months, those vast warehouses of stores and those immense means of land-transport which could alone sustain regular and extended operations in the field. They had not, in short, as yet, constituted their oriental 'base of operations.' Therefore, if purely military views were to govern, and if Russia were really the formidable invader of Turkey that the world had believed her to be, there would have been some rashness in pushing forward the combatants of the two armies towards the scene of conflict with a knowledge that for some time to come, they would be unable to move freely in the field.

The true ground for overruling the hesitation of the French strategists lay in the now obvious fact that (to say nothing of the armies of France and England assembled on the Bosphorus, with vast means of sea-transport at their command) Russia, ill-prepared for a great War in the South, driven out of the Euxine, threatened by Austria, and fiercely encountered and hitherto repulsed by the
Ottoman forces, was not so formidable an invader of European Turkey as to deserve that her despairing struggles in the country of the Lower Danube should be encountered with all the resources of strategic prudence. Besides, the question was not purely a military one. It was certain that the mere presence of the French and the English forces in the neighbourhood of the conflict would have a moral weight more than proportioned to their actual readiness for offensive operations. Finally, the question had been settled. The allied Generals, in their conference with Omar Pasha, had engaged to move their troops to Varna; and the honour of France and England stood pledged.

But if there was a semblance of military wisdom in the hesitation of the French to move up to Varna, there was none in their plan for the defensive line behind the Balkan at Aidos; for if the want of means of land-transport threatened to hamper the activity of the force even in the advanced position of Varna, it is obvious that the same cause would have reduced the French and English forces to sheer uselessness if they had taken up a position at so vast a distance as Aidos is from the scene of the conflict. If the plan had been followed, no French nor English troops in that year would have seen the shape of a Russian battalion. Yet Marshal St Arnaud, so far as concerned France, had determined thus to forfeit all military significance in the pending campaign, and had done so, and had begun to carry the plan
into execution, without consulting his English colleague.

How France was saved from this humiliation, and how the great alliance was preserved, will now be seen.

On the day following the interview with Marshal St Arnaud, Colonel Trochu came, as had been agreed, to Lord Raglan’s quarters. After repeating what Marshal St Arnaud had stated the day before—namely, that Bosquet’s Division was already in march for Adrianople—the Colonel pressed the advantages of the position which Marshal St Arnaud had proposed to take up in rear of the Balkan.

Lord Raglan heard all, and then simply requested Colonel Trochu to inform Marshal St Arnaud that he, Lord Raglan, objected to place any portion of Her Majesty’s army in Roumelia.

Lord Raglan added, that the movement which seemed to him the best was an advance to the front with a view to join Omar Pasha in an effort to relieve Silistria; and he said that if the Marshal were not prepared for such a movement, he (Lord Raglan) would keep his divisions on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and hold them ready to embark at any moment for Varna.

Firmness conquered. On the morning of the 10th of June, Colonel Rose came to the English headquarters, and announced that Marshal St Arnaud now consented to abandon his plan of taking up a defensive position behind the Balkan, and that, reverting to the original determination.
of the Allies, he would assemble his army at Varna.

Thus the danger passed. Secrecy, it would appear, had been well maintained; and the world did not know that, for all purposes of concerted military operations, the alliance of the Western Powers had lain in abeyance for five days.

Leaving small detachments at Gallipoli, the French and the English armies were now moved up to Varna. General Bosquet's Division, however, was made to feel the consequences of the resolution adopted by the French strategists; for, this division having actually commenced its march towards Adrianople in furtherance of the then intended plan of taking up a position behind the Balkan, Marshal St Arnaud, it seems, did not like to issue a countermand which would have disclosed to a sagacious soldiery his double change of counsels—nay, perhaps, might have given them a glimpse of the almost ridiculous destiny from which they had been saved by Lord Raglan. So, whilst all the rest of the allied forces were gliding up to Varna by water, Bosquet's Division continued to follow the direction first given it, and was brought into Bulgaria by long, painful marches. If the warlike Zouaves composing part of the division had known that their long, toilsome movement in the midst of the great summer-heats was the result of a plan for placing the French army in position at a distance of several hundreds of miles from the enemy, they would have solaced the labours of the march by tearing
the repute of the schemer who contrived it, and making him the butt for their wit.

It is obvious that the premature disclosure, either of Marshal St Arnaud's ambitious schemes or of his faltering counsels, would have been fraught with danger to the alliance; and since it used to happen in those days that tidings freshly entrusted to the English Cabinet were often disclosed to the world, it seems useful to show how it was that Lord Raglan proved able to screen these transactions of Marshal St Arnaud from the inquiring eye of the public. Apparently he did this by being careful in the choice of the time for making disclosures to the authorities at home. Except when there was a good reason for taking a contrary course, he liked to delay the communication of affairs involving danger until the danger was past. Thus, for instance, he would describe the beginning of an intrigue, and also its final defeat, at the same time; and the result was, that the end of the despatch not only made the disclosure of the earlier part of it comparatively harmless, but even destroyed its value as an article of 'news;' for in proportion as people were greedy for fresh tidings, they were careless of things which ranged with the past, and the time was so stirring that the tale of an abandoned plan of campaign, or an intrigue already baffled and extinct, was hardly a rich enough gift for a Minister to carry to a newsman.

Thus were averted the early dangers which
threatened the alliance; and thus, after resolving to take up a position some hundreds of miles distant from the nearest Russian outpost, the French Marshal gave way at last to Lord Raglan's ascendant, and was soon pushed forward to a camping-ground within hearing of the enemy's guns.
CHAPTER XIII.

The closing events of the summer campaign in Bulgaria did so much to kindle that zeal which forced on the invasion of the Crimea, that it seems right to speak of them here, not with any notion of putting into the set form of 'History' things which all Europe knew at the time in the most authentic way, but rather for the purpose of showing how the armies at Varna, and the statesmen and the people in England, were touched, were stirred, nay, governed, by the tidings which came from the Danube. Prince Paskievitch stood charged to execute with his own hand the plan of campaign which his Sovereign had persuaded him to design;* and accordingly, in the summer of the year 1854, he found himself marching on the Danube at the head of the Russian army then engaged in attempting an invasion of the Ottoman Empire. He had insisted, as we have seen, that, as the needful condition of a prosperous campaign, Silistria must fall by the first of May.† It was not before the middle of

* See ante, chap. iv.  
† Ibid.
the month that he was able to appear before the place; but thenceforth he lost no time, and on the 19th he opened his first parallel.

The new defences of the fortress had been planned by Colonel Grach, a Prussian officer in the service of the Porte. He had brought to the work a great deal of knowledge and judgment. He was still in the place, and he continued to lend the aid of his science to the garrison whenever he could do so without going out of his dwelling-house; but adhering, it seems, to the bare terms on which he had engaged his services, he stiffly abstained from taking any other than a scientific part in the struggle.

Prince Paskievitch pressed the seige with a vehemence which seemed to disdain all economy of the lives of his soldiery; and the place being weakly garrisoned, and seemingly abandoned to its fate, its fall was supposed to be nigh. To uphold the Sultan's cause three armies were at hand, but no one of them was moved forward with a view to relieve the place. Omar Pasha, shrewd and wary, was gathering the strength of the Ottoman Empire at Shumla, and it did not enter into his plan of campaign to smooth the path of the Russian General by going forward in strength to give him a meeting under the guns of the beleaguered fortress. On the other hand, France and England were rapidly assembling their forces in the neighbourhood of Varna, but, for want of sufficing means of land-transport, they were not yet in a condition to take the field.
Day by day the two armies at Varna were moved by fitful tidings of a conflict in which, though it raged within earshot, they were suffered to take no part. At first, few men harboured the thought that, without deliverance brought by a relieving force, a humble Turkish fortress would be able to hold out against the collected strength of Russia and the most renowned of her Generals. Soon, it was known that, of their own free will and humour, two young Englishmen—Captain Butler of the Ceylon Rifles, and Lieutenant Nasmyth of the East India Company’s Service—had thrown themselves into the place, and were exercising a strange mastery over the garrison. On one of the hills overlooking the town there was a seam of earth which, as though it were a kind of low fence designed and thrown up by a peasant, passed along three sides of the slope in a doubtful meandering course. This was the earthwork which soon became famous in Europe. It was called the Arab Tabia. The work was one of a slight and rude sort; but the ground it stood on was judged to be needful to the besiegers, and, at almost any cost of life to his people, Prince Paskievitch resolved to seize it. By diligent fighting on the hill-side—by sapping close up to the ditch—by springing mines which more than once blew in the counterscarp and levelled the parapet—by storming it in the daytime—by storming it at night—the Russians strove hard to carry the work; but when they sprang a mine, they ever found that behind the
ruins the Turks stood retrenched; and whether they stormed it by day or by night, their masses of columns were always met fiercely—were always driven back with a cruel slaughter. Prince Paskievič, the General commanding in chief, and General Schilders, who commanded the siege-works, were both struck down by shot and disabled. On the side of the Turks, Mussa Pasha, who commanded the garrison, was killed; but Butler and Nasmyth, now obeyed with a touching affection and trustfulness by the Ottoman soldiery, were equal to the historic occasion which they had had the fortune and the spirit to seize. At one time they were laying down some new work of defence; at another, the two firm lads were governing the judgment of the Turkish commanders in a council of war. Sometimes, with ear pressed to the earth, they were listening for the dull blows of the enemy's underground pickaxes. Now and then they were engaged in dragging to his place under fire some unworthy Turkish commander; and once in their sportive and English way, they were busy in getting together a sweepstakes, to be won by him who should name the day when Silistria would be relieved; but always when danger gathered in the Arab Tabia, the grateful Turks looked and saw that their young English guests were amongst them, ever ready with counsel for the new emergency, forbidding all thought of surrender, and even, it seems, determined to lay rough hands on the General who sought to withdraw with his
troops from the famous earthwork.* The presence of these youths proved apparently all that was needed for making of the Moslem hordes a faithful, heroic, and devoted soldiery. Upon ground known to be mined they stood as tranquilly as upon any other hill-side. ‘It was impossible,’ said Nasmyth’s successor in the Arab Tabia—‘it was impossible not to admire the cool indifference of the Turks to danger. Three men were shot in the space of five minutes while throwing up earth for the new parapet, at which only two men could work at a time so as to be at all protected; and they were succeeded by the nearest bystander, who took the spade from the dying man’s hands and set to work as calmly as ‘if he were going to cut a ditch by the road-side.’ Indeed, the childlike trust which these men were able to put in their young English leaders, so freed them from all doubt and question concerning the wisdom of the orders given, that they joyfully abandoned themselves to the rapture of fighting for religion, and grew so enamoured of death—so enamoured of the very blackness of the grave—that sometimes in the pauses of the fight a pious Mussulman, intent on close fighting and blissful thoughts of Paradise, would come up with a pickaxe in hand, would speak some touching words of devotion and gratitude to Butler and Nasmyth, and then proudly fall to work and dig

* I take it that this is what was meant by Nasmyth’s expression, ‘peculiar inducement.’ The man upon whom the ‘peculiar inducement’ was brought to bear was one whom Butler had dragged out bodily from his hiding-place.
for himself the last home, where he charged his comrades to lay him as soon as he attained to die.

Omar Pasha not choosing to march to the relief of Silistria, but being unwilling to leave its defenders to sheer despair, sent General Cannon* (Behram Pasha he was called in the Turkish army) with a brigade of irregular light infantry and instructed him to occupy some of the wooded ground in the neighbourhood of the place, with a view to trouble the enemy and to encourage the garrison. General Cannon, however, learnt, on reaching the neighbourhood of Silistria, that the hopes of the garrison had already ebbed very low; and therefore, though without the warrant of orders, he resolved to throw himself into the place with his whole brigade. This, by means of a stratagem and a long circuitous night-march, he was able to do. His achievement, as was natural, gave joy to the garrison; and, turning to account the enthusiasm of the moment, he administered, as is said, a direful oath to the Pasha in command—an oath whereby the Turk swore that, happen what might, he would never surrender the place.

It was whilst General Cannon was in Silistria that Captain Butler received the wound of which he afterwards died. The Russians had sapped up so close to the ditch that, if a man behind the

* General Cannon was an officer of our Indian army who had served with distinction in India, and in the force (the British Legion) which operated in Spain under the orders of General Evans.
parapet spoke much above a whisper, the sound of his voice used to draw the enemy's fire towards the nearest loophole or embrasure. Captain Butler, it seems, with a view to throw up a new work of defence, was reconnoitring the enemy's approaches through an aperture made in the parapet, and was consulting about his plan with General Cannon, when the General's aide-de-camp said something in a tone loud enough to be heard by a Russian marksman. The sound brought a rifle-ball in through the loophole and struck Captain Butler the blow from which (being weakened by toil and privation) he died before the end of the siege.

For some reason which he deemed to be imperative—stringent orders, perhaps, from Shumla—General Cannon marched out of the place with his brigade on the 18th of June, and at his request Nasmyth also went away for a time in order to confer with Omar Pasha at the Turkish headquarters; but meanwhile Lieutenant Ballard of the Indian army, coming thither of his own free will, had thrown himself into the besieged town; and whenever the enemy stirred, there was always, at the least, one English lad in the Arab Tabia, directing the counsels of the garrison, repressing the thought of surrender, and keeping the men in good heart.*

* The narratives of the siege of Silistria which appeared in the 'Times' were given, as is well known, by Nasmyth himself, and by the officer who succeeded to him and to Butler in governing the counsels of the garrison and helping to defend the Arab Tabia. Therefore any other account of the siege which I
There was a part of the allied camp where the French and the English soldiery could hear in a quiet hour the distant guns of Silistria. Day after day they listened for the continuing of the sound; and they listened keenly, for they were expecting the end, and there was nothing but the booming of the cannon to assure them that the fortress held out. On the 22d of June, and during a great part of the night which followed it, they heard the low thunder of the siege more continuously than ever before; but on the dawn of the following day they listened, and listened in vain. The cannonade had ceased, and it was believed in camp that the place had been taken. The opposite of this was the truth. The siege had been raised. The event was one upon which the course of history was destined to hinge; for this miscarriage at Silistria put an end at once to all schemes for the invasion of the Sultan's dominions in Europe.

Whilst Europe was still in wonder at the deliverance of Silistria, the French and the English armies at Varna were greeted with tidings of yet another victory won by the Turks.

Hassan Pasha was at Rustchuk with a large
body of Turkish troops; and at Giurgevo, on the opposite bank of the river, General Soimonoff commanded twelve battalions of Russian infantry, with several squadrons of horse and some guns. Both the Russian and the Turkish commanders desired that at this time there should be no conflict; and it might be thought that in this respect they would have their way; for although the forces at Rustchuk and at Giurgevo were near to each other, the broad Danube rolled between them. But the Ottoman soldiery are of so warlike a nature that, when their enemy is at hand, they are oftentimes seized with a raging desire for the fight; and the one check which tends to keep down this passion is a sense of the incoherency which results from the want of good officers. But so ready and so deep is their trust in any of our countrymen who will take the trouble to lead them, that, if Turkish soldiers be camped within reach of the enemy, the coming amongst them of a few English youths supplies the one thing needed, completes the electric circle, and in general brings on a fight. Now it happened that, besides General Cannon, who was on duty, and in command of a Turkish brigade, seven young English officers had found their way to the camp of Hassan Pasha. Two of these, Captain Bent and Lieutenant Burke, were officers of the Royal Engineers; Meynell was a Lieutenant in the 75th Regiment; Hinde, Arnold, and Ballard (the last of them fresh come from Silistria), were officers of our Indian army; Colonel Ogilvy was
General Cannon's aide-de-camp, but he gave his services freely; and, indeed, it may be said that, so far as concerns the part they took in the battle, every one of these seven young Englishmen was there of his own mere will.*

On the morning of the 7th of July it was observed that the Russians had struck their tents; and they were so posted that their numbers could not be descried from the right bank of the river. It was believed in the Turkish camp that Soimonoff had withdrawn the main part of his force; and it seems that what Hassan Pasha really meant to do was to execute a reconnaissance, and assure himself of the enemy's retreat. Be this as it may, he ordered, or consented, that the river should be crossed at two points; and General Cannon, embarking in boats with 300 riflemen, and speedily followed by a battalion of infantry under Ferik Bekir Pasha, succeeded in reaching the left bank of the river without encountering resistance. As soon as they had landed, the Turks tried to gain a lodgment upon a strip of ground where their front was covered by a long narrow mere or pool of water. Soon, however, they were attacked on their left flank by a body of Russian infantry, which issued from an earthwork placed above the western extremity of the

* The two Engineer officers, Captain Bent and Lieutenant Burke, had been sent to the Turkish camp with instructions to advise and aid in the construction of military works; but of course they had not been ordered to lead the Turks into battle; and therefore I include them with the rest of the seven as men taking part in the battle without professional sanction.
merc. Cannon and Bent, with their riflemen, not only withstood this attack, but drove their assailants back into the fosse from which they had issued, and there, it seems, a good deal of slaughter took place. Afterwards the riflemen were forced to give way, and fall back upon the main body of the troops, which had effected their landing; but young Ballard led forward another body of skirmishers, and kept the enemy back. What was needed was, that the troops which had landed should intrench themselves; but they had come without gabions or sand-bags, and nothing as yet could be done towards gaining a firm lodgment. There was a good deal of confusion amongst the troops, and the enterprise seemed likely to fail, when Ali Pasha, who was a brave and an able officer, came over with fresh troops. He soon restored order, and the men began to throw up intrenchments.

Meanwhile two battalions, led on by Ogilvy, Hinde, Arnold, Meynell, and Burke, had crossed the river higher up, in detached bodies; and although these small bands were left from first to last without reinforcements—although they had to move flankwise close under the guns of a Russian battery, which killed very many—and although they were sharply attacked and at one time hard pressed by the enemy’s infantry, as well as by four squadrons of cavalry—the remnant of these venturesome men fought their way down along the river’s bank, and at last made good their junction with the main body, then
intrenching itself behind the mere. But before they attained to this they had lost a great proportion of their comrades, and of their five youthful leaders they had lost three, for Burke, Arnold, and Meynell were killed.

Meanwhile fresh troops had been crossing the river at the point opposite to the landing-place first seized; and at length there was established on the ground behind the mere a force of some five thousand men.

Upon either flank of this body the Russian infantry came down in strong columns. Four times the attack was made, and four times the Turks, commanded or led on by Ali Pasha and General Cannon, by Bent, Hinde, Ogilvy, and Ballard, drove back their assailants with great slaughter. With pious and warlike cries, the Turks sallied over their new-made parapets, brought their bayonets down to the charge, forced mass after mass to give way, and fiercely pressed the retreat.

At sunset the action ceased. All night the Turks were intrenching themselves on the ground which they had gained; but when the morning dawned there was no sign that the enemy would hasten to renew the battle.

To keep a safe hold of the ground which had been won, it was necessary for the Turks to advance in the direction of their left front, and occupy a ridge which went by the name of the Slobenzie Heights; but Hassan Pasha dreaded the blame which might fall upon him if the movement should prove to be a wrong one.
General Cannon pressed him hard—for some time in vain; but at length the Pasha yielded, upon condition that the English General would give him a written warranty certifying the wisdom of the step.

On the third day after the battle, Prince Gortschakoff came up with a force which was said to number some sixty or seventy thousand men. He had been set free by the raising of the siege of Silistria, and he now appeared upon one of the ranges of hills looking down upon Giurgevo from the north-west. It seemed that he meant to cover over the stain of the defeat sustained at Giurgevo by driving the Turks back into the river; but before he camped for the night the British flag was already in the waters beneath him.

Lieutenant Glyn of the Britannia, with the young Prince Leiningen under him, and thirty seamen accompanied by a like number of sappers, had come up by land, and now took the command of some gunboats already in this part of the river. Glyn quickly carried his gunboats into the narrow loopstream which escapes from the main of the river above Giurgevo and meets it again lower down. By this movement Glyn thrust his gunboats into the interval which divided the Russian army from the Turks.* Gort-

* A critic used language which might seem to throw doubt on the above narrative of Lieutenant Glyn’s operations. So proof may be useful. In a letter now before me, Lieutenant (now Captain) Glyn writes:—‘He immediately threw across a large force, and ordered me to hold the creek between Slo-
schakoff perhaps overrated the force which had come with the British flag. At all events, he did not instantly move down to the attack; and whilst he seemed to hesitate, the Turks and the English worked hard. Captain Bent and his sappers, with the aid of our seamen and the Turks, threw a bridge of boats across the main stream of the Danube. This done, it was plain that, if Gortschakoff were to attack, he would have to do, not merely with the five thousand Turks already established on the left bank, but with the whole of the force which lay at Rustchuk. He resolved to avoid the encounter. Retreating upon Bucharest, he no longer disputed with the Turks for the mastery of the Lower Danube.

In this campaign on the Danube, those who fought for the cause of the Sultan were helped, it is true, by Fortune, by the anger and unskilfulness of the Czar, by the assured support of Austria, and by the impending power of England and France; but still there is one point of view in which their achievement was a great one. Military ascendancy is so closely connected with military reputation, that to be the first to bring down the warlike fame of a great empire is to do a mighty work, and a work, too, which hardly can fail to change the career of nations. By the time that Prince Gortschakoff retreated upon

"benzie and the town of Giurgevo with gunboats, which was done; otherwise the Russians would have turned the position of Slobenzie."—Note to 4th Edition.
Bucharest, people no longer thought of the Czar as they thought of him eight months before; and the glory of thus breaking down the military reputation of Russia is due of right, not to the Governments nor the armies of France or England, but to the warlike prowess of the Ottoman soldiery, and the ten or twelve resolute Englishmen who cheered and helped and led them.

The failure of the attempted invasion was almost instantly followed by the relinquishment of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Emperor Nicholas, as we saw, had been placed by Austria under the stress of a peremptory summons requiring him to withdraw from the Principalities; and the demand being supported by powerful bodies of troops, which threatened the flank of the intruding army, the Czar was schooled at last, and compelled to see that he must surrender his hold of the provinces which he had chosen to call his 'material guarantee.'

Thus, by the course of the events which followed it, the Czar's last defeat on the Danube was made to appear more signal than it really was. Of course, men versed in war and in politics knew that causes of a larger kind than a few hours' fight at Giurgevo were bringing about the abandonment of the Principalities; but people who drew their conclusions from the mere advance and retreat of armies, and from the issue of battles, were left to infer that the once-dreaded Emperor of the Russias was chased from the
country of the Danube by the sheer prowess of the victorious Turks.

It is therefore very easy to believe that this discomfiture at Giurgevo was more bitter to the Czar than any of the disasters which had hitherto tried his fortitude. People knew, or affected to know, what the troubled man uttered in torment, and the words they put in his mouth ran somewhat to this effect:

'I can understand Oltenitza—I can even understand that Omar Pasha should have been able to hold against me his lines at Kalafat—'I can partly account for the result of those fights at Citate—I can understand Silistria—the strongest may fail in a siege—and it chanced that both Paskievitch and Schilders were struck down and disabled by shot—but—but—but—that Turks—mere Turks—led on by a General of Sepoys and six or seven English boys—that they should dare to cross the Danube in the face of my troops—that, daring to attempt this, they should do it, and hold fast their ground—that my troops should give way before them; and that this—that this should be the last act of the campaign which is ending in the retreat of my whole army, and the abandonment of the Principalities. Heaven lays upon me more than I can bear!'

Many men in the Anglo-French camp were fretted by the tidings of this last Turkish victory; for, besides that, with their natural and healthy impatience of delay, they were stung by the
example of their Moslem ally, there was in the staff of the French and the English armies a pedantic dislike of wild troops. In this respect Lord Raglan had no breadth of view. Far from understanding that the hardy, the fierce, the devout, the temperate Moslems of the Ottoman provinces were the rough yet sound material with which superb troops could be made, he always looked upon these brave men, but especially upon the genus which people call 'Bashi-Bazouks,' with an almost superstitious horror. He was so constituted, or rather he was so schooled down by long years of flat office labour, that it shocked him to see a man bearing no uniform, yet warlike, and armed to the teeth. Indeed, from Bulgaria he once wrote and complained quite gravely that every Turk he saw had the appearance of being a 'bandit;' and the prejudice clung to him; for long after the period now spoken of, and even in the very hour when the fatal storm of the 14th of November was roaring through his port and his camp, he found time to sit at a desk and write down the Bashi-Bazouks.*

This hatred of undrilled warriors was the more perverse, since England above all other nations was rich in men (men like Hodson, for instance, or Jacob) who knew how to make themselves the adored chiefs of Asiatic soldiers.

* Recent events in the villages inhabited by Bulgarians will incline people to say how right Lord Raglan was in dreading the commission of atrocities by wild levies of this description; but it does not follow that they might not have been brought under proper control by men like our Anglo-Indian officers.
Besides, it must be borne in mind, that when an English Government undertakes to wage war in a country beyond the seas without doing all it can to get soldierly aid from the natives, it does not merely neglect a slight or collateral advantage; on the contrary, it throws away its power of acting with efficient numbers, and is in danger of frittering away the nation's strength upon those (often ill-fated) schemes which go by the name of 'expeditions.' Without our Portuguese auxiliaries there would have been no great Peninsular War, no successful invasion of France; without the native soldiery of Hindostan there would have been no British India; without the German auxiliaries who served under Wellington in his last campaign, he could not have given battle to Napoleon in the Netherlands, and the course of English history would not have run as it did. The truth is, that (especially at the beginning of a war) any body of English troops which our Government brings together at one time and one place is in general so costly, and of so high a quality, but also so scant in numbers, that to use it, and use it singly, for all the work of the campaign, is to consume and squander the precious essence of the nation's strength without making it the means of attaining any worthy result.

Therefore, whenever it is possible, a British force serving abroad and engaged in an arduous campaign, ought to have on its side, not mere allies—for that is but a doubtful, and often a poor support to have to lean upon—but auxiliaries
obeying the English commander, and capable of being trusted with a large share of the duties required from an army in the field. Nor is this an advantage which commonly lies out of our reach; for in most of the countries of the Old World the cost of labour is much lower than in England; and it is one of the prerogatives of the English, as indeed of all conquering nations, to be able to lead other races of men, and to impart to them its warlike fire. By beginning its preparations at the right time, and by bringing under the orders of some of our Indian officers a fitting number of the brave men who came flocking to the war from every province of the Ottoman Empire, our Government might have enabled their General to take the field with an army of great strength— with an army more fit for warlike enterprises than two armies, French and English, instructed to work side by side, and baffled by divided command.*

* The opinions which the Duke of Newcastle entertained on this subject were sound, and his efforts to give effect to them were vigorous; but he was thwarted by the curious antagonism which commonly shows itself at the beginning of a war—the antagonism between views really warlike and views which are only 'military.'
CHAPTER XIV.

By their own prowess, with the aid only of a moral support from their great allies and the actual presence of a few young English officers, the Ottoman soldiery had repelled the invasion; and, the defence of Turkey being accomplished in a way very glorious to the Sultan, and the deliverance of the Principalities being secured, it suddenly became apparent that the objects for which the Western Powers undertook the war had been already attained. And since (by the mere act of declaring war against the Czar) the Porte had freed itself from the obnoxious treaties which heretofore entangled its freedom, the condition of affairs was such that a prudent statesman of France or of England or of the Ottoman Empire might have well enough rested content. And in that condition of affairs the Emperor of Russia must have acquiesced; for having now learnt that he could not maintain an invasion of European Turkey, and being driven from the seas, he was cut off from all means of waging an offensive war against the Sultan except upon the desolate fron-
tiers of Armenia; and the pressure of the naval blockade enforced against him by the Allies, together with the torture of seeing the Baltic and the Euxine placed under the dominion of their fleets, would have more than sufficed to make him sign a peace.

If France had been mistress of herself, or if England had been free from passion and craving for adventure, the war would have been virtually at an end on the day when the Russian army completed its retreat from the country of the Danube and re-entered the Czar's dominions.

How came it to happen that, rejecting the peace which seemed to be thus prepared by the mere course of events, the Western Powers determined to undertake the invasion of a Russian province?

France was still lying under the men who had got her down on the night of the 2d of December; and it was in vain that her people at that time chanced to love peace better than war, for they had no longer a voice in State affairs. The French Emperor still wielded the whole strength of the nation; and, labouring to turn away men's thoughts from the origin of his power, he was very willing to try to earn for the restored Empire that kind of station and title which the newest of dynasties may acquire by signal achievements in war. It was still of great moment to him to remain in close friendship with England, and to use the alliance as an engine of war; but he observed that there was a spirit on this side of the Channel
which, springing from motives very unlike his own, was nevertheless tending in the same direction; and therefore, to draw England in, he no longer needed to resort to those ingenious contrivances which he had employed against her in the foregoing year. All that he had to do was to encourage her desire to go on with the war, and, if necessary, to make his own plans yield to those of his ally. To do all this he was very able; for he had, as we have seen, at that time, the power of keeping his mind alive to the difference between the greater and the less; and after he had once resolved to engage in alliance with England, he did not allow his main purpose to be baffled by differences on minor questions. Therefore, now when it became known that the Russian army was in full retreat, he was so willing to defer to English counsels, that virtually, though not in terms, he left it to the Queen's Government to determine what next step the Western Powers should take in the conduct of the war.

England had become so eager for conflict that the idea of desisting from the war merely because the war had ceased to be necessary was not tolerable to the people. In the Baltic their hopes had been bitterly disappointed; and as soon as it became clear that the defence of Turkey was a thing already accomplished, men longed to try the prowess of our land and sea forces in some enterprise against the Russian dominions. Already they had cast their eyes upon Sebastopol.

With a view to the conquest of empire on the
Bosphorus, the ambition of Russia had taken advantage of the spacious port on the south-west coast of the Crimea—had made there a great arsenal, and furnished it with an enormous supply of warlike stores. And having been warned a quarter of a century ago * that, if he thus gathered his strength in Sebastopol, he might have to count some day with the English, the Czar Nicholas had caused the place to be defended towards the sea by forts of great power. In the harbour, barred by these forts, his Black Sea fleet lay at anchor. Plainly it would be a natural and fitting consumption of a war in defence of the Sultan to destroy those very resources which the labours of years had gathered together against him. Moreover, the English, who hate the mechanic contrivances which prevent fair, open fighting, could hardly now bear that the vast sea-forts of Sebastopol should continue to shelter the Russian fleet from the guns of our men-of-war. Those who thought more warily than the multitude foresaw that the enterprise might take time; but they also perceived that even this result would not be one of unmixed evil; for if Russia should commit herself to a lengthened conflict in the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, she would be put to a great

* Despatch from Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated the 28th of November 1828. 'Although,' writes the Count, 'it may not be probable that we shall see an English fleet in the Black Sea, it will be prudent to make Sebastopol very secure against attacks from the sea. If ever England were to come to a rupture with us, this is the point to which she would direct her attacks, if only she believed them possible.'
trial, and would see her wealth and strength ruin-
ously consumed by the mere stress of the distance
between the military centre of the Empire and
the south-westernmost angle of the Crimea.

The more the English people thought of the
enterprise, the more eager they became to attempt
it; and it chanced that their feelings and opinions
were shared and represented with great exactness
by the Minister of War.

The Duke of Newcastle was a man of a san-
guine eager nature, very prone to action.* He
had a good clear intellect, with more of strength
than keenness, unwearied industry, and an aston-
ishing facility of writing. In the assumption of
responsibility he was generous and bold even to
rashness. Indeed, he was so eager to see his
views carried into effect, and so willing to take
all the risk upon his own head, that there was
danger of his withdrawing from other men their
wholesome share of discretion. He threw his
whole heart into the project of the invasion; and
if the Prime Minister and Mr Gladstone were
men driven forward by the feeling of the country,
in spite of their opinions and their scruples, it
was not so with the Duke of Newcastle. The
character of his mind was such as to make him
essentially one with the public. Far from being
propelled by others against his will, he himself

* I, of course, know that this view will not be assented to by
those who found their opinion upon observation made in later
years; but I am speaking of the summer of 1854, and I am
very sure that the sentence to which this note has been ap-
pended is true.
was one of the very foremost members of the warlike throng which was pressing upon the Cabinet and craving for adventure and glory. He easily received new impressions, and had nevertheless a quick good sense, which generally enabled him to distinguish what was useful from what was worthless. He seemed to understand the great truth that, without being military, the English are a warlike people, and that it is one of the great prerogatives of a nation gifted with this higher quality to be able to command other races of men, and to impart to them the fire of martial virtue. He also knew that when England undertakes war against a great European Power, she must engage the energies of the people at large, and must not presume to rely altogether upon the merely professional exertions of her small Peace Establishment. It was not from his default, but in spite of his endeavours, that for several months people lingered in the notion that our military system was an apparatus sufficing for war.

But the degree of public confidence inspired by the Duke was hardly, I think, quite proportionate to the evident merits which a reader of his despatches and letters would be inclined to attribute to him. Perhaps the very zeal with which he seized and adopted the ideas of the outer public was one of the causes which tended to lessen his weight; for he who comes into council with common and popular views, however likely it may be that he will get them assented to, can scarcely hope to kindle men's minds with the fire
that springs from a man's own thought and from his own strong will. Moreover, it was by a kind of chance rather than by intentional selection that the Duke of Newcastle had become entrusted with the momentous business of the war; and this circumstance so much weighed against him that, after a while, the propriety of his continuing to hold the office was peremptorily brought into question by one of his principal colleagues.*

From the first, the Duke of Newcastle, resisting all proposals for operating against Russia on the side of Poland, had warmly shared the popular desire to invade the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol. The Emperor of the French, steadily following his main policy, had long ago consented to look to this enterprise as next in importance to

* With his accustomed frankness, Lord Russell has himself declared that his only reason for insisting that the Duke of Newcastle should be replaced by another minister, was the one above shown. What I have above called 'a kind of chance' was brought about in this way:—According to the practice which was in force up to the summer of 1854, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was also the 'Secretary of War.' Before the war, however, the public hardly observed, and in fact hardly knew this, because in peacetime (thanks to the labours of the 'Horse Guards,' the office of the Secretary at War, the Ordnance, and several other offices) the duties of the Colonial Secretary, in his character as Secretary of War, were very slight; and, there being no prospect of war when Lord Aberdeen's Ministry was formed, the Duke of Newcastle was of course selected with a view to his qualifications for the administration of the Colonies, and not with any consideration, either one way or the other, as to his aptitude for the business of the War Department. When the rupture with Russia occurred, it became apparent that, unless a change were made, the Minister who happened to be the Colonial Secretary would stand charged with the business of the war.
the defence of the Sultan’s territory; and in the early part of April instructions to this effect had been given to the French and the English Generals.

It would seem, however, that at first the Duke of Newcastle was the only member of the Government who was fired with a great eagerness for the destruction of Sebastopol; and of himself he had not the ascendency which sometimes enables a Minister to bend other men to his purpose. Unless by the help of a mighty force pressing from without, he could not have brought the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen to partake his zeal for the enterprise.

But—impending over the counsels of all the ostensible rulers—there was an authority, not deriving from the Queen or the Parliament, which was destined to have a great sway over events. It would be possible to elude the task; but it seems to me that a history would be wanting in fulness of truth if it failed to impart some conception of this other power.

England was free; and although, whilst there was indifference or divided opinion in the country, the Government had very full latitude of action, yet, whenever it chanced that the feelings of the people were roused, and that they were known to be nearly of one mind, they spoke with a voice so commanding that no Administration could safely try to withstand it.

But the will of the nation being thus puissant, who was charged to declare it?

In former times almost everybody who could was accustomed to contribute in an active way to
the formation of opinion. Men evolved their own political ideas and drew forth the ideas of their friends by keen oral discussion, and in later times by long elaborate letters. But gradually, and following somewhat slowly upon the invention of printing, there came to be introduced a new division of labour. It was found that if a small number of competent men would make it their calling to transact the business of thinking upon political questions, the work might be more handily performed by them than by the casual efforts of people who were commonly busied in other sorts of toil; and as soon as this change took effect, the weighing of State questions and the judging of public men lapsed away from the direct cognisance of the nation at large, and passed into the hands of those who knew how to utter in print. What had been an intellectual exercise, practised in a random way by thousands, was turned into a branch of industry and pursued with great skill by a few. People soon found out that an essay in print—an essay strong and terse, but, above all, opportune—seemed to clear their minds more effectually than the sayings which they heard in conversation, or the letters they received from their friends; and at length the principle of divided labour became so complete in its application to the forming of political opinions, that by glancing at a newspaper, and giving swift assent to its assertions and arguments, many an Englishman was saved the labour of further examining his political conscience, and dispensed
from the necessity of having to work his own way to a conclusion.

But to spare a man from a healthy toil is not always an unmixed good. To save a free-born citizen from the trouble of thinking upon questions of State is to take from him his share of dominion; and although it be true that he who follows printed advice is under a guidance more skilful and dexterous than any he could have got from his own untutored mind, he is less of a man—and, upon the whole, is less fair, less righteous—than one who in a ruder fashion contrives to think for himself. Just as a man's quality may in some respects be lowered by his habitual reliance on the policeman and the soldier who relieve him from the trouble and the anxiety of self-defence, so his intellectual strength, and his means of knowing how to be just, may easily become impaired if he suffers himself to walk too obediently under the leading of a political writer.

But the ability of men engaged in political writing grew even more rapidly than the power to which they were attaining, and after a while, they so gained upon the ostensible statesmen that Parliament no longer stood alone as the exponent of opinion, and was obliged to share its privilege with a number of gifted men whose names it could hardly ever find out.* Still, Parliament had valour and strength of its own, and, except in the matter of mere celebrity, it was a gainer

* In the days of which I write there was much more mystery than there is now as to the authorship of periodical writings.
rather than a loser from the wholesome rivalry forced upon it by its new and mysterious associate. It was the public which lagged. Men commonly take a long time to adapt themselves to the successive advances of civilisation; and the people were backward in fitting themselves to deal with the increasing ability and the increasing knowledge of the public writer. They indeed hardly knew the true scope of the change which had been taking place; for whilst the writer was a personage chosen for his skill, and acting with the force which belongs to discipline and organisation, the readers were men straying loose; and for their means of acting in anything like concert with one another, they were dependent in a great degree upon that very engine of publicity which was fast usurping their power. Moreover, these readers of public prints were slow to understand the new kind of duty which had come upon them. They were slow to see that it became them to look in a very critical spirit upon the writings of a stranger, unseen and unknown, who was not only proposing to guide them, but even to speak in their name; and they did not yet understand that they ought to read print, not, perhaps, in a captious spirit, but, to say the least, with something of the measured confidence which their forefathers had been accustomed to place in the words of princes and statesmen. The blessing conferred by print will perhaps be complete when the diligence, the wariness, and, above all, the courageous justice of those who read, shall be
brought into fair proportion with the skill and the power of those who address them in print. Already a wholesome change has been wrought; and if in these days a man goes chanting and chanting in servile response to a newspaper, he misses the voices of the tens of thousands of fellow-choristers who sang with him five years ago. But certainly, at the time of the Russian war, the common discourse of an Englishman was too often a mere 'Amen' to something he had seen in print.

For a long time there had remained to the general public a vestige of their old custom of thinking for themselves, because in last resort they were privileged to determine between the rival counsels pressed upon them by contending journalists; but several years before the outbreak of the war, there had come yet another change. The apparatus provided by the constitution for collecting the opinions of the people was far from being complete; and notwithstanding the indications afforded by Parliament and by public writings, the direction which the nation's opinion had taken was a matter which could often be called in question. Some could say that the people desired one thing, and some, with equal boldness, that the people desired the contrary. Thence it came that the task of finding out the will of the nation, and giving to it a full voice and expression, was undertaken by private citizens.

Long before the outbreak of the war, there were living in some of the English counties certain
widows and gentlemen who were the depositories of a power destined to exercise a great sway over the conduct of the war. Their ways were peaceful, and they were not perhaps more turned towards politics than other widows and country gentlemen; but by force of deeds and testaments, by force of births, deaths, and marriages, they had become the members of an ancient firm or Company which made it its business to collect and disseminate news. They had so much good sense of the worldly sort, that, instead of struggling with one another for the control of their powerful engine, they remained quietly at their homes, and engaged some active and gifted men to manage the concern for them in London. The practice of the Company was to issue a paper daily, containing an account of what was going on in the world, together with letters from men of all sorts and conditions who were seeking to bring their favourite subjects under the eye of the public, and also a few short essays upon the topics of the day. Likewise, upon paying the sum required by the Company, any person could cause whatever he chose to be inserted in the paper as an ‘advertisement;’ and the sheet containing these four descriptions of matter was sold to the public at a low rate.

Extraordinary enterprise was shown by the Company in the gathering of intelligence; and during the wars following the French Revolution they caused their despatches from the Continent to reach them so early that they were able to
forestall the Government of the day. In other countries the spectacle of a Government outdone in this way by private enterprise would have seemed a scandal; but the Englishman liked the thought that he could buy and bring to his own home as much knowledge as was in the hands of a Minister of State, and he enjoyed the success of his fellow-countrymen in their rivalry with the Government. From this time the paper gathered strength. It became the foremost journal of the world; and this was no sooner the case, than the mere fact of its being thus foremost gave a great acceleration to its rise; for, simply because it was recognised as the most public of prints, it became the clue with which anxious man went seeking in the maze of the busy world for the lost and the unknown, and all that was beyond his own reach. The prince who was claiming a kingdom, the servant who wanted a place, the mother who had lost her boy, they all went thither; thither Folly ran hurrying, and was brought to a wholesome parley with Wisdom; thither went righteous anger; thither also went hatred and malice. And not in vain was all this concourse; for either the troubled and angry men got the discipline of finding that the world would not listen to their cries, or else they gained a vent for their passions, and brought all their theories to a test by calling a whole nation — nay, by calling the civilised world — to hearken and be their witness. Over all this throng of appellants men unknown sat in judgment, and — violently, perhaps, but never cor-
ruptly—a rough sort of justice was done. The style which Oriental hyperbole used to give to the Sultan might be claimed with more colour of truth by the journal. In a sense it was the 'asylum of the world.'

Still up to this point the Company occupied ground in common with many other speculators; and if they had gone no further, it would not have been my province to notice the result of their labours; but many years ago it had occurred to the managers of this Company that there was one important article of news which had not been effectually supplied. It seemed likely that, without moving from his fireside, an Englishman would be glad to know what the bulk of his fellow-countrymen thought upon the uppermost questions of the day. The letters received from correspondents furnished some means of acquiring this knowledge; and it seemed to the managers of the Company, that at some pains, and at a moderate cost, it would be possible to ascertain the opinions which were coming into vogue, and see the direction in which the current would flow. It is said that, with this intent, they many years ago employed a shrewd, idle clergyman, who made it his duty to loiter about in places of common resort, and find out what people thought upon the principal subjects of the time. He was not to listen very much to extreme foolishness, and still less was he to hearken to clever people. His duty was to wait and wait until he observed that some common and obvious thought was
repeated in many places, and by numbers of men who had probably never seen one another. That one common thought was the prize he sought for, and he carried it home to his employers. He became so skilled in his peculiar calling that, as long as he served them, the Company was rarely misled; and although in later times they were frequently baffled in their pursuit of this kind of knowledge, they never neglected to do what they could to search the heart of the nation.

When the managers had armed themselves with the knowledge thus gathered, they prepared to disseminate it, but they did not state baldly what they had ascertained to be the opinion of the country. Their method was as follows: they employed able writers to argue in support of the opinion which, as they believed, the country was already adopting; and, supposing that they had been well informed, their arguments of course fell upon willing ears. Those who had already formed a judgment saw their own notions stated and pressed with an ability greater than they could themselves command; and those who had not yet come to an opinion were strongly moved to do so when they saw the path taken by a Company which notoriously strove to follow the changes of the public mind. The report which the paper gave of the opinion formed by the public was so closely blended with arguments in support of that same opinion, that he who looked at the paper merely to know what other people thought, was seized, as he read, by the cogency of the reason-
ing; and, on the other hand, he who imagined that he was being governed by the force of sheer logic, was merely obeying a guide who, by telling him that the world was already agreed, made him go and flock along with his fellows: for as the utterance of a prophecy is sometimes a main step towards its fulfilment, so a rumour asserting that multitudes have already adopted a given opinion will often generate that very concurrence of thought which was prematurely declared to exist. From the operation of this double process it resulted, of course, that the opinion of the English public was generally in accord with the writings of the Company; and the more the paper came to be regarded as a true exponent of the national mind, the more vast was the publicity which it obtained.

Plainly, then, this printing Company wielded a great power; and if I have written with sufficient clearness, I have made it apparent that this was a power of more vast dimensions than that which men describe when they speak of 'the 'power of the Press.' It is one thing, for instance, to denounce a public man by printed arguments and invectives which are believed to utter nothing more than the opinion of the writers, and it is another and a graver thing to denounce him in writings which, though having the form of arguments, are (rightly or wrongly) regarded as manifestoes—as manifestoes declaring the judgment of the English people. In the one case the man is only accused; in the other he seems to stand already condemned.
But though the Company held all this power, their tenure of it was of such a kind that they could not exercise it perversely or whimsically without doing a great harm to their singular trade; for the whole scheme of their existence went to make them, not autocratic, but representative, in their character; and they were obliged, by the law of their being, to keep themselves as closely as they could in accord with the nation at large.

This, then, was the great English journal; and whether men spoke of the mere printed sheet which lay upon their table, or of the mysterious organisation which produced it, they habitually called either one or the other 'The Times.' Moreover, they often prefixed to the word such adjectives and participles as showed that they regarded the subject of their comments in the light of a sentient, active being, having a life beyond the span of mortal men, gifted with reason, armed with a cruel strength, endued with some of the darkest of the human passions, but clearly liable hereafter to the direst penalty of sin.*

* The form of speech which thus impersonates a manufactory and its wares has now so obtained in our language that, discarding the forcible epithets, one may venture to adopt in writing, and to give 'The Times' the same place in grammatical construction as though it were the proper name of an angel or a hero, a devil or a saint, or a sinner already condemned. Custom makes it good English to say: 'The "Times" will protect him;' 'The "Times" is savage;' 'The "Times" is crushing him;' 'The blessed "Times" has put the thing right;' 'That d——d "Times" has done all the mischief.'
On the Sabbath, England had rest; but in the early morning of all other days the irrevocable words were poured forth and scattered abroad to the corners of the earth, measuring out honour to some, and upon others bringing scorn and disgrace. Where and with whom the real power lay, and what was its true source, and how it was to be propitiated,—these were questions wrapped in more or less obscurity; for some had a theory that one man ruled, and some another, and some were sure that the Great Newspaper governed all England, and others that England governed the Newspaper. Philosophic politicians traced events to what they called 'Public opinion.' With almost the same meaning women and practical men simply spoke of 'The Times.' But whether the power of the great journal was a power all its own, or whether it was only the vast shadow of the public mind, it was almost equally to be dreaded and revered by worldly men: for plainly, in that summer of 1854, it was one with England. Its words might be wrong, but it was certain that to tens of thousands of men they would seem to be right. They might be the collected voice of all these isles, or the mere utterance of some one unknown man sitting pale by a midnight lamp,—but there they were. They were the handwriting on the wall.

Of the temper and spirit in which this strange power had been wielded, up to the time of the outbreak of the war, it is not very hard to speak. In general 'The Times' had been more willing to
lead the nation in its tendencies to improvement than to follow in its errors: what it mainly sought was—not to be much better or wiser than the English people, but to be the very same as they were—to go along with them in all their adventures, whether prudent or rash—to be one with them in their hopes and their despair, in their joy and in their sorrow, in their gratitude and in their anger. So, although in general it was willing enough to repress the growth of any new popular error which seemed to be weakly rooted, still the whole scheme and purpose of the Company forbade it all thought of trying to make a stand against any great or general delusion. Upon the whole, the potentate dealt with England in a bluff, kingly, Tudor-like way, but also with a Tudor-like policy; for though he treated all adversaries as 'brute folk' until they became formidable, he had always been careful to mark the growth of a public sentiment or opinion; and as soon as he was able to make out that a cause was waxing strong, he went up and offered to lead it, and so reigned.

I have said that, partly by guiding, but more by ascertaining and following, the current of men's opinion, 'The Times' always sought to be one with the great body of the people; and since it happened that there was at this period a rare concurrence of feeling, and that the journal, after a good deal of experiment, had now at length thoroughly seized and embodied the soul of the nation, its utterance came with increasing force;
and in proportion as the growing concord of the people enabled it to speak with more and more authority, power lapsed, and continued to lapse, from out of the hands of the government, until at length public opinion, no longer content to direct the general policy of the State, was preparing to undertake the almost scientific, the almost technical duty of planning a campaign.

On the morning of the 15th of June, the great newspaper declared and said that 'The grand political and military objects of the war could not be attained as long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet were in existence; but that, if that central position of the Russian power in the south of the empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars of Russia centuries to raise, must fall to the ground:' and, moreover, it declared, 'that the taking of Sebastopol and the occupation of the Crimea were objects which would repay all the costs of the war, and would permanently settle in our favour the principle questions in dispute; and that it was equally clear that those objects were to be accomplished by no other means—because a peace which should leave Russia in possession of the same means of aggression would only enable her to recommence the war at her pleasure.'

It was natural that some of the members of the Government should have qualms. They knew that Austria (supported for defensive purposes by Prussia) was at that time on the point of joining
her arms to those of the Western Powers; and they could not but know that if the French and English armies were to be withdrawn from the mainland of Europe in order to invade the Crimea, the wholesome union of the Four Powers would of necessity be weakened. The Prime Minister was he who loved peace so fondly that, though peace was no more, he had hardly yet been torn from her cold embrace; and though he lived under a belief that the military strength of the Czar was beyond measure vast, yet of the twelve months which Russia gave him for preparation he had only used three.* Having the heaviness of these thoughts on his mind, he saw it declared aloud, that the country of which he happened to be the Prime Minister could not well do otherwise than invade the Russian dominions. To a prudent man the measure might seem to be rash—to a good man impressed with horror of war, it might even seem to be very wicked; for it was a violent revival of a war which, unless this new torch were thrown, would expire of its own accord. But the print was clear; like stern Anangkie, it pressed upon feeble man's volition, for it was not to be construed away; and if an anxious Minister went back and looked again to see whether by chance he could find some loop in the wording

* Computing from the time when the Czar's determination to seize the Principalities was known to our Government. If the computations are to be made from the time when the hostile character of Prince Montschikoff's mission became known, several months more would have to be added. See Lord Aberdeen's evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.
and whether possibly he might be able to fulfil his duty without besieging Sebastopol, he was met by the careful negation which taught him in four plain words that he could fulfil it 'by no other means.'

Before the seventh day from the manifesto of the 15th, the country had made loud answer to the appeal; and on the 22d of June the great newspaper, informed with the deep will of the people, and taking little account of the fears of the prudent and the scruples of the good, laid it down that 'Sebastopol was the keystone of the arch which spanned the Euxine from the mouths of the Danube to the confines of Mingrelia,' and that 'a successful enterprise against the place was the essential condition of permanent peace.' And although this appeal was founded in part upon a false belief—a belief that the siege of Silistria had been raised—it seemed as though all mankind were making haste to adjust the world to the newspaper; for within twenty hours from the publication of the 22d of June, truth obeyed the voice of false rumours, and followed in the wake of 'The Times.'*

Of course there were those who saw great obstacles in the way of the proposed invasion; and they said that, since Russia was a first-rate military Power, it must be rash to invade her territory and to besiege her proudest fortress, without first gaining some safe knowledge of the enemy's

* The siege, as we saw above, was raised early on the morning of the 23d.
strength. But the narrative, then coming home in fragments from the valley of the Danube, was heating the minds of the people of England.

When first England learnt that the Turks were to be besieged in their fortress of Silistria by a great Russian army under the renowned Paskievitch, few believed that the issue was doubtful, or even that the contest could be long sustained. But as soon as it became known that, day after day, the military strength of the Czar was exerted against the place with a violent energy, and that every attack was fiercely resisted, and always, as yet, with success, our people began to give their heart to the struggle; and their eagerness rose into zeal when they heard that two young English travellers had thrown themselves into the fortress, were heading the Turkish soldiery, and maintaining the defence day and night.

The English were not of such a mettle as to be able to hear of tidings like these without growing more and more eager for warlike adventure. And in their hearts they liked the fact, that the few young English travellers who helped to save Silistria, and to turn away the war from the Danube, were men who did these things of their own free will and pleasure, without the sanction of the public authorities; for our people are accustomed to think more highly of their fellow-countrymen individually than they do of our State machinery; and they can easily bear to see their Government in default, and can even smile at its awkwardness, if all the shortcomings of office are effectually
compensated by the vigour of private enterprise. Nasmyth has passed away from us. I knew him in the Crimea. He was a man of quiet and gentle manners, and so free from vanity—so free from all idea of self-gratulation—that he always seemed as though he were unconscious of having stood as he did in the path of the Czar, and had really omitted to think of the share which he had had in changing the course of events; but it chanced that he had gone to the seat of war in the service of 'The Times,' and naturally the lustre of his achievement was in some degree shed upon the keen, watchful Company which had had the foresight to send him at the right moment into the midst of events on which the fate of Russia was hanging; for whilst the State armies of France and England were as yet only gathering their strength, 'The Times' was able to say that its own officer had confronted the enemy upon the very ground he most needed to win, and helped to drive him back from the Danube in great discomfiture.

Thus, day after day in that month of June, the authority of the Newspaper kept gaining and gaining upon the Queen's Government; and if Lord Aberdeen had any remaining unwillingness to renew the war by undertaking an invasion of Russia, his power of controlling the course of the Government seems to have come to its end in the interval between the 23d and the 28th of June. He continued to be the Prime Minister. His personal honour stood so high that no man at-
tributed his continuance in office to other than worthy and unselfish motives; but for those who lay stress upon the principle that office and power ought not to be put asunder, it was irksome to have to mark the difference between what the Prime Minister was believed to desire, and what he was now consenting to do.

Parliament was sitting, and it might be imagined that there was something to say against the plan for invading a province of Russia at a moment when all the main causes of the dispute were vanishing; but the same causes which I have spoken of as paralysing all resistance to the beginning of the war now hindered every attempt to withstand its renewal; for the orators who were believed to be tainted with the doctrines of the Peace Party were still lying under the ban which they had brought upon themselves by their former excesses of language. So now again in June, as before at the opening of the session, the counsels of these eloquent men were lost to the world. They became as powerless as the Prime Minister; and the cause which they represented was so utterly brought to ruin, that the popular demand for an invasion, which carried with it the virtual renewal of an otherwise expiring war, had the sound of that voice with which a nation speaks when the people are of one mind.

So now, in presenting to his colleagues this his favourite scheme of an enterprise against Sebastopol, the Duke of Newcastle, with the strong Palmerston at his shoulder, was upheld, nay,
urged and driven forward, by forces so overwhelming, that scruples and objections and fears were carried away as by a flood; and when it was proposed in the Cabinet to go and fetch, as it were, a new war, by undertaking this bold adventure, there was not one Minister present who refused to give his consent.*

Forthwith the Duke of Newcastle announced the decision of the Government to the General commanding the English army in Bulgaria. He did this by a private letter written on the 28th of June,† and nearly at the same time he prepared the draft of a Despatch,‡ which was to convey to the English headquarters, in full detail and in official form, the deliberate instructions of the Queen's Government. This paper constituted the instrument for meting out to the General in command the allowance of discretion with which he was to be entrusted. A Despatch recommending the expedition, but leaving to the General in command the duty of determining whether it could be prudently undertaken, would not have been followed by any invasion of the Crimea; and that which brought about the event was, not the decision of the Cabinet already mentioned, but the peculiar stringency of the language which was to

* The sitting of the Cabinet which thus adopted the momentous proposal to sanction an invasion of Crim Tartary took place in Downing Street on Tuesday the 27th of June, and lasted several hours. It was with anxious, with thoroughly wakeful care that our ministers weighed and determined the question then submitted to their judgment.

† The contents of this will be given in another chapter.
convey it to the English headquarters.* It therefore seems right to speak of what passed when the terms of this cogent Despatch were adopted by Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet.

The Duke of Newcastle so framed the draft as to make it the means of narrowing very closely the discretion left to Lord Raglan; and it was to be expected that the Duke might wish his Despatch to stand in this shape, because he was eager for the undertaking, and very willing to bear upon his own shoulders a large share of the responsibility which it entailed; but it is difficult to believe that all the other members of the Government could have intended to place the English General under that degree of compulsion which is implied by the tenor of the instructions. It is certain, however, that the paper was well fitted to elicit at once the objections of those who might be inclined to disapprove it on account of its cogency; for it confined the discretion to be left to the General with a precision scarcely short of harshness.

The Duke of Newcastle took the Despatch to Richmond, for there was to be a meeting of the members of the Cabinet at Pembroke Lodge, and he intended to make this the occasion for submitting the proposed instructions to the judgment of his colleagues.† It was evening—a summer even-

* The truth of this statement will be shown, as I think, in a future chapter, and, indeed, it is well enough proved by the tenor of Lord Raglan’s reply to the despatch.
† Wednesday the 28th of June.
ing—and all the members of the Cabinet were present, when the Duke took out the draft of his proposed despatch and began to read it. Then there occurred an incident, very trifling in itself, but yet so momentous in its consequences, that, if occurring under the Olympian Dispensation, it would have been attributed to the direct intervention of the immortal gods. In these days, perhaps, the physiologist will speak of the condition into which the human brain is naturally brought when it rests after anxious labours, and the analytical chemist may regret that he had not an opportunity of testing the food of which the Ministers had partaken, with a view to detect the presence of some narcotic poison; but no well-informed person will look upon the accident as characteristic of the men whom it befell; for the very faults, no less than the high qualities of the statesmen composing Lord Aberdeen’s Cabinet, were of such a kind as to secure them against the imputation of being careless and torpid. However, it is very certain that, before the reading of the paper had long continued, all the members of the Cabinet, except a small minority, were overcome with sleep.* For a moment, the noise of a tumbling chair disturbed the repose of the Government; but presently the Duke of Newcastle resumed the reading of his draft, and then again the fated sleep descended upon the eyelids of Ministers. Later in the evening, and in another room, the Duke of Newcastle

* See Note in the Appendix.
made another and a last effort to win attention to the contents of the draft, but again a blissful rest (not this time actual sleep) interposed between Ministers and cares of State; and all, even those who from the first had remained awake, were in a quiet assenting frame of mind. Upon the whole, the Despatch, though it bristled with sentences tending to provoke objection, received from the Cabinet the kind of approval which is often awarded to an unobjectionable sermon. Not a letter of it was altered; and it will be seen by-and-by that that cogency in the wording of the Despatch which could hardly have failed to provoke objection from an awakened Cabinet, was the very cause which governed events.

The instructions addressed from Paris to the French commander did not urge him to propose the invasion of the Crimea, nor even to lend the weight of his opinion to the proposed enterprise; but they forbade him from advancing towards the Danube. If it should be clear that the English were willing to undertake the expedition to the Crimea, then the French commander was not to be at liberty to hold back.*

* I deduce this conclusion, in an inferential way, from the general tenor of the materials at my command, and not from any one document distinctly warranting the statement.
CHAPTER XV.

At the time when the instructions from the Home Governments reached the camp of the Allies, the Generals were preparing for an active campaign in Bulgaria, and Marshal St Arnaud had around him, in the neighbourhood of Varna or moving thither, four strong divisions of infantry, with cavalry and field-artillery. He had no siege-train.

Lord Raglan had around him four divisions of infantry, the greater part of a division of cavalry, and of his field-artillery seven batteries. He had also on board ship off Varna the half of a battering-train, and the other half of it was nearly ready to be despatched from England.

The French Marshal was receiving and expecting constant additions to his force; and Lord Raglan had been apprised that a reserve division of infantry under Sir George Cathcart would speedily reach the Bosphorus.

So long as the French and English forces remained camped in the neighbourhood of Varna, their command of the sea-communication insured
to them the arrival of the supplies which were sent to them; but the means of land-transport were not yet within their reach. It was estimated that, in order to move effectively in the interior, the English army alone would require packhorses or mules to the number of 14,000. To obtain these was difficult, but not impossible; and at the time to which we point, about 5000 had been collected. By a continuance of these exertions in Bulgaria, and by due activity in forwarding munitions and stores from England, it is probable that the English force, after a further interval of about six weeks or two months, might have been prepared to move as an army carrying on regular operations; but of course this would only be true upon the supposition that the army should always march through countries yielding sufficient forage.

The preparations of the French were not, perhaps, quite so far advanced as our own; but it is probable that the two armies would have been found ready at about the same time for an active campaign in Bulgaria.

The ships of the Allied Powers were at hand, and their fleets had dominion over all the Euxine home to the Straits of Kertch. They had the command of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean, of the whole ocean; and of all the lesser seas, bays, gulfs, and straits, from the Gut of Gibraltar to within sight of St Petersburg. The Czar's Black Sea fleet existed, but existed in close durance, shut up under the guns of Sebastopol.
In the matter of gaining information respecting the enemy's resources, our Foreign Office had not been idle; and a great deal of material, bearing upon this vital business, had been there received, and collated. It resulted from these data, that, spread over vast space, Russia might nominally have under arms forces approaching to a million of men; but that the force in the Crim Chersonese, including the 17,000 men who formed the crews of the ships, did not, at the highest estimate, amount to more than 45,000; and that, although there were a few battalions which Russia might draw towards Sebastopol from her army of the Caucasus, she had no more speedy method of largely reinforcing the Crimea than by availing herself of the troops then in retreat from the country of the Danube, and marching them round to Perekop, by the northern shores of the Euxine.

Neither the ambassadors of France and England at Constantinople, nor any of their generals or admirals, had succeeded in obtaining for themselves any trustworthy information upon this vitally momentous business. For their failure in this respect more blame attaches upon the ambassadors than upon the military and naval commanders; because the ambassadors had been in the Levant during a period of many months, in which (since the war was impending, but not declared) they might have bought knowledge from Russian subjects without involving their informers in the perils of treason. The duty of gather-
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ing knowledge by clandestine means is one so repulsive to the feelings of an English gentleman, that there is always a danger of his neglecting it, or performing it ill. Perhaps no two men could be less fit for the business of employing spies than Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan. More diligence might have been expected from the French, but they also had failed. Marshal St Arnaud had heard a rumour that the force of the enemy in the Crimea was 70,000, and Vice-Admiral Dundas had even received a statement that it amounted to 120,000; but these accounts were fables. In point of fact, the information obtained by our Foreign Office approached to near the truth, and the Duke of Newcastle had the firmness—it was a daring thing to do, but it turned out that he was right—he had the firmness to press Lord Raglan to rely upon it. It was natural, however, that a general stationed within a few hours' sail of the country he was to invade, and yet unable to obtain from it any, even slight, glimmer of knowledge should distrust information which had travelled round to him (through the aid of the Home Government) along the circumference of a vast circle; and Lord Raglan certainly considered that, in regard to the strength of the enemy in the Crimea and the land defences of Sebastopol, he was simply without knowledge.
CHAPTER XVI.

On the evening of the 13th of July Marshal St Arnaud received a telegraphic despatch from his Government. The despatch had been forwarded by way of Belgrade, and was in cipher. The message came in an imperfect state. Part of it was intelligible, but the rest was beyond all the power of the decipherer; yet the interpreted symbols showed plainly that the whole message, if only it could be read, would prove to be one of deep import. It forbade Marshal St Arnaud from making any advance towards the Danube, and told him to look to the event of his army being conveyed from Varna by the fleet. This was all that could be deciphered. There were the mystic letters and figures which laid down, as was surmised, the destiny of the Allied armies, and no one could read. At night Colonel Troehm came to Lord Raglan's quarters, and communicated all that could be gathered from the telegraphic despatch. The English General had just received the Duke of Newcastle's letter of the 28th, but had not yet broken the seal of it. Now, how-
ever, Lord Raglan opened the letter, and in a few moments he was able to give M. Trochu the means of inferring the matter contained in the illegible part of his despatch. Apparently it was the desire of both the Home Governments that the Allied commanders should prepare to make a descent upon the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol.

On the 16th of July the despatch of the 29th of June was received at the English headquarters; and a despatch forwarded from Paris at nearly the same time reached the hands of Marshal St Arnaud.

Since the proposed expedition involved the employment of both land and sea forces, the duty of determining upon the effect to be given to the instructions from home devolved upon those who had the command of the Anglo-French armies and fleets. These were three: Marshal St Arnaud (having Admiral Hamelin under his orders), Lord Raglan, and Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Marshal St Arnaud had not weight proportioned to the magnitude of his command. Reputed at first to be daring even to the verge of rashness, we have seen him so cautioned and schooled into strategic prudence as to have determined to place hundreds of miles of territory, and even the great range of the Balkan, between the French and the Russians; and now, within the last week, he had been almost reproved by his Government for want of enterprise. Colonel Trochu, admitted into consultation upon the most
momentous affairs, seemed to wield great authority. At Constantinople and at Varna, no less than in Paris, the Marshal had been made the victim of unsparing tongues. Indeed at this time two of his divisional generals openly indulged in merciless invectives against their chief: and soldiers all know that a general officer thus setting himself against the commander-in-chief is never without a great following. Perhaps, as had been at first supposed, it may have been true that boldness and craving for adventure were the true lines of the Marshal's character; but if that were so, his native ideas had been overlaid by much counsel, and bent into unwonted shapes. After a while, as will be seen, his mind, fatigued by advice, and now and then broken down by bodily illness, began to lapse into a state which rendered him almost passive in very critical moments. Naturally, he had been cowed by the result of his endeavours to have his own way against Lord Stratford and Lord Raglan. He was without ascendancy in the camp of the Allies.

Colonel Trochu was a student of the principles applicable to formal inland warfare, and it might well be expected that, the more the obstacles to the proposed undertaking were canvassed, the more he would throw the weight of his scientific advice into the negative scale.

Upon the whole, it resulted, from the composition of the various forces acting upon the mind of M. St Arnaud, that, whatever opinion he might lean to, he was not strong enough to be able to
act upon events. If the English should decide against the project, he would be well content, and perhaps much relieved. If, on the other hand, the English should press for its adoption, then the French Marshal would do his best to carry it to a good conclusion.

The French fleet was commanded by Admiral Hamelin. It was understood that he disapproved the expedition, but being under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, he had not of course the weight that his voice might have otherwise carried.

It was not at that time a part of the project to move any very large proportion of the Turkish army to the coast of the Crimea, and therefore the opinion of Omar Pasha would hardly become a governing ingredient in the counsels of the Allies. It was known, however, that he deprecated the proposed invasion.

The English fleet was commanded by Vice-Admiral Dundas. Most of the Vice-Admiral's latter years had been passed in political and official life, and it was by force of politics that he had now become troubled with the business of war; for his seat at the Admiralty Board, and his subsequent appointment in peace-time to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, were things which stood in the relation of cause and effect. He had not sought to return to scenes of naval strife, but the war overtook him in his marine retirement, converting his expected repose into anxious toil. He was an able, a steadfast, a genial man, and his square Scottish head, and his
For the Invasion.

rough, shrewd, good-humoured eyebrows, had grown grey in the faithful service of a political party. By nature, he was so stout-hearted that he could afford to give free, manly counsel without the least dread lest men should say he was too cautious. His habits as a working, subordinate member of Government, and perhaps, also, his natural temperament, inclined him to take a homely view of questions—a view recommended by what men term 'common sense.' I am sure, though I never heard him say so, that he believed the war to be extremely foolish, and that the less there was of it, the better it would be for the Whigs, and for all the rest of mankind. He spoke and went straight forward. He thoroughly dis-approved the project of invasion, and he said so in plain words. His opinion sprang, not from dread of peril to the forces which he himself commanded, but from anxiety—anxiety in every way honourable to him—for the safety of the English army. That that anxiety was altogether vain, or even that it was weakly founded, few men, speaking with the light of the past, will be ready to say. Still less will it be thought that the Vice-Admiral was wrong in giving bold expression to his views.

Admiral Dundas's command was one quite independent of the General in command of the English army; but, the feasibility of the sea-transit not being in question,* it was plain

* Dundas, I think, said fairly and bluntly, that he could undertake to land the army on the coast of the Crimea, but that he did not at all make sure of being able to supply it, or to bring it back.
that the decision would properly rest with those who were responsible for the direction of the land-forces. So, although he held stoutly to his own opinion, the Vice-Admiral did not fail to give assurance that, if the decision of the Generals should be in favour of undertaking the expedition, they might rely upon the aid of the English fleet.

There remained Lord Raglan: and now it is time to give the words of the instructions which had been addressed to him, as we have already seen, by the Secretary of State.

The private letter which was the forerunner of the detailed despatch ran thus:

'The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, unless you and Marshal St Arnaud feel that you are not sufficiently prepared, you should lay siege to Sebastopol, as we are more than ever convinced that, without the reduction of this fortress and the capture of the Russian fleet, it will be impossible to conclude an honourable and safe peace. The Emperor of the French has expressed his entire concurrence in this opinion,
'and, I believe,* has written privately to the Marshal to that effect. I shall submit to the Cabinet a despatch to you on this subject, and if it is approved you may expect it by the next mail. In the mean time I hope you will be turning over in your own mind, and considering with your French colleague, what it will be safe and advisable to do.'†

The promised despatch was in these words:—

'Secret.

'War Department, 29th June 1854.

'My Lord,

'In my despatch of the 10th April, marked "Secret," I directed your Lordship to make careful inquiry into the amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol.

'At the same time I pointed out to your Lordship that, whilst it was your first duty to prevent, by every means in your power, the advance of the Russian army on Constantinople, supposing any such intention to exist, it might become essential for the attainment of the objects of the war to undertake operations of an offensive character, and that the heaviest blow which could be struck at the southern extremities of the Russian empire would be the taking

*I need hardly say that the underscoring represented by these Italics appears in the original note.
† Private letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan, dated 28th June 1854.
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' or destruction of Sebastopol. The events which
' have recently occurred, and which have become
' known to Her Majesty's Government by means
' of the telegraph from Belgrade,—the gallant and
' successful resistance of the Turkish army—the
' raising of the siege of Silistria—the retreat of
' the Russian army across the Danube, and the
' anticipated evacuation of the Principalities,—
' have given a new character to the war, and will
' render it necessary for you without delay to con-
' cert measures with Marshal St Arnaud, and with
' Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, suited to the
' circumstances in which these events have placed
' the Allied forces.

' The safety of Constantinople from any inva-
' sion of the Russian army is now, for a time at
' least, secured; and the advance of the English
' and French armies to Varna and Pravadi has
' succeeded in its object, without their being
' called upon to meet the enemy in action.

' Any further advance of the Allied armies
' should on no account be contemplated. To
' occupy the Dobrutscha would be productive
' of no beneficial results, and would be fatally
' prejudicial to the health of the troops; and
' even if the Russian army should not recross the
' Pruth, but continue in the occupation of the
' Principalities, it is the decided opinion of Her
' Majesty's Government that, for the present at
' least, no measures should be taken by you to
' dislodge them.

' The circumstances anticipated in my despatch
before referred to have, therefore, now arrived; and I have, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to instruct your Lordship to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, unless, with the information in your possession but at present unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. The confidence with which Her Majesty placed under your command the gallant army now in Turkey is unabated; and if, upon mature reflection, you should consider that the united strength of the two armies is insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you, though Her Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack, from which such important consequences are anticipated, must be any longer delayed. The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay; and as there is no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is, on all accounts, most important that nothing but insuperable impediments—such as the want of ample preparations by either army, or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it—should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations.
This decision should be taken solely with reference to the means at your disposal, as compared with the difficulties to be overcome.

It is probable that a large part of the Russian army now retreating from the Turkish territory may be poured into the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. If orders to this effect have not already been given, it is further probable that such a measure would be adopted as soon as it is known that the Allied armies are in motion to commence active hostilities. As all communications by sea are now in the hands of the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions. This would be effectually done by the occupation of the Isthmus of Perekop; and I would suggest to you that, if a sufficient number of the Turkish army can now be spared for this purpose, it would be highly important that measures should be taken without delay for sending an adequate force to that point, and associating with the troops of the Sultan such English and French officers as would assist, by their advice, in holding permanently the position. With the same object, important assistance might be rendered by Admiral Dundas, if he has yet been able to obtain any vessels of a light draught which would prevent the passage of Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea of Azov.
It is unnecessary to express any opinion, at this distance from the scene, as to the mode in which these operations should be conducted, or the place at which a disembarkation should be effected; and as the latter will, of course, be decided with the advice and assistance of the French and English Admirals, it is equally unnecessary to impress upon your Lordship the importance of selecting favourable weather for the purpose, and avoiding all risks of being obliged by storms to withdraw from the shore the vessels of war and transports when only a partial landing of the troops has been effected.

I will not, in this despatch, enter into any consideration of the operations which it would be desirable to undertake in Circassia or the coast of Abasia. The reduction of the two remaining fortresses of Anapa and Sujak Kaleh would be, next to the taking of Sebastopol, of the greatest importance, as bearing upon the fortunes of the war; but not only is their fall of far less moment than that of Sebastopol, but the capture of the latter might possibly secure the surrender of the Circassian fortresses.

In the event, however, of delay in undertaking these operations being inevitable, and the transports being in consequence available for any other service, I wish you to consider, with his Highness Omar Pasha and Marshal St Arnaud, whether some part of the Turkish army might not be conveyed by steam from Varna, and, by a combined movement with the forces of Gen-
eral Guyon and Schamyl, so entrap the Russian army in and around Tiflis as to compel its surrender to superior numbers.

I have only further to express to you, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, their entire reliance in your judgment, zeal, and discretion; and their conviction that, whilst you will not expose the army under your command to unnecessary risk, you will not forget that to the gallantry and conduct of your troops their countrymen are now looking to secure, by the blessing of Providence, the great object of a just war, the vindication of national rights, and the future security of the peace of Europe.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient humble servant,

Newcastle.'

General the Lord Raglan, G.C.B.,

'&c. &c. &c.'

In common circumstances, and especially where the whole of the troops to be engaged are under one commander, it cannot be right for any Sovereign or any Minister to address such instructions as these to a General on a distant shore; for the General who is to be entrusted with the sole command of a great expedition must be, of all mankind, the best able to judge of its military prudence, and to give him orders thus cogent is to dispense with his counsel.

But in this war the united forces of France
and England were under two commanders; and, besides, since the expedition was dependent upon naval co-operation, the Admirals of the two fleets would necessarily be taken into council. It is true that the French Admiral was under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, but there was no corresponding arrangement in regard to the English services, and our Admiral's command was independent of the General commanding the land-forces.

Thus it seemed to the Home Government that the question, if left to be decided on the shores of the Black Sea, would have to be weighed, not by one commander, but by a council of at least four, and to be actually decided by a council of not less than three; and it could scarcely be expected that such a body, deliberating freely, would come to that vigorous decision which might easily perhaps be attained by any one of them singly. On the other hand the two Governments were perfectly agreed. Upon the whole, therefore, there was some ground for resolving to transmit to the camps at Varna the benefit of that concord which reigned between Paris and London, and to subject the Generals and Admirals to the overruling judgment of the authorities at home.

Again, the chief reason which makes it unwise to fetter the discretion of Generals—namely, the superior knowledge which they are supposed to have of the enemy's strength and of the field of operations—was in this instance wanting; for the
Generals in the camp at Varna had absolutely no trustworthy information except what came to them from Paris or London; and in their power of testing the statements which reached them in this way they were below the Home Governments, for they did not so well know the sources from which the accounts were drawn.

Justice requires that these considerations should have their weight, for they tend in some measure to explain the extreme stringency of the instructions. The Minister who framed them had determined, with a boldness very rare in modern times, to take upon himself an immense weight of responsibility; and, having brought himself to this strong resolve, he rightly and generously did all he could to simplify the task of the Generals whom he ventured to direct, and to make the path of duty seem clear.

But Lord Raglan had a station in the Allied camp which made it very difficult for the Home Government to take his burthen upon themselves by any mere bold form of words. He commanded the land-forces, but he was clothed with a power of older date than the Queen's commission. He had been privy to the business of the wars which England waged in the great days; and if he had seen how Wellington ordered affairs in the field, he had witnessed too his endurance, and helped him in the patient, unapplauded toil by which he prepared the end. Men serving under Lord Raglan were none of them blind to the distance which History herself interposed betwixt their
General and themselves. There were none near the chief who would not feel bitter pain if they imagined that words or acts of theirs had thrown upon his face a shadow of displeasure. There were no men near him who would not fly with alacrity to execute his slightest wish. The ascendancy of the English General over his own people could not but reach into the French camp. Upon the whole, Lord Raglan had so great an authority in the camp of the Allies, and amongst public men in England, that if he had taken upon himself to resist the pressure of the Secretary of State, he would not have been left without support. On the other hand, if he should determine to follow the will of the Home Government, he would carry the French Marshal with him. So, in effect, the power of deciding for or against the expedition had passed from Paris and from London, and was all concentrated in the English General.

Of the general officers in the English camp there was one whom Lord Raglan had always been anxious to have near at hand: this was Sir George Brown. He was a Scotsman, sixty-four years old, and had served, with a great repute for his daring forwardness, in some of the most bloody scenes of the Peninsular War. He was of an eager fiery nature, and devoted to the calling of a soldier. After the peace of 1815 he began to hold office in the general staff of the army at the Horse Guards, and in time he became Adjutant-General. He now commanded the
Light Division. His zeal, and his lengthened toils in the Adjutant-General's office, had drawn him too far in a narrow path, and he overplied the idea of discipline; but he abounded in energy, and he was in many respects an accomplished soldier. He wrote on military subjects with clearness, with grace, and seemingly with a good deal of ease.

After receiving the Duke of Newcastle's despatch Lord Raglan sent for Sir George Brown, and expressed to him a wish to have his opinion about it. He handed the paper to Sir George across the table, and then went on with his writing, leaving Sir George to consider its contents at his leisure. When he had read it, Lord Raglan asked him to give him his opinion. Before giving it, Sir George naturally inquired what information Lord Raglan had obtained in regard to the strength of Sebastopol, and what force he expected might be opposed to him in the Crimea.

Lord Raglan's answer was, that he had no information whatever; that neither he nor Marshal St Arnaud knew what amount of force the enemy had there; that they believed and hoped there might not be more than 70,000 men in the peninsula; but that, in fact, it had not been blockaded, and that no means had been taken to procure information, and that, therefore, they did not in reality know they might not be opposed by 100,000 men, or even more.

Then Sir George Brown said: 'You and I are accustomed, when in any great difficulty, or
'when any important question is proposed to us, to ask ourselves how the Great Duke would have acted and decided under similar circumstances. Now, I tell your Lordship that, without more certain information than you appear to have obtained in regard to this matter, that great man would not have accepted the responsibility of undertaking such an enterprise as that which is now proposed to you! But, notwithstanding that consideration, I am of opinion that you had better accede to the proposal and come into the views of the Government, for this reason, that it is clear to me, from the tenor of the Duke of Newcastle's letter, that they have made up their minds to it at home, and that, if you decline to accept the responsibility, they will send some one else out to command the army who will be less scrupulous and more ready to come in to their plans.'

This suggestion did not at all govern Lord Raglan's decision.† At the time he disclosed no opinion of his own; but he soon made up his mind. His decision was governed by views

* One of my critics imagined that this piece of counsel was the work of the Author's 'ingenious' fancy, and remonstrated with him for carrying his love of ridicule to the extreme length of putting 'unmitigated nonsense' in the mouth of a 'gallant and sensible' old soldier like Sir George Brown; but the words attributed to Sir George Brown in the text are copied, without the change of a word, from a written narrative of the conference, which was handed to me by Sir George Brown himself.

† All who were acquainted with Lord Raglan's nature will acknowledge, I think, that his mind would have refused to
which must be explained. He believed that the enterprise was one of a very hazardous kind, and was not warranted by any safe information concerning the state of the enemy's forces. Having that conviction, why did he not feel bound to assert it, notwithstanding the urgency of the Home Government? Lord Raglan was, as might be supposed, deeply imbued with reverence for the authority of the Duke of Wellington; and, rightly interpreted, that authority is surely the safest guide that an English general can follow. But there is a certain danger in the precepts of the Great Duke, unless when they are construed down to their right degree of significance by applying to them the splendid context of his deeds; for he was accustomed to use sayings founded on quaint and very literal readings of our English law; and the loyalty of his nature rose so high above the reach of all cavil, that the maxims which he uttered seemed to give a noble simplicity to the tenor of his public life, though in reality he rarely or never permitted them to derange his policy, still less to confuse him in the management of war. Naturally, therefore, men were in danger of being misled by a too narrow

harbour, for one instant, the notion submitted to him by Sir George Brown—the notion of engaging his army in an imprudent undertaking from an apprehension of finding himself superseded in the command by some one less scrupulous and more ready to come in to the plans of the Government.

Lord Raglan, after this conference, was, I think, less inclined than before to single out Sir George Brown as the one man with whom to consult upon affairs of great moment.
reading of his precepts. Now, one of the Duke’s theories was, that an officer commanding an army on foreign service owed obedience to the Secretary of State—obedience close akin to that which a military subordinate owes to his military chief. If this precept were to be narrowly construed, a Secretary of State who conveyed the wishes of the Government to a general commanding forces abroad would be in danger of finding that he had shut out from his counsels the one man in all the world who could best advise him; and the relations of the Austrian generals with the old Aulic Council at Vienna would have to be adopted as a guide, instead of being valued as a warning. Against this doctrine, understood in its narrow sense, the Duke of Wellington’s whole military career in Europe was an almost unceasing rebellion; and it would be hard to find an instance in which he suffered his designs to be bent awry by the military opinions of the Home Government. During the Peninsular War he did not surely pass his time in obeying the Home Government, but rather in setting it right, and in educating it, if so one may speak, for the business of carrying on war.*

* The fierce, wilful, and contemptuous way in which the Duke of Wellington dealt with a Secretary of State who ventured to think he might take him at his word, and make him obey his wish, must be familiar to every reader of the Despatches; but I may refer to the specimen which will be found in Sir Arthur Wellesley’s letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 5th of September 1808. I mean the passage beginning ‘In respect to your wish that I should go into the Asturias, to examine
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It is known, however, that Lord Raglan accepted the Great Duke's precept without much qualification; and when he applied it to the despatch which had come to him from the Secretary of State, he saw, as he believed, where the path of duty lay; for now, in all its potency, the strange sleep which had come upon the Cabinet on the 28th of June began to tell upon events. But for this, or some like physical cause, it could hardly have chanced that fifteen men, all gifted with keen intellect, and all alike charged with a grave, nay, an almost solemn duty, would have knowingly assented to the draft of a long and momentous despatch, without seeking to wedge into it some of those qualifying words which usually correct the imprudence and derange the grammatical structure of writings framed in Council. A few qualifying words of this sort would have enabled Lord Raglan to act upon his own opinion. But the tranquil mood of the Cabinet on the evening of the 28th of June had prevented the mutilation of the despatch; and it retained so perfectly all that bold singleness of purpose which characterised the mind of the framer, that it virtually directed the Eng-

' the country and form a judgment of its strength, I have to mention to you that I am not a draughtsman.' It happened that, just six days before—namely, on the 30th of August—Sir Arthur had addressed to the same Secretary of State his customary professions of obedience:—' I shall do whatever the 'Government may wish; ' but he never thought of suffering himself to be hindered from penning an angry refusal on the 5th of September merely because he had used a submissive phrase on the 30th of August.
lish General to undertake the invasion, unless it should happen that he had obtained fresh knowledge of the enemy's strength—fresh knowledge of such a kind as would enable him to controvert the statements sent out to him by the Home Government, and say distinctly that the Russian forces in the Crimea were too numerous to be encountered with common prudence by the Allied armies. Now, Lord Raglan had not succeeded in obtaining any information at all on the subject, and, therefore, the one circumstance which might have relaxed the stringency of the despatch was entirely wanting. In the state of things which actually existed, the Duke of Newcastle's communication was little short of an absolute order from the Secretary of State. The English General determined to obey it.

It was thus that Lord Raglan persuaded himself into the belief that he would be justified in foregoing his own opinion, and acceding to the will of the Home Government; but perhaps, though he knew it not, he was under the power of a motive more heating than this bare process of the reason. There were sentences in the despatch which seemed as though they were meant for the guidance of one not sufficiently prone to action. The writer seemed to have busied himself in closing the loops by which a general might seek to escape from the obligation of having to make the venture. In reality, as we have seen, the despatch had been framed with a view of giving unanimity to a council of generals.
and admirals, but it reached its destination at a time when (for the purpose of this decision) the whole power of the camp at Varna was centred in the English General. Whether meant for the guidance of a council or not, the despatch was addressed to one man—and that man was Lord Raglan. Some may deem it wrong, and may call it a plan of life too closely deriving from times of chivalry; but it is still the habit of the English gentleman to think that his personal honour is no part of the property of the State, and that even, for what may seem the public good, he ought not to do a violence to his self-respect. He has his code formed in the time of his boyish conflicts or of his early manhood; and if there be fire and strength in his nature, he will not depart from it merely because he has become responsible and mature in years. Lord Raglan was of the bodily nature of those whose blood flushes hot to the face under the sting of an indignant thought; and if mortal eyes could have looked upon him when he revolved the contents of the despatch, they would have seen him turn crimson in poising the question whether he ought to resist the pressure of the Queen's Government,—and to resist because of mere danger. What the Duke of Newcastle meant was to do all he reasonably could to enforce the invasion; and, so intending, he did honestly in making his order as peremptory as possible; but if, in any times to come, it shall be intended that an English general commanding on a foreign service is to exercise his judgment
freely and without passion, the Secretary of State must not challenge him as Lord Raglan was challenged by the despatch of the 29th of June.

Lord Raglan's decision governed the counsels of the Allied camp; for although the Staff of the French army* (including, as I believe, M. St Arnaud himself) were averse to the undertaking, the Marshal's instructions were so framed that, if the English should be ready to go forward, he was virtually ordered to concur in the enterprise;† and we have seen that he had not such a weight in the French camp as would have enabled him to oppose any valid resistance to the wishes of his own Government and the determination of the English General.

In announcing his decision to the Home Government, Lord Raglan thus wrote to the Duke of Newcastle:

'It becomes my duty to acquaint you that it was more in deference to the views of the British Government as conveyed to me in your Grace's despatch, and to the known acquiescence of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or their state of preparation, that the decision to make a descent upon the Crimea was adopted.

* This will be shown by the narrative contained in a subsequent chapter.
† Lord Raglan had the advantage of knowing (by means of a communication from Lord Cowley) that the 'Emperor quite concurred in the views of the British Cabinet.'
The fact must not be concealed that neither the English nor the French Admirals have been able to obtain any intelligence on which they can rely with respect to the army which the Russians may destine for operations in the field, or the number of men allotted for the defence of Sebastopol; and Marshal St Arnaud and myself are equally deficient in information upon these all-important questions, and there would seem to be no chance of our acquiring it. 

The Duke of Newcastle's reply to this despatch was in full consistency with that fearless and unshrinking assumption of responsibility which had marked his instructions of the 29th of June.

'I wish,' he writes,† 'that circumstances which are engrossing my attention this afternoon permitted my expressing to you the feelings of intense anxiety and interest which your reply of the 19th of July to mine of the 29th of June have created in my mind. I cannot help seeing, through the calm and noble tone of your announcement of the decision to attack Sebastopol, that it has been taken in order to meet the views and desires of the Government, and not in entire accordance with your own opinions. God grant that success may reward you, and justify us!

'I wrote to the Queen the moment I received your despatch, and in answer she said: "The " very important news which he conveyed to her in it, of the decision of the Generals and

* 19th July.
† Private letter to Lord Raglan, 3d August 1854.
"Admirals to attack Sebastopol, have filled the Queen with mixed feelings of satisfaction and anxiety. May the Almighty protect her army and her fleet, and bless this great undertaking with success!"

'Let me add my humble aspirations and prayers to those of our good Queen. The cause is a just one, if any war is just; and I will not believe that in any case British arms can fail. May honour, victory, and the thanks of a grateful world attend your efforts! God bless you and those who fight under you!'
CHAPTER XVII.

On the 18th of July a conference took place at Marshal St Arnaud's headquarters. It was attended by the Marshal, by Lord Raglan, and by Admiral Hamelin, by Admiral Bruat (who was the second in command of the French fleet), by Vice-Admiral Dundas, and by Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, who was the second in command of the English fleet. It lasted four hours.

Perhaps most of the members of the conference imagined that they were met for the purpose of determining upon the expediency of undertaking the invasion; but Lord Raglan had already determined—not merely to support the wish of his Government in the Allied camp, but—to cause its actual adoption; and he was so constituted that he could bring the resources of his mind to bear upon the object in view with as much abundance and strength as if he had himself approved or even devised it. Clearly a discussion upon the expediency of undertaking the enterprise would have been fatal to it; for no member of the conference, except Lyons and (possibly)
Bruat, could have conscientiously argued that the scheme was wise or even moderately prudent. How was it to be contrived that a council of war, disapproving the enterprise, should be prevented from strangling it?

As almost always happened in conferences where Lord Raglan had the ascendant, the grand question was quietly passed over, as though it were either decided or conceded for the purpose of the discussion, and it was made to seem that the duty which remained to the council was that of determining the time and the means. The French had studied the means of disembarking in the face of a powerful enemy. Sir Ralph Abercromby's descent upon the coast of Egypt in the face of the French army was an enterprise too brilliant and too daring to allow of its being held a safe example, for he had simply landed his infantry upon the beach in boats, without attempting, in the first instance, to bring artillery into action. It seems that hardly any stress of circumstances will induce a French general to bring his infantry into action upon open ground without providing for it the support of artillery. Naturally, therefore, the French authorities at Varna were impressed with the necessity of being able to land their field-guns in such a way as to admit of their being brought into action simultaneously with the landing of their battalions; and, having anticipated some time before that a disembarkation in the face of an enemy might be one of the operations of the war, they
had already begun to make the boats required for the purpose. These were flat-bottomed lighters, somewhat in the form of punts, but of great size, and so constructed that they would receive the gun-carriages with the guns upon them, and allow of the guns being run out straight from the boat to the beach. It was understood that the building of these flat lighters would take about ten days; and it was determined that, in the meantime, a survey of the coast near Sebastopol should be made from on board ship, in order to determine the spot best suited for a descent.

With a view to cover the reconnaissance and draw off the enemy's attention, the Allied Admirals cruised with powerful fleets in front of the harbour of Sebastopol; and meanwhile the officers chosen for the service went northward along the coast in the Fury, seeking out the best place for a landing. The officers of the land-service who performed this duty were, on the part of the French, General Canrobert and Colonel Trochu, with one engineer and one artillery officer; and on the part of the English, Sir George Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, R.H.A., Captain Lovell, R.E., and Captain Wetherall, of the Quartermaster-General's department. The Fury was commanded by Captain Tatham, and on board her there also was one who had lent himself to the enterprise of the Invasion with impassioned zeal.

In the moment when Lord Raglan determined to treat the instructions of the Government as imperative, and to put them in course for execu-
tion, he came to another determination (a determination which is not so mere a corollary from the first as men unversed in business may think): he resolved to carry the enterprise through. He knew that, though work of an accustomed sort can be ably done by official persons acting under a bare sense of duty, yet that the engine for conquering obstacles of a kind not known beforehand, when they are many and big and unforeseen, must be nothing less than the strong, passionate will of a man. If every one were to perform his mere duty, there would be no invasion of the Crimea, for a rank growth of hindrances, springing up in the way of the undertaking, would be sure to gather fast round it, and bring it in time to a stop.

Amongst the English Generals there was no one who had given his mind to the enigma which went by the name of the 'Eastern Question'; but Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons had been for many years engaged in the animating diplomacy of the Levant. In Greece, the activity of the Czar's agents, or, perhaps, of his mere admirers, had been so constant, and had generated so strong a spirit of antagonism in the minds of the few contentious Britons who chanced to observe it, that the institutions called 'The Russian Party' and 'The English Party' had long ago flourished at Athens; and since Sir Edmund Lyons had been accredited there for several years as British Minister, he did not miss being drawn into the game of combating against what was supposed to be the ever-impending danger of Russian encroach-
ment. Long ago, therefore, he had been whetted for this strife; and now that the 'Eastern Question' was to be brought to the issue of a war in which he had part, he was inflamed with a passionate zeal. Resuming at once the uniform and the bearing of his old profession, he cast aside, if ever he had it, all semblance of diplomatic reserve and composure, and threw himself, with all his seaman's heart, into the business of the war.

Lord Raglan drew Sir Edmund Lyons into his intimate counsels. I know not whether this concord of theirs was ever put into words; but I imagine that, at the least, I can infer from their actions, and from the tenor of their intercourse, a silent understanding between them—an understanding that no lukewarmness of others, no shortcomings, no evasions, no tardy prudence, no overgrown respect for difficulty or peril, should hinder the landing of the Queen's troops on the coast of the Crimea. From the time that Lord Raglan thus joined Lyons to the undertaking he gave it a great momentum. To those within the grasp of the Rear-Admiral's energy it seemed that thenceforth, and until the troops should be landed on the enemy's shore, there could be no rest for man, no rest for engines. The Agamemnon was never still. In the painful, consuming passion with which Lyons toiled, and even, as some imagined, in the anxious, craving expression of his features, there was something which reminded men of a greater name.

With the cordial approval of Lyons, Tatham
carried the Fury* in so close to the shore that the coast could be reconnoitred with great completeness. The officers came to the conclusion (a conclusion afterwards overruled, as we shall see, by Lord Raglan) that the valley of the Kat-cha was the best spot for a landing.

We saw that the Czar's withdrawal from the Principalities would deprive the German Powers of their main ground of quarrel with Russia, and that our plan of engaging in a great marine expedition against Crim Tartary would cause Austria and Prussia to despair of all effective support from the West, thus driving or tending to drive them into better relations with Nicholas. Before the 28th of July there were signs that this change was beginning to set Russia free from the straits in which she had been placed by the unanimity of the four Great Powers; and tidings which reached the camp at Varna made it appear (though not with truth) that the Russian commander had not only suspended his retreat, but was commencing a fresh movement in advance. To deliberate upon this supposed change in the character of the war, a conference was held at the French headquarters, and was attended by Mar-

* It seems that before retiring to rest at night, Sir Edmund Lyons simply directed Tatham 'to take the ship in as before,' and that, this direction having been duly complied with, Lyons found upon coming on deck the next morning that the Fury was already 'close in.' Captain Tatham, a few days previously, had carried the Fury in so near to Sebastopol as to come to an exchange of shots with a part of the Russian fleet, and it was on that account that Dundas selected the Fury for this service.
shall St Arnaud, Lord Raglan, General Canrobert, Sir Edmund Lyons, General Martimprey, Sir George Brown, and Colonel Trochu. The French Generals grasped this as an occasion for bringing about the relinquishment of an enterprise which they had always held to be rash. They submitted that the general instructions addressed to both of the Allied commanders made it their duty to provide, in the first instance, for the safety of the Ottoman territory, and that, until that object was secured, they were not warranted in attempting an invasion of a Russian province far distant from the threatened frontier of European Turkey; that the order to invade the coast of the Crimea had been framed by the Home Governments, and acceded to by the Allied Generals upon the assumption that the armed intervention of Austria, then believed to be imminent, or, at the very least, a continuance of her menacing attitude on the flank of the Russian army would preclude any attempt by the Czar to resume his war on the Danube; that that assumption now unfortunately turned out to be unfounded; and that the abandonment by Austria of the common cause made it the bounden duty of the Allied commanders to return to their defensive measures; because it was now plain that, if they quitted Bulgaria, Omar Pasha, without aid from any quarter, would have upon his hands the whole weight of the Russian army. Now then, supposing the premises to be conceded, the French counsellors had made out good grounds for aban-
douing a resolution which, only a week ago, had been adopted by the Allied commanders.

Lord Raglan, however, was resolved that the enterprise should go on. From the moment he knew that the siege of Silistria had been raised he never doubted that, for that year at least, the invasion of European Turkey was at an end. But he knew that clever men who have taken the pains to build up a neat logical structure, do not easily allow it to be treated as unsound merely because it rests upon a sliding foundation. Without, therefore, combating the French arguments, he quietly suggested that the time which must needs elapse before the embarkation might throw new light on the probability of a renewed attack upon Turkey; and he proposed that, in the meantime, the preparations for the descent on the Crimea should be carried on with all speed. This opinion was adopted by every member of the conference. The preparations were carried on with increasing energy; and the theory that it was the duty of the Allied commanders to abandon the enterprise was never put down by argument, but left to die away uncontested.

Lord Raglan had been struck with the value of the French plan for landing artillery on flat lighters, and Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown were despatched to Constantinople, with instructions to do all they could towards supplying the British army with means which would answer the same purpose. They discovered that a platform resting upon two boats might be made
to serve nearly as well as one of the French lighters.* How they toiled the world will never know, for History cannot pause to see them ransacking Constantinople and the villages of the Bosphorus in their search after carpenters and planks; but before the appointed time, the whole work was done. This was not all. Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown propelled the arrangements for buying and chartering steamers, trampling down with firmness, perhaps one might say with violence, all obstacles which stood in the way. Of those obstacles one of the most formidable was what was called in those days the 'official fear of incurring responsibility.' Lyons and Sir George Brown taught men that, in emergencies of this sort, they should be pursued with the fear of not doing enough, rather than with the dread of doing too much. 'I cannot venture,' said a cautious official—'I cannot venture to give the price.' 'Then I can,' said Sir George Brown; 'I buy it in my own name!' It is thus that difficulties are conquered. When the restless Agamemnon came back into the Bay of Varna with Lyons and Sir George Brown on board, Lord Raglan was at the head of a truly British armament. He had the means, by steam-power, and at one trip, to descend upon the

*I believe that the merit of making this discovery, and of the irresistible energy by which it was carried into effect, belonged to Mr Roberts, late a Master in the Navy. See the forcible exposition of Mr Roberts's services, and of his cruelly frustrated hopes, in a little work called 'The Service and the 'Reward,' by Mr George John Cayley.
enemy's coast, with all his divisions of infantry, with his brigade of light cavalry, and with the whole of his field-artillery; and he would be enabled, if he landed in face of an enemy, to bring his guns into action whilst his infantry formed upon the beach.

When the allied commanders determined to execute the orders addressed to them, they saw the importance of endeavouring to veil their project from the enemy. With this view they tried to induce a belief that Odessa was to be the object of attack; but the measures which they took for this purpose were very slight and weak. To deceive the enemy by the mere spreading of a report, the first step for a general to take would be that of uttering the false word to some of his own people. That would be a difficult service for Lord Raglan to perform; and I do not believe that he ever could or ever did perform it.

Another contrivance for diverting the enemy's attention from the Crimea was that of endeavouring to alarm him for his Bessarabian frontier. Partly to attain this end, and partly, as was surmised, with the more ambitious object of striking a blow at some of the Czar's retiring columns, Marshal St Arnaud moved no less than three divisions into the Dobrudja. But, in truth, all secrecy was forbidden to the Allies. The same power which dictated the expedition precluded its concealment. It was in a council of the whole people that England had resolved upon the enterprise; and what advantage there is in knowledge
of an enemy's plans, that she freely gave to Russia. It might seem that for the Emperor of the French, who had shown that he was capable of the darkest secrecy in his own designs, it must have been trying to have to act with a power which propounded her schemes in print. But, happily, he understood England, and knew something of the conditions under which she moves into action.

Lord Raglan soon learnt that the native Bulgarians abstained from coming in with their farm produce to supply the ready market awaiting them in the English camp, and ascertaining that their backwardness arose from fear of their Turkish masters, combined, as he thought, with a hope of being freed from the yoke they wore, he addressed our Home Government on the subject in grave, earnest, thoughtful language. Having observed that the Rayahs went unarmed, whilst their masters, the Turks, stalked proudly under the burthen of the many bright weapons they carried for cutting, stabbing, and shooting their imaginary foes, he warned the Secretary of State that, so long as this inequality should be maintained, the condition of the people, kept down by such a distinction, must needs be very like that of slaves;* but

* Private letter of Lord Raglan, 8th August 1854, to the Duke of Newcastle. Lord Raglan's correspondence on this subject with the Duke of Newcastle bears so closely upon a question which has lately been raised—a question of great moment to the peace of Europe—that I place it in the Appendix. Very soon after writing his appeal of the 8th of August, in favour of the Bulgarian Rayahs, Lord Raglan was
Although his appeal drew a warmly concurring response from the Duke of Newcastle, it produced no other effect, and he himself when receiving it was on the eve of embarking for the Crimea.

On the 10th of August a fire broke out in the British magazines at Varna, and a large quantity of military stores was consumed.

But another and more dreadful enemy had now entered the camp of the Allies. From the period of its arrival in the Levant, the French army had been suffering much from sickness. In the British army, on the contrary, though slight complaints were not unfrequent, the bodily condition of the men had been upon the whole very good; and so it continued up to the 19th of July. On that day, out of the whole Light Division, there were only 110 in hospital. But it seems that one of the omens which portend the visitation of a great epidemic is a more than common flush of health. With the French, the cholera first showed itself on board their troop-ships whilst passing from Marseilles to the Dardanelles. It then appeared among the French quartered at Gallipoli, and followed their battalions into Bulgaria. There, its ravages increased, and before the beginning of the last week in July it reached the British army.

summoned away to a distant land; but the exceeding earnestness of his appeal gives me ground for believing that, if Bulgaria had continued to be the theatre of war, Lord Raglan would have persisted in his efforts to raise up the subject people of the province, and obtain for them, if not good government, at all events a much easier yoke than the one under which they then lived.
By the 19th of August our regiments in Bulgaria had lost 532 men. But it was amongst the three French divisions marched into the Dobrudja, and especially in General Canrobert's Division, that the disease raged with the most deadly virulence. In the day's march, and sometimes within the space of only a few hours, hundreds of men dropped down in the sudden agonies of cholera; and out of one battalion alone, it was said that, besides those already dead, no less than 500 sufferers were carried alive in the waggons. On the 8th of August it was computed, by an officer of their Staff, that out of the three French divisions which marched into the Dobrudja, no less than 10,000 lay dead or struck down by sickness.

If the cholera had been confined to the land-forces, the Generals would not, perhaps, have allowed it to delay their embarkation; but it now reached the fleets. In a few days the crews were in such a state that all idea of attempting to embark the troops was, for the moment, quite out of the question; and on the 11th and 12th of August the Admirals put out from their anchorage, in the hope of driving away the disease with the pure breezes of the sea. But they had scarcely done this when, on board some of the ships, the mysterious pest began to rage with a violence rare in Europe. The Britannia alone out of 985 lost no less than 139 men.*

* In former editions (owing to some mistake of figures which I have not traced to its cause) I stated the loss at only 105; but according to the statement furnished by Dr Rees, the
The number of those stricken, and of those attending upon them, was so great, that it was impracticable to carry on the common duties of the ship in the usual way; and if the disease had continued to rage with undiminished violence for three days more there would have been the spectacle of a majestic three-decker floating helpless upon the waves for want of hands to work her. This time of trial proved the quality of those who remained unstricken. There was a waywardness in the course of the disease on board British ships, for which it is difficult to account,—it spared the officers. On board British ships of war the seaman is accustomed to look to those who command with a strong affectionate reliance; and now the poor sufferers, in their childlike simplicity, were calling upon their officers for help and comfort. An officer thus appealed to would go and lie down by the side of the sufferer, and soothe him as though he were an infant. And this trust and this devotion were not always in vain. Even against malignant cholera the officer seemed to be not altogether powerless; for, partly by holding the sufferer in his kind hands, partly by cheering words, and partly by wild remedies, invented in despair of all regular medical treatment, he was often enabled to fight the disease, or to make the men think that he did.

surgeon of the Britannia, and, as I personally know, a most able and excellent officer, the number was what I now state it. Out of the first 60 cases 55 died, and of these, 50 died within the first 20 hours.
Almost suddenly the pestilence ceased on board the British ships of war. The dead were overboard, and the survivors returned to their accustomed duties with an alacrity quickened by the delight of looking forward to active operations against the enemy. Instinctively, or else with wise design, both officers and men dropped all mention of the tragedy through which they had passed.*

In a few days from the time when the cholera had been raging with its utmost fury, the crews of the fleet were ready to undertake the great business of embarking the troops and landing them on the coast of the Crimea.

In the camps of the Allied armies, at this time, the cholera had abated, but had not ceased. There were fevers, too, and other complaints. Grievous sickness fell upon that part of our camp which had been pitched in the midst of the beauteous scenery of the lake of Devna, but the whole English army at this time began to show signs of failing health. It appeared that, even of the men out of hospital and actually present under arms, hardly any were in the enjoyment of sound health — hardly any were capable of their usual amount of exertion.

This weakly condition of the men was destined to act, with other causes, in bringing upon the army cruel sufferings; and it may be asked

* I was for several days on board the Britannia without once, I think, hearing the least allusion to the pestilence which just four weeks before had slain 139 of the ship's crew.
whether, with the soldiers in this condition of body, it was right to undertake an invasion. The answer would be this: the medical authorities thought, and with apparently good reason, that, for troops sickening under the fierce summer heats of Bulgaria, the sea voyage, the descent upon another and more healthy shore, and, above all, the animating presence of the enemy, would work a good effect upon the health of the men; and, although these hopes proved vain, they seemed at the time to rest upon fair grounds. And, after all, it is hard to say what other disposition of the troops would have united the advantages of being better and possible. To remain in Bulgaria, or to attempt to operate in the neighbourhood of the Danube, was to linger in the midst of those very atmospheric poisons which had brought the health of the army to its then state; and, on the other hand, our people at home would hardly have borne to see the army sent back to Malta, and forced to recede from the conflict, for the bare reason that some of the men were in hospital, and that the rest, without being ill, were said to be in a weakly condition.
Our Admiral had at his command the means for conveying the British force to the enemy's shore either in steam-vessels or in sailing-ships towed by steam-power; and, until the eve of the embarkation, the French believed that their resources would enable them to achieve a like result. So, at a conference of the four Admirals held on the 20th of August, it was arranged that the whole of the French and English armament should move from the coast at the same time under steam-power; and the 2d of September was looked forward to as the day when the armament might perhaps go to sea, but the exact time would of course depend upon weather and other circumstances beyond the reach of exact calculation.

On the 24th of August the huge operation of embarking the armies had already begun. The French embarked 24,000 infantry and 70 pieces of field-artillery; but, since they were straitened in their means of sea-transport, the number of horses they allotted to each gun was reduced from six to four. The French embarked no
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A large portion of the French troops were put on board ships of war, and other portions were distributed among a great number of sailing-vessels. Some of these were very small craft.

Attached to the French army, and placed under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, there was a force of between 5000 and 6000 Turkish infantry. These men were embarked mainly or entirely on board Turkish vessels of war.

Sir Edmund Lyons was charged with the duty of embarking the English forces; and having first got on board our 60 pieces of field-artillery, completely equipped, with the full complement of horses belonging to every gun, he proceeded with the embarkation of the 22,000 infantry and the full thousand of cavalry which Lord Raglan intended to move from Bulgaria to the coast of the Crimea. To put on board ship a body of foot-soldiers is comparatively a simple process; but the shipping of horses involves so heavy a cost, so great an exertion of human energy, that he who undertakes such a task upon anything like a large scale

* They took with them from 80 to 100 horsemen to perform escort duty; but of course I do not regard this as an exception to the statement that 'no cavalry was embarked.'

† Our naval officers are strongly opposed, to the practice of putting troops on board ships of war. They are not the men to set their personal convenience against the exigencies of the public service, but they cannot endure that the efficiency of a man-of-war should be for one moment suspended. It is well ascertained, too, that the presence of a great number of soldiers—men who, for the time of the voyage, are almost necessarily idlers—is injurious to the discipline of a ship.
must needs be a man in earnest. On the other hand, it was clear that, for an invasion of the Crimea, a body of cavalry was strictly needed; therefore a sagacious interpreter of warlike signs, who saw that the English General was embarking a thousand cavalry horses, and that the French were embarking none, would be led to conjecture that the English were resolved to make the descent, and that the French were not. It will be seen, by and by, that such a conjecture would have been sound.

The time necessary for embarking a given number of foot-soldiers is small in proportion to that required for getting on board an equal number of troopers with their chargers. Nor is this all. The embarkation of infantry is not necessarily stopped by a moderate swell: the embarkation of cavalry is rendered very slow and difficult by even a slight movement of the sea, and is stopped altogether by a little increase of surf. The business of embarking the British cavalry was checked during some days by a wind from the north-east, and its consequent swell; but afterwards the weather changed, and the whole force was got on board without the loss of a man.*

Lord Raglan could not repress the feeling with which he looked upon the exertions of our naval

* The French were not so fortunate, for a painful accident occurred in the course of their embarkation. One of their steam-vessels ran down a boat laden with Zouaves. The men, encumbered by their packs, could do little to save themselves, and more than twenty were drowned.
officers and seamen. 'The embarkation,' he wrote on the 29th of August—'the embarkation is proceeding rapidly and successfully, thanks to the able arrangements of Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and the unceasing exertions of the officers and men under his orders. It is impossible for me to express, in adequate terms, my sense of the value of the assistance the army under my command derives from the Royal Navy. The same feeling prevails from the highest to the lowest—from Vice-Admiral Dundas to the youngest sailor; an ardent desire to co-operate, by every possible means, is manifest throughout; and I am proud of being associated with men who are animated by such a spirit, and who are so entirely devoted to the service of their country.'

Of course, the French, unencumbered with cavalry, were on board before the English embarkation was complete; but the steam-power at the command of the French fell short, and the necessity of a variation from the plan determined upon by the four Admirals was now announced. On the 4th of September, Admiral Hamelin, and an officer on the staff of the French army, informed Vice-Admiral Dundas that their resources would not, as they had expected, enable them to have their sailing transports towed by steamers.

No explanation was given of the failure which had thus suddenly crippled the French armament; and yet, it must be owned, the discovery was one that might well make men anxious, for they saw
that the whole flotilla would be clogged by the slowness of the sailing-vessels in which the Marshal's troops were embarked, and, accordingly, the fate of the enterprise then appeared more than ever dependent upon the accidents of weather. Marshal St Arnaud grew restless.
CHAPTER XIX.

We have seen that the 2d of September had been looked forward to as the time for the departure of the united armaments, and on that day, with military punctuality, Marshal St Arnaud went to Baljik; but the wind and the waves are still undisciplined forces, and the French embarkations were not destined to be completed until the evening of the 4th. The Marshal, therefore, was kept waiting at Baljik; and meanwhile sickness began to make havoc with his troops, for they were densely crowded on board the transports.

The Marshal was much tortured by the anxiety which he had had to bear during these three painful days, and (possibly to calm his mind) Vice-Admiral Dundas seems to have suggested to him that, his sailing-vessels not being provided with steam-power to tow them, he might as well cause them at once to weigh anchor. By these causes, joined to his irritation at what he thought the backwardness of the English embarkations, the Marshal was induced to determine, not merely that he would act upon Dundas's suggestion, but that he himself would wait no longer, and would
put to sea on the 5th of September with his sailing fleet; so when, on the same morning, Lord Raglan reached Baljik, he was surprised by the intelligence that the Marshal had already sailed out on board the Ville de Paris.

On the evening of the 6th the British armament was ready, and the arrangements for the voyage of the whole flotilla complete. The French fleet already at sea consisted of fifteen sail of the line, with ten or twelve war-steamers, and the Turkish fleet of eight sail of the line, with three war-steamers; but the French and the Turkish vessels were doing service as transports, and were so encumbered with troops that they could not have been brought into action with common prudence. It was upon the English fleet, therefore, that the duty of protecting the whole armada really devolved; and, supposing that the enemy were aware of the helpless state of the French and Turkish vessels laden with troops, and of the enormous convoy of transports which had to be protected, he might be expected to judge that it was incumbent upon him to come out of the harbour and assail the vast flotilla of transports; for under the guns of Sebastopol the Russians had fifteen sailing ships of the line,* with some frigates and brigs, and also twelve war-steamers, though of these the Vladimir was the only powerful vessel.† To encounter this force, and to defend from its enterprises the rest of the armada,

* Some say sixteen.
† Unless the Bessarabia be counted as a powerful steamer.
the English had ten sail of the line (including two screw-steamers), two fifty-gun frigates, and thirteen lesser steamers of war heavily armed.

The anxious duty of disposing and guiding the convoy was entrusted by Admiral Dundas to Sir Edmund Lyons; and, under Sir Edmund's directions, Captain Mends of the Agamemnon framed the programme of the voyage. On the evening of the 6th the captains of transports were called by signal on board the Emperor, and there, Mends read to them the instructions which he asked them to obey. The captains thus addressed were not in the Queen's service, but they were English seamen, and their answer was characteristic. They were not flighty men. They respectfully asked for an assurance that, in the event of death, their widows would be held entitled to pensions; and as to the question whether, of their own free will, they would encounter the chances of a naval action, they answered it with three cheers. It is not by the mere muster-roll of the army or the navy that England counts her forces.

With his force of horse, foot, and artillery, Lord Raglan had on board the transports (now all collected at Baljik)* the full number of ammunition-carts required for the first reserve of ammunition, the beasts required for drawing them, and sixty other carts, also provided with draught-power. But, in order to move so large a force at one trip, it was found necessary to dispense with the båt-

* At the time here spoken of there were two artillery transports lagging, but they were up in sufficient time.
horses of the army, and the force was not provided with means of land-transport either for the tents of the men or for the baggage of the officers. There were also on board large supplies of field-ammunition, of food for the troops, and of barley and hay for the horses. In some of the horse-transport there was an insufficiency of the forage required for the voyage. With that grave exception, all the arrangements seem to have been good. Due means had been taken for insuring, so far as was possible, the simultaneous transit, not only of our ships of war, but of the whole force which Lord Raglan had embarked, together with its vast appendage of warlike stores and provisions; for every sailing-vessel, whether she were a ship of war or a transport, was towed by a sufficiently powerful steamer. None of our ships of war carried troops on board; they were all, therefore, ready for action.

In addition to the forces and the means of land-transport which were actually on board, Lord Raglan had in readiness for embarkation the whole brigade of heavy cavalry, another division of infantry, a siege-train, and some five or six thousand pack-horses. The sick remained in Bulgaria, and such of the men out of hospital as seemed to be in a very weakly state were left at Varna and employed in garrison duty.

* The additional division of infantry (the 4th Division) was at Varna; the Scots Greys were on the Bosphorus; and the rest of the heavy cavalry in Bulgaria, where also the bat-horses were left. The siege-train was on board off Varna.
Vice-Admiral Dundas, commanding the whole British fleet had his flag on board the Britannia; Lyons, in the Agamemnon, had charge of the convoy. Each vessel had assigned to her the place she was to take when the signal for moving should be given.

Before night, the whole of the English flotilla, together with that part of the French and the Turkish flotilla which had the command of steam-power, was assembled in Baljik Bay, and in readiness to sail on the morrow.

Men remember the beauteous morning of the 7th of September. The moonlight was still floating on the waters, when, from numberless decks, eyes straining out towards the east were able to hail the dawn. A gentle, summer breeze was blowing fair from the land. At a quarter before five, a gun from the Britannia gave the signal to weigh. The air had become obscured by the busy smoke of the engines, and it was hard to see how and whence due order would come; but presently the Agamemnon moved through, and with signals at all her masts, for Lyons was on board her, and the colours, one after another, flying ceaselessly out to the breeze, seemed to picture the eagerness of a mind engaged in directing the convoy. The French steamers of war went out with their transports in tow, and their great sailing vessels formed line. The French went out more quickly than the English, and in better order. Many of their transports were vessels of very small size; and of necessity, therefore, they were
a swarm. Our transports went out in five columns of only thirty each. Then—guard over all—the English war-fleet, in single column, moved slowly out of the bay.*

Here, then, and apart from the bodies of foot and artillery embarked by the French and the Turks, there was an armament not unworthy of England. Without combat, and by the mere stress of its presence, our fleet drove the enemy's flag from the seas which flowed upon his shores,† and a small but superb land-force, complete in all arms, was clothed with the power of a great army by the ease with which it could be thrown upon any part of the enemy's coast.‡

Lord Raglan had not suffered himself to be disconcerted by the departure of Monsieur St Arnaud, and the consequent severance of the Allied forces. No steamer was sent to re-knit his communications with the errant French Marshal.

* I did not reach the fleet till some three days afterwards, when it was anchored at the rendezvous; and my impression of the scene in the Bay of Baljik is derived partly from some MSS. which have been furnished to me, but partly also from what struck me as a very good account of it, which I saw in a printed book, by Mr Wood, a spectator.

† I am justified in speaking of the English fleet as the force which kept the enemy's ships in duress, because, as we have seen, the French men-of-war were doing duty as transports, and were not, therefore, in a state for going into action.

‡ I of course speak here of the inherent power of such an armament, without reference to the fact that strictly-defined instructions had been addressed to Lord Raglan, and that the purport of these had become known to the enemy. The fixity of the plan of campaign, and the publicity which it had obtained, reduced the power of the force to the level of its actual numbers and its intrinsic strength.
CHAPTER XX.

We have seen that Marshal St Arnaud, under feelings of some vexation, put to sea on the morning of the 5th of September. He could not but know that, by his abrupt separation from the British fleet and army, he had offended against the English General. Upon reflection, he could not but grieve that he had done this. But he had put to sea, and had since heard no tidings from the shore. No swift steamer had followed him with entreaties to stay his course. He was left free to pursue his voyage; and the voyage was growing more and more dismal.

'The Black Sea' is a truer name than the 'Euxine.' Now, as in old times (if the summer be hardly past), the voyager leaves a coast smiling bright beneath skies of blue and glowing with sunny splendour; yet, perhaps, and in less than an hour, the heavens above and the waters around him are dark with the gloom and threatening aspect belonging to the Northern Ocean.* Mon-

* The contrast between the climate of the Black Sea and that of the countries which surround it is one of the enigmas to
sieur St Arnaud encountered this change. The wind blew from its dark quarter. Every hour was carrying the Marshal farther and farther into the centre of the inhospitable sea, farther and farther from the English fleet, farther and farther from Lord Raglan. If he went on, there was no junction to look for except at an imaginary point marked with a pencil on the charts, but having no existence in the material world; and from the wind and angry waves, no less than from his own fast-cooling thoughts, he began to receive a distressing sense of his isolation. The struggle in his mind was painful, but it came to an end. 'I am nearly twenty leagues,' writes the Marshal, on the evening of the 6th, to Lord Raglan—'I am nearly twenty leagues north-east of Baljik, separated from the English fleet, and from the part of my own convoy which was to sail with the convoy of the English fleet. Admiral Dundas's last letter being worded conditionally, so far as concerns his sailing this morning, I am not sure of not seeing increased, in great proportions, the distance which separates me from you, and then there is reason to fear circumstances of wind or sea which would render our junction difficult, and might compromise everything definitively. In this painful situation I decide to invite Admiral Hamelin (on his declaration that he cannot wait where he is) to return to meet the fleets and the convoy.' So the Mar- which scientific men have applied their minds; but whether, as yet, with success, I cannot say.
shal sailed back. Thus, happily, ceased the impulse which had threatened to sunder the fleets.

Lord Raglan's answer was stern. He removed the grounds which the Marshal had assigned for his departure, and then pointed gravely to the true line of duty for the future. 'Thanks be to 'God,' he wrote, 'everything now favours our 'enterprise. Very soon we shall reach the 'appointed rendezvous, and then we shall have 'an opportunity of showing that our manner of 'acting together remains unaltered, and that the 'sincerity of which you speak will continue, as 'at present, to be our guide and our mutual 'satisfaction.'*

Coming from Lord Raglan, this language was a reproof; but the result tends to show that it was happily adjusted to the object in view. Thenceforth there was no longer any tendency on the part of Marshal St Arnaud to break away from his colleague. From the hour of the first conference at the Tuileries, in the spring of the year, Lord Raglan's authority in the Allied councils had been always increasing; and now, as we shall presently see, it gained a complete ascendant.

On the 8th the great flotilla, moving under steam, came up with the French and the Turkish sailing fleets which had left Baljik on the 5th of September. The French fleet was in double column, and tacking to eastward across the bows of the steam flotilla; but upon being approached.

* Translated from the French, in which the letter was written.
the French ships backed topsails and lay-to. Every one of the French vessels had kept its position beautifully; and the moment the signal to lie-to was given, it was obeyed with a quickness which was honestly admired by our seamen. The Turkish fleet also lay-to, and for a while the whole armada of the Allies was gathered together. But the English fleet, being moved by steam, kept on to windward; and presently the French and the Turks began to sail off on opposite tacks. Between the fleets thus departing, the English flotilla of transports passed through in five columns.

The rendezvous was to be at a point forty miles due west of Cape Tarkan, and thither moved the three fleets with all their convoy.

There were in the French army several officers holding high command, and being otherwise men of great weight, who had become very thoughtful on the subject of the contemplated descent upon the enemy's coast. Personally, they were men quite as dauntless as those who gave no care to the business in hand; but being versed in the study, if not in the practice, of the great art of war, they had become strongly impressed with the hazardous character of the intended enterprise. It seems probable that, up to this time, they had relied upon the mature judgment and the supposed discreetness of Lord Raglan to prevent what they regarded as a rash attempt. It might well seem natural to them that two Governments in the West of Europe, attempting to dictate an
invasion of a Russian province at a distance of 3000 miles, would, sooner or later, be checked in their project by the generals commanding the forces; and, of course, they would have liked that the disfavour which unjustly attaches to military prudence should fall upon the English General rather than upon themselves or their own commander. But in the course of the 7th of September it became known to them that Lord Raglan was already at sea. They then knew, or rather they then recognised the fact, that the whole armada was really gliding on towards the enemy's coast, and the ferment their minds underwent now brought them to take a strange step.

Lord Raglan was on board the Caradoc; and on the 8th of September, whilst the fleets lay near to one another, this vessel was boarded by Vice-Admiral Dundas. He came to say that a French steamer had conveyed to him the desire of the Marshal St Arnaud to see Lord Raglan and the Vice-Admiral Dundas, and to see them on board the Ville de Paris, because the Marshal himself was too ill to be able to move. It happened that the sea at this time was rough, and the naval men thought that it would be difficult for Lord Raglan, with his one arm, to get up the side of the three-decker in which the Marshal was sailing; Lord Raglan, therefore, deputed his military Secretary, Colonel Steele, to accompany Vice-Admiral Dundas on board the Ville de Paris.

The Vice-Admiral and Colonel Steele found
the Marshal sitting up, but in a state of much suffering, and they were informed that he was very ill. He, however, sat at the conference; and the other persons present were—Admiral Hamelin, Admiral Bruat, Admiral Count Buat Wiliaumez, Colonel Trochu, General Rose, Vice-Admiral Dundas, and Colonel Steele. The Marshal took no part in the discussion which ensued. It seems he could hardly speak.

It was stated that the meeting had been summoned in order that a paper might be read to it. The document bore no signature, and Marshal St Arnaud was no party to it; but it was stated that it emanated from General Canrobert, General Martimprey, and the principal officers of the French artillery and engineers; and it was said, too, that General Rose* had furnished some of the materials from which it had been composed.

The document took it for granted that there were three places for landing which merited discussion—the Katcha, the Yetsa, and Kaffa; and it then went on to show the advantages and the drawbacks which would attend an attempt to land at each of those three spots. The objections to the landing at the Katcha were stated with so

* Now, Lord Strathnairm, the officer spoken of as Colonel Rose in Vol. I. He was at this time accredited as British Commissioner at the French headquarters. I have no reason for supposing that he intended to give any sanction to the step taken by the French remonstrants; and I imagine that any materials which he may have put in their hands must have been confined to maps or statements showing the physical character of the country about to be invaded.
much force as to show that the framers of the document entirely disapproved it; and indeed they urged that any landing north of Sebastopol would be surely followed by disastrous results. The document also raised weighty objections to a descent upon the coast near the Yetsa. The only plan which was made to appear at all justifiable was that of a landing at Kaffa; and although the difficulties attending even that operation were placed in a strong light, it was orally stated that the framers of the document considered that plan to be one nearly free from objection.

Now Kaffa was a seaport in the eastern part of the Crimean peninsula, and divided from Sebastopol by many long marches over mountain-roads. The autumn had already come. The landing at Kaffa implied an abandonment, for that year at least, of all attempts against Sebastopol. It was to attack Sebastopol forthwith, and in the year 1854, that the great flotilla with all its precious freight had been gathered together; and now, whilst the vast armada was moving towards the enemy's coast, there came from the men of weight and science in the French army this singular protest—for that is what it really was—against an enterprise already begun.

Marshal St Arnaud was in a painful strait. Being, as he knew, without ascendancy in the French army, he apparently thought that the weight attaching to the combined opinion of all the protesting officers was too great to warrant him in meeting their interposition with reproof.
or inattention; yet, suffering as he did at the
time under bodily anguish, he was ill able to go
into the discussions thus strangely forced on by
the remonstrants. He found a solution. He
desired Colonel Trochu to say that he would con-
cur in any decision to which Lord Raglan might
come.

The conference, therefore, was adjourned to the
Caradoc; and Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons
were then present at it, together with all those
who had met on board the Ville de Paris, except
only Marshal St Arnaud.

Thus, then, the ebullition of prudence which had
broken out amongst the officers of the French
army came under the arbitrament of the English
General; and with him, and with him only, it
rested to determine the movements of the whole
Allied force.

The business of the conference was opened by
Colonel Trochu. This officer, as we have already
seen, was supposed to be better acquainted than
any one else with the mind of the French Em-
peror; and his counsels, no longer bending in the
direction of extreme caution, were now rather in
favour of enterprise. The Colonel had possession
of the document. He read it aloud; and, as he
went on with the perusal, he commented upon
every point; but he declared that he was no party
to the contents of the paper, and that he did not
share the anxieties* either of the army or the navy
as to the disasters which might be expected to

* 'Préoccupations.'
follow from a landing on the coast to the north of Sebastopol.

Thereupon, Admiral Bruat repudiated the supposition of his being a party to the apprehensions attributed to the Admirals. Lyons also repudiated it. Neither he nor Vice-Admiral Dundas had known before the conference that any such step as that of framing and presenting the remonstrance had been imagined by the French officers, and, as might be expected, they were both very sure that nothing of the kind had sprung from the British navy.

The inference which Lord Raglan drew from the document was, that it evinced 'an indisposition to the expedition amongst the officers who are supposed to be looked up to and to exercise influence in the French army;' and, 'in fact,' said he, 'we were told as much at the meeting here on Friday.'

These, then, were the 'timid counsels' * of which the French Emperor afterwards spoke when he ascribed the glory of overruling them to Marshal St Arnaud. If it was right, as most men will think it was, that these counsels should be overruled, there was merit due to St Arnaud; but

* 'Timides avis.' When this letter of the French Emperor first appeared, it was imagined that the imputation of giving 'timid' counsels was intended to be cast upon some of our Generals or Admirals; but the Duke of Newcastle, with a becoming spirit, determined instantly that this should not be suffered to pass; and the 'Moniteur' was afterwards made to explain officially that the 'timides avis' were attributed by the Emperor, not to any Englishman, but to some unnamed officers in the French service.
his merit lay, not in any personal resistance which he was able to oppose to his counsellors (for he was helpless, as we have seen, from bodily illness), but in the sagacity and good sense which had led him to intrust the decision to his English colleague.

Lord Raglan's method of dealing with the protest of the French authorities was characteristic of himself and of the English nature. He did not much combat the objections set down in the paper, but he passed them by, and quietly lowered the debate from the high region of strategy to a question of humbler sort—a question as to what four steamers could be most conveniently employed for a reconnaissance on the enemy's coast.

So the conference which had been summoned to judge whether the enterprise against Sebastopol should not be brought to a stop, now found itself only deciding that the vessels sent on the reconnaissance should consist of one French steamer, together with the Agamemnon, the Caradoc, and the Sampson.

But, in truth, the powers of the conference had silently passed into the hands of one man. Thenceforth the protest was dropped; for, if its framers had risen up against the notion of being drawn on into what they thought a rash venture by the mere effect of M. St Arnaud's acquiescence, they were calmed when they came to know that the whole force at last had a leader. If still they held to their opinions, they did so in a spirit of
cheerful deference, which prevented them from throwing any further obstacle in the way of the enterprise. The armada moved on.

Again and again it has happened that mighty armaments, including the forces of several States and people of diverse races, have been gathered and drawn into scenes of conflict by the will of one man; but, in general, when such things have been done, the compelling mind has been brought to its resolve by the cogency of satisfied reason or by force of selfish desire. What was new in this enterprise was, that he who inexorably forced it on did not of himself desire it, nor deem it to be wise, nor even in a high degree prudent; and the power which had strength to bend the whole armada to the purpose of the invasion was, not ambition inflamed, nor reason convinced, but the mere loyalty of an English officer refusing to stint the obedience which he owed to the Minister of his Queen.

On the 9th, the whole of the English fleet with its convoy was anchored in deep water at the appointed rendezvous, a spot forty miles west of Cape Tarkand.

Lord Raglan made haste to use the great powers with which he was now invested, and he determined to reconnoitre the coast with his own eyes. At four o'clock on the morning of the 10th, General Canrobert and the other French officers who were to attend the reconnaissance came on board the Caradoc. Lord Raglan had with him Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir John Burgoyne, and Sir
George Brown. Not long after daybreak the Caradoc neared Fort Constantine, and then approached the entrance to the harbour. It was a fair, bright morning, and the Sunday bells were ringing in the churches when Lord Raglan first saw the great forts, and the ships, and the glittering cupola’d town. Afterwards, the vessel being steered round off Cape Chersonesus, he could see two old Genoese forts, and ridges of hills dividing the great harbour from the southern coast of the peninsula. What he looked on was for him fated ground, for the Genoese forts marked the inlet of Balaclava, and the ridges he saw were the ‘heights ‘ before Sebastopol.’ But the future lay hidden from his gaze.

The Caradoc was now steered towards the north, and the officers on board her surveyed the mouths of the Belbek, the Katcha, the Alma, and the Bulganak, and the coast stretching thence to Eupatoria. Of the sites thus reconnoitred, General Canrobert thought the Katcha the one best fitted for a landing. Lord Raglan entirely disapproved of the Katcha, and he did not at all like the ground at the mouths of the other rivers; but when, moving on in the Caradoc, he was off the part of the coast which lies six miles north of the Bulganak, he observed an extended tract of beach, which seemed to him to be the ground for which the Allies were seeking. Without generating a debate upon the subject, he nevertheless elicited so much of the opinion of those around him as he deemed to be useful. Then he declared
his resolve. He said that the Allied armies should land at Old Fort.

There are times when, to anxious, doubting mortals, no boon from Heaven is so welcome as the final resolve which is to govern their actions. It was so now. Debating ceased, and a happy alacrity came in its stead. That day our fleet and the swarming convoy close gathered around had been still lying anchored in deep water at the point of rendezvous. To many those long, peaceful Sabbath hours seemed to token a wanton delay, or worse than delay—some faltering in the great purpose of the Allies: but at night the Caradoc came in; and soon, though few could tell whence came the change, nor what had been passing, there flew from deck to deck a joyful belief—a belief that in some way—in some way not yet understood, the enterprise had gathered new force.

The French and Turkish fleets, less amply provided with steam-power than the English, had fallen to leeward; but on the evening of the 11th they were anchored within thirty miles of the British fleet, and the communication was of course kept up by steam-vessels.

During the whole of Tuesday the 12th, the French, Turkish, and English fleets were slowly drawing together and converging upon the enemy's coast. Before sunset the armed navies were all near together, and from their decks men could make out with glasses the low cliff to the north of Eupatoria. The English fleet anchored
for the night. The French Admiral sent to in-
timate that he would not anchor, but go on all
night, in the hope of being ready for the landing
the next morning. Vice-Admiral Dundas saw
that that hope was vain, because large portions of
the French convoy were still so distant that there
could be no landing on the following day. The
French, it will be remembered, were without
steam-power for their transports, and the breezes
were light. So, although every hour saw fresh
clusters of vessels slowly closing with the fleet,
the sea, towards the west, was always strewed
with distant sails, and, before the hulls of those
hove well in sight, the horizon got speckled again
with sails more distant still. So the English
Admiral anchored his fleet for the night.

The next morning, the 13th, the Ville de Paris,
under tow of the Napoleon steamer, had come
up; and, although, so late as noon, some of the
French ships of war, and very many of their trans-
ports, were still distant, they were under such
breezes as promised to enable them to close before
long with the fleets. So, virtually, the moment-
ous voyage was over. The weather—and upon
that, in such undertakings, the hopes of nations
must rest—the weather had favoured the enter-
prise; but the pest of modern armies had not
relented. The cholera had followed the men into
the transports. Many sickened on board the
troopships whilst they were still off Varna or Bal-
jik, and were carried back to die on shore. Dur-
ing the voyage many more fell ill, and many died.
But Marshal St Arnaud, whose illness scarce three days before seemed bringing him fast to his end, was now almost suddenly restored, and on the morning of the 13th he was like a man in health. During the interval of five days, in which the Marshal's illness had invested his English colleague with a supreme control, Lord Raglan had used to the full the occasion which Fortune thus gave him. In that time he had repressed the efforts of the French Generals who strove to bring the enterprise to a stop; he had committed the Allies to a descent upon the enemy's shores—on his shores to the north of Sebastopol; he had reconnoitred the coast; he had chosen the place for a landing; and meanwhile he had drawn the fleets on, so that now, when men looked from the decks, they could see the thin strip of beach where the soldiery of the Allies were to land.
CHAPTER XXI.

Concerning the country which they were going to invade, the Allies were poorly informed. Of Sebastopol, the goal of the enterprise, they knew little, except that it was a great military port and arsenal, and was deemed impregnable towards the sea. Respecting the province generally, it was known, by means of books and maps, that Crim Tartary, or 'the Crimea,' as people now called it, was a peninsula situate between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof; and there was a theory—not perfectly coinciding with the truth—that the only dry communication with the mainland was by the Isthmus of Perekop. It was understood that the north of the peninsula had the character of an elevated steppe—that towards the south it was rocky and mountainous—and that the undulating downs which connected the steppe with the mountainous region of the south were seamed with small rivers flowing westward from the summits of the highland district.* It

* A great body of most valuable information respecting the Crimea had been imparted to the English public by General
was believed that the inhabitants were for the most part Tartars, men holding to the Moslem faith. Of the enemy's forces in this country, the Allies, in a sense, were ignorant; for although the information which had come round to them by the aid of the Foreign Office was in reality well founded, they did not believe at the time that they could at all rely upon it, and therefore they were nearly as much at fault as if they had had no clue. They knew, however, that the peninsula was a province of Russia—that Russia was a great military power—that, so long as three months ago, the invasion had been counselled in print—and that afterwards the determination to undertake it had been given out aloud to the world. From these rudiments, and from what could be seen from the decks of the ships, they inferred that, either upon their landing, or on some part of the road between the landing-ground and Sebastopol, they would find the enemy in strength.

But beyond this, little was known; and the imagination of men was left to range so free that, although they were in the midst of their 'nineteenth century,' with all its prim facts and statistics, the enterprise took something of the character of adventure belonging to earlier ages. Common, sensible, fanciless men—men wise with the cynical wisdom of London clubs—were now by force (then Colonel) Mackintosh, and the Colonel had also addressed important reports on the same subject to the military authorities. What I intend to indicate in the text is, not that the means of knowledge were wanting, but that they had not been extensively taken advantage of.
voYAGE OF THE ARMA DA

CHAP. XXI.
turned into venturers, intent, as Argonauts of old, in gazing upon the shores of a strange land to which they were committing their lives. From many a crowded deck they strained their eyes to pierce the unknown. They could not see troops. They saw a road along the shore: now and then there appeared a peasant with a cart; now and then a horseman riding at full speed. Neither peasant nor horseman seemed ever to pause in his duty that he might cast a glance of wonder at the countless armada which was gathering in upon his country. At the northern end of the bay there was a bright little town: maps showed that this was Eupatoria.

At noon on the 13th, the English fleet had drawn near to this port of Eupatoria. There were no Russian forces there except a few convalescent soldiers; and the place being defenceless, Colonel Trochu and Colonel Steele, accompanied by Mr Calvert the interpreter, were despatched to summon it. The governor or head man of the place was an official personage in a high state of discipline. He had before his eyes the armed navies of the Allies, with the countless sails of their convoys; and to all that vast armament he had nothing to oppose except the forms of office. But to him the forms of office seemed all-sufficing, and on these he still calmly relied; so, when the summons was delivered, he insisted upon fumigating it according to the health regulations of the little port. When he understood that the Western Powers intended to land, he said that
decidedly they might do so; but he explained that it would be necessary for them to land at the Lazaretto, and consider themselves in strict quarantine.

On the following day the place was occupied by a small body of English troops. The few Russian inhabitants of the place, being mainly or entirely official personages, had all gone away, but the Tartar inhabitants remained; and although these men did not exhibit, as some might have expected, any eager or zealous affection for the allies of the Caliph, they seemed inclined to be friendly. Thoughtful men cared deeply to know whether between these natives and the Allies the relation of buyer and seller could be established—for it was of vital moment to the success of the expedition that the Allies should be able to obtain supplies of cattle and forage in the invaded country; and it was probable that much would turn upon the success of the first attempt to make purchases from the people of the country. The first experiment which was made in this direction elicited a curious proof of the difficulty which there is in causing mighty nations to act with the forethought of a single traveller. It was to be expected that, at the commencement of any attempted intercourse, the willingness of the natives to sell would depend upon their being tempted by the coins to which they were accustomed; because just at first they would not only be ignorant of the value of foreign money, but would also dread the consequence of being found in possession of coin plainly re-
ceived from the invaders. Yet the precaution of bringing Russian money had been forgotten by the public authorities; and when Mr Hamilton of the Britannia was preparing to land, with a view of endeavouring to begin a buying-and-selling intercourse with the natives, he had nothing to offer except English sovereigns. It chanced, however, that there were two or three English travellers on board the flag-ship, and that these men (foreseeing the likelihood of their having to buy horses or make other purchases from the natives of the invaded country) had supplied themselves with some of the gold Russian coins called 'half-imperials,' which were to be obtained without difficulty at Constantinople. The travellers—Sir Edward Colebrooke, I think, was one of them—advanced as many of these as they could spare to the public authorities; and Mr Hamilton being thus enabled to land with a small supply of the magic half-imperials, and being, besides, a good-tempered, humorous man, with a tendency to make cordial speeches in English to all his fellow-creatures alike, whether Russian, or Tartar, or Greek, he was able to make a merry beginning of that intercourse with the natives which was destined to become a fruitful source of strength to the Allied armies. The gains made by the first sellers soon drew fresh supplies into the place from the surrounding country; the commissariat afterwards began its operations in the town, and in time a good lasting market was opened to the invaders.
After receiving the surrender of Eupatoria on the afternoon of the 13th, the assembled armada moved down towards the south. All day there were sailing-vessels approaching from a distance, and closing at last with the French fleet; but before night (with the exception, it is believed, of two or three small lagging transports) the three fleets and the host of vessels they convoyed, were anchored near Old Fort in Kalamita Bay. The united armada extended in a line parallel with the coast, and in a direction, therefore, not far from north and south. The French and the Turkish fleets were on the south or right-hand side; the British fleet took the north, and formed the left of the Allied line.
CHAPTER XXII.

The ground chosen by Lord Raglan for the landing of all the Allied forces is five or six miles north of the Bulganak River. It gained its name of 'Old Fort' from an indication appearing on the maps, rather than from any slight traces of the structure then remaining. Along this part of the coast the cliffs rise to a height of from 60 to 100 feet, and for the most part, they impend too closely over the sea to allow much room for the beach. Near 'Old Fort,' however, the high grounds so recede that at first sight they appear to embrace a small bay or inlet of the sea, but upon a nearer approach it is perceived that the inner part of the seeming bay is a salt-water lake, and that this lake is divided from the sea by a low, narrow strip of beach. A little further north the same disposition of land and water recurs; for there, also, another salt lake, called the Lake of Kamishlu, is divided from the sea by a low, narrow strip of beach a mile and a half in length. The first-mentioned strip of beach—namely, the strip opposite to Old Fort—was the one which
Lord Raglan had chosen for the landing of all the Allied armies.

It was arranged that a buoy should be placed off the centre of the chosen ground to mark the boundary between the French and the English flotilla.* The French and the Turkish vessels were to be on the south of the buoy, the British on the north; and in the evening and night of the 13th the ships and transports of the three nations drew in as near as they could to their appointed landing-places.

But in the night of the 13th there occurred a transaction which threatened to ruin the whole plan for the landing, and even to bring the harmony between the French and the English forces into grievous jeopardy. During the darkness, the French placed the buoy opposite, not to the centre, but to the extreme north of the chosen landing-ground; † and when morning dawned, it appeared that the English ships and transports, though really in their proper places, were on the wrong side of the buoy—or rather, that the buoy was on the wrong side of them. Whether the act which created this embarrassment was one resulting

* Captain Mends, Sir Edmund Lyons's flag-captain, thought proper to write a letter to a newspaper on the 18th of March 1863, saying, 'It might suffice for me simply to say that I remember nothing about a buoy;' but on the 5th of the following April he did me the honour to address a letter to me, in which he said, 'It would seem there was a buoy.' See the correspondence on the subject in the Appendix.—Note to 4th Edition.

† See the extract from Lord Raglan's private letter on this subject, which is given in the next footnote.
from sheer mistake on the part of our allies, or from their over-greediness for space, or from a scheme more profoundly designed, it plainly went straight towards the end desired by those French officers who had been labouring to bring the enterprise to a stop. For what was to be done? If the English, disregarding the altered position of the buoy, were to persist in keeping to their assigned landing-ground, their whole flotilla, their boats and their troops, when landed, would be hopelessly mixed up with the French; and what might be expected to follow would be ruinous confusion—nay even, perhaps, angry and violent conflict between the forces of the Allies. To propose to move the buoy, or to get into controversy with the French at such a time, would be to delay and imperil the whole undertaking; and yet the boundary, as it stood, extruded the English from all share in the chosen landing-ground. It might seem that the whole enterprise was again in danger of failure, but again a strong will interposed.

From the moment when Lord Raglan consented to undertake the invasion, he seems to have acted as though he felt that the belief which he entertained of its hazardousness was a reason why he should be the more steadfast in his determination to force it on. Nor was he without the very counsel that was needed for overcoming this last obstacle. Lyons, commanding the in-shore squadron of the British fleet, was entrusted with the direction of our transports and the whole man-
agement of the landing. Moving long before
dawn in the sleepless Agamemnon, he saw where
the buoy had been placed by the French in the
night-time, and gathered in an instant all the
perilous import of the change. He was more
than a mere performer of duty, for he was a
man driving under a passionate force of purpose.
Without stopping to indulge his anger, he darted
upon the means of dealing with the evil. He had
observed that about a mile to the north of 'Old
Fort' there was that strip of beach, before spoken
of, which divided the Lake of Kamishlu from the
sea. There, Lord Raglan and he now determined
that the landing of the British forces should take
place.* It was true that this plan would sever

* One of the most conspicuous of my critics denied with great
confidence the whole statement above made in reference to the
buoy, and was supported (during a period of more than a fort-
night) by the testimony of Captain Mends. It therefore seems
right to give an extract from the private letter in which Lord
Raglan narrates the facts to the Duke of Newcastle:—

Extract from Lord Raglan's Narrative of the Landing, ad-
dressed as a Private Communication to the Duke of New-
castle, the Secretary of War, and dated 'Camp above Old
Fort Bay, September 18, 1854.'
'The disembarkation of both armies commenced on the
morning of the 14th.
'It had been settled that the landing should be effected in
Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed in the centre
of it to mark the left of the French and the right of the Eng-
lisli; but when the Agamemnon came upon the buoy at day-
light, Sir Edmund Lyons found that the French naval officer
had deposited it on the extreme northern end, and had thus
engrossed the whole of the bay for the operation of his own
army. This occasioned considerable confusion and delay, the
English convoy having followed closely upon the steps of
the French from the British forces during the operation of landing, but the evil thus encountered was a hundred-fold less grave than the evil avoided—for, even in the face of an enemy, the separation of the French from the English would have been better than dispute or confusion; and, moreover, the observations of the previous day had led the Allies to conjecture that the enemy did not intend to resist the landing. The morning showed that this conjecture was sound: therefore, great as was the danger from which the Alliance had been delivered, it turned out in the

' their leader, and got mixed with the French transports; but ' Sir Edmund Lyons wisely resolved to make the best of it; ' and at once ordered the troops to land in the bay next to the ' northward.'

I may add that all the many accounts which I have seen of the movements and counter-movements of the ships and the transports on the early morning of the 14th of September tally perfectly with the above statement by Lord Raglan. In saying this, I include Captain Mends’s letter to the newspaper. See the Appendix. It will be seen that the facts which he describes in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that letter are exactly those which would naturally result from the discovery and the change of plan which Lord Raglan communicates to the Minister of War.

I may add that Sir George Brown was on board the Agamemnon; that he was personally cognisant of the change which Lord Raglan described; that many years ago he recorded what occurred in language tallying perfectly with Lord Raglan's account; and, finally, that he (Sir George Brown) is still alive.

—Note (Slightly altered) to 4th Edition.

The kindness of Captain Arnytage (who was first lieutenant of the Highlander at the time of the landing) has now enabled me to give the words of the written order from Sir Edmund Lyons, proving the absolute accuracy with which Lord Raglan wrote when he said 'it had been settled that the landing should be ' effected in Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed
result that the immense advantage of having two extended landing-places instead of one, was not counterbalanced by any evil resulting from the severance of the two armies.

In point of security from molestation on the part of the enemy, both of the two landing-places were happily chosen. Both of them were on shores which allowed the near approach of the fleets, and placed the whole operation under cover of their guns. Also both landing-places were protected on the inland side by the salt lakes, which interposed a physical obstacle in the way of any front attack by the enemy; and the access to the flanks of the disembarking armies was by strips of land so narrow that they could be easily defended against any force of infantry or cavalry. It is true that the line of disembarkation of either army could have been enfiladed by artillery placed on the heights; but then those heights could be more or less searched by a fire from the ships; and the enemy had not attempted to

'in the centre of it' to mark the left of the French, and the 'right of the English.' The order ran thus:

'Light Division to be actually under weigh at 1 o'clock.
4th Division at 2
1st 3
2d 4
Steer SSE, 8 miles. Rendezvous Lat. 45°. Not to go within 8 fathoms. Those vessels which have cast off are to make fast their hawsers the moment they receive this note.
(Signed) Edmund Lyons.
Rear-Admiral.'

This order was received by Armytage at 3 A.M. The assigned latitude is 11° 19' S. of Eupatoria. — Note to 5th Edition.
prepare for himself any kind of defence on the high ground.

The necessity of having to carry the English flotilla to a new landing-place occasioned, of course, a painful dislocation of the arrangements which had already been acted upon by the commanders of the transports; but after much less delay and much less confusion than might have been expected to result from a derangement so great and so sudden, the position of the English vessels was adapted to the change.

Meanwhile, few of the thousands on board understood the change which had been effected,* or even saw that they were brought to a new landing-ground. They imagined that it was the better method or greater quickness of the French which was giving them the triumph of being the first to land. Both Lord Raglan and Lyons were too steadfast in the maintenance of the alliance to think of accounting for the seeming tardiness of the English by causing the truth to be known; and even to this day it is commonly believed

* Amongst these uninformed thousands was Captain Mends, Sir Edmund Lyons's flag-captain. See his letter to the newspaper in the Appendix, containing (inter alia) these words:—

'It might suffice for me simply to say, I remember nothing about 'a buoy.' The placing of a buoy for fixing the anchorage of each French column is officially narrated by the French in these words:—'Le Primauget, le Caton, et la Mouette ont pris 'les devants, avec la mission de placer, à petite distance de 'la plage de débarquement, des bouées de couleur différente 'destinées à indiquer par leur alignement le mouillage de nos 'trois colonnes que le Primauget a déterminé dans l'excursion 'de la veille.' Narrative enclosed to his Government, and declared accurate by Admiral Hamelin. —*Note to 5th Edition.*
that the English army effected its landing at Old Fort.

The bend of the coast-line at Kalamita Bay is of such a character that a spectator on board a vessel close in-shore is bounded in his view of the sea towards the south by the headland near the Alma; but if he stands a little way out to sea, the coast opens, and he then commands an unobstructed view home to the entrance of the Sebastopol harbour. So, whilst the in-shore squadrons approached the beach so closely as to be able to cover the landing, the bulk of the English fleet, commanded by Dundas in person, lay far enough out to be able to command the whole of the vast bay from Eupatoria to Sebastopol, keeping up an unbroken chain of communication from cape to cape, and always held ready to engage the Russian fleet if by chance it should come out and give battle.* Detached vessels reconnoitred the coast, and practised their gunners upon every encampment or gathering of troops which seemed to be within range. As though in the arrogant yet quiet assertion of an ascendant beyond dispute, one solitary English ship, watching off the Sebastopol harbour, stood sentry over the enemy's fleet.

* It has been already explained that the French men-of-war were doing duty as transports, and were not therefore in a condition to engage the enemy. There were people who thoughtlessly blamed Dundas for not taking part with the in-shore squadron in the bustle of the landing. Of course his duty was to hold his off-shore squadron in readiness for an engagement with the Sebastopol fleet; and this he took care to do.
Men had heard of the dominion of the seas, and now, what they had heard of they saw.

The plan of the English disembarkation was imitated from the one adopted by Sir Ralph Abercromby when he made his famous descent upon the coast of Egypt; and was based upon the principle of so ranging the transports and the boats that the relative positions of the several companies, whilst being rowed towards the shore, should correspond with those they would have to take when landed, and forming line upon the beach.*

All the naval arrangements for the landing were undertaken by Sir Edmund Lyons; but to dispose the troops on the beach—to gain a lodgment—to take up a position, and, if necessary, to intrench it—these were duties which specially devolved upon the Quartermaster-General. The officer who held this post was General Airey; and, since it was his fate to take a grave part in the business of the war, and to share with Lord Raglan his closest counsels, it seems useful to speak here at once, not of the quality of his mind (for that will best be judged by looking to what he did, and what he omitted to do), but rather of those circumstances of his life, and those outer signs and marks of his nature, which any bystander in the camp would be likely to hear of or see.

A strictly military career in peace-time is a poor schooling for the business of war; and the

* I abstain from giving a detailed account of the landing operation, because it was not resisted by the enemy.
rough change which had once broken in upon Airey’s professional life helped to make him more able in war than men who had passed all their lives in going round and round with the wheels. Airey was holding one of the offices at the Horse Guards when he was suddenly called upon by his relative Colonel Talbot, the then almost famous recluse of Upper Canada, to choose whether he and his young wife would accept a great territorial inheritance, with the condition of dwelling deep in the forest, far away from all cities and towns. Airey loved his profession, and what made it the more difficult for him to quit it was the favour with which he was looked upon by the Duke of Wellington. It chanced that he had once been called upon to lay before the Duke the maps and statements required for showing the progress of a campaign then going on against the Caffres; and the Duke was so delighted with the perfect clearness of the view which Airey was able to impart to him, that he instantly formed a high opinion of an officer who could look with so keen a glance upon a distant campaign and convey a lucid idea of it to his chief. Airey communicated to the Duke of Wellington Colonel Talbot’s proposal, and explained the dilemma in which he was placed.

‘You must go,’ said the Duke; ‘of course you must go—it is your duty to go; but we will manage so that whenever you choose, you shall be able to come back to us.’ Airey went to Canada. It had been no part of Colonel Talbot’s plan to smooth the path of his chosen inheritor.
He gave him a vast territory, but omitted to give him a home.

So, left isolated in the midst of the forest, and with no better shelter than a log-hut half-built, the staff-officer, hitherto expert in the prim traditions of the Horse Guards, now found himself so circumstanced that the health, nay, the very life of those most dear to him, was made to depend upon his power to become a good labourer. He could not have hoped to keep his English servants a day if he had begun by sitting still himself and ordering them to do the rough work to which they were unaccustomed; so he worked with his own hands, in the faith that his example would make every kind of hard work seem honourable to his people; and being endued with an almost violent love of bodily exertion, he was not only equal to this new life, but came to delight in it. Clad coarsely during the day, he was only to be distinguished from the other workmen by his greater activity and greater power of endurance. Many English gentlemen have done the like of this, but commonly they have ended by becoming altogether just that which they seemed in their working hours—by becoming, in short, mere husbandmen. It was not so with Airey. When his people came to speak to him in the evening, they always found him transformed. Partly by the subtle change which they were able to see in his manner, partly even by so outward a thing as the rigorous change in his dress, but most of all perhaps by his natural ascendant, they were prevented from forgetting
that their fellow-labourer of the morning was their master—a master to whom they were every day growing more and more attached, but still their master. He therefore maintained his station. He did more: he gained great authority over the people about him; and when he bade farewell to the wilderness, he had become like a chief of old times—a man working hard with his own hands, yet ruling others with a firm command.

It was during a period of some three or four years that Airey thus wrestled with the hardships of forest life, but at length coming home to England, he resumed his military career. Those who know anything of the real business of war will easily believe that this episode in the life of General Airey was more likely to fit him for the exigencies of a campaign and for the command of men than thrice the same length of time consumed in the revolving labours of a military department; nay, perhaps they will think that, next to a campaign, this manful struggle with the wilderness was the very work which would be the most sure to set a mind free from the habits, the bylaws, and the petty regulations of office.

Before the expedition left England, Lord Raglan had asked General Airey to be his Quartermaster-General. Airey, preferring field duty with the divisions, had begged that some other might be appointed, and Lord Raglan acceded to his wish; but when, on the eve of the depart-
ture of the expedition from Varna, Lord De Ros
returned to England,* the Quartermaster-Generalship was again pressed upon General Airey
in terms which made it unbecoming for him
to refuse the burthen. His loyalty and affec-
tionate devotion to Lord Raglan were without
bounds; and he imagined that he was always
acting with a strict deference to the wishes of
his chief. But then Airey was a man of great
ardour, of a strong will: and having also a rapid,
decisive judgment, he certainly accustomed him-
self to put very swift constructions upon Lord
Raglan's words. No one ever used to see him
in the pain of suspense between two opinions.
Either he really knew with minuteness Lord
Raglan's views, or else he was so prone to take
a great deal upon himself, that in his zeal for
the public service he might almost be called
unscrupulous. Men who were hesitating and
trying to make out what was the path of their
duty, soon came to know that Airey was the
officer who would thrust away their doubts for
them; because rightly or wrongly, whether with
or without due authority, he used to speak in
such a way as to untie or to cut every knot.†
He was himself, it would seem, unconscious of
exercising so much power as he really did; but
it is certain enough that those who complained

* Lord de Ros went home on account of ill-health. He
was so ill that he had to be carried on board.

† An illustration of this way of his (which was supplied to
me after the publication of the 3d Edition) will be found post,
in the note at the foot of p. 355.
of his ascendancy were not very wrong in believing that he held a great sway; for though, being guileless and single-hearted, he always liked to receive his first impulsions from the chief, yet, when once he was thus set moving, his strong will used to burst into action with all its own proper force, and very much, too, in its own direction.

Notwithstanding this proneness to action, his manner had all the repose which is thought to be a sign of power. He did not, in general, speak at all until he could speak decisively; and he was more accustomed than most other Englishmen are to use that degree of precision and completeness of language which makes men content to act on it. Officers hesitating in the pain of suspense used to long to hear the tramp of his coming—used to long to catch sight of his eager, swooping crest (it was always strained forward and intent)—his keen, salient, sharp-edged features—his firm, steady eye—for they knew that he was the man who would release them from their doubts. He was gifted by nature with the kind of eloquence that it is good for a soldier to have. His oral directions to those in authority under him were models of imperative diction; but when he spoke of what he had seen, the vivid pictures he drew were marked with a sharpness of outline hardly consistent with a perfect freedom from exaggeration—they wanted the true English haze. He was too eager for action to be able to stand still weighing phrases;
and I imagine that he did not even know how to try the exact strength and import of words in the way that a lettered man does. Upon the whole, his qualities were of such a kind as to make it impossible for him to be without great weight in the army. His friends would call him a man plainly fitted for high command—his adversaries would say that power in his hands was likely to be used dangerously; but all would alike agree that, whether for good or whether for evil, he had from nature the means of impressing his own will on troops.

The arrangements of the French were like those of the English; and at half-past eight o'clock on the morning of the 14th of September 1854, their first boat touched the shore. The English had made such good haste to retrieve the time spent in moving to their new landing-place, that very soon afterwards their disembarkation began.

The morning was fine; the sea nearly smooth. The troops of the Light Division were in the boats, and the seamen were at their oars, expecting the signal. The signal was given, and instantly, from along the whole of the first line of transports, an array of boats freighted with troops—boats ranged upon a front of more than a mile—began to dart in towards the shore. It was said that the boat commanded by Vesey of the Britannia was the first to touch the beach.* He was

* The question as to which of the English boats was the first to land has excited more interest than it apparently deserves; for the landing did not take place in face of the enemy. Per-
an officer who would do all man could to be foremost.

As soon as the boats had landed, the soldiers stepped ashore, and began to form line upon the beach; but presently afterwards they piled arms. There were some Tartar peasants passing alonghaps one of the causes which led men to look at the question with something more than mere curiosity, was the surprise of finding that, notwithstanding all the charges of want of zeal which had been brought against Admiral Dundas, a boat from his flag-ship (the Britannia) was said, after all, to have been the first to land.

According to one opinion, Captain Dacres, with the gig of the Sanspareil, was the first to reach the shore; and there are antecedent reasons for supposing that this would be likely to be the case; for, besides that Captain Dacres was (as the work of that and the four following days showed) an officer of great zeal and ability, he had been entrusted with the naval command on the beach (he was beach-master), and would of course be anxious to reach the shore as soon as possible. It seems that there got to be, as it were, a kind of race between the Britannia boat and the gig of the Sanspareil, and a race, too, which was a very close one; for although the Britannia boat, laden with troops, could not match its speed with the gig, it had a start just long enough to make up for the superior swiftness of its rival. Captain Dacres never doubted that he, with the gig of the Sanspareil, was the first to land; but among those who were on board the Britannia boat (and I speak now of soldiers as well as sailors) the belief was that that was the boat which won.

On both sides the statements are positive, and on one side they are also circumstantial. They are also rather interesting; and I would have given them here, if it were not that I am unwilling to place men in an attitude of direct conflict with one another upon an unimportant matter of fact.

If Vesey, with the Britannia boat, was the first to land, Colonel Lysons of the 23d Fusiliers must have been the first man of the land service who touched the shore. If, on the other hand, Dacres, with the gig of the Sanspareil, landed first, Sir George Brown, I think, must have been the first English officer of the land service who reached the shore of the Crimea.
the coast-road with small bullock waggons. The waggoners showed little or no alarm, and, knowing that they could not move off quickly with bullocks, they did not attempt to get away. Apparently they were not struck with any sense of unfairness when they saw that the English took possession of the waggons; and yet it could scarcely have been explained to them at that moment (as it afterwards would be) that everything taken by the English from private owners would be paid for at a just price. One of the waggons was laden with small pears, and the soldiers amused themselves with the fruit whilst the natives stood and scanned their invaders.

After a while, many of the battalions which had landed were ordered forward to occupy the hill on our right; and thenceforth, during all the day, the acclivity was sparkling with the bayonets of the columns successively ascending it. But what were those long strings of soldiery now beginning to come down from the hill-side and to wind their way back towards the beach; and what were the long white burthens horizontally carried by the men? Already? already, on this same day? Yes; sickness still clung to the army. Of those who only this morning ascended the hill with seeming alacrity, many now came down thus sadly borne by their comrades. They were carried on ambulance-stretchers, and a blanket was over them. Those whose faces remained uncovered were still alive. Those whose faces had been covered over
by their blanket were dead. Near the foot of the hill the men began to dig graves.

But meanwhile the landing went merrily on. It might be computed that, if every man in the navy had only performed his strict duty, the landing would have taken some weeks. It was the supererogation, the zeal, the abounding zeal, which seemed to achieve the work. No sailor seemed to work like a man who was merely obeying—no officer stood looking on as if he were merely commanding; and though all was concert and discipline, yet every man was labouring with the whole strength of his own separate will.* And all this great toil went on with strange good-humour—nay, even with thoughtful kindness towards the soldiers. The seamen knew that it concerned the comfort and the health of the soldiers to be landed dry, so they lifted or handed the men ashore with an almost tender care: yet not without mirth—nay, not without laugh-

* When it is seen that I conceive myself warranted in applying this language to the exertions of the navy at the time of the landing, it may be asked whether there was not some one man who had the merit of giving a right direction to the zeal and energy of the seamen thus toiling on the beach? There was. The officer who commanded on the beach was Captain Dacres; and I believe one might safely echo the words of him who once said to Captain Dacres, 'The 14th of September was your day.' Both Dundas and Lyons were doing all that was right; but, so far as concerns the vast operation going on upon the beach, their wisdom lay in the wise trustfulness with which they committed the business to a fit man, and then left him alone, undisturbed and unfretted by orders. I believe that during the four days and four nights which followed the commencement of the landing, Captain Dacres never received any orders from Sir Edmund Lyons.—Note to 4th Edition.
ter far heard—when, as though they were giant maidens, the tall Highlanders of the 42d placed their hands in the hands of the sailor and sprang by his aid to the shore, their kilts floating out wide while they leapt.

After mid-day the sea began to lose its calmness, and before sunset the surf was strong enough to make the disembarkation difficult, and in some degree hazardous. Yet, by the time the day closed, the French had landed their 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry, together with eighteen guns; and the English had got on shore all their infantry divisions, and some part of their field-artillery.

Some few of the English regiments remained on the beach, but the rest of them had been marched up to the high grounds towards the south, and they there bivouacked. At night there fell heavy rain, and it lasted many hours. The men were without their tents.* Lying in wet pools or in mud, their blankets clinging heavy with water, our young soldiers began the campaign. The French soldiery were provided with what they call dog-tents—tents not a yard high, but easily carried, and yielding shelter to soldiers creeping into them. It was always a question in the French army whether these tents gave the men more health and comfort than they could find in the open air.

* This was because there were no sufficing means of land-transport for conveying the camp equipage towards Sebastopol. After the 14th the tents were landed, but they were afterwards reshipped.
The next morning was fine, but the surf had so much increased that for several hours the landing was suspended. After the middle of the day it became practicable, though still somewhat difficult, to go on with the work; and great efforts were made to land the English cavalry and the rest of the artillery with the appertaining horses and equipages.

Unless a man has stood in the admiring crowd which gathers to see the process of landing one horse upon an open sea-shore; and unless, whilst he carries in his mind the labour and energy brought to bear upon this single object, he can imagine the same toil gone through again and again and again and again, till it has conquered the whole assigned multiple, he will hardly know what work must be done before a general can report to his Government that he has landed upon an open coast, with a thousand cavalry and sixty guns all in readiness for either movement or combat. By labour never once intermitted (except when darkness or the state of the sea forbade it), and continued from the morning of the 14th until the evening of the 18th, the whole of the English land-force, which had been embarked at Varna (together now with Cathcart’s Division), was safely landed upon the enemy’s coast.*

The result then was, that under circumstances

* Cathcart’s Division—the 4th—had been meant to constitute a reserve for our army, and was therefore, as we saw, left behind when the invading armies embarked; but Lord Raglan soon perceived the expediency of having this force with him in the Crimea, and the orders he therefore gave brought it up by the time above shown.
of weather which were, upon the whole, favourable, and with the advantage of encountering no opposition from the enemy, an English force of some 26,000 infantry and artillerymen, with more than a thousand mounted cavalry, and sixty guns, had been landed in the course of five September days; and, although the force thus put ashore was without those vast means of land-transport which would be needed for regular operations in the interior, and was obliged to rely upon the attendant fleet for the continuance of its supplies, it was nevertheless so provided as to be able to move along the coast carrying with it its first reserve of ammunition, and food enough for three days.

The operation was conducted with an almost faultless skill, and (until a firm lodgment had been gained), it proceeded in the way that was thought to be the right one for landing in the face of the enemy. Though the surf was at times somewhat heavy, not a man was lost.

For Marshal St Arnaud, who had brought no cavalry with him, the task of effecting his descent on the shore was one of comparative ease; and he might have placed himself in a condition to march long before the English were ready; but knowing that the disembarkation of a large number of horses must needs cost a good deal of time, he had no strong motive for hurrying; and accordingly, during the whole of the five days which our people consumed in the process, there was always work going on at the landing-ground used by the French.
The Turks did the work of landing very well; and, indeed, they quickly showed that they had an advantage over the French and the English in their more familiar acquaintance with the mode of life proper to warfare. They did not let the want of land-transport prevent them from landing their camp equipage; for, with them, the carriage of tents is a very simple business. Two soldiers, one at each end, bear the pole of a tent between them, and the canvas is carried by others in turns. So early as the 15th, the first day after that on which the landing began, the Turks were comfortably encamped on the ground assigned to them; and whilst the young troops of France and England were still sitting wretched and chilled by the wet of their night's bivouac, the warlike Osmanlis seemed to be in their natural home. Soliman, who commanded them, was able to welcome and honour the guests who went to visit him in his tent as hospitably as though he were in the audience-hall of his own pashalic. He had all his tents well pitched; and his men, one could see, were still a true Moslem soldier—men with arms and accoutrements bright, yet not forgetful of prayer. He had a supply of biscuit and of cartridges, and a good stock of horses, some feeding, some saddled and ready for instant use. He was not without coffee and tobacco. His whole camp gave signs of a race which gathers from a great tradition, going on from father to son, the duties and the simple arts of a pious and warfaring life.
CHAPTER XXIII.

When the people of the neighbouring district came to see the strength of the armies descending upon their coast, the head men of the villages began to present themselves at the quarters of the Allies. The first of these deputations was received by Lord Raglan in the open air. The men were going up to headquarters when they passed near a group of officers on foot in blue frock-coats, and they learned that the one whose maimed arm spoke of other wars was the English General. They approached him respectfully, but without submissiveness of an abject kind. Neither in manner, dress, appearance, nor language, would these men seem very strange to a traveller acquainted with Constantinople or any of the other cities of the Levant. They wore the pelisse or long robe, and although their head-gear was of black lamb-skin, it was much of the same shape as the Turkish fez. They spoke with truthfulness and dignity, allowing it to appear that the invasion was not distasteful to them, but abstaining from all affectation of enthusiastic sympathy. They
seemed to understand war and its exigencies; for they asked the interpreters to say that such of their possessions as might be wanted by the English army were at Lord Raglan's disposal. Pleased with the demeanour of the men, as well as with the purport of their speech, Lord Raglan told them that he would avail himself of some of their possessions, more especially their wagons and draught animals, but that everything taken for the use of the English army would be paid for at a proper rate. Much to Lord Raglan's surprise (for he was not accustomed to the people of the East), the head man of the village resisted the idea of the people being paid, and anxiously pressed the interpreter to say that their possessions were yielded up as free gifts.

Pure ignorance of the invaded country gave charm to every discovery tending to throw light upon the character and pursuits of the inhabitants; and if our soldiery had found in the villages high altars set up for human sacrifices, they would scarcely have been more surprised than they were when, prying into the mysteries of this obscure Crim Tartary, they came upon traces of modern refinement and cultivated taste. In some of the houses at Kentugan there were pianos; and in one of them a music-book, lying open and spread upon the frame, seemed to show that the owner had been hurried in her flight. But the owners of these dwellings must have been official personages. The mass of the country people were Tartars.
In the villages there was abundance of agricultural wealth. The main want of the country was water; but General Airey caused wells to be sunk.

The English system of payment for supplies rapidly began to bear its usual fruit, and the districts from which the people came in to barter with us were every day extending.

In their passage across the Euxine our battalions had not yet been followed by that evil horde who are accustomed to cling to an army selling strong, noxious drinks to the men. Therefore our army was without crime.* It was with something more than mercy, it was with kindness and gentle courtesy, that the people of the villages were treated by our soldiery; and the interpreters had to strain the resources of the English tongue in order to convey a faint apprehension of the figures of speech in which the women were expressing their gratitude. Their chief favourites, it seems, were the men of the Rifle Brigade. Quartered for a day or two in one of the villages, these soldiers made up for the want of a common tongue by acts of kindness. They helped the women in their household work; and the women, pleased and proud, made signs to the stately ‘Rifles’ to do this and do that, exulting in the obedience which they were able to win from men so grand and comely. When the interpreter came, and was asked to construe what the

* This statement, broad as it looks, is meant to be taken literally, and to be regarded as a statement taken from the right official source.
women were saying so fast and so eagerly, it appeared that they were busy with similes and metaphors, and that the Rifles were made out to be heroes more strong than lions, more gentle than young lambs.

A dreadful change came over that village: the Rifles were withdrawn—the Zouaves marched in. There followed spoliation, outrage, horrible cruelty. When those tidings came to Lord Raglan, he was standing on the shore with several of his people about him. He turned scarlet with shame and anger. The yoke of the alliance had wrung him.

In general, it would fall within the duty of light horse to sweep the face of the invaded territory and bring in supplies; but the French were without cavalry; and although the body of horse which we had landed was called 'the Light Brigade,' the Lancers, the Hussars, and the Light Dragoons of which it consisted, were not troops of such nimble kind, and not so practised as to be all at once apt at foraging. Besides it was plain that in advancing through the enemy's country, the power of the invaders would have to be measured by the arm in which they were weakest, and a material loss in our small, brilliant force of cavalry might bring ruin upon the whole expedition. There was the Commissariat. The officers of that department were gentlemen taken from a branch of the Treasury; and although they could make requisitions on the military authorities with more or less hope of a result, they had no force of their own for supplies. Outrages perpetrated by the Zouaves.
with which to act. The regimental officers were of course busied with their respective corps. Yet it was certain that the power of operating effectively with the English army would depend upon its obtaining a large addition to its existing means of land-transport. In the result, it was the chief of one of the business departments of our Headquarter Staff who pressed forward into the gap, and succeeded in achieving the work upon which, in a great degree, the fate of the campaign seemed likely to hinge.

From the first General Airey had seen that the mere inert presence of armies in an invaded province is a thing very short of conquest. Conquest, he knew, must generally rest upon the success with which supplies can be drawn from the invaded province; and he never forgot that, unless the country could be made to yield means of land-carriage, the Allies would have to creep timidly along the shore, tethered fast by the short string of carts with which they had come provided; therefore, even within a few minutes from the time when the landing began, he was already striving to gain—not the mere occupation of the soil—not the mere licence for the troops to stand or lie down on the ground—but that hold, that military grasp of the country which would make it help to sustain the invasion. When only a few battalions of the Light Division had landed, and were beginning to form on the beach, he had hastened up to the high ground on our right. There, at once catching sight of a long string of
waggons escorted by a body of Cossacks he obtained the aid of a company of the 23d Fusiliers under Major Lysons, and with these advanced quickly in skirmishing order. The Cossacks tried hard to save the convoy by using the points of their lances against the bullocks, and even against the drivers; but, the Fusiliers advancing and beginning to open fire, the Cossacks at length retreated, leaving Airey in possession of just that kind of prize which the army most needed—a prize of some seventy or eighty waggons, with their oxen and drivers complete.* Never ceasing to think it was vital to have more and more means

* After the publication of the 3d Edition, I received from Colonel Lysons a more detailed narrative of this incident than is given in the text. He says: 'Shortly after landing, Sir George Brown ordered me to extend the company that was with me along the top of the ridge which overlooked the landing-place. While there, General Airey came up to me, and, pointing to a line of arabas which was moving across the plain some way off, asked if I could take them. I answered, 'Yes, but Sir George had ordered me to stay where I was.' The General (Airey) then began to write on a piece of paper to ask leave to send me from my post; but on looking up, and seeing that the waggons were already far off, he exclaimed, 'We shall lose them if you don't go at once. I will take the responsibility on myself.' So away I went in skirmishing order. On approaching a hillock, which screened the arabas from our view, I saw the long lances of some Cossacks waving in the air. Fearing they might attack us, I closed my men to the centre on the march; but as we cleared the top of the rising ground, these gentlemen (the Cossacks) galloped off to the arabas, on which we had gained considerably. A few minutes after, I saw the Cossacks making the drivers unyoke their bullocks, that they might drive them away from us. Knowing they would beat me at that game, I desired three old soldiers to fall out of the ranks and fire at the Cossacks. The first shot fell short. On the second being fired, I saw one
of transport, Airey afterwards despatched the officers of his department in all directions to bring in supplies. Sending Captain Sankey to Tuzla and Sak, he thence got 105 waggons. Sending Captain Hamilton to Bujuk Aktash, to Beshi Aktash, to Tenish, and Sak, he got 67 camels, 253 horses, 45 cartloads of poultry, barley, and other supplies, with more than a thousand head of cattle and sheep.* At a later date, and when the army was moving, he took 25 waggons from a village near the line of march. One day, moreover, it happened that General Airey sent his aide-de-camp Nolan to explore for water, and, though he was without a cavalry escort, Nolan boldly cut in upon a convoy of 80 government waggons laden with flour, and seized the whole of it. In all, some 350 waggons were obtained, with their teams and their Tartar drivers.

* In some, but not all of these expeditions, Sankey and Hamilton had cavalry escorts.
In general, the appropriation of the resources of the country is a business which ranges among mere commissariat annals; but in order to this invasion, the seizing of means of land-transport was a business hardly otherwise than vital. Even as it was, the army was brought to hard straits for want of sufficing draught-power; and without the cattle and waggons which were seized whilst the troops were landing, the course of events must have been other than what it was.

Those Tartar drivers of whom I have spoken, were a wild people, little fit, as it seemed, for the obedience and patient toil exacted from camp-followers; but the descent of the Allies upon the coast was the first military operation that they had witnessed, and before their amazedness ceased, they found themselves unaccountably marshalled and governed, and involuntarily taking their humble part in the enterprise of the Western Powers. Many of them wore the same expression of countenances as hares that are taken alive, and they looked as though they were watching after the right moment for escape; but they had fallen, as it were, into a great stream, and all they could do was to wonder, and yield, and flow on. There were few of those captured lads who had strength to withstand the sickness and the hardships of the campaign. For the most part, they sank and died.
CHAPTER XXIV.

There were now upon the coast of the Crimea some 37,000 French and Turks,* with sixty-eight pieces of artillery, all under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud; and we saw that 27,000 English, including a full thousand of cavalry, and together with sixty guns, had been landed by Lord Raglan. Altogether, then, the Allies numbered 63,000 men and 128 guns. These forces, partly by means of the draught animals at their command, and partly by the aid of the soldier himself, could carry by land the ammunition necessary for perhaps two battles, and the means of subsistence for three days. Their provisions beyond those limits were to be replenished from the ships. It was intended, therefore, that the fleets should follow the march of the armies; and that the invaders, without attempting to dart upon the inland route which connected the enemy with St Petersburg, should move straight upon the north side of Sebastopol by following the line of the coast.

* 30,204 Frenchmen and 7000 Turks, according to the French accounts. Lord Raglan, I believe, thought that the French force was less, and put it at 27,600.
The whole body of the Allied armies was to operate as a 'movable column.' *

Between an armed body engaged in regular operations, and that description of force which the French call a 'movable column,' the difference is broad; and there is need to mark it, because the way in which regular operations are conducted is not even similar to that in which a 'movable column' is wielded. It is, of course, from the history of Continental wars that the principle of regular operations in the field is best deduced. A prince intending to invade his neighbour's territory takes care to have near his own frontier, or in states already under his control, not only the army with which he intends to begin the invasion, but also that sustained gathering of fresh troops, and that vast accumulation of stores, arms, and munitions, which will suffice, as he hopes, to feed the war. The territory on which these resources are spread is called the 'base of operations.' When the invading general has set out from this, his strategic home, to achieve the object he has in view, the neck of country by which he keeps up his communications with the base is called the 'line of operations;' † and the maintenance of

* I make this endeavour to elucidate the true character of the operation for the purpose of causing the reader to understand the kind of hazard which was involved in the march along the coast, and also in order to lay the ground for explaining (in a future volume) the causes which afterwards brought upon the army cruel sufferings and privations.

† This is generally, but not invariably, the same line as the one by which he has advanced.
this line of operations is the one object which
must never be absent from his mind. The farther
he goes, the more he needs to keep up an incess-
ant communication with his 'base;' and yet,
since the line is lengthening as he advances, it is
constantly becoming more and more liable to be
cut. Such a disaster as that he looks upon as
nearly equal to ruin, and there is hardly anything
that he will refuse to sacrifice for the defence of
the dusty or mud-deep cart-roads which give him
his means of living and fighting.

On the other hand, the commander of a 'mov-
able column' begins his campaign by wilfully
placing himself in those very circumstances which
would bring ruin upon an army carrying on regu-
lar operations. He does not profess nor attempt
to hold fast any 'line of operations' connecting
him with his resources. He says to his enemy:
'Surround me if you will; gather upon my front;
hover round me on flank and rear. Do not
affront me too closely, unless you want to see
something of my cavalry and my horse-artillery;
but, keeping at a courteous distance, you may
freely occupy the whole country through which
I pass. I care nothing for the roads by which I
have come; what I need whilst my task is doing
I carry along with me. I have an enterprise
in hand; that achieved, I shall march towards
the resources which my countrymen have pre-
pared for me. Those resources I will reach or
else perish.' If an army engaged in regular
operations were likened to an engine drawing its
supplies by means of long pipes from a river, the principle of the 'movable column' would be well enough tokened by that simple skinful of water which, carried on the back of a camel, is the life of men passing a desert.

Each of the two systems has its advantages and its drawbacks. The advantages enjoyed by an army undertaking regular operations are: the lasting character of its power, and its comparative security against great disasters. The general conducting an army in regular operations is constantly replenishing his strength by drawing from his 'base' fresh troops and supplies to compensate the havoc which time and the enemy, or even time alone, will always be working in his army; and if he meets with a check, he retires upon a line already occupied by portions of his force, already strewed with his magazines. He retires, in short, upon a road prepared for his reception, and the farther he retreats, the nearer he is to his great resources. The drawbacks attending this system are: the great quantity of means of land-transport required for keeping up the communication, and the eternal necessity of having to be ready with a sufficient force to defend every mile of the 'line of operations' against the enterprises of the enemy.

The advantages of the 'movable column' are: that its means of land-transport may be comparatively small—may, in fact, be proportioned to the limited duration of the service which it undertakes; and that, not being clogged with the duty
of maintaining a 'line of operations,' it has, in truth, nothing to defend except itself. But grave drawbacks limit the power of a 'movable column.' In the first place, it is an instrument fitted only for temporary use; because, during the service in which it is engaged, it has no resources to rely upon except what it carries along with it. Another drawback is the hazard it incurs—not of mere defeat, but of total extermination; for it is a force which has left no dominion in its wake, and if it falls back, it falls into the midst of enemies having hold of the country around, and emboldened by seeing it retreat.

Then, also, a 'movable column,' even though it be never defeated in any pitched battle, is liable to be brought to ruin by being well harassed; and very inferior troops, or even armed peasants, if they have spirit and enterprise, may put it in peril; for, having the command of the country all round it, they can easily prepare their measures for vexing the column by day and by night. Again, the 'movable column' cannot send its sick and wounded to the rear. It must either abandon the sufferers, or else find means of carrying them wherever it marches, and this, of course, is a task which is rendered more and more difficult by every succeeding combat. Again, if the 'movable column' is brought to frequent halts by the necessity of self-defence, there is danger that the operation in which it is engaged will last to a time beyond the narrow limit of the supplies which it is able to carry along with it.
In Algeria the French had brought the system of using small 'movable columns' to a high state of perfection. One might there see a force complete in all arms, carrying with it the bread and the cartridges, and driving betwixt its battalions the little herd of cattle which would enable it to live and to fight; might see it bidding farewell—farewell for perhaps several weeks—to all its other resources, and boldly venturing into the midst of a wilderness alive with angry foes. But the Arabs and Kabyles, though not without some of the warlike virtues, were, upon the whole, too unintelligent and too feeble to be able to put the system of the 'movable column' to a test sufficing to prove that the contrivance would hold good in Europe.*

Upon the whole, it may be acknowledged that, for operating in a country where the enemy is looked upon as at all formidable, the employment of a 'movable column' is a measure which will be likely to win more favour from those who love an adventure, than from those who are acquainted with the art of war.

But whichever of the two methods be chosen, it is of great moment to choose decisively, taking care that the operations are carried on in a way consistent with the principle of the system on which they proceed. A general conducting regular operations must be wary, circumspect, and

* It was the custom of the Arabs to abstain rigorously from night attacks, and this habit of theirs was of inestimable advantage to the French.
resolutely patient. The leader of a 'movable column' must be swift, and even, for very safety's sake, he may have to be venturesome; for what would be rashness in another may in him be rigid prudence. The two systems are so opposite, that to confuse the two, or to import into the practice of one of them the practice applicable to the other, is to run into grave troubles and dangers. Yet this is what the Allies did. When the English Government committed to this enterprise a large proportion of their small, brilliant army, and appointed to the command of it a General mature in years, and schooled by his long subordination to Wellington, they acted as though they meant that the army should engage with all due prudence in regular operations. When they ordered that this force should make a descent upon the Crimea without intending to prepare for it a base of operations at the landing-place, they caused it to act as a 'movable column.' It will be seen hereafter that, from this ambiguity of purpose, or rather from this dimness of sight, the events of the campaign took their shape.

Again, it is right to see how far it be possible to change with the same force from one of the two systems to the other. Upon this, it can be said that an army engaged in regular operations may well enough be able to furnish forth a 'movable column,' but to hope that a 'movable column' will be able to gather to itself all at once the lasting strength of an army prepared for regular operations, is to hope for what cannot be. It is
true, as we shall see hereafter, that by dint of great effort and the full command of the sea, the two mighty nations of the west were able in time to convert the remains of their 'movable column' into an army fitted for regular operations; but we shall have to remember that, before the one system could be effectually replaced by the other, the soldiery underwent cruel sufferings.

The 63,000 invaders now preparing to march towards the south were the largest, and by far the best appointed, force that the Powers of modern Europe had ever dared to engage in what (as distinguishing it from regular operations) may rightly be called an adventure. Their plan was to advance towards the north of Sebastopol, suffering the enemy to close round their rear, and intending to march every day to a new point of contact with the fleet. It was only at the mouths of the rivers that the cliffs between Old Fort and Sebastopol left room for anything like a landing-place; and (except so far as concerned the mere interchange of signals), the land-forces, whilst marching from the banks of one river to the banks of another, could not expect to be in communication with the fleets. Moreover, the Allied Generals were still in ignorance of the numerical strength of the enemy whom they were thus to defy. All they knew was that, so far as concerned his numbers of brave, steady, highly-drilled troops, the Czar was reported to be the foremost potentate of the world; and that the publicity of the Allied counsels had given him a
good deal of time for reinforcing the garrisons of the invaded province.

It may be said that, since the Allied armies were to be attended along the coast by their fleets, they were not in the strictest sense a 'movable column.' Each night, no doubt, they expected to be in communication with their ships; but, during each of the marches they were about to undertake, their dangers were to be in all respects the same as those which attend upon any other 'movable column;' for every morning they were to cast loose from the ties which connected them with their resources, as well as with their means of retreat, and were to ground their hopes of recovering their communications upon their power to force their way through a country held by the enemy. In short, the Allied armies were a 'movable column;' but a movable column which could hope to find means of succour, and, if necessary, of retreat, by fighting its way to a point of contact with the attendant fleets, and covering its withdrawal by a victory. There is the more need for showing this by dint of words, since it happened that the true nature of the expedition was obscured by the course of events. It passed for a measure more prudent than it really was, because Prince Mentschikoff, being wilful and unskilled, did not take the right means for exposing its rashness.

The march now about to be undertaken by the invaders was of such a kind that an enterprising enemy who understood his calling might bring
them to a halt whenever he chose; and, forcing them to try to convert their flank into a front, might compel them to fight a battle with their back to the sea-cliff—to fight, in short, upon ground where defeat would be ruin. When, therefore, on the 19th of September 1854, the Allied armies broke up from their bivouacs and marched towards the south, they were engaging in a venturesome enterprise.

It seems that, although by human contrivance a whole people may be shut out from the knowledge of momentous events in which its armies are taking a part, there is yet a subtle essence of truth which will permeate into the mind of a nation thus kept in ignorance. To a degree which freemen can hardly imagine to be possible, the first Napoleon had succeeded in hiding the achievements of the English army from the sight of the French people; and since the French in after years were little tempted to gather up by aid of history the events which they had been hindered from learning in the form of 'news,' there was—not merely in the French army, but even in all France—a very scant knowledge of the way in which the two mighty nations of the West had encountered one another in the great war. Yet, now that the time had come for testing the faith which one army had in the prowess of the other, it suddenly appeared that a belief in the quality of the English soldier was seated as deep in the mind of the French army as though it were a belief founded upon historic knowledge.
This will be understood by observing the relative place which the French commander was content to take in the order of march, and by looking at it in connection with what then promised to be the character of the impending campaign.

When once the invaders had landed and seized the coast-road, the one line of communication which the Russians could trust to for linking the garrison of Sebastopol to the mainland was by the great road which passes through Bakshi Serāi and Simpheropol. It was vital to the Russian commander to be able to hold this road, for by that his reinforcements were to come. On the other hand, he had to try to cover Sebastopol; but such was the direction in which the Allies were preparing to march upon the place that, by manoeuvring with his back towards the great road passing through Simpheropol, he could cling to his line of communication, and yet be able to come down upon the flank of the invading armies whilst they were marching across his front. In this way he would cover Sebastopol much more effectively than by risking his communications in order to place his army like a mere inert block between the invaders and their prey. Moreover, he was known to be relatively strong in cavalry, and the country was of such a kind that the Allies, advancing from Old Fort to the Belbec, would have upon their left a fair, undulating steppe, such as horsemen exult to look upon. It was, therefore, to be expected that the whole stress of the task undertaken by the invaders
would be thrown, in the first instance, upon that portion of the Allied force which might be chosen to form their left wing.

In the armies of Europe the right is the side of precedence, and from the time that the Western Powers had begun to act together in Turkey, the French had always claimed, or rather had always taken, the right. Now, it happened that, both in Turkey and in the Crimea, the side of precedence was the side nearest to the sea, whilst the left was the side nearest to the enemy. Lord Raglan had observed all this, but he had observed in silence; and finding the right always seized by our Allies, he had quietly put up with the left. Yet he was not without humour; and now, when he saw that, in this hazardous movement along the coast, the French were still taking the right, there was something like archness in his way of remarking that, although the French were bent upon taking precedence of him, their courtesy still gave him the post of danger. This he well might say; for, so far as concerned the duty of covering the venturesome march which was about to be undertaken, the whole stress of the enterprise was thrown upon the English army. The French force was covered on its right flank by the sea, on its front and rear by the fire from the steamers and on its left by the English army. On the other hand, the English army, though covered on its right flank by the French, was exposed in front, and in rear, and on its whole left flank, to the full brunt of the enemy's attacks. If the
Russian General should act in anything like conformity to the principles of the art of war, the whole weight of his attacks would have to be met, in the first instance, by the English alone; and although the French would have an opportunity of acting as a reserve, they would do so under circumstances rendering it very difficult for them to retrieve any check sustained by their Allies. In short, the French could not but know that, if the enemy should direct his enterprises against the open left flank of the invaders, the least weakness on the part of the English might enable him to roll up the whole Allied force, involving French and English alike in one common disaster. Yet so steadfast was the trust which the French reposed in the English, so unshaken the courage and good sense with which they committed themselves to the prowess of their ancient foe, that they never for an instant sought to meddle with the duty of covering the march from an attack on the left flank. They planned that the English should be there.

On the morning of the 19th of September the Allied armies began their advance towards the south. On the right, and nearest the sea, the French army marched in a formation adopted by Marshal Bugeaud at the battle of Isly. The outline of the ground covered by their troops took the shape of a lozenge—a lozenge, whereof the foremost apex was formed by the 1st Division, the angles on either flank by the 2d and 3d, and the rearmost point by the 4th Division. Within
the masculine or hollow lozenge thus formed, there marched the Turkish battalions and those portions of the artillery and the convoy which were not specially attached to one or other of the divisions. Each French division* marched in two columns consisting each of one brigade, and the artillery and encumbrances belonging to each division marched between the two brigades. Each brigade was in regimental column at sectional distance. The Allied fleets, slowly gliding along the coast, covered the French army on its right flank, and carefully reconnoitred every seam and hollow of the ground in front which could be reached by the eyes of men looking from the ships.

Since the English army was to advance in a way which left it open to the enemy in front, in rear, and on its left flank, Lord Raglan of course deemed it likely that he would be attacked in his march; and that upon smooth, open ground, his army would be called upon to defend both itself and its trailing convoy against the assaults of an enemy who was strong in the cavalry arm. But this task was rendered less hard than it would otherwise be by the quality of the English soldier, and the peculiar order of battle in which he loves

* It was intended and ordered that the 1st and 4th French Divisions should effect a lozenge formation analogous to that which characterised the general order of march, but the direction was not practically attended to. No one knows better than an African General the art of enfolding the helpless portions of a column in battalions of infantry; but, the French force being covered on all sides in the way already described, no elaborate precautions were needed.
to fight. He fights in line; and therefore, with his moderate force of infantry and artillery, Lord Raglan was able to resolve that, from whatever quarter the onset might come, he would be ready to meet it with a front of bayonets and field-artillery, extending along nearly two miles of ground.

In order to be able, at a few minutes' notice, to show a front of this extent either towards the south, the east, or the north, Lord Raglan kept each of his infantry divisions massed in close column, and he disposed his 1st, 2d, 3d, and Light Divisions in such a way that the whole body had both a front and a depth of two divisions. The distances between the divisions were so arranged that, without dislocation, they could form line either in front or towards the flank. The artillery attached to each division marched on the right or seaward flank of the force to which it belonged.

The advance-guard consisted of the 11th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons under Lord Cardigan. In rear of the small infantry advance-guard, which followed the horsemen, there marched a detachment of the Rifles in extended order. Then, on the right, came the 2d Division; and, on the left, the Light Division. The 3d Division marched in rear of the 2d, and the Light Division was followed by the 1st Division. Of the 4th Division, the 63d Regiment and two companies of the 46th had been left (with a troop of the 4th Light Dragoons) to clear the beach at Kamishlu; but the remainder of the division, under Sir George Cathcart, marched in rear of the 1st Divi-
sion. Along the left flank of the advancing columns, and at a distance from them of some 200 yards, were riflemen in skirmishing order, and a line of skirmishers from the same force closed the rear of the infantry. On the left flank, and nearly in the same alignment as the leading infantry divisions, was the 8th Hussars; and on the same flank, but in an alignment less advanced than the rearmost of the infantry columns, there was the 17th Lancers. The cattle and the baggage marched in rear of the 3d Division, and so as to be covered towards the left by the 4th Division. Then followed the rear-guard, and then a line of Rifles disposed at intervals in extended order. Last of all came the 4th Light Dragoons, under Lord George Paget.

Thus marched the strength of the Western Powers. The sun shone hotly, as on a summer's day in England; but breezes springing fresh from the sea floated briskly along the hills. The ground was an undulating steppe alluring to cavalry. It was rankly covered with a herb like southernwood; and when the stems were crushed under foot by the advancing columns, the whole air became laden with bitter fragrance. The aroma was new to some. To men of the western counties of England it was so familiar that it carried them back to childhood and the village church; they remembered the nosegay of 'boy's love' that used to be set by the Prayer-Book of the Sunday maiden too demure for the vanity of flowers.
In each of the close-massed columns which were formed by our four complete divisions there were more than 5000 foot soldiers. The colours were flying; the bands at first were playing; and once more the time had come round when in all this armed pride there was nothing of false majesty; for already videttes could be seen on the hillocks, and (except at the spots where our horsemen were marching) there was nothing but air and sunshine, and at intervals the dark form of a single rifleman, to divide our columns from the enemy. But more warlike than trumpet and drum was the grave quiet which followed the ceasing of the bands. The pain of weariness had begun: Few spoke—all toiled. Waves break upon the shore; and though they are many, still distance will gather their numberless cadences into one. So, also, it was with one ceaseless hissing sound that a wilderness of tall crisping herbage bent under the tramp of the coming thousands. As each mighty column marched on, one hardly remembered at first the weary frames, the aching limbs which composed it; for—instinct with its own proper soul and purpose, absorbing the volitions of thousands of men, and bearing no likeness to the mere sum of the human beings out of whom it was made—the column itself was the living thing—the slow, monstrous unit of strength which walks the modern earth where empire is brought into question. But a little while and then the sickness which had clung to the army began to make it seen that the columns
in all their pride were things built with the bodies of suffering mortals.

We saw that, before the embarkation, our troops had fallen into a weak state of health, and that, even of those who were free from serious illness, there were hardly any who had been able to keep their accustomed strength. It had been hoped that the voyage would bring back health and strength, but the hope proved vain; and Lord Raglan, knowing the weakly state of the men, had ordered that they should be allowed to enfold the few things they most needed in their blankets and to land and march without their knapsacks. Yet now, before the first hour of march was over, the men began to fall out from the ranks. Some of these were in the agonies of cholera. Their faces had a dark choked look; they threw themselves on the ground and writhed, but often without speaking and without a cry. Many more dropped out from mere weakness. These the officers tried to inspirit, and sometimes they succeeded;* but more often the sufferer was left on the ground. It was vain to tell him, though so it was believed at the time, that he would fall

* The officers were themselves so heavily laden that they could not get through the day's march without having to endure great fatigue; for the scantiness of the means available for land-transport had made it necessary for Lord Raglan to ask that the officers would trust to their own bodily strength for the carriage of all they required. This most 'unusual' demand upon their fortitude was met at the time in such a spirit that, in narrating the fact to the Secretary of War, Lord Raglan was able to say, 'I have not heard a single murmur.' Published Despatch, 23d September 1854.
into the hands of the Cossacks. The tall stately men of the Guards dropped from their ranks in great numbers. It was believed at the time that the men who fell out would be taken by the enemy; but the number of stragglers at length became very great, and in the evening a force was sent back to bring them in.

During the march, the foot-soldiers of the Allied armies suffered thirst; but early in the afternoon the troops in advance reached the long-desired stream of the Bulganak; and as soon as a division came in sight of the water, the men broke from their ranks, and ran forward that they might plunge their lips deep in the cool, turbid, grateful stream. In some of the brigades a stronger governance was maintained. Sir Colin Campbell, for instance, would not allow that even the rage of thirst should loosen the discipline of his grand, Highland regiments. He halted them a little before they reached the stream, and so ordered it that, by being saved from the confusion that would have been wrought by their own wild haste, they gained in comfort, and knew that they were gainers. A like discipline was maintained by General Codrington, and probably by several other commanders. When men toil in organised masses, they owe what well-being they have to wise and firm commanders.

It was on the banks of this stream of the Bulganak that the Allied armies were to bivouac for the night.
CHAPTER XXV.

EARLY in the afternoon, Lord Raglan, riding in advance of the infantry divisions, had reached the banks of the river, and, observing a group of Cossacks on the brow of the hill towards the south, he ordered the squadrons which Lord Cardigan had with him * to move forward and reconnoitre the ground. Lord Lucan was present with this portion of his cavalry force.

Where the post-road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol crosses the Bulganak, the ground on the south side of the river rises gradually for some hundreds of yards from the banks of the stream, then dips a little, then rises again, then dips rather deeply, and then again rises up to the summit of the ridge which bounds the view of an observer in the valley of the Bulganak.

Our reconnoitring squadrons went forward a great way into the lower dip, and when they were there, it was perceived that, confronting them from the hill above, there was a body of cavalry 2000 strong. Our four squadrons halted

* The 11th Hussars and 13th Light Dragoons.
and formed line. The Russian cavalry came forward a little, then halted, and, throwing out skirmishers, attempted some long fruitless shots with their carbines. Our squadrons also threw out skirmishers.

But Lord Raglan, who had remained with his Staff on the northern side of the hollow, had now discerned the formidable body of cavalry which was confronting our four squadrons; and General Airey, being gifted with a keen, far-reaching sight, was able to make out that the glitter which could be seen between the second crest and the summit was the play of the sun upon the points of bayonets, and that in the upper hollow, there were several battalions. It was soon made plain that, within a few hundred yards of our four squadrons, the enemy was present with all three arms, and in some force. He had there, as we now know, about 6000 men of his 17th Division, two batteries of artillery, a brigade of regular cavalry, and nine sotnias of Cossacks.

Lord Raglan, whose army was still on its march, saw that he must take care to avoid provoking an action; but also he had to provide for the retreat of the four squadrons, which stood rooted in the centre of the lower hollow, so near to an overwhelming enemy's force of all arms, and so far from their supports, that they were in some danger. The problem was to extricate them, and to do this, if possible, without getting into that sort of conflict which would be likely to bring about a serious engagement. Lord Raglan saw that
what made the Russians hesitate was the steadiness and the exact ceremonious formation of the little cavalry force of four squadrons which tranquilly confronted them; and that, if he were to withdraw it before he had made arrangements for covering its retreat, it would be pursued and roughly handled by overwhelming numbers. He was anxious—for, small as was this little body of horse, it was a large proportion of his whole strength in the cavalry arm; but he saw that its safety would be best provided for by bringing up troops to its support, and allowing it in the mean time to remain where it was, confusing the enemy by its obstinate presence and its careful array. He ordered up in all haste the Light and the 2d Divisions, the 8th Hussars, and 17th Lancers, and afterwards the nine-pounder batteries attached to the Light Division. When our infantry divisions came up they were formed in line, and the cavalry supports took a position in left rear of the advanced squadrons. All these operations the enemy suffered to take place without resistance, and when they were completed his opportunity was gone.

So, all being now in readiness, Lord Raglan wished that the four squadrons should forthwith retire; and the more so as he was apprehensive lest these horsemen, in their evident longing for a combat, should be tempted to charge the body of cavalry in their immediate front. Still he was unwilling to embarrass Lord Lucan (close as he then was to the enemy) by an order too precise
or imperative. In these circumstances General Airey galloped forward to give effect to Lord Raglan's wishes.

When Airey came up, he found that by communicating Lord Raglan's wishes without delivering a positive order, he was supplying materials for a debate between Lord Lucan and his brigadier. Yet for a wordy debate the time and the place were ill-fitted, for the four squadrons, as we have seen, were within but a little distance of overwhelming forces. There is some obscurity as to the exact way in which General Airey brought his will to bear; but he saw what was wanted, and he said the force must retire immediately, and by alternate squadrons. Though he spoke in terms which might have meant that he was only giving his own opinion, yet perhaps the decisiveness of his speech and manner led to the impression that he was delivering Lord Raglan's orders. Be this as it may, the result was quickly attained. Lord Lucan understood that he had to go forthwith to Lord Raglan. Lord Cardigan understood that the force was to retire immediately, and by alternate lines. The operation instantly commenced, and was conducted with excellent precision, for during the whole retreat there were always two squadrons out of the four which were showing a smooth front to the enemy.*

* Colonel Douglas, commanding the 11th Hussars, had the tact to see that considering the close presence of the enemy, it was expedient to depart from the usual practice, and to retire at a walk instead of a trot. His wise deviation from the common method made Lord Cardigan very angry.—Note to 5th Edition.
The moment the withdrawal of our little cavalry force began, the enemy's artillery-teams, unseen before, came bounding up from the hollow, and his guns, being quickly unlimbered, were soon in battery upon the ridge. With these he opened fire upon our retreating squadrons; but he saw that these horsemen, no longer isolated, were retiring upon ample supports of all arms; he did not therefore venture to pursue with his cavalry. Two men in our cavalry force were wounded, and four or five horses killed. The six-pounder guns attached to our cavalry replied to the enemy's artillery without good effect; but when our nine-pounder guns were brought into action, they caused the enemy's artillery to limber up and retire. They also, it seems, inflicted some loss upon the enemy's cavalry, for it was said that as many as thirty-five of his troopers were killed or wounded. The Russians were soon out of sight.

The slight combat thus occurring on the Bulganak was the first approach to a passage of arms between Russia and the Western Powers. The pith of what had happened was this:—The Russians had been making a reconnaissance in force at a time when Lord Raglan was making a reconnaissance with only four squadrons; and as the nature of the ground concealed the enemy's strength, our lesser force was exposed for some minutes to a good deal of danger; but the enemy, being slow to take advantage of fortune, had given the English general full time to extricate
his squadrons by the use of the three arms. Lord Raglan was so well pleased with the success of this last operation, and with the steadiness shown by our cavalry, that, even on the night of the Alma (when it might have been supposed that the impressions produced by the battle would have superseded the recollection of the previous day), he spoke with complacency of this affair on the Bulganak.*

* In speaking of the affair of the Bulganak, Lord Raglan's despatch says: 'In the affair of the previous day, Major-General the Earl of Cardigan exhibited the utmost spirit and coolness, and kept his brigade under perfect command.' Published Despatch of the 23d of September 1854.—Note to 4th Edition.
CHAPTER XXVI.

When this affair was concluded, Lord Raglan began to prepare for a contingency of graver import. The enemy, as it now appeared, had a force of all arms in the immediate neighbourhood, and it was known that he had his whole field-army within a few hours' march of the Bulganak. On the other hand, Lord Raglan was exposed to attack in front, left flank, and rear; and even on his right flank he was without immediate support, for the course of the day's march had thrown an interval of a mile between the French and the English armies. It was to be apprehended that the enemy, issuing during the night from his intrenched position on the Alma, would place himself in such a position as to be able to fall upon our army in front and flank at dawn of day. Lord Raglan, therefore, determined that the troops should bivouac in order of battle, and so as to be rapidly able to show a deployed front to the enemy either in front or flank. He placed the troops himself, fixing their exact position with minute care.
The first brigades of the 2d and Light Divisions were drawn up in line parallel with the river, and some hundreds of yards in advance of it. The first brigades of the 1st and 3d Divisions were placed in an oblique line receding from the left of the Light Division, and going back to the river's bank. The troops thus deployed formed, with the river, a kind of three-sided enclosure, in which the principal part of the cavalry and the encumbrances of the army were enfolded. The second brigade of each of the divisions already named was formed in column in rear of the first or deployed brigade. The 4th Division and the 4th Light Dragoons were placed in observation on the northern side of the river. Finally, Colonel Lagondie, one of the French Commissioners at our headquarters, was requested to suggest to Prince Napoleon the expediency of his drawing his division somewhat more near to the English right.*

Our troops piled arms, and bivouacked in order of battle.† There was a post-house at the point where the road crossed the river, and there Lord Raglan passed the night.

Upon the supposition that the Allied armies might be promptly attacked on the morrow, their situation during those hours of rest was certainly, as all must see, critical; but when morning

* Colonel Lagondie fulfilled his mission; but on his return, being a near-sighted man, he rode into the midst of a Cossack picket, and was taken prisoner.
† See the Plan.
dawned, it appeared that the enemy having drawn off was attempting nothing against them.

It is common to attribute great results to careful design; but the truth is, that the Allies owed their prosperous landing and their tranquil march to the forbearance of the Russian commander.

The enemy had fallen back to an intrenched position on the left bank of the Alma, and was there awaiting his destiny.
APPENDIX.

NOTE I.

PAPERS SHOWING THE CONCORD EXISTING BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS AT THE TIME WHEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND WERE ENGAGING IN A SEPARATE COURSE OF ACTION.

Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, February 2, 1854.

(Translation.)

Present: The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.

The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, have met together in conference to hear the communication which the Austrian Plenipotentiary has been good enough to make to them of the proposition submitted by the Cabinet of St Petersburg in reply to those which he had undertaken, on the 13th of January, to forward to the Imperial Government, and which were sanctioned by the approval of the Powers represented in the Conference of Vienna. The document which contains them is annexed to the present Protocol.

The undersigned, after having submitted the above-mentioned propositions to the most careful examination,
have ascertained that, in their general character and in their details, they so essentially differ from the basis of negotiation agreed upon on the 31st of December at Constantinople, and approved on the 13th January at Vienna, that they have not considered them to be such as should be forwarded to the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

It consequently only remains for the undersigned to transmit the annexed document to their respective Courts, and to wait till they shall have taken their final resolutions.

(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORELAND.
ARNIM.

The Earl of Westmoreland to the Earl of Clarendon.—
(Received February 13.*)

Vienna, February 8, 1853.

My Lord,—

I have just left the Conference to which Count Buol had this morning invited me, in conjunction with my colleagues. Upon our assembling, he stated that he had no proposal to make to us; but in consideration of the perfect union existing amongst us upon the Eastern Question, he thought he was forwarding our common objects by communicating the despatches he had addressed to Count Esterhazy, for the purpose of being submitted to Count Nesselrode.

Count Buol then read to us these despatches. The first

* i.e., just one fortnight before England despatched the hostile summons which brought her into a state of war.
gave an account of the proposal brought forward by Count Orloff, that the Emperor of Austria should, in conjunction with Prussia, take an engagement with the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of a strict neutrality in the war now existing with the Porte, and in which the Mar-itime Powers seemed likely to take part. Count Buol, in his despatch, develops in the clearest and most distinct language the impossibility of the adoption by the Emperor of any such engagement. He states, with all courtesy to the Emperor Nicholas, the obligations by which the Aus- trian Government is bound to watch over the strict main-tenance of the principle of the independence and integrity of Turkey—a principle proclaimed by the Emperor Nicho-las himself, but which the passage of the Danube by his troops might, by the encouragement of insurrections in the Turkish Provinces, endanger. Count Buol, therefore, states that he cannot take the engagement proposed to him. The second despatch to Count Esterhazy relates to the answer which has been returned to the proposals for negotiations transmitted by Count Buol with the sanction of the Con- ference on the 13th ultimo.

In this despatch, Count Buol states with considerable force the disappointment felt by the Emperor at the want of success which had attended his recommendation in favour of the Turkish propositions. He enters very fully into the subject, and renews the expression of the Em- peror's most anxious desire that the Emperor Nicholas may still adopt the proposals which had been submitted to him.

The last despatch is one in which Count Buol replies to the reproach which was addressed to the Imperial Govern-ment, that by its present conduct it was abandoning the principles upon which the three Governments of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had hitherto acted for the mainte-nance of the established interests and independence of the
different States of Europe, and that, by so doing, it was endangering the established order of things in Europe, and the security at present existing.

The answer of Count Buol to this reproach is very firmly and clearly stated.

It is impossible for me to give your Lordship a more detailed account, before the departure of the messenger, of these despatches; but I must add, that they met with the entire approbation of the members of the Conference, that they were looked upon as most ably drawn up, and that, while using every courteous and friendly expression towards the Emperor Nicholas, they most clearly pointed out the present position which the Austrian Government would maintain with the view of upholding the principles they had proclaimed, and the engagements which they had taken for their support.*

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* The rest of the despatch relates only to a suggestion for an arrangement which came to nothing, and is therefore omitted.

† i.e., whilst messengers were carrying the hostile summons from Paris and London to St Petersburg.
Court of Austria being requested by the Cabinet of St Petersburg to apply for the support of the two Maritime Powers, in order to obtain the acceptance of these preliminaries by the Sublime Porte.

After mature deliberation, the Plenipotentiaries of France and Great Britain, taking as the basis of their examination the previous documents which had received the sanction of the four Powers, established the existence of radical differences between those documents and the proposed preliminaries.

1. Inasmuch as the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, which is fixed to take place after the signature of the preliminaries, is made to depend on the departure of the combined fleets, not only from the Black Sea but from the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles—a condition which could only be admitted by the Maritime Powers after the conclusion of the definitive Treaty.

2. Inasmuch as the document now under consideration tends to invest with a form strictly conventional, bilateral, and exclusively applicable to the relations of the Porte with Russia, the assurances relative to the religious privileges of the Greeks—assurances which the Porte has only offered to give to the five Powers at the same time and in the form of a simple identic declaration. The assurances, in fact, once inserted in the preliminary Treaty, must then needs be reproduced in the definitive Treaty, and would be accompanied, moreover, by an official note confirmatory of the said privileges exclusively addressed to the Court of Russia, a note which, in its turn, would be considered as annexed to the Treaties; that is to say, as having the same force and the same effect.

3. Inasmuch as the preliminaries communicated to Vienna are, by implication, withheld from any discussion in Conference upon the modifications considered necessary to make them correspond with the original text of the
Acts which had received its assent, and inasmuch as the conclusion of the definitive Treaty contains no greater reservation for its inspection and interference.

4. Inasmuch as, whilst the propositions of the Porte expressly require the revision of the Treaty of 1841, so as to make Turkey participate in the guarantees of the public law of Europe, this condition is passed over in silence.

The Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia, appreciating the force of the observations offered by the Plenipotentiaries of France and of Great Britain, recognised in like manner on their part the remarkable differences pointed out between the Russian draft of preliminaries and the Protocols of the 13th of January and 2d of February.

In consequence, the Conference unanimously agreed that it was impossible to proceed with those propositions.

(Signed)  BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
            BOURQUENEY.
            WESTMORELAND.
            ARNIM.

Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, April 9, 1854.*

(Translation.)

Present: The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.

At the request of the Plenipotentiaries of France and of Great Britain, the Conference met to hear the documents read which establish that the invitation addressed to the Cabinet of St Petersburg to evacuate the Moldo-Wallachian provinces within a fixed time having remained unanswered, the state of war already declared between Russia and the

* i.e., the very day before the Treaty of Alliance between England and France.
Sublime Porte is in actual existence equally between Russia on the one side, and France and Great Britain on the other.

This change which has taken place in the attitude of two of the Powers represented at the Conference of Vienna, in consequence of a step taken directly by France and England, supported by Austria and Prussia as being founded in right, has been considered by the Representatives of Austria and Prussia as involving the necessity of a fresh declaration of the union of the four Powers upon the ground of the principles laid down in the Protocols of December 5, 1853, and January 13, 1854.

In consequence, the undersigned have at this solemn moment declared that their Governments remain united in the double object of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, of which the fact of the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is and will remain one of the essential conditions; and of consolidating in an interest so much in conformity with the sentiments of the Sultan, and by every means compatible with his independence and sovereignty, the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

The territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is and remains the sine qua non condition of every transaction having for its object the re-establishment of peace between the belligerent Powers; and the Governments represented by the undersigned engage to endeavour in common to discover the guarantees most likely to attach the existence of that Empire to the general equilibrium of Europe; as they also declare themselves ready to deliberate and to come to an understanding as to the employment of the means calculated to accomplish the object of their agreement.

Whatever event may arise in consequence of this agreement, founded solely upon the general interests of Europe, and of which the object can only be attained by the return
of a firm and lasting peace, the Governments represented by the undersigned reciprocally engage not to enter into any definitive arrangements with the Imperial Court of Russia, or with any other Power, which would be at variance with the principles above enunciated, without previously deliberating thereon in common.

(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORELAND.
ARNIM.

Treaty of Alliance, Offensive and Defensive, between Austria and Prussia.

(Translation.)

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, penetrated with deep regret at the fruitlessness of their attempts hitherto to prevent the breaking out of war between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, France, and England on the other;

Mindful of the moral obligations entered into by them by the signing of the last Vienna Protocol;

In the face of the military measures ever gathering on both sides around them and of the dangers resulting therefrom for the general peace of Europe;

Convinced of the high duty which, on the threshold of a future pregnant with evil, is imposed, in the interest of the European welfare, on Germany, so intimately united with the States of the two High Parties;

Have determined to ally themselves in an offensive and defensive alliance for the duration of the war which has broken out between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey,
France, and England on the other, and have appointed for the conclusion of it the following Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the Baron Henry de Hess, his actual Privy Councillor, &c. &c.; and the Count Frederick de Thun-Hohenstein, his Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, &c. &c.;

And His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Baron Othon Theodore de Manteuffel, his President of the Council of Ministers, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c.

The same having exchanged their full powers found to be in good order, have agreed upon the following points:

**Article I.**

His Imperial Apostolic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Prussia guarantee to each other reciprocally the possession of their German and non-German possessions, so that an attack made on the territory of the one, from whatever quarter, will be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory.

**Article II.**

In the same manner the High Contracting Parties hold themselves engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and consider themselves bound accordingly for the mutual repulse of every attack on any part whatsoever of their territories; likewise also in the case where one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the other, obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interests. The agreement relating to the latter-named eventuality, as likewise the extent of the assistances then to be given, will form a special, as also integral, part of the present Convention.
APPENDIX.

Article III.

In order also to give due security and force to the conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance now concluded, the two Great German Powers bind themselves, in case of need, to hold in perfect readiness for war a part of their forces, at periods to be determined between them, and in positions to be fixed. With respect to the time, the extent, and the nature of the placing of those troops, a special stipulation will likewise be determined.

Article IV.

The High Contracting Parties will invite all the German Governments of the Confederation to accede to this alliance, with the understanding that the federal obligations existing in virtue of Article 47 of the final Act of Vienna will receive the same extension for the States who accede as the present Treaty stipulates.

Article V.

Neither of the two High Contracting Parties will, during the duration of this alliance, enter into any separate alliance with other Powers which shall not be in entire harmony with the basis of the present Treaty.

Article VI.

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible by the High Contracting Sovereigns.

Done at Berlin, April 20, 1854.*

(L.S.) HENRY BON. DE HESSE.
(L.S.) F. THUN.
(L.S.) BON. OTH. THEOD. MANTEUFFEL.

* i.e., ten days after the date of the Anglo-French alliance.
Additional Article to the Offensive and Defensive Alliance between Austria and Prussia of April 20, 1854.

(Translation.)

According to the conditions of Article II. of the Treaty concluded this day between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, for the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, a more intimate understanding with respect to the eventuality when an active advance of one of the High Contracting Parties may impose on the other the obligation of a mutual protection of the territory of both, was to form the subject of a special agreement to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty.

Their Majesties have not been able to divest themselves of the consideration, that the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the territories on the Lower Danube, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, by Imperial Russian troops, would endanger the political, moral, and material interests of the whole German Confederation, as also of their own States, and the more so in proportion as Russia extends her warlike operations on Turkish territory.

The Courts of Austria and Prussia are united in the desire to avoid every participation in the war which has broken out between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, France, and Great Britain on the other, and at the same time to contribute to the restoration of general peace. They more especially consider the declarations lately made at Berlin by the Court of St Petersburg to be an important element of pacification, the failure of the practical influence of which they would view with regret. According to these declarations, Russia appears to regard the original motive for the occupation of the Principalities as removed by the concessions now granted to the Christian subjects
of the Porte, which offer the prospect of realisation. They, therefore, hope that the replies awaited from the Cabinet of Russia to the Prussian propositions, transmitted on the 8th, will offer to them the necessary guarantee for an early withdrawal of the Russian troops. In the event that this hope should be illusory, the Plenipotentiaries named on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, Freiherr Baron von Hesse and Count Thun, and on the part of His Majesty the King of Prussia, Baron Manteuffel, have drawn up the following more detailed agreement with respect to the eventuality alluded to in the above-mentioned Article II. of the Treaty of Alliance of this day:

Single Article.

The Imperial Austrian Government will also on their side address a communication to the Imperial Russian Court with the object of obtaining from the Emperor of Russia the necessary orders, that an immediate stop should be put to the further advance of his armies upon the Turkish territory, as also to request of His Imperial Majesty sufficient guarantees for the prompt evacuation of the Danubian Principalities; and the Prussian Government will again, in the most emphatic manner, support these communications with reference to their proposals already sent to St Peters burg. Should the answer of the Russian Court to these steps of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin — contrary to expectation—not be of a nature to give them entire satisfaction upon the two points afore-mentioned, the measures to be taken by one of the Contracting Parties for their attainment, according to the terms of Article II. of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance signed on this day, will be on the understanding that every hostile attack on the territory of one of the Contracting Parties is to be repelled with all the military forces at the disposal of the other.
APPENDIX.

But a mutual offensive advance is stipulated for only in the event of the incorporation of the Principalities, or in the event of an attack on, or passage of, the Balkan by Russia.*

The present Convention shall be submitted for the ratification of the High Sovereigns simultaneously with the above-mentioned Treaty.

Done at Berlin the 20th of April 1854.

(Signed) HESS. (Signed) MANTEUFFEL
THUN.

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Protocol signed at Vienna on the 23d of May 1854 by the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.

(Translation.)

Present: The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries have deemed it conformable to the arrangements contained in the Protocol of the 9th of April, to meet in conference in order to communicate reciprocally, and record in one common Act, the Conventions concluded between France and England on the one hand, and between Austria and Prussia on the other, upon the 10th and 20th of April of the present year.

After a careful examination of the aforesaid Conventions, the undersigned have unanimously agreed:

* Of course the contemplated march of Austrian troops into the Principalities (though undertaken with a view to expel the Russian forces) could not be a 'mutual offensive advance.' The clause defines the circumstances in which the two great German sovereigns should be bound to attack Russia, and does not cast any obscurity upon that part of the treaty which provided for the event in which 'one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the other, 'obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interest.'
1. That the Convention concluded between France and England, as well as that signed on the 20th of April between Austria and Prussia, bind both of them, in the relative situations to which they apply, to secure the maintenance of the principle established by the series of Protocols of the Conference of Vienna.

2. That the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the evacuation of that portion of its territory which is occupied by the Russian army, are, and will continue to be, the constant and invariable object of the union of the four Powers.

3. That consequently, the Acts communicated and annexed to the present Protocol correspond to the engagement which the Plenipotentiaries had mutually contracted on the 9th of April, to deliberate and agree upon the means most fit to accomplish the object of their union, and thus give a fresh sanction to the firm intention of the four Powers represented at the Conference of Vienna, to combine all their efforts and resolutions to realise the object which forms the basis of their union.

(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORELAND.
ARNIM.

Convention between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Boyadjikay, June 14, 1854.

(Translation.)

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, fully recognising that the existence of the Ottoman Empire within its present limits is necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power between the States of Europe, and that, specifi-
cally, the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is one of the essential conditions of the integrity of that Empire; being, moreover, ready to join, with the means at his disposal, in the measures proper to insure the object of the agreement established between his Cabinet and the High Courts represented at the Conference of Vienna:

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, on his side, accepted this offer of concert, made in a friendly manner by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria;

It has seemed proper to conclude a Convention, in order to regulate the manner in which the concert in question shall be carried into effect.

With this object, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, M. le Baron Charles de Bruck, Privy Councillor of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, his Internuncio and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold, Knight of the Imperial Order of the Iron Crown of the first class, &c.;

And His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, Mustapha Reshid Pasha, late Grand Vizier, and at present his Minister for Foreign Affairs, decorated with the Imperial Order of Medjidié of the first class, &c.;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

**Article I.**

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in
case they are required, the number of troops necessary to attain this end.

**Article II.**

It will appertain in this case exclusively to the Imperial Commander-in-chief to direct the operations of his army. He will, however, always take care to inform the Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army of his operations in proper time.

**Article III.**

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes, by common agreement with the Ottoman Government, to re-establish in the Principalities, as far as possible, the legal state of things such as it results from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte in regard to the administration of those countries. The local authorities thus reconstituted shall not, however, extend their action so far as to attempt to exercise control over the Imperial army.

**Article IV.**

The Imperial Court of Austria further engages not to enter into any plan of accommodation with the Imperial Court of Russia which has not for its basis the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as well as the integrity of his Empire.

**Article V.**

As soon as the object of the present Convention shall have been obtained by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will immediately make arrangements for withdrawing his forces with the least possible delay from the territory of the Principalities. The
details respecting the retreat of the Austrian troops shall form the object of a special understanding with the Sublime Porte.

**Article VI.**

The Austrian Government expects that the authorities of the countries temporarily occupied by the Imperial troops will afford them every assistance and facility, as well for their march, their lodging, or encampment, as for their subsistence and that of their horses, and for their communications. The Austrian Government likewise expects that every demand relating to the requirements of the service shall be complied with, which shall be addressed by the Austrian commanders, either to the Ottoman Government, through the Imperial Internunciate at Constantinople, or directly to the local authorities, unless more weighty reasons render the execution of them impossible.

It is understood that the commanders of the Imperial army will provide for the maintenance of the strictest discipline among their troops, and will respect, and cause to be respected, the properties as well as the laws, the religion, and the customs of the country.

**Article VII.**

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna in the space of four weeks, or earlier if possible, dating from the day of its signature.

In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it and set their seals to it.

Done in duplicate, for one and the same effect, at Boyadji-Keny, the fourteenth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty four.

(L.S.) V. Bruck.  (L.S.) Reshid
NOTE II.

LORD CLARENDON'S DESPATCH DEMANDING THE EVACUATION OF THE PRINCIPALITIES.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON to COUNT NESSELRODE.

*Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.*

M. le Comte,—As the ordinary channels of communication between England and Russia have been closed by the recent interruption of diplomatic relations between the two Courts, I am under the necessity of addressing myself directly to your Excellency on a matter of the deepest importance to our respective Governments and to Europe.

The British Government has for many months anxiously laboured, in conjunction with its allies, to effect a reconciliation of differences between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and it is with the utmost pain that the British Government has come to the conclusion that one last hope alone remains of averting the calamity which has so long impended over Europe.

It rests with the Government of Russia to determine whether that hope shall be realised or extinguished; for the British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, is compelled to declare to the Cabinet of St Petersburg, that if Russia should decline to restrict within purely diplomatic limits the discussion in which she has for some time past been engaged with the Sublime Porte, and does not, by return of the messenger who is the bearer of my present letter, announce her intention of causing the Russian troops under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff to commence their march with a view to recross the Pruth, so that the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia shall be completely evacuated on the 30th April next, the British
Government must consider the refusal or the silence of the Cabinet of St Petersburg as equivalent to a declaration of war, and will take its measures accordingly.

The messenger who is the bearer of this letter to your Excellency is directed not to wait more than six days at St Petersburg for your reply; and I earnestly trust that he may convey to me an announcement on the part of the Russian Government that by the 30th of April next the Principalities will cease to be occupied by Russian forces.

—I have, &c.,

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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NOTE III.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LORD RAGLAN AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE SUBJECT OF 'ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY TURKS IN BULGARIA.' *

LORD RAGLAN to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

[From Varna], 8th August 1854.

My Lord Duke,—The way in which the Christian population is treated by the Turks in Bulgaria has come so prominently under the notice of Her Majesty's officers since the army has been stationed in this neighbourhood, that I think it my duty to bring the subject under the official notice of your Grace; and with this view, I beg to lay before you copies of three despatches which I have found it necessary to write to the Ambassador: the two

* This heading looks as if it belonged to the present day—January 1877—or to the summer or autumn of last year; but it is couched in the exact words which were used by Colonel Steele (the Military Secretary) when he docketed and labelled the answer to the above despatch in the year 1854.
first, containing representations of atrocities committed in
the vicinity of his camp, by Lt.-General Sir De Lacy Evans,
and the last forwarding a letter from Lt.-General the Duke
of Cambridge, with a detailed Report from the Assist-
Adjutant-General of the 1st Division, Lt.-Col. Honble.
Alexander Gordon, who was directed by H.R.H. to ascer-
tain, with the assistance of an interpreter, how it arose
that the Bulgarian peasantry manifest such reluctance to
bring supplies to our camps.

The reason is now obvious. These unfortunate people
dare not appear there. They are liable to be robbed on
their return home, and to be ill-used as soon as it is known
that they are in possession of any money; and they are
fortunate if they are not carried off, and, if not ransomed
at the price demanded, murdered, as the accompanying
papers show to have been the case in more than one
instance.

Hence it is that the Christian inhabitants of the pro-
vince hail any change as preferable to the yoke under
which they are now being crushed; and it may be relied
upon, that so long as the Turks are allowed to load them-
selves with arms, and the Bulgarians are not permitted to
carry any, the existence of the latter will be, to use the
language of Colonel Gordon, little better than that of
slaves.

The treatment of these poor creatures has excited a most
painful impression in the army under my command.

The Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan.

(Private.)

Osborne, 22d August 1854.

My dear Lord Raglan,—Amongst your official de-
spatches received yesterday, there is only one, I think,
which requires any particular answer. I allude to your
despatch of the 8th August, complaining of the infamous treatment of the Christian population of Bulgaria by the Turks. I quite agree with you that we cannot permit such atrocities to be committed under the eyes of the troops we have sent to protect the perpetrators from foreign aggression, and that we must resort not merely to strenuous remonstrance, but to something stronger, if necessary. Either the Turks should be disarmed, or the Christians permitted equally with them to bear arms. Individual acts of atrocity must be expected in time of war in any country; but equality of laws and the right of self-defence may be conceded by a Government, however unable to repress outrage by its own arm. I will write to Lord Clarendon with the view to a formal application to the Porte through Lord Stratford, and you shall have a copy next mail.

NOTE IV.


When a man has been set to sleep by a document, he commonly imagines that he was awake all the time, and that he 'heard every word.' A firm impression of that sort is one of the known phenomena of sleep in a chair; and it is obvious, therefore, that any of those who slept the sleep of which I have spoken may honestly contradict the statement in the text without, however, being entitled to expect that their contradiction will have any weight. But though the accuracy of the statement will be denied—and denied in perfect good faith—by those who slept, it will not, I am sure, be questioned by any of those who remained awake. Of course the deliberations of a Cabinet ought to be kept
secret; but sleep is not deliberation, and there is no rule nor principle which precludes a Minister from describing any natural phenomenon which he may have observed at a Cabinet meeting.

I own that, to me, the assenting disposition of those who remained awake (for they were anxious, careful, laborious men) is harder to account for than the condition of those who were in a complete state of rest; and I incline to the solution which I have spoken of as likely to be offered by the analytical chemist, because his theory (that of a narcotic substance having been taken by some mischance) would account for a torpor which affected all more or less, though in different ways and in different degrees.

That I am right in the view I take as to the inexorable stringency of the Despatch, is shown, I think, clearly enough by the effect which it instantly had upon the minds of the two men who first saw it when it reached the camp—namely, Lord Raglan and Sir George Brown. Lord Raglan's letter of the 19th of July (p. 277) shows clearly that he submitted to act with soldierly readiness under instructions which he looked upon as imperative, or, at all events, violently cogent; and Sir George Brown gives his interpretation of the Despatch (p. 271) with a bluntness which precludes all doubt about the light in which he regarded it. The Government, he considered, were resolved that, at all hazards, the expedition should proceed; and if Lord Raglan should not consent to lead it, he thought they would instantly send out some one else who would.

It may be said that this sleep of the Cabinet is one of those things which, however true they may be, it is better not to disclose. Certainly no one is obliged to go and state a thing thoughtlessly, or without a purpose, merely because it happened. But I have to account for a great transaction—the invasion of a Russian province. I ascertain that this invasion was caused, and caused entirely, by
the peculiar wording of a despatch. But why was it that a despatch so worded received the approval or the tacit assent of a Cabinet? It would be unfaithful for me to stop short at that point in the chain of causation unless I were brought to a stop by the want of knowledge, or by the want of a right to disclose what I know. It so happens, however, that neither of these excuses is available to me. I knew the truth, and I learnt it under circumstances which gave me a full right to disclose it.—End of Note to 1st Edition.

It is now, I believe, declared that, before the opening of the momentous Despatch, some long tiresome papers on other matters were read out to the Cabinet, and that the sound thus produced was the real narcotic.—Note to 4th Edition.

The Despatch of the 29th of June 1854 was no ordinary document. It directed the venturesome invasion of a Russian province in language evincing an unusually bold assumption of responsibility on the part of the Government, and besides, had the literary merit of being extremely well penned. The writer of such a State mandate might fairly expect that some one or more of his colleagues would be startled at the wording of a Despatch which went so far in the exercise of authority as to leave barely any discretion to the commander of our distant army; and on the other hand, it would have been natural for him to imagine beforehand that the mere composition of this historic paper, upon which great issues depended, must needs provoke a few words of praise from the men who were to have it read out to them. To expect a reception of that keenly critical, yet laudatory, kind, and to find instead that his words were sending the hearers to sleep—this might well disappoint any author; and accordingly, in describing the scene at Pembroke Lodge, the Duke of Newcastle used to speak in a way which showed, as I thought, that he had been personally vexed by the torpor of his colleagues.
Both the sleep of those who slept, and the dead acquiescence of those fewer members of the Cabinet who did not fall into a state of unconsciousness, may be partly, as I now think, accounted for, when one hears of the foregone conclusion at which they had arrived by mistake at the Cabinet of the previous day. Having there well weighed and adopted the proposal then submitted for approval, and having also, I believe, heard there read to them a draft of the Duke's private letter, they, some of them, if not all, imagined that they had already approved the substance of the instructions which were to be sent out to Lord Raglan, and accordingly took it for granted that the new, lengthy draft of Despatch which the Duke brought down to Pembroke Lodge was virtually a mere repetition (in expanded official form) of the private letter of the 28th—a paper read out to them for form's sake, but not seriously demanding a renewal of that anxious care and attention that they had bestowed upon the subject, in Cabinet, on the previous day. I have a letter before me from one who was a member of Lord Aberdeen's Government, and present at the Cabinet of the 27th in Downing Street, as well as at the Cabinet meeting of the following day at Pembroke Lodge, in which the writer insists upon the completeness of the deliberation on the first of those days as sufficiently accounting for the inattention of the members of the Cabinet on the day following, and for the actual sleep to which most of them yielded.

Of the soundness of the view thus insisted upon, all who handle this volume can judge. If they think that the Duke of Newcastle's private letter of the 28th (with the substitution of 'My Lord' for the words 'My dear 'Lord Raglan') would alone have sufficed to make Lord Raglan undertake the expedition against the dictates of his own judgment, they may consistently go on to say that the phenomenon of the sleeping Cabinet, however
curious or interesting to the collector of small trifling anecdotes, was not an event really fraught with any historic consequences. That conclusion, as is seen by the text, I have not myself reached; for it seemed, and still seems to me, that what really obtained Lord Raglan's assent to the behest of the Government was—not the bare intimation of its desire (which the private letter alone would no doubt have sufficed to convey), but—the pressure applied by those sentences—those stringent, elaborate sentences which abounded in the Official Despatch. In other words, I have judged that the almost irresistible cogency of the instructions sent out to Lord Raglan was not imparted to them by the mere decision of the Cabinet of the 27th, but by the wording or, as Frenchmen would say, the 'rédaction' of the Despatch of the 29th; and the conclusion of course is obvious, because the expediency of adopting that same cogent wording or 'rédaction' was the very question which lulled the Ministers assembled at Pembroke Lodge.

After all, as I have now come to learn, the phenomenon of a sleeping Cabinet is not one so entirely unheard of as many perhaps might suppose. The truth is, that at an anxious time, and when Parliament is sitting, our Ministers often tax their strength to the very verge of what is possible; and, when they strive to do yet more, nature puts her gentle veto on their attempted excesses, and makes them sleep the sleep of the weary instead of pressing on with their toils. There have been brought to my knowledge several instances of Cabinets endeavouring to deliberate in the later hours of the evening, and succumbing, as on the 28th of June 1854, to the narcotic effect of a voice reading out a lengthy document.—*Note to 6th Edition.*
NOTE V.*

Correspondence respecting the placing of the Buoy by the French in the night between the 13th and 14th of September.

First Letter

Captain Mends on the subject of the Buoy.

To the Editor of the 'Times.'

Sir,—May I ask the insertion in your columns of the following remarks?

As I have been referred to by many as to the truth of Mr. Kinglake's statement, in his 'Invasion of the Crimea,' that the landing of our army at Old Fort was materially delayed by the wilful misplacement of a buoy by the French, I feel called upon, in justice to the French naval service, to state the facts which came under my own observation; and here I desire to observe that, during two years of very close intercourse with that service, their whole conduct, so far from being such as to bring our harmony into grievous jeopardy, was that of chivalrous, loyal allies.

As I am the officer who, by the direction of Sir Edmund Lyons, planned the whole of the details connected with the embarkation, transfer, and landing of the army, it might suffice for me simply to say that I remember nothing about a buoy; that Mr. Bower, the master of the Agamemnon, who conned the ship under my orders, remembers nothing about a buoy; and that Captain Spratt (who then

* The publication of the above correspondence as an 'Addendum' to this second volume takes place with the assent of Captain Mends. For the purpose of indicating passages which seem to me to be among the most important in regard to the question of fact, I have taken the liberty of causing some portions of Captain Mends's letters to be printed in italics.
commanded the Spitfire, and, as the senior surveying officer, was usually entrusted with such delicate and important duties), remembers nothing about a buoy; but I will not take upon myself to state positively that there was no buoy in question, as it is not impossible that Sir Edmund Lyons may have entered upon a confidential agreement with the French Admiral that the duty of placing a buoy on the coast selected by the Allied Admirals and Generals during the final reconnaissance on the 10th should be kept in the hands of the French, to be laid by them during the night preceding the landing, in order to prevent so significant a mark of the designed locality becoming known to the enemy; but it is passing strange that Sir Edmund Lyons, in whose confidence I was, and who had entrusted the whole of the arrangements to me, should have given me no instructions relative to it, if he attached importance to it.

The Agamemnon, having weighed from Eupatoria at 1 A.M., accompanied by the Sanspareil, Triton, and Spitfire, and followed by all the transports, was the advance ship, by a long way, of the Allied flotilla. Sir Edmund Lyons, in his eager desire to be in the van, pushed on to the southward of the beach, behind which lay Lake Kamishli, the southernmost of the three lakes marked on the maps, until we arrived off the rocky headland lying between two shallow bays, within which lay the beaches, one having Lake Kamishli at the back of it (being that on which the British ultimately landed), the other and more southern beach (on which the French landed) having no lake behind it, and being circumscribed in its limits.

When off the Point, Sir Edmund Lyons, who was anxiously scanning the coast, desired me to stop the engines; while thus hove-to, with the ship's head brought round to the N.E., or inshore, the French Admiral, heading his fleet, came up, and passing close to us, hailed to say we were
too far to the southward; upon which a conversation ensued between Sir Edmund Lyons and the French Admiral from the poops of their respective ships until the onward movement of the French ship terminated it, whereupon a French naval officer came on board immediately with a message from his Admiral to Sir E. Lyons to say that we were too far to the southward, the Point off which we then were being the line of demarcation between the armies. During this short suspense I called the attention of Sir Edmund to the approach of the transports, and pointed out that they would fall into confusion if he did not quickly decide upon his anchorage, as the Spitfire and Triton, the two steamers told off to anchor as the points within which our flotilla had been instructed to bring up, were looking to the Agamemnon for position. Sir Edmund instantly gave me orders to steer back to the northward of the Point, and close in with the beach as near as possible. Meanwhile the Agamemnon’s boats had been hoisted out and the artillery rafts put together, so that on the moment of anchoring, which we did about half-past six, we were ready to commence the operation of landing, which Sir E. Lyons desired to do at once, but Sir George Brown, who was on board the Agamemnon, wished to await the decision of Lord Raglan, who was approaching on board the Caradoc. The French had by this time many men landed, for seeing no prospect of opposition they began to disembark as fast as their ships got to the anchorage. As soon as the Caradoc closed, Lord Raglan came on board the Agamemnon, and after a short consultation Sir Edmund Lyons desired me to make the signal to land, and we commenced immediately.* Thus it will be seen that the French were the

* A careful reader will observe that all the movements backwards and forwards, and the conferences here described, are exactly such as might have been expected to occur upon the supposition that Lord Raglan’s account, as given in the next page but one, is strictly accurate.
cause of no serious delay, as British transports had never even arrived at the Point, to the southward of which a buoy is said to have been placed. If the choosing of the beach was left in the hands of the French, they certainly gave us the advantage of position, our landing-place having the lake at the back, and being less circumscribed. Had it been decided to land both armies in the bay selected by the French, the space on the beach would not have sufficed for the work, and serious confusion would have ensued, while the anchorage would have been too limited for the assembling of so many vessels.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. R. MENDS, Captain, R.N.

United Service Club, Pall Mall,
March 18.

SECOND LETTER.

Mr Kinglake to Captain Mends.

12 St James's Place, April 4, 1863.

Sir,—I have the honour to enclose an extract from that part of Lord Raglan's private letter to the Secretary of War which relates to the affair of the buoy.

Since the appearance of your letter to the newspaper, you have probably received some communications on the subject; and if there be anything in those communications, or in the enclosed extract from Lord Raglan's letter, which is calculated to modify the impression under which you thought it your duty to come forward and question my statement, I feel certain that you will take the course which your own sense of fairness must dictate.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient humble servant.

(Signed) A. W. KINGLAKE.

Captain Mends, R.N., &c. &c. &c.
Enclosure accompanying Mr Kinglake's Letter.

INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.


Captain Mends having stated (in a letter which he thought proper to address to the Editor of a newspaper) that he remembers nothing about a buoy, it may be convenient for readers of the book which was the subject of Captain Mends's remarks to have before them the words in which Lord Raglan described the transaction.

Extract from Lord Raglan's Narrative of the Landing, addressed as a Private Communication to the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of War, and dated 'Camp above Old Fort Bay, September 18, 1854.'

'The disembarkation of both armies commenced on the morning of the 14th.

'It had been settled that the landing should be effected in Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed in the centre of it to mark the left of the French and the right of the English; but when the Agamemnon came upon the buoy at daylight, Sir Edmund Lyons found that the French naval officer had deposited it on the extreme northern end, and had thus engrossed the whole of the bay for the operation of his own army. This occasioned considerable confusion and delay, the English convoy having followed closely upon the steps of their leader, and got mixed with the French transports; but Sir Edmund Lyons wisely resolved to make the best of it, and at once ordered the troops to land in the bay next to the northward.'
THIRD LETTER.*

Captain Mends to Mr Kinglake.

BLOOMFIELD CRESCENT, HARROW ROAD, W.,
5th April, 1863.

Sir,—In reply to your communication of the 4th instant enclosing an extract from Lord Raglan's private letter to the Secretary of War, which relates to the affair of the 'buoy,' I have the honour to acquaint you that, since writing my letter to the 'Times' of the 18th ult., I have heard nothing which is calculated to modify the impression under which I wrote it; for though it would seem there was a buoy, and though I differ from Lord Raglan, whose memory I so highly respect, I aver that not the slightest inconvenience, confusion, nor delay, was occasioned to the disembarkation of the British by any act of the French. I never heard of the buoy until I saw your book; and I feel satisfied that were Sir Edmund Lyons alive, he would be one of the first to do justice to the chivalrous conduct of his colleague, Admiral Bruat, whose heart and soul were in the success of the undertaking, and whose example was cordially followed by every officer under his command; that in my opinion, wherever the buoy was placed, none but the most upright motives prompted the act, and the most sound practical reasons warranted the selection of the spot.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient humble servant.

(Signed) W. R. MENDS.


* It seems right to say that this copy has been carefully compared with the original, and found to be strictly correct. In the original, the words 'by any act of the French' are underscored.
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