HARRIS (James): Hermes or A Philosophical Inquiry concerning University Grammar. The Fifth Edition. London: Printed for F. Wingrave..., 1794. 8vo, pp. xix [xx adverts], 442 [443 - 458 Index], engraved frontispiece, contemporary sheepskin, gilt spine, green morocco label; title-page and frontispiece slightly water-stained, binding rubbed and wormed, spine dried, joints cracked. £60
HERMES
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BY IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

THE FIFTH EDITION.

LONDON:
Printed for F. WINGRAVE, Successor to
Mr. NOURSE, in the Strand.

M.DCC.XCIV.
To the Right Honourable

PHILIP LORD HARDWICKE,
Lord High Chancellor of Great-Britain *.

My Lord,

As no one has exercised
the Powers of Speech
with jufier and more universal
applaufe, than yourself; I
have presumed to inscribe the
following Treatife to your
Lordship, its End being to
investigate the Principles of
those Powers. It has a far-
ther claim to your Lord-
ship's Patronage, by being
connected in some degree with
that politer Literature, which,
in the moft important scenes

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended as real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should now be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory.
Dedication.

of Business, you have still found time to cultivate. With regard to myself, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leisure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordship, whether I consider you as a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to assure your Lordship, that with the greatest gratitude and respect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and most obedient humble Servant,

Cit of Salisbury,
Oct. 1, 1751.

James Harris.
THE chief End, proposed by the Author of this Treatise in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curiosity and inquiry; not to teach them himself by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if possible, to become Teachers to themselves, by an impartial use of their own understandings. He thinks nothing more absurd than the common notion of Instruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble the growth of Fruit; however external causes may in some degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of
the tree, that must ripen the juices to their just maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themselves into subjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his first and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named these, in distinction to others; because, as his studies were never prosecuted with the least regard to lucre, so they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are those, to whose perusal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate to confess,

Hoc juvat et melli est.—

For
For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has no desire to be thought indifferent, or insensible to honest Fame.

From the influence of these sentiments, he has endeavoured to treat his subject with as much order, correctness, and perspicuity as in his power; and if he has failed, he can safely say (according to the vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns those trite and contemptible methods of anticipating pardon for a bad performance, that "it was the hasty "fruits of a few idle hours; written "merely for private amusement; "never revised; published against "consent, at the importunity of "friends, copies (God knows how) "having by stealth gotten abroad;" with other stale jargon of equal falseness and inanity. May we not ask such Prefacers, If what they allege be
be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities.

As to the Book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title promises, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occasion to rise in its inquiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from small matters to the greatest. Nor is it formed merely upon sentiments that are now in fashion, or supported only by such authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little studied; and some perhaps, whose very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them survive in the Libraries of the learned, where some venerable Folio, that still goes by their name,
just suffices to give them a kind of nominal existence. The rest have long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of those subordinate Heroes, Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Noemenaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, should venture to bring his reader into such company as these last, among people (in the fashionable phrase) that nobody knows; what usage, what quarter can he have reason to expect? Should the Author of these speculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he best take in a circumstance so critical? — Let us suppose him to apologize in the best manner he can, and in consequence of this, to suggest as follows— He
PREFACE.

He hopes there will be found a pleasure in the contemplation of antient sentiments, as the view of antient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has something venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of novelty; so that here, as in other instances, Extremes may be said to meet. Farther still, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in distant countries; some in the full maturity of Grecian and Roman Literature; some in its declension; and others in periods still more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleasing speculation, to see how the same Reason has at all times prevailed; how there is one Truth, like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness both of Sophistry and Error.

x

Nothing
PREFACE.

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than these extensive views of Men, and human Knowledge; nothing can more effectually take us off from the foolish admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate both of present Men, and present Literature.

It is perhaps too much the case with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themselves, and their own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere of knowledge, they think nothing worth knowing. As we Britons by our situation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our case. And hence the reason, that our studies are usually satisfied in the works of our own Countrymen; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every kind of subject, whether serious or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we think per-
perfection with ourselves, and that it is superfluous to search farther.

The Author of this Treatise would by no means detract from the just honours due to those of his Countrymen, who either in the present, or preceding age, have so illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can with pleasure and sincerity join in celebrating their deserts, he would not have the admiration of these, or of any other few, to pass thro' blind excess into a contempt of all others. Were such Admiration to become universal, an odd event would follow; a few learned men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this last prejudice something
peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinsically valuable, than Mathematics. It is hard indeed to say to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts of Science. They are the noblest Praxis of Logic, or universal Reasoning. It is thro' them we may perceive, how the stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of Quantity. By marking the force of these Forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther still—by viewing the Mind, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know in part, what kind of Being it is; since Mind, like other Powers, can be
be only known from its Operations. Whoever therefore will study Mathematics in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert Logician, and by Logic a more rational Mathematician, but a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.

But when Mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if Logic pass into contempt, and if Mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single Species, a species wholly involved in Lines and Numbers only; they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all Reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every
every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.

And thus we see the use, nay the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatise, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taste of antient Literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to assert to Authors of every age their just portion of esteem; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a service.
service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his Work to survive, he has confessed already, it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern Wit are every day passing,

—in vicum vendentem thus et odores.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The Reader is desired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. he refers to Three Treatises published first in one Volume, Octavo, in the year 1745.
THE CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

Chapter I. Introduction. Design of the whole. page 1

Chap. II. Concerning the Analyzing of Speech into its smallest Parts. p. 9

Chap. III. Concerning the several Species of those smallest Parts. p. 23

Chap. IV. Concerning Substantives, properly so called. p. 37

Chap. V. Concerning Substantives of the Secondary Order. p. 63

Chap. VI. Concerning Attributives, and first concerning Verbs. p. 87

Chap. VII. Concerning Time and Tenses. p. 100

Chap. VIII. Concerning Modes. p. 140

Chap. IX. Concerning Verbs, as to their Species and other remaining Properties. p. 173
CONTENTS.

Chap. X. Concerning Participles and Adjectives. p. 184
Chap. XI. Concerning Attributives of the Secondary Order. p. 192

BOOK II.

Chapter I. Concerning Definitives. page 213
Chap. II. Concerning Connectives, and first those called Conjunctions. p. 237
Chap. III. Concerning those other Connectives, called Prepositions. p. 261
Chap. IV. Concerning Cases. p. 275
Chap. V. Concerning Interjeotions—Recapitulation—Conclusion. p. 289

BOOK III.

Chapter I. Introduction—Division of the Subject into its principal Parts. page 305
Chap. II. Upon the Matter or common Subject of Language. p. 316
CONTENTS.

Chap. III. Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.  p. 327

Chap. IV. Concerning general or universal Ideas.  p. 350

Chap. V. Subordination of Intelligence—Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations—Different Genius of different Languages—Character of the English—the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages—Superlative Excellence of the Last—Conclusion.  p. 403

ERRATA.

Page 80, Note, line 14, for υποταξικος, read υποταξικος.

328, l. 3 from the bottom, for ογγιατον, read ογγιατον.
Lately Published,

A NEW EDITION, IN FIVE VOLUMES OCTAVO,
PRICE 1l. 11s. 6d. BOUND,
WITH A HEAD OF THE AUTHOR BY BARTOLOZZI,
The WORKS of JAMES HARRIS, Esq.

CONTAINING,


Vol. II. HERMES; or, a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar.

Vol. III. PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, containing a variety of speculations, logical, physical, ethical, and metaphysical; derived from the principles of the Greek Philosophers, and illustrated by examples from the greatest Writers both ancient and modern.

Vol. IV. PHILOLOGICAL INQUIRIES: In Three and V. Parts. Containing,

I. The Rise and different Species of Criticism and Critics.

II. An Illustration of Critical Doctrines and Principles, as they appear in distinguished Authors, as well ancient as modern.

III. An Essay on the Taste and Literature of the middle Ages.

To which are added, four Appendixes.—First, An Account of the Arabic Manuscripts belonging to the Escorial Library in Spain. Second, Concerning the Manuscripts of Livy, in the same Library. Third, Concerning the Manuscripts of Cæcilius, in the Library of the King of France. Fourth, Some Account of Literature in Russia, and of its Progress towards being civilized.

* * Any of the above Volumes may be had separate, to complete Sets.
BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

Design of the Whole.

If Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to converse one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Discourse. Since Speech then is the joint Energie of our best and noblest Faculties (a), (that is to say, of our Reason.

(a) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume.
son and our social Affection) being withal our peculiar Ornament and Distinction, as Men; those Inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how Speech may be naturally resolved; or how, when resolved, it may be again combined.

Here a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold Speech, as divided into its constituent Parts, as a Statue may be divided into its several Limbs; or else, as resolved into its Matter and Form, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure.

These different Analysings or Resolutions constitute what we call (b) Philosophical, or Universal Grammar.

When

(b) Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica, &c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. And soon after he adds—Verumtamen hac ipsa re moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus Grammaticam quandam, quae non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba et res seive rationem sedulo inquirat.
When we have viewed Speech thus analyzed, we may then consider it, as compounded. And here in the first place we may contemplate that (c) Synthesis, which by combining simple Terms produces a Truth; then by combining two Truths produces a third; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of Science.

Now this is that superior and most excellent Synthesis, which alone applies itself to our Intellect or Reason, and which to }

\[ (c) \text{ Aristotle says—τὰν δὲ καλὰ μηδείματα συμ-} \]
\[ πλοῦτον λεγομένων ἥδιν ὑπὲ αληθὺς ὑπὲ ψευδός ἤσιν— \]
\[ σοῦν ἀνθρωπὸς, λευκὸς, πρόσκτη, νησῖ—Of those words which are spoken without Connection, there is no one either true or false; as for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatise De Interpretatione, τεῖ γὰρ σύνθεσιν ἥδις διάτρεσιν ἢς τὸ ψεύδος τὲ ἢς τὸ ἀλήθες. True and False are seen in Composition and Division. Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and so far therefore may be called synthetical. \]
HEMIES.

Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, constitutes the Art of Logic.

After this we may turn to those (d) inferior Compositions, which are productive

(d) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise Περὶ Ερμανείας, p. 53, gives the following Extract from Theophrastus, which is here inferred at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) elsewhere extant.

Διαφορά γὰρ ὅσος τῷ λόγῳ σχέσεως, (καθ’ αὐτοίς ἐνοχὸς Θείας) τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς ἥ σημαίνει τι, ἥ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ δὲν ὅ λόγων προτίθηται τῶς αἰρετικῶς, ἠφεῖ μὲν ἐν τὴν σχέ- σιν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ κατα- γήνοντας τοιαύτης κτ. ἰδιότητι, διότι ἔσχον αὐταῖς ἐκλει- ρεῖται τὰ σεμιώτερα τῶν ὁνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὲ τὰ κοινὰ ἦ δεδημαρκών, ἦ ταῦτα ἀνοριστικῶς συμπλέκειν ἀλ- λὰ καί, ὡς δὲ τῶν κτ. τῶν τῶν ἐπομένων, οἷον σαφειοικης, γλυκύτπης, τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεων, ἐτε μετα- χρονικώτης, κτ. Βραχυειχολογίας, καὶ κατὰ καιρὰν ποτὶ τῶν ἀναλαμβανομένων, οὕτω τοῖς ἀκροατῶν, ἦ εἰπλήξαι. Κτ. προς τὴν πείθω χειρωθείνα ἐχθειν τῆς δὴ γε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῷ λόγῳ σχέσεως ἧ φιλόσοφος ἐπιμελήσεια, τὸ, τῇ δὲ ἴδιλγχον,
Book the First.

ductive of the Pathetic, and the Pleasant in all their kinds. These latter Compositions

δ' το ἀληθείς ἀποδεξιών. The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the Hearers, to whom it explains something, and one to the Things, concerning which the Speaker proposeth to persuade his Hearers: With respect to the first Relation, that which regards the Hearers, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the business of these two, to select the most respectable Words, and not those that are common and of vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one with another, so as thro' these things and their consequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Brevity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to Things, here the Philosopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in demonstrating the True.

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same Subject. 

Segueit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia Sociabilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima est Grammatica, quae ob oratione falso-cismos & barbarismos expellit; secunda Dialectica, quae in Sermonis veritate versatur; tertia Rhetorica, quae ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit. Min. l. 1.
portions aspire not to the Intellect, but
being addressed to the Imagination, the
Affections, and the Sense, become from
their different heightnings either Rhetorici
or Poetry.

Nor need we necessarily view these
Arts distinctly and apart; we may ob-
serve, if we please, how perfectly they
co-incide. Grammar is equally requi-
site to every one of the rest. And though
Logic may indeed subsist without Rhetorici
or Poetry, yet so necessary to
these last is a sound and correct Logic,
that without it, they are no better than
warbling Trifles.

Now all these Inquiries (as we have
said already) and such others arising from
them as are of still sublimer Contempla-
tion, (of which in the Sequel there may
be possibly not a few) may with justice be
deemed Inquiries both interesting and
liberal.
At present we shall postpone the whole synthetical Part, (that is to say, Logic and Rhetoric), and confine ourselves to the analytical, that is to say, Universal Grammar. In this we shall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, first dividing Speech, as a Whole, into its constituent Parts; then resolving it, as a Composite, into its Matter and Form; two Methods of Analysis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations.

Should any one object, that in the course of our Inquiry we sometimes descend to things, which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which those things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Consequences, let him honour the Principles.

The following Story may not improperly be here inserted. "When the Fame
"of Heraclitus was celebrated throughout Greece, there were certain persons, that had a curiosity to see so great a Man. They came, and, as it happened, found him warming himself in a Kitchen. The meanness of the place occasioned them to stop; upon which the Philosopher thus accosted them—

"Enter (says he) boldly, for here too there are gods (e)."

We shall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Presence; so there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philosophical Inquiry.

(e) See Aristot, de Part. Animal. l. 1. c. 5.
CHAP. II.

Concerning the Analysing of Speech into its smallest Parts.

THOSE things which are first to Nature, are not first to Man. Nature begins from Causes, and thence descends to Effects. Human Perceptions first open upon Effects, and thence by slow degrees ascend to Causes. Often had Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to be the Moon's Interposition; much oftner had they seen those unceasing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cause to be the Earth's double Motion (a).

Even

(a) This Distinction of first to Man, and first to Nature, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. See Arist. Phys. Auseult. l. i. c. 1. Themistius's Comment on the same, Postcr. Analyt. l. i. c. 2. De Anima, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Distinction between
Even in Matters of Art and human Creation, if we except a few Artists and critical

between Intelligence Divine and Intelligence Human.

God may be said to view the First, as first; and the Last, as last; that is, he views Effects thro’ Causes in their natural Order. Man views the Last, as first; and the First, as last; that is, he views Causes thro’ Effects, in an inverse Order. And hence the Meaning of that Passage in Aristotle: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὁμοιαὶ πρὸς τὸ φεγγὸν ἢχει τὸ μεθ’ ḥμέραν, έτώ κύ τις ὁμετέρας ψυχῆς οὐδὲς πρὸς τὰ τῆς φύσει φανερώτατα πάνων. As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, so is Man’s Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all Things. Metaph. 1. 2. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. 1. 1. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise—'Ἀγαπητῶν τῇ άνθρωπῑνῃ φύσει, ἐν τῶν άτελεστῶν ἥ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ άτελεστα ἡ τελειότερα προέιναι τὰ γὰρ συνθέτα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, ἡ γνωριμώτερα. "Οὔτω γένει ἡ ὁ πάϊς εἴραι μὲν λόγων, ἡ ἐπεισι, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, οἶδεν τότεν δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, ἡ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβᾶσι, νὰκεῖν εἰς σοιχεῖα, ὀχιτί. Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more simple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates walketh;
tical Observers, the rest look no higher than to the Practice and mere Work, knowing nothing of those Principles, on which the whole depends.

Thus in Speech for example—All men, even the lowest, can speak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of those, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which respects the Genius of their own Language? How few then must be those, who know Grammar universal; that Grammar, which without regarding the several Idioms of particular Languages, only respects those Principles, that are essential to them all?

'Tis our present Design to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we shall walketh; but how to resolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.
shall follow the Order consonant to human Perception, as being for that reason the more easy to be understood.

We shall begin therefore first from a Period or Sentence, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all; and thence pass, if possible, to those its primary Parts, which, however essential, are only obvious to a few.

With respect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there so ignorant, as if we address him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we assert, and when we question; when 'tis we command, and when we pray or wish?

For example, when we read in Shakespeare*,

The Man, that hath no music in himself,  
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,  
Is fit for Treasons—

* Merchant of Venice.
Or in Milton*,

_O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet,
Haftling this way—_
'tis obvious that these are _assertive Sentences_, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Sensation.

_When_ the Witch in _Macbeth_ says to her Companions,

_When shall we three meet again_
_In thunder, lightning, and in rain?_
this 'tis evident is an _interrogative Sentence._

_When Macbeth_ says to the Ghost of _Banquo_,

——_Hence, horrible Shadow,_
_Unreal Mock'ry hence!_——
he speaks an _imperative Sentence_, founded upon the passion of hatred.

_When_

* P. L. IV. 866.
When Milton says in the character of his Allegro,

Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee jest and youthful folly,

he too speaks an imperative Sentence, tho' founded on the passion, not of hatred but of love.

When in the beginning of the Paradise Lost we read the following address,

And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer Before all temples th' upright heart, and pure,

Instruct me, for thou know'st—

this is not to be called an imperative Sentence, tho' perhaps it bear the same Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 'tis a Sentence precative or optative.

What then shall we say? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceasing, all differing from each other in
their stamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite Classes? If not, they can be no objects of rational comprehension.—Let us however try.

'Tis a phrase often applied to a man, when speaking, that he speaks his mind; as much as to say, that his Speech or Discourse is a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his Soul. So it indeed is in every one that speaks, excepting alone the Dissembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as possible, affects the appearance.

Now the Powers of the soul (over and above the meer † nutritive) may be included all of them in those of Perception, and those of Volition. By the Powers of Perception, I mean the Senses and the Intellect; by the Powers of Volition, I mean, in an extended sense, not only the Will, but the several Passions and Appetites; in short, all that moves to Action, whether rational or irrational.

† Vid. Aristotle. de An. II. 4.
If then the leading Powers of the Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, must of course respect one or other of these.

If we assert, then is it a Sentence which respects the Powers of Perception. For what indeed is to assert, if we consider the examples above alleged, but to publish some Perception either of the Senses or the Intellect?

Again, if we interrogate, if we command, if we pray, or if we wish, (which in terms of Art is to speak Sentences interrogative, imperative, precative, or optative) what do we but publish so many different Volitions?—For who is it that questions? He that has a Desire to be informed.—Who is it that commands? He that has a Will, which he would have obey'd.—What are those Beings, who either wish or pray? Those, who feel certain
certain wants either for themselves, or others.

If then the Soul's leading Powers be the two above mentioned, and it be true that all Speech is a publication of these Powers, it will follow that every Sentence will be either a Sentence of Assertion, or a Sentence of Vocation. And thus, by referring all of them to one of these two classes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (b).

THE

(b) 'Ρητέον ἕν ὦτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διτλάς ἐκάστης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωσικάς, τὰς δὲ ζωικὰς, τὰς ἃ ὀρεκλικὰς λεγομένας' (λέγω δὲ γνωσικὰς μὲν, καθ’ ἄς γινόμενα ἐκατ’ τῶν ὑμῶν, οίον ὑπ’, δια- νοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν ὃ ἀνθρώπου ὀρεκλικὰς ἐι, καθ’ ἄς ὀργαμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὑμῶν, ἢ τῶν δοκήντων, οίον βάλλοιν λέγω, ἡροισμίν, θυμὸν, ἢ ἐπι- θυμίαν) τὰ MEN τίτλαρα εἶδη τῷ λόγῳ (τὰ χαρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικόν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρεκλικῶν δυνάμεων προερχο- ται τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἄντις καθ’ ἄντι τῆν ἐνεργίας, ἀλλ’ ἡ δὲ ἐπειν ἀποτελειμένης (τὸν συμβάλλοντα δοκῶντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) ἢ ὢτοι λόγον ἑκ’ ἄλλη

C ζυτύσης
The Extensions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be seen if we compare the

...
the Eneid to an Epigram of Martial. But the longest Extension, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extension here considered, that is to say, a Sentence. The greater Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated.

Now a Sentence (c) may be sketch'd in the following description—a compound Quantity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tem, aut Interrogantem vocant; vel rem: sique rem, vel cum ipsam consequit, quicum loquitur, ut in op- tante oratione, vel aliquum ejus actionem: atque in hac, vel ut a praetantiore, ut in Deprecatione; vel ut ab in- feriore, ut in eo, qui proprie Iulius nominatur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate proficiatitur: haeque nunciat verum cognitionem, quae in nobis est, aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Hae sola verum falsum- que capit: praeterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Δέγγο ἐί φωνὴ συνθέσθη σημαντικὴ, ἦς ἐνια μὲν ἔγει ἄντα σημαίνει τι. Aríst. Poet. c. 20. See also de Interpret. c. 4.
Quantity of Sound significant, of which certain Parts are themselves also significant.

Thus when I say [the Sun shineth] not only the whole quantity of sound has a meaning, but certain Parts also, such as [Sun] and [shineth.]

But what shall we say? Have these Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner significant, and so may the progress be pursued to infinite? Can we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to be divisible, and to include within itself other Meanings without end? If this be absurd, then must we necessarily admit, that there is such a thing as a Sound significant, of which no Part is of itself significant. And this is what we call the proper character of a (d) Word. For thus, though the Words

(d) ψωνὶ σημαντική, ἡς μίξῃ εἴδεν ἵπα καὶ αὐτῷ σημαντικών. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. Priscian's Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows
Words \([\text{Sun}]\) and \([\text{shineth}]\) have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other.

If therefore all Speech, whether in prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain Meaning, divisible into other Meanings, but Words imply a Meaning, which is not so divisible: it follows that Words will be the smallest parts of speech, in as much as nothing less has any Meaning at all.

follows—*Didio est pars minima orationis construetae, id est, in ordine composita. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem idee dictum est, nequise conuer vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in vi & res; non enim ad totum intelligendum haec sit divisio. To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.—\(\Lambda_{\xi}i\gamma\varepsilon\,\mu_{\epsilon}_{\zeta} \varepsilon\gamma\varepsilon\sigma\varepsilon\nu\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha\varepsilon\nu\) & \(\lambda\gamma\upsilon\alpha\).* Introd. Gram. 1. 4. Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word—See Cratylus, p. 385. Edit. Serr.*
Ch. II. To know therefore the species of Words, must needs contribute to the knowledge of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of its minutest Parts.

This therefore must become our next Inquiry.
Concerning the species of Words, the smallest Parts of Speech.

Let us first search for the Species of Words among those Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For example, in one of the passages above cited—

The Man, that hath no music in himself,
And is not mov'd with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons—

Here the Word [The] is an Article;—
[Man] [No] [Music] [Concord] [Sweet] [Sounds] [Fit] [Treasons] are all Nouns, some Substantive, and some Adjective—
[That] and [Himself] are Pronouns—
[Hath] and [is] are Verbs—[moved] a Participle — [Not] an Adverb—
[And] a Conjunction — [In] [with] and
and *[For]* are *Prepositions*. In one sentence we have all those Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latin* only differ in having no Article, and in separating the *Interjection*, as a Part of itself, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

**What** then shall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why so many? or if neither more nor fewer, why these and not others?

To resolve, if possible, these several Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and see what differences we can discover in its Parts. For example, the same Sentence above,

*The Man that hath* no *Music*, &c.

**One** Difference soon occurs, that some Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Hast*, *Had,*
Had, &c. *Sweet* into *Sweeter* and *Sweekest*; *Fit* into *Fitter* and *Fittest*. On the contrary, the Words *The*, *In*, *And*, and some others, remain as they are, and cannot be altered.

And yet it may be questioned, how far this Difference is essential. For in the first place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called necessary, because only some Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual* Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns, and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Case, and Number; whereas the *English* never vary them in any of those ways, but thro' all kinds of Concord preserve them still the same. Nay even those very Variations, which appear most necessary, may have their places supplied by other methods; some by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti*, or *Bruto*, we say, of *Brutus*, to *Brutus*;
Brutus; some by mere Position, as when for Brutum amavit Cassius, we say, Cassius lov'd Brutus. For here the Accusative, which in Latin is known anywhere from its Variation, is in English only known from its Position or place.

If then the Distinction of Variable and Invariable will not answer our purpose, let us look farther for some other more essential.

Suppose then we should dissolve the Sentence above cited, and view its several Parts as they stand separate and detached. Some 'tis plain still preserve a Meaning (such as Man, Music, Sweet, &c.) others on the contrary immediately lose it (such as, And, The, With, &c.) Not that these last have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when in company, or associated.

Now it should seem that this Distinction, if any, was essential. For all Words
Words are significant, or else they would not be Words; and if every thing not absolute, is of course relative, then will all Words be significant either absolutely or relatively.

With respect therefore to this Distinction, the first sort of Words may be call'd significant by themselves; the latter may be call'd significant by relation; or if we like it better, the first sort may be call'd Principals, the latter Accessories. The first are like those stones in the basis of an Arch, which are able to support themselves, even when the Arch is destroyed; the latter are like those stones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer stand, than while the whole subsists (e).

§ This

(e) Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest Authors that ever wrote on the subject of Grammar) illustrates the different power of Words, by the different power of Letters. "Ετι, ὅν τρότου τῶν σωκέων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαινήσεως, ὕπ' ἑαυτὸς ἔστω ἑαυτῷ φαινὴν ἀποτελεῖ."
§ This Distinction being admitted, we thus pursue our Speculations. All things what-

In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters, some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no express Vocality; so likewise may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for these parts of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only significant, when associated to something else. Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. 1. c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen & verbum Solas esse partes Orationis; cetera vero, Administracula & juncturas carum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae & trabes, cetera autem (id est, cera, flappa, & clavi & similia) vincula & conglutinationes;
whatever either exist as the Energies, or Affections, of some other thing, or without being the Energies or Affections of some other thing. If they exist as the Energies or Affections of something else, then are they called Attributes. Thus to think is the attribute of a Man; to be white, of a Swan; to fly, of an Eagle; to be four-footed, of a Horse. If they exist not after this manner, then are they call'd Substances*. Thus Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are none of them Attributes, but all Substances, because however they may exist in Time and Place, yet neither of these, nor of any thing else, do they exist as Energies or Affections.

And thus all things whatsoever, being either (f) Substances or Attributes, it follows of course that all Words, which are significant as Principals, must needs be significant of either the one or the other. If they are significant of Substances, they are call’d Substantives; if of Attributes, they are call’d Attributives. So that all Words whatever, significant as Principals, are either Substantives or Attributives.

Again, as to Words, which are only significant as Accessories, they acquire a Signification either from being associated to one Word, or else to many. If to one Word alone, then as they can do no more than in some manner define or determine, they may justly for that reason be called

---

(f) This division of things into Substance and Attribute seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects and Ages. See Categor. c. 2. Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. De Coelo, L. III. c. 1.
Book the First.

Definitives. If to many Words at once, then as they serve to no other purpose than to connect, they are called for that reason by the name of Connectives.

And thus it is that all Words whatever are either Principals or Accessories; or under other Names, either significant from themselves, or significant by relation. —If significant from themselves, they are either Substantives or Attributives; if significant by relation, they are either Definitives or Connectives. So that under one of these four Species, Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives, are all Words, however different, in a manner included.

If any of these Names seem new and unusual, we may introduce others more usual, by calling the Substantives, Nouns; the Attributives, Verbs; the Definitives, Arti-
Shou'd it be ask'd, what then becomes of Pronouns, Adverbs, Prepositions, and Interjections; the answer is, either they must be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or else must be admitted for so many Species by themselves.

§ There were various opinions in ancient days, as to the number of these Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * Sophist mentions only two, the Noun and the Verb. Aristotle mentions no more, where he treats of † Prepositions. Not that those acute Philosophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they spoke with reference to Logic or Dia-

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3,
Book the First.

Dialectic (g), considering the Essence of Speech as contained in these two, because these alone combined make a perfect affirmative Sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect. Hence therefore Aristotle in his * treatise of Poetry (where he was to lay down the elements

(g) Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duae, Nomen & Verbum; quia hoc felix etiam per se conjuncta plenam faciunt orationem; alias autem partes συναθαγωγήματα, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant: Priscian. I. 2. p. 574. Edit. Puthchi. Exisit hic quaedam quæstio, cur duo tantum, Nomen & Verbum, se (Aristoteles se.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc libro difficulsi, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat trahere, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, quae sic sit huicmodi est, ut junétis tantum Verbis et Nominibus conponatur. — Quare superfluum est quaerere, cur alias quoque, quee videtur orationis partes, non propositurit, qui non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicioris orationis insituit elementa partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius from the above principles elegantly calls the Noun and Verb, τὰ ἰδιωκτάτα μὲν τὲ λόγοι, the most animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi, l. i. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quer. Platon. p. 1009.

* Poet. Cap. 20.
mens of a more variegated speech) adds the Article and Conjunction to the Noun and Verb, and so adopts the same Parts, with those established in this Treatise. To Aristotle's authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder Stoics (b).

The latter Stoics instead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the Appellative and Proper. Others increased the number, by detaching the Pronoun from the Noun; the Participle and Adverb from the Verb; and the Preposition from the Conjunction. The Latin Grammarians went farther, and detached the Interjection from the Adverb, within which by the Greeks it was always included, as a Species.

(b) For this we have the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Struél. Orat. Sec. 2. whom Quintilian follows, Inst. I. I. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Priscian make them always to have admitted five Parts. See Priscian, as before, and Laertius, Lib. VII. Segm. 57.
We are told indeed by (i) Dionysius of Ch. III. Halicarnassius and Quintilian, that Aristotle, with Theodectes, and the more early writers, held but three Parts of speech, the Noun, the Verb, and the Conjunction. This, it must be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whose Grammars (we are (k) told) admit no other. But as to Aristotle, we have his own authority to assert the contrary, who not only enumerates the four Species which we have adopted, but ascertains them each by a proper Definition *.

(i) See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(k) Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. Eftque hac Arabum quoque sententia—Hebraei quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam scribere definerent, artem eam demum scribere coeperunt, quod ante annos contigit circit ter quadreringentos) Hebraei, inquam, hac in re securi sunt magistros suos Arabes.—Immo vero trium classium numerum aliae etiam Orientalis linguae retinent. Dubium, utrum ea in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Graecorum, an hi potius securi sunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut est, etiam veteres Graeces tres tantum partes agnoscerone, non solum autem est Dionysius, \textit{&c.} Volf. de Analog. l. 1. c. 1. See also \textit{Sanctii Minerv.} l. 1. c. 2.

* Sup. p. 34.
Ch. III. — To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the Noun, the Verb, the Article, and the Conjunction; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call Substantives, Attributives, Definitives, and Connectives.
Concerning Substantives, properly so called.

Substantives are all those principal Words, which are significant of Substances, considered as Substances.

The first sort of Substances are the natural, such as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

There are other Substances of our own making. Thus by giving a Figure not natural to natural Materials, we create such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, Telescope, &c.

Again, by a more refined operation of our Mind alone, we abstract any Attribute from its necessary subject, and consider it apart, devoid of its dependence. For example,
example, from Body we abstract to Fly; from Surface, the being White; from Soul, the being Temperate.

And thus it is we convert even Attributes into Substances, denoting them on this occasion by proper Substantives, such as Flight, Whiteness, Temperance; or else by others more general, such as Motion, Colour, Virtue. These we call abstract Substances; the second sort we call Artifical.

Now all those several Substances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in natural Substances, Animal is a Genus; Man, a Species; Alexander, an Individual. In artificial Substances, Edifice is a Genus; Palace, a Species; the Vatican, an Individual. In abstract Substances, Motion is a Genus; Flight, a Species; this Flight or that Flight are Individuals.
As therefore every (a) Genus may be found whole and entire in each one of its Species; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, are each of them distinctly a complete and entire Animal) and as every Species may be found whole and entire in each one of its Individuals; (for thus Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them completely and distinctly a Man) hence it is, that every Genus, tho' One, is multiplied into Many; and every Species, tho' One, is also multiplied into Many, by reference to those beings, which are their proper subordinates. Since then no individual has any such subordinates, it can never in strictness be considered as Many, and so is truly an Individual as well in Nature as in Name.

(a) This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of μίαν ίδιαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου κειμένω χαρίς, ἡ διατεταμίευς—καὶ πολλὰς, ἵπτες ἄλληλων, ὅπο μὴν ἐξόδον περιπερικένας. Soph. p. 253. Edit. Serrani. For the common definition of Genus and Species, see the Isagoge or Introduction of Porphyry to Aristotle's Logic.
Ch. IV. From these Principles it is, that *Words* following the nature and genius of *Things*, such *Substantives* admit of *Number* as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while those, which denote (b) *Individuals*, in strictness admit it not.

**Besides**

(b) Yet sometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the caufes following. In the first place the *Individuals* of the human race are so large a multitude, even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new *Name* for every new-born *Individual*. Hence then instead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and *many* called *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the Romans had their Plurals, *Marcus* and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthonies*. Now the Plurals of this sort may be well called *accidental*, because it is merely by chance that the *Names* coincide.

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the *Ptolemies, Scipios, Catos*, or (to inftance in modern names) the *Howards, Pelhams, and Montagues*; because a *Race* or *Family* is like a smaller sort of *Species*; so that the *family Name* extends to the Kindred, as the specific *Name* extends to the *Individuals*.

A third caufe which contributed to make proper *Names* become *Plural*, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of some one *Individual*, whose *Name* became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all those,
Besides Number, another characteristic, visible in Substances, is that of Sex. Every Substance is either Male or Female; or both Male and Female; or neither one nor the other. So that with respect to Sexes and their Negation, all Substances conceivable are comprehended under this fourfold consideration.

Now the existence of Hermaphrodites being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language,

those, who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus every great Critic was call’d an Aristarchus; every great Warrior, an Alexander; every great Beauty, a Helen, &c.

A Daniel come to Judgment! yea a Daniel, cries Shylock in the Play, when he would express the wisdom of the young Lawyer.

So Martial in that well known verse,
Sint Mæcenates, non deerunt, Flacco, Marones.

So Lucilius,
AηΓΙΑΙΠΟΙ montes, ΑΕΘΝÆ onnes, asperi Athenes.

guage, only regarding those distinctions which are more obvious, considers Words denoting Substances to be either Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter *.

As to our own Species, and all those animal Species, which have reference to common Life, or of which the Male and the Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are eminently distinguished, most Languages have different Substantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to those animal Species, which either less frequently occur, or of which one Sex is less apparently distinguished from the other, in these a single Substantive commonly serves for both Sexes.

* After this manner they are distinguished by Aristotle. Τῶν ὀνοματικῶν τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα, τὰ δὲ Ἰάλεκα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ. Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras before him had established the same Distinction, calling them ἄρρενα, Ἰάλεκα, κύ σκίν. Aristotle Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called ἕδετερα, or Neuters, were by these called τὰ μεταξύ κύ σκίν.
† In the *English* Tongue it seems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is *Masculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Substance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Substance*; and that where the Substance *has no Sex*, the Substantive is always *Neuter*.

But 'tis not so in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern* Tongues. These all of them have Words, some masculine, some feminine (and those too in great multitudes) which have reference to Substances, where Sex never had existence. To give one instance for many. *MIND* is surely neither male, nor female; yet is *ΝΟΤΣ*, in *Greek*, masculine, and *MENTS*, in *Latin*, feminine.

† *Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non assignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars, &c.* Consent. apud Putsch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Passage from *Genera Hominum, qua naturalia sunt*, &c. is worth perusing.
In some Words these distinctions seem owing to nothing else, than to the mere casual structure of the Word itself: It is of such a Gender, from having such a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to such a Declension. In others we may imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, even in things without Sex, a distant analogy to that great natural Distinction, which (according to Milton) animates the World.†.

In this view we may conceive such Substantives to have been considered as Masculine, which were "conspicuous for the Attributes of imparting or "communicating; or which were by nature active, strong, and efficacious, and "that indiscriminately whether to good "or to ill; or which had claim to Emi- "nence, either laudable or otherwise."

† Mr. Linnaeus, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the Distinction of Sexes throughout the whole Vegetable World, and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method.
The Feminine on the contrary were such, as were conspicuous for the AttIBUTES either of receiving, of containing, or of producing and bringing forth; or which had more of the passive five in their nature, than of the active; or which were peculiarly beautiful and amiable; or which had respect to such Excesses, as were rather Feminine, than Masculine.

Upon these Principles the two greater Luminaries were considered, one as Masculine, the other as Feminine; the Sun (\textit{Sol}) as Masculine, from communicating Light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his Rays; the Moon (\textit{Luna}) as Feminine, from being the Receptacle only of another's Light, and from thinning with rays more delicate and soft.

\textit{Thus}
CH. IV.  

Thus Milton,

First in his East the glorious Lamp was seen,
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Involved with bright rays; jocund to run
His longitude thro' Heav'n's high road:
the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before him danc'd,
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the Moon
But opposite, in levell'd West was set,
His mirror, with full face borrowing her Light
From him; for other light she needed none.

P. L. VII. 370.

By Virgil they were considered as Brother and Sister, which still preserves the same distinction.

Nec Fratris radii obnoxia surgere Luna.
G. I. 396.

The Sky of Ether is in Greek and Latin Masculine, as being the source of those showers, which impregnate the Earth.
* The Earth on the contrary is universally Feminine, from being the grand Receiver, the grand Container, but above all from being the Mother (either mediately or immediately) of every sublunary Substance, whether animal or vegetable.

Thus Virgil,

_Tum Pater omnipotens secundis imbibris Æther Conjugis in gremium Lætæ descendit, & omnes Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fietus._

G. II. 325.

Thus Shakespeare,

---† Common Mother, Thou Whose Womb unmeasurable, and infinite Breast Teems and feeds all—Tim. of Athens.

So Milton,

_Whatever Earth, all-bearing Mother, yields._

P. L. V.

---

* Senecæ Nat. Quæst. III. 14.
Ch. IV. So Virgil,

Non jam mater alit Tellus, viresque ministrat (c).
Æn. Xl. 71.

Among artificial Substances the Ship (Ναυς, Navis) is feminine, as being so eminently a Receiver and Container of various things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, &c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their Vessel, say always, “she rides at anchor,” “she is under sail.”

A City (Πόλις, Civitas) and a Country, (Πατρίς, Patria) are feminine also, by being (like the Ship) Containers and Receivers, and farther by being as it were the Mothers and Nurses of their respective Inhabitants.

Thus

(c)—ὅδε η α' εν τῷ ἄλω τῇ ΘΗΣ ἡμῶν, ὡς ΘΗΑΤ κ' ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νεμίζωσιν’ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ ὡς ΗΑΙΟΝ, κ' ει τι τῶν άλλων τῶν τοιάτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ κ' ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορέωσι. Arist. de Gener. Anim. I. c. 2.
Thus Virgil,
Salve, magna PARENTS FRUGUM, Saturnia Tellus,
MAGNA VIRUM— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on those brave Greeks, who fell at Chæronæa,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἐχεῖ κόλποις τῶν πλείστων πα-μόντων
Σώματα—

Their parent Country in her bosom holds
Their wearied bodies.—*

So Milton,

The City, which Thou seest, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, Queen of the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the Ocean, tho' from its being the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the Container

* Demost. in Orat. de Coronâ.
OBJECTS of so many Vegetables and Animals, it might justly have been made (like the Earth) Feminine; yet its deep Voice and boisterous Nature have, in spight of these reasons, prevailed to make it Male. Indeed the very sound of Homer's

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with female delicacy and softness.

**Time (Χρόνος)** from his mighty Efficacy upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks and English justly considered as Masculine. Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man,

* 'Ο γὰρ Χρόνος μ' ἐκαμψι, τέκτων ἡ σοφία, Ἄπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενοι ἀσθενεσθένα τ.*

"Me Time hath bent, that sorry Arti, he That surely makes, whate'er he handles, worse."

---

* Ω Χρόνος, πωλοίων Σώλην πανεπίσκοπος Δαιμόν. **Græc. Anth. p. 290.**
† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.**
So too Shakespeare, speaking likewise of Ch. IV.

Orl. Whom doth he gallop withal?
Ros. With a thief to the gallows.

As you like it.

The Greek θάνατος or Aιθός, and the English Death, seem from the same irresistible Power to have been considered as Masculine. Even the Vulgar with us are so accustomed to this notion, that a Female Death they would treat as ridiculous (d).

Take a few examples of the masculine Death.

(d) Well therefore did Milton in his Paradise Lost not only adopt Death as a Person, but consider him as Masculine: in which he was so far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not supported by Custom, that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of national Opinion for his Masculine Death, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.
Callimachus upon the Elegies of his Friend Heraclitus—

"Ας δὲ τειχ ζύγων αἵδονες, ὧσιν ὁ πάντων
"Ἀρπαντήρ Ἀϊδῆς ἐν ἑπὶ χείρα βαλεῖ.

——yet thy sweet warbling strains
Still live immortal, nor on them shall Death
His hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all.

In the Alcestis of Euripides, Θάνατος or Death is one of the Persons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between Him and Apollo; and towards its end, there is a fight between Him and Hercules, in which Hercules is conqueror, and rescues Alcestis from his hands.

It is well known too, that Sleep and Death are made Brothers by Homer. It was to this old Gorgias elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend asked him, "How he did?"——

"Sle..."
"Sleep (replied the old Man) is just Ch.IV.
upon delivering me over to the care of
his Brother (e)."

Thus Shakespeare, speaking of Life,
—merely Thou art Death's Fool;
For him Thou labour'st by thy flight to
shun,
And yet run'st towards him still.
Meal, for Meal.

So Milton,
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans;
Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant Death his
dart
Shook; but delay'd to strike——
P. L. XI. 489 (f).

(c) "Ἡν με Ο ΤΠΝΟΣ ἰδεχεται παρακατατι-
(f) Suppose in any one of these examples we in-
troduce a female Death; suppose we read,
Ch. IV. The supreme Being (God, Theos, Deus, Dieu, &c.) is in all languages Masculine, in as much as the masculine Sex is the superior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with such words as To Πνευμα, To Θεόν, Numen, Deity (which last we English join to a neuter, saying Deity itself) sometimes I say we meet with these Neuters. The reason in these instances seems to be, that as God is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expressed by a Negation, than by any of those Distinctions which are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as Male for example is

And over them triumphant Death her dart
Shook, &c.

What a falling off! How are the nerves and strength of the whole Sentiment weakened!
Book the First.

is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Ch. IV. Left, &c. &c. (g).

Virtue (Ἀρετή, Virtus) as well as most of its Species, are all Feminine, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the most reprobate and corrupt.

E 4 — abashed

(g) Thus Ammonius, speaking on the same Subject—

Ch. IV. — abash'd the Devil stood,
And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw
Virtue in her shape how lovely; saw,
and pin'd
His loss — —

P. L. IV. 846.

This being allowed, Vice (Kakia) becomes Feminine of course, as being, in the συσυνία, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Opposite (b).

The Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of Fortune would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make a very

(b) They are both represented as Females by Xenophon, in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. See Memorab. L. II. c. 1. As to the συσυνία here mentioned, thus Varro — Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem. De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See also Arist Metaph. L. I. c. 5. and Ecclesiasticus, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.
very natural *Female*, which has no small resemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, and shifting her favours, as different Beaus succeed to her good graces.

*Transmutat incertos honores,*
*Nunc mibi, nunc alii benigna.* Hor.

**Why the Furies were made Female,** is not so easy to explain, unless it be that female Passions of all kinds were considered as susceptible of greater excess, than male Passions; and that the *Furies* were to be represented, as Things superlatively outrageous.

*Talibus Aleclo disitis exarrit in iras.*
*At juveni cranti subitus tremor occupat artus :*
*Diriguere oculi : tot Erinmys fibilat Hydris,*
*Tantaque se facies aperit : tum flammea torquens*

*Lumina*
Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere plura
Repulit, & geminos crexit crinibus angues,
Verberaque insennuit, rabidoque hæc addidit ore:
En! Ego vita situ, &c.
Æn. VII. 455 (i).

(i) The Words above mentioned, Time, Death, Fortune, Virtue, &c. in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquired, except in a few instances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say η' αήση or ι' αήση, hæc Virtus or hie Virtus, la Vertu or le Vertu, and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in English. We in our own language say, Virtue is its own Reward, or Virtue is her own Reward; Time maintains its wonted Pace, or Time maintains his wonted Pace.

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction between the severe or Logical Stile, and the ornamental or Rhetorical. For thus when we speak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,
He, that would see more on this Subject, may consult Ammonius the Peripatetic,

Sex, as Neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes a logical inquiry. When we give them Sex, by making them Masculine or Feminine, they are from henceforth personified; are a kind of intelligent Beings, and become, as such, the proper ornaments either of Rhetoric or of Poetry.

Thus Milton,

—The Thunder,

Wing’d with red lightning and impetuous rage,

Perhaps hath spent his shafts—— P. Loft. I. 174.

The Poet, having just before called the Hail, and Thunder, God’s Ministers of Vengeance, and so personified them, had he afterwards said its Shafts for his Shafts, would have destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much nearer to Prose.

The following Passage is from the same Poem.

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again

His red right hand—— P. L. II. 174.

In this Place His Hand is clearly preferable either to Her’s or It’s, by immediately referring us to God himself, the Avenger.
tic, in his Commentary on the Treatise de Interpretatione, where the Subject is treated at large with respect to the Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, that as all such Speculations are at best but Conjectures, they should therefore be received.

I shall only give one instance more, and quit this Subject.

At his command th’ up-rooted Hills retir’d
Each to his place: they heard his voice and went
Obsequious: Heav’n his wonted face renew’d,
And with fresh floreets Hill and Valley smil’d.

P. L. VI.

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book.

Here all things are personified; the Hills hear, the Valleys smile, and the Face of Heaven is renewed. Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws of his Language to have said—Each Hill retir’d to its Place—Heaven renew’d its wonted face—how prolix and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the Prosopopeia, which he was aiming to establish! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity; and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be wished, his Correctors had been as wise on their parts.
ed with candour, rather than scrutinized with rigour. Varro's words on a Subject near akin, are for their aptness and elegance well worth attending. Non mediocres enim tenebres in sile, ubi haec captanda; neque eò, quò pervenire volumus, fœmitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitteribus quædam objecia, quæ cunctum retinere possunt *

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been said, that both Number and Gender appertain to Words, because in the first place they appertain to Things; that is to say, because Substances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Substantives have Number, and are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter. There is however this difference between the two Attributes: Number in strictness descends no lower, than to

* De Ling. La. L. IV.
Ch.IV. to the last Rank of Species (k): Gender on the contrary stops not here, but descends to every Individual, however diversified. And so much for Substantives, properly so called.

(k) The reason why Number goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to Individuals; the cause of which see before, p. 39.
Conceming Substantives of the Secondary Order.

We are now to proceed to a Secondary Race of Substantives, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whose Nature may be explained in the following manner.

Every Object which presents itself to the Senses or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is recognized as having been perceived before. In the former case it is called an Object τὴς πρώτης γνώσεως, of the first knowledge or acquaintance (a); in the latter

(a) See Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus Priscian—Intereft autem inter demonstrationem & relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, Primam Cognitionem ostendit; Quis
Now as all Conversation passes between Particulars or Individuals, these will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, that is to say, till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to be done? How shall the Speaker address the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himself by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient upon this occasion seems to have been Δείξε, that is, Pointing, or Indication by the Finger or Hand, some traces of which are still to be observed, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our speaking. But the Authors of Language

Language were not content with this. They invented a race of Words to supply this Pointing; which Words, as they always stood for Substantives or Nouns, were characterized by the Name of Ἀνώνυμοι, or Pronouns (b). These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling them Pronouns of the First, the Second, and the Third Person, with a view to certain distinctions, which may be explained as follows.

Suppose the Parties conversing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either side known, and

(b) Ἐκεῖον ἐν Ἀνώνυμοι, το μετὰ ἈΞΗΣΧΟΣ ἀναφερᾶ, ἈΝΤΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly destined to the expression of Individuals, that he does not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and still is their true and natural use. PRONOMEN est pars orationis, quae pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipitur. Prisc. L. XII. See also Apoll. L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.
HERMES.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be the Speaker himself. Here, to supply the place of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, they furnished the Speaker with the Pronoun, I. I write, I say, I desire, &c. and as the Speaker is always principal with respect to his own discourse, this they called for that reason the Pronoun of the First Person.

AGAIN, suppose the Subject of the Conversation to be the Party addressed. Here for similar reasons they invented the Pronoun, Thou. Thou writest, Thou wast, &c. and as the Party addressed is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes next with reference to the discourse; this Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun of the Second Person.

LASTLY, suppose the Subject of Conversation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addressed, but some Third Object, different from both. Here they provided another Pronoun. He, She, or It, which
Book the First.

In distinction to the two former was called the Pronoun of the Third Person.

And thus it was that Pronouns came to be distinguished by their respective Persons (c).

As

(c) The Description of the different Persons here given is taken from Priscian, who took it from Apollo-nius. Personae Pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. Prima est, cum ipsa, quae loquitur, de se pronuntiat; Secunda, cum de ea pronunciata, ad quam directo termone loquitur; Tertia, cum de ea, quae nec loquitur, nec ad se directum accipit Sermonem. L. XIII. p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the same Distinctions. Πρώτον (προσωπον sc.) ὑ πρῶτον εαυτῷ φαζέω τὸ λέγων ἔλεγεν, ὑ πρῶτον τῷ, ὑ πρῶτον ὑν τὸ λέγει τοσον, ὑ πρῶτον ἠπόκεν. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.

This account of Persons is far preferable to the common one, which makes the First the Speaker; the Second, the Party addressed; and the Third, the Subject. For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, one the Speaker, the other the Party addressed; yet till they become subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again as to the Third Person's being the subject, this is a character, which it shares in common with
Ch. V. As to Number, the Pronoun of each Person has it: (I) has the plural (we), because

with both the other Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, *the second Person* immediately appears, because he makes *Dido*, whom he *addresses*, the immediate subject of his Discourse.

*Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem.*

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho’ the be all that time the party addrest) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Person*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the *First Person* may be seen everywhere, because the *Speaker* everywhere is himself the *Subject*. They were indeed Events, as he says himself,

—*quaeque ipse miserrima vidi,*

*Et quorum pars magna fui*—

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the course of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into
because there may be many Speakers at once of the same Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the Sentiment of many. (Thou) has the plural (you), because a Speech may be spoken to many, as well as to one. (He) has the plural (they), because the Subject of discourse is often many at once.

But tho' all these Pronouns have Number, it does not appear either in Greek, or Latin, or any modern Language, that those of the first and second Person carry the distinctions of Sex. The reason seems to

into Second Persons by being introduced as present. The real Second Person (Dido) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Euclid, we find neither First Person, nor Second, in any Part of the whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor Party address (in which light we may always view the Writer and his Reader) can possibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.
to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dress was commonly (d) apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third Person, of whose Character and Distinctions, (including Sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is that in most Languages the third Person has its Genders, and that even English (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (e) distinction of He, She, and It.

Hence


(e) *The Utility of this Distinction may be better* voicing it away. Suppose for example we in history these words—*He caused him*
Hence too we see the reason why a single Pronoun (§) to each Person, an I

[F 4]

to destroy him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something different, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whose Names were Alexander, Thais, and Persipolis. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its Genders, how would it appear, which was destroyed; which was the destroyer; and which the cause, that moved to the destruction? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when instead of the ambiguous Sentence, He caused him to destroy him, we are told with the proper distinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Instrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(f) Quæritur tamen cui prima quidem Persona & secunda singula Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero sex diversae indicent voces? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima quidem & secunda Persona idæ non agent diversis vocibus, quod semper præsentes inter se sunt, & demonstrativa; tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hic, Istæ; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933.
to the First, and a Thou to the Second, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of Speech. But it is not so with respect to the Third Person. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many Pronouns, such as He, This, That, Other, Any, Some, &c.

It must be confessed indeed, that all these Words do not always appear as Pronouns. When they stand by themselves, and represent some Noun, (as when we say, This is Virtue, or δειμτικητρος, Give me That) then are they Pronouns. But when they are associated to some Noun (as when we say, This Habit is Virtue; or δειμτικητρος, That Man defrauded me) then as they supply not the place of a Noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the Species of Definitives or Articles. That there is indeed
indeed a near relation between Pronouns and Articles, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which Class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this—The genuine Pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the Power of a Noun, and supplying its place—The genuine Article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a Noun for its support, as much as Attributives or (g) Adjectives.

As

(g) Τὸ 'Αφθον μεθ' ἐνόματι, καὶ ἡ Ἀφθονικὰ ἐν ἐνόματι. The Article stands with a Noun; but the Pronoun stands for a Noun. Apoll. L I. c. 3. p. 22. Αὖξ ἐν τῇ Ἀφθο, τῆς ψευδας τῇ ἐνόματι συναρτήσεως ἀποσάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτειχίσμων ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπτοι. Now Articles themselves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Again—Ὅταν τὸ 'Αφθον μὴ μετ' ἐνόματι παραλαμεῖνται, ποιήσαντες δὲ σύνταξιν ἑνὸματι.
As to the Coalescence of these Pronouns, it is, as follows. The First or Second

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows: **Articulis autem Pronomina communerantes, infinitos ea Articulos appellabant; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus nos carunnus, infinitos Articulos dicebant. Vel, ut aliis dicunt, Articulos communerabunt Pronominibus, & Articularia eos Pronomina vocabant, &c.** Frii. L. I. p. 574. Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hie, calls them both Articles, the first indefinite, the second definite. De Ling. Lat. L. VII. See also L. IX. p. 132. Vossius indeed in his Analogia (L. I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because Hie has not the same power with the Greek Article,
Second will, either of them, by themselves coalesce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good Grammar, to say in any Language—I am He—Thou art He—but we cannot say—I am Thou—nor Thou art I. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the Speaker to be the Subject also of the Discourse, as when we say, I am He; or for the Person addrest; as when we say, Thou art He.

But for the same Person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the Speaker, and the Party addrest, this is impossible; and so therefore is the Coalescence of the First and Second Person.

And now perhaps we have seen enough of Pronouns, to perceive how they differ from

But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who considered all Words, as Articles, which being associated to Nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their Signification.
from other Substantives. The others are Primary, these are their Substitutes; a kind of secondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reasons already (b) mentioned the others could not be used. It is moreover by means of these, and of Articles, which are nearly allied to them, that

(b) See these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reasons the principal one is, that "no Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. 

"It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes equivalent to ἐπαίζει, that is, to Painting or Indication by the Finger." It is worth remarking in that Verse of Persius,

Sed pulchrum est digitò monstrari, & dicier, 
Hic est.

how the ἐπαίζει, and the Pronoun are introduced together, and made to co-operate to the same end.

Sometimes by virtue of ἐπαίζει the Pronoun of the third Person stands for the first.

Qued si militis parces, erit hic quoque Miles. 
That is, I also will be a Soldier.

Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See Vulpius.
that "Language, tho' in itself only "significant of general Ideas, is brought "down to denote that infinitude of Par- "ticulars, which are for ever arising, and "ceasing to be." But more of this here- after in a proper place.

As to the three orders of Pronouns al- ready mentioned, they may be called Pre-
positive, as may indeed all Substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But be-
sides those there is another Pronoun (in

It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and You make their appear-
ance, there is a sort of implied Presence, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in Apollonius, τὰς μὲν τὴν ὑπόσων εἶναι διάκεις, τὰς δὲ τὰ ὑπερ, that some Indications are oc-
ular, and some are mental. De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.
(i) The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this Pronoun ἅρπαξιχνόν ἄθαντον, the Subjunctive Article. Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the ἃποστροφή or true Prepositional Article, not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds—ὅταν ἢν ἢς ἡν ἐς ἄθαντον τοὺς ἑκατονταξιδοὐ—for these reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article. And just before he says, ἡν ἱππὶ μὴν ἄθαντον τοῦ ἁρπαξιχνόν—however properly speaking it is the Prepositional is the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.
These would apparently be two distinct Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second, Light, I were to place the prepositive Pronoun, it, and say—Light is a Body; it moves with great celerity—the Sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a Connective (as for Example an and) saying—Light is a Body, and it moves with great celerity—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall.

Now it is in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun, that we may see the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of and it, we substitute that, or which, saying Light is a Body, which moves with great celerity—the Sentence still retains its Unity and Perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason therefore call this Pronoun the Subjunctive, because it cannot (like the
the Prepositional) introduce an original Sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous (k).

(k) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, which Sentence contains, either express or understood, two Verbs, and two Nominatives.

Thus in that Verse of Horace,

*Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.*

_Ille non erit liber_—is one Sentence; _qui metuens vivit_—is another. _Ille_ and _Qui_ are the two Nominatives; _Erit_ and _Vivit_, the two Verbs; and so in all other instances.

The following passage from Apollonius (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew, whence the above Speculations are taken.

*Τό ὑποτακτικόν ἀρθρον ἐπί ρῆμα ὕδιον φίεσται, συνδε- 

δέμενον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκείμενῷ ὄνοματι ὡς ἐνεθύμην ἀπλῶν λόγων ἐσαφίζανεν καὶ ἣν τῶν δύο ἐπιμάτων σύμβασιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄνοματι, ἡ τῇ ἐν ἀυτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συν- 

cίσμα. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) οὐκ ἔσται*
The Application of this Subjunctive, like the other Pronouns, is universal. It

\[\text{παρεσελάμεθα} \text{ το} \ \text{ονόμα} \ \text{το} \ \text{προσελεμένου}, \ \text{σύμπλεκον} \ \text{δὲ} \ \text{ετερον} \ \text{λόγον} \ \text{πάντως} \ \text{κἀ} \ \text{ετερον} \ \text{ῥῆμα} \ \text{παρεσελάμεθα}, \ \text{καὶ} \ \text{αὐτῷ} \ \text{τῷ}, \ \text{ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ} \ \text{Ὁ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ}, \ \text{ΟΣ} \ \text{ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ}, \ \text{δυνάμει} \ \text{τὸν} \ \text{αὐτὸν} \ \text{αποτελεῖ} \ \text{τῇ} \ \text{(forf. τῷ)} \ \text{Ὁ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ} \ \text{ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ}, \ \text{ΚΑΙ} \ \text{ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ}. \ \text{The subjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative affixes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it is that the Words—the Grammarian came, who discoursed—form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say—the Grammarian came, and discoursed. Apell. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale & rafinée, Chap. IX.}

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their
It may be the Substitute of all kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the Animal, Which, &c. the Man, Whom, &c. the Ship, Which, &c. Alexander, Who, &c. Bucephalus, That, &c. Virtue, Which, &c. &c.

Nay, it may even be the Substitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of course therefore expressive of all three Persons. Thus we say, I, who now read, have near finished this Chapter; Thou, who now readest; He, who now readeth, &c. &c.

And thus is this Subjunctive truly a Pronoun from its Substitution, there being

 Qui and Quis from Que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from KAI and 'OΣ, KAI and 'O. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

Homer also expresseth the Force of this Subjunctive, Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepositive and a Connective, exactly consonant to the Theory here established. See Iliad, Α. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 541, 157, 158.
ing no Substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is *essentially distinguished* from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only a *Substitute*, but withal a *Connective* (1).

**AND**

(1) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second Person, the *Ego* and the *Tu*, are *implied in the very Form of the Verb itself* (γεγραμ, γεγραμ, *scribo, scribis*) and are for that reason never *expressed*, unless it be to mark a *Contradistinction*; such as in Virgil,

*Nos patriam fugimus; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbrâ*

*Formosum resonare doces, &c.*

This however is true with respect only to the *Casus rectus*, or Nominative of these Pronouns, but not with respect to their *oblique Cases*, which must always be added, because tho' we see the *Ego* in *Amo*, and the *Tu* in *Amas*, we see not the *Te* or *Me* in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even these *oblique Cases* appear in a different manner, according as they mark *Contradistinction*, or not. If they contradistinguish, then are they *commonly* placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the Verb, or leading Substantive.
And now to conclude what we have said concerning Substantives. All Substantives

Thus Virgil,

Quid Thesea, magnum
Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab Iove summo.

Thus Homer,

ΤMIN μὲν Σειώ δεῖν—
Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟI λύσατε φιλην—

Il. A.

where the 'Τμήν and the Μοι stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the 'Τμήν even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances, these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ἐποτονμένων, or Pronouns uprightly accented. When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name of Εγκλιτικων, that is, Leaning or Inclining Pronouns. The Greeks too had in the first person 'Εμή, 'Εμεί, 'Εμε for Contradistinguatives, and Μέ, Μοι, Μέ for Enclitics. And hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read

παῖδα
stantives are either primary, or secondary, that is to say, according to a language more familiar and known, are either nouns or pronouns. The nouns denote substances, and those either natural, artificial, or abstract. They moreover denote things either general, or special, or particular. The pronouns, their substitutes, are either prepositive, or subjunctive. The prepositive is distinguished into three orders, called the first, the second, and the third person. The subjunctive includes

\[ \text{\textit{G3}} \]

\( \text{\textit{waíto de 'EMOI, for waíto de MOI, on account of the contradistinction, which there occurs between the Grecians and Chryses. See Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103.}} \)

This diversity between the contradistinctive pronouns, and the enclitic, is not unknown even to the English tongue. When we say, Give me Content, the (Me) in this case is a perfect enclitic. But when we say, Give Me Content, Give Him his thousands, the (Me) and (Him) are no enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an accent of their own, and so become the true ὧθορονμένων.

\( \text{* See before, p. 37, 38.} \)
Ch. V. the powers of all those three, having superadded, as of its own, the peculiar force of a Connective.

Having done with Substantives, we now proceed to Attributives.
CHAP. VI.

Concerning Attributives.

Attributives are all those principal Words, that denote Attributes, considered as Attributes. Such for example are the Words, Black, White, Great, Little, Wife, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, &c. (a).

How-

(a) In the above list of Words are included what Grammarians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles, in as much as all of them equally denote the Attributes of Substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated of some Subject or Substance, Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or Verb is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretatione calls λέγεις a Verb, tells us παρανόης φωνή, καθηγούμενον ὑπὸ ἡ προτασειν τοίως, 'PHMA καλεῖται, that every Sound articulate, that forms the
However, previously to these, and to every other possible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be anything else. For existence may be considered as an universal genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every proposition, in which they may still be found, either express, or by implication; express, as when we say, The Sun is bright; by im-

*Predicate in a Proposition, is called a Verb,* p. 24. Edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to the present. *Non Declinative, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis.* L. II. p. 576. And in another place he says—*non similitudo declinationis omnimo conjungi vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis.* L. XIII. p. 970.
implication, as when we say, *The Sun rises*, which means, when resolved, *The Sun is rising* (b).

The Verbs, *Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est, Fit, ὑπάρχει ἐστι, πέλει, γίνεται*, are all of them used to express this general Genus. The Latins have called them *Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive*, but the Greeks Ῥήματα ὑπάρχικα, *Verbs of Existence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well Attribute, as Substance. The principal of those Verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the Verb, ἐστι, *Est, Is*.

Now all Existence is either absolute or qualified—*absolute*, as when we say, *B is*; *qualified*, as when we say, *B is an Animal; B is black, is round, &c.*

*With*

(b) See *Metaphys. Aristot. L. V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall.*
With respect to this difference, the Verb (is) can by itself express \textit{absolute Existence}, but never the \textit{qualified}, without subjoining the particular Form, because the Forms of Existence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not express, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (is) only serves to subjoin some such Form, it has little more force, than that of a \textit{mere Assertion}. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expressing that \textit{Assertion}, which is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, \textit{Riseth} means, \textit{is rising}; \textit{Writeth}, \textit{is writing}.

\textit{Again—As to Existence in general, it is either mutable, or immutable; mutable, as in the Objects of Sensation; immutable, as in the Objects of Intellec}tion and Science. \textit{Now mutable Objects exist all in Time, and admit the several Distinctions}
tinctions of present, past, and future. Ch.VI.

But immutable Objects know no such Diffe
tinctions, but rather stand opposed to all
things temporary.

And hence two different Significations
of the substantive Verb (is) according
as it denotes mutable, or immutable Be-
ing.

For example, if we say, This Orange
is ripe, (is) meaneth, that it existeth so
now at this present, in opposition to past
time, when it was green, and to future
time, when it will be rotten.

But if we say, The Diameter of the
Square is incommensurable with its side, we
do not intend by (is) that it is incom-
menurable now, having been formerly
commensurable, or being to become so
hereafter; on the contrary we intend that
Perfection of Existence, to which Time
and its Distinguions are utterly unknown.
It is under the same meaning we employ
this
this Verb, when we say, Truth is, or, God is. The opposition is not of Time present to other Times, but of necessary Existence to all temporary Existence whatever (c). And so much for Verbs of Existence, commonly called Verbs Substantive.

We are now to descend to the common Herd of Attributives, such as black and white, to write, to speak, to walk, &c. among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Substantive

(c) Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non cum dicimus nunc esse, sed tantum in Substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem petius substantiae quam ad tempus aliquid referatur. Si autem dicimus, dies est, ad nullam dicem substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, quam si dicamus, nunc est. Quare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam designamus, simpliciter est addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid praesens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.
stantive make without farther help a perfect assertive Sentence; while the rest, tho' otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, Cicero eloquent, Cicero wife, these are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Substance and an Attribute. The reason is, that they want an Assertion, to shew that such Attribute appertains to such Substance. We must therefore call in the help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (is) or a (was) to complete the Sentence, saying Cicero is wife, Cicero was eloquent. On the contrary, when we say, Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the Words (writeth) and (walketh) imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into Is and Writing, the other into Is and Walking.

Now
Now all those Attributives, which have this complex Power of denoting both an Attribute and an Assertion, make that Species of Words, which Grammarians call Verbs. If we resolve this complex Power into its distinct Parts, and take the Attribute alone without the Assertion, then have we Participles. All other Attributives, besides the two Species before, are included together in the general Name of Adjectives.

And thus it is, that all Attributives are either Verbs, Participles, or Adjectives.

Besides the Distinctions abovementioned, there are others, which deserve notice. Some Attributes have their Essence in Motion; such are to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of Motion; such are to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And lastly, others have it in subjects, which have nothing to do
do with either Motion or its Privation; such are the Attributes of, Great and Little, White and Black, Wise and Foolish, and in a word the several Quantities and Qualities of all Things. Now these last are Adjectives; those which denote Motions, or their Privation, are either Verbs or Participles.

And this Circumstance leads to a farther Distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all Motion is in Time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies Time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But besides this, all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one Place for one Instant only?—so too is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity. To stop therefore or rest, is to be in one Place for more than one Instant.

† Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise concerning Motion. Ἡμείς ἐγὼ το πτετεσκον καὶ ἔπεσον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ δὲ, ἃ ἀντι, ὃ τὰ μέρη.
96

HERMES.

Ch. VI. Instant, that is to say, *during an Extension between two Instants*, and this of course gives us the Idea of Time. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation* imply *Time* as their concomitant, so *Verbs*, which denote them, come to denote *Time* also (d). And hence the origin and use of *Tenses*, "which are so many different forms, assigned to each Verb, to shew, without "altering its principal meaning, the various *Times* in which such meaning "may exist." Thus *Scribit, Scriptit, Scripsit, or Scribled*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

**Should**

(d) The ancient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well described this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a *Verb*—πρᾶξις δέ ἢ ἰσί τὸ

*ἀνθρώπωσιμων ἔένον*, a Verb is something, which signifies *Time over and above* (for such is the force of the Preposition, ἐνδεκ.). If it should be asked, *over and above what?* It may be answered, over and above its *principal Signification*, which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. See *Arist. de Interpret*. c. 3. together with his Commentators Ammonius and Boethius.
Should it be asked, whether Time itself may not become upon occasion the Verb's principal Signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same Time may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words, writeth and speaketh) and different Times by the same Verb (as in the words, writeth and wrote) neither of which could happen, were Time any thing more, than a mere Concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or substantives. Of the adjective kind are Timely, Yearly, Dayly, Hourly, &c. of the substantive kind are Time, Year, Day, Hour, &c.

The most obvious division of Time is into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any language complete, whose verbs have not Tenses, to mark these distinctions. But we may go still farther. Time past and future are both infinitely extended.

Hence
Hence it is that in universal Time past we may assume many particular Times past, and in universal Time future, many particular Times future, some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present Time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of Extension, as does every given line, however minute.

Here then we are to seek for the reason, which first introduced into language that variety of Tenses. It was not it seems enough to denote indefinitely (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, but it was necessary on many occasions to define with more precision, what kind of Past, Present, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Preterits, and even Present Tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our Ideas.
However as the knowledge of Ch. VI. Tenses depends on the Theory of Time, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.
C. VII. Time and Space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply Extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the Extension of Space, and between Yesterday and To-morrow, the Extension of Time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of Space exist at once and together, while those of Time only exist in Transition or Succession (a). Hence then we may gain some Idea of Time, by considering it under

(a) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is said by Ammonius—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ χρῆσθαι ἐν καθαρίας,· ἢ κατὰ μίνυν τὸ Νῦν· ἵνα τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἐν ἐκατόρθους. Time doth not subsist the whole at once, but only in a single Now or Instant; for it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be. Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.
under the notion of a transient Continuity. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of Transition go, Time is different from Space; but as to those of Extension and Continuity, they perfectly coincide.

Let us take, for example, such a part of Space, as a Line. In every given Line we may assume any where a Point, and therefore in every given Line there may be assumed infinite Points. So in every given Time we may assume any where a Now or Instant, and therefore in every given Time there may be assumed infinite Nows or Instants.

Further still—A Point is the Bound of every finite Line; and a Now or Instant, of every finite Time. But altho' they are Bounds, they are neither of them Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor the Now or Instant of any Time. If this appear strange, we may remember, that the parts of any thing extended are necessary
C. VII. sarily extended also, it being essential to their character, that they should measure their Whole. But if a Point or Now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other Points, and infinite other Nows (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest Extension) and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.

These assertions therefore being admitted, and both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, but not as Parts (b), it will

(b) — φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ μέζιν τὸ ΝΥΝ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἡ ἡ σιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ τῶν τῆς μέζις μέζων. It is evident that a Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, than Points are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur. Auc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἡ μέζον· μετεξῆ, τὸ γὰρ τὸ μέζον, κ. σύγχρονοι δὲ τὸ θλὸν ἐκ τῶν μεζῶν' ὡς δὲ ΧΡΗΝΩΣ ἡ δικαιοτεκοῦσα ἐκ τῶν ΝΥΝ. A Now is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its Parts; but Time does not appear to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14.
will follow, that in the same manner as the same Point may be the End of one Line, and the Beginning of another, so the same Now or Instant may be the End of one Time, and the Beginning of another. Let us suppose for example, the Lines, A B, B C.

I say that the Point B is the End of the Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line, B C. In the same manner let us suppose A B, B C to represent certain Times, and let B be a Now or Instant. In such case I say that the Instant B is the End of the Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time B C. I say likewise of these two Times, that with respect to the Now or Instant, which they include, the first of them is necessarily Past Time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. As therefore every
From the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place there cannot (strictly speaking) be any

(c) Τὸ δὲ Νῦν ἐστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ἀπερ ἐλίξηθη. συνέχεια γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν παρειδύναμον, ἐσόμενον, ὑποταμάζων χρόνου ἐστὶν ὡστε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄξον, τὸ δὲ τελευτή. A Now or Instant is (as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. Axion. I. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that Function or Holding together, by which Extension is imparted to other things.
any such Thing as Time present. For if all Time be transient as well as continuous, it cannot like a Line be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such Continuity is essential?

Farther than this—If there be no such thing as Time Present, there can be no Sensation of Time by any one of the senses. For all Sensation is of the Present only, the Past being preserved not by Sense but by Memory, and the Future being anticipated by Prudence only and wise Foresight.

But if no Portion of Time be the object of any Sensation; farther, if the Present

* Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αἰσθήτει τ. c.) ὅτε τὸ μίλλον, ὅτε τὸ γιγνόμενον γνωσίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ᾠάσον μίνον. Ἀρισ. πεζὶ Μηνυ. Α. ζ.
sent never exist; if the Past be no more; if the Future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts, out of which Time is compounded: how strange and shadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity (d)? Let us try however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to seize this fleeting Being.

The World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to resemble no one more, than some moving spectacle

(d) "Ὅτε μὲν ἐν ὅλως ἐκ ἑσύν, ἡ μόρις καὶ ἀμυνθεῖς, ἐκ τῶν δὲ τις ἃν ὑποπλέυσεῖς, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὖτε γέγονε, ἡ ἐκ ἑσύν τὸ δὲ μέλλει, ἡ ἕπω ἑσύν ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἡ ἐπειρὴς ὡς ὁ αἰὲι λαμπάνων ἡ χρήν ὡς σύλλεκται. τὸ δὲ ἐκ μὲ ὑπὼν συλλείμενον, αὕξαντον ἂν δόξει κατέχειν ποτὲ ἄσίως. That therefore Time exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of Entity. Natural. Auct. L. IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M.S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.
tacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast as others make their appearance. The Senses look on, while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the Soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, save what is present and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to the Imagination, and above all to the Intellect, the several Nows or Instants are not lost, as to the Senses, but are preserved and made objects of steady comprehension, however in their own nature they may be transitory and passing. "Now it is "from contemplating two or more of these "Instants under one view, together with "that Interval of Continuity, which sub- "sists between them, that we acquire in- "sensibly the Idea of Time (e)." For ex- ample:

(e) Τότε φαμέν γεγονέων τῷ ἄνων, ὅταν τῷ προτέρῳ ὑπέσε τὴν κινήσει ἀνεβανεν λαβέμεν. Ὁ θεὸς ἔστε ὑμᾶς.
ample: The Sun rises; this I remember: it rises again; this too I remember. These Events are not together; there is an Extension.

It is then we say there has been Time, when we can acquire a Sensation of prior and subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two Now's, one prior and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is Time, and this it is we call Time. Natural. Aufcunt. L. IV. c. 16. Themisius's Comment upon this passage is to the same purpose. "Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ μὲν αἰκαμυμοθεὶς τὰ Νῦν, ὁ δὲ ἐστιν, ἐστὶν τὰλιν ἐστι τὸ τῆμερον, τέτε ὁ χρόνον εὑρίσκεις ἑννόησε, ὧπο τῶν δύο Νῦν ὤριζόμενον, ὥστε ὧπε ἔρειν δύναι εἰς ἕξεις, ὃ τοι ποσόν εἰς ὕπερ-τεκίδεκα πέντε, τὸ ἱκκάκεια, ὃν εἶ ὁ πείρας γεγομένης περιφαίλεται δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενον. For when the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of Time, terminated by these two Now's, as by two Boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it were to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points. Themisius, Op. edit. Aldi. p. 45. b.
extension between them—not however of Space, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognize some Extension between them. Now what is this Extension, but a natural Day? And what is that, but pure Time? It is after the same manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extension between these: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extension between these; that we gain Ideas of other Times, such as Months and Years, which are all so many Intervals, described as above; that is to say, passing Intervals of Continuity between two Instants viewed together.

And thus it is the Mind acquires the Idea of Time. But this Time it must be remembered is Past Time only, which is always the first Species, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of Time Future? The answer is, we acquire it by Anticipation. Should it be demanded still farther, And what
what is Anticipation? We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions, that are presumed hereafter. For example: I observe as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been succeeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and so downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I anticipate a similar succession from the present Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights in futurity. After the same manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time past I find never to have failed, I anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession, which makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, in Time future.

We go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in these natural Periods, but even in matters of human and civil concern,
concern. For example: Having observed in many past instances how health had succeeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth; we anticipate future health to those, who, being now sickly, use exercise; and future sickness to those, who, being now healthy, are slothful. It is a variety of such observations, all respecting one subject, which when systematized by just reasoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Master-Artist, or Man of practical Wisdom. If they respect the human body (as above) they form the Physician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Statesman; if matters of private life, the Moralist; and the same in other subjects. All these several characters in their respective ways may be said to possess a kind of prophetical discernment, which not only presents them the barren prospect of futurity (a prospect not hid from the meanest of men) but shews withal those events, which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with superior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except those,
those, who have had diviner affistances)
we may justly say, as was said of old,

_He's the best Prophet, who conjectures well (_,).

So Milton.

_Till old Experience do attain
To something like Prophetic Strain.

_Et facile exitLimari potent, Prudentiam esse quodam-modum Divinationem.


There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the
Mind of Intellect only, as the Future does, since we
find no place for its existence any where else.
Not but the same, if we consider, is equally true of the
Past. For tho' it may have once had another kind of
being, when (according to common Phrase) it actually
was, yet was it then something Present, and not some-
thing Past. As Past, it has no existence but in the
Mind or Memory, since had it in fact any other, it
could not properly be called Past. It was this intimate
connection between Time, and the Soul, that made
some Philosophers doubt, whether if there was no Soul,
there could be any Time; since Time appears to have its
Being in no other region. _Πότερον δε μη ύστερις ψυχής
Aufcul. L. IV. c. 20. _Themistius, who comments
the above passage, expresses himself more positively.
_Ει τοις δις λέγεται τότε ἀειμακτόν ε'ι το ἀειμακτό-
μενον, το μη το ἀειμακτόν ὅπλαδη ὄνωμει, το δε ἐν-
ειμαν, ταύτα δε ἀν ὑποσάλη, μη ἄντος το ἀειμακ-
μενον...
Book the First.

From what has been reasoned it appears, that knowledge of the Future comes from knowledge of the Past; as does knowledge of the Past from knowledge of the Present, so that their Order to us is that of Present, Past, and Future.

Of these Species of knowledge, that of the Present is the lowest, not only as first in perception, but as far the more extensive, being necessarily common to all animal Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they possess Sensation. Knowledge of the Past comes next, which is superior to the former, as being confined to those animals, that have Memory as well as Senses. Knowledge of the Future

HERMES.

C. VII. Future comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason the most excellent as well as the most rare, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse.*

And now having seen, how we acquire the knowledge of Time past, and Time future; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the present Now or Instant, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

In the first place there may be Times both past and future, in which the present Now has no existence, as for example in Yesterday, and To-morrow.

Again,

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter.
Again, the present Now may so far belong to Time of either sort, as to be the End of the past, and the Beginning of the future; but it cannot be included within the limits of either. For if it were possible, let us suppose C the present Now included

\[ A \quad B \quad C \quad D \quad E \]

within the limits of the past Time A.D. In such case C D, part of the past Time A.D, will be subsequent to C the present Now, and so of course be future. But by the Hypothesis it is past, and so will be both Past and Future at once, which is absurd. In the same manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a future Time, such as BE.

What then shall we say of such Times, as this Day, this Month, this Year, this I 2 Cent-
C. VII. Century, all which include within them the present Now? They cannot be past Times or future, from what has been proved; and present Time has no existence, as has been proved likewise *. Or shall we allow them to be present, from the present Now, which exists within them; so that from the presence of that we call these also present, tho' the shortest among them has infinite parts always absent? If so, and in conformity to custom we allow such Times present, as present Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each must of necessity be a compound of the Past and the Future, divided from each other by some present Now or Instant, and jointly called Present, while that Now remains within them. Let us suppose for example the Time XY, which

\[ \text{f...} \quad \text{X A B C D E Y...} \quad \text{g} \]

let

* Sup. p. 104.
let us call a Day, or a Century; and let the present Now or Instant exist at A. I say, in as much as A exists within XY, that therefore XA is Time past, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, Time present. The same holds, if we suppose the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the present Now exists at Y, then is the whole XY Time past, and still more so, when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In like manner before the Present Now entered X, as for example when it was at f, then was the whole XY Time future; it was the same, when the present Now was at X. When it had past that, then XY became Time present. And thus it is that Time is present, while passing, in its present Now or Instant. It is the same indeed here, as it is in Space. A Sphere passing over a Plane, and being for that reason present to it, is only present to that Plane in a single Point at once, while
while during the whole progression its parts absent are infinite (g).

From what has been said, we may perceive that all Time, of every denomination,

(g) Place, according to the antients, was either mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe, because I am in England; in England, because in Wiltshire; in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury; in Salisbury, because in my own house; in my own house, because in my study. Thus far Mediate Place. And what is my immediate Place? It is the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body. Τὰ περιβάλλοντος περιτής, καὶ τὸ περιβάλλων περιβαλλόμενον. Now as this immediate Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this relation that those mediate Places also are called each of them my Place, tho' the least among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to Time. The Present Century is present in the present Year; that, in the present Month; that, in the present Day; that, in the present Hour; that, in the present Minute. It is thus by circumscriptaion within circumscriptiss that we arrive at that real and indivisible Instant, which by being itself the very Essence of the Present diffuses Presence throughout all
mination, is divisible and extended. But if C.VII. fo, then whenever we suppose a definite Time, even though it be a Time present, it must needs have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. And so much for Time.

Now from the above doctrine of Time, we propose by way of Hypothecis the following Theorie of Tenses.

The Tenses are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either indefinitely with-

all even the largest of Times, which are found to include it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blem-mides speaks much to the same purpose. 'Ενεσώς ἐν χρόνος ἐστιν ὁ ἐμφ έκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίῳ ΝΤΝ. χρόνος μεσινίς εἱ παρεπιθεύοτος ἡ μέλλοντος συνεσώς, ἡ διὰ τὴν προς τὸ κυρίῳ ΝΤΝ γείωσιν, ΝΤΝ λεγόμενος ἡ αὐτός. Present Time therefore is that which adjoins to the real Now or Instant on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that real Now said to be Now also itself. 'ΕπΗ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. 6. See also Arist. Physic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.
without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or else definitely, in reference to such distinctions.

If indefinitely, then have we three Tenses, an Aorist of the Present, an Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the Future. If definitely, then have we three Tenses to mark the Beginnings of these three Times; three, to denote their Middles; and three to denote their Ends; in all Nine.

The three first of these Tenses we call the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Present, the Middle Past, and the Middle Future. And the three last, the Completive Present, the Completive Past, and the Completive Future.

And thus it is, that the Tenses in their natural number appear to be twelve; three
three to denote Time absolute, and nine to denote it under its respective distinctions.

Aorist of the Present.
Γράφω. Scribo. I write.

Aorist of the Past.
"Εγράψα. Scripsi. I wrote.

Aorist of the Future.
Γράψω. Scribam. I shall write.

Inceptive Present.
Μέλλω γράφειν. Scripturus sum. I am going to write.

Middle or extended Present.
Τυγχάνω γράφων. Scribo. or Scribens sum. I am writing.

Compleitive Present.
Γέγραφα. Scripsi. I have written.

Inceptive Past.
"Εμελλὼν γράφειν. Scripturus eram. I was beginning to write.

Middle
C. VII. Middle or extended Past.

"Εγραφων ορ 'ετύγχανον γράφων. Scribebam. I was writing.

Compleotive Past.

"Εγραφάμεν. Scripsieram. I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφων. Scripturus ero. I shall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

"Εσομαι γράφων. Scribens ero. I shall be writing.

Compleotive Future.

"Εσομαι γεγραφός. Scripsero. I shall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypothesis should be justified through all instances in every language. It fares with Tenses,
Tenses, as with other affections of speech; be the Language upon the whole ever so perfect, much must be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere authority and chance.

It may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be discovered in favour of this system, either in languages themselves, or in those authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or lastly in the nature and reason of things.

In the first place, as to Aorists. Aorists are usually by Grammarians referred to the Past; such are ἔλθον, I went; ἐπέσον, I fell, &c. We seldom hear of them in the Future, and more rarely still in the Present. Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that wherever Time is signified without any farther circumscriptio, than that of Simple present, past, or future, the Tense is an Aorist.

Thus
C. VII. Thus Milton,

Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth
Unseen, both when we wake, and when we sleep. P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (walk) means not that they were walking at that instant only, when Adam spoke, but ἀεικά εἰς indefinitely, take any instant whatever. So when the same author calls Hypocrisy,

—the only Evil, that walks Invisible, except to God alone,

the Verb (walks) hath the like aoristical or indefinite application. The same may be said in general of all Sentences of the Gnomologic kind, such as

Ad pænitendum properat, cito qui judicat.

Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte facit, &c.

All
ALL these Tenses are so many Aorists of the Present.

Gnomologic Sentences after the same manner make likewise Aorists of the Future.

_Tu nihil admittes in te, formidine pæne._ Hor.

So too Legislative Sentences, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, &c. for this means no one particular future Time, but is a prohibition extended indefinitely to every part of Time future (b).

(h) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of Aorists. It has no peculiar Form even for an Aorist of the Past, and therefore (as Priscian tells us) the Praeteritum is forced to do the double duty both of that Aorist, and of the perfect Present, its application in particular instances being to be gathered from the Context. Thus
We pass from "Aorists, to the Inceptive Tenses."

These may be found in part supplied (like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliary. MEΛΛΩ γράφω. Scripturus sum. I am going to write. But the Latins go farther, and have a species of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of these Tenses, and are themselves for that reason called Inchoatives or Inceptives. Thus from Caleo, I am warm, comes Calcisco, I begin to grow warm; from Tumco, I swell, comes Tumescio, I begin to swell. These Inchoative Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated to the Beginnings of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenses, which denote it in its Completion, and there-

---

It is that feci means (as the same author informs us) both πεινώνα and ἰπώνα, I have done it, and I did it; vidit both ιδωνα and ιδον, I have just seen it, and I saw it once. Prisc. Gram. L. VIII. p. 814, 838. Edit. Putsch.
therefore have neither Perfectum, Plus quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future. There is likewise a species of Verbs called in Greek Ἐπιστήμα, in Latin Desiderativa, the Desideratives or Meditatives, which if they are not strictly Inceptives, yet both in Greek and Latin have a near affinity with them. Such are πολέμησεω, Bellaturio, I have a desire to make war; βεσσεω, Esurio, I long to eat (i). And so much for the \textbf{Inceptive Tenses}.

The two last orders of Tenses which remain, are those we called (k) the \textbf{Middle Tenses} (which express Time as extended and

(i) As all Beginnings have reference to what is future, hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a future Participle. From πολέμησω and βεσσω come πολεμησεω and βεσσεω; from Bellaturus and Esurus come Bellaturio and Esurio. See Macrobius, p. 691. Ed. Var. ἐ πάνω γε με νῦν δὴ ἘΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ εποίησας γελάσαι. Plato in Phaedone.

(k) Care must be taken not to confound these middle Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same name among Grammarians.
and passing) and the Perfect or Collective, which express its Completion or End.

Now for these the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. Hoadly, and explained and confirmed by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his rational edition of Homer's Iliad. Nay, long before either of these, we find the same scheme in Scaliger, and by him (l) ascribed to + Grocinus, as its author. The learned Gaza (who


† His Name was William Grocin, an Englishman, contemporary with Erasmus, and celebrated for his learning. He went to Florence to study under Landin, and was Professor at Oxford. Spec. Lit. Flor. p. 205.
Book the First.

(Book 1) The Present Tense (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἑνεσάμενον ἥ ἀτελὲς, that which is now Instant and incomplete; the Perfectum, τὸ παρεσαλνθὸς ἁρτί, ἥ ἐτελὲς τῷ ἑνεσάωτος, that which is now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present; the Imperfectum, τὸ παρεσαλλαμένον ἥ ἀτελὲς τῷ παρεσαλλήμενα, the extended and incomplete part of the Past; and the Plus-Quam-Perfectum, τὸ παρεσαλνθὸς ἁρτί, ἥ ἐτελὲς τῷ παρεσαλλήμενα, that which is past long ago, and is the completion of the prateritum. Gram. L. IV.

(Book 2) Εὔτεθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι ἐς παρεσαλλήμενα συντελεῖν σημαίνει ὁ παρεσαλλήμενος, τὸν γε μὴν ἑνεσάωαν—Hence we are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion of the Past, but Present Completion. Apollon. L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, was the application and use of the Particle ἂν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted Potentiality or Contingence, would assort (he says) with any of the pattering, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never with this Perfectum, because this implied such a complete and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a Contingent.

K.
C. VII. Priscian too advances the same doctrine from the Stoics, whose authority we esteem greater than all the rest, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their superior skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar attachment to Dialectic, which naturally led them to great accuracy in these Grammatical Speculations (o).

Before

(o) By these Philosophers the vulgar present Tense was called the Imperfect Present, and the vulgar Präteritum, the Perfect Present, than which nothing can be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let us hear Priscian, from whom we learn these facts. Præsens tempus proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteriit, pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, iussit more, in stabili volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in praesenti, hoc est, in infantii. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dicitum est) vel präteriit vel futura est.—Unde Stoici jure hoc tempus præsens etiam Imperfectum vocabant (ut dicitum est) eo quod prior ejus pars, qua praeteriit, transacta est, deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu dicam, scribo versum, priore ejus parte scripta; cui ad-huc deest extrema pars, præsenti utor verbo, dicendo, scribo versum: sed Imperfectum est, quod deest ad-huc versui, quod scribatur—Ex eodem igitur Præsenti nascitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem veniat inceptum, statim utimur Præterito Perfecto; continuo enim, scripto ad finem versu, dico, scripti versum.—And soon after speaking of the Latin Par-
Before we conclude, we shall add a few miscellaneous observations, which will be more easily intelligible from the hypothesis here advanced, and serve with al to confirm its truth.

And first, the Latins used their Præteritum Perfectum in some instances after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus, Vixit, signified, is dead; Fuit, signified, now is not, is no more. It was in this sense that Cicero addressed the People of Rome, when he had put to death the leaders in the Catalinarian Conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum,

HERMES.

C. VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,

* Vixerunt. So Virgil,

--- || Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium & ingens

Gloria Dardanidum --- AEn. II.

And

* So among the Romans, when in a Cause all the Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim Dixerunt, i.e. they have done speaking. Aescon. Pæd. in Verr. II.

|| So Tibullus speaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hac fuerint olim. Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,

Prodigia indomitis merge sub aquoribus.

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

Let these Events have been in days of old;—by Implication therefore—But henceforth let them be no more.

So Eneas in Virgil prays to Phoebus.

Hac Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna secuta.

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy, and its inhabitants,) have so far followed us. By implication therefore, but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic fit Finis, as Servius well observes in the place.

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the force of the Tense, but of the Mood, the Prepositive or Imperative, not in the Future but in the Past. See p. 154, 155, 156.
And again,

—Locus Ardea quondam

Diéus avis, & nunc magnum manet
Ardea nomen,

*Sed fortuna fuit—Æn. VII.

The reason of these significations is derived from the complective Power of the Tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of Contraries. It is thus with Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; with Prosperity and Adversity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then; in the instances above, the completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say, HATH LIVED, or, HATH BEEN, has the same meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO MORE.

*Certus in hospitibus non est amor; errat, ut ipsi:
Cumque nihil saceres firmius esse, fuit.

Sive erimus, se nos Fata fuisse volent.

Tibull. III. 5. 32.
C. VII. It is remarkable in *Virgil, that he frequently joins in the same sentence this complete and perfect Present with the extended and passing Present; which proves that he considered the two, as belonging to the same species of Time, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

—*Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens Scorpius, & caeli justa plus parte reliquit.*

*G. I.*

*Terra tremit; fugere fera—*  

*G. I.*

*Præsertim si tempestras a vertice sylvis Incubuit, glomeratque fereus incendia ventus.*

*G. II.*

—*illa noto citius, volucrique sagittâ, Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.*

*Æn. V.*

In

*See also Spencer’s Fairy Queen, B. I. C. 3.*

St. 19. C. 3. St. 34. C. 8. St. 9

*Like thus his Shield redeem’d, and forth his Sword he draws.*
In the same manner he joins the same two modifications of Time in the Past, that is to say, the complete and perfect Past with the extended and passing.

---Inruerant Danai, & testum omne tenebant.  
Æn. II.
Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aequos
Addiderant, rutili tris ignis, & alitis austri.
Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque metumque
Miscebant operi, flamminique sequacibus iras (p).
Æn. VIII.

As

(p) The Intention of Virgil may be better seen, in rendering one or two of the above passages into English.

---Tibi jam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpius, & cæli juvâ plus parte reliquit.

For thee the scorpion is now contracting his claws, and hath already left thee more than a just portion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting Augustus among the heavenly signs, that though he has already made him more than room enough, yet...
As to the Imperfectum, it is sometimes employed to denote what is usual and customary. Thus surgebat and scribēbat signify not only, he was rising, he was writing, but upon occasion they signify, he used to rise, he used to write. The reason of this is, that whatever is customary, must be something which has been frequently repeated. But what has been frequently repeated, must needs require an Extension of Time past, and thus we fall insensibly into the Tense here mentioned.

Again,

he still continues to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one perfect, the other pending, and hence the use of the two different Tenses. Some editions read relinquuit; but relinquuit has the authority of the celebrated Medicean manuscript.

— Illa noster citius, velocirique sagittā, Ad terram fugit, & portu se condidit alto.

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, continues flying to land, and is hid within the lofty harbour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid from those spectators, who had gone out to
Again, we are told by Pliny (whose authority likewise is confirmed by many gems and marbles still extant) that the ancient painters and sculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it 
pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind of In-
scription, and employed for that purpose the Tense here mentioned. It was Ἀπελ-
κῆς ἔποιει, Ἀπελλος faciebat, Πολύκλετος ἔποιει, Polycleitus faciebat, and never ἐποίησε or fecit. By this they imagined that they avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in case of censure an apology (as it were) prepared, since it appeared from the work it-
self, that it was once indeed in hand, but no pretension that it was ever finished (q).

It
to see the Ship-race, but yet might still continue sail-
ing towards the shore within.

—inrerant Danai, & testum omne tenebant.

The Greeks had entered and were then pos-
sessing the whole House; as much as to say, they had entered, and that was over, but their Possession con-
tinued still.

(q) Plin. Nat. Hist. L. I. The first Printers (who were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of
C. VII. It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the Latins derive these Tenses from one another, shews a plain reference to the system here advanced. From the *passing Present* come the *passing Past* and *Future*. *Scribo, Scribemam, Scribo.*

From the *perfect Present* come the *perfect Past* and *Future*. *Scriptis, Scripseram, Scripsero.* And so in all instances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero.*

We shall conclude by observing, that the *Order* of the Tenses, as they stand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already.

---

the antient Artifts used the same Tense. *Excudebat H. Stephanus.* *Excudebat Guil. Morelius.* *Absolebat Joan. Benenatus,* which has been followed by Dr. *Taylor* in his late valuable edition of *Demosthenes.*
ready (r). Hence it is, that the Present Tense stands first; then the Past Tenses; and lastly the Future.

AND now, having seen what authorities there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, which denote Time indefinitely; and what for those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which mark it definitely, (such as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Completie) we here finish the subject of Time and Tenses, and proceed to consider the Verb in other Attributes, which it will be necessary to deduce from other principles.

(r) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's observation upon this occasion is elegant.—Ordo autem (Temporum seil.) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præterit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco debere toni videatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo: quamobrem Praeans Tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Prateritum autem ipsis tantum, quae memoriam praedita sunt. Futurum vero ostiam pucioribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentiae efficium. De Cauft. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Seneca Epifl. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprehendit praesentia; præteritorum, &c.
C. VIII. WE have observed already (a) that the Soul's leading powers are those of Perception and those of Volition, which words we have taken in their most comprehensive acceptation. We have observed also, that all Speech or Discourse is a publishing or exhibiting some part of our soul, either a certain Perception, or a certain Volition. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in a different part, or after a different manner, hence I say the variety of Modes or Moods (b).

(a) See Chapter II.
(b) Gaza defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doctrine. He says it is — βάλημα, εἰς ἐν τῷ θείῳ φύξις, διὰ φωνῆς σημαίνομεν — a Volition or Affection of the Soul, signified through some Voice, or Sound articulate. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence
If we simply declare, or indicate something to be, or not to be, (whether a Perception or Volition) it is equally the same) this constitutes that Mode called the Declarative or Indicative.

A Perception.

—Nosco crinis, incanaque menta
Regis Romani— Virg. Æn. VI.

A Volition.

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
Corpora— Ovid. Metam. I.

If we do not strictly assert, as of something absolute and certain, but as of something possible only, and in the number of

it is Apollonius observes—τοὺς βραχίονας ἑλπιστέους παρακατέβαι ὑπὸ τραχιὰς διάθεσις—the Soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs. De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too Priscian: Medit sunt diversae inclinationes Animi, quas varia consequitur declinatio Verbi. L. VII. p. 82.
C.VIII. Contingents, this makes that Mode, which Grammarians call the Potential; and which becomes on such occasions the leading Mode of the sentence.

*Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, HABERET
Plus dapis, &c.*

Yet sometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only subjoined to the Indicative. In such case, it is mostly used to denote the End, or final Cause; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in despite of all our foresight, is therefore express'd most naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

*Ut jugulent homines, surgunt de nocte latrones.*

Thieves rise by night, that they may cut mens throats.
Book the First.

Here that they rise, is positively asserted in the Declarative or Indicative Mode; but as to their cutting mens throats, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly soever it may be the End of their rising, it is still but a Contingent, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but the Subjunctive.

But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some Perception informed, or some Volition gratified. Hence then new Modes of speaking; if we interrogate, it is the Interrogative Mode; if we require, it is the Requisitive. Even the Requisitive itself hath its subordinate Species: With respect to inferiors, it is an Imperative Mode;
with respect to equals and superiors, it is a **Precative or Optative** *.

And thus have we established a variety of Modes; the **Indicative or Declarative**, to assert what we think certain; the **Potential**, for the Purposes of whatever we think Contingent; **the Interrogative**, when we are doubtful, to procure us Information; and **the Requisitive**, to assist us in the gratification of our Volitions. The Requisitive too appears under two distinct Species, either as it is **Imperative** to inferiors, or **Precative** to superiors (c).

---

* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave rise to a Sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with—*Sing, Muse, the Wrath,*—when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. ἐνετοξισσάνικα ἐκείνους ἐπιτάξειν. A. i. 19. The Solution is evident from the Division here established, the Grammatical Form being in both cafes the same.

(c) The Species of **Modes** in great measure depend on the Species of **Sentences**. The Stes increased the number of Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides those mentioned in Chapter II. **Note** (b) they had many
As therefore all these several Modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain

many more, as may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret. p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as included within those, which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Affertive. There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, which may be supposed to co-incide with the Affertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἰδος κλητικόν, but the Stoics more properly ψευσαγορευτικόν) was nothing more than the Form of address in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. Ammonius and Boethius, the one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latin, have illustrated the Species of Sentences from Homer and Virgil, after the following manner.

'Αλλα τῇ λόγῳ πέζυτε εἰδὼν, τῷ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ως τό, "Ω μάκαρ Ἀτρεύδη—
κῇ τῇ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ως τό, Βάσκ' ήθι, "Ιεί ταχεία—

L
certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled

---

Boethius's Account is as follows. Perfectionem vero Orationum partes quinque sunt: Deprecativa, ut,
Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si filii eris ulla,
Da deinde auxilium, Pater; atque hae cima firma.

Imperativa, ut,
Vade age, Nati, voca Zephyro, e labere pennis.

Interrogativa, ut,
Die mihi, Dameta, cujum pecus?

Vocativa, ut,
O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque externa potestas.

Enuntiativa, in qua Veritas vel falsitas invenitur, ut,
Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.
Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.
enabled by our discourse to signify them, one to another. And hence those various Modes or Moods, of which we find in common Grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than "so many "literal Forms, intended to express these "natural Distinctions" (d).

In *Milton* the same Sentences may be found, as follows. **The Precative,**

—*Universal Lord! be bounteous still
To give us only Good*—

**The Imperative,**

*Go then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might.*

**The Interrogative,**

*Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?*

**The Vocative,**

—*Adam, earth's hallow'd Mold,
Of God inspir'd*—

**The Assertive or Enunciative,**

*The conquer'd also and enslave'd by war
Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose.*

(d) The *Greek* Language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several Modes,
C.VIII. All these Modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the
and all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and consist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of Syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the Syllabic and the Temporal. The Latin, which is but a Species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion of those Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the Auxiliar, summ. The modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each Language the Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the English Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from Write cometh Wrote; from Give, Gave; from Speak, Spake; &c. Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. Do, Am, Have, Shall, Will, May, and Can; which we use sometimes singly,
the Soul and its Affections. Their Peculiarities and Distinctions are in part, as follows.

The Requisitive and Interrogative Modes are distinguished from the Indicative and Potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a Return, to the two former it is always necessary.

If we compare the Requisitive Mode with the Interrogative, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the Return, but in other Peculiarities.

as when we say, I am writing, I have written; sometimes two together, as, I have been writing, I should have written; sometimes no less than three, as I might have been lost, he could have been preserved. But for these, and all other speculations, relative to the Genius of the English Language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of the learned Dr. Lowth, intitled, A Short Introduction to English Grammar.
The Return to the Requisitive is sometimes made in Words, sometimes in Deeds. To the request of Dido to Eneas—

—a primâ dic, hospes, origine nobis
Insidias Danâum—

the proper Return was in Words, that is, in an historical Narrative. To the Request of the unfortunate Chief—date obolum Belsario—the proper Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with respect to the Interrogative, the Return is necessarily made in Words alone, in Words, which are called a Response or Answer, and which are always actually or by implication some definitive assertive Sentence. Take Examples. Whose Verses are these?—the Return is a Sentence—These are Verses of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy Man?—the Return is a Sentence—Brutus was a worthy Man.

And hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity
affinity of this Interrogative Mode with the Indicative, in which last its Response or Return is mostly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the Verb retains the same Form (e), nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the Addition or Absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (f).

**But**

(e) "Πης ἐν ἀφολυμένη οἰσική έγκλισίς, τήν ἐγκλισίναν κατάφασιν ἀποθάλαισα, μεθίσται τῇ καλείσθαι ὀρεική —ἀναπληρωθέοι σε τῆς καταφά-

(f) It may be observed of the Interrogative, that as often as the Interrogation is simple and definite, the Response may be made in almost the same Words,
C.VIII. But to return to our comparison between the Interrogative Mode and the Requisitive.

by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—Are these Verces of Homer?—Response—These Verces are of Homer. Are these Verces of Virgil?—Response—These are not Verces of Virgil. And here the Artifics of Language, for the sake of brevity and dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses; Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative.

But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we say—Are these Verces of Homer, or of Virgil?—much more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general—Whose are these Verces?—we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no Interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately
The Interrogative (in the language of Grammarians) has all Persons of
rately denied. For instance—Are these Verses Homer’s, or Virgil’s? (1.) They are Homer’s.—(2.) They are not Homer’s.—(3.) They are Virgil’s.—(4.) They are not Virgil’s—we may add, (5.) They are of neither. The indefinite Interrogations go still farther; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance—Whose are these Verses? We may answer affirmatively—They are Virgil’s, They are Horace’s, They are Ovid’s, &c.—or negatively—They are not Virgil’s, They are not Horace’s, They are not Ovid’s, and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single Yes, or a single No, which particular is meant among infinite Possibles? These therefore are Interrogations which must be always answered by a Sentence. Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for Answer only the single essential characteristical Word, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when we are asked—How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?—we answer in the short monosyllable, Two; whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have been—Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle.

The
of both Numbers. The Requisitive or Imperative has no first Person of the singular, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in Medes for a person to request or give commands to himself, as it is in Pronouns, for the speaker to become the subject of his own address *

Again, we may interrogate as to all Times, both Present, Past, and Future. Who was Founder of Rome? Who is King of China? Who will discover the Longitude? —But Intreating and Commanding (which are the essence of the Re-

The Antients distinguished these two Species of Interrogation by different names. The simple they called 'Ερώτημα, Interrogatio; the complex, πώςμα, Perćontatio. Ammonius calls the first of these 'Ερώτησις διαλεξινή; the other, 'Ερώτησις πυσματική. See Am. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 100. Diog. Laert. VII. 66. Quintil. Infl. IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.
Requissive Mode) have a necessary respect to the Future (g) only. For indeed what

(g) Apollonius's Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth observing. "Επὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένου ὅ μὴ γεγονότοις ἡ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ: τὸ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ὅ μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιτηδείωτα δὲ ἐχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσοδοι, ΜΕΛΔΟΝΤΟΣ ἐστὶ. A Command has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to the Future. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says—"Ἀπαντᾷ τὰ προσαναλθόντα ἐκεῖμένων ἐχθὶ τὸν τῷ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χαδὸν γάρ ἐν ἑσε ἐστὶ τὸ, ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩΝ, τῷ ΤΙΜΘΟΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρῶν ἑωϊσαι τῇ ἱκελίσει διηλαξάζος, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προσα- 

All Imperatives have a disposition within them, which respects the Future—with regard therefore to Time, it is the same thing to say, Let him, that kills a Tyrant, be honoured, or, he, that kills one, shall be honoured; the difference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is Imperative, the other Indicative or Declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find
what have they to do with the present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary?

It

find his *present* to be nothing else than an immediate *future*, as opposed to a more distant one. *Imperatīvus vero Præsens & Futūrum [Tempus] naturali quādam necessitate vidētur pessē accipere. Eunctīnum imperanum, quœ vel in praesenti statim voluntūs fieri sine aliquā dilatatione, vel in futuro. Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aoristis*. But then these Tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their *temporary* Character, or else are used to insinuate such a *speed of execution*, that the deed should be (as it were) *done*, in the very instant when *commanded*. The same difference seems to subsist between our English Imperative, *be gone*, and those others of, *go*, or *be going*. The first (if we please) may be said the Imperative of the *perfectum*, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our Commands: the others may be said Imperatives of the *future*, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward.

It is thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter first cited, distinguishes between οὐκατέργας τὸς ἀπότειλεν, *go to digging the Vines*, and οὐκατέργας τὸς ἀπότειλεν, *get the Vines dug*. The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς

\[\text{παράτασιν}\]
It is from this connection of Futurity with Commands, that the Future Indicative is sometimes used for the Imperative, and that to say to any one, You shall do this, has often the same force with the Imperative, Do this. So in the Decalogue—Thou shalt not kill—Thou shalt not bear false witness.

παρατάσσων, by way of Extension, or allowance of Time for the work; the second, εἰς συντελεσθον, with a view to immediate Completion. And in another place, explaining the difference between the same Tenses, Σχάπτε and Σχάψων, he lays of the last, ἐ μέγεν τὸ μη γενόμενον σφοστάσσι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γενόμενον εἰν παρατάσσων ἀπαγορεύσει, that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an Extension, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, ΓΡΑΦΕ, Write (for that he is now, and has been long doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ, Get your writing done; make no delays. See Apoll. L. III. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Graec. & Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Latini non cxlimaverunt, &c,
C.VIII. \textit{witness}—which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative Commands.

As to the \textit{Potential Mode}, it is distinguished from all the rest, by its \textit{subordinate} or \textit{subjunctive} Nature. It is also farther distinguished from the \textit{Requisitive} and \textit{Interrogative}, by implying a kind of feeble and weak \textit{Affertion}, and so becoming in some degree susceptible of Truth and Fallhood. Thus, if it be said potentially, \textit{This may be}, or, \textit{This might have been}, we may remark without absurdity, \textit{It is true}, or \textit{It is false}. But if it be said, \textit{Do this}, meaning, \textit{Fly to Heaven}, or, \textit{Can this be done?} meaning, \textit{to square the Circle}, we cannot say in either case, \textit{it is true} or \textit{it is false}, though the Command and the Question are about things impossible. Yet still the \textit{Potential} does not aspire to the \textit{Indicative}, because it implies but a \textit{dubious} and \textit{conjectural} \textit{Affertion}, whereas that §
of the Indicative is absolute, and without reserve.

This therefore (the Indicative I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of Time, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various Past Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its Futures is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Forethought, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its Present Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish necessary Truth; that Truth, which from its nature only exists in the Present; which knows no distinctions.
tinctions either of Past or of Future, but is everywhere and always invariably one (b).

Through

(b) See the quotation, Note (c) Chapter the Sixth. Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non cum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c.

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a Roman of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two sects, as they sprang from the same Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same Persons, such as Themistius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Ammonius, and others. There were no sects of Philosophy, that lay greater stress on the distinction between things existing in Time and not in Time, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from the following Sketch.

"The things, that exist in Time, are those whose Existence Time can measure. But if their Existence may be measured by Time, then there may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence of any one of them, as there may be assumed a number greater than the greatest multitude, that is capable
Through all the above Modes, with their respective Tenses, the Verb being capable of being numbered. And hence it is that things temporary have their Existence, as it were limited by Time; that they are confined within it, as within some bound; and that in some degree or other they all submit to its power, according to those common Phrases, that Time is a destroyer; that things decay through Time; that men forget in Time, and lose their abilities, and seldom that they improve, or grow young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, Time always attends Motion. Now the natural effect of Motion is to put something, which now is, out of that state, in which it now is, and so far therefore to destroy that state.

The reverse of all this holds with things that exist eternally. These exist not in Time, because Time is so far from being able to measure their Existence, that no Time can be assumed, which their Existence doth not surpass. To which we may add, that they feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to damage or dissolution.

To instance in examples of either kind of Being. There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge and the Pyramids. It is likewise true at this instant, that the Diameter of the square is commensurable with its side. What then shall we say? Was there ever
HERMES.

CVIII. considered as denoting an Attribute, has always reference to some Person, or Substance. Thus if we say, Went, or, Go, or Whither goeth, or, Might have gone, we must add a Person or Substance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero went; Caesar might have gone; whither goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor! But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs sometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Persons or Substances. For example—To eat is pleasant; but

"ever a Time, when it was not incommensurable," as
"it is certain there was a Time, when there was no
"Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it daily growing lest
"incommensurable, as we are assured of Decays in both
"those vastly Structures?" From these unchangeable
Truths, we may pass to their Place, or Region; to the
unceasing Intellecction of the universal Mind, ever per-
fect, ever full, knowing no remissions, languors, &c.

Τῷ γὰρ Ναό οἱ μὲν τεῖν ωρίματος, η μὴ τεῖν ὁ δὲ ὁ τέφρας, η
παρ. ἀλλὰ η ἢ μήποτε ὡσεὶ τίνιν, ἢ μὴ τεῖν τεῖν ὁ δὲ τεῖν
ἀλλὰ, ἢ πάντα τεῖν, ἢ μὴ ἀλλοῦ ἄλλα, ἢ πάντα ἂν τέφρας ἢ
but to fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs, To eat, and, To fast, stand alone by themselves, nor is it requisite or even practicable to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence the Latin and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, INFINITIVES. Sanctius has given them the name of Impersonals; and the Greeks that of 'Απαγομένα, from the same reason of their not discovering either Person or Number.

These infinitives go farther. They not only lay aside the character of Attributives, but they also assume that of Substantives, and as such themselves become distinguished with their several Attributes. Thus in the instance above, Pleasant is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, To Eat; Wholesome the attribute attending the Infinitive, To Fast. Examples in Greek and Latin of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce & decorum est pro patria mori.
Sicre tuum nihil est—

M 2

'Qu
THE Stoics in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, that they

(i) It is from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Grammarians have called it sometimes 'Onoma ἕματικον, a verbal Noun; sometimes 'Onoma ὕματος, the Verb's Noun. The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek more evident, from its taking the pre-positive Article before it in all cases; τὸ γεάφειν, τῇ γεάφειν, τῷ γεάφειν. The same construction is not unknown in English.

Thus Spencer,

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake,
Could save the Son of Thetis from to die—

ἄρ'tο τῷ Ἰάνειν. In like manner we say, He did it, to be rich, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Pre-position, For. He did it, for to be rich, the same as if we had said, He did it for gain—ἐσέκα τῷ ἔλευθε, ἐσέκᾳ τῷ νίφως—in French, pour s'enrichir. Even when we speak such Sentences, as the following, I choose to philosophize, rather than to be rich, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βάλομαι, ἦπερ τὸ πληστῆ, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusatives, as if we were to say, I choose philosophy rather than Riches, τῷ—
they held this alone to be the genuine PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and unmixed in the Infinitive only. Thus the Infinitives, Περιπατεῖν, Ambulare, To walk, mean simply that energy, and nothing more. The other Modes, besides expressing this energy, superadd certain Affections, which respect persons and circumstances. Thus Ambulo and Ambula mean not simply To walk, but mean, I walk, and, Walk Thou.

M 3

And

φιλοσοφίαν βέλουμαι, ἦτερ τὸν φιλοσόφον. Thus too Priscian, speaking of Infinitives—Currere enim est Cursus; & Scribere, Scriptura; & Legere, Lectio. Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & alis causalibus, more Nominum; ut Persius,

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, & dicier, bic est.

And soon after—Cum enim dico, Bonum est legere, nihil aliud significo, nifi, Bona est lectio. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See alio Apoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza Gram. L. IV. To ὅτι ἀπαρίστατον, ἐνομίζει εἰς ἤματος Χ. T. Λ.
And hence they are all of them resolvable into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, together with some sentence or word, expressive of their proper Character. Ambulo, I walk; this is, Indico me ambulare, I declare myself to walk. Ambula, Walk Thou; that is, Impero te ambulare, I command thee to walk; and so with the Modes of every other species. Take away therefore the Assertion, the Command, or whatever else gives a Character to any one of these Modes, and there remains nothing more than the mere Infinitive, which (as Priscian says) signifícat ipsam rem, quam continet Verbum (k).

(k) See Apollon. L. III. 13. Ἐπειδὴ ὑάν ταξινυ-
μένον ἀπὸ τίνος ἡ ἀ. See also Gaza, in the note before. Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Ver-
borum (id est, Nomini, quod significat ipsam rem) ha-
bere INFINITIVUM possumus dignoscere; res autem in
Personas distributa fecit alios verbi motus.—Itaque
omnes modi in hum; id est, Infinitivum, transsumuntur
sive resolvuntur. Prisc. L. XVIII. p. 1131. From
these Principles Apollonius calls the Infinitive 'Πᾶς
γενικῶτατον, and Priscian, Verbum generalis.
The application of this Infinitive is somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces with all those Verbs, that denote any Tendence, Desire, or Volition of the Soul, but not readily with others. Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say βέλομαι ζην, Cupio vivere, I desire to live; but not to say ἐσθίω ζην, Edo vivere, or even in English, I eat to live, unless by an Ellipsis, instead of I eat for to live; as we say 'ένεκα τα ζην, or pour vivre. The reason is, that though different Actions may unite in the same Subject, and therefore be coupled together (as when we say, He walked and discoursed) yet the Actions notwithstanding remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to Volitions, and Actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate, that the Volition is unintelligible, till the Action be express. Cupio, Volo, Desidero—I desire, I am willing, I want—What?—The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect.
C.VIII. Cæt. We must help them then by Infinitives, which express the proper Actions to which they tend. Cupio legere, Volo dicere, Desidero videre, I desire to read, I am willing to live, I want to see. Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in sentiment, as in syntax (l).

AND so much for Modes, and their several Species. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their most eminent characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every necessary truth, and every demonstrative syllogism (which last is no more than a combination of such truths) must always be expressed under positive assertions, and as positive

(l) Prisian calls these Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, Verba Voluntativa; they are called in Greek Προώγστικα. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly see Apeionius, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat. p. 685. Ed. Var.

Nec omne ἀπαρίστατον cuicunque Verbo, &c.
positive assertions only belong to the Indicative, we may denominate it for that reason the Mode of Science. Again, as the Potential is only conversant about Contingents, of which we cannot say with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, the Mode of Conjecture. Again, as those that are ignorant and would be informed, must ask of those that already know, this being the natural way of becoming Proficients; hence we may call the Interrogative, the Mode of Proficiency.

Inter cundla leges, & percontabere doctos,
Quid ratione queas traducere leniter orum,
Quid purè tranquillet, &c. Hor.

Further still, as the highest and most excellent use of the Requisitive Mode is legislative

C.VIII. legislative command, we may stile it for this reason the Mode of Legislation. *Ad Divos adeunto caele*, says Cicero in the character of a Roman legislator; *Be it therefore enacted*, say the laws of England; and in the same Mode speak the laws of every other nation. It is also in this Mode that the geometrician, with the authority of a legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and circles described, as preparatives to that science, which he is about to establish.

There are other supposed affections of Verbs, such as Number and Person. But these surely cannot be called a part of their essence, nor indeed are they the essence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Substances. The most that can be said, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which respect the Number and Person of every Substantive, that we may know
know with more precision, in a complex sentence, each particular substance, with its attendant verbal Attributes. The same may be said of Sex, with respect to Adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they respect Beings male or female, tho' Substances past dispute are alone susceptible of sex (n). We therefore pass over these matters, and all of like kind, as

(n) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational a Grammarian as Sanctius, should justly deny Genders, or the distinction of Sex to Adjectives, and yet make Persons appertain, not to Substantives, but to Verbs. His commentator Perizonius is much more consistent, who says—At vero si rem rectè consideres, ipsis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maximè, imò unice inest ipsa Persona; & Verba se habent in Persnonarum ratione ad Nomina planè sicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis autor (Sanetius scil. L. I. c. 7.) & rectè Genus adscribit, exclusis Adjectivis. Sanct Minerv. L. I. c. 12. There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of Sex and Person. There are but two Sexes, that is to say, the Male and the Female; and but two Persons (or Characters essential to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addressed. The third Sex and third Person are improperly so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.
C.VIII. as being rather among the elegancies, than the essentials (0) of language, which essentials are the subject of our present inquiry. The principal of these now remaining is the Difference of Verbs, as to their several Species, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

(0) Whoever would see more upon a subject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly in note (b) of this chapter, may consult Letters concerning Mind, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. John Petavin, Vicar of Ilffington in Devon, a person who, though from his retired situation little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.
Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their other remaining Properties.

All Verbs, that are strictly so called, denote (a) Energies. Now as all Energies are Attributes, they have reference of course to certain energizing Substances. Thus it is impossible there should be such Energies, as To love, to fly, to wound, &c. if there were not such beings as Men, Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is necessarily conversant about some Subject. For example, if we say, Brutus loves—we must needs supply—loves Cato, Cæsius,

(a) We use this word Energy, rather than Motion, from its more comprehensive meaning; it being a sort of Genus, which includes within it both Motion and its Privation. See before, p. 94, 95.
Ch. IX. Cassius, Portia, or some one. The Sword wounds—i.e. wounds Hector, Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And thus is it, that every Energy is necessarily situate between two Substantives, an Energizer which is active, and a Subject which is passive. Hence then, if the Energizer lead the sentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call a Verb active.—Thus we say Brutus amat, Brutus loves. On the contrary, if the passive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call a Verb passive.—Thus we say, Portia amatur, Portia is loved. It is in like manner that the same Road between the summit and foot of the same mountain, with respect to the summit is Ascent, with respect to the foot is Descent. Since then every Energy respects an Energizer or a passive Subject; hence the Reason why every Verb, whether active or passive, has in language a necessary reference
reference to some Noun for its Nominative

Ch. IX.

But to proceed still farther from what has been already observed. Brutus loved Portia.—Here Brutus is the Energizer; loved, the Energy; and Portia, the Subject. But it might have been, Brutus loved Cato, or Cassius, or the Roman Republic; for the Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among these infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer also, as when we say Brutus loved himself, slew himself, &c. in such Case the Energy hath to the same being a double Relation, both active and passive. And this it is which gave rise among

(b) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and modern. See Sanct. Min. L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. Priscian. L. XVIII. p. 1134. Apoll. L. III. sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper Nominative supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character.
among the Greeks to that species of Verbs, called **Verbs middle** (c), and such was their true and original use, however in many instances they may have since happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb still retains its active Form, and the passive Subject (*he or himself*) is expressed like other accusatives.

**Again**, in some Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never passes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, *Caesar walketh, Caesar sitteth*, it is impossible

---

(c) Τὰ γὰς καλέμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπλωσιν ἀνεδέξτο ἐνεργητικῆς ἑκ ἔνθετικῆς διαθέσιν. The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and passive Character. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of the middle verb explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that able Critic Kuster, entitled, *De vero Usu Verborum Mediorum*. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately published.
ble the Energy should pass out (as in the case of those Verbs called by the Grammarians Verbs transitive) because both the Energizer and the Passive Subject are united in the same Person. For what is the cause of this walking or sitting?—It is the Will and Vital Powers belonging to Cæsar. And what is the Subject, made so to move or to sit?—It is the Body and Limbs belonging also to the same Cæsar. It is this then forms that species of Verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call Verbs neuter, as if indeed they were void both of Action and Passion, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather said to imply both. Not however to dispute about names, as these Neuters in their Energizer always discover their passive Subject (c), which other Verbs

(c) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily express by the Terms, 'Αυτοπάθεια and 'Ιδιο-πάθεα, which Priscian renders, quae ex se in se ipsa fit intrinsecus Passio. L. VIII. 790. Consentii Ars apud Putsch. p. 2051.
Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects being infinite; hence the reason why it is as superfluous in these Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars.

It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called Actives, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive character; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, and assume the Form of Neuters, so as to stand by themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects the mere Energy or Affection only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, ἐκ οἴον ἀναγινώσκειν ἅτος, This Man knows not how to read, speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of reading, we must have added them, ἐκ οἴον ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ὀμήρου, He knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or Cicero, &c.

Thus Horace,

*Qui cupit aut metuit, juvat illum sibi domus aut rei,*

*Ut lippum plecte tabula.*

*He that desires or fears (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whose breast*
grammars that **Verbs Active require an Accusative, while Neuters require none.**

Of the above species of Verbs, the Middle cannot be called necessary, because most languages have done without it. **The Species of Verbs** therefore remaining are the Active, the Passive, and the Neuter, and those seem essential to all languages whatever *(d)*.

---

**N 2 THERE**

these affections prevail) **has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.** So Cæsar in his celebrated Laconic Epistle of, **Veni, Vidi, Vici**, where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached Form, as that Neuter itself. **The Glory it seems was in the rapid Sequel of the Events.** Conquest came as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. *When* he saw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boasted. **See Apoll. L. III. c. 31. p. 279.**

*(d) The Stoics, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propositions, considered them under the four following Sorts.*

When
There remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of Energy.

When a Verb, co-inciding with the Nominative of some Noun, made without farther help a perfect affirmative Sentence, as Ἀσκάτις ἔφη, Socrates walketh; then as the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reason Κατηγορία, a Predicable; or else, from its readiness συμπείνειν, to co-incide with its Noun in completing the Sentence, they called it Σύμβασμα, a Co-incider.

When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a perfect affirmative Sentence, yet could not associate with such Noun, but under some oblique Case, as Ἀσκάτει, πενίτει, Socratem penitet: Such a Verb, from its near approach to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Περισύμβασμα or Περικατηγορία.

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun in its Nominative, still required, to complete the Sentiment, some other Noun under an oblique Case, as Πλάτων ὁ ἐλεύθερος Δίος, Plato loveth Dio (where without Dio or some other, the Verb loveth would rest indefinite;
Energy and Motion. But there are some which appear to denote nothing more, than a mere simple Adjective, joined to an Assertion. Thus ἰσάζει in Greek, and Equalleth in English, mean nothing more than

...
than \( \text{albus abest,} \) is equal. So Albeo in Latin is no more than albus sum.

—Campique ingenites \( \text{albus albent.} \) Virg.

The same may be said of Tumeo. Mons tumet, i.e. tumidus est, is tumid. To express the Energy in these instances, we must have recourse to the Inceptives.

Fluctus ut primo ceptit cum albescere Vento. Virg.

Freta ponti
Incipient agitata tumescere. Virg.

There are Verbs also to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in Abstract Nouns (such as Whiteness from White, Goodness from Good) as also in the Infinitive Modes of Verbs, the Attributive is converted into a Substantive; here the Substantive on the contrary is converted into an Attributive. Such are \( \text{kynik} \) from \( \text{kyno}, \) to act the part of a Dog, or be a Cy-
Book the First.

The First.

nie; φιλιππίζω from φιλιππεῖ, to Philip-
pize, or favour Philip; Syllaturire from Sylla, to meditate acting the same part as Sylla did. Thus too the wise and virtuous Emperour, by way of counsel to himself —ὅρα μὴ ἀποκαταστάσεις, beware thou beest not BEcæsar'd; as though he said, Be-
ware, that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle into a mere Cæsar (e). In like manner one of our own witty Poets,

Sternhold himself be Out-Stern-
holded.

And long before him the facetious Fuller, speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary Bi-
shop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says of him, that he out-bonner'd even Bonner himself*.

And so much for that Species of Attributes, called Verbs in the strictest Sense.

(e) Marc. Antonin. L. VI. § 30.
* Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21.

N 4 C H A P.
THE nature of Verbs being understood, that of Participles is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expressive of an Attribute; of Time; and of an Assertion. Now if we take away the Assertion, and thus destroy the Verb, there will remain the Attribute and the Time, which make the essence of a Participle. Thus take away the Assertion from the Verb, ἔγραφε, Writeth, and there remains the Participle, ἔγραφων, Writing, which (without the Assertion) denotes the same Attribute, and the same Time. After the same manner, by withdrawing the Assertion, we discover ἔγραψας in ἔγραψας, ἔγραψαυ in ἔγραψε, for we choose to refer to the Greek, as being of all languages the
Book the First.

the most complete, as well in this respect, as in others.

And so much for Participles (a).

The

(a) The Latins are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in or, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (such as Loquens, Locutus, Locuturus) but none of the Passive. Their Actives ending in O, have Participles of the Present and Future (such as Scribens, and Scripturus) but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles of the Past (such as Scrip tus) but none of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as Scribendus and Docendus for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis—for γεγραμμενος they say, cum scripsisset—for γέγραμμενος, dum scribitur, &c. In English we have sometimes recourse to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenses.

The English Grammar lays down a good rule with respect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Considering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in
Ch. X. The nature of Verbs and Participles being understood, that of Adjectives becomes easy. A Verb implies (as we have said) both an Attribute, and Time, and an Assertion; a Participle only implies an Attribute, and Time; and an Adjective only implies an Attribute; that is to say, in other Words, an Adjective has no Assertion, and only denotes such an Attribute, as has not its essence either in Motion or its Privation. Thus in general the Attributes of quantity, quality, and relation (such as many and few, great and little, in our Language, it seems wrong to annihilate the few Traces, that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, it was wrote, for, it was written; he was drove, for, he was driven; I have went, for, I have gone, &c. in all which instances a Verb is absurdly used to supply the proper Participle, without any necessity from the want of such Word.
Book the First

little, black and white, good and bad, double, treble, quadruple, &c.) are all denoted by Adjectives.

It must indeed be confessed, that sometimes even those Attributes, which are wholly foreign to the idea of Motion, assume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. Of such we gave instances before, in albeo, tumeo, ἵππος, and others. These however, compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few in number, and may be called, if thought proper, Verbal Adjectives. It is in like manner, that Participles insensibly pass too into Adjectives. Thus docēs in Latin, and learned in English, lose their power, as Participles, and mean a Person possessed of an habitual Quality. Thus Vir eloquens means not a man now speaking, but a man, who possesses the habit of speaking, whether he speak or no. So when we say in English, he is a thinking Man, an understanding Man, we mean not a person, whole mind is in actual Energy,
Energy, but whose mind is enriched with a larger portion of those powers. It is indeed no wonder, as all Attributives are homogeneous, that at times the several species should appear to interfere, and the difference between them be scarcely perceptible. Even in natural species, which are congenial and of kin, the specific difference is not always to be discerned, and in appearance at least they seem to run into each other.

We have shewn already (b) in the Instances of Ψιλιππίζεω, Syllaturire, Ἀποκαλωσομαύναι, and others, how Substantives may be transformed into Verbal Attributives. We shall now shew, how they may be converted into Adjectives. When we say the party of Pompey, the stile of Cicero, the philosophy of Soerates, in

(b) Sup. p. 182, 183.
in these cases the party, the style, and the
philosophy spoken of, receive a stamp
and character from the persons, whom
they respect. Those persons therefore
perform the part of Attributes, that is,
stamp and characterize their respective
Subjects. Hence then they actually pass
into Attributes, and assume, as such, the
form of Adjectives. And thus it is we
say, the Pompeian party, the Ciceronian
style, and the Socratic philosophy. It is
in like manner for a trumpet of Brass,
we say, a brazen Trumpet; for a Crown
of Gold, a golden Crown, &c. Even Prono-
minal Substantives admit the like muta-
tion. Thus instead of saying, the Book
of Me, of Thee, and of Him, we say, My
Book, Thy Book, and His Book; instead
of saying the Country of Us, of You, and
of Them, we say, Our Country, Your
Country, and Their Country, which
Words may be called so many Pronomi-
nal Adjectives.
Ch. X. It has been observed already, and must needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no sex (c). And yet their having terminations conformable to the sex, number, and case of their Substantive, seems to have led grammarians into that strange absurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, tho' with respect to these they are perfectly homogeneous; with respect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as both sorts denote Attributes; they are heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, as never properly denoting Substances. But of this we have spoken before (d).

(c) Sup. p. 171.
(d) Sup. C. VI. Note (a). See also C. III. p. 28, &c.
THE Attributives hitherto treated, Ch. X. that is to say, Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives, may be called Attributives of the first Order. The reason of this name will be better understood, when we have more fully discussed Attributives of the second Order, to which we now proceed in the following chapter.
Concerning Attributives of the second Order.

As the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote the Attributes of Substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the Attributes only of Attributes.

To explain by examples in either kind—when we say, Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent; Statius and Virgil both of them wrote; in these instances the Attributives, eloquent, and wrote, are immediately referable to the substantives, Cicero, Virgil, &c. As therefore denoting the Attributes of Substances, we call them Attributives of the first Order. But when we say, Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent; Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably;
in these instances, the Attributives, *Moderately, Exceedingly, Indifferently, Admirably*, are not referable to Substantives, but to other Attributives, that is, to the words, *Eloquent, and Wrote*. As therefore denoting Attributes of Attributes, we call them Attributives of the second order.

Grammarians have given them the Name of *Ἔπιθετα, Adverbia, Adverbs*. And indeed if we take the word 'Ῥήμα, or, *Verb*, in its most comprehensive Signification, as including not only *Verbs* properly so called, but also Participles and Adjectives [an usage, which may be justified by the best authorities (a)] we shall find

(a) Thus Aristotle in his Treatise de Interpretatione, instances Ἀνθρώπως as a *Noun*, and Λέγως as a *Verb*. So Ammonius—κατὰ τὸ τὸ σημαίνόμενον, τὸ μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τοιώτα· ῬΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ὙΓΟΜΑΤΑ. According to this Signification (that is of denoting the Attributes of Substance...
find the name, ἐπίστημα, or Adverb, to be a very just appellation, as denoting a Part of Speech, the natural Appendage of Verbs. So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an Adverb can no more subsist without its Verb, than a Verb can subsist without its Substantive. It is the same here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its existence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its existence requires a solid Body (b).

and the Predicate in Propositions) the words, Fair, Just, and the like, are called Verbs, and not Nouns. Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arisf. de Interp. L. I. c. 1. See also of this Treatise, c. 6. Note (a) p. 87.

In the same manner the Stoics talked of the Participle. Nam Participium connumerantes Verbis, Participiale Verbum vocabant vel Casuale. Priscian, L. I. p. 574.

(b) This notion of ranging the Adverb under the same Genus with the Verb (by calling them both Attributives) and of explaining it to be the Verb's Epithet

§
Among the Attributes of Substance are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we say, a white Garment, a high Mountain. Now some of these Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intension, and Remission. Thus we say, a Garment exceedingly white; a Mountain tolerably high.

or Adjective (by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conformable to the best authorities. Theodore Gaza defines an Adverb, as follows—μέρος λόγος ἀπλωτος, κατὰ θήματος λεγόμενον, ἡ ἐπιλεγόμενον ἡματικ, η ὅτιν εἰπθετον ἡματος. A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective. L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, how properly the Adverb is made an Aporte, since its principal sometimes has cases, as in Valde Sapiens; sometimes has none, as in Valde amat.) Priscian's definition of an Adverb is as follows—Adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellatissimus nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens home; prudenter egit; felix Vir; feliciter vivit. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says—Etiam Adverbia Nominibus vel Verbis connumerabant, & quas adjectiva Verborum nominabant. L. I. p. 574. See also Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 3. sub fin.
HERMES.

Ch. XI. *high, or moderately high.* It is plain therefore that Intension and Remission are among the Attributes of such Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of secondaryAttributives, or Adverbs, to denote these two, that is, *Intension,* and *Remission.* The Greeks have their ἔχωμαις, μάλιστα, ἄνω, ἔνιου; the Latins their valde, vehementer, maximē, satis, mediocriter; the English their greatly, vastly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indifferently, &c.

Farther than this, where there are different Intensions of the same Attribute, they may be compared together. Thus if the Garment A be *exceedingly White,* and the Garment B be *moderately White,* we may say, the Garment A *is more white than the Garment B.*

In these instances the Adverb *More* not only denotes Intension, but *relative Intension.* Nay we stop not here. *We *
not only denote Intention merely relative but relative Intention, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say the Mountain A is more high than the Mountain B, but that it is the most high of all Mountains. Even Verbs, properly so called, as they admit simple Intensions, so they admit also these comparative ones. Thus in the following Example—Fame he loveth more than Riches, but Virtue of all things he loveth most—the Words more and most denote the different comparative Intensions of the Verbal Attributive, Loveth.

And hence the rise of Comparison, and of its different Degrees; which cannot well be more, than the two Species above mentioned, one to denote Simple Excess, and one to denote Superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited Number, when in all subjects, susceptible of Intension, the
intermediate Examples are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of more White, between the first Simple White, and the Superlative, Whitest; the same may be said of more Great, more Strong, more Minute, &c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about three such Degrees, which they call the Positive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their Positive there is † no Comparison at all, and because their Superlative is a Comparative, as much as their Comparative itself. Examples to evince this may be found everywhere. Socrates was the most wise of all the Athenians—Homer was the most sublime of all Poets.—

—Cadit et Ripheus, Justissimus unus
Qui fuit in Teucris— Virg.

† Qui (scil. Gradus Positivus) quoniam perfectus est, a quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Con-
fectui Ars apud Putsch. p. 2022.
It must be confessed these Comparatives, as well the simple, as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative Nature, and only retain their intensive. Thus in the Degree, denoting simple Excess,

Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes. Virg.

Rusticior paulo est— Hor.

In the Superlative this is more usual. Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most learned Man, a most brave Man,—that is to say, not the bravest and most learned Man, that ever existed, but a Man possessing those Qualities in an eminent Degree.

The Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench these Comparative Adverbs, by expressing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of More fair, they say Fairer; instead of Most fair, Fairest, and the same
This Practice however has reached no farther than to Adjectives, or at least to Participles, sharing the nature of Adjectives. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are some Attributives, which admit of Comparison, so there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote that Quality of Bodies arising from their Figure; as when we say, a Circular Table, a Quadrangular Court, a Conical Piece of Metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same Figure, participate it equally, if they participate it at all. To say therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all Attributives, denoting definite Quantities, whether continuous or discrete, whether absolute or relative. Thus the
two-foot Rule A cannot be more a two-foot Rule, than any other of the same length. Twenty Lions cannot be more twenty than twenty Flies. If A and B be both triple, or quadruple to C, they cannot be more triple, or more quadruple, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be no Comparison without Intention and Remission; there can be no Intention and Remission in things always definite; and such are the Attributives, which we have last mentioned.

In the same reasoning we see the cause, why no Substantive is susceptible of these Comparative Degrees. A Mountain cannot be said more to be, or to exist, than a Mole-hill, but the More and Less must be fought for in their Quantities. In like manner when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called more a Lion, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such Attribute. So again, in referring many Species
Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky, more strong*, &c. the Excels, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite—that *Substance is not susceptible of More and Less* (c). But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of Adverbs.

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attributives already mentioned, these denoting Intension or Remission may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once, Twice, Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity discrete*; *More and Most, Less and Least*, to which may be added *Equally, Proportionally, &c.* are

---

(c) ἡ ἐν ἐπιδείχων ἡ ἡσία το μᾶλλον κ' το ἴδιον, Categor. c. 5. See also Sanétius, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also Priscian, p. 598. Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Nominibus Adjec.tivis, &c.
are Adverbs of Relation. There are others of Quality, as when we say, Honestly industrious, Prudently brave, they fought bravely, he painted finely, a Portico formed Circularly, a Plain cut Triangulately, &c.

And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same Essence, assumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ Honest, Honestly, and Honesty. The Answer is, they are in Essence the same, but they differ, in as much as Honest is the Attributive of a Substantive; Honestly, of a Verb; and Honesty, being divested of these its attributive Relations, assumes the Power of a Substantive, so as to stand by itself.

The Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to Verbs of every Species; but there
there are some which are peculiar to Verbs properly so called, that is to say, to such as denote Motion or Energy, with their Privations. All Motion and Rest imply Time and Place, as a kind of necessary Coincidents. Hence then, if we would express the Place or Time of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper Adverbs; of Place, as when we say, he stood there; he went hence; he travelled far, &c.: of Time, as when we say, he stood then; he went afterward; he travelled formerly, &c. Should it be asked—why Adverbs of Time, when Verbs have Tenses? The Answer is, tho' Tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater Distinctions of Time, yet to denote them all by Tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote Yesterday, To-day, Tomorrow, Formerly, Lately, Just now, Now, Immediately, Presently, Soon, Hereafter, &c.? It was this then that made the
the Temporal Adverbs necessary, over and above the Tenses.

To the Adverbs just mentioned may be added those, which denote the Intentions and Remissions peculiar to Motion, such as speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c. as also Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions, such as ów and κατω from ὧν and κατα, in English upward and downward, from up and down. In some instances the Preposition suffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we say, circa equitat, he rides about; prope cecidit, he was near falling; Verum ne post conferas culpam in me, But do not after lay the blame on me (d).

There

There are likewise Adverbs of Interrogation, such as Where, Whence, Whither, How; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their Interrogative power, they assume that of a Relative, so as even to represent the Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun. Thus Ovid,

*Et Seges est, ubi Troja fuit—*

translated in our old English Ballad,

*And Corn doth grow, where Troy town stood.*

That is to say, *Seges est in eo loco, in quo,* &c. Corn groweth in that place, in which, &c. the power of the Relative, being implied in the Adverb. Thus Terence,

*Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,*

*Ubi me excarnusices— Heaut. IV. 6.*

where *ubi* relates to *res*, and stands for *quibus rebus.*
It is in like manner that the Relative Pronoun upon occasion becomes an Interrogative, at least in Latin and English. Thus Horace,

Quem Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri Tibia fumes celebrare, Clio?

So Milton,

Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?

The reason of all this is as follows. The Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, Relatives. Even when they become Interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject, which is antecedent, definite, and known; with an Interrogation, to a Subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown,
known, and which it is expected that the Answer should express and ascertain.

Who first seduced them?

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' unknown, the Pronoun, Who, has a reference.

Th' infernal Serpent——

Here in the Answer we have the Subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the Who in the Interrogation is (we see) as much a Relative, as if it had been said originally, without any Interrogation at all, It was the infernal Serpent, who first seduced them.

And thus is it that Interrogatives and Relatives mutually pass into each other.

And so much for Adverbs, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all Attributives. We have likewise attempted
tempted to explain their general Nature, which we have found to consist in being the Attributes of Attributes. There remains only to add, that Adverbs may be derived from almost every Part of Speech: from Prepositions, as when from After we derive Afterwards—from Participles, and through these from Verbs, as when from Know we derive Knowing, and thence Knowingly; from Scio, Sciens, and thence Scienter—from Adjectives, as when from Virtuous and Vicious, we derive Virtuously and Viciously—from Substantives, as when from \( \pi\theta\mu\eta\sigma \), an Ape, we derive \( \pi\theta\mu\eta\delta\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\ ), to look Apishly; from \( \Lambda\varepsilon\omega\nu \), a Lion, \( \Lambda\varepsilon\tau\nu\tau\delta\varepsilon\sigma\ ), Leoninely—nay even from Proper Names, as when from Socrates and Demosthenes, we derive Socratically and Demosthenically. It was Socratically reasoned, we say; it was Demosthenically spoken.

* Aristotle has \( \kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu \varepsilon\gamma\nu\kappa\omicron \) Cyclopically, from \( \kappa\upsilon\kappa\lambda\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu \) a Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X. 9.
Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, such as Catiliniter from Catilina, Sisenniter from Sisenna, Tullianè from Tullius, &c. (e).

Nor are they thus extensive only in Derivation, but in Signification also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us (f), that Adverbs may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their Infinity, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal Genera. The Stoics too called the Adverb by the name of Πανδιτης, and that from a view to the same multiform Nature. Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessâ sibi rerum variâ potestate. It is thus thatSophipater explains


(f) —διὸ δὴ ὡς ἄριστως εἶναι ὡς τῶν ἐπιρρή-μάτων γίνη Σίσθαι εἰκεῖν, ἐκεῖν, ποιον, ποσοῖν, πρός τι, κ. τ. λ. Gram. Introd. L. II.
explains the Word \((g)\), from whose authority we know it to be \textit{Stoical}. But of this enough.

And now having finished these \textbf{principal parts} of Speech, the \textit{substantive} and the \textit{attributive}, which are \textit{significant} when alone, we proceed to those \textit{auxiliary parts}, which are \textit{only significant}, when associated. But as these make the Subject of a Book by themselves, we here conclude the first Book of this Treatise.

\(\text{\(g\)}}\) \textit{Sesip. Char. p. 175. Edit. Putschii.}
WHAT remains of our Work, is a matter of less difficulty, it being the same here, as in some Historical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an easy labour to design the rest.
Ch. I. **DEFINITIVES**, the Subject of the present Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, "인." They are of two kinds, either those properly and strictly so called, or else the Pronominal Articles, such as This, That, Any, &c.

We shall first treat of those Articles more strictly so denominated, the reason and use of which may be explained, as follows.

The visible and individual Substances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To supply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whose proper Name is not known, we ascertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at least to some Genus. For example—a certain
certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to possess the powers of Self-motion and Sensation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it Dog, or Horse, or Lion, or the like. If none of these Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, Animal.

But this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? Known, or unknown? Seen now for the first time, or seen before, and now remembered?—It is here we shall discover the use of the two Articles (A) and (The). (A) respects our primary Perception, and denotes Individuals as unknown; (The) respects our secondary Perception, and denotes Individuals as known. To explain by an example—I see an object pass by, which I never saw
faw till now. What do I say?—*There goes a Beggar with a long Beard.* The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I say then?—*There goes the Beggar with the long Beard.* The Article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered.

Yet mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, once vague, is now recognized as *something known*, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of *previous acquaintance*, by referring the present Perception to a like Perception already past (*a*).

The Truth is, the Articles (*A*) and (*The*) are both of them *definitives*, as they circumscribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the most

---

(*a*) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64.
most part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itself unascertained, whereas the Article (The) ascertains the Individual also, and is for that reason the more accurate Definitive of the two.

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the Greeks have no Article correspondent to it, but supply its place, by a negation of their Article, 'O. 'O ανθρωπος ἔπεσεν, THE man fell — ανθρωπος ἔπεσεν, A Man fell, without anything prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (b). Even in English, where the Article

(b) Τὸ γὰρ ἀφιεμένως πότε νόμιμα, η τῷ ἄθροι
παράδεισις ὑπὸ ἀριστοῦ τῷ προσώπῳ ἄγει. These things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Person. Apoll. L. IV. c. i. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ωσι (τὸ Ἀθροίνεον ἐκ.) δ' ἀνα-
πίλησιν
Article (A) cannot be used, as in plurals, its force is express by the same Negation. *These are the Men*, means those are Individuals, of which we possess some previous Knowledge. *These are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are so many vague and uncertain Individuals, just as the Phrase, *A Man*, in the singular, implies one of the same number.

**But**

The Article causes a Review within the Mind of something known before the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says "*Andrew και ἦν, Man came* (which is the same, as when we say in English *A man came*) it is not evident, of whom he speaks. But if he says *ὁ ἄνδρος και ἦν, The man came*, then it is evident; for he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge together. Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.
But tho' the Greeks have no Article correspondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their 'O, to the Article, THE. 'O βασιλεύς, THE King; TO δῶρον, THE Gift, &c. Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the Greek Article, as they are described by Apollonius, one of the earliest and most acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining.

"Εσιν ὡν καθο ἂς ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἄρθρον ἡ ἀναφορὰ, ἡ ἐσι χρονατελεγένειν πρὸς ἑιρατικὴν.—Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which implies some certain Person already mentioned. Again—'Ον γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὅνοματα ἐκ αὐτῶν ἀναφορὰν ἡμῖν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοι τὸ ἄρθρον, ἢ ἐξαιρέτος ἐσιν ἡ ἀναφορὰ. For Nouns of themselves imply not Reference, unless they take to them the Article,
Ch. I.  
ticle, whose peculiar Character is Reference. Again—
—The Article indicates a pre-established acquaintance (c).

His reasoning upon Proper Names is worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells us) often fall into Homonymie, that is, different Persons often go by the same Name. To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse to Adjectives or Epithets. For example—there were two Grecian chiefs, who bore the name of Ajax. It was not therefore without reason, that Menebeus uses Epithets, when this intent was to distinguish the one of them from the other.

(€) Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of Reference is as follows—Ιδίωμα αναφερόν προκειμένως χροσώπω δευτερα γνώσις. The peculiar character of Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.
Book the Second.

If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, — at least alone
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.

Apollonius proceeds—Even Epithets themselves are diffused thro’ various Subjects, in as much as the same Adjective may be referred to many Substantives.

In order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to say the Adjective as well as the Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes an Article before it, that it may indicate a Reference to some single Person only, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορᾷ, according to the Author’s own Phrase. And thus it is we say, Τρυφόν ὁ Γραμματικός, Trypho the Grammarian; Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, Apollodorus the Cyrenean, &c. The Author’s Conclusion of this
HERMES.

Ch. I. this Section is worth remarking. Δεύτερος ἄρα κ' οὐκ ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ ψευδαίμων ἐστὶν ἀφθονίᾳ, συνειδήσει τὸ ἐπιθετικὸ τὸ κυρίον εὐφωματι—It is with reason therefore that the Article is here also added, as it brings the Adjective to an Individuality, as precise, as the proper Name (d).

We may carry this reasoning farther, and shew, how by help of the Article even common Appellatives come to have the force of proper Names, and that unassisted by epithets of any kinds. Among the Athenians Πλοῖον meant Ship; 'Eleven; and 'Anθρωπός, Man. Yet add but the Article, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, THE SHIP, meant that particular Ship, which they sent annually to Delos; 'Ο 'Eleven, THE ELEVEN, meant certain Officers of Justice; and 'Ο 'Anθρωπός, THE MAN, meant their public Executioner. So in English, City, is a Name

(d) See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by mistake Menebalus is put for Menelebus.
Name common to many places; and Speaker, a Name common to many Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, the City means our Metropolis; and the Speaker, a high Officer in the British Parliament.

And thus it is by an easy transition, that the Article, from denoting Reference, comes to denote Eminence also; that is to say, from implying an ordinary pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal Notoriety. Thus among the Greeks ὁ Ποιητής, the Poet, meant Homer (e); and ὁ Σταγίριτης, the Stagirite, meant Aristotle; not that there were

(e) There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle twice denotes Euripides by the Phrase ὁ Ἑρυπίδης, once at the end of the seventh Book of his Nicomachian Ethics, and again in his Physics, L. II. 2. Plato also in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. Edit. Serr.) denotes Hesiod after the same manner.
were not many Poets, beside Homer; and many Stagirites, beside Aristotle; but none equally illustrious for their Poetry and Philosophy.

It is on a like principle that Aristotle tells us, it is by no means the same thing to assert — ἐὰν τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀγαθὴν, or, ΤΟ ἀγαθὸν — that, Pleasure is A Good, or, The Good. The first only makes it a common Object of Desire, upon a level with many others, which daily raise our wishes; the last supposes it that supreme and sovereign Good, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (f).

But to pursue our Subject. It has been said already that the Article has no meaning, but when associated to some other word.—To what words then may it be associated?—To such as require defining, for

for it is by nature a Definitive.—And what Words are these?—Not those which already are as definite, as may be. Nor yet those, which, being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwise. It remains then they must be those, which though indefinite, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming definite.

Upon these Principles we see the reason, why it is absurd to say, Ο ΕΓΩ, ΤΗΕ I, or Ο ΣΥ, ΤΗΕ Thou, because nothing can make those Pronouns more definite, than they are (g). The same may be asserted of

(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun’s Definition, to refuse coalescence with the Article. Ἐχεῖν ἐν Ὁνυμαία, τὸ μετὰ δέιξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντικομαζόμενον, ὡς ἡ σύνετι τὸ άρθρον. That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with which the Article doth not associate. L. II. c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns—Πᾶν ἐς ἐκ ἕπιδικοὶς ἀρθρον. L. IV. Priscian says the same. Jure igitur apud Q.
of Proper Names, and though the Greeks say ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Εὐδοκία, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say in Greek Οἱ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in English, The both, because these Words in their own nature are each of them perfectly defined, so that to define them farther would be quite superfluous. Thus, if it be said, I have read both Poets, this plainly indicates a definite pair, of whom some mention has been made already; Δυος ἐγνωσµέν, a known Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself, (b) when he speaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be said, I have read Two Poets, this may mean any Pair out

---

apud Graecos prima et secunda persona pronominum, quae sine dubio demonstrativae sunt, articulis adjungit non posunt; nec tertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true reason of this. Supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas Pronomen.

(b) Apollon. L. I. c. 16.
out of all that ever existed. And hence, this Numeral, being in this Sense * indefinite* (as indeed are all others, as well as itself) is forced to assume the Article, whenever it would become definite *. And thus it is, The Two in English, and OI ΔΥΟ in Greek, mean nearly the same thing, as Both or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence also it is, that as Two, when taken alone, has reference to some primary and indefinite Perception, while the Article, The, has reference to some secondary and definite †; hence I say the Reason, why it is bad Greek to say ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad English, to say Two the men. Such Syntax is in fact a Blending of Incompatibles.

* This explains Servius on the XIIth Æneid. v. 511. where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amborum. In English or Greek the Article would have done the business, for the Two, or των άνω are equivalent to Both or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, but not so Duorum, because the Latins have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.
compatibles, that is to say of a defined Substantive with an undefined Attributive. On the contrary to say in Greek ἈΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in English, BOTH THE MEN, is good and allowable, because the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itself. So likewise, it is correct to say, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, because here the Article, being placed in the beginning, extends its Power as well through Substantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to define them both.

As some of the words above admit of no Article, because they are by Nature as definite as may be, so there are others, which admit it not, because they are not to be defined at all. Of this sort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we question about Substances, we cannot say Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ.
ΟΤΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (i). The same as to Qualities and both kinds of Quantity. We say without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in English, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reason is, that the Articles 'Ο, and the, respect Beings, already known; Interrogatives respect Beings, about which we are ignorant; for as to what we know, Interrogation is superfluous.

In a word the natural Associators with Articles are all those common Appellatives, which denote the several Genera and Species of Beings. It is these, which, by assuming a different Article, serve either to explain an Individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (k).

Q_3

(i) Apollonius calls ΤΙΣ, ἐνυπιωτατον τῶν ἄθεων, a Part of Speech, most contrary, most averse to Articles, L. IV. c. i.

(k) What is here said respects the two Articles which we have in English. In Greek, the Article does no more, than imply a Recognition. See before p. 216, 217, 218.
We shall here subjoin a few instances of the Peculiar Power of Articles.

Every Proposition consists of a Subject, and a Predicate. In English these are distinguished by their Position, the Subject standing first, the Predicate last. Happiness is Pleasure—Here, Happiness is the Subject; Pleasure, the Predicate. If we change their order, and say, Pleasure is Happiness; then Pleasure becomes the Subject, and Happiness the Predicate. In Greek these are distinguished not by any Order or Position, but by help of the Article, which the Subject always assumes, and the Predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. Happiness is Pleasure—ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐυδαιμονία—Pleasure is Happiness—ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐυδαιμονία—

Every things are difficult—χαλέπα τὰ καλά—Difficult things are fine—τὰ χαλέπα καλά.
In Greek it is worth attending, how in the same Sentence, the same Article, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιαζότας ἐτιμήθη—Ptolemy, having presided over the Games, was publicly honoured. The Participle γυμνασιαζότας has here no other force, than to denote to us the Time, when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the Games. But if, instead of the Substantive, we join the Participle to the Article, and say, Ὁ γυμνασιαζότας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—The Ptolemy, who presided over the Games, was honoured. The Participle in this case, being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (l).

(l) Apollon. L. I. c. 33, 34.
In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the Sense is changed by changing of the Articles, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—

*And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the Man.* In that single the, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reason is contained. By that alone are the Premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this Assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the Article, and then see what will become of the Prophet and his reasoning.—*And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a Man.* Might not the King well have demanded upon so impertinent a position,

*Non dices bodie, quorsum hæc tam putidæ pendent?*

But

*ΣΤ ΕΙ Ὀ ΑΝΗΡ.* Βασιλ. B. κεφ. λε. 16.
But enough of such Speculations. The only remark, which we shall make on them, is this; that "minute Change in "PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in "EFFECTS; so that we are PRINCIPLES "intitled to our regard, however in ap- "pearance they may be trivial and low."

The ARTICLES already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as, This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, No, or None, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (m), where

(m) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been some view of words, like that here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue—
Noster sermo Articuloros non desiderat; idesque in alios partes orationis sparguntur. Infl. Orat. L. I. c. 4.
So Scaliger. His declaratis, satis conflat Graecorum Articulos non neglegetis a nobis, sed eorum usum super-
fluum. Nam ubi aliquid praebendum est, quod Graeci per articulum efficient (ἐκείνοι ὁ δὲλος) expetunt a Latinis per Is aut ILLE; Is, aut, Ille servus dixit, de
where we have shewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the Essence of an Article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing else, and as such should be considered in Universal Grammar. Thus when we say, this Picturc I approve, but that I dislike, what do we perform by the help of these Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, Some men are virtuous, but Al! men are mortal, what is the natural Effect of this All and Some, but to define that Universality, and Particularity, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them

---

de quo serva antea facla mentio sit, aut qui alio quo ?ada notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, ejus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad prescribendum intellectionem, quae latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus, C. Cæsar, Is qui postea diölator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Graecæ Kaíta ὁ ᾄ-\[\text{to}-\]nys\[\text{at}o\]. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.
them away? The fame is evident in such sentences, as—some substances have sensation; others want it—chuse any way of acting, and some men will find fault, &c. For here some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different parts of a given whole; some, to denote a definite part; any, to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,

Excudent alii spirantia molliüs aerā;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
Orabunt causas meliūs, cælique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane,
memento, &c. Æn. VI.

Nothing
Ch. I. Nothing can be stronger or more sublime, than this Antithesis; one \( \text{et} \) set as equal to many other \( \text{et} \)s taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is \( \text{Tu Romane} \), not \( \text{Vos Romani} \)) to all other Men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of \( \text{Alii} \) to \( \text{Tu} \).

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of Connectives.
Concerning Connectives, and first those called Conjunctions.

Connectives are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either Sentences or Words, are called by the different Names of Conjunctions, or Prepositions. Of these Names, that of the Preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the Conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the Conjunction first, because it connects not Words, but Sentences. This is conformable to the Analysis, with which we began this inquiry*, and which led us,

* Sup. p. II, 12.
us, by parity of reason, to consider *Sentences themselves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a *Conjunction* is as follows—a *Part of Speech*, void of *Signification* itself, but so formed as to help *Signification*, by making two or more *Significant Sentences* to be one *significant Sentence* (a).

(a) Grammarians have usually considered the *Conjunction* as connecting rather single *Parts of Speech*, than whole *Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c. This *Sanctius* justly explodes. *Conjunction neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsae enim partes inter se conjunguntur—sed conjunctione Orationes inter se conjungit.* Minar. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed *Scaliger*, who had asserted the same before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconfultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsae enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur)—sed *Conjunction est, quae* conjungit *Orationes plurum.* De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 165.
Book the Second.

This therefore being the general Idea of Conjunctions, we deduce their Species in

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius, who in the several places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sentences, and not Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support Scaliger and Sanclius, and that is Aristotle's Definition, as the Passages have been corrected by the best Critics and Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἵνα ἁκούσην μὲν φωνὰν μίας, σημαντικῶν ἡ, ποιεῖν τινὶ νῦν μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικὴν. An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is considered as one, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men are by nature social, it is their Interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the Laws
Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences.
(1.) Men are by nature social. (2.) It is Man's Interest to be just. (3.) It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man should be just. The first two of these Sentences are made One by the Conjunction; If; these, One with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, Tho'; and the three, thus united, make that ἑν μία σημασία, that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same Subject. Ὅ γὰρ σύνεσις ἐν χωρὶ ἔστω τὸ σωλήνα. ὢς εἰπεν ἡγεῖσθη, ἐπειδὴ ὅτι τὰν ἄνθρωπον ἐστιν τὸ ἐν σωλήνα. The Conjunction makes many; one; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, ἡλθον, ἀπίστησα, ἔδειμν, ώσι, οccurrι, ῥηγανι, where by the way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, (for ἡλθον, ἀπίστησα, and ἔδειμν, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective faculty.
also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two Sentences—
Rome was enslaved—Caesar was ambitious—and connect them together by the Conjunction, BECAUSE. Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Caesar was ambitious. Here the Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say,—Manners must be reformed, or Liberty will be lost—here the Conjunction, or, though it join the

Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὸ ἐὰν τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὑπάρχειν μίαν ομοίωσιν, ὁ μετὰ τὸν ἐν τῷ μονάδω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, ἔσται τὸ τῶν ἐντολῶν οὐκ ἂν ὑπέρ τῆς μᾶλλον ἀναλογικὰ τὰς ὑπάρχεις δηλῶν, ἐνά (lege διὰ) τωθὲ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἰσοβαίνως ποιοὶ, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ ὑπὶ τῇ ἐν πολλῶν ὑποκειμένη ξύλων, ὡποὶ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένω ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἐνωσιν. Of Sentences that, which denotes one Existence simply, and which is strictly one, may be considered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet seved, and called on this account One. That, which denotes several Existences, and which appears to be made one by some Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity. Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54. 6.
Ch. II. the Sentences, yet as to their respective Meanings, is a perfect Disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions conjoin Sentences, yet with respect to the Sense, some are Conjunctive, and some Disjunctive; and hence (b) it is that we derive their different Species.

The Conjunctions, which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings, are either Copulatives, or Continuatives. The principal Copulative in English is, And. The Continuatives are, If, Because, Therefore, That, &c. The Difference between these is this—The Copulative does no more than barely couple Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whose Natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate Sen-

(b) Thus Scaliger. Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero dis-jungunt. De C. L. Lat. c. 167.
Sentences into one continuous Whole, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an essential Co-incidence.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to say, *Lysippus was a Statuary, and Priscian was a Grammarian*—*The Sun shineth, and the Sky is clear*—because these are things that may co-exist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, *Lysippus was a Statuary, because Priscian was a Grammarian; tho' not to say, the Sun shineth, because the Sky is clear.* The Reason is, with respect to the first, *the Co-incidence is merely accidental*; with respect to the last, it is *essential,* and founded in nature. And so much for the Distinction between Copulatives and Continuatives (c).

(c) *Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Sensum.* Thus *Priscian, p. 1026.* But *Scaliger is more explicit—si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessario,*
Ch. II. As to Continuatives, they are either **Suppositive**, such as, **If**; or **Positive**, such as, **Because**, **Therefore**, **As**, **&c.**

Take Examples of each—**you will live happily**, *if you live honestly*—**you live happily, because you live honestly**. The Difference between these Continuatives is this—**The Suppositives** denote **Connection**, but assert not actual **Existence**; the **Positives** imply both the one and the other (d).

**FARThER**

**necessario, aut non necessario, et si non necessario, tum**

**funt Copulativa, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of Continuatives is as follows.**

**Continuativa sunt, qua continuationem & consequentiam rerum significant**—ibid. Scaliger's account is—causam aut praestitununt, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the Copulative was Συνδεσμος & συνεξελεξικώς; for the Continuative, συναπτικώς; the Etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

(d) The old Greek Grammarians confined the name Συναπτικώς, and the Latin** that of Continuativa, to
Farther than this, the Positives above mentioned are either causal, such as, Because, Since, As, &c. or collective, such as, Therefore, Wherefore, Then, &c. The Difference between these is this—The Causes subjoin Causes to Effects—The Sun is in Eclipse.

those Conjunctions, which we have called Suppositive or Conditional, while the Positive they called παρασυναπτικος, or Subcontinuative. They agree however in describing their proper Characters. The first according to Gaza are, οi υπαρξιν μεν ε, αξιολαθειν δε τινα kε ταξιν δηλαντες—L. IV. Priscian says, they signify to us, qualis est ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquâ essentia rerum—p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin sine subjunctio necessaria; potest enim subjicere & non subjicere; utrumque enim admitunt. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Positive, or παρασυναπτικος (to use his own name) Gaza tells us, οτι υπαρξιν μετα ταξις σημαινεσιν ζτοιγε—And Priscian says, causam continuationis osendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum—And Scaliger, non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subjicit, conjungunt. Ibid.
BECAUSE the Moon intervenes—The Collectives subjoin Effects to Causes—The Moon intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in Eclipse. Now we use Causals in those instances, where, the Effect being conspicuous, we seek its Cause; and Collectives, in Demonstrations, and Science properly so called, where the Cause being known

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the Positive Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordinate to the Suppositive, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive are confined to what actually is; the Suppositive extend to Possibles, nay, even as far as to Impossibles? Thus it is false to affirm, As it is Day, it is Light, unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, If it be Day, it is Light, because the, If, extends to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks. Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion—amplitudinem Continuative percipio ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando praesupponit. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.
known first, by its help we discern consequences (c).

All these Continuatives are resolvable into Copulatives. Instead of, Because it is Day, it is light, we may say, It is Day, and it is Light. Instead of, If it be Day, it is Light, we may say, It is at the same time necessary to be Day, and to be Light; and so in other Instances. The Reason is, that the Power of the Copulative extends to all Connections, as well to the essential, as to the casual or fortuitous. Hence therefore the Continuative may be resolved into a Copulative and something more, that is to say, into a Copulative implying an essential Co-incidence (f) in the Subjects conjoined.

R 4

(c) The Latins called the Causals, Causales or Causativae; the Collectives, Collectiva or Illativa: The Greeks called the former Ἀποτολογικοὶ, and the latter Συλλογιστικοὶ.

(f) Resolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Causa cum Effectu Suápte naturâ con-

juncta est. Scal. de C, L, Lat. c. 169.
As to Causal Conjunctions (of which we have spoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Causes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, the Material Cause—The Trumpet sounds, because it is made of Metal—The formal—The Trumpet sounds, because it is long and hollow—The efficient—The Trumpet sounds, because an Artist blows it—The final—The Trumpet sounds, that it may raise our courage.

Where it is worth observing, that the three first Causes are expressed by the strong affirmation of the Indicative Mode, because if the Effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last Cause has a different Mode, namely, the Contingent or Potential. The Reason is, that the Final Cause, tho' it may be first in Speculation, is always last in Event. That is to say, however it may be the End, which set the Artist first to work, it may still be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which,
Book the Second.

which, like other Contingents, may either happen, or not (g). Hence also it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as, That, \\', Ut, &c.

The Sum is, that all Conjunctions, which connect both Sentences and their Meanings, are either Copulative, or Continuative; the Continuatives are either Conditional, or Positive; and the Positives are either Causal or Collective.

And now we come to the Disjunctive Conjunctions; a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, because, while they disjoin the Sense, they conjoin the Sentences (b).

With

(g) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol. I Note XVII. p. 280.

(b) 'Oι δε διαζευγμικοι τα διαζευγματα συνεδρια
και ἡ πραγμα ἀπὸ πραγµατε, ἡ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προσωπε διαζευγμουτε, την φρασιν ἐπισυνδεσιν.
Gaza
With respect to these we may observe, that as there is a Principle of Union diffused throughout all things, by which this Whole is kept together, and preserved from Dissipation; so there is a Principle of Diversity diffused in like manner, the Source of Distinction, of Number, and of Order (i).

Now

Gaza Gram. L. IV. Disjunctivae sunt, quae, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent. Prisc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intellecction be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly synthetical, as any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. I. Note (b). p. 3.

(i) The Diversity, which adorns Nature, may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some things only differ, when considered as Individuals, but if we recur to their Species, immediately lose all Distinction: such for instance are Socrates and Plato. Others differ as to Species, but as to Genus are the
Now it is to express in some degree the Modifications of this Diversity, that Disjunctive Conjunctions seem first to have been invented.

Of these Disjunctives, some are Simple, some Adversative—Simple, as when we say, either it is Day, or it is the same: such are Man and Lion. There are others again, which differ as to Genus, and co-incide only in those transcendental Comprehensions of Ens, Being, Existence, and the like: such are Quantities and Qualities, as for example an Ounce, and the Colour, White. Lastly all Being whatever differs, as Being, from Non-being.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diversity, there is an appearance of Opposition with respect to each other, in as much as each thing is itself, and not any of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this Opposition is not the same. In Relatives, such as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cause and Effect, in these it is more striking, than in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In Contraries, such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad,
HERMES.

Ch. II. is Night—Adversative, as when we say, It is not Day, but it is Night. The Difference between these is, that the simple do no more, than merely disjoin; the Adversative disjoin, with an Opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the Adversative are definite; the Simple, indefinite. Thus when we say, The Number of Three is not an

Bad, Virtuous and Vicious, in these the Opposition goes still farther, because these not only differ, but are even destructive of each other. But the most potent Opposition is that of Ἀνθρώπου, or CONTRADICTION, when we oppose Proposition to Proposition, Truth to Falsehood, ascertaining of any Subject, either it is, or it is not. This indeed is an Opposition, which extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable must needs have its Negative, though multitudes by nature have neither Relatives, nor Contraries.

Besides these Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deserve notice: such for instance, as the Diversity between the Name of a thing, and its Definition; between the various Names, which belong to the same thing, and the various things, which are denoted by the same Name; all which Diversities upon occasion become a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.
an even Number, but an odd, we not only disjoin two opposite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we say, The Number of the Stars is either even or odd, though we assert one Attribute to be, and the other not to be, yet the Alternative notwithstanding is left indefinite. And so much for simple Disjunctives (k).

As

(k) The simple Disjunctive ἡ, or Τei, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is used definitely, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous, and has the same force with η ἢ οὐ, or, Et non. It is thus Gaza explains that Verse of Homer.

Βάλομεν ἵνα λα ῥᾳ σῶν ἐμπεύειν, ἴπτανον ἀπολέσθαι.  
I. A.

That is to say, I desire the people should be saved, and not be destroyed, the Conjunction ἡ being ἀναγερικός, or sublative. It must however be confess, that this Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of μᾶλλον, or οὕτως, concerning which see the Commentators.
As to Adversative Disjunctives, it has been said already that they imply Opposition. Now there can be no Opposition of the same Attribute, in the same Subject, as when we say, Nireus was beautiful; but the Opposition must be either of the same Attribute in different Subjects, as when we say, Brutus was a Patriot, but Caesar was not—or of different Attributes in the same Subject, as when we say, Gorgias was a Sophist, but not a Philosopher—or of different Attributes in different Subjects, as when we say, Plato was a Philosopher, but Hippias was a Sophist.

The Conjunctions used for all these purposes may be called Absolute Adversatives.

But there are other Adversatives, besides these; as when we say, Nireus was more beautiful, than Achilles—Virgil was as
As great a Poet, as Cicero was an Orator.

The Character of these latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only Opposition, but that Equality or Excess, which arises among Subjects from their being compared. And hence it is they may be called Adversatives of Comparison.

Besides the Adversatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the most eminent are unless and altho'. For example—Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved—Troy will be taken, altho' Hector defend it. The Nature of these Adversatives may be thus explained. As every Event is naturally allied to its Cause, so by parity of reason it is opposed to its Preventive. And as every Cause is either adequate (I) or in-adequate (in-

(I) This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is any Cause at all.
Ch. II. (in-adequate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) so in like manner is every Preventive. Now adequate Preventives are express by such Adversatives, as unless—Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved; that is, this alone is sufficient to prevent it. The In-adequate are express by such Adversatives, as altho'—Troy will be taken, altho' Hector defend it; that is, Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual.

The Names given by the old Grammarians to denote these last Adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their Natures (m). They may be better perhaps called Adversatives Adequate, and In-adequate.

And thus it is that all Disjunctives, that is Conjunctions, which conjoin Sentences,

(m) They called them for the most part, without sufficient Distinction of their Species, Adversatives, or 'Evantia(adversati)'.

tences, but not their Meanings, are either Simple or Adversative; and that all
Adversatives are either Absolute or Comparative; or else Adequate or Inadequate.

We shall finish this Chapter with a few miscellany Observations.

In the first place it may be observed, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the same Disjunctive appears to have greater or less force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by Nature. For example, if we say, Every Number is even, or odd—Every Proposition is true, or false—nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the Disjunctive, because no things are in Nature more incompatible than the Subjects. But if we say, That Object is, a Triangle, or Figure contained under three right lines—the (or) in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than distinctly to express the Thing, first by its Name,
Name, and then by its Definition. So if we say, *That Figure is a Sphere, or a Globe, or a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this case, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the several Names, which belong to the same Thing (*n*).

Again—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the same nature, such as, *Whence, Wherever, Whither, Whenever, Where*, &c. may be properly called Adverbal Conjunctions, because they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions—of Conjunctions, as they conjoin Sentences.

(*n*) The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, which they called Subdisjunctiva, a Subdisjunctive; and that was *Sive*. *Alexander sive Paris; Mars sive Mavors*. The Greek *Etit* *ετ* seems to answer the same end. Of these Particles, Scaliger thus speaks—*Et sive nomen Subdisjunctivum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivae. Nam Disjunctioe sunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctiae autem etiam in non Contrariis, sed Diversissimantium; ut, Alexander sive Paris.* De C. L. Latc. 170.
tences; of Adverbs, as they denote the Attributes either of Time, or of Place.

Again—these Adverbial Conjunctions, and perhaps most of the Prepositions (contrary to the Character of accessory Words, which have strictly no Signification, but when associated with other words) have a kind of obscure Signification, when taken alone, by denoting those Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like Zoophytes in Nature; a kind of (o) middle Beings, of amphibious character, which, by sharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (p).

And


(p) It is somewhat surprizing that the politeft and most elegant of the Attic Writers, and Plato above all

S 2
And so much for conjunctions, their genus, and their species.

the rest, should have their works filled with particles of all kinds, and with conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a particle, or conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is connection in the meaning, there must be words had to connect; but that where the connection is little or none, such connectives are of little use? That houses of cards, without cement, may well answer their end, but not those houses, where one would choose to dwell? Is this the cause? or have we attained an elegance, to the antients unknown?

Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c.
Concerning those Connectives, called Prepositions.

Prepositions by their name express their Place, but not their Character. Their Definition will distinguish them from the former Connectives. A Preposition is a Part of Speech, devoid itself of Signification, but so formed as to unite two Words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves (a).

This

(a) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος, Præpositiva Conjunction, a Prepositive Conjunction. "Ως μὲν ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμιοφθεῖσις τῷ προθετικῷ Σύνδεσμῳ συνδέοντας γίνομαι παρεμφατικά, λέγει οὖν ἡμῖν ἐν ἑν ἐν ἁφομην ὑφηται παρὰ τοῖς Στοιχεῖοι τῇ καλεῖται οὕτως Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος. Now in what manner even in other applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence
This connective Power, (which relates to Words only, and not Sentences) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Morter and the Stone coalesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities coalesce immediately with their Substances. Thus it is we say, a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain; and from this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident, arises the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective. In like

whence too the Stoics took occasion to call them Prepositive Conjunctions. Apollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive Sketch, than a complete Definition, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See Gaz. L. IV. de Præposit. Priæ. L. XIV. p. 983.
like manner Actions co-alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their Patients. Thus it is we say, Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered. Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, Agent, Energy, and Patient, co-alesce with the same facility; as when we say, Alexander conquers Darius. And hence, that is from these Modes of natural Co-alescence, arises the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accusative by its Verb. Farther than this, Attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such Attributives as ran, beautiful, learned, he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c. And hence the Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjectives.

The general Conclusion appears to be this. "Those Parts of Speech unite "of themselves in Grammar, whose "original Archetypes unite of
"Themselves in Nature." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that the great Objects of Natural Union are Substance and Attribute. Now tho' Substances naturally co-incide with their Attributes, yet they absolutely refuse doing so, one with another (b). And hence those known Maxims in Physics, that Body is impenetrable; that two Bodies cannot possess the same place; that the same Attribute cannot belong to different Substances, &c.

From these Principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the Substantive without difficulty co-incides with the Verb, from the natural Co-incidence of Substance and Energy—The Sun warmeth. So likewise the Energy with the Subject,

(b) Causa, propter quam duo Substantiva non ponuntur sine copulâ, e Philosophiâ petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter unum esse poteft, sicut Substantia et Accidens; itaque non dicas, Cæsar, Catopugnat, Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 177.
Book the Second.

Subiect, on which it operates — warmerth the Earth. So likewise both Substance and Energy with their proper Attributes.—The Splendid Sun,—generally warmerth — the fertile Earth. But suppose we were desirous to add other Substantives, as for instance, Air, or Beams. How would these coincide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as Nominatives or Accusatives, for both those places are already filled; the Nominative by the Substance, Sun; the Accusative by the Substance, Earth. Not as Attributes to these last, or to any other thing; for Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made. Here then we perceive the Rife and Use of Prepositions. By these we connect those Substantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume for instance a pair of these Connectives, Thro', and With, and mark their Effect upon the Substances here mentioned. The Splendid Sun with his Beams genially warmerth
Ch. III. warmeth thro' the Air the fertile Earth.
The Sentence, as before, remains intire and one; the Substantives required are both introduced; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must here be observed that most, if not all Prepositions seem originally formed to denote the Relations of Place (c). The reason is, this is that grand Relation, which Bodies or natural Substances maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at rest.

It may be said indeed that in the Continuity of Place they form this Universe or

---

(c) Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare spus fuit aliquá nota, quæ TO NOT significaret, fīve esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, fīve esset in aliter extremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus Prepositionis essentialem definitionem. Scal. de Caufl. Ling. Lat. c. 152.
of visible Whole, and are made as much One by that general Comprehension, as is consistent with their several Natures, and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we have Prepositions to denote the contiguous Relation of Body, as when we say, Cains walketh with a Staff; the Statue stood upon a Pedestal; the River ran over a Sand; others for the detached Relation, as when we say, He is going to Italy; the Sun is risen above the Hills; these Figs came from Turky. So as to Motion and Rest, only with this difference, that here the Preposition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we say, that Lamp hangs from the Ceiling, the Preposition, from, assumes a Character of Quiescence. But if we say, that Lamp is falling from the Ceiling, the Preposition in such case assumes a Character of Motion. So in Milton,

——To support uneasy Steps
Over the burning Marle—Par. L. I.

Here over denotes Motion.
Ch. III. Again—

—He—with looks of cordial Love
Hung over her enameur'd—Par. L. IV.

Here over denotes Rest.

But though the original use of Prepositions was to denote the Relations of Place, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themselves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to denote Relations, as well intellectual as local. Thus, because in Place he, who is above, has commonly the advantage over him, who is below, hence we transfer over and under to Dominion and Obedience; of a King we say, he ruled over his People; of a common Soldier, he served under such a General. So too we say, with Thought; without Attention; thinking over a Subject; under Anxiety; from Fear; out of Love; through Jealousy, &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind,
kind, shew that the first Words of Men, like their first Ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible Objects, and that in afterdays, when they began to discern with their Intellect, they took those Words, which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual Conceptions. There is indeed no Method to express new Ideas, but either this of Metaphor, or that of Coining new Words, both which have been practised by Philosophers and wise Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion (d).

(d) Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to Anaxagoras, Ὀμοιομέγες; to Plato, Ποιότης; to Cicero, Qualitas; to Aristotle, Ἐνελέχεις; to the Stoics, ὂντις, κεφάτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to special Meanings, to the Platonics we may ascribe Ἰδία; to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, Κατηγορία, and Κατηγορείς; to the Stoics, Κατάληψις, ἐπάληψις, καθήκον; to the Pyrrhonists, Ἐξεί, ἐνδιέχεται, ἐπίχα, &c.

And
In the foregoing use of Prepositions, we have seen how they are applied ἐν θεωρήσεω, by way of Juxta-position, that is to say, where they are prefixed to a Word,

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently synonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he pretumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, used by such Author, and his Sect; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical;—He I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praise, and censure merely by chance; and though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends ancient Philosophy, as his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther help, it is impossible he should attain.
without becoming a Part of it. But they may be used also κατὰ σύνθεσιν, by way of Composition, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, so as to become a real Part of it (e). Thus in Greek we have Ἐπιγραφή, in Latin, Intelligere, in English, to Understand. So also, to foretel, to overaël, to undervalue, to outgo, &c. and in Greek and Latin, other instances innumerable. In this case the Prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in most instances will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the Relations of Place, (f) as used either in its proper or metaphorical acceptation.

Lastly,

(e) See Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Prepositione.

(f) For example, let us suppose some given Space. E and Ex signify out of that Space; Per, through it, from beginning to end; In, within it; Sub, under it.
Lastly, there are times, when Prepositions totally lose their connective Nature, being

Hence then E and Per in composition augment; Enormis, something not simply big, but big in excess; something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; Dico, to speak; Edico, to speak out; whence Edictum, an Edict, something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So Terence,

*Dico, Edico vobis—Eun. V. 5. 20.*

which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an *Avεραιος. Fari, to speak; Effari, to speak out—hence Effatum, an Axiom, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. Cic. Acad. II. 29. Per magnus, Perutilis, great throughout, useful through every part.

On the contrary, In and Sub diminish and lessen. Injustus, Iniquus, unjust, inequitable, that lies within Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short of them; Subniger, blackish; Subrubicundus, redish; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

*Emo* originally signified to take away; hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. Inter, Between, implies Discontinuance,
being converted into Adverbs, and used in Syntax accordingly. Thus Homer,

—Γέλασε δὲ τῶνακεφήρι χθὼν.
—And Earth smil'd all around.

Il. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding Chapter (g). One thing we must however observe, before we finish this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of Cases in modern Languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is expressed by two Methods,

ance, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes, Interim, to kill, that is to say, To take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also Perimo, to kill a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek Verb, 'Αναίσθι, and the English Verb, To take off, seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that Prepositions become Parts of other Words.

(g) See before, p. 205.
thods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepositions*; the Nominative and Accusative Cases by Situation; the rest, by Prepositions. But this we shall make the Subject of a Chapter by itself, concluding here our Inquiry concerning Prepositions.
CHAP. IV.

Concerning Cases.

As Cases, or at least their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of Nouns, partly of Verbs, and partly of Prepositions; they have been reserved, till those Parts of Speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the Subject of so late a Chapter, as the present.

There are no Cases in the modern Languages, except a few among the primitive Pronouns, such as I, and Me; Je, and Mon; and the English Genitive, formed by the addition of s, as when from Lion, we form Lion's; from Ship, Ship's. From this defect however we may be enabled to discover in some instances what a Case is, the Periphrasis, which sup-
plies its place, being the Café (as it were) unfolded. Thus *Equi* is analized into *Du Cheval, Of the Horse, Equo into Au Cheval, To the Horse.* And hence we see that the *Genitive and Dative Cases* imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Preposition*, the Genitive’s Preposition being *A, De, or Ex*, the Dative’s Preposition being *Ad, or Versus.*

We have not this assistance as to the *Accusative*, which in modern Languages (a few instances excepted) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

The *Vocative* we pass over from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the *Nominative*.

The *Ablative* likewise was used by the *Romans* only; a Café they seem to have adopted.
adopted *to associate with their Prepositions*, as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Case certainly not necessary, because the *Greeks* do as well without it, and because with the *Romans* themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

**There remains the Nominative,** which whether it were a Case or no, was much disputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no *Case*, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary and original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, such for example, as the line AB.

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

The Variations from the Nominative, they considered as if AB were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to AC, or AD. Hence then they only called these
Variations, πτωσεῖς, Casus, Cases, or Fallings. The Stoics on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the Nominative a Case also. Words they considered (as it were) to fall from the Mind, or discursive Faculty. Now when a Noun fell thence in its primary Form, they then called it πτωσις ορθή, Casus rectus, an erect, or upright Case of Falling, such as AB, and by this name they distinguished the Nominative. When it fell from the Mind under any of its variations, as for example in the form of a Genitive, a Dative, or the like, such variations they called πτωσεῖς πλαγίαι, Casus obliqui, oblique Cases, or side-long Fallings (such as AC, or AD) in opposition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular (a). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, καίσις, Declinatio, a Declension, it

(a) See Ammon, in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.
it being a sort of progressive Descent from the Noun's upright Form thro' its various declining Forms, that is, a Descent from A B, to AC, AD, &c.

Of these Cases we shall treat but of four, that is to say, the Nominative, the Accusative, the Genitive, and the Dative.

It has been said already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are Substance and Attribute. Now from this Natural Concord arises the Logical Concord of Subject and Predicate, and the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Attributive (b). These Concords in Speech produce Propositions and Sentences, as that previous Concord in Nature produces natural Beings. This being admitted,

(b) See before, p. 264.
admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, Nature's Substance, the Logician's Subject, and the Grammarian's Substantive are all denoted by that Case, which we call the Nominative. For example, Cæsar pugnat, Æs fngitur, Domus ædificatur. We may remark too by the way, that the Character of this Nominative may be learnt from its Attributive. The Action implied in pugnat, shews its Nominative Cæsar to be an Active efficient Cause; the Passion implied in fngitur, shews its Nominative Æs to be a Passive Subject, as does the Passion in ædificatur prove Domus to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as possible conform itself to its Substantive, so for this reason, when it has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and appears as a Nominative also. So we find it in such instances as—Cicero est eloquens; Vitium est turpe; Homo est animal,
ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases, (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of Number and Person*; as when we say, Cicero loquitur; nos loquimur; Homines loquuntur.

From what has been said, we may make the following observations—that as there can be no Sentence without a Substantive, so that Substantive, if the Sentence be regular, is always denoted by a Nominative—that on this occasion all the Attributives, that have Cases, appear as Nominatives also—that there may be a regular and perfect Sentence without any of the other Cases, but that without one Nominative at least, this is utterly impossible. Hence therefore we form its Character and Description—the Nominative is that Case, without which there can be no regular

* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see before, p. 170, 171.
HERMES.

Ch.IV. lar (c) and perfect Sentence. We are now to search after another Case.

When the Attributive in any Sentence is some Verb denoting Action, we may be assured the principal Substantive is some active efficient Cause. So we may call Achilles and Lysippus in such Sentences as Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the Mind is still in suspense, and finds its conception incomplete. Action, it well knows, not only requires some Agent, but it must have a Subject also to work on, and it must produce some Effect. It is then to denote one of these (that is, the Subject or the Effect) that the Authors of Language

(c) We have added regular as well as perfect, because there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfect without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of those Verbs, called by the Stiches Παρασυμπάματα or Παραχατηγογέματα, such as Σωκράτει μεταμελεῖ, Socratem paeinit, &c. See before, p. 180.
guage have destined the Accusative. Achilles vulneravit Hectorum—here the Accusative denotes the Subject. Lysippus fecit statuas—here the Accusative denotes the Effect. By these additional Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepositions, this Case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its Character and Description—the Accusative is that Case, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect or the passive Subject. We have still left the Genitive and the Dative, which we investigate, as follows.

It has been said in the preceding Chapter (d), that when the Places of the Nominative

(d) See before, p. 265.
minative and the Accusative are filled by proper Substantives, other Substantives are annexed by the help of Prepositions. Now, though this be so far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the Latin or Greek, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.

Among the various Relations of Substantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the Term or Point, which something commences from, and the Term or Point, which something tends to. These Relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar Terminations of their own, which express their force, without the help of a Preposition. Now it is here we behold the Rise of the antient Genitive, and Dative, the Genitive being formed to express all Relations
commencing from itself; the Dative, all Relations tending to itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the Analysis of these Cases in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already (e).

It is on these Principles that they say in Greek—Δειομαὶ ΣΟΙ, διδωμί ΣΟΙ, Of thee I ask, To thee I give. The reason is, in requests the person requested is one whom something is expected from; in donations, the person presented, is one whom something passes to. So again—(f) Πεποιησας και, it is made of Stone. Stone was the passive Subject, and thus it appears in the Genitive, as being the Term from, or out of which. Even in Latin, where the Syntax is more formal and strict, we read—

Implentur

(e) See before, p. 275, 276.

(f) Χευσοῦ πεποιημένος, η ἐλέφαντος, made of Gold and Ivory. So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jupiter, L. V. p. 400. See also Hom. Iliad. Σ. 574.
The old Wine and Venison were the funds or stores, of or from which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Πῶς τῷ ὑπὸτος, is a Phrase in Greek; and Je bois de l'eau, a Phrase in French, as much as to say, I take some or a certain part, from or out of a certain whole.

When we meet in Language such Genitives as the Son of a Father; the Father of a Son; the Picture of a Painter; the Painter of a Picture, &c. these are all Relatives, and therefore each of them reciprocally a Term or Point to the other, from or out of which it derives its Essence, or at least its Intellecution (g).

---

(g) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expressed by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, Πάλα δὲ τὰ πτὲροι τι πτὲρον ἀνισοφίστω πενταυ, oivn
Book the Second.

The Dative, as it implies Tendency to, is employed among its other uses to denote the Final Cause, that being the Cause to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances, among innumerable others.

—Tibi suaveis dædala tellus
Submittit flores—Lucret.

—Tibi brachia contrabit ardens
Scorpius—Virg. G. I.

—Tibi serviat ultima Thule.
Ibid.

And so much for Cases, their Origin and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,
tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (b) both in the Greek and Latin Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

(b) Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et simillimum fuiffe; modernas, his ferè desitutas, plurima per præ-
positiones et verba auxiliaria fignitur expedere? Sanè facile quis conjiciat (ut evunque nobis ipsi placeamus) in-
genia priorum seculum nostrum noftris fuiffe multo acuitora et subtiliora. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. i.
Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—Conclusion.

Besides the Parts of Speech before mentioned, there remains the Interjection. Of this Kind among the Greeks are ὃν, ὑ, ἄ, &c. among the Latins, Ah! Heu! Hei! &c. among the English, Ab! Alas! Fie! &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their Adverbs; improperly, if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with some Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an Attributive. Now Interjections co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in † separating

† Vid. Servium in Æneid XII. v. 486.
parating them by themselves, and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.

**Should** it be asked, if not Adverbs, what then are they? *It* may be answered, not so properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain *Voices of Nature*, rather than Voices of *Art*, expressing those Passions and natural Emotions, which spontaneously arise in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of interesting Events (*a*).

"**And**

---

(*a*) **Interjectiones a Græcis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et rege quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationis solam inferuntur, ut nota affectus, velut inspirii aut metus, vix videntur ad classem aliqua pertinent, ut quae naturales sint notae; non, aliarum vocalium instant, ex instituto significant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. i. **Interjectio est vox affectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi opem sentimentiam compleans. Ibid. c. 3. Restitut classium extrema, Interjectio. Hujus appellatio non simi**"
"And thus we have found that all Words are either significant by themselves, or only signifi-
U 2 " cant,
"CANT, when associated—that those significant by themselves, denote either Substances or Attributes, and are called for that reason Substantives and ATTRIBUTIVES—that the Substantives are either Nouns or Pronouns—that the ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY or SECONDARY—that the Primary ATTRIBUTIVES are either Verbs, Participles, or Adjectives; the Secondary, Adverbs—Again, that the Parts of Speech, only significant when associated, are either DEFINITIVES or CONNEC TIVES—that the Definitives are either Articular or Pronominal—and that the Connectives are either Pre positions or Conjunctions."

And thus have we resolved LANGUAGE, as a Whole into its constituent Parts, which was the first thing, that we proposed, in the course of this Inquiry (b). But

(b) See before, p. 7.
But now as we conclude, methinks I hear some Objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry, and ridicule—“Is there no speaking then without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned, as learned; as well poor Peasants, as profound Philosophers?” We may answer by interrogating on our part—Do not those same poor Peasants use the Levar and the Wedge, and many other Instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those Geometrical Principles, from which those Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of these Peasants, a reason for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a less becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur every day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion—of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation—of our very Senfes and Intellect, by which we perceive every thing else—
That they are, we all know, and are perfectly satisfied—What they are, is a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last Question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all Philosophy at once out of the world (c).

But a graver Objector now accosts us. "What (says he) is the Utility? Whence the Profit, where the Gain?"

Every Science whatever (we may answer) has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent

(e) 'Αλλ' ἐστι πολλα τῶν οὕτων, δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑπαρξίν ἔχει γνωσιμωτάτην, ἀγνωστάτην δὲ τὴν θείαν ὡσπέρ ἄπει κύνηςις, ὡς δὲ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρήσος. Ἐκάστη γὰρ τῶν τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώσιμον ἥν ἀναμφιλεκτον' τίς δὲ νοτεῖ ἐσιν αὐτῶν ἡ θεία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων δραθήναι. 'Εσι δὲ δὴ τί τῶν τοιοτῶν ἡ Ψυχῇ τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τι τῆς Ψυχῆς, γνωσιμωτάτου καὶ φανερώτατου τί δὲ νοτεῖ ἐσιν, ἡ μάθειν καταμαθεῖν. Ἀλεξάνδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ Ψυχῆς, Β'. p. 142.
lent for the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for the measuring of Estates; Astronomy, for the making of Almanacks; and Grammar perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and Conveyances.

Thus much to the Sordid—If the Liberal ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them from the best authorities, that every Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exercise of the Body, tends to call forth and strengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reason are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the busier, or of the sedater kind.
Ch. V. Perhaps too there is a Pleasure even in Science itself, distinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of Body desirable for their own sakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen; And have not Health and Strength of Mind their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of fordid Emolument? Why should there not be a Good (could we have the Grace to re-cognize it) in the mere Energy of our Intellect, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportsman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly ask of these, why they pursue such things; but if they answer, they pursue them, because they are Good, it would be folly to ask them farther, why they pursue what is Good. It might well in such case be replied on their
their behalf (how strange soever it may at first appear) that if there was not something Good, which was in no respect useful, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence. For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are Ends, some things are Means, and that if there were no Ends, there could be of course no Means.

It should seem then the Grand Question was, what is Good—that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly questioned, since Men in each instance are far from being agreed.

In the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleasures, Amusements, and Diversions, some for Summer, others for Winter; some for Country,
Country, others for Town; some, easy, indolent, and soft; others, boisterous, active, and rough; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as perfect Good, without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reason called Mifers, or Miserable.

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its self without view to any thing farther, in so many Objects of the subordinate kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the sublimest of all Objects? Shall the Intellect alone feel no pleasures in its Energy, when we allow them to the grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Reality of all Pleasures and Goods were
were to be controverted, may not the *Intellec* tual Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of *Intellectual* Good, that it is "the "Good of that Part, which is most ex-"cellent within us; that it is a Good ac-"commodated to all Places and Times; "which neither depends on the will of "others, nor on the affluence of external "Fortune; that it is a Good, which de-"cays not with decaying Appetites, but "often rises in vigour, when those are no "more (d)."

There is a Difference, we must own, between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Mo-"*ral Virtue. Moral Virtue, from its Employment, may be called more Hu-"man,

(d) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.
HERMES.

Ch. V. Man, as it tempers our Appetites to the purposes of human Life. But Intellectual Virtue may be surely called more Divine, if we consider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

Indeed for Moral Virtue, as it is almost wholly conversant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, it would be impious to suppose the Deity to have occasion for such an Habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet God Is, and Lives. So we are assured from Scripture it self. What then may we suppose the Divine Life to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE
comprehensive Objects of Intellection, which Objects are no other than that Intellect itself? For in pure Intellection it holds the reverse of all Sensation, that the perceiver and Thing perceived are always one and the same (c).

(c) 'Ει ἐν ἰτως εὐ ἐξει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ὑποτε, ὁ Θεὸς αἴει, Ἰατρικήν εἰ ἐν μᾶλλον, ἐτε Ἰννακισσωτερον ἐξει ἐν ὧν, ὡς ἡ ὑπάρχει. ἢ γὰρ Νῦ ἐνεργεία, ὡς Ἐνενος δὲ, ἢ ἐνεργεια. ἐνεργεια ἐν ἡ καθ' αὐτῆς, ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐξέιση καὶ αἴίδος. Φαμέν δὲ τῶν Θεῶν εἰναι ζῶου αἴίδον, ἄριστον ὡς ζῶος καὶ αἰῶν συνεκχις καὶ αἴίδος ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ ΤΟΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυτὰ Λ'. ζ'. It is remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly characterized as a Living God, in opposition to all false and imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the best were nothing better than illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of Humanity.
It was Speculation of this kind concerning the Divine Nature, which induced one of the wisest among the Antients to believe—"That the Man, who could live in the pure enjoyment of his Mind, and who properly cultivated that divine Principle, was happiest in himself, and most beloved by the Gods.

For if the Gods had any regard to what past among Men (as it appeared they had) it was probable they should rejoice in that which was most excellent, and by nature the most nearly allied to themselves; and, as this was Mind, that they should requite the Man, who most loved and honoured This, both from his regard to that which was dear.

To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. 'Αυτῶν δὲ νοεῖ ἐνεν κατὰ πεπαλαίσθην τὰ νοητὰ νοητῶς γὰρ γίνεται, ἔνιστάναι ὡς νῦν ὅσε ΤΑΤΤΟΝ ΝΟΤΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ.
Book the Second. 303

"dear to themselves, and from his acting a Part, which was laudable and "right (f)."

And thus in all Science there is something valuable for itself, because it contains within it something which is divine.

End of the Second Book.
INTRODUCTION—DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT INTO ITS PRINCIPAL PARTS.

SOME things the MIND performs thro' the BODY; as for example, the various Works and Energies of Art. Others it performs without such Medium; as for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either case, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are these last more
more properly its own peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is Mind ultimately the Cause of all; of every thing at least that is Fair and Good.

Among those Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of mental Separation may be well reckoned one. Corporeal Separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest Limb, severed from the smallest Animal-cule (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection) has still a triple Extension of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and so will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (a) the Mind surmounts all power of Concretion,

\[\text{(a)} \text{ Itaque Naturee facienda est prorsus Solutio et Separatio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum. Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.}\]
creation, and can place in the simplest manner every Attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superfi-
cies; superflcies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.

And thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as Wholes, into their more conspicuous Parts, but persisting, till it even separate those Elementary Principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest Part, as much as in the mightiest Whole (b).

Now if Matter and Form are among these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as the principal among them, it may not be foreign to the Design of this Treatise, to seek whether these, or any things analogous to them, may be found in Speech

(b) See below, p. 312.
HERMES.

CH. I. SPEECH OF LANGUAGE (c). This therefore we shall attempt after the following method.

(c) See before, p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in Greek ΤΑΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of ancient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Substance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal or concrete, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or Chemical Processes.

The original meaning of the Word ΤΑΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus Homer,

—Τρέειε δ' ἥρας μακρὸν ἐν ΤΑΗ,
Ποσείν ύπ' ἀθανάτοις Ποσειδώνος ἱντος.

As Neptune past, the Mountains and the WOOD Trembled beneath the God’s immortal Feet.

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the first and most useful kind of Materials, the Word "ΤΛΝ, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER of MATERIALS in general. In this sense Brass was called the "ΤΛΝ or Matter of a Statue; Stone, the "ΤΛΝ or Matter of a Pillar; and so in other instances. The Platonic Chalcidius, and other Authors
Every thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution committed.

Authors of the latter Latinity use Sylva under the same extended and comprehensive Signification.

Now as the Species of Matter here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, Matter and Body have been taken to denote the same thing; Material to mean Corporeal; Immaterial, Incorporeal, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term Matter was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. By these, every thing was called ΤΑΗ, or Matter, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cause.

In this sense they not only called Brefs the "Ταλα of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the "Ταλαι of Words; Words or simple Terms, the "Ταλαι of Propositions; and Propositions themselves the "Ταλαι of Syllogisms. The Stoics held all things out of our own power (τα ἄξι εἰπ' εὐμυν.) such as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health.
compounded of something Common, and
something PECULIAR; of something Com-
mon,

Health and Sickness, Life and Death, to be the "\text{\scriptsize \v{y}l\v{a}v},
or \text{Materials of \scriptsize Virtue or Moral Goodness}, which had its
effence in a proper conduct with respect to all these,
(Vid. \text{\scriptsize Arr. Epicl. L. i. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of}
these miscellaneous \text{\scriptsize Treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant.}
XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the \text{\scriptsize 'Yl{\i}k\o\nu and}
\text{\scriptsize 'A}r\text{\scriptsize t}i\text{\scriptsize o}i\text{\scriptsize d}e\text{\scriptsize s}e are opposed to each other). The Peripatetics,
tho' they expressly held the Soul to be \text{\scriptsize \v{a}n\o\mu\v{a}tov}, or
Incorporeal, yet still talked of a \text{\scriptsize N\o\v{s \v{y}l\v{a}k\o\v{s}, a material Mind or Intelle\text{\scriptsize c}t.}
This to modern \text{\scriptsize Ears may possibly found somewhat harshly}. Yet if we translate the
Words, \text{\scriptsize Natural Capacity}, and consider them as only
denoting that \text{\scriptsize original and native Power of Intelle\text{\scriptsize ct}},
which being previous to all \text{\scriptsize human Knowledge}, is yet
necessary to its reception; there seems nothing then to
remain, that can give us offence. And so much for
the Idea of \text{\scriptsize \v{y}A\v{h}, or Matter}. See \text{\scriptsize Alex. Aphrod.}
\text{\scriptsize 122, 141. Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid. p. 22, 23.}

As to \text{\scriptsize \E{i}d\o\v{s}}, its original meaning was that of
\text{\scriptsize Form or Figure}, considered as denoting \text{\scriptsize visible Sym-
metry, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from}
\text{\scriptsize \E{i}d\o\v{w} to see}, Beauty of person being one of the noblest,
and most excellent Objects of \text{\scriptsize Sight. Thus Euripides,}

\[\text{\scriptsize \Pi{\v{e}t\o\v{n} \mu\v{i}n \E{i}d\o\v{s} \d\v{e}\v{z}{\i}n\v{t}w\a{\i}n\i\v{d}o\v{s},}
\text{\scriptsize Fair Form to Empire gave the first pretence.}\]
Book the Third.

mon, and belonging to many other things; and of something Peculiar, by which it is

Now as the Form or Figure of visible Beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its Name and Essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any Beings, as to its θαν or Matter, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΩΣ or Form. Thus not only the Shape given to the Brafs was called the Εϊδος or Form of the Statue; but the Proportion assigned to the Drugs was the Εϊδος or Form of the Medicine; the orderly Motion of the human Body was the Εϊδος or Form of the Dance; the just Arrangement of the Propositions, the Εϊδος or Form of the Syllogism. In like manner the rational and accurate Conduct of a wise and good man, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εϊδος or Form, described by Cicero to his Son,—Formam quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem Honesti vides: quae, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiae, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther still—the supreme Intelligence, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,

X 4
this supreme Intelligence has been called \( \text{EI} \Delta \text{O} \Sigma \text{EI} \Delta \text{ON} \), the Form of Forms, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those essential and distinctive Attributes, which make it to be itself, and not any thing else.

And so much concerning Form, as before concerning Matter. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their separating, to perish, and be at an end—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxtaposition, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate Co-incidence, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both Matter and Form, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the Beings, which they constitute; the Matter being to be found in the world at large; the Form, if artificial, pre-existing within the Artificer, or if natural, within the supreme Cause, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

\[ \text{*Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse}
\]

\[ \text{Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.} \]

Even
Hence Language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Found-

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre-existing in their immediate generating Cause; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c.

Cicero’s account of these Principles is as follows.

Matter.

Sed subjectam putant omnis sine ulla specie, atque centrnum omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tracando usu-tatius hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex quâ omnia expressa atque efficitur sint: (quae tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eaque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. I. 8.

Form.

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pul-chrum, quod non pulchrior id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi image, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur.—Hasrerum formas appellat Ideas illae non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimae auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera nasci, occidere, fieræ, habi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est
a Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a Sound*. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas those Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language *a Meaning or Signification is essential*. Again, Language, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to distinguish it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of those Animal Sounds is derived *from Nature*, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from Compact* (d).

---

*(d) The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant *xara συνβίσνυ*, by Compact. See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the Words *xara συνβίσνυ*, *ad placitum*,
From hence it becomes evident, that Language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings; and that of these two Principles, the Sound is as the Matter, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the Meaning as that peculiar and characteristic Form, by which the Nature or Essence of Language becomes complete.

citum, or secundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment—Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecita res à naturâ est, ita quaque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit litteris syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjactarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.
HERMES.

CHAP. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of Language.

Ch. II. THE ΤΑΗ OR Matter of Language comes first to be considered, a Subject, which Order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ΤΑΗ or Matter is Sound, and Sound is that Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, adequate to the producing such Effect (a).

As

(a) This appears to be Priscian's Meaning when he says of a Voice, what is more properly true of Sound in general, that it is—suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod propriè auribus accidit. Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of Sound to an Undulation in the Air propagated circularly, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and
As the Causes of this Percussion are various, so from hence Sound derives the Variety of its Species.

Farther, as all these Causes are either Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand Species of Sounds are likewise Animal or Inanimate.

There is no peculiar Name for Sound Inanimate; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cause, which is merely accidental. But that,
that, which they make by proper Organs, in consequence of some Sensation or inward Impulse, such Animal Sound is called a Voice.

As Language therefore implies that Sound called Human Voice; we may perceive that to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact to know the Matter or common Subject of Language.

Now the Voice of Man, and it should seem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The Lungs furnish Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.

What these Vocal Organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by Philosophers
fophers and Anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Passage thro' the Nose, when the Mouth is so far flopt, as to prevent the least utterance.

Now pure and simple Voice, being thus produced, is (as before was observed) transmitted to the Mouth. Here then, by means of certain different Organs, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the Form or Character of Articulation. For Articulation is in fact nothing else, than that Form or Character, acquired to simple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its several Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, &c. The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft (which are its primary Qualities) but it acquires to these Characters certain
certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them (b).

(b) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of Speech, but those very different ones likewise of Mastication and Respiration; so frugal is Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in vain.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for Discourse in Man, who is a Discursive Animal, than they are in other Animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his Treatise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. De Animal. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, he may with much jufter cause wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to themselves.

The following account from Ammonius will shew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what
The simplest of these new Characters are those acquired thro' the mere Openings of what authority we have to distinguish Voice from mere Sound; and articulate Voice from simple Voice.

Kai ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐστι πληγὴ ἄφος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοή. ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐστὶ ἐμψυχὴ γινόμενος, ὄταν διὰ τῆς συγκολῆς τῷ Σώφασκῳ εὐθλιβῶμενοι ἀπὸ τῷ πνεῦμας ὁ συνπνευμείς ἀθὲς προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλλιμένῃ τραχείᾳ ἀφτηρίᾳ, κῷ τῇ υπερόχῃ, ὅτι τῇ νεφελῇ ἐσφάγῳ, κατὰ τὶνα ἐρμῆν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑπὲρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευσάμας παρὰ τοῖς μασκοῖς καλλιμένοι όργάνοις συμβαίνει, ὅτι αὐλῶν ἐς συρίγγαν τῆς γλώττης, κῷ τῶν ὀδοντῶν, κῷ χείλεων πορὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἁμαρταίων ὄντων, ἠρές δὲ ΤΗΝ 'ΑΠΑΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ὁ πάντως συμβαίνοντων.—Ephrae Sonus, ictus acrius qui auditum sentitur: Vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attrahit a pulmone, elitis simul tatus in arteriam, quem asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictus sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perfect. Id quod in instrumentis quae quia inflant, idem ἐμπνευσά a musica dicuntur, siu venit, ut in tibibus, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad bolelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant. Ann. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Beerhageae Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630.
Ch. II. of the Mouth, as these Openings differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the Variety of Configurations in these Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several Vowels; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus eminently Vocal (c), and easy to be founded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate Forms, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by different Contacts of its different parts; such for instance, as it makes by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote Sound in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἰδιὸν δισθόντος άνώς, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the Note preceding. Animal Sound they defined to be—Ἄνιο, ὑπὸ ἐρμής ἐπικαγ-μένος, Air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse; and Human or Rational Sound they defined—Ἐν ειρής ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐπειμπομένη, Sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty. Diog. Laert. VII. 55.

(c) ΦΩΝΗΔΑ.
Book the Third. 323

With the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Ch. II. Palate, and the like.

Now as all these several Contacts, unless some Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with some such Opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the Articulations so produced are called Consonant, because they found not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary Vowel (d).

There are other subordinate Distinctions of these primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this Treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common Name of 

(d) ΣΥΜΦΩΝΑ.
MENT (e), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their smallest Combination they produce a Syllable; Syllables properly combined produce a Word; Words properly combined produce a Sentence; and Sentences properly combined produce an Oration or Discourse.

And thus it is that to Principles apparently so trivial (f), as about twenty plain ele-

(e) The Stoic Definition of an Element is as follows— ἐστὶ δὲ σοιχεῖον, ἓξ ὑπὸ περίπτω γίνεται τὸ γνώμενα, καὶ εἰς δὲ ἐσχατὸν ἀναλύεται. An Element is that, out of which, as their first Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon Elements with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνὰς σοιχεῖα, ἕξ ὑπὸ σύγχειται ή φωνή, καὶ εἰς δὲ διαίρεσθαι ἐσχατὰ εἰς ἑαυτὰ δὲ μὴν εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἐπιθέτη τῷ εἴδει οὖν. The Elements of articulate Voice are those things, out of which the Voice is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. c. 3.

(f) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they
elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so innumerable a Multitude, as all the present and past Generations of Men.

They called **Theuth**. By the Greeks he was worshipped under the Name of **Hermes**, and represented commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs*, standing upon a *quadrilateral Basis*. The Head itself was that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a *Petafus*, or *Bonnet*, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ἘΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, the **Hermes of Language or Discourse**. He possessed no other part of the human figure but the **Head**, because no other was deemed requisite to rational Communication. *Words* at the same time, the medium of this Communication, being (as Homer well describes them) ἔσπεροια, *Winged Words*, were represented in their *Velocity* by the *Wings* of his Bonnet.

Let us suppose such a **Hermes**, having the *Front of his Basis* (the usual place for Inscriptions) *adorned with some old Alphabet*, and having a *Veil flying across*, by which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let a *Youth* be seen *drawing off this Veil*; and a *Nymph*, near the Youth, *transcribing what she there discovers*.

Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. **The Youth** we might imagine to be the **Genius**...
It appears from what has been said, that the Matter or common Subject of Language is that Species of Sounds called Voices articulate.

Of Man (Natura est Deus hominum, as Horacestyled him;) the Nymph to be ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ, or Memory; as much as to insinuate that "Man, for the "Preservation of his Deeds and Inventions, was nes-"cessarily obliged to have recourse to Letters; and "that Memory, being conscious of her own Insuffici-
"ency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an Ac-
"quisition."

Mr. Stuart, well known for his accurate and eleg-ant Edition of the Antiquities of Athens, has adorned this Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taste truly Attic and Simple, which no one possesses more eminently than himself.

As to Hermes, his History, Genealogy, Mytholo-

For the value and importance of Principles, and the difficulty in attaining them, see Aristot. de Sophist. El.meb. c. 34.
What remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar Form, that is to say, Language considered, not with respect to Sound, but to Meaning.

The following Passage, taken from that able Mathematician Tacquet, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been said in this chapter concerning Elementary Sounds, p. 324, 325.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.

When to any articulate Voice there accedes by compact a Meaning or Signification, such Voice by such accession is then called a WORD; and many Words, possesting their Significations (as it were) under the same Compact (a), unite in constituting a particular LANGUAGE.

(a) See before Note (c) p. 314. See also Vol. I. Treatise II. c. I. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from Ammonius is remarkable—Καθ’ ἐστιν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τέπον κινεῖται, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς, Ἔστεν κατὰ συνθήκην, κατὰ μὲν ζύλον, φύσει, ἢ δὲ θύγατα, Ἔστεν. Εἰτω κατὰ μὲν φωνήν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι’ ὁνομάτων ἢ ἡμιγίνων σημαίνειν, Ἔστεν—κατὰ τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν ὅνωμαν, ὁργανὼν ἔστω τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐκ νὰ ὁμορμίων γνωσικῶν, ἢ ὁρεικιῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἤχειν ὥ ἄνθρωπῳ παραπλησίος τοῖς ἀλγοῖς.
It appears from hence, that a word may be defined a voice articulate, and significant by Compact—and that language may be defined a System of such voices, so significant.

It is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be

Σω& ε' το δε ανόμασιν, η ρήμασιν, η τοις ειν τάτων συγκεκριμένοις λόγοις χρησθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν (υκέτι φύσει ἦσιν, ἀλλὰ Θεῖει) ἑξαίρετον ἐχεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἀλογά ζῶα, διέτι κά τι μόνως τῶν Θουτῶν αυτοκράτορες μετέχει φυσικῶς, κα τεχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμίνα, ίνα κα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φωσίν ἡ τεχνικὴ ἀυτὸς διαχρινθῇ δύναμις διηλύτι δε ταύτα οί εἰς κάλλες συνθείμενοι λόγοι μετα μιτρών, η άνευ μιτρών. In the same manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in Nature, but a Door is something positive; so is the power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul’s faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I say, Man seems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as
be tempted to call Language a kind of Picture of the Universe, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars.

And yet it may be doubted, how far this is true. For if Pictures and Images are all of them Imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the irrational animals: but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Position) this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shews itself; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, (ἐνεργεῖν τεχνικῶς) of which Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the Human Soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design; else it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10. 158, 159, &c.
the Original, will by help of the same faculties know also its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its Greek or Latin Name.

The Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from Natural Attributes, and then it is an Imitation; or else from Accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a Symbol (b).

Now,

(b) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ὙΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟ-
ΔΟΤ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὑμεῖς τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῇ
πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπεικονίζοντας βύλεται,
κἂν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἑμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ
εἰκόνι γεγομένῳ τῷ Σωκράτες ὑμεῖς, ἐμὲ μὴ δὲ τὸ
φαλάκρον, κἂν τὸ σιμών, κἂν τὸ ἑξώφθαλμον ἔχει τῷ
Σωκράτες, ἐκεῖτ' ἄν αὐτὰ λέγοντα εἶναι ὑμεῖς, ἐμὲ
δὲ γε σύμβολον, ἄτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλό-
σοφος αὐτὸ ὑμεῖς) τὸ ὄλον ἐφ᾽ ἑμῖν ἔχει, ὁτε ἐκ
μόνης ὑφισάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας' οἷον, τῇ
πότε δὲ τὸ συμβαλλειν ἀλλῆλοις τὰς ἡμελεμέντας, δῦ-

nąται
Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their natural Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through such Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that Words must of necessity be Symbols, because it appears that they cannot be Imitations.

But here occurs a Question, which deserves attention—"Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have Imitations been neglected, and Symbols..."
preferred, although Symbols are only
known by Habit or Institution, while
Imitations are recognized by a kind of
natural Intuition?—To this it may be
answered, that if the Sentiments of the
Mind, like the Features of the Face, were
immediately visible to every beholder, the
Art of Speech or Discourse would have
been perfectly superfluous. But now,
while our Minds lie enveloped and hid,
and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every
thing but itself, we are necessarily compell-
led, when we communicate our Thoughts,
to

peculiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, and the Eyes
projecting, cannot properly be called a Representation of
him. But a Symbol or Sign (for the Philosopher
Aristotle uses both names) is wholly in our own power,
as depending singly for its existence on our imagination.
Thus for example, as to the time when two armies should
engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the sounding of a
Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what
Euripides says,

But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign
Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, &c.)
or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the dart-
ing of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Ammon,
in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b,
to convey them to each other through a Medium which is corporeal (c). And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the Senses (d). Now the Senses, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converse, not by Symbols but by Imitations, as far as things are characterized by Figure

(c) Αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτερα, γυμναὶ µὲν ἄσαι τῶν σωμάτων, ὑδύκαστο δὲ ἀυτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. Επειδή δὲ σώματι συνθέται, δικαιοφέως περικαλύπτοις αὐτῶν τὸ νεφέων, εἰδοθεταν τῶν νοημάτων, δὲν σημαίνεσθαι ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. Ἀνίμασατο a corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent: cum autom corporibus insulati sint, perinde aë nubulæ, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegitur: quaecirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter se significarent. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. i 3. a.

(d) Quicquid scendi posset in differentias satis numerores, ad notionem varietatem explicandum (modo differentiae illæ fenfu perceptibles sint) fieri potest vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem. Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1.
gure and Colour, our Imitation would be necessarily thro' Figure and Colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the same reason be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be said of all the other Senses, the Imitation still shifting along with the Objects imitated. We see then how complicated such Imitation would prove.

If we set Language therefore, as a Symbol, in opposition to such Imitation; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we consider the Ease and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Ease which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a *Speed, which equals the Progress of our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that some Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects universally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly

* Επεξ ἔλεγοντα—See before, p. 325.
plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed, "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, Imitations have been rejected, and Symbols preferred."

Hence too we may perceive a Reason, why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things, as a Mirror exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between the Medium and themselves there is nothing CONNATURAL (e).

(e) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.
It is true indeed, when Primitives were once established, it was easy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the just deduction of Derivatives and Compounds. Thus the Sounds, Water, and, Fire, being once annexed to those two Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the first, Watry, of the last, Fiery, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverse. But why, and from what natural Connections the Primitives themselves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well in the instances before us, as in most others. We may here also see the Reason, why all Language is founded in Compact, and not in Nature; for so are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species.

The Question remains if Words are Symbols, then Symbols of what?—
If it be answered, of things, the Question returns, of what Things?—If it be answered, of the several Individuals of Sense, the various particular Beings, which exist around us—to this, it is replied, may be raised certain Doubts. In the first place every Word will be in fact a proper Name. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whose express business is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at least to explain them, not from their own Art, but from History?

Again, if all Words are proper Names, then in strictness no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if so, then, as Individuals are infinite, to make a perfect Language, Words must be infinite also. But if infinite, then incomprehensible, and never to be attained by the wisest Men; whose labours in Language upon this Hypothesis would be as idle as that study of infinite written Symbols, which
Miffionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the Chinese.

Again, if all Words are proper Names, or (which is the same) the Symbols of Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals are not only infinite, but ever passing, that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, must be everywhere different, and everywhere changing, since such is the Nature of Individuals, which it follows.

Again, if all Words are proper Names, the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow that in Language there can be no general Proposition, because upon the Hypothesis all Terms are particular; nor any Affirmative Proposition, because no one Individual in nature is another. It remains, there can be no Propositions, but Particular Negatives.
But if so, then is Language incapable of communicating General Affirmative Truths—If so, then of communicating Demonstration—If so, then of communicating Sciences, which are so many Systems of Demonstrations—If so, then of communicating Arts, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If so, we shall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (e). And so much for this Hypothesis; let us now try another.

If Words are not the Symbols of external Particulars, it follows of course, they must be the Symbols of our Ideas: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols

(e) The whole of Euclid (whose Elements may be called the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon general Terms, and general Propositions, most of which are affirmative. So true are those Verses, however barbarous as to their style,

\[ \text{Syllogizari non est ex Particulari,} \]
\[ \text{Neve Negativus, ratiocinare si vis.} \]
Symbols of things *without*, they can only be Symbols of something *within*.

**Here** then the Question recurs, if Symbols of Ideas, then of what Ideas?—Of sensible Ideas.—Be it so, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the supposition of their being the Symbols of external Particulars; and that from this plain and obvious reason, because the several Ideas, which Particulars imprint, must needs be as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are themselves.

If then Words are neither the Symbols of external Particulars, nor yet of particular Ideas, they can be Symbols of nothing else, except of general Ideas, because nothing else, except these, remains.—And what do we mean by general Ideas?—We mean such as are common to many Individuals; not only to Individuals which exist now,
but which existed in ages past, and will exist in ages future; such for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, Man, Lion, Cedar.—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that if Words are the Symbols of such general Ideas, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with proper Names.

It follows that one Word may be, not homonymously, but truly and essentially common to many Particulars, past present and future; so that however these Particulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Language notwithstanding may be definite and steady. But if so, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the Chinesè Absurdity*.

Again, it follows that the Language of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it stands

* See p. 338, 339.
stands for the same general Ideas, may be as intelligible now, as it was then. The like may be said of the same Language being accommodated to distant Regions, and even to distant Nations, amidst all the variety of ever new and ever changing Objects.

Again, it follows that Language may be expressive of general Truths; and if so, then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind (f).

Now if it be true "that none of these things could be asserted of Language, "were not Words the Symbols of general * Ideas—and it be further true, that these "things may be all undeniably asserted "of Language"—it will follow (and that necessarily) that Words are the Symbols of General Ideas.

(f) See before Note (e).
And yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of general Ideas, Language may answer well enough the purpose of Philosophers, who reason about general, and abstract Subjects—but what becomes of the business of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of Particulars, where an Explanation by Language is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to no other End. How then can this End in any respect be answered, if Language be expressive of nothing farther than general Ideas?

To this it may be answered, that Arts surely respect the business of ordinary Life; yet so far are general Terms from being an Obstacle here, that without them no Art can be rationally explained. How for instance should the measuring Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he first through general Terms
Terms learnt those general Theorems, that respect the doctrine and practice of Mensuration?

But suppose this not to satisfy a persevering Objector—suppose him to insist, that, admitting this to be true, there were still a multitude of occasions for minute particularizing, of which it was not possible for mere Generals to be susceptible—suppose, I say, such an Objection, what should we answer?—That the Objection was just; that it was necessary to the Perfection and Completion of Language, that it should be expressive of Particulars, as well as of Generals. We must however add, that its general Terms are by far its most excellent and essential Part, since from these it derives "that comprehensive Universality, that just proportion of Precision and Permanence, "without which it could not possibly "be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of Reasoning and "Science;"
Ch. III. "Science;"—that particular Terms have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a supply of these.

ONE Method of expressing Particulars, is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the least artificial, because proper Names being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be considered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES (g), whether we assume the pronominal, or those more strictly so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite Art of Language, which, without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say in other words, which, by the small Tribe of Definitives properly applied to general Terms,

(g) See before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c.
Terms, knows how to employ these last, tho' in number finite, to the accurate expression of infinite Particulars,

To explain what has been said by a single example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occasion to apply this Term to the denoting of some Particular. Let it be required to express this Particular, as unknown; I say, a MAN—known; I say, the MAN—indefinite; ANY MAN—definite; A CERTAIN MAN—present and near; THIS MAN—present and distant; THAT MAN—like to some other; SUCH a MAN—an indefinite Multitude; MANY Men—a definite Multitude; A THOUSAND Men—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout; EVERY Man—the same ones, taken with distinction; EACH Man—taken in order; FIRST Man, SECOND Man, &c.—the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively; ALL Men—the Negation of this Multitude; NO Man. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

The
The Sum of all is, that Words are the Symbols of Ideas both general and particular; yet of the general, primarily, essentially, and immediately; of the particular, only secondarily, accidentally, and mediately.

Should it be asked, "why has Language this double Capacity?"—May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourse of our Ideas? Should it not therefore be framed, so as to express the whole of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either Intellec tion without Sensation, or Sensation without Intellec tion? If not, how should Language explain the whole of our Perception, had it not Words to express the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?
To conclude—As in the preceding Chapter we considered Language with a view to its Matter, so here we have considered it with a view to its Form. Its Matter is recognized, when it is considered as a Voice; its Form, as it is significant of our several Ideas; so that upon the whole it may be defined—A System of articulate Voices, the Symbols of our Ideas, but of those principally, which are general or universal.
Concerning general or universal Ideas.

MUCH having been said in the preceding Chapter about general or universal Ideas, it may not perhaps be amiss to inquire, by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are; since the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly considered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher, now a days, and that from causes much the same with those, which influence the Vulgar.

The Vulgar merged in Sense from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of pursuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing to
to be real, but what may be tasted, or touched. The Philosopher, as to these matters being of much the same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no higher, than to experimental Amusements, deeming nothing Demonstration, if it be not made ocular. Thus instead of ascending from Sense to Intellect (the natural progress of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midst of Sense, where he wanders at random without any end, and is lost in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence then the reason why the sublimer parts of Science, the Studies of Mind, Intellection, and intelligent Principles, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by Experiment, is deemed no better than mere Hypothesis.

And yet it is somewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of such Notions, that there should still remain two Sciences in fashion,
Ch. IV. fashion, and these having their Certainty of all the least controverted, \textit{which are not in the minutest article depending upon Experiment.} By these I mean \textit{Arithmetic,} and \textit{Geometry (a).} But to come to our Subject concerning \textit{general Ideas.}

\textit{Man's}

(a) The many noble Theorems \textit{(so useful in life, and so admirable in themselves)} with which these two \textit{Sciences} so eminently abound, arise originally from \textit{Principles, the most obvious imaginable;} Principles, so little wanting the pomp and apparatus of \textit{Experiment,} that they are \textit{self-evident} to every one, possessed of common sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue \textit{Experiment;} whose importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious \textit{Nustrums} and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts of Life. Nay, I go farther—I hold \textit{all justifiable Practice in every kind of Subject} to be founded in \textit{Experience,} which is no more than the result of many repeated \textit{Experiments.} But I must add withal, that the man who acts \textit{from Experience alone,} tho' he act ever so well, is but an \textit{Empiric} or \textit{Quack,} and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. It is then only that we recognize \textit{ART,} and that the \textit{Empiric} quits his name for the more honourable one of \textit{Artist,} when to his \textit{Experience} he adds \textit{Science,}
MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are those of the Senses, in as much as they commence from his earliest Infancy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least indefinite, and more fleeting and transient, than the very Objects, which they exhibit, because

Science, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, what is to be done, but why it is to be done; for Art is a composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing it Materials, and Science giving them a Form.

In the mean time, while Experiment is thus necessary to all practical Wisdom, with respect to pure and speculative Science, as we have hinted already, it has not the least to do. For whoever heard of Logic, or Geometry, or Arithmetic being proved experimentally? It is indeed by the application of these that Experiments are rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise nothing better than puerile amusements. But that these Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.
because they not only depend upon the existence of those Objects, but because they cannot subsist, without their immediate Presence. Hence therefore it is, that there can be no Sensation of either Past or Future, and consequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the Senses, it never could acquire the least Idea of Time (b).

But happily for us we are not deserted here. We have in the first place a Faculty, called Imagination or Fancy, which however as to its energies it may be subsequent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both in dignity and use. This it is which retains the fleeting Forms of things, when Things themselves are gone, and all Sensation at an end.

That this Faculty, however connected with Sense, is still perfectly different, may be

(b) See before, p. 105. See also, p. 112. Note (f).
be seen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no such things can be made objects of *Sensation*. We have an easy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almost what manner we please; but our *Sensations* are necessary, when their Objects are present, nor can we control them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourselves (c).

(c) Besides the distinguishing of *Sensation* from *Imagination*, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be distinguished from it, and these are MNHMHN, and ANAMNHSUS, *Memory*, and *Recollection*.

When we view some *relic* of sensation reposed within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any sensible Object, this is *Phantasy* or *Imagination*.

When we view some such *relic*, and refer it withal to that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and original, this is *Memory*.
Ch. IV. As the Wax would not be adequate to its business of Signature, had it not a Power to retain, as well as to receive; the same holds of the Soul, with respect to Sense and Imagination. Sense is its receptive

Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or casually, this is Recollection. I have added casually, as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Distinction between Memory and Phantasy be not sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is the Portrait, such Contemplation is analogous to Phantasy. When we view it with reference to the Original, whom it represents, such Contemplation is analogous to Memory.

We may go farther. Imagination or Phantasy may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. It is here that Hope and Fear paint all their pleasant, and all their painful Pictures of Futility. But Memory is confined in the strictest manner to the past.
receptive Power; Imagination, its retentive. Had it Sense without Imagination, it would not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impressions may be instantly made, yet as soon as made they are as instantly lost.

Thus then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call Sense (if we please) a kind of transient Imagination; and Imagination on the contrary a kind of permanent Sense (d).

Now

What we have said, may suffice for our present purpose. He that would learn more, may consult Aristot. de Animâ, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise de Mem. et Reminisc.

(d) Τὶ τοῖνυ ἐσὶν ἡ φαντασία ὡθεὶν γνωστικεῖς; δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν ἡμεῖς τὰ αἰσθητὰ, διὸν τῦπον (λεγεῖ τῦπον) τινὰ καὶ ἀναγωγομένην ἐν τῷ πρωτῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμα τῷ τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ αἰσθητῆς γνωστικῆς κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μπέτη τῷ αἰσθητῶ ψωφίστω, υπομένει τῇ καὶ σώζεται, ὃν ὀσφέρ ἐκών τις.

Α α 3
Ch. IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Frost bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; so does the Soul in vain seek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of Reason and Intellect, till Imagination first fix the fluency of Sense, and thus provide a proper Basis for the support of its higher Energies.

After

αὐτῷ, δὲ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν σωζόμενον ἄλιου γίνεται τὸ τοιῶτον ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοιῶτον ὁπέρ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλεῖν. Now what Phantasy or Imagination is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression (as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a relic of that motion caused within us by the external object; a relic, which when the external object is no longer present, remains and is still preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of relic and (as it were) Impression they call Phantasy or Imagination. Alex. Aphrod. de Animâ, p. 135. b. Edit. Ald.
After this manner, in the admirable Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures subordinate made subservient to the higher. Were there no Things external, the Senses could not operate; were there no Sensations, the Imagination could not operate; and were there no Imagination, there could be neither Reasoning nor Intellecction, such at least as they are found in Man, where they have their Intensions and Remissions in alternate succession, and are at first nothing better, than a mere Capacity or Power. Whether every Intellecct begins thus, may be perhaps a question; especially if there be any one of a nature more divine, to which “Intension and Remission and mere Capacity “are unknown (e).” But not to digress.

(e) See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of Man’s Existence is not a little different from that of the Deity. The Life of Man has its Eilence in Motion.
Ch. IV. It is then on these permanent Phantasms that the human Mind first works, and by

Motion. This is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that Life, which is peculiar to him as Man. Objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to Practice or Contemplation. But the Life or Existence of God (as far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that reason immutable and superior to all Motion.

It is to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he tells us—Ou γὰς μόνον κινήσεις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας: κινεῖται μᾶλλον ἐν ἀκινήτῃ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μετακολύθει πάντων γυμνῶν, κατὰ τὰν ποιητὴν, διὰ ποιήσαν τινὰ ὡσπερ γὰς ἀνήμωτος ἐνμετακόλουθος ὁ ποιητός, κινεῖται δὲ ἐν μετακολύθει· καὶ γὰς ἀπλῶς, οὐδ' ἐπικίνητος. For there is not only an Energy of Motion, but of Immobility; and Pleasure or Felicity exists rather in REST than in Motion; Change of all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same manner as the
by an Energy as spontaneous and familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it discerns at once what

bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that Nature that requireth Variety, in as much as such Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin.

It is to this unalterable Nature of the Deity that Boethius refers, when he says in those elegant verses,

—Tempus ab Ævo
Ire jubes stabilisque manēns das cum qua moveri.

From this single principle of immobility, may be derived some of the noblest of the Divine Attributes; such as that of impassive, incorruptible, incorporeal, &c. Vide Ariflot. Physic. VIII. Metaphyl. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 to 266—also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are quoted at length.

It must be remembered however, that tho' we are not Gods, yet as rational Beings we have within us something Divine, and that the more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable,
HERMES.

Ch. IV. what in MANY is ONE; what in things DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR and the SAME (f). By this it comes to behold permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real Happines and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says)—'Ομοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, the becoming like to GOD, as far as in our power. Τοῖς μεν γὰς Θεοῖς πᾶς ἐς βίον πανδείας τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὑμιστίκα τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. For to the Gods (as says another antient) the whole of life is one continued happiness; but to Men, it is so far happy, as it rises to the resemblance of so divine an Energy. See Plat. in Theæt. Aris. Eth. X. 8.

(f) This connective Act of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its most excellent Part. It is this removes that impenetrable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the sensible World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is made up of all these, and other attributes UNITED; not an unknown Constitution of insensible Parts, but a known Constitution of sensible Parts, unless we chuse to extirpate the possibility of natural Knowledge.
Book the Third.

behold a kind of superior Objects; a new Race of Perceptions, more comprehensive than

What then perceives this Constitution or Union?—Can it be any of the Senses?—No one of these, we know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight also. It is the same in other instances. We must necessarily therefore recur to some higher collective Power, to give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her subordinate wholes, much more in that comprehensive Whole, whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this collecting, and (if I may be allowed the expression) this unifying Power more conspicuous, than in the subjects of pure Truth. By virtue of this power the Mind views One general Idea, in many Individuals; One Proposition in many general Ideas; One Syllogism in many Propositions; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions of Science,

Quas neque concurriunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspersum, &c. Lucr.

Even
Even negative Truths and negative Conclusions cannot subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, so necessary is this uniting Power to every Species of Knowledge. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the distinction between sensitive Perception, and intellectual, may observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is heard by our Ears, and understood by our Minds. That these two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such, as hear the sounds, without knowing the language. But to shew their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall both hear and understand the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles. That this is one Truth, and not two or many Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to sensation?—The Answer is obvious; it is by successive Portions of little and little at a Time. When the first Word is present, all the subsequent are absent; when the last Word is present, all the previous are absent; when any of the middle Words are present, then are there some absent, as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much is not, (to Sensation at least) as
and whole in the separate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, without departing

tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And so much for the perception of Sense, than which we see nothing can be more dissipated, fleeting, and detached. —And is that of the Mind similar?—Admit it, and what follows? — It follows, that one Mind would no more recognize one Truth, by recognizing its Terms successively and apart, than many distant Minds would recognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is, every Truth is one, tho' its Terms are many. It is in no respect true by parts at a time, but it is true of necessity at once and in an instant.—What Powers therefore recognize this Oneness or Unity? — Where even does it reside, or what makes it? — Shall we answer with the Stagirite, To δὲ ἔν ΠΟΙΟΤΝ τῷ ὌΝΥΣ ἐκαστον — If this be allowed, it should seem, where Sensation and Intellection appear to concur, that Sensation was of Many, Intellection was of One; that Sensation was temporary, divisible and successive; Intellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once.

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find at the Circumference that they are Many; at the Center that they are One. Let us then suppose Sense and Mind to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them at the Circumference, Mind at the Center; and
and hence we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same object.

There is another Act of the Mind, the very reverse of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not one in many, but many in one. This is that mental Separation, of which we have given some account in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or Analysis which enables us to investigate the Causes, and Principles, and Elements of things. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attribute, and make it by itself the Subject of philosophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for particular Sciences to exist; because otherwise they would be as much blended, as the several Attributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could there be such a Science as Optics, were we necessitated to contemplate Colour concreted with Figure, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but associated? I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of which still present themselves, whenever we look on any coloured Body.

These
And thus we see the Process by which we arrive at General Ideas; for the Per-

Those two noble Sciences, Arithmetic and Geometry, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this separative Power. They are both conversant about Quantity; Geometry about continuous Quantity, Arithmetic about Discrete. Extension is essential to continuous Quantity; Monads, or Units, to Discrete. By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those simple and perfectly similar Units, which being combined make Number, and are the Subject of Arithmetic. Again, by separating from Body every possible subordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Extension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be Body no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed Magnitude, the contemplation of whose properties makes the Science of Geometry.

By the same analytical or separate Power, we investigate Definitions of all kinds, each one of which is a developed Word, as the same Word is an enveloped Definition.

To conclude—In Composition and Division consists the whole of Science, Composition
Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In these too we perceive the objects of Science and real Knowledge, which can by no means be, but of that which is general, and definite, and first (g).

Here

tion making Affirmative Truth, and shewing us things under their Similarities and Identities; Division making Negative Truth, and presenting them to us under their Dissimilarities and Diversities.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.—If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science as well to compound as to separate, may we not say that those Philosophers took Half of Wisdom for the Whole, who distinguished it from Wit, as if Wisdom only separated, and Wit only brought together?

—Yet so held the Philosopher of Malmbury, and the Author of the Essay on the Human Understanding.

(g) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, Scientia, and Understanding, may serve in some degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of those Beings, their true and proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ὄνομασαί, διὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ ἡ ἄνευ τῶν περιγράμτων ἄγειν ἄμας, ἢ
Here too even Individuals, however of themselves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge,

**Book the Third.**

Science (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) has its name from bringing us (ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) to some Stop and Boundary of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is convergent about Subjects, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, as may be seen in the following account of it from his Cratylus. In this Dialogue Socrates, having first (according to the Heraclitean Philosophy, which Cratylus favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that Flow and unceasing Mutation, supposed by Heraclitus to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and begins to etymologize from another, which supposed something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds Σκοπώμεν δὴ, ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τῶτο τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιδίαλον ἐστὶ, ὡς μᾶλλον ἔσομε σημαίνον τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς ἀφόγμασι τῆν ψυχήν, ὅτι συμπερι- φίεται. Let us consider then (says he) some of the very
Ch. IV. Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may any Particular be

very Words already examined; and in the first place, the Word Science; how disputable is this (as to its former Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear to signify, that it Stops the Soul at Things, than that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a strange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing System of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἔσθεναι and μείναι, as if it kept along with things, by perpetually following them in their motions. See Plato as before, p. 412.

be said to be known, when by asserting it to be a Man, or an Animal, or the like, we

The English Word, Understanding, means not so properly Knowledge, as that Faculty of the Soul, where Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind of firm Basis, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to stand under them; as their immoveable Support?

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies; whether they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to have considered Science and Understanding, not as fleeting powers of Perception, like Sense, but rather as steady, permanent, and durable Comprehensions. But if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain steady, permanent, and durable Objects; since if Perception of any kind be different from the thing perceived, (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) such Perception must of necessity be erroneous and false. The following passage from a Greek Platonic (whom we shall quote again hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its weight—Εἰ έστι γνῶσις ἀνθρώπου τῆς αἰσθήσεως, έν ή ἡ γνώσις ἀνθρώπου τῶν αἰσθητῶν. If there be
Ch. IV. we refer it to some such comprehensive, or general Idea.

Now it is of these comprehensive and permanent Ideas, the genuine perceptions of pure Mind, that Words of all Languages, however different, are the Symbols. And hence it is, that as the Perceptions include, so do these their Symbols

A Knowledge more accurate than Sensation; there must be certain objects of such knowledge more true than objects of Sense.

The following then are Questions worth considering,—What these Objects are?—Where they reside?—And how they are to be discovered?—Not by experimental Philosophy it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational speculation of Mathematics; for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our own Minds, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the Satirist be no ways improper,

—Nec Te quæsiveris extra.

Pers.
SYMBOLS express, not this or that set of Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were therefore the Inhabitants of Salisbury to be transferred to York, tho' new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new Language to explain themselves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the *local proper Names*; which Names, as we have said already*, are hardly a part of Language, but must equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode.

It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the Language of modern England is able to describe antient Rome; and

---

* Sup. p. 345, 346.
and that of antient Rome to describe modern England (b). But of these matters we have spoken before.

§ 2. And now having viewed the Process, by which we acquire general Ideas, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) whence it is that these Ideas originally come. If we can succeed here, we may discern perhaps, what kind of Beings they are, for this at present appears somewhat obscure.

(b) As far as Human Nature, and the primary Genera both of Substance and Accident are the same in all places, and have been so thro' all ages: so far all Languages share one common Identity. As far as peculiar species of Substance occur in different regions; and much more, as far as the positive Institutions of religious and civil Polities are everywhere different; so far each Language has its peculiar Diversity. To the Causes of Diversity here mentioned, may be added the distinguishing Character and Genius of every Nation, concerning which we shall speak hereafter.
Let us suppose any man to look for the first time upon some Work of Art, as for example upon a Clock, and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea of what he had seen?—And what is it, to retain such Idea?—It is to have a Form internal correspondent to the external; only with this difference, that the Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the External is united with it, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like.

Now if we suppose this Spectator to view many such Machines, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one End, he might be then said to possess a kind of intelligible Form, by which he would not only understand, and know the Clocks, which he had seen already, but every Work also of like Sort, which he might see hereafter.—Should
Ch. IV. Should it be asked "which of these Forms is prior, the External and Sensible, or the Internal and Intelligible," the Answer is obvious, that the prior is the Sensible.

Thus then we see, there are intelligible Forms, which to the Sensible are subsequent.

But farther still—If these Machines be allowed the Work not of Chance, but of an Artist, they must be the Work of one, who knew what he was about. And what is it, to work, and know what one is about?

—It is to have an Idea of what one is doing; to possess a Form internal, corresponding to the external, to which external it serves for an Exemplar or Archetype.

Here then we have an intelligible Form, which is prior to the sensible Form; which, being truly prior as
as well in dignity as in time, can no more become subsequent, than Cause can to Effect.

Thus then, with respect to Works of Art, we may perceive, if we attend, a triple Order of Forms: one Order, intelligible and previous to these Works; a second Order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these Orders the Maker may be said to work; thro’ the second, the Works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation. To make these Forms by different Names more easy to be understood; the first may be called the Maker’s Form; the second, that of the Subject; and the third, that of the Contemplator.

Let us pass from hence to Works of Nature. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified Prospect; “a Plain, for example, spacious and fertile;
Ch. IV. "tile; a river winding thro' it; by the
"banks of that river, men walking and
"cattle grazing; the view terminated
"with distant hills, some craggy, and
"some covered with wood." Here it
is plain we have plenty of Forms na-
tural. And could any one quit so fair
a Sight, and retain no traces of what he
had beheld?—And what is it, to retain
traces of what one has beheld?—It is to
have certain Forms internal corre-
tpondent to the external, and resem-
bling them in every thing, except the
being merged in Matter. And thus, thro'
the same retentive and collective Powers,
the Mind becomes fraught with Forms
natural, as before with Forms artifi-
cial.—Should it be asked, "which of
"these natural Forms are prior, the Ex-
ternal ones viewed by the Senses, or the
"Internal existing in the Mind?" the
Answer is obvious, that the prior are the
External.

Thus
Titus therefore in Nature, as well as in Art, there are intelligible Forms, which to the sensible are subsequent. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil est in Intellectu quod non prius fuit in Sensu*; an Axiom, which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the Ideas of a mere Contemplator.

But to proceed somewhat farther—Are natural Productions made by Chance, or by Design?—Let us admit by Design, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly more exquisite than any Works of Art, and yet these we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by Chance.—Admit it, and what follows?—We must of necessity admit a Mind also, because Design implies Mind, wherever it is to be found.—Allowing therefore this, what

* Aris. de Part. Animal. L. I. c. i.*
what do we mean by the Term, Mind? —

We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas these Works are fashioned.

That such Exemplars, Patterns, Forms, Ideas (call them as you please) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the Cause of Nature to be a Mind, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a Mind do we leave without them? Chance surely is as knowing, as Mind, without Ideas; or rather Mind without Ideas is no less blind than Chance.

The Nature of these Ideas is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their Existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, seen in natu-
ral Substances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are mental is plain, as they are of the Essence of Mind, and consequently no Objects to any of the *Senses*, nor therefore circumscribed either by Time or Place.

Here then, on this System, we have plenty of *Forms intelligible, which are truly previous to all Forms sensible*. Here too we see that *Nature is not defective in her triple Order*, having (like Art) her *Forms previous*, her *Concomitant*, and her *Subsequent* (i).

---

(i) Simplicius, in his commentary upon the *Predicaments*, calls the first Order of these intelligible Forms, τὰ πρὶν τὰς μεθὲμένως, *those previous to Participation*, and at other times, ἡ ἐκπνομένη κοινότης, *the transcendent Universal or Sameness*; the second Order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθὲς, *those which exist in Participation*, that is, those merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them ἡ κατατεταγμένη κοινότης, *the subordinate Universal or Sameness*; lastly, of the third Order he says,
fays, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that—ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἑννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑπερήφανοι, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves. Simp. in Praedic. p. 17. In another place he fays, in a language somewhat mysterious, yet still conformable to the same doctrine—Μὴ ποτε ἐν τριτίνῳ ἑννοίαν τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἑξηκομενὸν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτά, κυ σιτον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτὴ φύσιν, ἐστὶν ἐν τῆς διαφοράς της κατὰ τὴν πολυειδῆ ἱτρά-ληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ ἐς τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἄπο τοκοῦν αὐτῶν τοῖς διαφοράς ἑκέσιν ἐνδιδόμενον, ἢ ἐνυπάρχουν αὐτῶν—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίξεις ἐξ ἀφαί-φισίως ὑπερήφανοι, ὑπερφένες ὑπ’—Perhaps therefore we must admit a TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; that of the first Order, transcendent and superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cause of their Diversity—that of the second Order, what is infused from the first universal Cause into the various Species of Beings; and which has its existence in these several Species—that of the third Order, what subsequent by abstraction in our own Understandings; being of subsequent origin to the other two. Ibid. p. 21.
prior to all things else. The whole visible World exhibits nothing more, than...

To Simplicius we shall add the two following Quotations from Ammonius and Nicephorus Blemmides, which we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of these Authors are not easy to be procured.
HERMES.

Ch.IV. so many passing Pictures of these immutable Archetypes. Nay thro' these it attains even a Semi-

384

"Ει δε τι καθ' εξίων λογικών ποιεῖ, οίδεται σωματός το γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῆς. 'Ει τούπων μὴ δείκνυον, ἡ κατὰ ἀνθρώπων συνέχεια ποιεῖ, οἷος τοῦ γιγνόμενον· εἰ δὲ διδέων οἱ ποιεῖ, αὐτές εἶλον, ὡς ἦσσεν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ τα ἐκδοθέν. "Εσι δὲ τὸ εἴδος ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, ὡς ὧν τῷ δακτυλῷ τύπος; κύριε λέγεται τάτο τὸ εἴδος ПΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, κυρίως δὲν τῆς ὑλῆς. "Εσι δὲ τὸ εἴδος τά ἀνθρώπων κύριε εἰς τοὺς καθ' ἐκατον ἀνθρώπων, ὡς τά ἐν τοῖς κηρεῖς εἰκονάματα· κύριε λέγεται τά τοι αὐτά ἐν ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ξεναί, κυρίως δὲν τῆς ὑλῆς. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων· ὧτι πάντες τό αὐτὸ εἴδος τά ἀνθρώπων ἐκατον, (ὡς εἰ) τῷ ζυρέον ἑλθοντος, κυρίως δὲν τῷ κηρεῖ) κακομαζόμενον. αὐτό εἰς τῇ διάνοια· κύριε λέγεται τάτο ἐν ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ὡς μετὰ τῷ πολλῷ, κυρίως δὲν ἠγνοεῖναι· Intelligatur annius, qui alicujus, ut—pete Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat: multa insuper cereis sint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quispiam,uideatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione formatas, annulique impressionem in mente continat: sigillum annulo insculptum, ANTE MULTA dicetur: in cerulis impression, in MULTIS: quod vero in ilius, qui illo venerat intellectu romanferit, POST MULTA, et poste—rius.
Book the Third.

a Semblance of Immortality, and continues

Deus omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficiere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum ceteros faciat omnes. At si quis reflexerit, dicitque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quos ut diligentem attendat: Opifex, quae facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nescit, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggregitur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quoadam rationis pererte aliquid agit, prout agit natura (ex quo consicitur, ut natura etiam agat, et siquae faciat, non advertat:). Si vero ratione quoadam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognoscit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quae fecit cognovit: si cognovit quae fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formae autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque nomine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris; et in MULTIS, nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum figulos homines animo conscipimus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente noftrâ insidens POST MULTA, et posteriorius genita dicetur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa figilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressâ conœxerat. Annun. in Porphyr. Introduét. p. 29. b.
Hermes.

Ch. IV.

...tinues throughout ages to be specifically

Δέγοιται δὲ τὰ γένη κἂ τὰ εἴδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ
ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ἩΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἘΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ
ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἵν έννοιαί θεί τι σφραγισθείσιν, ἓχου
κη ἐκλύσωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἵνα τὰ κηρία πολλὰ μεταλαβέ
tο τὰ ἐκλύσωματ', καὶ τις ὑπ' ὑψι αγαθῶτα ταῦ
τα, καὶ προκαταλήψιον μηδ' ὅλος τὸ σφραγισθείσι 
ἐσθοικὸς δε τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκλύσωμα, κη ἐπισθήσε 
ὅτι πάλαι τὰ αὐτῆ μετέχοισιν ἐκλύσωματ', κη τὰ δοκι
tο πολλά τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἓν, ἰχνή τώ 
τα διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν ἐν σφραγισθείσιν τύπωμα λέγε
ται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις,
ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δε ἐκ αὐτῶν καταλη
tότι, κη κατὰ διάνοιαν αὖλως ὑποσάν, ἘΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ
ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. Ὁ οὕτως ἐν τῇ γένε τῇ εἴδη
ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μὲν εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ Δημιου
ρᾷ, κατὰ τὰς σωιτοχικὰς λόγος· ἐν τῷ Ὑδώ γὰρ οἳ ἐ-
πιστοὶ λόγοι τῶν ὑπὸ ἐμαῖας προφητεύσεις, καθ'
δὲ λόγος ὁ ὑπερβοῦσι τὰ ὑπὸ πᾶσα κη προφητεύ 
παράγαγεν' ὑφεσηκεναι δὲ λέγοιται τὰ γένη κη 
τα εἴδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ 
μέγας ἀνθρώποις τὸ τὰ ἀνθρώπων εἰδός ἐστι, κη τοῖς 
κατὰ μέγας ἑπτοῖς τὸ τὰ ἑπτὰ εἶθος ἐστι, ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ,
kη ἑπτοῖς, κη τοῖς ἀλλοίς ζωίς τὸ γένος ἐφιέσηται 
tῶν τοιοῦτον εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζώον κη τοῖς ζωίς
ἐρᾶ κη τοῖς ζωφύτοις τὸ καθολικῶτερον γένος, τὸ 
αἰσθητικῆς, ἐξετάζεται συναχθεῖσιν δὲ κη τῶν φυτῶν,
CALLY ONE, amid those infinite parti-
cular

Senator to the ἐμψυχον* εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμψυχοις ἔθελει
τις ἐπισκοπεῖν κἂ τὰ ἀψυχα, τὸ σώμα σύμπαν κα-
tόχεται* συνδραμομένον δὲ τοῖς ιερημένοις τῶν ἀσωμά-
tων ἰσίων, τὸ πρῶτον γεν* φανεῖται κἂ γενικώτατον
κἂ ἐτώ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ύφέσηκε τὰ εἰδὴ κἂ
τὰ γένη. Καταλαβοῦν δὲ τις εἰ τῶν κατὰ μὲν ἀν-
θρώπους τῶν αὐτῶν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρωπότητας, εἰ δὲ τῶν
κατὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπους αὐτῶν τὴν ἰππότητα, κἂ ἐτώ τῶν
καθόλου ἀνθρώπου, κἂ τῶν καθόλου ἰππων ἰππόσως, κἂ
τὸ καθόλου ζύων εἰ τῶν καθένας τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγων·
kὰ τὸ καθόλου αἰσθητικῶν, κὰ τὸ καθόλου ἐμψυχον,
kὰ τὸ καθόλου σώμα, κὰ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ἰσίαν εἰς
ἀπάντων συλλογισμάμεν*, οὐ τοιμὸς εἰ τῇ ἐκτὸς δια-
νοίᾳ τὰ γένη κἂ τὰ εἰδὴ αὐλως ύπέσησεν ἐν τοῖς
ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τετέσει, μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ κὰ υἱογονεῖς.
Genera vero et Species dicuntur esse ANTE MULTA,
in MULTIS, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur
sigillum, quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multae cerar
ejudem figuræ sint participes, et in medium aliquis hab
proserat, nequaquam praevio sigillo. Cum autem vi-
disset eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et animad-
dervertisset omnes eandem figuram participaret, et quis
videbantur multae, rationes in unum coegisset, hoc in
mente teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur esse Species ANTE
MULTA; illa vero in ceris, IN MULTIS; quae vero
ab iis desumitur, et in mente immaterialiter subsisit,
POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE
MULTA in Creatore sunt, secundum rationes efficientes.
C C A
cular changes, that befall it every moment (k).


(k) The following elegant Lines of Virgil are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

Ergo.
May we be allowed then to credit those speculative Men, who tell us, "it is in these

Ergo ipsius quamvis angusti terminus ævi
Excipiat: (neque enim plus septima ductur astas)
At Genus immortale manet—G. IV.

The same Immortality, that is, the Immortality of the Kind, may be seen in all perishable substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' Individuals perish, the several Kinds still remain. And hence, if we take Time, as denoting the system of things temporary, we may collect the meaning of that passage in the Timeus, where the Philosopher describes Time to be—

We have subjoined the following extract from Boethius, to serve as a commentary on this description of Time.—Æternitas igitur est, interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta posita. Quodex collatione temporaliun clarissimum. Nunc quidquid vivit in tempore, id praebens a praeteritis in futura procedit: nihilque est in tempore ita constitutum, quod totum vitæ suas spatium pariter possit amplecti; sed est minum quidem nondum apprehendit, heclemun vero jam perdidit. In hodierno quoque vitæ non amplius vivit, quam in illo mobili transitorioque
“these permanent and comprehensive forms
that the Deity views at once, without
looking abroad, all possible productions
both present, past, and future—that this
great and stupendous View is but a View
of himself, where all things lie enveloped,
in their Principles and Exemplars, as be-
ing
Book the Third.

"ing essential to the fulness of his universal " Intellec- tion?"—If so, it will be proper that we invert the Axiom before mentioned. We must now say—Nil est in Sensu, quod non prius fuit in Intellectu. For tho' the contrary may be true with respect to Knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to Know-

rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturae. Hunc enim vitae immobils praesentarium statum, infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur; cumque eum effingere, atque aequare non possit, ex immobiilitye deficit in motum; ex simplicitate praesentiae decrecit in infinitam futuri ac praeteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitae suae plenitudinem nescuat posseedere, hoc ipso, quod aliquo modo nunquam esse definit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur semulari, alligans se ad qualcumque praesentiam huic exiguus voluciisque momenti: quae, quoniam manentlis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscunque contingit, id praeflat, ut esse videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eaque modo factum est, ut continuaret vitam eundo, cujus plenitudinem complexi non valuit permanendo. Itaque, &c. De Consolat. Philosophi. L. V.
Ch. IV. Knowledge universally, unless we give precedence to Atoms and lifeless Body, making Mind, among other things, to be struck out by a lucky Concourse.

§ 3. It is far from the design of this Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in their several Systems, how readily they admit of the above Precedence.

For mark the Order of things, according to their account of them. First comes that huge Body the sensible World. Then this and its Attributes beget sensible Ideas. Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made Ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they admit that Mind was coeval with Body, yet till Body gave it Ideas, and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at best have been nothing more,
more, than a sort of dead Capacity; for innate ideas it could not possibly have any.

At another time we hear of Bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very Exility makes them susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrunk into intellect by their exquisite subtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, such as subtle Aëther, animal Spirits, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, and the like; Terms, which modern Philosophy, upon parting with occult Qualities, has found expedient to provide itself, to supply their place.

But the intellectual Scheme, which never forgets Deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the primary mental Cause. It is here it looks for the origin of intelligible Ideas, even of those, which exist in human Capacities. For tho' sensible Objects may be
their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were it otherwise, there could be no intercourse between.

αὐτὸς διανοεῖται: καὶ ἐὰν ἠφεικέναι τὴν ψυχήν μηδαμῇ ἢν, τι διανοεῖται: τὰς γὰρ Φευδῆς τῶν διδῶν ἄχι μὴ ὕπτων ἀλλ' ὑπτων μὲν, ἀλλῶν δὲ κατ' ἄλλων τινας συνθεῖσις τινας, κατὰ τὸ ἄρθρων γινομένας. Λειτερρεῖται δὲ ἀφ' εἰτέρας τινὸς ψυχῆς πολλοὶ ἐπὶ χρειάζοντος τε καὶ τελειώτερας ἀφ' οὗν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελειώτερον τῇ τῶν ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν τις λόγων. Those who suppose Ideal Forms, say that the Soul, when she assumes, for the purposes of Science, those Proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. New this superior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence anywhere else. For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has existence nowhere, since even such opinions, as are false, are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but of various real Beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this Perfection, which is superior to the Proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the Soul from some other Nature, which is by many degrees more excellent and perfect. De Aristotel. et Platon. Philos. Diff. Edit. Paris 1541.

The ΑΟΓΟΙ or Proportions, of which Gemistius here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions of
between Man and Man, or (what is more important) between Man and God.

For

of Equality and Inequality, which exist in Quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical Lines, Angles, Figures, &c. of all which Αὐγον or Proportions, tho’ we posses in the Mind the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible World.

To these two Authors we may add Boethius, who, after having enumerated many acts of the Mind or Intellect, wholly distinct from Sensation, and independent of it, at length concludes,

Hæc est efficiens magis
Longè causâ potenteri,
Quam quæ matiere modo
Impressâs patitur notas.
Præedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore passio.
Cùm vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus inlstrepit;
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Quas intus species tenet,
Ad motus similis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
Introrsumque reconditis
Formis miscet imagines.

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V.
For what is Conversation between Man and Man? — It is a mutual intercourse of Speaking and Hearing. — To the Speaker, it is to teach; to the Hearer, it is to learn. — To the Speaker, it is to descend from Ideas to Words; to the Hearer, it is to ascend from Words to Ideas. — If the Hearer, in this ascent, can arrive at no Ideas, then is he said not to understand; if he ascend to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is he said to misunderstand. — What then is requisite, that he may be said to understand? — That he should ascend to certain Ideas, treasured up within himself, correspondent and similar to those within the Speaker. The same may be said of a Writer and a Reader; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid wrote in Greece two thousand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there should be so exact an Identity of our Ideas, if they were
were only generated from sensible Objects, infinite in number, ever changing, distant in Time, distant in Place, and no one particular the same with any other?

Again, do we allow it possible for God to signify his will to Men; or for Men to signify their wants to God?—In both these cases there must be an Identity of Ideas, or else nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do these common identical Ideas come?—Those of Men, it seems, come all from Sensation. And whence come God's Ideas?—Not surely from Sensation too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to Body that notable Precedence of being prior to the Intelligence of even God himself.—Let them then be original; let them be connate, and essential to the divine Mind.—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that Ideas of corporeal rise, and others of mental, (things derived from subjects so totally distinct) should
H A D we not better rea son thus upon so abstruse a Subject?—Either all M I N D S have their Ideas derived; or all have them o r i g i n a l ; or some have them o r i g i n a l , and some derived. If all Minds have them derived, they must be derived from something, w h i c h i s i t s e l f n o t M i n d , and thus we fall insensibly into a kind of A t h e i s m. If all have them original, t h e n a r e a l l M i n d s d i v i n e , an Hypothesis by far more plausible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then must one Mind (at lea st) have o r i g i n a l Ideas, and the rest have them d e r i v e d . Now supposing this last, whence are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, most likely to derive them?—F r o m M I N D , o r f r o m B o d y ?—From M I N D , a t h i n g h o m o g e n e o u s ; or f r o m B o d y , a t h i n g h e t e r o g e n e o u s ? F r o m M i n d , s u c h a s ( f r o m t h e H y p o t h e s i s ) h a s
Book the Third.

original Ideas; or from Body, which we cannot discover to have any Ideas at all? (l)—An Examination of this kind, pursuèd with accuracy and temper, is the most probable method of solving these doubts. It is thus we shall be enabled with more assurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean Poet,

Corporea natura animum consileare, animamque;

or trust the Mantuan Bard, when he sings in divine numbers,

\textit{Igneus est ollis vigor, et caelestis origo Seminibus.}

But

(l) \textit{NOTN \& t\iota \sigma\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\rev\vau\vau \vau \omega\nu\nu\nu \vau \tau\alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \alpha \a
Ch. IV. But it is now time, to quit these Speculations. Those, who would trace them farther, and have leisure for such studies, may perhaps find themselves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them prospects both interesting and pleasant. We have at present said as much as was requisite to our Subject, and shall therefore pass from hence to our concluding chapter.
Subordination of Intelligence — Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations — Different Genius of different Languages — Character of the English, the Oriental, the Latin, and the Greek Languages — Superlative Excellence of the Last — Conclusion.

Original Truth (a), having the most intimate connection with the supreme Intelligence, may be said (as it were) to

(a) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of Being and Knowledge are derived from Body and Sensation, have a short method to explain the nature of Truth. It is a factitious thing, made by every man for himself; which comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance the last of any, being not only subsequent to sensible Objects, but even to our Sensations of them. According to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be,
to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but itself neither admits Diminution, nor Change, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among these therefore we must look for ignorance and be, and have not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent Truth not as the last, but the first of Beings; who call it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To these it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method how they perceive Truth, was to pass for an account of Truth itself; as if to describe the road to London, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the
and error, and for that Subordination of Intelligence, which is their natural consequence.

We have daily experience in the Works of Art, that a partial Knowledge will suffice for Contemplation, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to Nature; and well for mankind is it found to

the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of natural materials, but are as much creatures of our own, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If Milton by his Urania intended to represent Truth, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

Heav'nly born!
Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy Sibyl; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
With thy celestial Song.—P. L. VII.

Marc. Antonin. IX. 1.
to shine with unchangeable splendor, enlightening throughout the Universe every possible Subject, by nature susceptible of its benign influence. Passions and other obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obscure the Sun; but it self neither admits Diminution, nor Change, because the Darkness respects only particular Percipients. Among these therefore we must look for ignorance and

be, and have not been yet; and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all.

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have had very different notions; those I mean, who represent Truth not as the last, but the first of Beings; who call it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; Attributes, that all indicate something more than human. To those it must appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that a crude account of the method how they perceive Truth, was to pass for an account of Truth itself; as if to describe the road to London, could be called a Description of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensation and Reflection, and am taught the process at large how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the
and error, and for that Subordination of Intelligence, which is their natural consequence.

We have daily experience in the Works of Art, that a partial Knowledge will suffice for Contemplation, tho' we know not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. Much more is this true, with respect to Nature; and well for mankind is it found to the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist (for aught we know) of natural materials, but are as much creatures of our own, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If Milton by his Urania intended to represent Truth, he certainly referred her to a much more ancient, as well as a far more noble origin.

—Heav'ly born!
Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flew'd,
Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse,
Wisdom thy Sister; and with her didst play
In presence of th' almighty Father; pleas'd
With thy celestial Song.—

Mark. Antonin. IX. 1.
to be true, else never could we attain any natural Knowledge at all. For if the constitutive Proportions of a Clock are so subtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artist himself; what shall we say to those seminal Proportions, which make the essence and character of every natural Subject?—Partial views, the Imperfections of Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbulence of Passions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in many instances to furnish us with Ideas, some too general, some too partial, and (what is worse than all this) with many that are erroneous, and contrary to Truth. These it behoves us to correct as far as possible, by cool suspense and candid examination.

Νῦς, ἥ μὴν καὶ ἄπειρα, ἀδρα μὴ ταῦτα τῶν φενῶν.

And thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cause of Letters, and that
that of Virtue appear to co-incide, it being the business of both to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth (b).

In this important Work, we shall be led to observe, how Nations, like single Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how these peculiar Ideas become the Genius of their Language, since the Symbol must of course correspond to its Archetype (c);

(b) How useful to Ethic Science, and indeed to Knowledge in general, a Grammatical Disquisition into the Etymology and Meaning of Words was esteemed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by consulting Plato in his Cratylus; Xenoph. Mem. IV. 5, 6. Arrian. Epit. I. 17. II. 10. Marc. Anton. III. II. V. 8. X. 8.

how the wisest Nations, having the most and best Ideas, will consequently have the best and most copious Languages; how others, whose Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, discover by Words, to whom they are indebted for Things.

To illustrate what has been said, by a few examples. We Britons in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our multiform Language may sufficiently shew. Our Terms in polite Literature prove, that this came from Greece; our Terms in Music and Painting, that these came from Italy; our Phrases in Cookery and War, that we learnt these from the French; and our Phrases in Navigation, that we were taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. These many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cause, why it is so deficient in Regularity and Analogy. Yet we have this advantage to compensate the
the defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we gain in *Copiousness*, in which last respect few Languages will be found superior to our own.

**Let us pass from ourselves to the Nations of the East.** The (d) Eastern World, from the earliest days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never shed its genial influence. If at any time civil Discords arose among them (and arise there did innumerable) the contest was never about the *Form of their Government*; for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of, *who should be their Master, whether*

---

(d) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δελεικότερον εἶναι τὰ ἥθη οἷ μεν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἐλλήνων, οἱ δὲ ἔρει τῶν Ἀσίων τῶν ἔρει τῶν Ευρώπης, ὑπόμισε τὴν διστοσιὰν ἀξίως, ἀδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. *For the Barbarians by being more fawish in their Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring or discontent.* Arist. Polit. III. 4.
ther a Cyrus or an Artaxerxes, a Mahomet or a Muslapha.

Such was their Condition, and what was the consequence?—Their Ideas became consonant to their servile State, and their Words became consonant to their servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for ever in their sight, was that of Tyrant and Slave; the most unnatural one conceivable, and the most susceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themselves, as the meanest and most abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into the Great and Magnificent (e), they as frequently degenerated

(e) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of divine Providence, &c.
degenerated into the Tumid and Bombast. The Greeks too of Asia became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their masters; and hence that Luxuriance of the Asiatic Stile, unknown to the chaste eloquence and purity of Athens. But of the Greeks we forbear to speak now, as we shall speak of them more fully, when we have first considered the Nature or Genius of the Romans.

And what sort of People may we pronounce the Romans?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, some foreign, some domestic, which for seven hundred years wholly engrossed their thoughts. Hence therefore their Language became, like their Ideas, copious in all Terms expressive of things political, and well adapted to the purposes both of History and popular Eloquence.—But what was their Philosophy?—As a Nation, it was none, if we may credit their ablest Writers. And hence the Unfitness of their Language
Language to this Subject; a defect, which even Cicero is compelled to confess, and more fully makes appear, when he writes Philosophy himself, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent (f).

Virgil

(f) See Cic. de Fin. I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4. &c. but in particular Tusc. Disp. I. 3. where he says, Philosophia jacuit usque ad banc etatem, nec illum habuit lumen Literarum Latinarum; que illustranda et excitanda nobis est; ut si, &c. See also Tusc. Disp. IV. 3. and Acad. I. 2. where it appears, that 'till Cicero applied himself to the writing of Philosophy, the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean performances of Amasianus the Epicurean, and others of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to Cicero for Philosophy, and with what industry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be seen not only from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved.

The Epicurean Poet Lucretius, who flourished nearly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over-looked the Latin writers of his own sect; deriving all his Philosophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian Sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in Philosophy in Latin, both from the Poverty of the Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject.
Virgil seems to have judged the most truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at last with his usual majesty,

Tu

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, wrote some in the way of Philosophy; as did the Patriot Brutus, a Treatise concerning Virtue, much applauded by Cicero; but these Works are now lost.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came Horace, some of whose Satires and Epistles may be justly ranked amongst the most valuable pieces of Latin Philosophy, whether we consider the purity of their Stile, or the great Address, with which they treat the Subject.

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the Satirist Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus; to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
(Hae tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

Tuous Life, fo his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single difficult writer among the Latin Classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also Seneca; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the Characteristics, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the Antonines, lived Aulus Gellius, or (as some call him) Agellius, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a Philosopher, yet deserves not to pass unnoticed here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With Aulus Gellius we range Macrobius, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under
Book the Third.

From considering the Romans, let us pass to the Greeks. The Grecian Common-

under Honorius and Theodosius) but from his near resemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miscellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero may be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind.

In the same age with Ausus Gellius, flourished Apuleius of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whose Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher Stile, was Martianus Capella, if indeed he deserve not the name rather of a Philologyst, than of a Philosopher.

After Capella, we may rank Chalcidius the Platonic, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the Timæus of Plato.

The
The last Latin Philosopher was Boethius, who was descended from some of the noblest of the Roman Families, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greater part in the Logical way. But his Ethic piece, On the Consolation of Philosophy, and which is partly prose, and partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable to those crabbed African's already mentioned. By command of Theodoric king of the Goths, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer death; with whom the Latin Tongue, and the last remains of Roman Dignity, may be said to have sunk in the western World.

There were other Romans, who left Philosophical Writings; such as Musonius Rufus, and the two Emperors, Marcus Antoninus and Julian; but as these preferred the use of the Greek Tongue to their own, they can hardly be considered among the number of Latin Writers.

And so much (by way of sketch) for the Latin Authors of Philosophy; a small number for so vast an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near six successive centuries.
the politest, the bravest, and the wisest of
men. In the short space of little more
than a Century they became such States-
men, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Phy-
sicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculp-
tors, Architects, and (last of all) Philoso-
phers, that one can hardly help consider-
ing that Golden Period, as a Provendi-
tial Event in honour of human Na-
ture, to shew to what perfection the Spe-
cies might ascend (g).

Now

(g) If we except Homer, Hesiod, and the Lyric
Poets, we hear of few Grecian Writers before the ex-
pedition of Xerxes. After that Monarch had been
defeated, and the dread of the Persian power was at an end, the Effulgence of Grecian Genius (if I
may use the expression) broke forth, and shone till the
time of Alexander the Macedonian, after whom it dis-
appeared, and never rose again. This is that Golden
Period spoken of above. I do not mean that Greece
had not many writers of great merit subsequent to that
period, and especially of the philosophic kind; but the
Great, the Striking, the Sublime (call it as you please)
attained at that time to a height, to which it never
could ascend in any after age.
Now the Language of these Greeks was truly like themselves, it was con-

The same kind of fortune befel the people of Rome. When the Punic wars were ended, and Carthage their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as Horace informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden Period, which lasted to the death of Octavius Caesar.

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses that flourished in each, one the Socratic Period, the other the Ciceronian.

There are still farther analogies subsisting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals) so by this the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then among the
conformable to their transcendent and universal Genius. Where Matter so abounded,

the Greeks that fatal Peloponnesian War, which together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; wafted their strength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon to enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the Romans; raised those unhappy contests between the Senate and the Gracchi; between Sylla and Marius; between Pompey and Caesar; till at length, after the last struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots Brutus and Cassius at Philippi, and the subsequent defeat of Anthony at Actium, the Romans became subject to the dominion of a Fellow-Citizen.

It must indeed be confessed, that after Alexander and Octavius had established their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their Government. Aristotle maintained a friendship and epistolary correspondence with Alexander. In the time of the same Monarch lived Theophrastus, and the Cynic, Diogenes. Then also Demosthenes and Aeschines spoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of Octavius, Virgil wrote his Aeneid, and with Horace.
abounded, Words followed of course, and those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they stood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expressed in Greek.

Here were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an Aristophanes; for the native

Horace, Varius, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it must be remembered, that these men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly spirit, which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Government left by Alexander and Octavius, soon stopped the growth of anything farther in the kind. So true is that noble saying of Longinus—Θέσψαι τε γὰρ ίκανὴ τὰ φρονίματα τῶν μεγαλοφάνων ἡ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐπιπλησθαι, καὶ ἄμα διαβεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς προς ἀλλήλας έξιδος, καὶ τής πείπν πα κρατεῖν πιλοτημίας. It is Liberty that is formed to nurse the sentiments of great Genius; to inspire them with hope; to push forward the propensity of contest one with another, and the generous emulation of being the first in rank. De Subl. Sect. 44.
native Elegance of a Philemon or Menander; for the amorous Strains of a Minnemus or Sappho; for the rural Lays of a Theocritus or Bion; and for the sublime Conceptions of a Sophocles or Homer. The fame in Prose. Here Isocrates was enabled to display his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoise of Diction. Here Demosthenes found materials for that nervous Composition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, like a torrent, too imperious to be withstood.

Who were more different in exhibiting their Philosophy, than Xenophon, Plato, and his disciple, Aristotle? Different, I say, in their character of Composition; for as to their Philosophy itself, it was in reality the same. Aristotle, strict, methodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; sparing in Ornament; with little address to the Passions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with such
such a pregnant brevity, that in every sentence we seem to read a page. How exquisitely is this all performed in Greek? Let those, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, satisfy themselves either by attempting to translate him, or by perusing his translations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either Xenophon or Plato, nothing of this method and strict order appears. The Formal and Didaetic is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, it is without professing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Address, in which, as in a Mirror, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

And yet though these differ in this manner from the Stagirite, how different are they likewise in character from each other? — Plato, copious, figurative,
tive, and majestic; intermixing at times the facetious and satiric; enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the mystic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect simplicity; everywhere smooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the mystic; ascending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the colours of Stile, as to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment itself.

The Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to suit so accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared so elegant in any other manner.

And thus is the Greek Tongue, from its Propriety and Universality, made
HERMES.

Ch. V. for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.

Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo
Musa loquii.

It were to be wished, that those amongst us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leisure (for as to such, as do either from views more fordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined drudgery) it were to be wished, I say, that the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) would inspect the finished Models of Grecian Literature; that they would not waste those hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the French and English Press; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any
any rational pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid improvement.

To be *competently* skilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of such insuperable pains. The very progress itself is attended with delight, and resembles a Journey through some pleasant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms arise. It is certainly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or many other Characters equally illiberai and low. The same application, the same quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that *it is Men,* and not *Books,* we must study to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common consolation and language of Dunces. They shelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whose transcendent abilities, without the common
common helps, have been sufficient of themselves to great and important Ends.
But alas!

Decipit exemplar vitius imitabile—

In truth, each man's Understanding, when ripened and mature, is a composite of natural Capacity, and of super-induced Habit. Hence the greatest Men will be necessarily those, who possess the best Capacities, cultivated with the best Habits. Hence also moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far transcend others the most acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and base purposes. And thus for the honour of Culture and good Learning, they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinsically more excellent than his natural Superiors.

And
And so much at present as to general Ideas; how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language. So much likewise as to the Subject of this Treatise, Universal Grammar.

End of the Third Book.
ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes are either Translations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the Author has said already concerning others of the same kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 95.—to Stop, &c.] The Quotation from Proclus in the Note may be thus rendered—That thing is at rest, which for a time prior and subsequent is in the same place, both itself, and its Parts.

P. 105. In the Note, for γιγνόμενον read γιγνόμενυ, and render the passage thus—For by this faculty (namely the faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the Past, but the Present only.

P. 106. Note (d).] The passage of Philoponus here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the notion of beings corporeal and sensible, which were said to be nearly approaching to Non-Entities. The Author explains this, among other reasons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔστι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παθέωδεν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον, ταὐτὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχεί το μὲν γὰρ ἥφασιν καὶ ἐκ ἐνταῦθας ἐστὶ, το δὲ ἀπό ἐς τὸν καθαράσθαι καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὰ φύσιμα πάλιν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὴς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημα ἐστὶ, οὐ χρόνος. How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entities? In the first place, because here (where they exist) exist the Past and the Future, and these are Non-Entities; for the one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances pass away along with Time, or rather it is upon their Motion that Time is an Attendant.

P. 119
Additional Notes.

P. 119—in the Note here subjoined mention is made of the Real Now, or Instant, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a necessary Connection between Existence and the Present Instant, because no other Point of Time can properly be said to be, but also between Existence and Life, because whatever lives, by the same reason necessarily is. Hence Sophocles, speaking of Time present, elegantly says of it—

—χένω τῷ ζωΐ, καὶ παρήλιν. νῦν.

The Living, and now present Time.

Trachin. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Passage in Virgil, of which Servius here speaks, is a description of Turnus’s killing two brothers, Amycus and Diores; after which the Poet says of him,

—curru absceifsa Duorum

Suspendit capita—

This, literally translated, is—he hung up on his chariot the heads of Two persons, which were cut off; whereas the Sense requires, of the Two persons, that is to say, of Amycus and Diores. Now this by Amborum would have been express properly, as Amborum means The Two; by Duorum is express improperly, as it means only Two indefinitely.

P. 259.—The Passage in Note (o) from Themistius, may be thus rendered—Nature in many instances appears to make her transition by little and little, so that in some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.

P. 294.
P. 294.—Note (c)—There are in the number of things many, which have a most known Existence, but a most unknown Essence; such for example as Motion, Place, and more than either of them, Time. The Existence of each of these is known and indisputable, but what their Essence is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class: that it is something, is most evident; but what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.


P. 368—in the Note—yet so held the Philosopher of Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.]

Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his account of Wisdom or Philosophy, and its Attributes, or essential Characters.—*Idiōn γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐξώσι θεαροράν δείξαι τὴν κοινώνιαν, ἤ τὸ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐχύσι κοινώνιαν δείξαι τίνι διαφέροντι· ἔ γὰρ δυσχερές τὸ δείξαι φάτνης (lege φάτνη; καὶ περισσεῖς κοινώνιαν (ποινὶ γὰρ πρῆποιν), ἀλλ’ ἐ (lege ὁποῖ) τὸ διάφορον τῶν ἐπιτίν· ἔθε κυνὸς κ’ ἐπε ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλὰ τὶ κοινὰν ἐχύσιν. It is the proper business of Philosophy to shew in many things, which have Difference, what is their Common Character; and in many things, which have a Common Character, through what it is they differ. It is indeed
no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379—they are more exquisite than, &c.] The Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these—μᾶλλον δ’ ἐσι τὸ ἐνεκά & τὸ καλῶν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔψεσιν, ἡ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς. The Principles of Design and Beauty are more in the Works of Nature, than they are in those of Art.

P. 379—we must of necessity admit a Mind, &c.] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of Ideas, as held by antient Philosophers.

Εἰ δὲ δὲν συντόμως ἐκτίνῃ τὴν αἰτιῶν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι’ ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ὧσεσα, ἤτοι ὅτι τάντα πλάνα ὡσα ἔχασα, ἠφάναι καὶ ἐπο σελῆνην, ἂ ἀπὸ ταυλομάτω ἔστιν, ἂ κατ’ αἰτιῶν ἄλλῃ ἀπὸ ταυλομάτω ἀδύνατον’ ἐσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπεροίς τὰ κρείττονα, νῦσ, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰτίας, καὶ ἐτώ τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείττο τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔχει τῷ ἡ ἐφοι σο ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ’ δεὶ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ’ ἁυτα, τότεν γὰρ ἑκαίνης τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὡσε το ἀπὸ ταυλομάτω πασιν ὑπερετέρῳ ἂν ἦν ἐν τὰ κατ’ αἰτίαν, καὶ ἂν ἀπὸ ταυλομάτω τὰ Θείατα ὑπὸ τῶν φανερῶν. If there-
therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE
Hypothesis of Ideas pleased them (namely Parme-
nides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing
that all the various visible objects around us, the heav-
• enly as well as the sublunary, are either from Chance,
or according to a Cause. From Chance is im-
possible; for then the more excellent things (such as
Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause)
will be among those things that come last, and so the End-
ings of things will be more excellent than their Be-
ginnings. To which too may be added what Aristotle
says; that essential Causes ought to be prior
to accidental, in as much as every acciden-
tal Cause is a Deviation from them; so that
whatever is the Effect of such essential Cause [as is in-
deed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must
needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance,
even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of
visible objects [the Heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite
Cause of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds
to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of
things this Cause must be ONE. After which he
goes on, as follows.—

Εἰ μὲν ἐν ἀλόγων τῷ ἀτοπῳ, ἄτοπου. ἐστι γάρ τι
πάλιν τῶν υπότερων τύς τέτων αἰτίας κρείττουν, τó κατὰ
λόγον ἣ γνώσιν ποιοῦν, ἔσσω τῇ Παντος ὕψῳ, κ. τ. ὅλη
μέρους, ὃ ἐστιν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγυν τοιέτο. 'Εἰ δὲ λόγων
ἐχει, ἣ ἀυτὸ γνώσιμον, οἴδεν ἐκτὸ ἀπε τῶν πάντων
ἀιτίων ὕψῳ, ἢ τέτο ἄγνωσιν, ἄγνωσι τῇ ἐκτῇ φύσιν.
'Εἰ δὲ οὗτος, ὃτι κατ' εὔτικα ἔστι τῇ παντος αἰτίον, τὸ

Ff 2
But if, on the contrary, the Cause of the Universe be a Cause, having Reason and knowing itself; it of course knows itself to be the Cause of all things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from its very Essence it is the Cause of the Universe, and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the Cause. It knows therefore the Universe, and all things out of which the Universe is composed, of all which also it is the Cause. But if this be true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by knowing itself, it knows what comes after itself, and is subsequent. It is, therefore, through certain Reasons and Forms devoid of Matter that
that it knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a Cause, distinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—agreeable to which Ideas these Works are fashioned, &c.] It is upon these Principles that Nicomachus in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the Supreme Being an Artist—ἐν τῇ τῇ ττεχνή Θεῷ διανοίᾳ, in Dei artificis mente. Where Philoponus, in his manuscript Comment, observes as follows—τεχνήν φησι τὸν Θεόν, ὡς παράγων τὰς πρώτας αἰ-
τίας καὶ τὰς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχονα. He calls God an Artist, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins—ὡσπερ ὡν ὑπεἰς, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, τοι-
αίμεν τῷ τῇ, ἦτο εἰ ὁ παρώνος, ἢ ὡς εἰκὸν ἀπο-
ελέτων, τὰ τῇ τῇ παρὰ κακόσμηκεν ἄλλ’ ἴσον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῇ τῇ σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ ὡς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἐφεξέτυποι καὶ παρέλειποι ἔστιν.

As therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so also the Creator, looking at these Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those Reasons or Proportions, which exist in God, are Archetypal and all-perfect.

It is according to this Philosophy, that Milton represents God, after he had created this visible World, contemplating.
Proclus proves the Existence of these General Ideas or Universal Forms by the following Arguments.—

In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair,
Answ'ring his great Idea—

P. Loft, VII. 556.

It is thus that Fire both giveth Warmth...
to something else, and is itself warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows therefore, that the Cause of the Universe, operating after this manner, is that primarily, which the World is secondarily. If therefore the World be the plenitude of Forms of all Sorts, these Forms must also be primarily in the Cause of the World, for it was the same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in the Universe. These therefore exist primarily in the Cause of the Universe; another Sun besides the apparent, another Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The Forms therefore, previous to the sensible and external Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their active and efficient Causes, are to be found pre-existing in that One and Common Cause of all the Universe. Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this antient Philosophy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Orpheus himself.

If the Phrase, to operate merely by existing, should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 162, 359. That
That we should not therefore think of a blind unconscious operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy, where he forms the Character of these Divine and Creative Ideas.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—ἀλλ’ ἔπειτε ἐθέλομεν τὴν ίδιότητα αὐτῶν (τ. Ἰδεῶν) ἀφοριστικάς διὰ τῶν γνωσιμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάθομεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἰναι ποιητικῶν, ὡς ἄν ὑπ’ ξοισί: ἀπὸ δέ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωσικῶν, ὡς ξοισίσι, ἄν μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἰναι ποιησί, ἣ ταύτα εὐσκολές φώμεν αἰτίας εἰναι τὰς Ἰδέας δημιουργικάς ἀμα καὶ κοράς πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεῖμένων. But if we should choose to define the peculiar character of Ideas by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from natural Principles the Power of effecting, merely by existing, all the things that they effect; and from artificial Principles the Power of comprehending all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing; and then uniting these two, let us say that Ideas are at once the efficient and intelligent Causes of all things produced according to Nature. From book the second of the same Comment.

The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this Philosophy. Res omnès comparantar ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad Artem.
The Verses of Orpheus on this subject may be found in the tract De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 23. Edit. Sylburg.

Zeus ἄρσην γίνετο, Ζεῦς κ. τ. λ.

P. 391—Where all things lie enveloped,

—οςα χέρ ἤσι TA ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δὴ τινὰ με-

ρισμοῦ, τοσαύτα ἤγ TO EN έκπεσον χέρ τα μεσιμε

κατὰ τὸ πάνθη ἀμείβτει ὦ γάρ ἐν, ὡς ἐλάχιστον, κα-

θάτερ ὁ Σπευσπίπτος ἠδηξε λέγειν, ἄλλῃ EN, ὩΣ

ΠΑΝΤΑ. As numerous as is the Multitude of Individuals by Partition, so numerous also is that Principle of Unity by universal Impartibility. For it is not One, as a minimum is one (according to what Speucippus seemed to say,) but it is One, as being all things. Damascius χέρ Ἂχων, MS.

P. 408—the wisest Nations—the most co-

pious Languages.] It is well observed by Muretus — Nulli unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus

cas exprimerent, quaerunt. Var. Leot. VI. 1.

P. 411—But what was their Philoso-

phy?] The same Muretus has the following passage upon the Roman Taste for Philosophy.—

Beati autem illi, et opulentis, et omnium gentium victores

Romani, in petendis honoribus, et in prenendis civibus,

et in exeris nationibus verbo componendis, re complandis

occupati, philosophandi curam servis aut libertis suis, et

Graculis esurientibus relinquebant. Ipsæ, quæ ab ova-

ritia,
ritia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si partem aliquam aut ad audientiam Graecum quempiam philosophum, aut ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel legendum vel scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen pervenisse, jam victam a se et profligatam jacere Graeciam somniabant. Var. Lect. VI. i.
INDEX.

A.

ADJECTIVE, how it differs from other Attributes, such as the Verb, and the Participle, 186. verbal, 187. pronominal, 189. strictly speaking can have no Genders, — — 190

ADVERBS, their character and use, 192 to 194. Adverbs of Intenfion and Remifion, 195. of Comparison, 196 to 199. of Time, and Place, and Motion, 204, 205. made out of Prepositions, 205. Adverbs of Interrogation, 206. affinity between these last, and the Pronoun relative, 206 to 208. Adverbs derived from every Part of Speech, 209. found in every Predicament, 210. called by the

Stoics Παράδειγμα, — — ibid.

Æschines, — — 419

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 294, 310, 433. his account of Phantasy or Imagination, — 357

Alexander and Thais, 71. his influence upon the

Greek Genius, — — 419, 420

Amafanius, — — 412

Ammonius, his account of Speech, and its relations,

4. of the Progress of human Knowledge from Complex to Simple, 19. of the Soul's two principal Powers, 17. of the Species of Sentences, ibid. his notion of God, 55. quoted, 59. his notion of a Verb, 87, 193. his notion of Time, 100. illustrates from Homer the Species of Modes or Sentences, 145. quoted, 154. his notion of conjunctive Particles, and of the Unity which they produce, 241. quoted, 278. his account of Sound, Voice, Articulation, &c. 321, 328. of the distinction between
INDEX.

between a Symbol and a Resemblance, 331. what he thought the human Body with respect to the Soul, 334. his triple order of Ideas or Forms, — 382
Anaxagoras, 331
Analysis and Synthesis, 275, 276, 285
Anthologia Gr. 47, 50
Antoninus, 183, 310, 405, 407, 416
Apollonius, the Grammarian, explains the Species of Words by the Species of Letters, 27, his elegant name for the Noun and Verb, 33, quoted, 63. his idea of a Pronoun, 65, 67. quoted, 70. explains the Distinction and Relation between the Article and the Pronoun, 73, 74. his two Species of Διίκεις or Indication, 77. holds a wide difference between the Prepositive and Subjunctive Articles, 78. explains the nature of the Subjunctive Article, 80. corrects Homer from the doctrine of Enclitics, 84, 85. his notion of that Tense called the Präteritum perfectum, 129. holds the Soul’s disposition peculiarly explained by Verbs, 141. his notion of the Indicative Mode, 151. of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, 155. explains the power of those past Tenses, found in the Greek Imperatives, 156. his Idea of the Infinitive, 165. his name for it, 166. quoted, 168, 175. his notion of middle Verbs, 176. quoted, 179, 181, 195. explains the power and effect of the Greek Article, 217 to 222. holds it essential to the Pronoun not to coalesce with it, 225 to 228. shews the different force of the Article when differently placed in the same Sentence, 231. quoted, 238, 239. his idea of the Preposition, — 261
Apu-
INDEX.

APULEIUS, short account of him, — 415

AQUINAS, THOMAS, quoted — — 440

Argument a priori & a posteriori, 9, 10. which of the two more natural to Man, — ibid.

ARISTOPHANES, — — 420

ARISTOTLE, his notion of Truth, 3. quoted, 8. his notion of the difference between things absolutely prior, and relatively prior, 9, 10. quoted, 15. his Definition of a Sentence, 19. of a Word, 20. of Substance, 29. divides things into Substance and Accident, 30. how many Parts of Speech he admitted, and why, 32, 33, 34, &c. his notion of Genders, 42. his account of the metaphorical use of Sex, 48. quoted, 55, 56, 89. his Definition of a Verb, 96. his notion of a Now or Instant, 102. of Sensation limited to it, 104, 105, 431. of Time, 106, 107. of Time's dependence on the Soul, 112. quoted, 119, 193. his notion of Substance, 202. calls Euripides διόνυσις, 223. himself called the Stagirite, why, ibid. a distinction of his, 224. his definition of a Conjunction, 239. a passage in his Rhetoric explained, 245. his account of Relatives, 286. his notion of the divine Nature, 301. whom he thought it was probable the Gods should love, 302. his notion of Intellect and intelligible Objects, ibid. held Words founded in Compact, 314, 315. quoted, 310, 320. his account of the Elements or Letters, 324. his high notion of Principles, 325. quoted, 357, 379, 434. his notion of the difference between moveable and immovable Existence, 360. between intellectual or divine Pleasure, and that which is subordinate, ibid. quoted, 361. his notion of the divine Life or Existence, compared
INDEX.

compared with that of Man, 362. of the difference between the Greeks and the Barbarians, 409. his character, as a Writer, compared with Plato and Xenophon, 421. corresponds with Alexander, 419. Arithmetic, founded upon what Principles, 352. (See Geometry.) its subject, what, 367. owes its Being to the Mind, how, — — ibid. Art, what, and Artist, who, — 111, 352. Articles, 31. their near alliance with Pronouns, 73. of two kinds, 214. the first kind, 214 to 232. the second kind, 233 to 236. English Articles, their difference and use, 215. Greek Article, 219. Articles denote pre-acquaintance, 218, 220. hence eminence and notoriety, 222 to 224. with what words they associate, with what not, 224 to 229. Greek Article marks the Subject in Propositions, 230. Articles, instances of their effect, 231, 232. Articles pronominal, 72, 73, 233. instances of their effect, 235, 236, 347. Subjunctive Article, see Pronoun relative or subjunctive. Articulation, see Voice. Asconius, — — 132. Attributives, 30, 31. defined, 87. of the first order, 87 to 191. of the second order, 192 to 211. See Verb, Participle, Adjective, Adverb. Aulus Gellius, short account of him as a Writer, 414. B. Bacon, his notion of Universal Grammar, 2. of ancient Languages and Geniuses, compared to modern, 288. of mental Separation or Division, 306. of Symbols, to convey our thoughts, 334. of the 6. Analogy
INDEX.

Analogy between the Geniuses of Nations and their Languages, — — 407
Being, or Existence, mutable, immutable, 90, 371. temporary, superior to Time, 91, 92. See Truth, God.
Belisarius, — — 150
Blemmides, Nicephorus, his notion of Time prefent, 119. his Etymology of ἐνθέμι, 308. his triple order of Forms or Ideas, — 386
Body, Instrument of the Mind, 305. chief Object of modern Philosophy, 308. confounded with Matter, 309. human, the Mind's veil, 333. Body, that, or Mind, which has precedence in different Systems, — — 392, 393
Boerhaave, — — 321
Boethius, how many Parts of Speech he admitted as neceflary to Logic, 33. his idea of God's Existence, 92. illustrates from Virgil the Species of Modes or Sentences, 146. quoted, 312. held Language founded in Compact, 315. refers to the Deity's unalterable Nature, 361. his notion of original, intelligible Ideas, 397. of the difference between Time (however immense) and Eternity, 339. short account of his Writings and character, — — — 416
Both, differs from Tαύ, how, — 227
Brutus, — — — 413, 419

C.

Cæsar, C. Julius, his Laconic Epifde, — 178
Cæsar, Octavius, influence of his Government upon the Roman Genius, — — 419, 420
Callimachus, — — 52

Cases,
INDEX

Cases, scarce any such thing in modern Languages, 273. name of, whence, 277. Nominative, 279 to 282. Accusative, 282, 283. Genitive and Dative, 284 to 287. Vocative, why omitted, 276. Ablative, peculiar to the Romans, and how they employed it, — — 276, 277

Causes, Conjunctions connect the four Species of, with their effects, 248. final Cause, first in Speculation, but last in Event, ibid. has its peculiar Mode, 142. peculiar Conjunction, 248. peculiar Case, 287

Chalcidius, 301. short account of him, — 415

Chance, subsequent to Mind and Reason, 434, 435

Charisius, Sosipater, — — 205, 210

Cicero, 132, 170, 269, 272, 311, 313, 407. compelled to allow the unfitness of the Latin Tongue for Philosophy, 411. one of the first that introduced it into the Latin Language, 412. Ciceronian and Socratic Periods, — — 418

City, Feminine, why, — — 48

Clark, Dr. Sam. — — 128

Comparison, degrees of, 197 to 199. why Verbs admit it not, 200. why incompatible with certain Attributives, ibid. why with all Substantives, 201


Conjunctive, 30, 31. its two kinds, 237. its first kind, ibid. to 260. its second, 261 to 274. See Conjunction, Preposition.
INDEX.

Consentius, his notion of the Neuter Gender, 43.
of middle Verbs, 177. of the positive Degree, 198
Consonant, what, and why so called, — 323
Contraries, pass into each other, 132. destructive of
each other, — — 251
Conversation, what, — — 398
Conversion, of Attributives into Substantives, 38. of
Substantives into Attributives, 182, 189. of Attribu-
tives into one another, 187. of Interrogatives into
Relatives, and vice versa, 206, 207. of Connectives
into Attributives, — — 205, 272
Corn. Nepos, — — 212
Country, Feminine, why, — — 48

D.

Damascius, his notion of Deity, — 441
Death, Masculine, why, 51. Brother to Sleep, 52
Declension, the name, whence, — 278
Definitive, 30, 31, 214. See Articles.
Definitions, what, — — — 367
Δείκτης, — — 64, 76
Demosthenes, — 49, 419, 421
Derivatives more rationally formed than Primitives,
why, — — — 336
Design, necessarily implies Mind, — 379, 434
Diogenes, the Cynic, — — 419
Diogenes Laertius, 34, 145, 154, 317, 322, 324,
407

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, — — 34, 35
Diversity, its importance to Nature, 250. heightens
by degrees, and how, — ibid. to 252
Donatus, — — 74, 272

E.

Earth, Feminine, why, — — 47
G g Eccle-
INDEX.

Ecclesiasticus, 56
Element, defined, 324. primary Articulations or Letters so called, why, ibid. their extensive application, 325. See Letters.
Empiric, who, 352
Enclitics, among the Pronouns, their character, 84, 85
English Tongue, its rule as to Genders, 43. a peculiar privilege of, 58. expresses the power of contradiñctive and enclitic Pronouns, 85. its poverty as to the expression of Modes and Tenses, 148. its analogy in the formation of Participles, 185, 186. neglected by illiterate Writers, ibid. force and power of its Articles, 215 to 233. shews the Predicate of the Proposition by position, as also the Accusative Case of the Sentence, 26, 274, 276. its character, as a Language, 408
Epictetus, 310, 407
Eπισιφεν, its Etymology, 368
Ether, Masculine, why, 46
Euclid, a difference between him and Virgil, 69. his Theorems founded upon what, 340
Euripides, 52, 310, 331
Existence, differs from Essence, how, 294, 433
Experience, founded on what, 352
Experiment, its utility, 352. conducive to Art, how, ibid. beholden to Science, tho' Science not to that, 353

F.

Form and Matter, 2, 7. elementary Principles, 307. mysteriously blended in their co-existence, ibid. and 312. Form, its original meaning, what, 310. transferred from lower things to the highest, 311. pre-existent, where, 312. described by Cicero, 311, 313.
INDEX.


*Fortune, Feminine, why, — — 57

*Fuller, — — 183

G.

Gaza Theodore, his Definition of a Word, 21. explains the Persons in Pronouns, 67. hardly admits the Subjunctive for an Article, 78. his account of the Tenses, 129. of Modes, 140. quoted, 151. calls the Infinitive the Verb’s Noun, 165. quoted, 181. his Definition of an Adverb, 195. arranges Adverbs by classes according to the Order of the Predicaments, 210. explains the power of the Article, 218. quoted, 225. explains the different powers of conjunctive Particles, 245. of disjunctive, 249. his singular explanation of a Verse in Homer, 253. quoted, — — 262, 271

Gemistus, Georgius, otherwise Pletho, his doctrine of Ideas or intelligible Forms, — 395

Genders, their origin, 41. their natural number, 42. (See Sex.) why wanting to the first and second Pronoun, — — 69

Genus and Species, why they (but not Individuals) admit of Number, — — 39

Geometry, founded on what Principles, 352. that and Arithmetic independent on Experiment, ibid. (See Science.) its Subject, what, 367. beholden for it to the Mind, how, — — ibid.

God, expressed by Neuters, such as το Ἀνένα, Numen, &c. why, 54, 55. as Masculine, why, ibid. immutable table,
INDEX.

Table, and superior to Time and its Distinctions, 92.
allwife, and always wife, 301. immediate objects of
his Wisdom, what, ibid. whom among men he may
be supposed to love, 302. Form of Forms, sovereign
Artist, 312, 313, 437. above all Intensions and Re-
missions, 162, 359, 439. his Existence different
from that of Man, how, 360, 362. his divine At-
tributes, 361. his Existence necessarily infers that
of Ideas or exemplary Forms, 379, 380, 436. ex-
quise Perfection of these divine Ideas or Forms,
380, 437. his stupendous view of all at once, 389,
390, 442. region of Truth, 162, 391, 403, 405.
in Him Knowledge and Power unite, 440
Good, above all utility, and totally distinct from it,
297. sought by all men, 296, 298. considered by all
as valuable for itself, ibid. intellectual, its charac-
ter, 299. See Science, God.

Gorgias, 52
Grammar, philosophical or universal, 2. how essential
to other Arts, 6. how distinguished from other
Grammars, 11
Grammarians, error of, in naming Verbs Neuter, 177.
in degrees of Comparison, 198. in the Syntax of
Conjunctions, 238
Greeks, their character, as a Nation, 415, &c.
Asiatic Greeks, different from the other Greeks, and
why, 410. Grecian Genius, its maturity and de-
cay, 417, &c.
Greek Tongue, how perfect in the expression of
Modes and Tenses, 147. force of its imperatives
in the past tenses, 156. wrong in ranging Interjec-
tions with Adverbs, 289. its character, as a Lan-
guage, 418, 423
Grocinus, his System of the Tenses, 128

H. Herac-
INDEX.

H.

Heraclitus, Saying of, 8. his System of things, what, — — — 369, 370
Hermes, his Figure, Attributes, and Character, 324, 325, 326. Authors who have writ of him, 326
Hesiod, called ὁ ωοτᾶς, the Poet, by Plato, 223
Hoadly’s Accidence, — — 128
Homer, 50, 52, 82, 84, 145, 149, 221, 223, 235, 253, 273, 285, 308, 417, 421
Horace, 57, 80, 125, 142, 163, 169, 178, 199, 207, 232, 260, 413, 424, 425

I.

Ideas, of what, Words the Symbols, 341 to 347. if only particular were to exist, the consequence what, 337 to 339. general, their importance, 341, 342. undervalued by whom, and why, 350. of what faculty the Objects, 360. their character, 362 to 366, 390. the only objects of Science and real Knowledge, why, 368. acquired, how, 353 to 374. derived, whence, 374, &c. their triple Order in Art, 376. the same in Nature, 381. essential to Mind, why, 379, 380. the first and highest Ideas, character of, 380, 440. Ideas, their different Sources, stated, 400. their real source, — 434, 438
Jeremiah, — — 405
Imagination, what, 354. differs from Sense, how, 355. from Memory and Recollection, how, ibid.
Individuals, why so called, 39, 40. quit their character, how and why, 40, 41. their infinity, how expressed by a finite number of Words, 214 to 217, 234, 346. become objects of Knowledge, how, 369
Instant. See Now.
Intelligence. See Mind.
INDEX.

Interjections, their application and effect, 289.
no distinct Part of Speech with the Greeks, though
with the Latins, 289. their character and descrip-
tion, 290

Interrogation, its species explained and illustrated, 151
to 154. Interrogatives refuse the Article, why, 228

Joannes Grammat. See Philoponus.

Isocrates, 421

Julian, 416

K.

Kuster, 176

Knowledge, if any more excellent than Sensation, the
consequence, 371, 372

L.

Language, how constituted, 327. defined, 329.
founded in compact, 314, 327. (See Speech:) sym-
bolic, not imitative, why, 332 to 355. impossible
for it to express the real Essences of things, 335. its
double capacity, why necessary, 348. its Matter, what, 349. its Form, what, ibid. its Precision and
Permanence derived whence, 345. particular Lan-
guages, their Identity, whence, 374. their Diversity,
whence, ibid. See English, Greek, Latin, Oriental.

Latin Tongue, deficient in Aorists, and how it sup-
plies the defect, 125. its peculiar use of the Præte-
ritum Perfectum, 131. has recourse to Auxiliars for
some Modes and Tenses, 148. to a Periphrasis for
some Participles, 185. in what sense it has Articles,
233. the Ablative, a Case peculiar to it, 276. right
in separating Interjections from the other Parts of
Speech, 289, 290. its character, as a Language,
411. not made for Philosophy, ibid. 412. funk
with Boethius, 416

Letters,
INDEX.

Letters, what Socrates thought of their Inventor, 325.

divine honours paid him by the Egyptians, ibid. See
Element.

Liberty, its influence upon Men's Genius, 420
Life, connected with Being, 300, 301, 432

Linnaeus, — — — 44

Literature, its cause, and that of Virtue, connected,
how, 407. antient, recommended to the Study of
the liberal, 424. its peculiar effect with regard to
a man's character, — 425, 426

Logic, what, — — 3, 4

Longinus, noble remark of, — 420

Lucian, — — 41

Lucilius, — ibid.

M.

Macrobius, short account of him, 414. quoted,
127, 157, 168

Man, rational and social, 1, 2. his peculiar ornament,
what, 2. first or prior to Man, what, 9, 269. his
Existence, the manner of, what, 359. how most
likely to advance in happiness, 362. has within
him something divine, 302. his Ideas, whence de-
duced, 393 to 401. Medium, thro' which he de-
rives them, what, 359, 393. his errors, whence,
406. to be corrected, how — ibid.

Manuscripts quoted, of Olympiodorus, 371, 394,
395. of Philoponus, 431, 433, 437. of Pro-
clus, 434, 435, 438, 440. of Damascius, 441

Marcellus Capella, short account of him, 415

Maister Artijb, what forms his character, — 111

Matter joined with Form, 2, 7. its original meaning,
confounded by the Vulgar, how, 309. its extensive
character according to antient Philosophy, 308. de-
scribed
INDEX.

scribed by Cicero, 313. of Language, what, 315. described at large, — — 316, &c.
Maximus Tyrius, his notion of the supreme Intellect, — — 162
Memory and Recollection, what, 355. distinguished from Imagination or Phantasy, how, — ibid.
Metaphor, its use, — — 269
Metaphysicians modern, their Systems, what, — 392
Milton, 13, 14, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 59, 60, 112, 124, 147, 207, 267, 268, 404, 437
Mind (not Sense) recognizes time, 107 to 112. universal, 162, 311, 312, 359. differs not (as Sense does) from the objects of its perception, 391. acts in part through the body, in part without it, 305. its high power of separation, 306, 366. penetrates into all things, 307. Noös |λιος, what, 310. Mind differs from Sense, how, 364, 365. the source of Union by viewing One in Many, 362 to 365. of Distinction by viewing Many in One, 366. without Ideas, resembles what, 386. region of Truth and Science, 371, 372. that or Body, which has precedence, 392, &c. Mind human, how spontaneous and easy in its Energies, 361, 362. all Minds similar and congenial, why, — 395
Modes or Moods, whence derived, and to what end declined, 140. Declarative or Indicative, 141. Potential, 142. Subjunctive, 143. Interrogative, ibid. Inquisitive, ibid. Imperative, 144. Preceptive or Optative, ibid. the several Species illustrated from Homer, Virgil, and Milton, 145 to 147. Infinitive Mode, its peculiar character, 162, 163. how dignified by the Stoics, 164. other Modes resolvable into it, 166. its application and coalescence, 167. Mode of Science, of Conjecture, of Proficiency, of Legislation, 168 to 170. Modes compared and distinguished,
INDEX.

guished, 149 to 160. Greek Imperatives of the Past explained, and illustrated, — 156, 157
Moon, Feminine, why, — — 45
Motion, and even its Privation, necessarily imply
Time, — — 95
Muretus, quoted, 441, 442. his notion of the Romans, — — ibid.
Musonius Rufus, — — 416

N.

Names, proper, what the consequence if no other words, 337 to 339. their use, 345. hardly parts of Language, — — 346, 373
Nathan and David, — — 232
Nature, first to Nature, first to Man, how they differ, 9, 10. frugality of, 320. Natures subordinate subservient to the higher, — — 359
Nicephorus. See Blemmides.
Nicomachus, — — 437
Noun, or Substantive, its three Sorts, 37. what Nouns susceptible of Number, and why, 39. only Part of Speech susceptible of Gender, 41, 171
A Now or Instant, the bound of Time, but no part of it, 101, 102. analogous to a Point in a geometrical Line, ibid. its use with respect to Time, 104. its minute and transient Presence illustrated, 117. by this Presence Time made present, 116, 117, 118. See Time, Place, Space.
Number, to what words it appertains, and why 39, 40

O.

Objectors, ludicrous, 293. grave, — 294
Ocean,
INDEX.

Ocean, Masculine, why, — — 49

Olympiodorus, quoted from a Manuscript, —— his notion of Knowledge, and its degrees, 371, 372. of general Ideas, the Objects of Science, 394, 395.

One, by natural co-incidence, 162, 173, 192, 241, 262 to 265. by the help of external connectives, 241, 265

Oriental Languages, number of their Parts of Speech, 35. their character and Genius, — 409

Orpheus, — — 441

Ovid, — — 132, 141, 206

P.

Participle, how different from the Verb, 94, 184. its essence or character, 184. how different from the Adjective, 186. See Attributive, Latin and English Tongues.

Particulars, how, though infinite, expressed by Words which are finite, 346. consequence of attaching ourselves wholly to them, — — — 351

Pausanias, — — 285

Perception and Volition, the Soul's leading Powers, 15, 17. Perception two-fold, 348. In Man what first, 9, 10, 353, 359. Sensitive and intellectual differ, how, 364, 365. if not correspondent to its objects, erroneous, — — — 371

Period. See Sentence.

Peripatetic Philosophy, in the latter ages commonly united with the Platonic, 160. what species of Sentences it admitted, 144. its notion of Cases, 277. held words founded in Compact, — 314

Perizonius,
INDEX.

Perizonius, his rational account of the Persons in Nouns and Pronouns, ——— 171

Persius, 76, 163, 372. short account of his character, ————— 413

Persons, first, second, third, their Origin and Use, 65 to 67

Phaëthon. See Imagination.

Philoponus, his notion of Time, 431. of the business of Wisdom or Philosophy, 433. of God, the Sovereign Artist, ————— 437

Philosophy, what would banish it out of the World, 293, 294. its proper business, what, 433. antient differs from modern, how, 308. modern, its chief object, what, ——— ibid.

Philosophers, antient, who not qualified to write or talk about them, 270. provided words for new Ideas, how, ————— 269

Philosophers, modern, their notion of Ideas, 350. their employment, 351. their Criterion of Truth, ibid. deduce all from Body, 392. supply the place of occult Qualities, how, ——— 393

Place, mediate and immediate, 118. applied to illustrate the present Time, and the present Instant, ibid. its various relations denoted, how, 266, 271. its Latitude and Universality, ——— 266

Plato, 21. how many Parts of Speech he admitted, 32. his account of Genius and Species, 39. quoted, 92. his Style abounds with Particles, why, 259. new-coined Word of, 269. quoted, 325. in what he placed real happiness, 362. his two different and opposite Etymologies of Επίσημον, 369, 370. his Idea of Time, 389. quoted, 407. his character, as a Writer, compared with Zenophon and Aristotle, 422

Pletho. See Gemistus.

Pliny,
INDEX.

Pliny, his account how the antient artificers inscribed their names upon their Works, — 136

Plutarch, — — — 33

Poetry, what, — — — 5, 6

Porphyry, — — — 39

Position, its force in Syntax, 26, 274, 276, 279

Prepositions, 32. defined, 261. their use, 265. their original Signification, 266. their subsequent and figurative, 268. their different application, 270, 271. force in Composition, 271, 272. change into Adverbs, — — 272, 205

Principles, to be estimated from their consequences, 7. 232, 236, 325. of Union and Diversity, their different ends and equal importance to the Universe, 250. (See One, Union, Diversity.) elementary Principles mysteriously blended, 307. their invention difficult, why, 325. those of Arithmetic and Geometry how simple, — — — 352

Priscian, defines a Word, 20. explains from Philosophy the Noun and Verb, 28, 33. quoted, 34. explains how Indication and Relation differ, 63. the nature of the Pronoun, 65. of pronominal Persons, 67. his reason why the two first Pronouns have no Genders, 70. why but one Pronoun of each sort, 71. ranges Articles with Pronouns according to the Stoics, 74. a pertinent observation of his, 88. explains the double Power of the Latin Praeteritum, 125, 131. his doctrine concerning the Tenses, 130. defines Moods or Modes, 141. his notion of the Imperative, 155. of the Infinitive, 165, 166. of Verbs which naturally precede the Infinitive, 168. of Impersonals, 175 of Verbs Neuter, 177. of the Participle, 194. of the Adverb, 195. of Comparatives, 202. quoted, 210. his reason why certain Pronouns
INDEX.

Pronouns coalesce not with the Article, 225, 226. explains the different powers of Connectives which conjoin, 243, 244, 245. of Connectives which disjoin, 250. quoted, 262. his notion of the Interjection, 291. of Sound or Voice, — 316

Proclus, his Opinion about Refl, 95, 431. quoted, 310. explains the Source of the Doctrine of Ideas, 434, 435, 436, 438

Pronouns, why so called, 65. their Species, or Persons, 65, 66. why the first and second have no Sex, 69, 70. resemble Articles, but how distinguished, 73. their coalescence. 74, 75. their importance in Language, 77. relative or subjunctive Pronoun, its nature and use, 78 to 83. those of the first and second person when expressed, when not, 83. Ἠγερημέναι and ὅθησενμέναι, how distinguished, 84.

Primitives, refuse the Article, why, — 225

Protagoras, his notion of Genders, 42. a Sophism of his, — — 144

Proverbs of Solomon, — — 405

Puelius Syrus, — — 124

Q.

Quintilian, — — 154, 233, 407

Qualities occult, what in modern Philosophy supplies their place, — — 393

R.

Relatives, mutually infer each other, 251, 286. their usual Case, the Genitive, — — ibid.

Rhetoric, what, — — 5, 6

Romans, their character as a Nation, 411. Roman Genius, its maturity and decay, — 418, &c.

S. Sallus-
INDEX.

S.

Sallustius Philosoph. — — 401
Sanctius, his elegant account of the different Arts respecting Speech, 5. quoted 36, 163, 171. rejects Impersonals, 175. quoted, 202. his notion of the Conjunction, after Scaliger, 238. of the Injection, — — 291
Scaliger, his Etymology of Quis, 82. his notion of Tenses from Grocinus, 128. his elegant observation upon the order of the Tenses, 138. upon the pre-eminence of the Indicative Mode, 169. his account how the Latins supply the place of Articles, 233. his notion of the Conjunction, 238. his subtle explication of its various powers, 242 to 247, 258. his reason from Philosophy why Substantives do not coalesce, 264. his origin of Prepositions, 266. his Etymology of Scientia, — — 370
Science, 5. its Mode the Indicative, and Tense the Present, why, 159. its Conjunction the Collective, why, 246. defended, 295. valuable for its consequences, ibid. for itself, 296 to 303. (See God.) pure and speculative depends on Principles the most simple, 352. not beholden to Experiment, though Experiment to it, 353. whole of it seen in Composition and Division, 367. its Etymology, 369. residence of itself and its objects, where, 372. See Mind.
Scriptures, their Sublimity, whence, — 410
Seneca, — — 47, 139, 414
Sensation, of the Present only, 105, 107, 139. none of Time, 105. each confined to its own Objects, 333.
INDEX.

333, 369. its Objects infinite, 338, 353. Man's first Perception, ibid. consequence of attaching ourselves wholly to its Objects, 351. how prior to Intellecction, 379. how subfrequent, — 391
Sentence, definition of, 19, 20. its various Species investigated, 14, 15. illustrated from Milton, 147, &c. connection between Sentences and Modes, 144
Separation, corporeal inferior to mental, why, 306
Servius, — 132, 227, 432
Sex, (See Gender.) transferred in Language to Beings, that in Nature want it, and why, 44, 45. Substances alone susceptible of it, — 171
Shakespeare, — 12, 13, 23, 41, 47, 51, 53
Ship, Feminine, why, — 48
Simplicius, his triple Order of Ideas or Forms, 381, 382
Sophocles, — 432
Soul, its leading Powers, — 15, &c.
Space, how like, how unlike to Time, 100. See Place.
Speech, peculiar Ornament of Man, 1, 2. how resolved or analyzed, 2. its four principal Parts, and why these, and not others, 28 to 31. its Matter and Form taken together, 307 to 315. its Matter taken separately, 316 to 326. its Form taken separately, 327 to 359. necessity of Speech, whence, 332, 333. founded in Compact, — 314, 327
Spencer, — 134, 164
Spirits, animal, subtle Ether, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, &c. their use in modern Philosophy. See Qualities occult.
Stoics,
INDEX.

Stoics, how many Parts of Speech they held, 34. ranged Articles along with Pronouns, 74. their account of the Tenses, 130. multiplied the number of Sentences, 144. allowed the name of Verb to the infinitive only, into which they supposed all other Modes resolvable, 164 to 166. their logical view of Verbs, and their Distinctions subsequent, 179 to 181. their notion of the Participle, 194. of the Adverb, 195. called the Adverb ἔπαινος, and why, 210. called the Preposition σύνθεσις ὑπερτικός, 261. invented new Words, and gave new Significations to old ones, 269. their notion of Cases, 278. of the "Τὰ η or Matter of Virtue, 309, 310. of Sound, 316. of the Species of Sound, 322. their Definition of an Element, — 324 Subject and Predicate, how distinguished in Greek, 230. how in English, ibid. analogous to what in nature, 279 Substance and Attribute, 29. the great Objects of natural Union, 264. Substance susceptible of Sex, 171, 41. of Number, 40. coincides not with Substance, 264. incapable of Intension, and therefore of Comparison, — 201, 202 Substantive, 30, 31. described, 37. primary, ibid. to 62. secondary, 63 to 67. (See Noun, Pronoun.) Substantive and Attributive, analogous in Nature to what, — — 279 Σύμεπάω, Πεφασμέπαω, &c. — 180 Sun, Masculine, why, — — 45 Sylva, a peculiar Signification of, — 308, 309 Symbol, what, 330. differs from Imitation, how, ibid. preferred to it in constituting Language, why, 332

T. Tenses,
INDEX.

TENSES, their natural Number, and why, 119, 120.
Aorists, 123. Tenses either passing or complective, what authorities for these Distinctions, 128 to 130.
Præteritum perfectum of the Latins, peculiar uses of, 131 to 134. Imperfectum, peculiar uses of, 135 to 137. order of Tenses in common Grammars not fortuitous, — — 138

TERENCE, — — 205, 206, 272

THE and A. See Article.

THEMISTIUS, 9. his notion how the Mind gains the idea of Time, 108. of the dependance of Time on the Soul’s existence, 112. of the latent transition of Nature from one Genus to another, 259, 432

THEODECTES, — — 35

THEOPHRASTUS, his notion of Speech under its various Relations, 4. mentioned, — 419

THEUTH, inventor of Letters, 324. See HERMES.

TIBULLUS, — — 76, 132, 133

TIME, Masculine, why, 50. why implied in every Verb, 95, 96. gave rise to Tenses, ibid. its most obvious division, 97. how like, how unlike to Space, 100 to 103. strictly speaking no Time present, 105. in what sense it may be called present, 116, 117, 432. all Time divisible and extended, 118, 100, 101. no object of Sensation, why, 105. how faint and shadowy in existence, 106, 431. how, and by what power we gain its idea, 107. Idea of the past, prior to that of the future, 109. that of the future, how acquired, 109, 110. how connected with Art and Prudence, 111. of what faculty, Time the pro-
INDEX.

per Object, 112. how intimately connected with the Soul, ibid. order and value of its several Species, 113. what things exist in it, what not, 160 to 162. its natural effect on things existing in it, 161, 50. described by Plato, as the moving Picture of permanent Eternity, 389. this account explained by Boethius, ibid. See Now or Instant.

Truth, necessary, immutable, superior to all distinctions of present, past, and future, 90, 91, 92, 159, 160, 404, 405. (See Being, God.) its place or region, 162, 372. seen in Composition and Division, 3, 367. even negative, in some degree synthetical, 3, 250, 364. every Truth One, and so recognized, how, 364, 395. factitious Truth, — 403

V.

Varro, — — 56, 61, 74, 413

Verb, 31. its more loose, as well as more strict acceptations, 87, 193. Verb, strictly so called, its character, 93, 94. distinguished from Participles, 94. from Adjectives, ibid. implies Time, why, 95. Tenses, 98, 119. Modes or Moods, 140, 170. Verbs, how susceptible of Number and Person, 170. Species of Verbs, 173. active, 174. passive, ibid. middle, 175, 176. transitive, 177. neutral, ibid. inceptive, 126, 182. desiderative or meditative, 127. formed out of Substantives, 182, 183. (See Time, Tenses, Modes.) Impersonals rejected, 175

Verbs Substantives, their pre-eminence, 88. essential to every Proposition, ibid. implied in every other Verb, 90, 93. denote existence, 88. vary, as varies the Existence, or Being, which they denote, 91, 92. See Being, Truth, God.
INDEX.

Verfes, logical, — — 342
Vice, Feminine, why, — — 56
Virgil, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 68, 83, 132. his peculiar method of coupling the passing and complete Tenses, 133 to 136. quoted, 141, 182, 198, 199, 206, 235, 286, 287, 389, 401, 432. his idea of the Roman Genius, — — 235, 412
Virtue, Feminine, why, 55. moral and intellectual differ, how, 299, 300. its Matter, what, 309, 310. its Form, what, 311. connected with Literature, how, — — — 407
Understanding, its Etymology, 369. human Understanding, a composite of what, — 425
Union, natural, the great objects of, 264, 279. perceived by what power, 363. in every truth, whence derived, — — — 365
Universe. See World.
Voice, defined, 318. simple, produced how, 318, 319. differs from articulate, how, ibid. articulate, what, 319 to 324. articulate, species of, 321 to 323. See Vowel, Consonant, Element.
Volition. See Perception.
Vossius, — — 35, 75, 290
Vowel, what, and why so called, — 321, 322
Utility, always and only sought by the fordid and illiberal, 294, 295, 298. yet could have no Being, were there not something beyond it, 297. See Good.

W.

Whole and Parts, — — 7
Wisdom, how some Philosophers thought it distinguished from Wit, — — 368, 433
Words,
INDEX.

Words, defined, 20, 21, 328. the several Species of, 23 to 31. significant by themselves, significant by Relation, 27. variable, invariable, 24. significant by themselves and alone, 37 to 211. by Relation and associated, 213 to 274. significant by Compact, 314, 327. Symbols, and not Imitations, 332. Symbols, of what not, 337 to 341. Symbols, of what, 341 to 249, 372. how, though in Number finite, able to express infinite Particulars, 346, 372, 373

World, visible and external, the passing Picture of what, 383, 437. preserved one and the same, though ever changing, how, 384, 385. its Cause not void of Reason, — — 436

 Writers, ancient polite, differ from modern polite, in what and why, — — 259, 260

X.

XENOPHON, 56, 407. his character, as a Writer, compared with Plato and Aristotle, — 422, 423

Y.

*TΛ*, 308. See Matter, Sylus.

FINISH.