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THE

REPUBLIC OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH CRITICAL NOTES, COMMENTARY
AND APPENDICES

BY

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VOLUME I
BOOKS I—V

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TO
THE MEMORY OF
ROBERT ALEXANDER NEIL
I GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATE
THIS BOOK

eis ekeínon tôn bión, ótan aúthís gevúmenoi tois toioútous
eútúxomev lógois.
ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ θεῷ θεολογεῖται οὐκ ὡς ὁ ἀνθρωπός μιᾷ
ουκ ὡς ὁ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐγγύς καὶ
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PREFACE.

THE Republic of Plato touches on so many problems of human life and thought, and appeals to so many diverse types of mind and character, that an editor cannot pretend to have exhausted its significance by means of a commentary. In one sense of the term, indeed, there can never be a definitive or final interpretation of the Republic: for the Republic is one of those few works of genius which have a perennial interest and value for the human race; and in every successive generation those in whom man's inborn passion for ideals is not quenched, will claim the right to interpret the fountain-head of idealism for themselves, in the light of their own experience and needs. But in another sense of the word, every commentator on the Republic believes in the possibility of a final and assured interpretation, and it is this belief which is at once the justification and the solace of his labours. Without desiring in any way to supersede that personal apprehension of Platonism through which alone it has power to cleanse and reanimate the individual soul, we cannot too strongly insist that certain particular images and conceptions, to the exclusion of others, were present in the mind of Plato as he wrote. These images, and these conceptions, it is the duty and province of an editor to elucidate, in the first instance, by a patient and laborious study of Plato's style and diction, divesting himself, as far as may be, of every personal prejudice and predilection. The sentiment should then be expounded and explained, wherever possible, by reference to other passages in the Republic and the rest of Plato's writings, and afterwards from other Greek authors, particularly those who wrote before or during the lifetime of Plato. The lines of Goethe,

Wer den Dichter will verstehen
Muss in Dichters Lande gehen,

apply with peculiar force to the study of the Republic, a dialogue which more than any other work of Plato abounds in allusions
both implicit and explicit to the history, poetry, art, religion and philosophy of ancient Greece. By such a method of exegesis, provided it is securely based on a careful analysis of the language, we may hope to disentangle in some degree the different threads which are united in Plato's thought, and thus contribute something towards an objective and impersonal interpretation of the Republic, as in itself one of the greatest literary and philosophical monuments of any age, and not merely a treasure-house of arguments in support of any school of thought or dogma.

I have done what in me lies to make an edition of the Republic in accordance with these principles. Although it has sometimes appeared necessary, for the better exposition of Plato's meaning, to compare or contrast the doctrine of the Republic with the views of later writers on philosophy, any systematic attempt to trace the connexion between Platonism and modern political, religious, or philosophical theory is foreign to the scope of this edition. I am far from underestimating the interest and importance of such an enquiry: no intellectual exercise that I know of is more stimulating or suggestive: but it is unfortunately fraught with danger for anyone whose object is merely to interpret Plato's meaning faithfully and without bias. The history of Platonic criticism from Proclus to the present time has shewn that it is difficult for a commentator who is constantly looking for parallels in contemporary thought to maintain the degree of intellectual detachment which the study of Plato's idealism demands; and although it is true that the genius of Plato outsoars the limits of time and place, the best preparation for following its flight is to make ourselves co-heirs with him in his intellectual heritage, and transport ourselves as far as possible into the atmosphere in which he lived. The influence of Plato on succeeding thinkers from Aristotle down to the present day is a subject of extraordinary range and fascination, but it belongs to the history, rather than to the interpretation, of Platonism. If ever that history is fully told, we shall begin to understand the greatness of the debt we owe to Plato, not only in philosophy, but also in religion. In the meantime we can only rejoice that Platonism is still a living force in both: ἐτὶ ἢλιος ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσὶ καὶ ὀὔπω δέδικεν.

One of the most toilsome duties which an editor of the Republic has to face is that of reading and digesting the
enormous mass of critical and exegetical literature to which the dialogue, particularly during the last century, has given rise. I have endeavoured to discharge this duty, so far as opportunity allowed; and if the labour has sometimes proved tedious and unremunerative, it is none the less true that in some instances the perusal of obscure and half-forgotten pamphlets and articles has furnished the key to what I believe to be the true interpretation. In many other cases, where the thesis which a writer seeks to prove is demonstrably false, the evidence which he accumulates in its support has served to illustrate and enforce a truer and more temperate view. But in spite of all the learning and ingenuity which have been expended on the Republic during recent years, there still remain a large number of passages of which no satisfactory explanation has hitherto been offered, and a still larger number which have been only imperfectly and partially explained. I have submitted all these passages to a fresh examination, partly in the Notes and partly in the Appendices, and although I cannot hope to have placed them all beyond the pale of controversy, I have spared no amount of time and labour to discover the truth, and in many cases I have been able to arrive at views which will, I hope, command the assent of others as well as myself. Wherever I have consciously borrowed anything of importance from previous commentators and writers, I have made acknowledgement in the notes; but a word of special gratitude is due to Schneider, to whom I am more indebted than to any other single commentator on the Republic. Since I began my task, the long-awaited edition of the Republic by Jowett and Campbell has made its appearance, and I have found their scholarly and lucid commentary of service even in those places where it has seemed to me inadequate or inconclusive. Professor Burnet's text of the Republic was not available until the larger part of this edition had been printed off, but I have been able to make some use of his work in the later books.

I have to thank a number of friends for assistance rendered in various ways, and above all my former teacher, Dr Henry Jackson, of Trinity College, who has read through all the proofs and contributed many corrections and suggestions. Mr Archer-Hind, of Trinity College, and Mr P. Giles, of Emmanuel College, have also helped me with their criticisms on some portions of the work. To Professor J. Cook Wilson, of New College, Oxford,
I owe a special debt of gratitude for undertaking in response to my appeal an exhaustive discussion of the astronomical difficulties in Book X, and unreservedly placing at my disposal the full results of his investigations. It is due to the kindness of Professor Campbell that I have again been able to use Castellani's collations of the Venetian MSS II and Ξ, as well as Rostagno's collation of Cesenas M. The late Mr Neil, of Pembroke College, to whose memory I have dedicated the work, read and criticised the notes on the first four books before his untimely death, and often discussed with me many questions connected with the interpretation of Plato in general and the Republic in particular. Nor can I refrain from mentioning with affectionate gratitude and veneration the name of my beloved friend and teacher, Sir William Geddes, late Principal of the University of Aberdeen, to whose high enthusiasm and encouragement in early days all that I now know of Plato is ultimately due.

The coin which is figured on the title-page is a silver didrachm of Tarentum, dating from the early part of the third century B.C., and now in the British Museum. It represents a naked boy on horseback, galloping and holding a torch behind him: see the description by Mr A. J. Evans in the Numismatic Chronicle, Volume IX (1889), Plate VIII 14. I have to thank Mr Barclay V. Head, of the British Museum, for his kindness in sending me a cast of this appropriate emblem of the scene with which the Republic opens.

My best thanks are due to the Managers and staff of the University Press for their unremitting courtesy and care.

It is my hope to be able in course of time to complete this edition by publishing the introductory volume to which occasional reference is made throughout the notes. The introductory volume will deal inter alia with the MSS and date of composition of the dialogue, and will also include an essay on the style of Plato, together with essays on various subjects connected with the doctrine of the Republic.

Emmanuel College,
Cambridge.
September 5, 1902.
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NOTE ON THE TEXT OF THIS EDITION.

The materials for the text of the Republic will be discussed in the introductory volume to this edition: but it is necessary here to make a brief statement of the rules by which I have been guided in the selection of readings, and in the formation of the apparatus criticus.

The fundamental principle to which I have endeavoured to conform in the constitution of the text is as follows:—

"By reason of its age and excellence, Parisinus A is the primary authority for the text of the Republic, but the other mss are valuable for correcting its errors and supplying its omissions" (The Republic of Plato, 1897, p. x).

The MS which stands next in authority to Parisinus A is admitted by all to be Venetus II; and in those cases where A is wrong, and the right reading occurs in II, either alone, or, as happens much more frequently, in common with other MSS, I have been content to cite in the apparatus criticus merely the authority of II, adding, of course, the discarded text of A.

In those cases where neither A nor II can be held to represent what Plato wrote, I have considered, in the first instance, the reading of all the other available MSS; secondly, the evidence of ancient writers who quote or paraphrase parts of the Republic; and, thirdly, emendations; but in the critical notes I have as far as possible restricted myself to Venetus Ξ and Monacensis q, partly because I have found by experience that they come to the rescue of thenest when A and II break down, and partly because they are among the few MSS of the Republic,
NOTE ON THE TEXT.

besides A and Π, of which we possess thoroughly trustworthy collations. It is difficult to overestimate the debt which Platonic scholarship owes to Bekker, but the accuracy and completeness of his collations leave much to be desired, and it is safest for the present to cite, as far as may be, only those MSS of Bekker in which his work has been revised and supplemented by subsequent collators.

It sometimes, though comparatively seldom, happens that the reading which appears to be correct occurs only in MSS other than A, Π, Ξ or q. In such instances, if the reading which I approve is found in Angelicus v, I have sought to lighten the *apparatus criticus* by citing that MS only, even where its testimony is supported by that of other MSS. My experience has been that, next to Π, Ξ and q, Angelicus v is on the whole the most useful of Bekker's MSS for correcting the errors of A.

In the small number of passages where A, Π, Ξ, q and v appear all to be in error, I have named the other MSS which give the reading selected, confining myself in the first instance to the MSS collated by Bekker, and quoting the MSS of de Furia and Schneider only where Bekker's afford no help. Cesenas M has seldom been cited in the critical notes unless it appears to be the sole authority for the text adopted, but occasional reference is made to it in the commentary.

If the reading in the text is due to an early citation of Plato, or to an emendator, I mention the authority on which it rests. Considerably fewer emendations have been admitted than in my earlier edition, and in this as in other respects the text will be found to be conservative; but there are still some passages where all the MSS and other authorities are unsatisfactory, and in these I have printed the emendations of others or my own, when they appear to me either highly probable or right.

In all cases where I have deserted both A and Π in favour of a reading found in Ξ (or q), the readings of A, Π and q (or Ξ) have also been recorded in the *apparatus criticus*; and when it has been necessary to desert not only A and Π, but also Ξ and q, I have given the readings of each of these four MSS for the information of the student.
NOTE ON THE TEXT.

The upshot of these rules is that unless the apparatus criticus states the contrary, the text of this edition follows Parisinus A, and that the value of the other MSS of Bekker, de Furia, and Schneider has been estimated by the assistance which they give whenever A is at fault. I have tried to give a full account of the readings of the great Paris MS, which I collated in 1891, and afterwards examined again in order to settle the few discrepancies between the results of Professor Campbell's collation and my own. The scale of this edition has permitted me to give a tolerably complete record of the traces of double readings in A, so far at least as they point to variants affecting the sense or interpretation, and in such cases the rules by which the apparatus criticus is constructed are analogous to those already explained, as will appear from an inspection of the critical notes on 327A 3, 328E 34, 330E 33, 333E 28 and elsewhere.

It may be convenient to subjoin a table of the MSS cited in the notes, together with the centuries to which they have been assigned, and the authors of the collations which I have used.

1 I have however as a rule refrained from chronicling in the notes those cases in which I abandon the punctuation, accentuation, breathings, or spelling of A. Questions of orthography are most conveniently treated in a separate discussion, and something will be said on this subject in the Introduction. In the meantime I may be allowed to borrow from my edition of the text a statement of the rules which I have endeavoured to observe in matters orthographical. "As regards the spelling, A preserves several traces of the true Attic orthography, such as ἀποκτείνωμι (for example in 360 c), ὅς and a few others. These I have sedulously preserved. In general I have silently abandoned the spelling of A wherever the practice of Inscriptions appeared contrary to it, and sometimes also (sparingly) on other grounds, as for example in φιλόνικος versus φιλόνικος. Otherwise, in doubtful cases, where no sure guidance comes from Inscriptions, such as the addition or omission of ὑ ἐφελοκοτικῶν, εὐπάθεια versus εὐφάθεια and the like, I have invariably aimed at following the practice of the first hand in A. I have also deferred to Inscriptions so far as to exclude those grammatical forms which have conclusively been shewn to be unattic, such as ἐτοίμασαν (352A et al.), ᾑνδέσθωσαν (381 E), ἐιρήσθαι (for ἐνρήθαι), and a few others; but when there seems to be some room for doubt, the reading of A has been retained. In general, the cases where it has seemed necessary to abandon A on these and similar grounds are few and insignificant." The orthography of this edition will be found to be in practical agreement with that adopted by Schanz in his Platonis opera.
### NOTE ON THE TEXT.

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I hope to say something on the relationship between these MSS in my introductory volume.

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1. I have also recollated this MS for Books I—III of the *Republic*.
2. From Book II onwards. I owe my information as to the date of this and the following MS to a communication from Dr Mercati.

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3. IV 429 C—442 D is missing.
4. Contains only I—III 358 E, followed by the rest of II in a later hand.
5. Flor. B is usually assigned to the twelfth, and Flor. C to the thirteenth, century.

The dates here given are due to Dr Guido Biagi, who has been good enough to re-examine at my request these and the other Florentine MSS.

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6. Contains only I—V.
7. II 379 B—I III 399 B is missing.
8. Contains only VII and X (up to 604 c).
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

TA TOT ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ
ΘΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ
ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ

A.

I. Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἀμα τῇ σοφίᾳ ὑπότεθαί τινα τρόπον ποιήσωσιν, ἀνε ὑν δρότον ἄγουτες. καλῆ μὲν οὖν

3. ἀνε Α.Π.κτλ. ὦστε Α.Π.

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία. On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

327 A—328 B Socrates describes how he visited the Piraeus in company with Glauco, and was induced by Polemarchus and others to defer his return to Athens.

327 ι. Κατέβην κτλ. Dionys. Hal. de comp. verb. p. 208 (Reiske) ὃ δὲ Πλάτων, τοὺς ἐαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτείνοις καὶ βοστρυχίζοις, καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκω, οὐ μετέπει όγδοοντάτο γηγονώς ἑτη. πάσιν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτοι φιλολόγοι γνώριμα τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τάνθόδοις ἵστορομένα, τὰ τ᾽ ἅλλα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς δέλτου ἡν τελευτήσαντο αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν εὑρέθηναι ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς πολιτείας ἐξουσιά τήν ἅλλην “κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος.” See also Quint. viii 6. 64, and Diog. Laert. iii 37. The latter gives as his authorities Euphorion and Panaetius. As Cicero was tolerably familiar with the writings of Panaetius, it is possible that he too has the same story in view in de Sen. v 13, where he says of Plato “scribens est mortuus.” The anecdote may well be true, but does not of course justify any inference as to the date of composition of the Republic. See Introd. § 4.

2 τῇ θεῷ. What goddess? Bendis or Athena? The festival is the Bendideia (354 A) and it is perhaps safest to acquiesce in the usual view that Bendis is here meant. “Alii Minervam intelligunt, quae vulgo ή ΘΕΩΣ appellabatur; neque mihi videtur Socrates in ista Panathenaeorum propinquitate de Minerva veneranda cogitare non potuisse: sed quod simpliciter τῆν ἐορτὴν dicit, nunima diversa statuere non sinit” (Schneider). We hear of a temple of Bendis in the Piraeus in 403 B.C. (τὴν ὑδόν ἡ φέρει πρὸς τὸ λέον τῆς Μονυχίας Ἀρτεμίδος καὶ τὸ Βενδίδεον Xen. Ηέλλ. ii 4. 11). See also Introd. § 3 and App. i.

3 νῦν πρῶτον. Perhaps 410 B.C. Introd. § 3.

A. P.
5 of Ὀράκες. Probably resident aliens (as opposed to the ἐπιχώριοι or natives), living for commercial purposes in the Piraeus, which at all times contained a large admixture of foreign population. It was part of Athenian policy to encourage commercial settlers by allowing them to exercise their own cults (Foucart des assoc. relig. chez les Grecs p. 131). Foucart holds that the worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis was brought to the Piraeus by Thracian merchants (p. 84). Others have supposed that of Ὀράκες refers to envoys from Thrace, or Thracian mercenaries, the survivors of those who came to Athens in 414 B.C. (Thuc. VII 27); but the other view is more probable.

327 B 6 τὸ ἄστυ or ἄστυ 327 C is regular for Athens itself as opposed to the Piraeus. Hartman would omit the article (cf. Lys. 13. 88 τῶς ἐν ἀστείοις ἐν τῷ Πειραιάει): but it occurs infra 328 C, Phid. 230 C, Arist. Pol. Ath. 38. 1 and elsewhere.

10 αἰτός: 'ipse' 'eruns' 'the master' as often: cf. e.g. Prot. 314 D οὐ σοχή αἰτώ and the Pythagorean αἰτός ἥμα. With the deictic οὕτος cf. Symp. 175 A Σώκρατις οὕτος—ἐστήκεν, 'there goes Socrates—standing.'

327 C 18 ἐν λειπέται. See cr. n. ἐλλείπεται (which Hermann and others retain) is less pointed, in view of the two alternatives ἥ—κρεῖττος γένεσθε ἢ μένειν αἰτότω. For λειπέται said of the metáσ τι (Symp. 202 A) or third alternative, cf. Theaet. 188Α ἄξιον γ'/οὐδὲν λειπέται περὶ ἐκατόν πλὴν εἶδέν ἢ μὴ εἶδέν. 20 ὃς—διαινοεῖτε: 'well, you may make up your mind that we shall not refuse to listen.' Cf. (with Stallbaum) Crat. 439 C διαινοεῖται—ὡς ὅτιν ?><, ἀπαντῶν δεῖ καὶ ἰδιότων. μὴ is owing to the imperative: cf. Soph. O. C. 1154 and Jebb's note.

328 A 1 λαμπάς κτι. λαμπάς was the official name for a torch-race: see Mommsen's Ichnotologie pp. 170 n., 282. τῇ θεῷ: see on 327 A and App. I.
2 Λαμπάδα: Harpocratio remarks ἦν 
νῦν ἡμέρας λαμπάδα καλοῦσεν, αὖτως ὄνομα. But λαμπάς was used for ‘torch’ even in classical Greek. Plato chooses 
λαμπάδιον because he has just used λαμ-
pάς in a different sense.

3 διαδοσοῦσιν κτλ. shews that—except for the novel substitution of mounted competitors for runners—the torch-race in question was of the kind alluded to in Hdt. viii. 98 and elsewhere as held in honour of Hephæstus. The competition was not between one individual and another, but between different lines of competitors, the torch being passed on from man to man. Victory fell to the chain whose torch, still burning, first reached the goal. The well-known figure in Læs. 776 B καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βιον παραδόντα ἄλλοις εἰς ἄλλως refers to the same form of race. Plato nowhere mentions the simpler form described by Pausanias (i. 30. 2), in which individuals contended against each other: see Baumeister Denk-

5 ἄξιον δείκνυσθαι. Songs and dances were the leading features in a ποιησί. See Soph. Ant. 1146—1152 and Eur. Hercl. 781—783 ἀνειδέτει δὲ γάς ἐπ’ 
δύθα | (the Acropolis) ὀλόγυματα πανυχίων ὧν πάρεσθεν ἱακεί τῶν κρότουσιν (in honour of Athena at the Panathenaeae). 
ἐξαναστησόμεθα κτλ. The promise is nowhere fulfilled.

328 B 7 μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε. Schanz (Novae Comm. Plat. p. 25) shows that this phrase, which is tolerably frequent in Plato, always occurs in combination with a positive command (here μένετε) except in 11 369 B.

328 B—328 E The scene at the house of Polemarchus. Socrates begins to inter-
rogate Cephalus on the subject of old age.

328 B 10 ἐς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου. Po-
lemarchus was older than Lysias (infra 331 D), and we are to infer that at this time Cephalus lived with him. There is no reason why we should (with Blass 
Att. Ber. p. 338) reject Plato’s statement that Polemarchus had a house in the 
Piraeus: the words of Lysias (12. 16), which Blass relies upon as shewing that Polemarchus lived not in the Piraeus, but in Athens, refer to 404 B.C. and do not prove it even for that year. Lysias probably lived at this time in a house of his own in the Piraeus, as in 404 B.C. (Lys. 12. 8): it is to be noted that he is mentioned along with the visitors, in contrast with Cephalus (ἡ δ’ ἐνδόν κτλ.
—τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ 
p. xii.

15 διὰ χρόνου—αὐτὸν. καὶ ‘indeed’ goes with the whole clause: cf. Soph. 
Anth. 1253 ἄλλ’ ἔστησεν μὴ τι κατά-
σχετον | κρυφῇ καλύτερε καρδίᾳ θυμωμένη 
with Jebb’s note. Tucker translates ‘for 
it was some time since I had so much 
seen him’—throwing, I think, too much 
emphasis on καὶ.
δὲ ἐστεφανομένος ἐπὶ τίνος προσκεφαλαῖον τε καὶ δίφρον· τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγγυαν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἔκαθεζόμεθα οὐν παρ’ αὐτῶν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτῶδει κύκλῳ. εὐθὺς οὖν μὲ ἰδὼν ο Ἐφέσιος ἱππάζετο τε καὶ εἰσεν’ Ω Σαλβατεῖ, οὐδὲ θαμίζεις ἥνιν καταβαινόν 20 έις τον Πειραιά: χρῆν μεντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγώ ἐτί ἐν δυνάμει ἰν τοῦ βάρδιος πορευεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀστυ, οὐδέν ἂν σε ἐδεί δεύρο ἱέναι, ἀλλὰ ήμείς ἁν παρὰ σε ἱμεν. νῦν δε σε χρῆν πυκνότερον δ εὔρο ἱέναι· οἴς εὖ ἠσθι ὁτι ἐμουγε, ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱδοναί ἀπομαίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὔξονται αἱ περὶ τούς λόγους 25 ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ἱδοναί· μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεί, ἀλλὰ τούσδε τε τοῖς νεανίασ ξύνεσθι καὶ δεύρο παρ’ ἱμας φοίτα ὦς παῦ δίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους. Καὶ μην, ἵν δ ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω

26· ὅς παρὰ δίλους τε ΙΙ ετι καὶ μγ. Α5· : ομ. Α1.

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328 Α 16 προσκεφαλαίον τε καὶ δίφρον· virtually a hendiadys, as Hartman remarks, comparing Homer II. ix 200 εἶναι δ’ εν κλαμοιοί τάπητι τε πυκνότερον. It is somewhat fanciful to suppose (with Hartman) that Plato throughout this picture was thinking of the aged Nestor seated among his sons (Od. ΙΙΙ 32 ff.). τόνος adds a touch of vagueness: ‘a sort of combination of cushion and chair’ (Tucker).

tεθυκώς γὰρ explains ἐστεφανομένος: “coronati sacrificabundo, ut satis constat” Stallbaum. The God to whom Cephalus had been sacrificing was doubtless Zeus ἔρεικεις, whose altar stood in the αὐλή.

19 οὖδέ—Πειραιᾶ: A negative must be supplied, “ut amice expositubundus cum Socrate senex hoc dicere videatur: tu neque alia facis, quae debebas, neque nostram domum frequentas. Simili ellipsis nostrates: ‘Deck blirst nicht oft zu uns’ (Schneider). οὐδὲ is ‘also not’: for exx. see Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms § 141 and Jebb on Soph. O. C. 590f. οὖδὲ in οὐδὲ πάνυ βάδου ΙΧ 589 C is another instance, in which, as here, the idiom has a kind of colloquial effect. Stallbaum takes οὐδὲ with θαμίζεις “ne venti- tas quidem ad nos, h. e. raro sane domum nostram frequentas”; but his equation hardly holds good, and is not justified by Xen. Συμπ. 4. 23, where οὐδὲ coheres closely with the emphatic σῶς. Others have suspected corruption, proposing οὐ τι (Ast, cf. Od. v 88 πάρος γε μὲν ὡς τι θαμίζεις), οὐ δὲ (Nitzsch), or οὐ δ’ (Hart- man). οὐ τι is very unlikely; for θαμίζεισ is not exclusively a poetic word (cf. Laws 843 b), and we need not suppose that Plato is thinking of Homer. I agree with Hartman that οὐ δ’ is improbable; δ’ is not sufficiently explained by saying that it is ‘adversative to the idea contained in ἱππάζετο’ (J. and C., with Schneider Additamenta p. 2). None of the cases quoted by Sauppe Ep. Crit. ad G. Hermannum p. 77 (Add. Knights 1302, Hdt. 1 x 108, Theogn. 659, 887, 1070 and Callinus 1 r) seem to me to justify the change of οὐδὲ to οὐ δ’. Hartman’s correction is better; but I believe the text is sound.

328 Β 25 μὴ οὖν κτλ.: Το σετις λεγεί. 181 B C furnishes a near parallel. νεανίασ refers to Socrates’ companions who had come from Athens, as opposed to Cephalus, Polemarchus and the others; the emphasis, as often, being on the καί clause: ‘associate with these young men, but come and visit us also.’ So also Boeckh KI. Schr. iv p. 475. There is no sufficient reason for reading νεανίασ (with II and other MSS): see Introd. § 3.

27 καὶ μὴν κτλ.: ‘Indeed, Cephalus,’ etc. γε need not be added (with II and other MSS) after χαίρω: cf. Phaed. 84 D καὶ μὴν, Ο Σαλβατεῖ, τάληθη σοι ἐρώ, Euthyd. 275 ε 304 C al., with Jebb on Soph. O. T. 749, 1005.
328 ΕΥΔΙΑΛΕΓΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΣΦΟΔΡΑ ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΑΙΟΥΝ. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἵμα, παρ᾽ αὐτῶν πυνθαίνοντα, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὅδον προεληλυθότων, ἥν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἰσως δεδείχει παρείσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστιν, τράχεια καὶ ζωὴ
χαλεπὴ, ἡ ραβδια καὶ εὐπορος. καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδονὰς ἀν πυθοίμην, ὃ τί σοι φαίνεται τούτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἡδὴ εἰ τῆς ἡλίκιας, ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γῆρας οὐδόδω φασίν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, τότερον χαλεπόν τοῦ
βίου ἢ πώς, σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

329 ΠΕΡΙΟΙΣΟΙΣ, ὥποτε ΤΙΝΑ ὙΠΟΝΥΜΗ. Τὸ ἀρχιτέκτονεσ, τὸν ἔχουσαν ἡμᾶς τινες εἰς ταυτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλίκιαν ἔγορας, διαφοράντες τὴν παλαιὰν παρομιαν. οἱ οὗν
πλεῖστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφυρόται ξυπνάτες, τάς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἄδουας
ποθόντες καὶ ἀναμμηναικόνουν περὶ τὰ ταφροδιαί καὶ περὶ 5
πότους καὶ εὐχαρίσια καὶ ἀλλ᾽ ἄτατα δ᾽ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἔχεται, καὶ
ἀγνακτοῦντις ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερήμενοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ
Β竞技, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ γηράται. ἐνιοῦ δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν ὀικεῖων προπη-

34. αὐτὸ Α' II: αὐτὸς Α".
Lakíseis tòu γήρως ὄδύρονται, καὶ ἔπι τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν 10 ὀςων κακῶν σφάσιν αἰτίων. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὁ Ἑκάρτης, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἰτίον αἰτιάσαται. ἐι γὰρ ἦν τούτῳ αἰτίων, κἂν ἐγὼ τὸ αὐτὴ ταύτη ἐπεστούθη ἐνεκά γιὰ γήρας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐπιστάθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας, νῦν δὲ ἔγγοι ἕδη ἐντετυχίκα ὡς οὐτὸς ἐξουσι καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Ὁσοφκλεῖς ποτὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο παρεσφυσμῆν.

15 ἐρωτομένῳ ὑπὸ τίνος Πῶς, ἐφή, ὁ Ὁσοφκλεῖς, ἔχεις πρὸς τάφρο-δίσια; ἐτὶ οὖς τε ἐι γνωκικ συγγιγνεσθαί; καὶ ὁς, Ἐὐθῆμει, ἐφή, ὁ ἀνθρωπε: ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὡσπερ λυττῶτα τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγόν. εὐ οὐν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνοι εἰσπεῖ καὶ νῦν ὡς ἠπό. παπτάπαι τῷ τῶν γε τοιοῦτων 20 ἐν τῷ γῆρα πολλῆ ἐξωθή γύρνεται καὶ ἀλευθερία. ἐπειδιάν αὐτοὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν παύνονται κατατείνουσι καὶ χαλάσσωσιν, παπτάπαι τὸ τοῦ Ὁσοφκλέους γύρνεται: ἴ δεσπότων πάνυ πολλών ἐστὶ καὶ Δ μαίνομένου ἀπηλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιοῦτον πέμε καὶ τῶν γε πρός τούς οἰκείους μὰ τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὁ Ἑκάρτης, 25 ἀλλ’ ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἄν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὐκολοί ὡςω, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίος ἐστὶν ἐπίτουν: εἰ δὲ μῆ, καὶ γῆρας, ὁ Ἑκάρτης, καὶ νέοτης χαλέπη τῷ τοιοῦτο ξυμβαίνει.

329 C 16 ἕπ—συγγιγνεσθαί. These words are rejected by Hirschg, Cobet, and Hartman, but their genuineness is supported by the singular αὐτό in αὐτό ἀπέφυγον and by Plut. περι φιλοσοφίας 5. 525 A ὁ Σοφόκλης ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ δύναται γνωστὶ πλησίασέν. Εὐθῆμε, αὐθρωπε, εἰσέν κτλ. In such matters Greek realism called a spade a spade. In spite of the anecdote here told, few writers have painted sadder pictures of old age than Sophocles: see for example O. C. 1235—1238 and Fr. 684. More in keeping with the present passage is Fr. 688 οὖν ἐστι γῆρας τῶν σοφῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ νοῦς ἔπει ἐξετάζειν ἴδτηραμένοις.

17 ἀπέφυγον—ἀποφυγόν. The repetition adds a certain impressiveness to the sentence. Herwerden is in error when he ejects ἀποφυγόν, which seems to have been read also by Plutarch (referred to in last note).

21 κατατείνουσι is intransitive. If the meaning were (as Ast holds) transitive —man being conceived as the puppet of the desires cf. Laws 644 E—we should expect ἐπι- or ὑπε- rather than κατα- τείνουσι; see Phaed. 94 C and 98 D.

ΠΑΝΤΑΠΑΣΧΕΝ ΚΤΛ. The impressive iteration is in keeping with the age and earnestness of the speaker: cf. 321 A, B.

22 ἕπι. Stallbaum and others eject this word, but it is not easy to see why a scribe should have inserted it, particularly in such an idiomatic position. The asyndeton before δεσπότων is regular in explanatory clauses. I read ἐστιν (with A) in preference to ἐστιν: the meaning ‘is possible’ does not suit, and would require ἀπαλλαγήμαι rather than ἀπηλάχθαι. Translate ‘it is the deliverance once and for all from tyrants full many and furious.’ The grammatical subject, as in English, remains vague; it is involved in ἐπειδὰν —χαλάσσωσιν. For the use of ἐστι cf. Lysiph. 2 D φαινεται μοι—ἀρχεθαίρ ὡρίζων ὡρίζων ἐγὼ ἐστίν τῶν νῦν πρότερον ἐπιμεληθήμαι. The sentence-accent falls on πολλῶν and μαίνομένων and not on ἐστι. The view of old age presented here recalls the μελέτη θανάτου of the Phaedo.

IV. Καὶ ἔγω ὡρασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, δοῦλομενὸς ἔτι Εἷς λέγειν αὐτοῦ εἰκόνοι καὶ εἴπων: 'Ὡ Κέφαλη, οἷμαι σοι τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὡσ ταῦτα λέγης, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤγεισθαί σε βαζίδος τὸ γήρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσαι: τοὺς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια φασιν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφῆ, λέγεις: οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγοντι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὄσον οἴονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεομιστοκλέους εἰς ἔχει, ὅς τῶν Σερίφων λοιπονυμένως καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐ δι' αὐτόν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδόκησαι, ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀν αὐτὸς Σερίφων ὅν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναίος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γήρας φέρουν, εἰς ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀν ὁ ἐπιεικὴς πάνω τι βαζίδος γήρας μετὰ πενίας 5 εὐεγκοι, οὔθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικῆς πλούτησας εὐκολὸς ποτ' ἀν εὐαυτῷ

29. σου Α.Π.Ι: σε κορ. Α.2.

329 D—331 B Socrates further ques-
tions Cephalus. ' Most men will say that it is your riches which make you happy in old age.' C. ' Character has more to do with happiness than wealth.' S. ' What is the chief advantage of money?' C. ' It enables the good man to pay his debts to gods and men before he passes into the other world.'

29 εἰκόνοι. καίνων 'rouse' is technical in the Socratic dialect for the stimulating of the intellect by interrogation: cf. (with Stallbaum) Lys. 233 A, Xen. Mem. IV 2 2. See also Ar. Clouds 745.

329 B 34 οὐ μέντοι γε. The collocation μέντοι γε, which rarely occurs in good Greek, is condemned by Porson (on Eur. Med. 675) and others. In Plato it is found only here and in Crat. 424 c, [Sisyph.] 388 A. Here some inferior MSS omit γε. It would be easy (with Hoefer de particulis Plat. p. 38, Cobet, and Blaydes) to write οὐ μέντοι διόν γε, but 'notanda talia potius quam mutanda.' The idiom, though exceptional, is (in my judgment) sufficiently supported (see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 709). It should also perhaps be remembered that the speaker, Cephalus, was not a native Athenian. Cf. 331 B εἰ μή.

τὸ τοῦ Θεομιστοκλέους. The story as told by Herodotus VIII 125 is probably more true, if less pointed: ὅτι δὲ εἰ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἀπίκετο (sc. Θεομιστοκλῆς) ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἐνθαῦτα Τιμόθεος Αἰφιδ-ναῖος—φόθοτε καταμαργέων ἐνεκεκ τὸν

Θεομιστοκλέα—ὡς διὰ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔχει τὰ γέρας τὰ παρὰ Λακεδαίμονων, ἀλλ' ὧν δὲ εἰ ἐστιν. δὲ—ἐπει' ἐνθ' ἔχει το' ὡστ' ἐντὸς ἐν ἔνει ὑπὸ Βελβῶκης (Belbina was a small is-

land about 2 miles south of Sunium) ἐπιμήκθην ὡς τοῖς Ἐπαρτιτσίοις, ὡστ' ἄν οὐ ἄνθρωπον ἐν Ἀθηναίοις. The changes are not due to Plato: for τοι in τὸ Σερβίω—for which Heindorf on Char. 155 B wrongly suggests τῷ, like Cicero's Servio guidam (Cat. Mai. 8)—shews that Plato's form of the story was also familiar. The Platonic version, in which Belbina has become Seriphus, and Themistocles' detractor a Seriphan, afterwards held the field.

330 A 3 καὶ τοῖς δή. καὶ is 'also' and δή illative.

6 εὐκόλοις—εὐαυτῷ. The dative is used as with εἰμινης: cf. Ar. Frogs 359 μῆδο εὐκόλοις ἐστι πολίταις (v.l. πολίτην). To suit the application precisely to the story we should require (1) neither would the ἐπιει-

κῆς easily endure old age with poverty, (2) nor the μὴ ἐπιεικῆς easily endure old age with riches. For (2) Plato substitutes 'nor would the bad man ever attain to peace with himself by becoming rich'; thereby conveying the further idea that the bad man is not εὐκόλοι εὐαυτῷ under any cir-

cumstances or at any time. Richards' suggestion ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e. γῆρα) for εὐαυτῷ is neat, but loses sight of this additional point. The allusion to old age in the second clause, so far as it is necessary to allude to it, is contained in ποτε.
330 a, b 8 ποί οই ἐπεκτηγάμην κτλ.: 'do you want to know what I acquired, Socrates?' ποιά is simply 'what' as in Men. 87 ε εἰκόνισα δῆ καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποία ἐστιν ὁ ἡμᾶς ὄφελει. ὄφελει φαμέν καὶ ἀξίω καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή: τῶν κόσμων καὶ τῶν τοιαύτα ὄφελιμα, καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ τὰ πού ταῦτα; There is no derision implied, as in ποίος Κτήσιππος (Edithyd. 291 a) and the like: had Cephalus desired to pour scorn on the suggestion, he would have said πόθεν ἐπεκτηγάμην; (cf. Crat. 308 ε): and it would be absurd to deride a charge to which you at once plead guilty (γένομαι χαμάσασθαι τῇ κτλ.). If Socrates' question had been not πόθεν—τὰ πλεῖον παρέλαβας ἢ ἐπεκτήσας, but ποία ἐπεκτήσας, Cephalus would have said ὅποια ἐπεκτηγάμην: but this idiom is inadmissible, except where the same interrogative occurs in its direct form in the original question. In view of the answer (μέσον τὰ κτλ.) which Cephalus gives, πόλεα for ποία would be too precise. Of the various emendations which have been suggested, the only plausible one (in point of sense) is Richards' πόθεν for ποία or τοί: this would assimilate the original and the repeated question, but is less well adapted to Cephalus' reply. Cephalus in point of fact uses an old man's privilege and accommodates his interrogator's question to his own reply. See also ν 465 b n.

330 b II Δυσανίας δέ. Groen van Prinsterer's suggestion (Plat. Prosopogr. p. 111) Δωσίας for Δυσανίας is at first sight plausible, since it is in harmony with the well-known Greek custom of calling grandsons after their grandparents: but the fashion was by no means invariable: see Blümmer, Gr. Privatalterth. p. 284. [Plut.] vit. Lys. 835 c also calls Cephalus son of Lyssias.

13 τούτουςιν. Bekker and others read τούτοις, but there is no reason for deserting the MSS. The archaic dative in -οις is tolerably often used by Plato. In the Republic alone it recurs in 345 ε, 388 δ, 389 β, 468 δ (Homer), 560 κ, 564 c, 607 b (-αι) (poetic): see also Schneider on 111 389 β, and for the usage of inscriptions Meisterhans 8 p. 126. In this particular passage the archaic ending suits the age of the speaker; but it should be remembered that Plato's style (at least in his more mature dialogues) is not a mere reproduction of the vernacular Attic, but also in no small measure a literary language or 'Kunstsprache,' in which Ionisms and poetic and archaic forms are occasionally employed: see especially Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 246—250 nn. Hirzel (ib. p. 34 n. 1) gives reasons for holding that a sort of κάθε διάλεκτος, resembling the dialect of Herodotus, was actually spoken in certain cultivated circles at Athens in the Periclean age, e.g. by Anaxagoras and his group, by the Ionian sophists and their followers etc., and some of Plato's Ionisms may be inherited from this source. Cf. vii 533 b n.

14 οὗ τοι ἑνέκα—ὕπτι. The reading τούτον for οὗ, though supported by Sto-baurs (Flor. 94. 22), is a correction made by some one unacquainted with the idiom, which is common enough in conversational style: cf. infra 491 b δ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, οὗτοι κτλ. and Ag. Frogs 108. Hartman's τοῦ τοι (interrogative) is ingenious, but unnecessary.
The meaning is simply ‘twice as much as the others’: cf. e.g. *Laws* 608 a διπλὴ τὸ βλάβος εκτεινόμενο τὸ πολύν τὸν λόγον. διπλή. The is like ἡ after διπλάς, διπλάς, etc. If διπλὴ meant simply ‘on two grounds’, it could not be followed by ἡ, and we should have to regard ἡ of ἡ ἄλλα as an interpolation. Cephalus expresses himself somewhat loosely, as if loving a thing on two grounds, or in two ways, were equivalent to loving it twice as much. ταύτη below is defined by the ὑπερ clause, and is preferred to ὑπερ, partly in order to correspond to διπλὴ but still more to suit κατὰ τὴν χρήσιν. The present passage is through Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* IV. 2. 1120 b 14, cf. ib. IX. 7. 1168 a 1—3) the source of the proverb about ‘parents and poets.’

30 C. 16 διπλὴ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι. The meaning is simply ‘twice as much as the others’: cf. e.g. *Laws* 608 a διπλὴ τὸ βλάβος εκτεινόμενο τὸ πολύν τὸν λόγον. διπλὴ. The is like ἡ after διπλάς, διπλάς, etc. If διπλὴ meant simply ‘on two grounds’, it could not be followed by ἡ, and we should have to regard ἡ of ἡ ἄλλα as an interpolation. Cephalus expresses himself somewhat loosely, as if loving a thing on two grounds, or in two ways, were equivalent to loving it twice as much. ταύτη below is defined by the ὑπερ clause, and is preferred to ὑπερ, partly in order to correspond to διπλὴ but still more to suit κατὰ τὴν χρήσιν. The present passage is through Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* IV. 2. 1120 b 14, cf. ib. IX. 7. 1168 a 1—3) the source of the proverb about ‘parents and poets.’

21 ἔγγυσθαι: ‘to meet’ in social intercourse, as in Ἀρ. 41 Λ. ἔγγυσθαι (suggested by Richards) would express habitual intercourse, which is not what Plato means to say. With the sentiment cf. Συμφ. 173 c ὅταν μὲν τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγον ἤ αὕτη ποιώμαι ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολοῦ− ὑπερφήνω ὧς χαίρων: ὅταν δὲ ἄλλους τινάς, ἄλλος τε καὶ τοὺς ὑπερτέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτὸς τε ἄχρομαι ὡς τοὺς ἐτάραυς ἐλέω, ὅτι ὀφείλει τι ποιῶν οὖν ποιῶντες.

30 D. 26 ἐπίδαι—τελευτήσεις: ‘when a man faces the thought that he must die,’ not (with Jowett) ‘when a man thinks himself to be near death,’ which would be ἐπίδαι τις ἐγγὺς ἐνείλοι τοῦ τελευτῆσαι, as Herwerden proposes to read (cf. *Laws* 922 c ὅταν ὁδικός ἐγγὺς ἐνείλοι τοῦ τελευτῆσαι. ‘Senum, non iuvenum to odiæsi teneutæ est’ (Hartman): the weakness of old age convinces us at last that we too must die. Cf. Simon, 85. 7—10 θητῶν δ’ ὅφρα τις ἀνθώς ἔχει πολυνήρατων ἡβίσκοι κοιφῶν ἔχων γνώμην, πάλιν ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ· | οὔτε ἑκρανίδ’ ἔχει γνωσμένοις οὔτε θανείσθαι, | οὐδ’ ὑγίς ὅταν ἡ, φροντίδ’ ἔχει καμάτων. | 29 ἀδικήσαντα—διδόναι δίκην. Plato is fond of this verbal play: cf. καθαρός 8 b 8 and 8 e τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δαστόν δίκην. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: for the tale of justice must be made up. Note that we have here in ἀδίκεια and δίκη the first casual allusion to the subject of the Republic.

330 E. 30 αὐτῶς κτλ. αὐτός = ἐπειρ s. ullo as opposed to οἱ λεγόμενοι μόνοις. The verb is to be supplied by a kind of
zeugma from μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά (i.e. τά ἑκέν; or rather the predicate is accommodated to the second alternative. Cf. 344 B infra and VIII 553 C. To regard the bodily weakness of old age as in itself the cause of clearer vision of the world beyond may be in harmony with the doctrine of the Phaedo, but Cephalus is not represented as a Platonist. Tucker needlessly doubts the text.

34 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπινών κτλ. καὶ is 'both,' not 'and,' and balances καὶ ἐκ: 'many a time, like children, awakes out of sleep in terror and lives in the expectation of ill.' For ὑπέτεροι οἱ παιδες compare Phaed. 77 D, E, and for the general sentiment Arist. Eth. Nic. 1 13. 1102 b 8—11 ἀργία γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ ὄνομος τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν ἐν πτίκα μικρὸν δικυκλοῦσαι τινὲς τῶν κινήσεως, καὶ τάδη βέλτιον γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐνεχθέντων καὶ τῶν παρωνίων.

331 a 1 ὡδεία—γνωριστόφως. ὡδεία is suggested by Pindar's ἱλικεία, and καὶ ἀγαθῆ, as presently appears, is not part of the quotation, but goes with ἐπισί and is added by Plato in contrast to μετὰ κακῆς ἐπισίδος.

γνωριστόφως κτλ.: 'to nurse him in old age, as Pindar also says.' γνωριστόφως is best taken by itself and not with ἀγαθῆ.

5 ἀτάλλοςια κτλ. ἀτάλλω is used of rearing children, and helps out the idea of γνωριστόφως: διὰ παίδεις οἱ γέρωντες. It is not clear how the fragment is to be arranged, nor to what class of Pindar's poems it belongs. See Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr. 4 1 p. 452.

6 εὐ οὐν—σφόδρα. The emphasis is quite in keeping with Cephalus' age and character; and Hartman is certainly wrong in condemning the clause: cf. 329 C, 331 B.

331 b 10 ὡδείαντα—θεοὶ θυσίας τινάς. Phaed. 118 a ἐπέκ. δ ὁ τελευταῖον ἐφέββασιν, ὁ Κρίτων, ἔφη. τῷ 'Ασκhapus ὡδείαντα ἀλεκτρνᾶν ἀλλά ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήθητε. Wealth is in Cephalus' view the indispensable χορηγία ἀρετῆς.

12 ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀνδρί ἐνός. ἀλλὰ γε is extremely rare in Attic prose: in the
Platonic corpus it occurs—according to the best manuscript authority—here and in Rep. vili 543 c, Phaed. 86 e, Hipp. Minor 287 b, Phaedr. 262 a (āllā γε δή), Phaed. 116 d (id.). In some of these passages ἀλλὰ γε has been conjectured—wrongly, as I think (with Schneider), at all events in the passage of the Republic—but ἀλλὰ γε cannot lead in the Phaedrus and Hippias Minor. There is no a priori objection to the collocation, which is also implied in ἀλλὰ γε (γε ἄρα); and in later Greek ἀλλὰ γε arose no objection. The meaning is 'but still,' originally 'yes, but:' as Schneider says, 'γε in his dictum nos concedit aliquatenus praecedentia, sed magis urget sequentia.' There is perhaps also a dramatic motive for putting ἀλλὰ γε into the mouth of Cephalus; see on on τοῦτο γε in 329 e. Against the reading of Stobaeus (Flor. 94, 22) ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἐνδοῦ ἐνδός, we may urge the further objection that the idiomatic phrase ἐν ἐνδός ἐνδός ('setting one thing against another,' as Jowett correctly translates it) seems to depend for its peculiar force (like μονος μόνος and the like) on the juxtaposition of its two parts: cf. Phil. 63 b (ἐν ἐνδός ἐνδός) and Laws 705 b (ἀνάλος ἐνδός ἐνδός). The passage quoted by Stallbaum from Euripides Orest. 651 ἐν μὲν τῷ ἦμιν ἀνάλος ἐνδός δούλων δουλεύει σε χρῆ is quite different and does not mean 'hoc praecipue,' but 'one thing in return for one thing,' as is clear from lines 646 f.

Plato's speech is not adverbial (as Hartman and others suppose), but belongs to τοῦτο: 'setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least important object for which wealth is most useful to a man of sense.' The emphasis is characteristic: cf. 329 c, 331 a. 331 c, d. The question 'What is Justice?' is for the first time raised. Is it simply to speak the truth and pay what you owe? Polemarchus succeeds to Cephalus' part in the conversation. 331 c 16 τὴν ἀλήθειαν κτλ. This theory of justice or righteousness is deduced from the words of Cephalus: τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντα τινα ἐξαπατηθαι ἢ παρανομασθαι being generalised into ἀλήθεια (truthfulness, cf. τάληθρη λέγειν below), and μηδὲ αὐτοῦ λοιπὸν ἢ τις δείξῃ τις ἢ ἀγαθὰ τεῖναι ἢ ἀρνητὰ τεῖναι ἢ ἁμαρταντερῶν ἤ ἁμαρταντέων ἢ ἁμαρτημάτων ἢ ἁμαρτηματῶν ἢ ἁμαρτηματίων. It is simply Truth and Honesty, the two chief ingredients in the popular conception of morality.

ἀπλός οὕτως: 'quite without qualification.' For this idiomatic οὕτως cf. ἐποίησε οὕτως II 377 b, 18 οὐδεὶς τοῦτον ἕργον. Similar points of conversation are raised in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus ap. Xen. Mem. iv 2, 12 ff. 21 οὐδ' αὐτ' κτλ. I have removed the comma before οὐδέ, because the ὁ in ὁ ἀποδίδει covers both participles, the person in both cases being the same.
There is not sufficient reason for changing the best supported reading ἐφη, ἐγώ to ἔφην ἐγώ. Polemar- chus is throughout the introduction represented as a vivacious person: e.g. in ὑπὸ δὲν ἦμας—δοὺς ἐστὲν (337 c), and in the lively emphasis with which he breaks in just above: πάντως μὲν ἐπέρη γέ τι χρῆ Σιμωνίδης πειθέσθαι. True to his name, he is first to mingle in the fray. It is this philosophy on the part of his son which draws a smile from Cephalus: over-much προθυμία always struck the Greeks as laughable: cf. e.g. Eur. Ion 1172 ff. The words in which Socrates addresses Polemar- chus so ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος are also somewhat more appropriate if the title was self-chosen. Cephalus leaves the argument to be carried on by the assembled company (for ἐπέρη does not mean Polemarchus and Socrates alone): whereupon Polemarchus, seizing hold on the word παρασκεύασμα in its sense of ‘transmit,’ ‘bequeath,’ playfully claims the right to inherit his λόγος as Cephalus’ eldest son and heir. It may be added that ἐφη ἐγώ was much more likely to be changed to ἔφην ἐγὼ than vice versa. With the Greek compare Phaed. 89 c ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἐφη, τὸν ἰδίων παρακαλέσαι.

28 ἀμά η̣ε̣πρ̣ὸς τ̣ὰ̣ iε̣ρά. Soph. Fr. 206 γῆρα πρεσβύτωρα σῶετε τὴν εὐφυμίαν. The editors quote Cicero Epfr. ad Att. iv 16. 3 “credo Platonem vivus putasse satis con- sonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinisset.” Cf. the words of Theodorus in Theaet. 162 b ὅμως ἄλλων πίστεων ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν θεοθαῦμα καὶ μη ἐκεῖνον πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον, σκληρὸν ἴδα ὑπά, τῷ δὲ δὲ νηστέρῳ τε καὶ ἀγρότῃρ οὖν προσπαλαίνω. It is worthy of note that the entrance and exit of Cephalus are alike associated with the services of religion: see 328 c and Introd. § 2.

331 E—332 B The second half of the definition of ‘Justice which Socrates deduced from Cephalus’ remarks is now taken up and discussed in the form in which it was expressed by Simonides—‘rendering to each man his due.’ In the present section Socrates confines himself to eliciting the meaning of ‘due.’ As between friends, it is something good; as between enemies, something evil; in gene-
VI. Λέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί φής τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὅρθως λέγειν περί δικαιοσύνης; "Οτι, ἢ δ' 30 ὦ, τὸ τὰ ὁφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δικαιόν ἐστὶν τούτῳ λέγειν ὁκεῖ ἔμοι πάλιν λέγειν. "Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἢ 3 ἢ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδη βεβαίως ὁ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεύω σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θείος αὐτήρ τούτῳ μέντοι ἢ τί ποτε λέγειν, σὺ μὲν, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἵπτωσ γεγυνόσκεις, ἐγώ δὲ ἀφροῦ. δήλων ἡρμή ὑπὸ τούτο λέγειν, ὡπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τινὸς 35 παρακαταθέμενος τι ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης τί νομίσατε ἠμεῖς, ἤ γὰρ;

331 E 29 τι τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος. See on παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἄνδρος 11 368 Α. 31 τα ὁφειλόμενα—ἐστι. Probably some current saying attributed to Simonides: there is nothing like it in his fragments. The words do not profess to be a definition of justice; if they did, it would appear before δικαίον. It is not likely that Simonides himself explained this particular saying as Polemarchus does, although he would not have disapproved of the explanation. In Xen. Hēr. 11 2 he is represented as saying that tyrants are λεγώνται—κακωσάρι μὲν ἕχθροις, ὁμέρας δὲ φιλοὺς. The words of Socrates σὺ μὲν, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἵπτωσ γεγυνόσκεις, ἐγώ δὲ ἀφροῦ tend to fix the responsibility of the explanation on Polemarchus alone. Probably Simonides (if the saying is his) meant no more than that we should 'render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's.' Plato virtually confesses in 332 B that his interpretation is forced.

32 ἔμοι: said with confidence, as Σιμωνίδη γε with emphasis and some mockery: with you one might disagree, but not with Simonides.

33 σοφός—θείος. Cf. Prot. 315 E. σοφὸς and θείος were fashionable words of praise: in the mouth of Socrates they are generally ironical. Plato's own connotation of the word θείος is given in Men. 99 C οὐκόνω, ὡς Μένων, ἄξιον τούτων θείους καὶ τῶν ἄδρας, ὀσίες νυν μη ἄρα ταῦτα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦν ἦν πράττοντες καὶ λέγοντες; Ἄρθρον ἐν καλολίμαν θείους τε, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐλέγομεν χρησμοδοῦσκας καὶ μαντεῖς καὶ τοὺς πυθικοὺς ἀπαίνετε καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἡκάτα τούτων φαίνετο ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθυσιαστές, ἐπίπτουσιν οὖν καὶ κατεχόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθοῦσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδίης ἂν λέγοιγί·

34 ἀνήρ. I formerly read ἀνήρ, but ἀνήρ (in the predicate) is satisfactory enough: cf. Mem. 99 B θείος ἀνήρ, φασὶν, ὤντος.


36 ὄρθων is to be taken with παρακαταθέμενον and not with ἀπαίνετεν. 37 καῖτο ὑ ὁφειλόμενον. There is the same dispute about καῖτο γε as about μέντοι γε and ἀλλὰ γε (see on 332 B, 331 B). καῖτο γε has the best ms authority in its favour here and in IV 440 D: elsewhere in Plato it is not well-attested except in the ροδομορφοῦν, where it occurs Min. 318 E, Axioch. 364 B, 368 E. καῖτο γε is also found occasionally in Aristophanes, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the orators: see Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 611, and the Lex. Arist. Many distinguished critics would emend the idiom everywhere; but the instances are far too numerous for such a drastic policy. The difference between καῖτο ὁφειλόμενον γε ποι (which Hofer de part. Plat. p. 38 would read) and καῖτο γε ὁφειλόμενον would seem to be that in the former more stress is thrown on the word ὁφειλόμενον, in the latter on τοι. καῖτο γε is 'and surely' rather than 'quænamquam' (as Kugler holds de part. τοις εἰσιμε κα τοις ἀρ. Pl. ism p. 20), cf. IV 440 D N. The periphrasis ὁφειλόμενον—ἐστι is used of course to correspond to τὰ ὁφειλόμενα in E above: such periphrases (the principle of which is explained in Euriph. 9 E ff.) are extremely common in Plato. See W. J. Alexander in A. J. Ph. IV pp. 299 ff.
14

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332 a 2 ἀποδοτέον—ἀπαιτοῖ: 'well, but we were not on any account to make restoration at the time when the claimant is'—according to the Greek idiom 'was'—'mad.' Socrates, as in ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγμεν, is appealing to the admissions made by the πατὴρ τοῦ λάγου (in 331 C), as he is justified in doing when addressing his heir. ὅπερ is not—as ὅπερ shews—the particle of 'indefinite frequency,' but stands for ὅπερ of the direct: the whole clause τὸ ὅπερ τις μὴ σωφρόνος ἀπαιτοὶ is thus in the ορατο ὀφθαλμον self-quotation and exactly corresponds to ἐν μανεῖς ἀπαιτοὶ in 331 C. Madvig's ἀπαιτεῖ for ἀπαιτοὶ is therefore unnecessary. Goodwin MT. p. 213 explains the optative otherwise, but not (I think) rightly.

6 ἁγαθὸν μὲν τί δρᾶν sc. αὐτοῦ, for τοῖς ὕλαις depends on ὁφελεῖν, to which τοῖς ὕλαις is the subject.

μανθάνω—ὅτι is 'because,' not 'that,' as always (I believe) in Plato's use of this phrase: cf. Euthyphr. 3 b, 9 b and infra III 402 E, VIII 568 E. For the sentiment cf. (with J. and C.) Xen. Mem. IV 2 17 ff.

332 b 12 ὁφελεῖται δὲ. See cr. n. In explanatory clauses of this kind δὲ and not δὲ τε is the correct usage: cf. infra 337 D, 344 A. I therefore follow Bekker in reading δὲ.

13 προστήκει. ὁφελίμονων has thus been equated with προσήκον by means of the special cases τοῖς ὕλαις ὁφελίμονον and τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὁφελίμονον. τὸ προσ-

332 C—336 A The definition is further elucidated down to 333 B; and thereafter Socrates begins to criticise it.

In the first place, the definition is made more precise by representing justice as an art, whose business it is to benefit friends and injure foes (332 C, D). The question is then raised—how does the art of justice do good to friends and harm to foes? By the analogy of other arts Polemarchus is induced to say that justice benefits friends and harms enemies (1) by fighting with them and against them in time of war, and (2) in connexion with partnerships concerned with money in time of peace (332 D—333 B). The explanation of Simonides' saying is now complete.

Socrates first directs his attack against (2). In cases where money has to be used, it is not justice, but some other art, that is useful for the required purpose: in other words justice is (in time of peace) useful only in dealing with useless or unused money and other unused objects: which is an unworthy view of the art (333 B—333 E). Further, the analogy of the other arts shows that the art of justice, if it is the art of keeping money safe, is also the art of stealing money—always provided that it does so for the benefit of friends and the injury of foes (333 E—334 B). Polemarchus, in bewilderment, reiterates his
VII. 'Εννιάτοτα ἄρα, ὦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦς ἐοίκεν, ὦ Σιμονίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον δ' ἐγῷ. διενοεῖτο μὲν γὰρ, ὦς | φαίνεται, ὦτι τούτ' ἐν δίκαιον, τὸ προσήκον εἴκαστο ἀποδιδόναι, τούτῳ δὲ ὄνομασεν ὀφειλόμενον. 'Αλλὰ τί οἶει; ἐφη. Ο' πρὸς Δίος, ὦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τίς αὐτὸν ἥρετο, ὦ Σιμονίδης, ἦ τίσαν οὖν τὶ ἀποδιδόντα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνῃ ιατρική καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῶν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; Δῆλον ὸτι, ἐφη, ὦ σώμασιν φάρμακα 20

definition in the old form, and Socrates hereupon starts a fresh line of argument. By 'friends' and 'foes' Polemarchus means those who seem to us good and bad, not those who are so. But as bad men often seem to us good and good men bad, justice will often consist in benefiting bad men, and harming good, i.e. in wronging those who do no wrong; or conversely, if we refuse to accept this conclusion, and hold that it is just to benefit the just and hurt the unjust, it will often be just to hurt friends and benefit enemies, viz. when our friends are bad, and our enemies good (334 C—334 E).

Polemarchus hereupon amends his explanation of 'friend' and 'enemy' into 'him who both seems and is good,' and 'him who both seems and is bad'; and the definition now becomes, 'It is just to benefit a friend if he is good, and injure an enemy if he is bad.''

'To this amended definition Socrates now addresses himself. He first proves by the analogy of the other arts that to hurt a human being is to make him worse in respect of human excellence; i.e. justice, in other words, to make him more unjust, and afterwards by means of similar analogical reasoning, that no one can be made more unjust by one who is just. Simonides' saying, if Polemarchus has explained it aright, was more worthy of a tyrant than of him (335 A—336 A).

332 B ff. The seventh chapter is a good example of Plato's extreme care in composition. A careful study will show that the structural basis consists of two illustrations followed by an application: this occurs seven times before the conclusion of the argument is reached. Similar, but less elaborate, examples of symmetrical structure are pointed out in my notes on Crito 49 B, Prot. 324 D.

332 B 14 ἡμέρατο—ποιητικός. Theaet. 194 c τὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς κέαρ, δ' ἐφη 'Ομηρος αὐτητόμενος την τοῦ κυριοῦ διάστημα. The present passage is no more serious than that in the Theaetetus: Plato knew that Simonides merely meant to say 'it is just to render what you owe.'

332 C 17 ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; is a rhetorical question, which needs and receives no answer, like τί μὴν; and τί μὴν δοκεῖς; (Theaet. 162 B). It is equivalent to 'of course.' For the use of τί Stallbaum compares Gorg. 480 B τὶ γὰρ ὅφελεν; to which there is also no reply. This explanation is preferable to that of Madvig, who gives ἀλλὰ τί οἶει to Socrates, and takes ἐφη as equivalent to συνῆφη—a harsh usage in a narrated dialogue, and not likely to have been intended by Plato, because sure to be misunderstood. Liebhold's ἀλά τι οἶει; <οὐκ> ἐφη has everything against it.

ὁ πρὸς Δίος κτλ. 'In the name of heaven, said I, if any one then had asked him' etc. 'what reply do you think he would have made to us?' ὧν before πρὸς Δίος is (as Schanz holds) an interjection, and does not require a vocative to follow it (cf. Euthyd. 287 A, 290 E). It is tempting (with Tucker) to take ὧν πρὸς Δίος as part of the address to Simonides (cf. Euthyd. 294 B ὧν πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσίδωρε—ἀυτῷ τῷ ὡς ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστασθὼν). But on this view the presence of ei oiv—ἡρετο forms a difficulty, and ὧν πρὸς Δίος may very well go with τί ἂν οἶει—ἀποκρίνασθαι.

19 ὀφειλόμενοι καὶ προσήκον. It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A. Here ὀφειλόμενοι is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.

Ιατρική—μακειρική. In Gorg. 463 A ff. Plato refuses the name of 'art' to ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον. It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A. Here ὀφειλόμενοι is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.

Iatricai—maleceri. In Gorg. 463 A ff. Plato refuses the name of 'art' to ὀφειλόμενοι καὶ προσήκον. It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A. Here ὀφειλόμενοι is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.
332 D 23  

332 E 30  

333 A 5  

333 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [332 C

πε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. Ἡ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδίδοσα ὑφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκου τέχνη μαγειρική καλεῖται; Ἡ τοῖς ὑποτρόποις τὸ δ ἡδύσματα. Εἶπεν ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδίδοσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἄν καλοῖτο; Εἰ μὲν τι, ἐφ᾽, δει ἀκολουθεῖν, ὁ Σωκρατῆς, τούτων εμπροσθεν εἰρήμενοι, ἡ τοῖς φιλοσ καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὑφειλαῖς τε καὶ βλάβες ἀποδιδοῦσα. Τοῦτο δὲ φιλοῖς ἁρὰ εὐ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατῶτας κάμοντας φιλοῖς εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροῖς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν; Ἦκτορος. Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τοῦ τῆς θαλάττης E 30 κίνδυνον; Κυβερνήτης. Τί δὲ; ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τι ἐργόν δυνατῶτας φιλοῖς ὑφειλαῖς καὶ ἐχθροῖς βλάπτειν; Ἔγι το διοικομεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαίωμα, ἑμοῦγε δοκεῖ. Εἶπεν μὴ κάμονται γε μὴν, ὁ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, Ἦκτορος ἁχοστος. Ἀληθῆ. Καὶ μὴ πλέονοι δὴ κυβερνήτης. Ναι. Ἂρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἁχοστος; Ὁ οὖν πάνω μοι δοκεῖ τούτο. Χρήσιμον ἁρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαίωσην; Χρήσιμον. Καὶ ἥρ γεωργία. 333 ἡ οὐ; Ναι. Πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν. Ναι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομή. Ναι. Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, οἷμαι, φαίνεται κτῆσιν. Πάνω γε. Τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ καταστοσιάν εἴπῃς εἰς ἑρήνη φαίνει ἀρχήγοι ἐν καταστοσιάν εἴπῃς; Πρὸς τὰ ἔμβολα, ὁ Σωκρατῆς. Εὐμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνίματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; Κοι

of the two illustrations. So also below in 333 A τι δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην κτλ. 332 προσπολεμεῖν explains ἐχθροῖς βλάπτειν as ἐμμαχεῖν explains φιλοῖς ὑφειλαῖς. Ast's προσπολεμεῖν (a conjecture of Stephanus) would leave ἐχθροῖς βλάπτειν unrepresented. Stephanus' conjecture was natural enough with the wrong reading καὶ ἐμμαχεῖν, which Ast also followed. For ἑμοῦγε δοκεῖ Hartman demands ἑμεῦγε δοκεῖ; but cf. 333 B, Crit. 43 D, Phaed. 108 D, Menex. 236 b. These cases shew that δοκεῖ can be used without ὅτι: and ἑμοῦγε δοκεῖ is a false reading does not occur in the Republic (Gravenwald in Schanz's Beitr. zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3 p. 13). 333 A 5 ἔμβολα are contracts where-money is involved. Polemarchus (as in εἰς ἄργυρον in B below), in harmony with the natural meaning of Simonides' saying, thinks first of pecuniary dealings as the sphere in which δικαιοσύνη acts. Socrates substitutes for ἔμβολα the more general term κοινωνίματα, in order once more to introduce the analogy of the arts.
Β νομήμα τα δήτα. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνίς εἰς πεπτῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεπτευτικός. Ἀλλ' εἰς πλάνθου καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνίς τοῦ ὀἰκοδομικοῦ; Οὐδέμοις. Ἀλλ' εἰς τινά δή κοινωνίαν το ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνίς τοῦ κιβαριστικοῦ, ὡσπέρ ὁ κιβαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρομμάτων; Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἐμοίω γε δοκεῖ. Πλὴν γ' ἵσως, ὁ Πολεμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρήσαται ἀργυρῷ, ὅταν δέκ αργυρίου 

Ε κοινῇ πρίσσα τή ἀποδόσα τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγώ οἶμαι, ὥς ἐγὼ ὁμιλεῖ, ὅ ἰππικός, ἡ ἐμφανείται. Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοίον, ὁ ναυ-15 πηγός ἢ ο ὄχθεινής ἡ ἐμφάνει. Ἐσκευ. Ὅταν οὖν τι δέκ αργυρίῳ ἡ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρήσαται, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἅλλων; Ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἰναι, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοὶ λέγεις, ὅταν μήδεν δέκ αὐτῷ χρήσαται ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι; Πάντω γε. Ὅταν ἄρα ἄρχομον ἢ ἀργυρίῳ, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ 

D δικαιοσύνη; Κινδυνεύει. Καὶ ὅταν δέκ δέκατον δέκ φυλάττει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἱδιά; ὅταν δέ χρήσαται, ἡ ἀμπελουργική; Παύεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀνθίζαι καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέκ φυλάττει καὶ μηδέν χρήσαται, χρήσιμον εἰναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δέ χρήσαται, τὴν ὀτιλικήν καὶ τὴν μονοικήν; Ἀνάγκη. 25 Καὶ περὶ τὰλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστοτε ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄρχομον, ἐν δὲ ἄρχομον χρήσιμος; Κινδυνεύει. 

Ε VIII. Ὅποι ἂν οὖν, ὁ φιλε, πάνυ γε το σπουδαῖον εἰς ἡ 

21. δεῖ ὁ: δεῖν ΑΠΕ. 28. οὖκ ἂν οὖν ξ et corr. in mg. Α: οὖκον Α' η: οὐκόν II.

333 Β 1ο εἰς τινα δη κοινωνίαν εἰς idiomat fec εἰς τίνας δή κοινωνίαν. Compare VІІ 556 Α ἢ εἰς νοθῆνας ἡ εἰς ἀλλαξεισ τισι κοινωνιαν καὶ τὴν τιμήν ταῦτην (where the English idiom would expect τὴν τιμήν ταῦτην) in II 371 E. In spite of οἰκονομάτων καὶ ἀργυρίου, it is not necessary to read (with Richards) τίνος. 

333 Β 18 παρακαταθέσαται καὶ σῶν εἰναί. The double expression is necessary to explain κοινῇ χρήσασα τα Κοινωνία arises because one deposits the money and by the other it is kept safe. 

20 ἄρχομον—χρήσιμος. ἄρχομον fluctuates between 'unused' and 'useless'; the latter sense is predominant here and gives an epigrammatic tone to the sentence (cf. εἰς μὲν χρήσει ἄρχομον, ἐν δὲ ἄρχομον χρήσιμος in D). It is noticeable that Plato does not take into account the possibility of money being deposited at interest: in this case the money could not be said to be useless. 

333 Β 22 καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἱδιά: not 'to the individual and to the state,' but 'both in dealings with others, and in personal concerns.' The words καὶ ἱδιά are, strictly speaking, irrelevant, for it is with κοινωνίατα (in the widest sense) that we are concerned. They are to be regarded merely as a rhetorical amplification for the sake of emphasis: cf. infra 350 Α, 351 Απρη. 

333 Ε 28 οὖκ ἂν οὖν κτλ. See cr. n. Some may think that we should read οὐκον (with the majority of MSS) and cancel εἰς after σπουδαῖον (so also Vind.
334 A 1. Στρατοπέδου γε κτλ. The στρατηγὸς must be both φιλανθρωπὸς καὶ κλέπτης according to Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 1. 6.

2 κλέπτης and κλέμμα were used (especially by Spartans) with reference to military operations involving surprise and stealth (Classen on Thuc. V 9 3).

6 κλέπτης - ἀναπέφαντα. Cf. Ἡρ. Min. 365 c ff., where this view is worked out at length, ib. 366 b ἀναπέφαντα ὁ ἄροι ὁ ψεύδης τε καὶ ἀδόξης καὶ Ἴθικης καὶ Ἱππ. Mem. IV 2 20 ff. ἀναπέφανται, as J. and C. remark, expresses an unexpected result—here a paradox. Like ὁ ἑκὼν ἀμαρτάνων ἀμείνων, the conclusion is a logical inference from the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge, made without regard to experience.

334 B 8. ἀγαστὰ, 'estemests,' is said with reference to ἐσθιόν in Hom. Od. xix 305 ομ. μητρὸς ἐνοπλὸς πατέρι ἐσθιόν, ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκλεκτό κλέπτον θ' ὄρκῳ τε. The suggested ἀγαστὰ for ἀγαστὰ τε would be too strong: see Ἰμπ. 180 b μᾶλλον—θυμάζοντας καὶ ἀγανταὶ—οὔτον ἐρωμένοις τῶν ἐραστῆς ἀγαπὴ, where the meaning of ἀγαστὰ is shewn by οὕτω πέρι πολλῶν ἐποιεῖτο in 180 a.
13 τούτο — ἐτι. So Euthyphro (15 ii) harks back to his first definition of piety (6 e) after he has been refuted by Socrates. Cf. also VII 515 E μ. 14 δοκεῖ does double duty, first with τούτο and then with δικαιώσαι: cf. VI 493 A, VII 517 B, 525 B, 530 B and (with Stallbaum) Ἀρ. 25 B. Hartman needlessly doubts the text.

15 φίλους δὲ λέγεις κτλ. The same mode of argument recurs in 339 B ff. Cf. also Ἰππ. Μαίορ 284 D.

334 C 21 φιλοί κτλ. Schneider rightly observes that κατὰ δὴ τῶν σον λόγων below tend to show that ἄλλα ὄμοι—βλάπτειν is interrogative. The argument is in the form of a dilemma: either (a) it is just to injure those who do us no injustice (and benefit those who do), or (b) it is just to injure friends and benefit foes. The first alternative is immoral (τονυρός), and the second directly opposed to Simonides' view. Socrates suppresses the words which I have put in brackets, because they lessen rather than increase the immorality of the conclusion: the second alternative is expressed in full as the αὐτὸ τούτων ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. 334 D 28 ὅσοι κτλ.: not 'those of mankind who are in error' (J. and C.) but 'those who have mistaken their men'; cf. Phaedr. 257 D τῶν ἐταῖρων συρχῶν διαμαρτάνει. So also Schneider, and Davies and Vaughan.

334 E 30 τονυροὶ γὰρ κτλ. Stallbaum (followed by D. and V.) wrongly takes αὐτοῖς as 'in their eyes.' The reasoning is difficult only from its brevity. If it is δικαιον βλάπτειν ἄδικους, and men sometimes suppose that a man is good when he is bad (τονυροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσιν 'for they have bad friends'), then since friend has been defined as one whom we suppose to be good (334 C), it is sometimes δικαιον βλάπτειν φίλους. Stallbaum's view is quite inconsistent with the definition of friends in 334 C as ὅσον ἄν τις ἦγεται χρηστοῖς. 33 τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν. Hartman (with some inferior mss) wishes to insert τῶν before ἐχθρῶν; but cf. infra III 400 D and
Πῶς θέμενοι, ο Πολέμαρχε; Τίν δοκοῦντα χρηστόν, τούτον φίλον 
εἶναι. Νῦν δέ πῶς, ἢν δ' εὖγο, μεταθώμεθα; Τίν δοκοῦντα τε, 
ἕ̄ δ' ὅς, καὶ τοῦν ὑπόλεγον τοῦτον· τίν δέ δοκοῦντα | μὲν, ὄντα ἰδίως 335 
de μὴ, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐξήρου δὲ ἢ αὐτὴ 
θέσις. Φίλος μὲν δή, ὃς ἐοίκε, τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγάθος ἐσταί, 
ἐξήροι δὲ ὁ ποιητὸς. Ναι. Κελεύεις δὴ ἢ μᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ 
5 δικαίῳ, ἢ ς τῷ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγουσι δικαίον εἶναι τὸν μὲν 
φίλον εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐξήρου κακός, νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὑδὲ ἱέρειν, 
ὅτι ἐστὶν δικαίον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγάθου ὑπὰ εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ 
ἐξήρου κακὸν ὑπὰ διαλλάττει; Πάνι μὲν οὖν, ἐφ', ὦτος ἂν μοι Β 
δοκεῖ καλὸς λέγεσθαι.

IX. Ἐστὶν ἀρά, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίον ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καί

many other examples cited by himself. To pronounce them all corrupt is to 
destroy the basis on which our knowledge of Platonic idiom rests.

35 τὸν δοκοῦντα τε—καὶ τὸν ὅντα.
The meaning required—'he who both 
seems and is good'—would be more cor-
correctly expressed by τὸν δοκοῦντα τε—καὶ 
ὅντα (so Ast and others), but "aliquid tri-
buendum interpositis ἢ δ' ὅς, quae negli-
gentiam rependiti, si est negligentia, 
saltam excusant" (Schneider, who 
compares also infra 341 B ποτέρων λέγει τὸν 
ἀρχικά τε καὶ τόν κρεπττονα). Εἰ τὸν δὲ 
δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὅντα δὲ μὴ Polemarthus ex-
presses himself more accurately.

335 A 3 ὁ ἀγάθος—ὁ ποιητὸς.
Socrates unfairly neglects the δοκοῖ, although 
according to Polemarthus' amended de-
definition the ἀγάθος who seemed ποιητὸς 
would not be a friend, nor the ποιητὸς 
who seemed ἀγάθος an enemy. Pole-
marthus' theory indeed points to a division 
of men into three classes: friends, enemies, 
and those who are neither (viz. those who 
seem good and are bad, and those who 
seem good and are good). The somewhat 
ideal view that the ἀγάθος is φίλος and the 
ποιητὸς ἐξήροι is genuinely Socratic (cf. 
Mem. 11.6.14 ff.): it is part of the wider 
view that all men desire the good (Synap. 
266 A, Gorg. 407 c ff.).

1 προσθεῖναι—βλάπτειν. Ἡ ἀγάθος ἡ ποιητὴς 
εἰς τὸν δικάλον must mean 'or in other words': cf. 
infra 349 E πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἰδίως πλέον ἱέρειν 
and Φαίδ. 85 ὁ ἐπὶ βεβαιωτέραν ἃχματος, 
ἡ λόγου θείων τῶν (so the Boelean, but Η 
is cancelled by many editors). The late 
expression Φαίδων ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς involves 
essentially the same use of ἡ. 'The clause

ós—κακὸς is summed up in τοῦτῳ, and the whole sentence means: 'do you wish us 
to make an addition to our account of 
justice, or in other words to say now—in 
addition to our original definition where 
we said it was just to do good to friends 
and harm to enemies—that it is just to do 
good to friends if they are good etc.' This 
explanation is (I think) the least vulnerable 
one, if the text is to be retained. With 
προσθεῖναι used absolutely cf. 339 B. For 
other views see App. III.

335 B 10 Ἐστὶν ἀρὰ κτλ. Cf. Crito 
49 A ff., Gorg. 409 B, [peri ἀρετής] 376 E. 
This chapter contains the only element of 
permanent ethical interest and value in 
the discussion with Polemarthus—the only 
element, moreover, which reappears in 
a later book of the Republic (II 379 B). 
The underlying principle—that κακὸς ποιεῖ = 
κακὸν ποιεῖ—is in accordance with the 
traditional Greek view of life. For illus-
trations we may cite Od. Xviii 136 f. τοῖς γὰρ 
νόσοι ἐστιν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἄνθρωπον | ὅν ἐπ' ἡμών ἄγοι 
πάθη ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, Arch. Fr. 70 (Bergk), and Simon. Fr. 
5.10—14 ἄνθρωπος. ὁ σοὶ ἐμ οὐ μὴ 
κακὸν ἐμμεῖναι ἢ διὰ ἄρμανον συμφορὰ καθέλλει, 
πρᾶξα μὲν εἰ πάς ἄηρ ἄγαθος, κακὸς δ' 
κακὸς <τις>, κατ' ἀνθρώπων ἀντίον, 
τοῖος ἐκ θεῶν φιλῶν. The same 
point of view is manifest in the transition 
of meaning in μενοχρόνος and ποιητὸς 
from 'laborious,' 'afflicted' (e.g. Hesiod 
Fr. 95.1 Götting) to 'depraved.' Converse-
ly, prosperity makes one morally better, 
as in Solon 13.69 f. τῷ δὲ κακὸς ἐροῦντι 
θεὸς περὶ πάντα τίθεναι | συντυχοῦν ἄγαθον, 
ἐκλέγει ἄφορῶτην, and in the frequent 
identification of εἰπραγι α ὕφαιμον.
with ευ πράττειν e.g. Charm. 172 A, 173 D, Alc. 1 116 b, Arist. Eth. Nic. 1 8. 1098b 20. It is by the analogy of the arts that Socrates in this chapter seeks to prove, first the identification kakως ποιεῖν = κακὸν ποιεῖν, and second that the good man cannot harm others: the Socratic conception of right conduct as an art is still predominant. It is important to observe that it was by means of this Socratic weapon that Plato achieved this noble anticipation of Christian ethical theory (St Matth. 5. 44 al.). Cf. also Gorg. 473 D ff.

16 ἀνθρώπους ἔδει κτλ. Cf. 352 E — 353 E.

335 E 33 οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς—εἰπὼν. Teichmuller (Lit. Fehd. 1 p. 22 n.) finds in this an allusion to Xenophon, who puts into the mouth of Socrates (addressing Critobulus in Mem. 11 6. 35) the words ἵνα καὶ ἄνδρος ἀρετὴν εἴη, μοι καὶ ἄνδροις μὲν φιλοὺς εὑρίσκετε, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς: but the reference is only to 331 E σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεὸς ἄνδρα. The presents φησιν and νοεῖ are used in a general way, because such a theory and such an interpretation of it might be held by any one at any time: in οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ταῦτα εἰπὼν the time is changed to the past to suggest οὐκ ἦν Σιμωνίδης ταῦτα εἰπών (Simonides being σοφός 331 E). But for ταῦτα εἰπὼν, ἦν would be ἄστι. It is a mistake to take ἦν as 'is after all': ἦν is hardly so used in Plato without ἦν, nor is Phaedr. 230 A (cited by Goodwin MT p. 13) an example of that idiom.
σὺ, εάν τις αὐτὸ φη ἢ Σιμωνιδῆν ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακόν εἰρηκέναι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακράινον ἄνδρων; 'Εγώ γοῦν, ἐφη, ἐτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. Ἀλλὰ οἴσθα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, | o' 336 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι το ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὥφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἐφη. Οίμαι αὐτῷ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρφου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τίνος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἄνδρός. 'Αληθέσις-

37. ἐγὼ γοῦν II: ἐγώ γοῦν Α.

36 εάν τις αὐτὸ φη—Σιμωνιδῆν: as Xenophon virtually does in Hier. II 2: see 331 E n.

37 τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακραίνον ἄνδρων. μακάριος is somewhat stronger than θείος, which it suggests, μάκαρες being a usual epithet of gods. The whole phrase is intended to carry us back to 331 E σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θείος ἄνδρ. Ast's view that μακαριον means 'qui ante nostram actatem florerunt,' as if 'sainted,' misses the allusion to 331 E, and is a little far-fetched: it is enough that μακάριος conveys the same ironical commendation as θείος: cf. (with Stallbaum) Men. 71 A.


336 A 4 Περιάνδρου κτλ. Periander, Xerxes and Perdiccas are taken as types of tyrants, and no tyrant is σοφός (Kerp. IX 587 D). It is noticeable that Periander does not appear in the list of the seven wise men in Prot. 343 A. The expedition of Xerxes against Greece is cited by Callicles in Gorg. 483 D in connexion with the doctrine that might be right. In Περδίκκου the allusion is to Perdiccas II, father of Archelaus (Gorg. 471 B): he died late in 414 or early in 413, three years before the probable date of action of the Republic (Introductory § 3), after proving himself a fickle friend and foe to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war. Isimenias is mentioned again in Men. 90 A as having become rich δώρων τιμῶν—ο νῦν νεωτί εἰφρώς τα Πολυκράτους χρήματα. There can be no doubt that he is to be identified with the Ismenias who (see Xen. Hell. III 5. 1) in 395 took money from Timocrates the Rhodian, envoy of the Persian King, in order to stir up war against Sparta, and who in 382, when the Spartans had seized the Cadmea, was condemned on this charge among others (Xen. Hell. v 2. 35; Plut. Pericles. 5. 2). Plato implies that Ismenias kept enough Persian gold to enrich himself. He was no true Greek if he did not. But what is meant by saying that he had received the money of Polycrates? This question has been much discussed. Possibly the money of Polycrates' (with allusion, of course, to the riches of the Samian tyrant) was a sarcastic expression current in Athens for the 'money of Timocrates': this is perhaps the more likely as we are informed that the Athenians got no share of it themselves (Hell. 111 5. 2). Plato would naturally avail himself of such a political gibe to express his dislike of a man who took gold from the natural enemy of Greece (Rep. v 470 c) to stir up not war, but sedition (ib. 470 B), and withdraw Agesilaus from fighting with the barbarian: for his political ideal in foreign policy was that of Cimon. See also on v 471 B. It is not however likely, I think, that the present passage was written after Ismenias' death, for Plato is not given to reviling his contemporaries after their death. That the other three persons cited by Plato were already dead would only make his reproof of the living more marked and scathing. The present passage—so far as it goes—is on the whole in favour of Teichmüller's view (Lit. Fehd. 1 p. 25) that the first book of the Republic was written soon after 395, when the disgraceful affair was still fresh in men's minds. See Introductory § 4.

5 οἰομένου is to be pressed (as in III 395 D, 409 c: cf. IV 431 C): their power is fancied, not real: they cannot even do the thing they want: cf. Gorg. 467 Α Β. ποὺ ἀν ὄνοι οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναστο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰν μὴ Σωκράτης
tata, ἐφή, λέγεις. Ἐλευ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφαν \ή δικαιοσύνη δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἄν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

Β. Χ. Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξύ ἀρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειτα ύπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκώλυτο βουλμένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον. \ώς δὲ διεπανσάμετα καὶ εἶγο ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἅσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συντρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὁσπέρ θηρίων ἥκει εφ' ἕμας ὡς διαπασόμενος. καὶ εἰγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δειλαντες διεπτοθῆμεν.

Ο' δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος Τίς, ἐφῆ, ἦμας πάλαι \φλυαρία ἐξει, ὁ Σώκρατες; καὶ τί εὐνθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατα-15 κλημονούν ἐμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὃς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ἐστι, μη μόνον ἔρωτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι ἀποκρίνεται, ἐγνωκὼς τούτῳ, ὅτι ῥᾶσιν ἐρωτᾶν ἣ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἶπε, τί φῆς εἶναι

eξελεγχθη—ὅτι ποιοῦν ἂ βοῦλονται,—οἱ φημὶ ποιεῖν αὐτὸς ἂ βοῦλονται. Ηε alone (says Plato) is truly powerful who wills what is good and has the power to obtain it.

336 A—337 B Introduction of Thrasymachus.

On Plato's representation of Thrasy machus in the Republic, see Introd. § 2.

336 B 11 ὠς ἀ διεπανσάμεθα. Cobet's suggestion ὡς δὲ ἐπανσάμεθα misses the point. No doubt διαπασόμενος is (as he says) "interrimento orationem post aliquam moram denuo dicturum" (cf. Tim. 78 E, Symp. 191 C), but this is precisely the sense required, for the question with which Socrates concludes (τί δὲ ἄλλο κτλ.) shows that he desires to resume the discussion.

tαὐτ' εἶπον refers to εἶν—φαίη εἶναι.

12 συντρέψας—διαπασόμενος: 'gathering himself up he sprang at us like a wild beast as though he would seize and carry us off.' Thrasy machus comes down like a wolf on the fold. ἥκει is not from ἥκω, but from ἥμα: this is also Ast's view (in his Lex. Plat.). The expression ἥκει εφ' ἕμας would be too weak after συντρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὁσπέρ θηρίων. The object to ἥκει is ἑαυτῶν, easily supplied from συντρέψας ἑαυτῶν: lit. 'he let himself go at us.' Cf. Ar. Frogs 133. It should be noted also that compounds of ἥμα occasionally drop ἑαυτῶν altogether and become intrasitive (e.g. viii 563 A, Prot. 336 A). Hartz- man's ἔτερ for ἕκει is not likely to find favour. For διαπασόμενος Cobet would read διαπασόμενος. Plato however does not use διασάω of harrying by wild beasts, but in the sense of distingsere, seingere (vi 503 B, Laws 669 D): and even Cobet does not propose to change Pol. 274 B δισυσσάων επ' αὐτῶν (i.e. θηρίων). J. and C.'s citation of H. XVI 325 αίφα διαπάζουν (i.e. ὃ λίκου τἀ ὄρας) seems to me (in spite of Hartman's wonder) strictly relevant, if only we take διαπάζουν as 'harry,' and not (with J. and C.) as 'tear in pieces.'

336 C 15 τί εὐνθίζεσθε κτλ. εὐνθίζεσθε refers to the readiness of the interlocutors to assent to one another's questions: cf. Charm. 175 C οὕτως ἡμῶν εὖνθίζων τυχόναι ἢ αἴσχοι καί ὅλο σκληρών.

ὑποκατακλίνομαι: a metaphor, not from the wrestling schools, but from taking a lower or inferior seat at table or the like: cf. Symp. 222 E εἰπ' οὕτω σοὶ κατακλιν' Ἀγαθῶν and Plut. mimonodi adul. ab amico internoscatur 58 D τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποκατακλίσεις (alluding to men who take the front seats at theatres etc., in order to flatter the rich by giving up their seats to them). Thrasy machus' brutal frankness is not intended by Plato to be altogether wide of the mark: see App. II and 335 A μ.

17 μη—φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων. A common reproach against Socrates: cf. Theaet. 150 C.
336 D 20 ὅπως μοι κτλ. This idiom is colloquial and abrupt, almost rude: cf. 337 B and the examples cited in Goodwin MT: p. 94. Thrasymachus will not tolerate the stale and barren platitudes—note θεόν below—of ordinary disputation; cf. [Citraph:] 400 c ὅπως μοι—τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ δόν, ἔτερος ἐκ τὸ ὀφέλμοι, ὅ τοῦ λειπεῖν, καὶ ἐτί σωφρονίσθηναι. This phrase is used seventeen times by Plato, always in negative clauses, and generally in the nominative or accusative (Grünewald in Schanz’s Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 131 f.).
35. όδον γε σο, ὃ φιλε ἂλλ’, ὁμα, οὗ δυνάμεθα εἰλεεσθαί οὖν ἡμᾶς πολύ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἔστιν | του 337 ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἡ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

336 E 28 μὴ χαλεπός ἡμῖν ἕσθι: ἄδει δὴ ραδισάμαχος εἶ, said Herodicus on one occasion to the sophist (Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1400 b 20).
29 εἰμαρτάνουμεν—ἀμαρτάνουμεν: the preposition is often dropped in repeating a compound verb: cf. V 452 A, VII 533 A, X 608 A and my note on Prot. 311 A. I can see no sufficient reason for inserting τι before εἰμαρτάνουμεν (with II and some other MSS), although Stallbaum and others approve of the addition.
337 A 2 χαλεπαίνεσθαι. This strained use of the passive of χαλεπαίνω in order to make the antithesis to εἰλεεσθαί formal as well as real is not found elsewhere in Plato. For parallels see Cope’s Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. I p. 299.
XI. Καὶ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασε τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἰπεν Ἡράκλεις, ἐφη, αὕτη 'κείνη ἡ εἰσθανία εἰρωνεία Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, 62. 5 ff., IV 85. 6, and cf. Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 126—128. The most conspicuous assertion of the principle before Plato's time was found in Pindar's much-quoted fragment (Bergk 169 and ap. Pl. Gorg. 484 B) νῦνος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς τῶν τε καὶ ἄθανάτων ἐκείνων ἔνεσα τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἡφάστατον, ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ κτλ., though it may well be doubted (with Dümmler Prolegomena zu Platons Staat p. 34) whether Pindar intended to suggest any such view. It is in order to refute this theory, as expounded by Glauco and Adimantus, 'Thrasymachus' successors in the argument (see on παίδες ἐκείνων τοῦ ἄνδρος 11 368 A) that Socrates finds it necessary to draw a picture of an Ideal State (ib. 368 D ff.), so that the political theory of Plato's Republic may truly be said to commence here. For more on this subject see Chiappelli Per la storia della Sofistica Greca in Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos. III pp. 263 ff.

3 σαρδάνιον. Plato uses this expression as Homer does, of a sinister smile which bores pain to others: Od. XX 301 B. ιεῦσαν δὲ θυμόν σαρδάνιον μάλα τούτοις (of Odysseus among the suitors). Among later authors it more frequently denotes the forced smile which disguises the sufferer's own pain; and so apparently Simonides used the phrase (Fr. 202 A Bergk). The explanations volunteered by the ancients apply only to the non-Homeric usage: the Scholion, however, at the end of his note on this passage correctly remarks, μὴ τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ὅμηρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ή παρομία ταύτα εἴρη, "ιεῦσαν δὲ κτλ., τοῦτον ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν χελῶν γελατά καὶ μέγχρο τοῦ σε σερνεται γελήμενον σημαίνει." The spelling σαρδάνιον came into vogue through the popular etymology from the bitter Sardinian herb, ἢ οἱ γενιαμένοι δοκοῦσι μὲν γελώστεστε, στασίμῳ δὲ ἀποθεμεκούσετε (Schol.). The Scholiast's suggested derivation from σάρις (ringis), as of an angry dog) suits the meaning which the phrase bears in Homer and Plato, and is probably right. Photius' σαρδάνιον μετὰ πικρίας γελῶν preserves the δ.
5 taui' eivw ήδη te kai toutoi prouleugon, oti ou apokrinasthai men ouk eitheligos, eironwenosio dei kai pantu/mallon poihsiou
ht apokrinoi, ei tis ti s' erwota. Sofoos gar ei, hni d' eivw, o
Thetaasymache: eiv ouv hndeta oti, ei tivi epirio optasa esti ta
dodeka, kai eromenos proeitou autw. opws moi, o anbropote. B
10 m'h ereis, oti estiin ta dodeka dis ex mhd' oti triis teptara mhd
oti ezaikis duo mhd' oti teptrakes tria: ouk ouk apodekoinai soi,
ein toiauta phvarph: dziyov, oimai, soi hni oti oudeis apokrinoitot
To oustoi pithainomenv. aL' ei soi eipen: 'o Thetaasymache, po's
legeis; mi apokrinomai ou proeiptes mou; poterov, o thaniasi,
15 mhe' ei touton Tiv nyaxhanei ou, aL' eteiron eipon ti tou althous;
hti pois legeis; ti an autw eipes proa taua; Elen, ephi: ou d' C
-omoiou toutou ekeiwn. Oudhen ge kolwe, hni d' eivw: ei d' ouv kai
m' estin omoiou, faivetai de to eprotetenvi toiovon, hti ton ti
auton oui apokrineisai to fainomenon eautou, eivn te hemi;
20 apagorenowein eivn te m': 'Allo ti ouv, ephi, kai su ouv poihsiws;
ouv eivw apieitw, touton ti apokrinei; Ouik an thanasaimi, hni
d' eivw, eioi moj skepsameno ouv doxeiwe. Ti ouv, ephi, an eivw deixe
etepw apokrisin para paisas taua peri dikaiosynhe betaioi D

7. apokrinoi q: apokrinoi AEP: apokrinoi II. 12. apokrinoi q: apokrinoi
AEP. 19. apokrineshei II: apokrineshei A.

6 poishous is rejected by Cobet and Herwerden. "Post oudeiv allo h, tiv allo
h, pantou mallon h verbum omittunt" (says Cobet, quoting Theophr. Char. c. 25).
poishous is not however otiose, but suggests the phrase pantu poiein, 'leave
nothing undone,' as in Euthyph. 8 C pantu poidein kai legeuni feyounvei

7 irota. I formerly read epotom (with Goodwin MT, p. 277). A few inferior
mss have epotov. The optative is certainly the regular periodic construction
in clauses of this kind, but the indicative may perhaps be allowed in loose
conversational style.

337 B 15 Tynxhanei ou. Stallbaum
explains of as 'being true,' and 'the subject to Tynxhanei. This view is perhaps
less natural than to make of the copula and the predicate: for the pronoun
'it' i.e. to epotowmen (Schneider) can be quite easily understood. For the use of
Tynxhanei ou ('really is') cf. II 379.A
VII 518 E, Euthyph. 4 E with my note
ad loc.

337 C 16 ois by. The force of in
this common ironical expression quasi vero, cf. Corp. 358 E, 449 h) is referred by
Jebb (Soph. O. C. 800) to an ellipse: ' (do you mean) soforso that.' An ob-
jection to this theory is that it will not explain ois by tou in cases like II 366 C,
Phae. 124 C, Tim. 26 B. It seems better to explain these usages on the same
principle. The view that is exclamatory will not account for II 366 C,
and is not specially appropriate in the other places. Neither is it easy to make
ois = eitei (your illustration is excellent, seeing that the cases are so very similar!)
Tucker). Schneider (on II 366 C) regards ois as nearly equivalent to oise (cf. note on II 365 h). Probably is is in
reality consequential (like the English 'so'), the relative retaining its original
demonstrative sense. This explanation will, I believe, suit all the passages in
question.

337 D 23 peri dikaiosunhe ktl.
polyteia

338 A]

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α

27
toúton; τί ἄξιος παθεῖν; Τί ἄλλο, ἣν δ' εξώ, ἣ ὑπέρ προσήκει
πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δὲ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος: 25
καὶ ἤγα οὖν τοῦτο ἄξιόν παθεῖν. Ἡδον ἢ μάρ εἰ, ἐφι. ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπóτεισθεῖν ἀργύριον. Οὐκών ἐπειδὴι μοι γένηται,
ἐποτν. Ἀλλ' ἑστιν, ἐφι οἱ Γλαύκοιν: ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργύριον, ὁ
Θρασύμαχε, λέγει: πάντες γὰρ ὡμείς Σωκράτει εἰσοδόσιμον. Πάνω

Ε γε, ὦμι, ἦ δ' οὐ, ὡν Σωκράτης τὸ εἰσόθος διαπράξεται, ἀυτὸς μὲν 30
μὴ ἀποκρίνεται, ἀλλ' δὲ ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ
ἐλέγχῳ. Ποὺς ἦμ' ἄν, ἐφιν ἔγω, ὅ βέλτιστο, τὸς ἀποκρίαντα
πρῶτον μὲν μη ἐξίδως μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἐπείτα, εἰ τι καὶ οἶετα
περὶ τούτον, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ [ἐἰν], ὅτις μηδὲν ἔρει ὁν ἡγεῖται,
ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ 35
φῆς εἰδεῖναι καὶ ἐγείνει εἰπεῖν· μὴ οὖν ἄλλος ποιεί, ἀλλ' ἐμοί τε
χαριζῶ ἀποκρινομενα καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε
dιδίξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

34. αὐτῷ Bremius: αὐτῷ ἐν κωδ.

περὶ δικαίωσίνης καὶ τοῦτων are rejected by
Herwerden, but the fulness of expression
suits the arrogant tone of Thrasymachus.
24 τί ἄξιος παθεῖν; Here and in what
follows there is a play on the judicial
formula παθεῖ ἢ ἀποτείει, where παθεῖ
refers to deisms φυγὴ βάναυσος ἀτίμα, and
ἀποτείει to fines. In a δικαί τιμήσων, the
defendant if found guilty would be asked in
the words τί ἄξιος παθεῖν καὶ ἀποτείει
to propose an alternative penalty to that
demanded by the accuser; after which it was the duty of the judges finally to assess
(τιμᾶν) the penalty: cf. Αρ. 36 B and
Laws 933 B. It is partly the paro-
nomasia in the words παθεῖν μαθεῖν (cf. the ancient text πάθος μάθος Aesch.
Αγ. 176) which draws from Thrasymachus
the mock compliment ἡδος γὰρ εἶ (‘you
are vastly entertaining’) although (cf. Α
ἡστε 34.8 C) Thrasymachus is also jeering
at the simplicity of Socrates.
26 πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότειεσαν.
Hertz and Herwerden conjecture παθεῖν for
μαθεῖν: but this would make 'Thrasy-
machus ignore Socrates’ identification
of παθεῖν with μαθεῖν. In ἀπότειεσαν
ἀργύρων Plato no doubt satirizes (some-
what crudely, it must be allowed) the avarice
of Thrasymachus and his class, in
contrast with whom Socrates has no
money, because his conversations are
gratis.
29 εἰσοδόσιμον. The metaphor is
drawn from a banquet to which each contributes
his share: cf. Συμπ. 177 C ἢεώ οὖν ἐπι-
θυμῶ ἃμα μὲν τότι ῥανον εἰσενεκεῖν
κτλ.
337 E 34 ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ. See cr. n.
The retention of αὐτῷ after αὐτῷ can only be
defended by regarding μὴ εἰδώς μηδὲ
φάσκων as equivalent to εἰ μὴ εἰδεῖν μηδὲ
φάσκων and carrying on the εἰ; but this is
excessively harsh and no parallel has
yet been adduced. Of the two alter-
natives, to insert an εἰ before ἀπειρημένον
or εἰν, and to drop εἰν (with Bremius),
I prefer the latter as simpler in itself and
accounting more easily for the corruption.
The accusative absolute may have been
misunderstood and εἰν inserted by a negli-
gible reader owing to εἰ in the 'previous
line. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 137)
inserts δ’ before αὐτῷ and retains εἰν,
regarding εἰ τι καὶ οἴεται καὶ ἀπειρη-
μένον δ’ αὐτῷ εἰν as coordinate clauses
under the rule of the same εἰ; but to
this there are many objections. Tuckers’
suggestion εἰ, δ’ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τοῦτων,
ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰν κτλ. (‘if, in regard
to whatever he thinks about them, it were
forbidden’ etc.) strikes me as heavy and
cumbrous.
338 A 1 μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ: 328 B n.
XII. Eιπόντος δὲ μου ταῦτα ὁ τε Πλαῦκοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι 5 ἐδέωντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλῳς ποιεῖν. καὶ οἱ Ὀρασύμαχοι φανέρος μὲν ἢν ἐπιθυμοῦν εἴπειν, ὡς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἡγούμενος ἥν εἴπειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην: προσεποίητο δὲ φίλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀποκρινόμενων. τελευτῶν δὲ ξυμεχόρρησαν, κατέπει Λύπη δή, Β ἐφι, Ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ 10 δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιούντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτον μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδο- δόναι. Ὅτι μὲν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἴπειν, οἱ Ὀρασύμαχοι· ὅτι δὲ οὔ με φής χάριν ἐκτίνευς, φυεῦδεν: ἐκτίνω όρῳ ὡς δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ ἐπιαίνειν μόνον: χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχων ὡς δὲ προθύμος τοῦτο ὅρω, ἐὰν τίς μοι δοθῇ ἐν 15 λέγειν, εὖ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνεται· οἴμαι γὰρ σὲ εὖ ἔρειν. Ἀκούει δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὅς. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κριττόνον ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τι οὐκ ἐπιαίνεις; ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐθέλεις. Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφη, τί λέγεις; νῦν γὰρ οὕτω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κριττόνον φῆς ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. 20 καὶ τούτο, ὁ Ὀρασύμαχη, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ ποῦ τὸ γε τοιούτες φῆς; εἰ Πολυδάμας ἡμῶν κριττόν ο παγκρατιάτης καὶ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρει τὰ βέβαια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σώμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοὺς ἤπτοις ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἃμα καὶ δίκαιον. D Ἰδέα λέγειν γὰρ εἰ, ἔφη, ὁ Σωκράτες, καὶ ταύτῃ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἢ ἄν 25 κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Οὐδαμῶς, ὁ ἀριστε, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ.
and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning” (Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. 1 p. 17). Cf. Gorg. 483 A (cited by Tucker).

26 εἰτ’ οὐκ οἶδα δι. ‘Do you mean to say you don’t know’ etc. The division of constitutions into Monarchy, Oligarchy (for which Aristocracy is here substituted) and Democracy was familiar to everybody: see Aeschin. Cles. 6, Tim. 4 ὁμολογοῦσιν γὰρ τρεῖς εἰσίν πολιτείαι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, τυραννία καὶ δυναστεία καὶ δημοκρατία. Cf. Whiblcy Greek Oligarchies pp. 17, 24. Thrasymachus proceeds to define κράτων as ὁ κράτων (not ὁ λαός, as Socrates had insinuated): κράτους ἐν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἄρσεν κατατούντα καὶ καλομένη καὶ ἄρσεν κατατούντα. 29 τιθέται δὲ γε: Λαύσ. 1, c. τιθέται ὅπου, φασί, τῶν νόμων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκάστητοι τὸ κράτος. η γὰρ; Αὐλίθθη λέγεις. ‘Αρ’ οὖν οἱ, φασί, πολλὰ δήμους ἑπάχθαν ἣ τινα πολιτείαν ἐλλήνη καὶ τυραννίαν ἑσθεναι ἑκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο ταῖς πρώτοις νόμων ἢ τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἀρχή τοῦ μένεις; Πάς γὰρ ἄν; Aristotle makes it the distinguishing mark of his three perverted forms (παρεκβάσεις) of constitution (τυραννία, δυναστεία, δημοκρατία) that they seek their own and not to the κοινὴ συμφέρων: Pol. Γ. 7. 1279b 4 ff.

338 B 32 τοῦ τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κτλ. Λαύσ. 714 D ὁμοκλῶν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰ τεθέντα παραβαίνειν, πολεμεῖ δὲ δίκαιον ὑπὸ ἀδίκουντα, δίκαια ταῦτα εἶναι ἐπωνομαζονταί. ‘Εσῦ γοῦν. Ταῦτα ἄρ’ διὰ καὶ διόντα τὸ δίκαιον ἂν ἔχων. Φησὶ δὲν οὗτος ὧν ὁ λόγος. νόμως καὶ δίκαιον are identified by this theory.

339 A 1 ταῦτα εἶναι δίκαιον. Her-werden would expunge τούτων, but ταῦτα is not more otiose here than to αὐτό below.

339 B 10 ἐκβαίνοντι γέ τι. There
Justice practitioners of the Republic, be a part of the state.

XIII. Their defence, by the rulers, is the interest, and, qua rulers, are infallible. Justice is the interest of the rulers, as the kings are interested in the state. The kings are interested in the state. The kings are interested in the state.

is here a hint of the main purpose of the Republic, which is to prove that the rulers are the true rulers, in the true sense for the individual and the state.

339 b—341 a. Now that the meaning of the definition has been explained, Socrates proceeds to attack it. Even if we assume that rulers seek their own advantage, yet they often err, and enacted laws to their own disadvantage therefore, as it is true for any subject to obey their rulers, justice will sometimes consist in doing what is not the interest of the stronger. Socrates reiterates this objection and is supported by Polemarchus. It is urged by Clitophon that Thrasymachus meant by the interest of the stronger what was thought—whether rightly or wrongly—by the stronger to be to their interest.

Thrasymachus declined to avail himself of this suggestion, and explains that, strictly speaking, rulers, qua rulers, cannot err. This statement he supports by arguing from the analogy of medical practitioners and others, pleading that his earlier concession was hit a popular way of expressing the fact that rulers seem to err. Therefore the original definition was strictly correct. Justice is the interest of the stronger, since rulers make laws in their own interest, and, qua rulers, are infallible.

On the reasoning of Thrasymachus in these two chapters see supra a, b, c. 344 a, b, c.

339 b 13 οὗ—μέντοι. "In interrogationibus hae particulæ" (μέντοι) "ita cum ov negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquid eis quae ex altero quaeritis summam veritatis ingerit specimen" (Hoefer in part. Plato. P. 34). μέντοι is simply 'of course,' 'surely;' 'surely you regard it as just to obey the rulers, do you not?' The idiom is frequent in Plato. The other examples of it (cited by Stallbaum) in the Republic are infra 346 Α, vii 521 d, ix 581 Α, 584 Α, x 596 Ε.

14 πότερον δὲ αναμαρτήτου κτλ. The reasoning echoes that of 334 c above.

339 c 17 τιθέναι—τιθέσθαι: we should expect τιθέναι in both cases, as the ἀρχόντες according to the theory we are discussing are κριτήριοι and supreme as legislators: but the middle of personal interest is naturally used in combination with τὰ ἐξαιρέσεις ἐναύτος: cf. infra 341 a.

339 d 23 τὶ λέγεις σὺ; a favourite eristic formula; see Ar. Clouds 1174 τούτῳ τὸν πρώτον ἀτεχνῷ ἐπανδίδοτο, τὰ τὶ λέγεις σὺ:
δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς ποιεῖν; ταὐτί οὖν ὁμολογηται;

Ε Οἴμαι ἐγώγε, ἐφη. Ὅθον τοίων, ᾧ ν' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ αὕτημορά
ποιεῖν τοῖς ἀρχοῦσι τε καὶ κρίττοις δίκαιον εἶναι ὁμολογήσαται
σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀρχοῦσες ἀκόντες κακὰ αὐτοῖς προστάτωσιν, τοῖς δὲ
δικαίον εἶναι φής ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ ἐκεῖνοι προσέταξαν ἃρα τότε,
ὁ σοφώτατε Ὀθασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτῷ οὕτωι
dικαίον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοῦναντίον ἢ ὅ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρε-
πτονος ἀεύμφορον δήτου προστάτηται τοῖς ἠπτουσὶ ποιεῖν. Ναί

340 μᾶ Δί', ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατα γε. 'Εὰν σὺ
γ', ἐφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃ, ὁ Κλειτοφὼν ὑπολαβὼν. Καὶ τι,
ἐφη, δεῖ ταῖς μάρτυροι; αὐτῶς γὰρ Ὀθασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν
ἀρχοῦσες εύνοες ἐναυτοῖς κακὰ προστάτευεν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχηγοῖς
dικαίον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελεύώμενα ποιεῖν, ὃ 5
Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχοντῶν δικαίον εἶναι ἐθέτο Ὀθασύμαχος.
Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὁ Κλειτοφὼν, συμφέρον δικαίον εἶναι

Β ἐθέτο. ταὐτὰ δὲ ἀμφότερα θέμενοι ὁμολογήσειν αὐτῷ ἐνίοτε τοὺς
κρείττονας τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀεύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἠπτοὺς τε καὶ ἀρχο-
μένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μάλλον τὸ τοῦ
κρείττονος ἐξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἢ εἰνή ἢ τὸ μὴ ἐξυμφέρον. 'ΔΛΛ', ἐφη
ὁ Κλειτοφὼν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὃ
κρείττοναν αὐτῷ ἐξυμφέρειν: τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τορ' ἠπτούν, καὶ

28 τοίων: not therefore, but also,
a frequent use in Plato. In the Republic
it occurs 29 times, according to Kugler de
particulæe τοι εἰσικε审视 compounded with Pl. wiu
p. 34.
339 Ε 30 οταν οi μεν—τοις δε (i.e. τοις
ἀρχηγοίς). These two clauses depend,
not on ὁμολογήσαται, but on τοῖς: it is
just to do τα ἀξύμφορα τοῖς ἀρχοῦσιν
as often as the rulers unwillingly prescribe
what is evil for themselves and so long as
Thrasymachus says it is just for subjects
to do what the rulers have prescribed.
Desire for brevity and balance leads
Plato to put both clauses under the
government of οὐτάν, although 'since'
rather than 'whenever' is the more
appropriate conjunction for introducing
the second: for Thrasymachus does not
sometimes but always assert that it is just
to obey the rulers. The suggested reading
φης for φής would require us to take
tοῖς δὲ κτλ. as an independent sentence,
and leave μὲν in oi μὲν without a corre-
sponding δὲ.

32 αὐτό is ‘the matter,’ ‘the case
before us’: cf. IV 428 A (ἀντί), VII 518 B
(ἀντίων), 524 E (ἀντί), Theaet. 172 E al.
The text has been needlessly suspected
by Madvig and other critics.
οὕτωι: not ‘in that case’ (Campbell),
but (with Jowett) simply ‘thus,’ as ex-
όυτωι σοι δοκᾷ; οὐδένα νομίζωθεν ἐναι;
34 ναί μὲν Δία κτλ. The interlude is
intended to mark that the first stage has
been reached in the refutation of Thras-
ymachus.
340 A 1 ἐὰν σὺ γε is of course
ironical. The disciples of the rival dis-
putants now enter the fray.
5 τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελεύωμα κτλ. If this,
and no more, had been ‘Thrasymachus’
definition, it would remain unrefuted;
commands would be commands, whether
expedient for the rulers or not.
340 B 12 δὴ γεύοιτο—ἐξυμφέρειν. This
explanation is involved in Clitophon’s
earlier statement τὸ τὰ κελεύωμα ποιεῖν
πλατωνος

τὸ δίκαιον τούτῳ ἐπιθέτο. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἡ δ' ὡς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἰ νῦν σοφιστῶν συνοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτῶν

XIV. Καὶ μοι εἰπέ, ὁ Ἐρασίμαχος· τούτῳ ἦν ὁ ἐβούλον λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἕμφερον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττου, εὰν τε ἐξυμφέρῃ εὰν τε μῆ; οὕτως σε φῶμεν λέγειν;

20 "Ἡκιστά γ', ἐφή' ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οὐδεὶς καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνη; Ἕγογκε, εἰπον, φῶμε σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἀρχόντας ὀμωλόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτανέων.

Συνοφάντης γὰρ εἰ, ἐφή, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπει τούτῳ ἰατροῦ καλεῖς σὺ τῶν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας 25 κατ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὁ ἐξαμαρτάνεις; ἰ ὁ λογιστικὸν, δι ἂν εὐς λογισμὸ ἀμαρτάνη, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνη, κατὰ ταύτῃ τὶν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ἡματίᾳ οὕτως, ὅτι οὗτος ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἑκατόστοι τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τούτ' ἐστιν ὁ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτῶν, οὕτως οὐδέποτε Ε 30 ἀμαρτάνεις· ὅστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειπούσῃ γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργοῦς· ὅστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχον οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἀρχὸν ἦν, 31. ἐπιλειπούσῃ Α'Π: ἐπιλειπούσῃ Α'.

упό τῶν ἀρχῶν: that which the rulers κελεύοντος is what they believe to be in their interests. Clitophon's defence finds no justification in the terms of Thrasymachus' definition; but it was the most obvious way of attempting to reconcile that definition with the admission that rulers are capable of erring.

340 c 18 το το κρείττονος ἕμφέρον κτλ. Bonitz (Zeitschr. f. ost. Gymn. 1865 p. 648), followed by Wohlrab, proposes to add the words το ἕμφερον after ἐξυμφέρον, "parum venuste," as Hartman thinks. Neither is it well (with Hartman) to omit τον κρείττονος. The apparent harshness of the construction ('that which seems to be the stronger's interest to the stronger') is justified by its brevity and precision, and by the desire to introduce the exact words of the original definition into its amended form.


27 λέγομεν τῷ ἡματίᾳ οὕτως. Bekker (with whom Shilleto on Dem. F. L. § 91 agrees) would insert μὲν after λέγομεν: but (as Schneider remarks) the emphasis on τῷ ἡματί does duty instead of the particle, and even otherwise, μὲν is not essential: cf. III 398 A (where Shilleto would also add μὲν), infra 343 c, 11 363 E, X 605 c al.

28 τό δ' ὡς 'whereas in point of fact' is a favourite Platonic idiom: cf. IV 443 C, VII 527 A, 527 D al.

340 E 31 ἐπιλειπούσῃ. See co. n. The present, which Stallbaum and others adopt, may be right, but the older reading is at least as good. The failure in knowledge must precede the actual error. For the mistake see Introdt. § 5.
35 ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The imperfect infinative, as Schneider remarks (Addit. p. 6).

341 A—342 E Socrates now meets Thrasymachus on his own ground, and attacks his definition according to the 'strictest form' of argument. He shows by analogy that every ruler qua ruler seeks the good of those whom he rules, since every art aims at the good of its own peculiar charge or object, and not at its own, for qua art there is nothing lacking to it.

341 A ff. It is to be noted that the discussion is now transferred from the region of facts into an atmosphere of idealism. For this, Thrasymachus is primarily responsible. The theory that the ruler qua ruler makes no mistakes, is no doubt true ideally, but practically it is of little moment, since he will suffer qua ruler for the errors which he commits in moments of aberration. The strength of Thrasymachus' theory lay in its correspondence with the facts (real or apparent) of experience; it is the temptation to defend his theory against the criticism of Socrates which leads him to abandon facts for ideas; and as soon as he is refuted on the idealistic plane, it descends to facts again (343 A ff.). The vein of idealism struck by Thrasymachus is worked to some purpose by Socrates. To assert that rulers qua rulers always seek the good of their subjects is in reality to set before us a political ideal, and Plato's Ideal Commonwealth is intended to be its embodiment in a state. Plato was probably the first to develop and elaborate this principle of political science, but the legislations of Solon and other early lawgivers furnish examples of its application to practical politics (see especially Arist. Rep. Ath. ch. 12 and Solon's verses there cited), and it is formulated by the historical Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 2, with which compare Cyrop. VIII 2. 14. See also Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 44, 145, and Whibley Greek Oligarchies p. 11 n. 29.

5 συκοφαντέως is explained in ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς—κακουργοῦσά σε, where κακουργοῦντα (as Schneider observes) is not used as in 338 D of putting an evil or sophistical interpretation on a theory, but of damaging a man's personal reputation and credit: "scilicet existimationis et pecuniae detrimentum facturus sibi videbatur sophista ideoque Socratem se, quamquam frustra, impignare in sequentibus quoque criminatur."

341 B 9 μη λαθὼν: "si non lauteris" (Schneider). Stephanus conjectured μὴν and Ast με for μη: but either change would destroy the antithesis between λαθάνειν and βιάζοσθαι—secret guile and open fraud: cf. II 305 D ἀλλὰ δὴ θεός οὔτε λαθάνειν, οὔτε βιάζοσθαι ἑυνάτοι. Hirschig's excision of μη λαθὼν greatly impairs the emphasis.


The only exact parallel to this use of ὧς ἐποιεῖ ποιεῖν in Plato is Laws 656 εκοποιῶ δ’ εὐφραίειν αὐθεὶς τὰ μυριστῶν ἐποιεῖ γεγραμένα ἡ τετυπωμένα ὑπὸ ὧς ἐποιεῖ ποιεῖν μυριστῶν ἀλλ’ ὡς. This idiomomatic phrase is rare before Plato, who uses it 77 times with the meaning ‘to put the matter in a word,’ implying that other and possibly more exact means of describing the thing in question might be found. In 52 of these cases the phrase is combined with πᾶς or όδος and their family of words, in the sense of fere, propemodium: its use in other connexions is in part a return to old poetic usage; cf. Aesch. Pers. 714, Eur. Hipp. 1162, Heracl. 167. See Grünenwald in Schanz’s Beiträge zur hist. Spr. d. gr. Spr. II, pp. 21 ff. The other examples in the Republic are 4 464 D, VIII 551 B, IX 577 C.

ὁ νῦν δὴ ἑλεγες: viz. in 340 εκατά τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The antecedent is the phrase ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The conjecture of Benedictus, ὅν for ὧς, thought adopted by several editors, would (as Schneider remarks) leave it uncertain whether λόγον or τὸν was referred to by the relative. There is no ms authority for ὧς.
jects upon whom the art is exercised. The expression is a little vague (cf. VIII 543 C n.) but it is rash and unnecessary to insert 'et cetera' or write 'ēkāstw <tōn eīdōn> τοῦτων, as Tucker recommends.

29 'ār' on—τελεάν εἰναι. I have retained this reading, in deference to the MSS, but it is open to grave objection. As the sentence stands, the meaning is that every art (as well as every object of an art—this is implied by καὶ) has 'ōme sumpferōn, viz. to be as perfect as it can, but no other. In the sequel this is interpreted to mean that no art needs any additional 'ārėtē; since it is ('μα art) perfect already: 'ōste γὰρ τονομία ἄμαρτα οὐδεμία οὐδεμία τέχνη πάρεστιν κτλ. (342 B). But the words of the sentence 'ār' on—τελεάν εἰναι have to be taken very loosely in order to admit of this interpretation. We must suppose them equivalent to 'No art has a sumpferōn of its own, unless you are to call the fact that it is perfect its sumpferōn.' If Plato had written the passage as it stands in f and in the margin of Flor. U (both MSS probably of the fifteenth century), it would be open to no objection: 'ἀρ' οὖν καὶ έκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἦτο τι εὖμφερον ἄλλο <ἀν προσδέται>, ή 'εξαιρετικὴ έκάστη αὐτὴ εἰναὶ, 'ὅτε' δ' τι μάλιστα τελεάν εἰναι; This reading was adopted by Bekker, and by Stallbaum in his first edition; and a careful study of the whole passage confirms the judgment of Schneider, 'Platonem non solum potuisse, sed etiam debuisse vel haec ipsa vel consimilia scribere.' The same sense, expressed more briefly, may be obtained by the insertion of 'ὅτε' before 'εἰναι: 'has every art also a εὖμφερον besides (i.e. besides the εὖμφερον of its object), or must it be as perfect as possible?' 'ēkāstēr' does not require to be repeated any more than in 346 A below. The alteration is very slight; for 'ὅτε' εἰναι, 'ὅτα' may have been written by mistake and δ' afterwards ejected.

341 E. 33 νῦν κτλ.: 'has now been invented.' The art of medicine is not coeval with body. I can see no reason for thinking (with Campbell) that νῦν is corrupt for ἡμᾶς.

34 σώμα ἐστὶν πονηράν κτλ. Lys. 217 B ἀναγκάζεται δ' γε σώμα διὰ νόσου ἱατρικήν ἀσπαζόμεθα καὶ φαίνεται. 35 ὅπως ἐκτορρίσῃ. This is said by Weber (Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 57) to be the only example in Plato of ὅπως with the subjunctive after a preterite tense.

342 A 3 εἬ αὐτώς. Hartman proposes ἐἬ αὐτώς. aὐτώς (sc. δραβαλισ, ὄνω) may be emphatic (ipsis), and ἐἬ, 'over and above,' 'besides': 'we require in addition to the organs themselves, an art' etc. But it is perhaps simpler to make ἐἬ = to preside over': cf. ἐἬ οἷς εὔπτον VI 511 E n.

4 εἰς ταῦτα means εἰς ὅψιν καὶ ἀκοήν. The art in question considers what is advantageous with respect to (εἰς) seeing and hearing.
5 ἐκποριούσης; ἀρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἦν τις ποιησία, καὶ δεὶ ἐκάστη τήν τέχνην ἄλλης τέχνης, ἦτις αὐτῇ τὸ ἔμμερον σκέψεται,

[καὶ τῇ σκοπουμένῃ ἐτέρας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τοῦτ'] ἐστὶν ἀπέραντον; ἡ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ τὸ ἔμμερον 1 σκέψεται; ἦ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης Β

προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς ποιησίαν τὸ ἔμμερον σκοπεῖν. οὔτε 10 γὰρ ποιησία οὔτε ἀμάρτια οὐδεμία ὁμοιαματικὰ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ 342

προσήκει τήν τέχνην ἄλλῳ τὸ ἔμμερον ζητεῖν ἢ ἑκεῖνοι οὐ τέχνην ἐστὶν, αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιος ἐστὶν ὅρθη οὖσα, ἐσωπήν ἢν ᾗ

ἔκαστη ἀκριβῆς ὄλῃ ἱπτερή ἐστὶ; καὶ σκότει ἑκεῖνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ 15 λόγῳ. οὔτως ᾗ ἄλλως ἐχεῖ; Ὅυτος, ἐφί, φαίνεται. Οὖκ ἄρα, ἦν ἰ' ἐγώ, ἵατρικὴ ἱατρικὴ 15 τὸ ἔμμερον σκοπεῖ ἅλλα σώματι.

C Ναί, ἐφι. Οὐδὲ ἰππικὴ ἰππική ἄλλ' ἰππος-' οὐδεὶ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ

οὐδεμίᾳ έαυτῇ, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἄλλῃ ἑκεῖνῳ οὐ τέχνην ἐστὶν. Φαίνεται, ἐφί, οὔτως. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὃ Θαρσύμαχε, ἀρχουσὶ γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἑκεῖνοι, οὔτε πείσεται τέχναι. Συνεχόρθησον 20 ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόνης. Οὖκ ἄρα ἐπιστῆμην γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἔμμερον σκοπεῖ οὐν' ἐπιτάττει, ἅλλα τὸ τοῦ ἱππονος 25 τε καὶ ἄρχουσιν ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς. Ἐνυμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα Δ

tελευτῶν, ἐπεχειρεῖ δε περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι ἐπειδῇ δε ὁμολογησίν, ἌΛΛΟ τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶ ἱατρὸς οὐδεὶς, καθ' ὁσον ἱατρὸς, τὸ 25 τῷ ἱατρῷ ἔμμερον σκοπεῖ οὐν' ἐπιτάττει, ἅλλα τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὁμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἱατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἀρχῶν ἅλλὰ 30 οὐ χρηματιστῆς. ἥν οὐχ ὁμολόγηται; Ἐννέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἀρχῶν ἅλλ᾽ οὐ ναυτῆς; Ε

5. ἐκποριούσης q: ἐκποριούσης ΑΠΕ. δεὶ Π: δεὶ δεὶ Α¹: δεὶ δεὶ Α².

12. αὐτῇ Ἐπ: αὐτῇ ΑΠΕ¹.

5 ἐκποριούσης. See cr. n. ἐκποριούσης appears in three Florentine mss. The present is difficult, if not impossible, in so close a union with the future: cf. x

604 ἄ and vi 494 D. See Introduct. § 5.

8 ἥ αὐτῇ—σκέψεται; This question (which is of course to be answered in the negative) shows the awkwardness of the reading of A in ἀρ' οὖν—τελεῖν εἰναι (341 D), which might almost be construed to mean that each art does seek its own συμμέρον, viz. the perfection of itself.

342 B 12 ἐσωπήν κτλ.: 'that is, so long as an art, taken in its strict sense' ('*streng genommen' Schneider) 'preserves its essence entire and unimpaired.' The predicate is ὁλὴ ἵπτερ ἐστὶ, and ἀκριβῆς = ἀκριβῆς οὖσα in the sense which ἀκριβῆς bears throughout this passage (341 B al.). Hartman's insertion of ἥ before ἀκριβῆς is unsatisfactory; his alternative proposal to change ἀκριβῆς to ἀκριβῶς spoils the emphasis, and gives a wrong sense.

342 c 20 ἐπιστῆμη is here a synonym for τέχνην. All arts rule: and ruling is itself an art or science, not a happy inspiration (cf. Mem. ι. 6). Like other arts, ruling seeks only the good of that which it rules.

343 A]

342 E 34 φαν—βλέπων. ϕ is of course (τής) δ, and τῷ ἄρχωνφ, is also neuter (not masculine), like ἄρχωνφ in D. Bremin took τῷ ἄρχωνφ as masculine, and consequently changed (with inferior ms authority) πρὸς ἑκέινω into πρὸς ἑκέινω: he has been followed by Stalbaum and others. But as φ must be neuter, it would be intolerable to make ἄρχωνφ masculine, since both words (as denoting the same object) are covered by the same article, viz. τῷ before ἄρχωνφ. ἑκέινω is of course neuter also.

343 A—344 C Thrasymachus with much insolence of tone now abandons the idealistic point of view, and takes an example from experience. The shepherd does not, as a matter of fact, seek the good of his flock, but fattens them for his own or his master's advantage. In like manner it is their own advantage that is aimed at by rulers who deserve the name. "Justice is 'other men's good' (ἀλλ'τρων ἀγαθῶν), whereas Injustice is one's own: the just man comes off second best everywhere, alike in commercial and in political transactions. That it is far more to one's interest to be unjust than to be just, we may see from the case of tyrants, who represent Injustice in its most perfect form. All men envy them. Finally, Thrasymachus reiterates his original theory with the remark that Injustice on a sufficiently large scale is at once stronger, more worthy of a freeman, and more masterly and commanding than Justice.

343 A ff. It should be noted that Thrasymachus has in no way changed his theory, but only reverts to his original standpoint, that of experience. In the panegyric on Injustice in the present chapter, the new and important point is the appeal to the evidence of tyranny and the emotions which it roused in the mind of the Greeks. See on 344 B.

2 εἰς τούτων. Justice has now become τοῦ ἄρχωνφ (rather than κρείττονος) συμφέρων.

5 κορύβωντα: 'snivelling,' 'whining,' μεμάζοντα: κορύβα γὰρ ἡ μέθα, ἤν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ κατάφοροι φαίνων (Schol.). Ruhnken on Timaeus Lex. s.v. quotes among other passages Lucian Alex. § 20 ἢν δὲ τῷ μηχάνῃ τῶσον ἀδρί μὲν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ φορτικὸν εἰπέν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμοί, πρόδρομον καὶ γνώσα τόδε, τοῖς δὲ ἱκάνοις καὶ κορύβοις μετοικὸς τήν βίαν τεράστιον καὶ παῖν ἀπίστω δύον, and Horace Sat. 1. 4. 8 (of Lucilius) emunctae naris.

6 ὅς γε αὐτὴ κτλ. "Apte αὐτὴ interposition; nam ipsi nutrici Socratis insipientium opprobrio esse, Thrasymachus vult significare" Ast. Richter (Fl. Jährb. for 1867 p. 140) ought not to have suggested δὲ γε αὐτὸς. The sense is 'for she cannot teach you to recognise even sheep or shepherd,' not 'you do not know either sheep or shepherd' (J. and C.), which would require αὐτὸς—οὗτε. The phrase is clearly a half-proverbial expression borrowed from the nursery.
γνωσκεις. "Ότι δὴ τι μάλιστα: ήν δ' ἐγώ. "Ότι οἷει τοὺς ποιμένας ἡ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προμιστῶν ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν Β ἄγαθον σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλοντα ἢ τὸ δεσποτῶν ἄγαθον καὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, ὡς ἄληθώς ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλος ποι ἦγει διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχομένους ἢ ὦστερ ἄν τίς πρὸς προβάτα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τις σκοπεῖν αὐτοῖς διὰ τούτων καὶ ἡμέρας ή τούτῳ ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὑφελίζονται. καὶ οὗτοι

15 πόρρω εἶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ οὗτος τέκνα καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἄγροβις, ὡς ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δικαίου ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονος τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ἄνθροπον, οἶκεια καὶ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ αὐτίκα τούναντιν, καὶ ἄρχει τοῖς ὡς ἄληθῶς εὐθικοῦς τε καὶ δικαίων, οἳ δὲ

7 ὡς οἷεὶ τοὺς ποιμένας κτλ. Thrasymachus gives a new turn to the nursery saying. The illustration from the shepherd and his sheep (which is now for the first time introduced) was used by the historical Socrates to justify the opposite conclusion {Xen. Men. II 2. 1} ἐντυχόν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος προσαγορεύεται ποιμένα λαῶν; ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀφροδίτης ἐξειλείται. ὃν, ὡς τις τοῦ ποιμένα ἐπιμελεῖται, ὃν ὡς τις τοῦ ποιμένα ἐπιμελεῖται, ὃν ὡς τις. In Plato Pol. 271 D ff. the deities of the golden age are compared to shepherds, and the comparison of the good ruler to a shepherd is very frequent in Plato: see Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v. νουμείς. In Socrates' view 'the shepherd careth for his sheep.' With Thrasymachus' attitude should be compared the picture of the tyrant in Thrac. 174 D as a συβοῦσαν ἢ ποιμένα ἢ τινα βουκόλον—πολύ βδαλ- λοῦτα (he squeezes as much milk as he can out of his flock): also Solon ap. Arist. Rep. Ath. ch. 12 εἰ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλος τούτος τῆς τιμῆς ἐτυχείς, οὐκ ἂν κατέχεις δέμουν οὖν ἐπαύσατο, | πῦν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξελέεν γάλα. In the ant ἀμφορείον οἱ ἀμμογοίι used by Cratinus in the sense of πόλεως διήθρου (Meineke Fr. Cont. Gracc. II 1, p. 140) the image is the same. Compare the eloquent words of Ruskin in Sesame and Lilies § 43 and Milton's Lydidas 113—129.

343 12 ἢν δ' ἄλλοτριον. The conjecture διακαίεσθαι for διανοεῖσθαι is tempting in view of διατεθείη which follows, but διανοεῖσθαι is better suited to σκοτεῖν and βλεπόντας just above. For the somewhat rare construction Schneider compares Laws 626 D αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν πότερον ὡς πολεμίως πρὸς πολέ- μοις διανοητέου, ἡ δὲ αὐτίκα τούναντιν, καὶ ἄρχει τοῖς ὡς ἄληθῶς εὐθικοῦς τε καὶ δικαίως, οἳ δὲ

15 πόρρω εἶ περ. πόρρω can hardly (I think) mean 'far from' (sc. knowing): this would require πόρρω εἶ <τοῦ τι εἰδέναι> περὶ, as Herderen suggests: cf. Lys. 212 A οὕτω πόρρῳ εἰμι τοῦ κτήμα- τος ὡστε κτλ. The meaning is (I believe) 'so far on'; 'so profoundly versed are you in justice' etc.: cf. πόρρῳ ἤδη ἐστὶν τοῦ βλάπ. Ar. 38 C and phrases like πόρρῳ σφιξάς ἑλώνειν: see also Blaydes on Ar. Wisps 192. Such biting sarcasm is appropriate in the mouth of Thrasymachus.

343 16 ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον. Arist. Eth. Nic. v 3. 315ε 3ε. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἄγαθον δοκεῖ εἰναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἁρτίων, ὅτι πρὸς ἑτέρον ἄντυν' ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχει τῇ κοινωνίᾳ (with Stewart's note) and ib. 10. 1134b 5.

17 τῷ ὄντι is not τῷ ὄντι δικαίως, but revera (as Stallbaum observes).

19 ὡς ἄληθῶς as well as ἄληθῶς, τῷ
ἀρχόμενοι τοιούτῳ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἐξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὑπότος, καὶ

19 ἔννοιαν ἐκείνου ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἐαυτούς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὑποστοίοιν. σκοπεῖσθαι δὲ, ὅ εὐνηθέστατε Σάκκρατες, ὑποτειὶ χρῆ, ὅτι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος πανταχοῦ ἐλαττῶν ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐξυμβολαῖοι ὑπὸ ἄν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ κοινωνίση, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὐρόις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλέον 35 ἔχουσα τὸν δίκαιον τὸν ἀδίκου ἀλλ᾽ ἐλαττῶν᾽ ἐπειτὰ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τὰ τινες εἰσφοραὶ ὑσίν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐἶσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὅ ὡς ἐλαττῶν, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὅ μὲν οὔδεν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχίν τινα ἀρχὴν ἐκτάρει, τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηθεία ἄλλῃ ζημίᾳ, τὰ γε οἰκεῖα 30 δὲ ἠμέλειαν μοιχθροτέρως ἔχει, ἡκὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὄφελεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτως ἀπεξέβασθαι τοῖς τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ τοῖς γυμνίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλη αὐτῷς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τάναντα ὑπάρχει.

344 λέγω γὰρ ὄντερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν 35 τούτον οὐν σκόπει, εἴπερ βουλεύει κρίνειν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐξυμφέρει ἵδι αὐτῷ ἀδίκου εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥάστα μαθήσει, ἔν πέτε τὴν τελεωτὰτν ἀδίκιαν ἔλθεις, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδίκησαντα εὐδαιμονεστάτον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικηθεῖς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀδικητάτους. ἔστιν δὲ τούτο τυραννὶς; ἢ οὐ κατὰ

οὖν, and the like, is used to indicate that a word is to be taken in its strict and full etymological sense (ἐν-ὁδικῶν): cf. Phaed. 80 D εἰς 'Αἰδοῦ ὥς ἄληθες, and infra II 376 B, V 474 A, VI 511 E, VIII 551 E

343 εἰς τὰ γα ὀικεία—μοιχθροτέρους. Wells aptly cites the refusal of Dioces in Herod. I 97 to continue as an arbiter: οὐ γὰρ οἱ λουστελεῖς τῶν ἀνευτῶν ἐξημεληκότα τούς πέλας δὲ ἰμέρης δικάρειν. Cf. also Ap. 23 B, 31 B. In like manner Aristotle mentions it as one of the safeguards of a democracy engaged in agriculture that the necessity of looking after their private interests will prevent the citizens from often attending the assembly (Pol. Z. 4. 131B c. 11). Plato is fond of the comparative ending in -ως (affected, says Cobet, by those "qui nitidissime scribunt"): see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gramm. I p. 577.

32 ἀπεξέβασθαι. ἀπεκφοραί as a present is not well attested in Plato's time; and the aorist 'to incur the enmity of' is at least as suitable in point of meaning here.

35 λέγω γὰρ ὄντερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Ast points out that nothing in what has been already said corresponds to the words τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, and reads ὅπερ on slight ms authority. But no special reference is intended: the words mean simply 'I mean the man I meant just now.' Thrasy machus asserts that he has all along been referring to τὸν μεγάλα κτλ.

344 A 3 ἢ τὸ δίκαιον: i.e. ἢ τὸ δίκαιον εἶνα τὸ δίκαιον. The reading αὐτῷ (found in A, but no dependence can be put on this ms in such matters) would require the omission of the article before δίκαιον (so Stallbaum and others). Tucker inclines to render 'how much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by justice,' but the ordinary view is preferable.

6 ἢ οὐ κτλ. This laboured sentence is perhaps intended as a parody of some sophistic style: cf. Gorg. 448 C.
σμικρόν ταλάντρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ήσια καὶ ἱδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλληθήσθην, ὃν ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ Β μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσῃς μὴ λάθῃ, ξημοῦται τε καὶ ὑνείδη ἔχει τὰ 10 μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερούλικοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοῖχωροι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπειδὰν δὲ τις πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσχηται, ἀντὶ τοῦτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὑπόματων εὐδαιμονες καὶ μακάριοι 15 κέκληται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, οὗ ὀνοὶ αν πῦθωνται αὐτῶν τὴν ὅλην ἁδίκιαν ἡδικηκόται· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἁδίκα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβοῦμεν ὑνειδίζοντες οἱ ὑνειδίζοντες τὴν ἁδίκιαν. οὕτως, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἵσχυρότεροι καὶ ἐλευθερώτεροι καὶ ἰσοποτικότεροι ἁδίκια δικαιούντες ἐστίν 20 ἰκανός γυνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ εὗ ἀρχὴς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κράτους ἐξουθένων τὸ δίκαιον τυχαίνει ὑν, τὸ δ’ ἄδικον ἐαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ἐξουθενεῖ.

7. βιά II: βία Α.

344 B 8 ὅν depends on μέρει.
10 ἀνδραποδισταῖς: ’kidnappers.’ The word is defined by Polux 111 78 as ὁ τῶν ἐλέυθερων κατασκοπόμενος ἢ τῶν ἀλλότρων οἰκῆσιν ἀπαγόμενος. Thessaly had an evil name for this kind of crime (Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 521); but the frequent references to it in Attic literature shew that Greece itself was not exempt. See on ιχν. 575 B and the article in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.

II τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων is usually explained as depending on κατὰ μέρη, but as κατὰ μέρη is adverbial, this is somewhat awkward. It is perhaps better to regard the genitive as partitive, ὃς being omitted as in κινῆσαι ἀν τῶν ἄξιων λόγοι νῦν ἱππὸν 14 445 E, where see note.

12 πρὸς τοὺς—χρήμασιν is virtually equivalent to πρὸς τῷ τά τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφελέσας, and combined by zeugma with δουλώσχηται. Cf. I 330 E n.
14 εὐδαιμονες—κέκληται. The generic singular τὸς has become a plural, as in Phaed. 109 D, infra vii 530 A. Envy of tyranny and tyrants was common in the Athens of Plato’s younger days: compare Gorg. 484 A, 470 D (where it is maintained by Polus that Archelaus of Macedon is εὐδαιμῶν, and Socrates says ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφέροντι ταῦτα ’Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἔνοι 472 A) and Alc. ii 141 A ff. The plays of Euripides in particular (see vii 568 A) often eulogised the tyrant: e.g. Troad. 1169 ff., Fr. 252, Phoen. 524 ff. In earlier days Solon’s friends had blamed him for not making himself tyrant of Athens; see the dramatic fragment (33 ed. Bergk), where the prevalent passion for tyranny is forcibly expressed in the lines θέλοι γὰρ κεν κρατήσασ, πολιτῶν ἅρμανοι λαβὼν | καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μοῦνοι ἡμέραν μίαν, | ἄσκος ἦσσεν ἄδειφαι κατετρίβας γένος (4—6). See also Newman’s Politics of Aristotle ! pp. 388—391.

20 ἰκανός γυνομένη; ‘realised on an adequate scale’ (I. and V.). For the construction of γυναίκαν with an adverb cf. (with Ast) Soph. 530 C and infra vi 504 C. After τὸ δ’ ἄδικον below, Herwerden would insert τὸ to go with ἀνωτέρων τε καὶ ἐξουθενεῖ, but only τυχαίνει (and not τυχαίνει ὑν) is to be understood after ἂδίκοι; nor is the last clause intended as a strict and formal definition of injustice.
The reply of Socrates falls into two parts. In the first (344 D—
347 E), after emphatically expressing his dissent from Thrasymachus' views, and
protesting against the Sophist's retraction (in the example of the shepherd and his
sheep) of the doctrine that every ruler seeks the good of his subjects, Socrates
returns to the stricter form of reasoning to which Thrasymachus had formerly challenged
him, and points out that no rulers, properly so called, rule willingly; they require wages.
When any kind of rule, e.g. an art, is attended with advantage to the ruler, the advantage comes from the concomitant operation of the 'art of wage-earning,' and not from the rule itself. Medicine produces health; the art of wages, wages; the doctor takes his fee, not qua doctor, but qua wage-earner. Thus it is not the ruler, qua ruler, but the subjects, as was already said, who reap the advantage. The wages which induce a man to rule, may be money, or honour, or the prospect of a penalty if he should refuse. The most efficacious penalty, in the case of the best natures, is the prospect of being ruled by worse men than themselves. In a city of good men, freedom from office would be as eagerly sought for as office itself is now. Herewith ends for the present the refutation of the theory that 'Justice is the interest of the stronger.' Socrates promises to resume the subject on another occasion.

The ensuing discussion is not a new argument (see 345 C eti yap tā ἐπιρροθήν ἐπισκεύωμεθα) in support of Socrates' view, but a restatement of his theory, with an addition necessitated by Thrasymachus' example of the shepherd. The shepherd (says Socrates) is no shepherd, when he fattens his sheep for his own gain, nor the ruler a ruler, when he enriches himself at the expense of his subjects. On such occasions both shepherd and ruler are in reality μισθωτοὶ—professors of μισθωτική, an art which is distinct from that of ruling, though usually associated with it. This analysis is new and valuable in itself; it also enables Socrates (in 347 D) to make the first explicit allusion in the Republic to an ideal state, and to formulate what afterwards becomes a leading principle of the Platonic commonwealth—the reluctance of the ruling class to accept office.

d 24 καταντλήσας. For the metaphor cf. infra vii 536 B, Lys. 204 D, Lucian Dem. Enc. 16 (imitated from this passage) and other examples in Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 483.

28 ἐμβαλὼν: cf. Theaet. 165 D, Prot. 342 E. The whole expression recalls the Latin proverb scrupulum abeunti (Cic. de Fin. iv 80).

344 E 31 διαγόμενος. The use of this verb in Soph. El. 782 χρόνοις δηγή με, Dem. 18. 80 πόλεμος—δηγήν υμᾶς, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1 3 and elsewhere is in favour of regarding διαγόμενος ('living') as grammatically passive and not middle both here and in Lavois 738 A. Cf. Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. διάγω.

ἔγω γὰρ κτλ. I agree with Stallbaum and others in taking this sentence as interrogative: 'do you mean that I think otherwise about this matter?' i.e. think that it is not a question of βίου διαγωγῆ. J. and C. complain that this interpretation is 'wanting in point.' It is surely much to the point to make Thrasymachus repudiate the imputation of trifling. His doctrine appears all the more dangerous when he confesses that it is no
sophistic paradox, but a rule of life. I can see nothing to justify Apelt's conjecture ἐνογ' ἃρ' ἀπ' ἐνώ γάρ (Obser. Crit. p. 11).

33 ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε. ἦτοι or ἦτοι—γε= or else' (not 'or rather' as J. and C.). The regular construction is ἦτοι—ἡ, and ἡ—ἦτοι was condemned by the grammarians as a solecism, though it occurs in Pind. Ποι. 6. 5. With the use of ὦτοι in this passage cf. 111 400 C, IV 433 A τοῦτο ἡμῶν—ὕτω τοῦτον τι ἐλεύθη ἡ δικαιό-

345 A 5 ἠστω μὲν ἄδικος κτλ. The subject is δ ἄδικος, supplied from ἄδικιαν. Το πείθει also δ ἄδικος is the subject; but ἡ ἄδικα or τὸ ἄδικον is the subject of ἔστι. The effect is exactly as in the English 'let him be unjust' etc., 'nevertheless he cannot convince me that it is really more profitable than justice.' J. and C. understand τυς before ἐστω, needlessly, as I think, and suppose that the "supposed impurity of injustice" is the subject to πείθει, but πείθει is much better with a personal subject. Although the sentence is a trifle loose, it is clear enough, and there is no occasion for reading ρεί-

345 C 17 ποιμαίνων. See cr. n. Cobet (Μην. IX p. 355) calls for πιανεῖν, but the "addita verba καθ' ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστω
τοιμήν ἐστίν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλὰ ὦστερ δαίμονα τινά καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστισθείσαθαι, πρὸς τὴν
Δ εὐνοχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόθαι, ὦστερ χρηματισθῆναι ἀλλ' οὐ τοιμένα. τῷ δὲ ποιμείκην οὐ δήποτε ἄλλου τού μέλει ἢ, ἐφ' ὁ
τέκτακται, ὅπως τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκτορμεί: ἐπεὶ τά γε αὐτῆς, ὡςτ' εἶναι βελτίστη, ἰκανός δὴποτε ἐκπετόρισθαι, ἔως γ' ἂν μηδὲν
ἐνδέχ τοῦ ποιμείκην εἶναι: οὔτω δὲ ὄψην ἔγνωξε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι ἦμιν ὀμολογεῖν, πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενί ἂλλῳ 25
τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχιμένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευ-Ε μένοι, ἕν τε πολιτική καὶ ἑιδωτική ἀρχή. οὖ δὲ τοὺς ἀρχοντᾶς
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἀρχοντας, ἐκόντας οἰεὶ ἀρχεῖν;
Μᾶ Δὲ οὐκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὐ οἶδα.

XVIII. Τλ δὲ; ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἐρασύμαχε, τας ἄλλας ἄρχισι 30
οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ότι οὐδεὶς εἴθελε ἄρχειν ἐκών, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αὐτῶιν,
ὡς οὐχι αὐτοίοις ὦφελίαν ἐσομενήν ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῖς
346 ἄρχομενοις; ἐπεὶ τοσοῦτοι εἰπτε: οὔχι ἐκάστην μέντοι φαμέν
ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτω ἐτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἐτέραν τὴν δύναμιν
ἐχειν; καὶ, ὁ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνω, ἵνα τι καὶ
περαινόμεν. Ἀλλὰ τούτω, ἔφη, ἐτέρα. Οὐκόν καὶ ωφελίαν
ἐκάστη ἰδίαν των ἦμιν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινών, οὐν ἰατρική 5
μὲν ὑγιείαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν εἰν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι

5. οἰον ΑΠ: οἰον Α1.

circa universum pastoris negotium erran-
tem a Socrate Thrasymachum notari do-
cent" (Schneider). How Thrasymachus
errs is explained in οὐ πρὸς τὸ κτλ. πια-
νέων might perhaps be read, if the ἄλλα
clause is taken closely with what pre-
cedes: you did not think it necessary
(says Socrates) to adhere rigidly to the
genuine shepherd, but think he fattens
his sheep μα sheph. In that case,
however, we should expect ἀλλὰ ὦ—βλέ-
πεναι in place of ὦ—βλέποντα, to form
the antithesis to πιανέων.

345 D 74. οὔτω δὲ ὄψην. Some in-
ferior mss (with Eusebius Prac. Εv. XIV
44. 2) read ὅ for δ', and so Ast and Stal-
baum. The connecting particle is better
than the illative here, where Socrates is
merely recalling his former train of rea-
ing; 'and it was thus that I came to
think.' etc.

Nīc. V 10. 1134 b 5 ff. καὶ διὰ τούτο ἄλλατρον
eιναι φασιν ἄγαθον τὴν δικαιοσύνην—μισθὸς
ἀρμί tis dōtōs.

32 αὐτοίοιν: see 330 B n.


3 παρά δόξαν is simply 'contrary to
your opinion' ("gegen deine Ueberzeug-
ung" Schneider) as in Prot. 337 B, cf.
349 A ἢν δ' ἂν σε ύπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἀπερ
diaoei and 330 E. The words could
hardly mean an 'unexpected or para-
doxical' reply (as Tucker construes).
Socrates is appealing—note ὁ μακάριε—
to Thrasymachus not to obstruct the dis-
covery of the truth by want of candour
and sincerity.

4 ἄλλα—ἐτέρα sc. ἐστίν. The
reading ἐτέραν is in itself equally good,
but has inferior mss authority. Herwer-
den needlessly recommends the omission
of ἐτέρα, or (as alternatives) ἄλλα τούτω, ἔφη, τῷ ἐτέραν, or ἄλλα τούτω, ἔφη, ἐτέραν,
tῷ ἐτέραν.
οὖτω; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθὸν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτὴς ἡ ἀντίοις παλαιὸς καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἡ εἰκόνα τοῦ βουλῆς ἀκριβῶς διορίζει, ὡσπερ ὑπέθετο, οὔδεν τι μᾶλλον, εάν τις κυβερνῶν ἕγγραφῃ τῷ αὐτῷ πλεῖων ἐν τῇ βαλλάττῃ, ἐνεκα τούτῳ καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικήν; ὃ ἰδέα, ἐφη. οὔδε γ', οἷμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἐὰν ύπαρξῃ τις μισθάραξ. Οὐ δηταί. Τὰ δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαριτικὴν, εάν ιώμενος τὶς μισθαριτικήν; Οὐκ ἐφη. C

15 Οὐκοῦν τὴν ὅψιν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἑδίκει ωμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; "Ἐστὶν, ἐφη. "Ἡμῖνα ἄρα ὡφελίαν κοινὴ ὁφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ, δὴλον ὅτι κοινῇ τῷ τοῦ αὐτὸ προσχρόμενοι ἀπτ' ἐκεῖνον ὁφελοῦνται. "Εοικεν, ἐφη. Φαμέν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὁφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρόμεθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ξυνέφη μόγων. Οὐκ ἀρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἑκάστην 1 αὕτη ἡ ὁφελία ἐστίν, τοῦ μισθοῦ D λήψις, ἀλλ' εἰ δεὶ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ύπάρξῃ ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαριτικὴ μισθὸν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαριτικὴ αὐτή ἐστίν. καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ πάσαι τορ στὸν αὐτὴν ὑπάρξῃ ποιεῖσθαι τις ἑκάστης ὁφελεῖσθαι, ἐφ' ὧ τέτακται. εἰ δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτὴν προσχρόμεθαι, ἐσθο' τι ὁφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἐφη. "Αρ' ὀνυν ὁδ' ὁφελεὶ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργαζόται; Οἷμαι ἐγώγη. E Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Ὑσερύμαχε, τούτο ἢδ' δηλοῦν, ὅτι οὐδεμια τέχνη οὔδε

11. ἐμφάρειν Ξη: ἐμφάρειν ΑΠΣ. 21. αὐτὴ Ξη: αὐτὴ Α: αὐτὴ (sic) II.


XIX. Πώς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων. τοὺς 5 μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γυγυνώσκω· τὴν δὲ ἦμιαν ἦμινα λέγεις καὶ ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ ἔρχεσα, οὐ ἦμινκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἑαρ μισθῶν, ἐφην, οὐ λύνεις, διὰ ὧν ἀρχουν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἰσθά, ὅτι τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιθανόν μενεὶ ὅνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστων; Ἐγώγε, ἐφη. 10 Διὰ ταῦτα τοινῦν, ὅν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὕτε τιμῆς; οὕτε γὰρ φανερῶς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἄρχης ἕνεκα μισθῶν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλησθαί, οὕτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄρχης λαμβάνοντες κλέπται. οὐδ' αὐτὴς ἦν εἰς πιθανόν. αὐτοὶ ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι καὶ 15

2. ὡς Ζ, superscripto οῦ: ὃς Λ: οὐ Πλ.

15. δῆ Π: δὲ Λ.

with the infinitive after verbs of saying, thinking and the like “carries with it the emphasis on the witness on oath, so to speak the emphasis of desire” (Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. 1 50). Cf. Thes. 155λ, Euthyph. 6b, Phaed. 94 c al, and infr. 33 407 E, IV. 419 A.

347 A 2 ὡς δοκεῖ belongs to ὡς ἕνεκα, and δεῖν is in indirect narration after ἑλέγον above. There would be no object in qualifying the force of δεῖν; it is not disputed that rulers must have their reward. Hence Stallbaum is wrong in regarding δεῖν as under the influence of δοκεῖ, an illogical idiom which is common in Herodotus (Stein on 1 65), and found occasionally in Tragedy (Jebb on Trach. 1238) and in Plato (Phil. 20 D, Soph. 263 D, Euthyd. 280 D). That ὡς δοκεῖ has no influence on δεῖν in this passage may also be seen from the fact that δεῖν (not δοκεῖ) would still be used if ὡς δοκεῖ were removed. δεῖν is not for δοκεῖ; the late participial form δεῖν is not found in Plato; see my note on Euthyph. 4 D.


7. ὡς εἰ μισθοῦ μέρει. ὡς is not (with Wohlrab) to be taken with εἰ μισθοῦ μέρει, but stands for the indirect interrogative ὡς.

348 B 14 αὐτός = ‘by themselves,’ ‘ultra,’ should be construed with λαμβάνοντες. The conjecture αὐτοῖς for αὐτός is very tame.
347 C 16 ὅθεν κινδυνεύει—νεομίσθαι. These words are intended to indicate parenthetically that Socrates' thesis finds support in the common judgment of men. Good men, he says, require to be compelled to rule. This may be why (ὅθεν) it is accounted a disgrace to enter on office willingly: that is to say, if you do so, you may be inferred to be, not ἄγαθος, but φιλότιμος or φιλάργυρος, which ὀνόματι λέγεται τε καὶ έστιν 347 B. There is no good reason for rejecting the clause, as some have proposed to do.

347 D 23 πόλις ἄνδρων ἄγαθων is the first express allusion to an Ideal City in the Republic. The principle here laid down—the reluctance of the best men to undertake the task of government—is fully recognised in Plato's commonwealth, where the ἄρχοντες are represented as unwilling to desert the life of contemplation for the cares of office. 'Nolo episcopari' is in fact one of the leading guarantees which Plato gives against the abuse of political power (Nohl Die Staatslehre Plato's in ihr. gesch. Entwick. p. 119). See VI 520 E, 521 A, where this topic is resumed. Cf. also Sesame and Lilies § 43 "The true kings—rule quietly, if at all, and hate ruling: too many of them make 'il gran rifiuto.'"

25 τῷ ὄντι κτλ. τῷ ὄντι belongs to οὐ περίκει, not to ἀληθινός (as As suppose). Richter suggests ἀληθινός for ἀληθινός, but what is said of a single ruler applies to all: cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 E λέγωμεν δὴ σώφρονα βλέπει ενα είνας καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ενα τῶν ἄνδρέων.

26 πάς ἀν κτλ. The articular infinitive with ἀρείβασιν is hard to parallel, and on this ground Richards would cancel τῶ. I once thought that τὸ ὀφελείθαι might be taken as the object after γεγραφηκὼν ('he who knows what being benefited is,' i.e. virtually 'who knows his own interests'); but this is harsh, and I now acquiesce in the usual interpretation. With γεγραφηκόν (intellegens) used absolutely cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 E σώφρονα μὲν οὖν βλέπει γέγραφον ἕνον δήσει πράον ἐπὶ πάντα. For the sentiment cf. Soph. O. T. 584—598, Eur. Ion 621—632, Hippi. 1016—1020.

347 E 30 εἰσαάθις σκεψόμεθα. The reference has been much discussed. Pfleiderer's idea (Zur Lösung d. Pl. Fr. p. 72) that the words were introduced by Plato "bei der Gesammtredaktion des Werkes" to prepare us for the second half of Book X is most unlikely, because (among other reasons) Book X does not expressly revert to this topic at all. Siebeck (Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dialoge pp. 121 ff.) holds that phrases of this sort always refer either to some future dialogue contemplated by Plato, or to a later part of the same dialogue. It is difficult to establish either alternative in the present case; nor
meiçou einaí, o nyn légei Ορασύμαχος, tôn tōu àdikou bivon φύσκων einaí kriptí tou tōn dikaiou. sv ouv potérov, hnv δ' égō, ὃ Πλαύκων, aíreí kai potéron ἀληθεστέρω δοκεί. ου λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τὸ δικαίον ἔγογα, ἐφ' ἀυτοῖς τῶν δικαίων. Ἡκουσας,

348 ἰν δ' ἐγώ, | ὃσα ἀρτί Ορασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τῶν ἀδικῶν; 35 Ἡκουσα, ἐφ' ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι. Βουλεῖ οὖν αὐτὸν πείθομεν, ἂν δυνώμεθα τῇ ἑξευρέω, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; Πώς γὰρ οὐ Βοῦλομαι; ἰν δ' ὡς. Ἀν μὲν τοῖνυν, ἰν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγομεν

33. ἀληθεστέρως ν: ὡς ἀληθεστέρως ΆΠΖιγ.

34. ἐφ' Λ'ΙΙ: om. Α'

has Siebeck, I think, succeeded in proving his point even elsewhere. It is simplest to suppose that such formulae (like ἴσον ὡς ἴσον in Arist. Eth. Nic. 15. 1097b 14) are in general only a convenient way of dropping the subject, although there may occasionally be a specific reference. Here there is none. So, also Hörmer, Entw. u. Komp. d. Pl. Polit. in Fl. Jahrb. Supplementband XXIII p. 607 n. 2.

347 E—348 B Introduction to the second part of Socrates' reply to Thrasymachus. See 344 D, 348 B nn.

347 E 31 τὸν τῶν ἀδικῶν βίων—

δικαίου. In these words Socrates sums up the remarks of Thrasymachus from 343 B (καὶ οὕτω πάροι τηλ.) to 344 C (λυπητού τε καὶ ξυμφόρους).

32 ΠΩΤΕΡΩΣ—ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ. Ast's suggestion ποτέρως, ἰν δ' ἐγὼ, ὃ Πλαύκων, αἱρεῖ; καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρω δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; is now generally adopted, but (apart from its considerable divergence from the MS reading) the juxtaposition of ποτέρως and ἀληθεστέρω is displeasing. The ποτέρως αἱρεῖ of Α is quite unobjectionable: cf. VII 528 A ὁστροφαὶ; and it is (I think) an objection to ποτέρως αἱρεῖ that it would represent Socrates as asking Glauco not which view he elected to take, but which life—the just or the unjust—he chose for himself. Schneider (after Bekker) retains the reading of the best MSS in ποτέρως ὃς ἀληθεστέρως, and explains the last two words as equivalent to ὡσπερ ὃ ἀληθεστέρως λέγεται: but ὃς ἀληθεστέρως could not (if written by Plato) be anything but the comparative of ὃς ἀληθῶς, and that is quite different in sense from ἀλη

θεστέρως. I have omitted ὃς (with Bre
mus and a few MSS of inferior authority), 

"ut ortum ex varia lectione ποτέρων et πο
téros in poterovos conflata" (Schneider). I am glad to find that Tucker adopts the same solution.

348 Α 1 διήλθε: i.q. διῆλθεν ὁντα τοι δικαίων ἐλεξεν εἶναι (Schneider). Cf. II 363 Α ἀφόαν ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ τοὺς φύσις μὲν ἀδικοῖς ad loc. In view of τον ἑκατέρω λέγομεν in II below, it is easy to suggest διῆλθεν <ἐν>; but the text is probably sound.

4 ἂν μὲν τοῖνυν κτλ. The alternatives are between continuous speech and dialectic. By λόγον in παρὰ λόγον Θρασ
ymachus' speech in 343 A ff. is meant; to this Socrates would reply, after which Thrasy machus would speak again, and finally Socrates. Thus each party would have delivered two speeches. In Athenian lawsuits there were often two speeches delivered by the accuser and two by the defendant (Meier und Schömam Attische Pro
cess p. 924), so that Plato's imagery is borrowed from the law-court, whence δικαστῶν τῶν τῶν διακρινόντων just below. This point escaped Ast, who reads καὶ αἰθὴν οὕτω άξλων ἡμῶν (after Ficinus and Stephanus).

ἈΝΤΙΚΑΤΑΤΕΙΝΑΝΤΕΣ is intransitive: cf. II 358 D κατατείνασ ἐρῶ τῶν ἀδικῶν βιῶν ἐπαινών and 367 B: the notion (as in ἔννεπι, ἐννεπταμένος and the like) is of nervous tension. The word cannot mean 'replying to one another in set speeches' (J. and C.). "Setting out alternative lists of advantages" (remarks Bosanquet) "was the well-known method of fable or poetry. See Book II" 361 D—362 C and 362 E—

365 A: "and compare Prodicus' Choice of 

Hercules (Xen. Mem. II 1) and the dis
cussion between the Just and Unjust arguments in the Clouds of Aristophanes."
5 autô lógon parâ lógon, όσα αὐ τά γαρα ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐ τίς οὖντος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀρετωδὴν δεῖσει τἀγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν όσα ἐκάτεροι ἐν ἐκατέρω λέγομεν, καὶ Ἰδὴ δικαστῶν τῶν τῶν διακρινοῦντος δεσδόμεθα: ἃν δὲ ὁ στήρι ἄρτι ἀνωμολογούμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλους σκοπῶμεν, ἀμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασται καὶ 10 ἁρτί ηὔτες ἐσόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφθ. ὁ ὡποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ’ εἴγον, ἄρέσκεις. Οὖντος, ἐφθ.

XX. Ἰθα δή, ἦν δ’ εἴγον, ὑ Θρασύμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἡμῖν εὖ ἀρχής τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὕσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέρας φης εἶναι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημι, ἐφθ., καὶ δεὶ ἦν, εἰρήνα. Καὶ 15 Φέρε δή τὸ τοιόνυ θέρετον αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν ποὺ ἁρτίν αὐτῶν καλεῖς, τὸ δ’ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν

5. αὖ Α2Π: ἄν Α1.

348 B 10 ὡποτέρως is virtually indirect; translate ‘whichever you please, then.’ Hermann reads ὡποτέρως, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in Euclyd. 271 A τίς ἦν, ὁ Ἐφράητε, ψ χεθε ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγον:—τίς ἦν; ὁ ὡποτέρως καὶ ἐστίας, ὁ Ὀρίκτων οὐ γὰρ εἰς, ἀλλὰ δ’un ἔστιν, ι.ε. (it depends on) which of these you are asking about etc. Cf. also ζήσ—αὐτῶν ἡ ἁρτή 353 C. In Rep. ix 578 E ἐν πολῷ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φῶς ὁ οὐ γενέθθαι αὐτῶν καὶ Gorg. 522 A, the ὀπόσω is perhaps due to the proximity of ὁ οὐ, which gives the question a certain semblance of indirectness; ὁπόσω in Alc. 1110 C and ὁπόσων infra 400 A may be similarly explained; while in Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὖν—ἀλλ’ δ’ ἐστιν τούτο, it is easy to supply a verb of saying. Possibly (as Heindorf thinks) ὠτὶ (B δ’ τί) in Euclyd. 287 B is corrupt for τί, as ὁπόσω for πῶς in Charm. 170 C. In Lys. 212 C ὡποτέρως οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλου ἐστιν; ὁ φίλων τοῦ φιλομένου—ὁ ὁ φιλομένος τοῦ φιλομένος; we ought no doubt to read ὁ ποτέρως (with Hermann).

348 B—350 C Thrasymachus now identifies Justice with Simplicity, Injustice with Discretion. He further declares that Injustice is strong and beautiful, and is ready to predicate of it all that is usually predicated of Justice (348 B—349 B).

Socrates then commences a very subtle refutation, addressing himself to the assertion that Injustice is Virtue and Wisdom (349 B—350 C). (1) The just man endeavours to overreach the unjust, but not the just: the unjust man to overreach both the just and the unjust. Therefore, generally, the just man endeavours to overreach the unlike; the unjust man to overreach both the like and the unlike. Further, the unjust man, being wise and good, resembles the wise and good, while the just man, being foolish and evil, resembles the foolish and evil; in brief, each is as those whom he resembles. (2) Again, from the analogy of the arts it is seen that the man who knows tries to overreach the unlike, while the ignorant man tries to overreach both the like and the unlike. But the man who knows is wise, and the wise man good; we may therefore in the last sentence substitute ‘wise and good man’ for ‘the man who knows,’ and ‘foolish and evil’ for ‘ignorant.’ Comparing, then, conclusions (1) and (2), we see that the just are like the wise and good, that is, are wise and good (since they are such as those whom they resemble), while the unjust in like manner are foolish and evil. Thus is refuted the thesis that Injustice is Virtue and Wisdom.

348 B ff. The second division of Socrates' reply begins here. Though professedly attacking the section of Thrasymachus' speech contained in 343 C—344 C, and summed up in the theory that the life of the Unjust is better than that of the Just (347 E), it is not till 352 D that Socrates directly grapples with this theory. In the meantime, certain further deliver-
of Thrasymachus on the nature of Injustice are refuted by means of arguments which have an indirect bearing on the question at issue (see 352 d) 

This part of Socrates' reply may therefore be regarded as so subdivided into two parts—the first being an indirect, the second a direct refutation of Thrasymachus. Cf. 352 D n.

348 C 17 εἰκός γε—τούνατον. Thrasymachus' view of δικαίωσις is like Callicles' theory of ἀρετή in Corp. 491 ε ff. esp. 492 β τρυφή and αξιολογία and ἀληθεία, ἐάν ἐπικυρίων ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστιν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία. The irony is clearly marked by ὡ ἤδαστε, and Hartman should not have revived Hirschig's proposal to read <οὐκον> εἰκός γε.

19 ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; 'Well, what else?' Cf. (with J. and C.) Synp. 206 ε.

348 D 20 πάνω γενναίαν εὐθείαν: 'sublime simplicity.' Such contempt for εὐθεία recalls Thucydides' description of contemporary morals: cf. especially III 83. 1 καὶ τὸ εὐθέα, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθεὶς ἥρανείθη.

21 εὐβουλία was preeminently a political virtue: cf. Alc. 1125 ε πολιτείας κοινωνίων τίνα καλεῖ ἑπτάτην, Εὐβουλία ἐγώγε, Prot. 318 ε, and infra IV 428 β. It is therefore fitly used by Thrasymachus to describe his theory, which is a theory of political rather than of private morality: cf. πάλις τε—ποιεῖσθαι below.

23 ὑπ' έαυτοῦ ποιείσθαι. έαυτοὺς is found in some inferior MSS, but the accusative is also admissible. Cf. Thuc. IV 60 (cited by Schneider) εἰκός—αὐτὸς τάδε πάντα πειράσοντα ὑπὸ σφάζει ποιείσθαι. In τελέω Thrasymachus recalls the τελέω διδακήν of 348 H.

74 στὸ δὲ οἷα—λέγειν. Baiter (with Paris A) assigns these words to Socrates; but they come much more naturally from Thrasymachus: cf. 344 B. βαλλάσσια and not βαλλάνσια is the spelling of A here and in VIII 552 D (βαλλαντιστόμος): in IX 575 B (βαλλαντιστομοσ) the second λ is due to an early corrector. The double-λλ has also the best MS authority in Corp. 508 ε, Synp. 190 ε. See also Blaydes on Ar. Prog. 772. For δὲ ὡς below after εἰν Cf. Phaed. 78 A and VII 522 A.

348 E 30 ἧδη στερεότερον: 'still more stubborn.' στερεός is like ἁλλησθάτην in Theoc. 155 E σκληροῦς—καὶ ἀντίτοπος αὐθάρωπος, but stronger, suggesting cast-iron hardness and inflexibility.

ῥόδιον. See cr. n. Schneider refers to Λατος 757 β τὴν δὲ ἀληθετάτην καὶ ἀράστην ἡσότερα ὑπέκειτο ῥόδιον παντὶ ἱδεῖν. ῥόδιον is not (I think) possible here: and a scribe might easily omit Δ in ΠΑΙΔΙΟΝ. Cf. Introd. § 5.

A. P.
31 εἰ γὰρ κτλ. Gorg. 483 C νῦμ ἡκιαν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσον, κακίαν μέντοι ἣ αἰσχρὰν αὐτῷ ὄμολογεις εἶναι, ὃσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἰχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομίσματα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἰ ὃτι φήσεις αὐτῷ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀισχρὸν εἶναι καὶ τάλλα αὐτῷ
35 πάντα προσθήσεις. ἀν ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθημεν, ἐπειδὴ 349
gε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῦ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας θείως. Ἀλλήστατα, ἕφη, μαντείη. ἈΛΛ' οὐ μέντοι, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀποκινητῶν γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθένι σκοπούμενι, ἔοις ἂν σε ὑπολαμβάνων λέγειν ἄπειρα διανοεῖ. ἐρον δοκεῖς σὺ, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ἀτεχνῶν νῦν ὦ σκόπτεως, ἀλλ' τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν. Τὰ δὲ
σοι, ἕφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, ἐτει μοι δοκεῖ ἐτεὶ μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν λόγων ἐλέγχεις; 1 Οὐδένε, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ. ἀλλ' τάδε μοι πειρῶ ἐτί πρὸς Β
τουτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι: ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τι σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν; Οὐδ' ἕφη: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστείος, ὅσπερ
νῦν, καὶ εὐθῆς. Τὰ δὲ; τῆς δικαιας πράξεως; Οὐδὲ τῆς <πράξεως>

11. πράξεως τῆς νοσ.: om. codd.
(Laws 754 B, 916 B, infra vii 516 B) the omitted word is unemphatic and easily supplied. For the error cf. Crito 50 B where the first hand of the Bodleian MS reads τάς δικασθέισας by mistake for τάς <δικας τάς> δικασθέισας. See also Introd. § 5.

349 C 19 οὐκοῦν καὶ—λάβη. The ἄδικος πράξεις which the unjust man over-reaches is to be regarded as ἄδικος because it has itself overreached (not fallen short of) the mean. ὡς with the subjunctive after verbs of striving does not seem to occur elsewhere in Plato: like its use in a pure final clause (in which there is only one example in Plato, viz. Tim. 93 A) it is almost exclusively confined (among Attic writers) to Xenophon and the tragedians. See Weber’s tables in Goodwin MT. p. 398, and cf. Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. iv p. 419.

22 τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου—τοῦ δὲ ἄνομοιον. This generalisation of ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ into abstract notions, without regard to their relativity, is suggestive of (but does not of course presuppose) the Ideas of τά πρός τί which we meet with in Phaed. 74 A.

349 D 26 οὐκοῦν κτλ. A proviso which is made use of in 350 C (ἀλλὰ μὴν –ἐκάτερον εἶναι).

28 ὁ δὲ μὴ οἰκικέα. ὁ δὲ is simply ‘the other’ (as is marked in Α by a pause after δέ), i.e. ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος: cf. 339 E (τοῖς δὲ λόγοις δὲ ἄρχομεν), 343 D ὁ μὴν δικαίος ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτοὶ πλῶν εἰσέφρει, ὁ δὲ ἐλπίζων καὶ 15 ΙΧ 587 B. J. and C., with most of the editors, adopt the reading of Stephanus (ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ οἰκικέα), which has the support of some inferior MSS; but the idiom is sufficiently well authenticated, and the collocation of the two negatives would be unpleasing. I am glad to see that Tucker takes the same view.

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30 Εἰν, ὃ Ῥασιόμαχος. μουσικὸν δὲ τινὰ λέγεις, ἐτερον ὑ ἀμοῦνοσ; Ε Ἔργωγε. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα; Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν ὑπὸ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἀμοῦνον ἄφρονα. Οὐκὼν καὶ ἀπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ὃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν; Ναί. Τί δὲ ιατρικὸν; ὦν ὄντως; ὄντως. Δοκεῖ ἂν ὦν τὶς σοι, ὃ ἀριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ.

35 ἀρμοττομεῦος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικὸν ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἑπτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἀξίουν πλέον ἐχεῖν; Οὐκ ἔρμογε. Τί δὲ; ἀμοῦσον; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Τί δὲ ιατρικὸς; | ἐν 350 τῇ ἐδωδῆ ἡ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τι ιατρικὸν πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ ἀνδρὸς ἡ πράγματος; Οὐ δητα. Μὴ ιατρικὸν δὲ; Ναί. Περὶ πάντας δὲ ὅρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμωσιν, εἰ τὶς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμης 5 μον ὀστισῶν πλειώ ἂν ἐθέλειν αἴρεσαθαι ἡ ὁσα ἀλλος ἐπιστήμων ἡ πράττειν ἡ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἐαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πράξε. Ἀλλ' ἵσως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη τούτο γε ὄντως ἐχεῖν. Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμων πλεονεκτήσειν ἂν, ὅ ὁμοῖον ὑπὸ ἀνεπιστήμων; ἵσως. Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφὸς; Φημὶ.

10 Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημὶ. Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μεν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναυσίου.

᾿Εοίκεν, ἐφη. Ὁ δὲ κακὸς τε καὶ ἀμαθῆς τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ.

30 μουσικὸν δὲ τινὰ κτλ. Here begin the usual Socratic illustrations from the arts, with the concomitant identification of virtue and knowledge (ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημὶ 350 B).

349 E 34 δοκεὶ ἂν οὖν—ἀξίουν πλέον ἐχειν. Socrates ignores the proverb καὶ κρασαεῖς κρασαεῖ κοτεῖ καὶ ἄμοθος ἀμοθῆ. Strictly speaking, however, it is not qia κρασαεῖς, but qia moneymaker (or the like) that the κρασαεῖς κοτεῖ. J. and C. cite an admirable parallel from Shakespeare (King John IV 2) “When workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness.” The words ἂν ἄξιοιν πλεον ἐχειν have a suspicious look, and are rejected by Heller (Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 171) and others, but such duplicate expressions are common in Plato, and as the illustration from the harp introduces a new and important stage in the argument, Plato may have wished to remind us that after all πλεονεκτεῖν is only the πλεον ἐχειν with which we started (349 B). It should be noted, too, that ἄξιοιν is a little more than ἐθέλειν.

350 Α ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἡ πόσει refers of course to the patient’s diet. Plato carefully writes πλεονεκτεῖν here in preference to πλέον ἐχειν. The ‘overreaching’ in such a case might well consist in giving the patient less.

6 ἡ πράττειν ἡ λέγειν. The idea of πλεονεκτεῖν in speaking has not been introduced before, nor is it made use of in the sequel. We must regard the addition of ἡ λέγειν as merely a rhetorical device to increase the emphasis: see on 333 D and 351 A.

7 τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; κτλ. Proclus’ commentary on these words is interesting, though he probably reads more into them than Plato intended here: καὶ ὅλος τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακὸν ἦπαιντοι μένιον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ καὶ τῷ καλῷ (leg. κακῷ) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀναπετείχον ὁυν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐναυσίου κακοῦ (in Alc. 1 p. 323 ed. Creuzer). The identifications in ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός and ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθόθωθο below have been allowed before in the special cases of the μουσικὸς and the ιατρικὸς (349 E).
The pervading strong argument is often used as an evocation which "praeter exceptationem emergit el elucet." The pervading fallacy in the discussion is akin to the a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Thus 'like' and 'unlike' are used absolutely, and each of them is equated with itself. The wise man is held to be good, because one is good in that in which one is wise (this might however be justified on the "stricter mode of reasoning"). Finally, the just man is inferred to be wise and good, on the principle that one is what one resembles: but whether the resemblance be in essence or in accident, we are not told. The argument should be regarded as a dialectical tour de force.—διονύσικοι μάλλον ἡ φαλάξες. The reasoning in the next section of the argument strikes a deeper note. 350 c—352 d. Socrates now attacks the second assertion made by Thrasymachus in 349 A, viz. that Injustice is strong. Justice (he argues) is stronger than Injustice, both because it is (as we have seen) virtuous and wise, and because in its effects it is the antithesis of Injustice, which injures hatred and sedition, both into aggregates of individuals, and into the individual himself. Injustice weakens by preventing community of action; it makes men collectively and individually hateful to themselves and to the just, among whom are the gods. When Injustice seems to be strong, it is in virtue of some latent justice which it still retains.

350 c ff. The argument in this section has a deeper ethical import than any which has preceded, and foreshadows some of the central doctrines of the Republic. See notes on 351 d, e, and (for the importance of the whole discussion in the general history of philosophy) Bosanquet's Companion, p. 65, where it is justly observed that the argument "marks an era in philosophy. It is a first reading of the central facts of society, morality, and nature. In social analysis it founds the idea of organization and division of labour....In morality it gives the conception of a distinctively human life which is the content or positive end of the distinctively human will. And for natural knowledge it suggests the connection between function and definition, and consequently between purpose and reality, which is profoundly developed in the sixth and seventh books. These conceptions become corner-stones of Aristotle's Philosophy, and still, when seen in their connection, form the very core of the best thought."

32 ο ὁ Θρασύμαχος κτλ. 'Now Thrasy machus' etc. δὲ is not "at" (Tucker), but at least as good as ἀγαθον, and much better supported by the ms.

οὐχ ὁσ εὖ νῦν ῥᾴδιος λέγω. "Expectabam certe: oυχ ὁσ εὖ νῦν λέγω ῥᾴδιος," says Herwerden; but the antecedent in Greek is idiomatically attracted into the relative clause (Kühner Gr. Gramm. 11 p. 922). Translate 'not in the easy way in which I now repeat them.'
PŁATΩΝΟΣ

350 D

25 πρότερον δε οὐπώ, Ὁθασύμαχος ἐρυθρώντα. ἐπειδῆ δε οὖν διω-μολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἁρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄδικιαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν. Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἦμιν οὕτω κείσθω, ἐφαμεν δὲ ἢ καὶ ἵσχυρον εἶναι τὴν ἄδικιαν ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὁ Ὁθασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἐφη ἀλλ' ἐμοιε οὐδὲ ἃ νῦν 30 λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. Εἶ οὖν λέγομι, 1 εἰ δ' οὖν ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἐν με φαίνης; ἢ οὖν ἐα με εἰπτεῖν ὡς βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ Βούλει ἐροτᾶν, ἐρώτα, ἐγώ δέ σοι, ὡσπερ ταῖς γραμμαῖς ταῖς τους μύθους λεγοῦσαι, εἶπεν ἐρώτα καὶ κατατησάμουμαι καὶ ἁνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμός, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, παρὰ γέ ἐν τὴν σαυτόν δόξαν. "Ὡστε σοι, ἐφη, ἄρεσκεν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔστω λέγειν. κατοί τί ἂν λαοὶ Βούλει; Οὔδεν μᾶ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' εἰπερ τοῦτο ποιῆσεις, ποιεῖν ἐγὼ δὲ ἐροτήσω. Ἐρότα δ' ή. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν ἐρωτοῦ, ὡπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψόμεθα | τὸν λόγον, ὅποιον τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς ἄδικιαν. ἐλέξθη γάρ ποι, ὅτι καὶ δυνατότερον καὶ ἱσχυρό-τερον εἴῃ ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφην, εἰπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἁρετή ἐστιν δικαιοσύνην, ῥαδίως, οἷμαι, φανησάται καὶ ἱσχυρότερον 5 ἄδικιας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστίν ἁμαθία ἢ ἄδικια οὗτες ἐν ἔτι τούτο ἁγνοίσειν. ἀλλ' οὐ τί οὕτωσι ἀπλῶς, ὁ Ὁθασύμαχε, ἔγογγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇδε τῇ σκέψασθαι. πόλιν φαίνης ἄν ἄδικον εἶναι

3. ἐφην ὑ et fortasse A1: ἐφη AΠΞ.

Beker (following the punctuation of A) takes τότε with δώτος, but πρότερον δε οὐπώ shews that it belongs to καὶ εἶδον.

τότε καὶ is simply ‘then too’; I cannot see anything “mock-heroic” in the expression, as J. and C. do.

30 e οὖν λέγομι κτλ. e δ' οὖν is read by Ast: “sed sufficit externum, ut ita dicam, vinculum oun (Schneider).” δημηγορεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν oun βούλομαι are the opposites of διαλέγεσθαι καὶ βραχυ-λογα (Prot. 336 B, 335 A).

350 E 32 ὡσπερ ταις γραφοις. Cf. Ges. 527 Α τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μιθῶς σου δοκεί λέγεσθαι, ὕσπερ γραφοις, καὶ κατα-φρονεῖς αὐτῶν: Prot. 368 E ἀλλ' δη τῷ μιθῶσ μου πάνω πρὸσχει τὸν νοῦν, καθάπερ οἰ παῖδες. ταῖς τοῖς γραφοῖς was read before Ast on the authority of one MS; but taia is quite satisfactory.

37 ὡπερ ἄρτι. The words εφαμεν δέ δή καὶ ἵσχυρον εἶναι τὴν ἄδικιαν ἢ οὐ μέμνησασ; (350 D), which are referred to in ἄρτι, involve the general question of the relation between justice and injustice; whence we have ὅποιον τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς ἄδικιαν. ὅποιον depends on ἐρώτα, not on λόγον.

351 A 2 ἐλέξθη γάρ ποι: 344 C, 348 E. It has nowhere been expressly said that Injustice is δυνατότερον than Justice, but καὶ δυνατότερον is added for emphasis (see on ἥ λέγειν in 350 A); and indeed according to the theory of Thra- symachus δύναμι (power in a general sense) rests solely on ἵσχυ (physical strength). δύναμι καὶ ἵσχος are clearly distinguished in Prot. 351 A.

6 ἀπλῶς. The Platonic use of ἀπλῶς has been investigated by Bonitz in Hermes 11 (1857) pp. 307 ff. Its antitheses are διπλῶς, διάφορος, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον, and the like, and it denotes that which is uniform, or single and simple, or true without any difference or qualifications. ἀπλῶς οὖσα means merely ‘in this simple or general way’ (“im Allgemeinen” Schneider): a more elaborate and profounder proof (thinks Socrates) is necessary.
351 B 8 καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι is rejected by Cobet, but successfully defended by Heller (Fl. Jahrh. 1875 p. 172). There is in reality no pleonasm: we have first an attempt (ἐπίχειρεῖν), then a successful attempt (καταδεδουλώσθαι), then the results of success (πολλάς δὲ καὶ υφ’ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσμένην; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφ’ καὶ τοῦτο γε ἡ ἁρπής μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεότατα οὕσα ἄδικος. Μανθάνω, ἐφ’ν’ ὅτι σοι οὕτως ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τὸ δέ περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶν πότερον ἡ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἀνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτή C μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Ἐλ ἡ μέν, ἐφ’ν’, ὅσ’ σοι ἄρτι ἐλεγες ἔχει, ἡ δικαιο- σύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης: εἴ δ’ ὅσ’ ἐγώ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἄδικας. 15 Πάνω ἀγαμαί, ἦν ἡ ἐγώ, ὅ Ὁρασύμαχος, ὃτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεσθαι μόνων καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνεται πάνω καλῶς. Σοι γὰρ, ἐφ’ν’, χαρίζομαι.

XXIII. Ἐν γε σ’ οὐ ποιῶν ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγεις: δοκεῖς ἂν ἡ πόλιν ἡ στρατόπεδον ἡ λρτιτὰς ἡ κλέπτας ἡ 20 ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, δόσα κοινῆ ἐπὶ τι ἐρχεται ἄδικος, πράξει ἃν τι D δύνασθαι, εἰ ἄδικοιεν ἀλλήλους; Ὅν δῆτα, ἡ δ’ ὃς. Τί δ’ εἰ μὴ ἄδικοιεν; σ’ οὐ μᾶλλον; Πάνω γε. Στάσεις γὰρ ποιν, ὃ Ὁρασύμαχος, ἢ γε ἄδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἢ δε δικαιο- σύνη ὁμόνοιαι καὶ φιλαν. ἡ γὰρ; Ἡ Εστίο, ἡ δ’ ὃς, ἕνα σοι μὴ 25

351 C 20 ἡ ληστάς κτλ. Cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Panath. 226 οδceeded αὐ- τοῦ (τοὺς Σπαρταίας) διὰ γε τὴν ὁμονοίαν δικαίως ἐπιφανείας, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντίστας καὶ ληστάς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας κ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι σφάλει αὐτὸς ὁμοούσιν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπόλ- λυσιν. There must be some honour even among thieves.

351 D 25 ὁμόνοιαι καὶ φιλαν. The conception of δικαιοσύνη which meets us in Book IV 433 A—434 E is dimly outlined here.
The gate follows. The results of Book IV are foreshadowed more clearly. The notion that justice present in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is more fully developed in 441 D, and implicitly assumes a psychological theory like that in Book IV, where soul is shewn to have ‘parts’ (435 c ff.). Further, in Book IV, Plato first describes justice in the State, and afterwards justice in the individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. The same method is observed here in the description of injustice, and afterwards in Books VIII and IX, where the varieties of δικία in states and individuals are described. The present passage (351 A —352 A), in fact, contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the Republic (with the exception of Books V—VII). Cf. Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 608.

μὴν (a strengthened num) occurs only twice in the Republic, here and in vi 505 C. In the later dialogues μὴν is especially frequent (Frederking in Fl. Jahrb. 1892 p. 539). A classified list of examples is given by Kugler de part. του εἰκόμενοι comp. ap. Pl. in Iου p. 40.

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352 B 11 τὰ λοιπὰ κτλ.: viz. the discussion which begins in D below.

12 δὲ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. The whole sentence is summed up in ταύτα μὲν οὖν δὲ οὖν οἷς ἔχει (352 D) and placed in this recapitulated form under the government of μανθάνω. The introduction of the antithesis (ἀλλὰ δὴ κτλ.) to οἱ ὁδὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττεις μὲτ’ ἄλληλων οὐλ’ τε, and of the explanations required by that antithesis, complicates the sentence, without, however, rendering it obscure. For similar anacolutha with δὲ see ν 465 A, vi 493 D nn. and cf. Engelhardt Anac. Plat. Spec. 111 pp. 38, 40. The whole sentence forms a kind of transition to "the rest of the feast" by summing up what has been so far proved; viz. that Justice is virtue and wisdom (καὶ σοφότερος καὶ ἀμείνος), and more capable of action than Injustice (δυνατότερον πράττειν); even the difficulty raised in ἀλλὰ δὴ—ἀδικῶν is not new, having been briefly explained in 351 c. Liebhold's δὲ for δὴ is an unhappy suggestion; nor should δὲ be rendered 'quoniam,' as Hartman proposes.

352 C 18 μήτοι—γα: a strong negative somewhat rarely used by Plato; cf. Phil. 67 A and infra 338 B, c. See Kugler de part. τοι εινεύτε comp. op. Pl. 111 n. 11.

352 D—354 C The argument here reverts to 347 E, and the rest of the book offers a direct refutation of the view that Injustice is more advantageous than Justice, in other words, that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. An indirect refutation, says Socrates, is afforded by the recent discussion (from 348 B to 352 D); the direct is as follows. Everything has its peculiar work or product (ἐργόν)—that, namely, which it alone produces, or which it produces better than ought else. Everything moreover has its own peculiar excellence, without which it will not do its work well. Now the work of soul is to deliberate, to rule, to live: its excellence is justice. Therefore the just soul will live well, and to live well is to be blest and happy. And as this is more advantageous than to be miserable, Injustice can never be more advantageous than Justice. In conclusion, Socrates sums up regretfully: until we knew what Justice is, we are not likely to discover whether it is a virtue or a vice, and whether its possessor is happy or unhappy.

352 D ff. The view that everything has its own peculiar function, which it can perform better than anything else, afterwards becomes one of the cardinal principles of the Ideal State (11 360 ff.); and the statement that everything has an excellence or virtue of its own is reaffirmed.
in Book x, where we are also told that everything that has its own peculiar vice, that of soul being ἄδικα (608 E ff.).

27 ὁνται τρόπον χρή ζήν. A reminiscence of the τῶν βιωτῶν of Socrates: cf. 344 E.

352 D 30 ἰν—ἀριστα. The political applications of this principle are developed from 369 E onwards: cf. IV 433 A ff.

32 ἀκούσας κτλ. The rapid succession of questions makes it possible to dispense with ὅσον in the second: cf. II 382 E.

33 φαίμεν. See cr. n. If φαίμεν is retained, ἰν will belong to εἶναι (cf. VI 493 c), but it is inappropriate here to make εἶναι future or hypothetical. Schneider, while retaining φαίμεν, refers ἰν to δικαίως, “ut sensus sit: ὀκούν, εἰ ταῦτα τούτων φαίμεν ἐργα εἶναι, δικαίως ἰν φαίμεν”—a harsh and unnatural view. We may either drop ἰν and keep φαίμεν, as (with one of Stobaeus’ MSS Flor. 9. 63) I formerly did: or change φαίμεν to φαίμεων. The latter solution is easier and better. Similarly in φαίμεων below (353 D) the is due to A². See also Ιntrod. § 5.

353 A 1 ἀποτείμως—see cr. n.—can hardly, I think, dispense with the particle ἰν. It should be noted that the illustrations are of two kinds—the first to illustrate ἦ μόνω ἐκείνῳ, the second to illustrate ἀριστα; after each division the conclusion is stated, in the second case more diffidently (ὁρ γ' ὄν ὤν—θήσωμεν), perhaps because it is less obvious.

6 μόνον τι. Cornarius unhappily suggested τις for τι and Stephanus μόνω τις for μόνω τι (cf. 352 E). μόνον τι is of course the subject to ἀποτείμως.

353 B 9 οὐκοῦν—προστέτακται. Cf.
εστιν ἐργον; "Εστιν. 'Αρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐστὶν; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δὲ; ὡς τίνι θέλῃς; Ναὶ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή; Καὶ ἀρετή. Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὖτω; Οὔτω.

'Εχε δὴ; ἀρ' ἄν ποτε ὦμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσασιντο

C μὴ ἔχουσα τὴν αὐτῶν ὀικείαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς 15 κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἐφ' ὑπολόγισα γὰρ ἑώς λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. "Ητις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή; οὐ γὰρ παύ τούτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ ὀικείᾳ μὲν ἀρετή τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὗ ἀπεργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακία δὲ κακῶς. 'Αλλ' ἐφ' ἐφ', τούτῳ γε λέγεις, Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτα στέρημεν τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν 20 ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τάλλα πάντα

D εἰς τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον; "Εμοιογε δοκεῖ. 'Ιθα δὴ; μετὰ ταύτα τὸ δὲ σκέψαι. "ψυχῆς ἔστιν τί ἐργον; δ' ἄλλω τῶν ὄντων οὔτε ἄν ἐνί πράξεις; οὐδὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο; τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ἐσθ' ὑπὸ ἄλλο ἡ ψυχῆς δικαίως 25

24. πράξεις Α'Π: πράξειον κορ. Α".

Men. 72 a οὐκ ἀπορία εἶνειν ἀρετῆς πέμ δ' ἐπετέλων; καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ῥήματι πρὸς ἐκάστον ἔργον ἐκάστῳ ῥήματι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν. ὡσαύτως δε—καὶ ἡ κακία: also infra X 608 E with Arist. Eth. Nic. II 5. 1106b 15 ff.

12 ἢν: "is, as we saw," viz. at 352 E: cf. infra IV 441 D, VI 400 A, VII 532 A.

14 ἀπεργάσαντο. Heindorf (at Crat. 424 E) would read ἀπεργάσαντο, and Bater adopts his suggestion; but (as Stallbaum observes) the use of ὀφθαλμῷ just above may affect the construction. In the same way, perhaps, the occurrence of γνώκες καὶ τάλλα ἡμία immediately before causes Plato to write δεξιοστόν (the reading of A) rather than δεξιόστο. Cf. Tim. 76 E. Of the other alleged cases of a plural verb after a neuter plural in Plato, some (e.g. Laws 634 E, 683 b) are not supported by the best MSS; one—ἐξ ὑμῶν τα ὑπόματα καὶ τὰ ρήματα συνεπεθεῖναι (so AT) Crat. 424 E—is distributive; some refer to living objects, e.g. Laws 638 C (with which contrast κράτος just before) and Lach. 180 E; at least one (Phil. 24 E) is perhaps corrupt. See also on Rep. II 306 B.

353 C 16 τυφλότητα κτλ. τυφλότης is also said to be the disease or vice of the eyes in Alc. I 126 b, a passage probably imitated from this. In the stricter discussion of X 608 E it is not τυφλότης

but ὀφθαλμία which is the vice to which the eyes are subject.

17 οὐ γὰρ τω—ἐρωτῶ is 'I do not, at this stage, enquire'; but the words do not, I think, contain an express promise that the subject will be afterwards resumed. Although the peculiar vice of the eyes is specified in Book X (I.C.), their virtue is not; and τοῦτο refers to ἡτίς αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή. Cf. 347 E n.

353 D 23 ψυχῆς ἔστιν τί ἐργον: cf. H 407 a and Arist. Eth. Nic. I 6. 1097 b 22—1098 a 17, where this discussion is closely imitated. That it is the ἔργον of soul (and in particular of νοῦ) to rule (ἀρχεῖν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and the like), is continually asserted in Plato: see for example Phaedr. 246 b πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆς παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἰσθανον, Crat. 400 A, Phil. 30C. Laws 866 A. The same doctrine is made the ground of the subjection of body to soul which is inculcated in the Phaedo (80 A, 94 B), and in Alc. I 130 A. Cf. also Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδίσεως 180 ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἄμως ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συγκεκάθαι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· αὐτῶν δὲ τοῖνοι οὐδὲ ἔστω τίτσ τίς ὡς οὖν ἄν χρήσθην ἡγεμονικότερα περικόκα τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πλείους ἄξιον· τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον εἶναι βουλεύεσθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱδών καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὑπηρετήσαι τοις ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γνωσθεῖν.
26 ἵκεινον. The reading ἵκεινον—see cr. n.—can only be defended by supposing that Plato was guilty of a strange confusion, unless we make a pause at ἄλλω, and take ἵ as 'or,' not 'than;' but ἵ after ἄλλω would certainly here be understood as 'than,' and an alternative question should be less ambiguously expressed. After ψυχή the corruption to ἵκεινος was natural enough. Madvig would eject the word.

27 τὸ ἵκον is κατ' ἐξοχήν the ἔργον of ψυχή in Plato: cf. Crat. 399 D, τὸ τούτο ἄρα (sc. ψυχή), ὅταν παρὰ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἵκου αὐτοῦ, τῆς τοῦ ἀνάπτειν δίναμιν παρέχον καὶ ἀναψεῦχον, ἀμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψεῦχου τὸ σῶμα ἀπόλλυται τε καὶ τελευτᾷ. δὴν δὴ μοι δοκοῦμαι αὐτὸν ψυχήν καλεῖται, and Phaed. 105 D. The influence of this idea makes itself felt in all the proofs of immortality in Plato, and not least in X 608 e ff. See Introd. ad loc.

353 Ε 32 συνεχωρήσαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 350 C, D: cf. also 348 C. In these passages Justice has been identified with Virtue, but not expressly with virtue of soul. For this reason Hartman would eject ψυχή. But as Plato has just been using ἀρετή 'excellence' in connexion with things other than soul (ears and eyes), it is important that he should now make it clear that in identifying δικαιοσύνη and ἀρετή, he meant soul's ἀρετή. Otherwise a soul may possess its ἀρετή without being just; in which case the conclusion which he is aiming at will not follow.

354 A 2 δὲ εὖ τὸν κτλ. The ambiguity (as it appears to us) of εὖ τὸν and εὖ πράττειν is frequently used by Plato to suggest that the virtuous life is the happy one, e.g. Charm. 172 A, 173 D: see note on 335 B. Aristotle says that Plato was the first to establish this identification: see the third fragment of his elegies τν. 4—6 ed. Bergk δὲ μόνον ἡ πρώτης θητών κατείδευσεν ἐναρχώς οἰκείοις τοίς βίοι και μεθόδοις λόγων ὃς άγαθος τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀμα γίνεται. ἀνήρ.

6 εἰσιτατόν. The metaphor occurs again in 352 B, V 458 A, I 571 D. It is one of the formal links connecting the Timaeus with the Republic: see Tim. 17 A. Cf. Shakespeare Macbeth Act I Scene 4 "In his commendations I am fed: It is a banquet to me."

7 Βενδίδειος. See Introd. § 3.

In ὑπὸ σοῦ γε κτλ. Plato seems to be making the amende honorable to Thrasymachus: cf. vi 498 C, D μὴ διάβαλλε—ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἀρτί φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐξ θρόους γεγονότας.
μου πράος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπάινων ἐπαύσω. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε 

B εἴστιμαί, δὲ | ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σὲ· ἀλλ' ὁσπερ οἱ λίχνου τοῦ 

ἀεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου ἰο 

μετρίως ἀπολαίθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ὡτό, πρὶν ὃ τοῦ πρῶτον 

ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφέμενον ἐκείνου 

ὁμήσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἶτε κακία ἐστίν καὶ 

ἀμαθία εἶτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὐτοῦ, λόγου, 

ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἀδίκια τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην 15 

C τὸ μή οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὅστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν 

ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μη ῥίδα 

ὁ ἐστιν, σχολὴ εἴσομαι εἶτε ἀρετή τις οὐδα τυγχάνει εἶτε καὶ οὔ, 

καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστίν ἡ εὐδαίμων.

τέλος πολιτείας A.

354 B 10 παραφερομένου. Casaubon's 
conjecture περιφερομένου is neat, but in 
appropriate, the reference being to the 
successive courses at a feast, which were 
not usually carried round among the 
Greeks. In Athen. IV 33 the carrying 
round of viands is mentioned as an Egyptian 
custom: τρίτη δ' ἐστίν ἰδα δεινών 
αἰγυπτική, τραπέζων μὲν οἱ παρατεθε-
μένων, πυνάκων δὲ περιφερομένων.

II ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ κτλ. Lys. 222 E 
ὁμοίως οὖν ὡσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστη-
ρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα ἄπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι.

The tone of the concluding summary 
recalls the usual finish of the earlier and 
professedly negative Socratic dialogues, 
like the Charmides (175 B—176 A). The 
only section of the dialogue which So-
crates passes over in silence is the reful-
tation of the statement that Injustice is 
strong (350 D—352 C). The original 
question—the quid sit of Justice—is ab-
bandoned at 347 E: the quae sit occupies 
the rest of the dialogue, and Socrates 
enquires first whether Justice is vicious 
and ignorant, or wise and good (347 E— 
350 C), next whether it is strong or weak 
(350 D—352 C), and lastly whether it is 
more or less advantageous than Injustice 
(352 D—354 A). To speculate on the 
quae sit of a thing before determining its 
quid sit is condemned by Plato in Men. 
71 B & δ' ἐμὴ ὡδα τι ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὅποιον γε 
τι τειχίν; cf. ibid. 86 D and 100 B. The 
words with which the first book concludes 
lead us to expect that in the remaining 
books the problem will be discussed in 
proper logical order—the essence first, 
and afterwards the quality, of Justice. 
The expectation is duly fulfilled; and 
Book 1 is therefore in the full sense of the 
term a προοίμων to the whole work.
APPENDICES TO BOOK I.

I.

I 327 A. προσευξόμενος τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἀμα τήν ἐφορτὶν βουλόμενος θεᾶσασθαὶ τίνα τρόπον ποιήσωσιν, ἀτε ἐνν πρῶτον ἄγοντες.

The question whether τῇ θεῷ here and in 328 A is Bendis or Athena is not so simple as it appears.

In favour of Athena it may be urged (1) that τῇ θεός regularly means Athena in Attic literature (see for example Ar. Eq. 656, 903 al., and Plato Laws 806 b): (2) that in view of the relation between the Republic and the Timaeus it is difficult to separate τῇ θεῷ here from τήν θεόν and τῆς θεός in Tim. 21 A and 26 E, where the goddess is certainly Athena, (3) that it is dramatically appropriate for an Athenian to dedicate his ideal city to the patron goddess of Athens. Plato's perfect city would thus become in a certain sense a βασιλεία τῆς θεός.

On the other hand, the goddess and the festival are mentioned so closely together that (if we have regard to the Republic by itself) we are scarcely justified in interpreting τῇ θεῷ without reference to τήν ἐφορτὶν, and it is quite in harmony with Socrates' principles that he should be among the first to pay his vows at the shrine of the new goddess as soon as the νόμος πόλεως received her. See Xen. Mem. 1 3. 1, IV 3. 16. It is therefore safer to accept the usual view that Plato is thinking of Bendis.

II.

I 333 E—334 A. ἀρ’ οὖχ ὃ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ ἔτε τυκτικῇ ἔτε τῷ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὔτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνυ γε. "Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινός φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὔτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσαι; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατόπεδον γε ὃ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμιῶν κλάσαι καὶ βουλεύσαι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνυ γε. "Ὅτου τις ἀρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτον καὶ φόρ δεινός. Ἐοικεν.

The reading φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὔτος δεινότατος καὶ ἐμποιήσαι, which has slight MS authority, is defended by Boeckh (Kl. Schr. iv pp. 326 ff.), with whom Zahlfleisch (Zeitschr. f. öst. Gymn. Vol. xxviii 1877, pp. 603 ff.) and others agree. Boeckh points out that καὶ λαθεῖν (sc. νόσον, according to his view) suggests (from its notion of clandestine cunning) the idea of stealing. This may be admitted, but the idea of stealing is much more forcibly suggested (as Stallbaum points out), if καὶ λαθεῖν is construed with οὔτος δεινότατος κτλ., and this involves the necessity of changing (with Schneider) ἐμποιήσαι of the MS to ἐμποιήσας, for the construction λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσαι, though retained by Campbell, is destitute of authority.
Even if Schneider’s emendation be adopted, the argument is (as stated in the notes) fantastical and inconclusive. In order that the conclusion οτον τις ἁρα δεινός φύλαξ, τούτον καὶ φωρ δεινός should be valid, φυλάξασθαι should be φυλάξαν, and the objects of the two verbs in proposition (1) should be identical, as well as those in propositions (2) and (3). As it is, if we express φυλάξασθαι in terms of φυλάξαν, they are not identical: for in (1) it is the enemy whom you smite, but yourself whom you guard: in (2) it is yourself (or your patient) whom you guard, but the disease which you secretly implant: in (3) you guard your own army, but steal the enemy’s plans, etc. Nevertheless Schneider’s emendation is preferable to the traditional reading, which not only contains all the same fallacies as the other, but leaves the three stages of the argument in comparative isolation, attaches the first hint of ‘stealing’ (λαθεῖν) to the wrong member of the clause, and involves the use of the somewhat strained expression λαθεῖν νόσον. It should be added that the change from ἐμπούησαι to ἐμπούησας is not greater than the insertion of καὶ before ἐμπούησαι, and that ἐμπούησας was very likely to be corrupted under the influence of δεινός φυλάξασθαι just before. The emphatic position of καὶ λαθεῖν is necessary to call attention to the first suggestion of the idea contained in κλέψαι; nor can I agree with J. and C. that in Schneider’s emendation “the emphasis falls on the wrong word.” In λαθεῖν ἐμπούησας, which is virtually a single expression, λαθεῖν is more important, in view of the conclusion καὶ κλέψτειν δεινός, than ἐμπούησας. Hartman condemns the words καὶ λαθεῖν, and thinks ὅστις and οὗτος have changed places: “cum enim ubique τὸ φυλάξασθαι urgetur (ο πατάξαι δεινότατος, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι—οὕτερ κλέψαι... [and] διὸ τῶν φυλάξαν ἁγαθῶν), requiritur οὗτος δεινός φυλάξασθαι, ὅστις δεινότατος κτλ.; quibus tribus exemplis praemissis inversa ratione concludit οτον τὶς ἁρα δεινός φυλάξ, τούτον καὶ φωρ δεινός.” Tucker revives the old conjecture καὶ ἄλθεῖν (‘heal’) instead of καὶ λαθεῖν, and suggests (as an alternative) that λαθεῖν should be μαθεῖν (i.e. καὶ μαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμπούησαι ‘clever at learning how to implant’). None of these conjectures appeals to me so probable as that of Schneider.

III.

I 335 A. Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ, ἦ, ὥσ τὸ πρώτον ἑλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὑρίσκω, τὸν δ’ ἔχθρον κακῶς, νῦν πρὸς τοῦτο ὡδὲ λέγειν, ότι ἐστὶν δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἁγαθὸν ὡντα εὑρίσκω, τὸν δ’ ἔχθρον κακῶς ὡντα βλάπτειν;

In this difficult passage Schneider takes ἦ as ‘than,’ and προσθείναι as equivalent to a comparative with a verb; but no exact parallel has hitherto been adduced, and the idiom even if admissible is exceedingly harsh. Neither the suggestion of Stephanus (προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἄλλως ἦ) nor that of Richards (to insert πλεῖον after ἦ) carries conviction. It should also be remarked that the words νῦν πρὸς τοῦτο ὡδὲ λέγειν follow somewhat awkwardly as an explanation of προσθείναι τῷ δικαίῳ if ἦ ὥσ is interpreted in Schneider’s way. Stallbaum’s ἦ ὥσ—τὸν δε ἔχθρον κακῶς; νῦν πρὸς τοῦτο ὡδὲ λέγειν, is very unpleasing, not so much from the
necessity of understanding λέγειν after ἥ ('or to say, as we said at first' etc.) as because it is extremely violent to separate ἥ from νῦν πρὸς τοῦτο ὀντε λέγειν. Faesius' proposal (in which he is followed by Ast, Madvig, and several editors) to eject ἥ gives the required sense ('do you bid us add to the view of justice which etc.', προσθέειν being explained by πρὸς τοῦτο ὀντε λέγειν), but it fails to account for the presence of ἥ in the mss. It may seem an objection to the view which I take that ἥ in a sentence of this kind would naturally introduce an alternative, whereas πρὸς τοῦτο ὀντε λέγειν only explains προσθέειν. This objection, such as it is, applies with still greater force to the view that ἥ is 'than.' Some will probably regard the whole clause from ἥ—λέγειν as a marginal commentary on προσθέειν; but this is much too drastic. Possibly ἥ should be replaced by καὶ—the corruption is said to be common (Bast Comment. Palaeogr. p. 815); but I am not convinced that ἥ does not sometimes mean 'or in other words' even in classical Greek.

IV.

I 336 E. μὴ γὰρ ἡ ὁνίν, εἰ μὲν χρυσόν εἰστοῖμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκώντας εἰσὶν ὑποκατακλίσεως ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇ ζήτησει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν ἐφεσίν αὐτῶν, δικαιούσθην ἐπὶ ζητούντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσῶν τιμιώτερον, ἡπεθ' οὕτως ἀνώτατοι ὑπεύκειν ἀλλήλους καὶ οὐ σπουδαζέν τι τὸ μάλιστα φανήναι αὐτῷ. ὅθεν γε σὺ, ὁ φίλε· ἀλλ', ὁμαί, οὐ δυνάμεθα.

Schneider's explanation of the words ὁνίν γε σὺ (sc. ἡμᾶς σπουδαζέν τὸ τι μάλιστα φανήναι αὐτῷ) would probably have met with wider acceptance if he had taken more pains to justify his view. The key to the meaning is to be found in the affirmative οἶεσθαί γε χρῆ which sometimes follows a fortiori reasoning of this kind in Plato. Two examples will suffice: Prot. 325 B, C τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἂρα τοὺς νείς διδάσκονται, ἐάθ' οἴς οὖν ἐστι θάνατος ἡ ἐξίμη ἄν μὴ ἐπίστανται, ἐάθ' ὃ δὲ ἢ τε ἡ ζῆμια θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισί—ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται οὖν ἐπιμελεύονται πάνω ἐπιμελεύειν; οἶεσθαί γε χρῆ, and Phaed. 68 a ἡ αὐθροπισίν μὲν παλικῶν—ἄποθανόντων πολλοί δὲ ἐκόντες ἥθελθαν εἰς ὁνίν λέναι—φρονήσεως ἃ ἄρα τις τῷ ὀντὶ ἐρῶν—ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθητήσων καὶ οὐκ ἀκμένος ἄσχον αὐτὸς; οἶεσθαί γε χρῆ. If in place of the imperative μὴ γὰρ ἡ ὁνίν, Plato had used an interpolation (as he generally does in sentences of this kind), writing let us say ἡ οἶει instead of μὴ γὰρ ἡ ὁνίν, he would have added οἶεσθαί γε χρῆ. The same way of writing, dictated of course by the desire to emphasize the δὲ clause, causes him to say ὁνίν γε when the sentence is in the imperative form. οὖ is of course necessary on account of ὁ φίλε. For the affirmative sense of ὁνίν cf. infra 346 E ἀρ' ὁνίν οὖν ὁφελεῖ τότε, ὅσταν προῖκα ἐργάζεσθαι; ὁμαί έγώγε, and X 608 D. Of the various suggestions made on this passage that of O. Apelt iou, iou, ὁ φίλε "aber wehe, o Freund, unsere Kraft, glaube ich, reicht nicht aus dazu" (FZ. Jahrb. 1891, p. 557) deserves mention for its ingenuity; but except for the corruption of γε το τε (see cr. n.), the text is sound. There is certainly no occasion to follow q and Stallbaum in writing μὴ οὖν σὺ for ὁνίν γε σὺ.
357 A—358 B Socrates had thought the conversation at an end, but Glauco revives the theory of Thrasymachus. A threefold classification of goods is first agreed upon. Goods are desirable either (i) for their own sakes, or (2) both for their own sakes and for their consequences, or (3) for their consequences alone. Justice is placed by Socrates in the second and noblest of these three classes. Glauco on the other hand asserts that the Many place it in the third, and proposes to advocate the belief of the Many, not as holding it himself, but in order to compel Socrates to defend Justice and condemn Injustice solely on their merits. Thrasymachus, he thinks, has cried off too soon.

357 A Ι. ἑγὼ κτλ. λόγου is abstract = τοῦ λέγειν, not 'the discussion' (Jowett), which would be τοῦ λόγου. For τὸ δὲ see on I 340 D.

2 ἵνα ἄρα: 'was after all,' as in IV 433 C τὸ δὲ γε ἵνα ἄρα—εἴδωλον τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης and Soph. Tr. 1172 τὸ δὲ ἵνα ἄρ’ οὔδεν ἄλλα πλὴν θανεῖ ἐμέ. With προοίμιον cf. infra vii 531 D, Aesch. P. V. 740 ff. ὁδὸς γὰρ νῦν ἀκήκοας λόγους | εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι μηθέων τινα προσιμίοις, and Shake-
10 χαίρειν—ἀβλαβεῖς. These "innocent pleasures" are defined in Laws 607 E as those which bring no consequences in their train, good, bad, or otherwise (cf. καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἐπετα χρόνον διὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται ἀλλὰ χαίρειν ἔχοντα. 'Εμοιοῦ, ήν δ' ἐγὼ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τι δὲ; ὁ αὐτῷ C τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γυμνομένων; οἶον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὀράν καὶ τὸ υγιαίνειν: τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα που δὲ 15 ἀμφότερα ἀσταξόμεθα. Ναὶ, εἰπὼν. Τρίτων δὲ ὀρᾶς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν δ' τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ιατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἱατρεύσις τε καὶ ὁ ἀλλὸς χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίσημα φαίνειν ἀν' ὀφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτῷ μὲν ἐαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν D δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν οὐκαὶ 20 γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν. 'Εστιν γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τούτῳ τρίτων. ἀλλὰ τί ὅτι; Ἐν ποιῶ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τίθης; 'Εγὼ μὲν οἷμαι, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ τὸ καλλίστῳ, οὐ καὶ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ 358 γυμνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητῶν τὸ μέλλοντι μακαρίω ἐσεθαι. Οὐ τοῖνοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιτόπου εἶδος,

not the idiomatic 'to continue rejoicing' (as Campbell suggests). The essential mark of these pleasures, viz. that they give pleasure only while they last, is brought out by ἔχοντα, which recalls δεξαίμεθα 'ἂν ἔχειν just above, and is used without an expressed object as in 360 E.

357 c 14 τὸ φρονεῖν—ὑγιαίνειν. ἀκοῦσθεν is added in 367 c. Cf. Aristotle. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1065 b 16 καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ποία θέη τις ταύτα; ή δὲ καὶ μονολομείται διόκεται, οὖν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὀράν καὶ ἑξελνομένοι τινὲς καὶ τιµῆς; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δ' ἀλλοί τί διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καὶ αὐτὰ ἀγαθών θεῖα τις τις ἂν: also Met. A 1. 980 b 2 ff. Aristole himself does not suggest that a special class should be made of things desirable both in themselves and for their results; but integri sensus and bona valedictio are included in the Stoic category of προτυμέα καὶ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ δ' ἑτέρα (Cic. De Fin. III 50; cf. D. L. VII 197).

16 γυμνάζεσθαι κτλ. Cf. Prot. 354 A and Gorg. 467 c, D (where χρηματισμός is again said to belong to this class). ἱατρεύσις as an example of χρηματισμός (in spite of the άκροβήθη λόγος of 1 342 B ff.) is suggested by ἱατρεύσθαι. ὁ ἀλλὸς is, 'the rest of,' and should not be taken (with Stallbaum) as praeterea: cf. Gorg. 1. οἱ πλεόνατε τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμόνον and Crit. 53 E. 
358 a 4. μισθῶν δ’ ἔνεκα κτλ. Her- 
werden would read μισθῶν τε μὲν ἔνεκα, 
but for δὲ without μὲν preceding see 
1 340 D n. The words δὲ δόξαν, 
which are condemned by the same eritic, may 
no doubt be a gloss on εὐδοκιμήσεως ἔνεκα. I 
incline however to think them 
genuine. Plato is not averse to duplicate 
expressions of this kind (see Schanz Nov. 
Comm. Plat. pp. 12—15), and the em-
phatic addition of δὲ δόξαν helps in the 
absence of μὲν to prepare us for the 
antithesis αὐτοὶ δὲ δὲ αὐτὸ κτλ. Cf. 363 A 
below.

7 ψέγεται. See cr. n. The words 
ἀδίκα δ’ ἐπανείταί are probably genuine: 
for the mention of ἀδίκα seems to be 
necessary to justify the pronoun ἐκατέρω 
just below: cf. also in δ’ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ 
ἀκολου ἀδίκαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοῦν 
δὲ ἐπανοῦντος. For the omission see 
Intro. § 5.

358 c 17. ὃς ἀναγκαίον ἀλλ’ οὐχ 
ὁς ἄγαθος. Cf. infra 360 c and vi 493 c 
τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἄγαθοῦ φύσιν δοσον 
διαφέρει τῷ δεῖ κτλ. 
18 ἀμείνον ἀρα. ἄρα disclaims re-
ponsibility for the theory: cf. 362 A, 
364 B, E al. 
21 Ὄρασμαχον—Ἀλλών. See on 1 
337 A ff.

358 D 24. κατατείνας κτλ.: 'I will 
speak vehemently in praise of the unjust 
life.’ The explanation of Phiotius and 
Suidas (κατατείνας ἐρώτ’ ἄντι τοῦ μακρὸν 
λόγον διεξελεξομοί) does not suit 11 367 B 
ὡς δοκῇ μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. For 
this intrusive use of κατατείνα cf. 1 348 A 
and Boeckh’s emendation of Eur. 194. 
Αὐτ. 336 ὅτε κατατείνα (κατατείνα MSS) 
λίγαν ἐγώ.

358 E 30 οἶδω τε τι. The reading of Α τι δὲν τε καὶ δὲν ἐγέρων involves the separation of δὲν from ἐγέρων, and is otherwise much too harsh to be right. There is something to be said in favour of Schneider’s πέρι τοῦτον ἄκον τι ὁσωταί, καὶ δὲν ἐγέρων δικαιοσύνη (see cr. n.), especially as the confusion between οἶδω τε and ὁσωταί occurs rather frequently in Platonic MSS (see Schneider on 1 329 E), but the specific reference in δ ἐφην πρῶτον ἔρειν το 358 C πρῶτον μὲν ἐρώ δικαιοσύνην οἶδον εἶναι φαίνει καὶ δὲν ἐγέρωναι points to the presence of οἶδω here. The reading οἶδω τε, adopted by Stallbaum, as well as by Jowett and Campbell, on the authority of three MSS (Vind. F, Flor. RT), is unexceptionable in point of sense, but fails to account for the presence of τι in the best MSS. I have ventured to read οἶδω τε τι (sc. ἄστι), supposing that the confusion arose from the accidental omission of τι, which was afterwards (as τι) wrongly inserted before οἶδω (where it remained in II), οἶδω itself being afterwards changed to δν in order to provide a kind of construction (‘being what, and whence, it arises,’ J. and C.). This δnv was itself fortified by τιγχάνει in Flor. B and the Aldine edition. Campbell’s suggestion that “τι δν τε may be a corruption of τι ἄστι” is improbable: still less can Herder and Hartman induce us to reject the whole clause. Few will approve of Tucker’s conjecture τι τι δν τε καὶ δὲν κτλ. Dr Jackson suggests άκον τι, οἶδω τε καὶ κτλ., and a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Lit. Centrallblatt 1898 p. 296 οἶδω τε ἄστι κτλ.

358 E—359 B Glauco will first describe the origin and nature of Ἰστία according to the theory which he has under-

taken to maintain. According to nature, to commit injustice is a good, to suffer injustice an evil. But as there is more evil in suffering than good in committing injustice, experience causes men to enter into a compact neither to commit nor suffer wrong. The collective prescriptions of this compact are called Law and Ἰστία. Justice is accordingly a compromise between the best policy, i.e. doing wrong without incurring any penalty, and the worst, i.e. suffering wrong without being able to exact vengeance. No one will accept the compromise who is strong enough to do wrong successfully.

358 E ff. In thus resuscitating the theory of Thrasymachus, Glauco removes a serious stumbling-block by introducing the distinction between φόβος and νόμος. Civilisation revolts against the anti-social doctrines of Thrasymachus in their application to itself, but receives them more favourably when its own existence is safeguarded by relegating them to an age anterior to society. The view maintained by Glauco is allied to that of Callicles in Gorg. 482 E ff.; and it has already been pointed out (on 1 337 A, 344 B) that similar views were tolerably widely entertained in Plato’s time. To the evidence previously adduced may be added Laws 690 B, 889 E, Eur. Phoen. 509 and Frag. 912 ἣ φόβος ἐβολεθῇ ἢ νόμον οἰδὲν μελεί. But whereas the doctrine of Callicles breaks down in explaining the origin of Law (Gorg. 483 C, cf. 488 D—489 D), Glauco’s theory endeavours to solve this difficulty by postulating a social contract. A kindred solution is ascribed by Aristotle to the Sophist Lyceophon: Pol. Γ 1380 b 10 ὃ νόμος σωθήκῃ, καὶ κάθαρε ἐφίν λυκόφων ὁ σωφήτης, ἐγγυητὴ διάλεκτος τῶν δικαίων. The theory of a Social Contract was revived by Epicurus: see D. L. x 150. The views of the “incomplete Protagoreans” in Theat. 172 B (with which cf. Laws 889 E), though they do not offer an explanation of the origin of
Law, are parallel in so far as they regard it as depending for its binding force solely upon the sanction of society.

31 περικεναι γάρ—κακόν. Cf. Corg. 483 A. I have adopted Ast’s conjecture δοκεῖν. Throughout this paragraph Glauco consistently presents his view at second hand. For the collocation of infinitives cf. ἀδίκεσθαι, δικαίωμα 360 D, and for the error itself Introd. § 5.

359 A 3 ἐξουσίας αὐτῶν: ‘covenants between another,’ ‘mutual covenants.’ Reading ἀβητῶν, Tucker suggests that the meaning is, ‘they established laws and covenants concerning them,’ i.e. concerning matters connected with ἄδικον and ἀδικεῖσθαι—very improbable view.

4 νόμομα τε καὶ δίκαιον: φημὶ γάρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμομα δίκαιον εἶναι, said Socrates (Mem. IV 4. 12).

6 τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου κτλ. Cf. the reasoning of Philus (whose position in Cicero’s work corresponds to that of Glauco here) in Cic. de Rep. III 23 “nam cum de tribus unum essest optandum, aut facere inuriarum nec accipere, aut et facere et accipere, aut neutrum, optimum est facere, impune si possis, secundum nec facere nec pati, miserrimum digladiari semper tum faciendis tum accipiendis inuriis.” Cicero is following Carneades (ibid. 8), who may have been thinking of the present passage. ἀγαπᾶσθαι below (as J. and C. observe) ‘implies acquiescence rather than decided preference.’

359 B 9 ἐπεὶ τοῦ δυναμένου κτλ. is further elaborated with much vigour in Corg. 484 A. With ὑπὲρ ἀδικοῦ ἀδίκα should be compared the emphatic ἀνάρ in that passage (ἀνάρ γε, οἷοι, ὕπερ ικανὸν γένηται ἢκαν άνάρ), and Eur. Phoen. 509 ἀναδρομῇ γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅσιον αὐτοπόλεμον | τοῦδε σωσι ἐλαβε. 359 B—360 D Secondly urges Glauco, no one is willingly just. Give the just and the unjust the fullest power to work their will, by ensuring them against all evil consequences—give them the faculty of becoming invisible, such as Gygges possessed through his ring, and the just man will shew himself no better than the unjust. If, with this power to screen himself, the just man still refused to do wrong, no doubt men would praise him openly, but in secret they would judge him wholly miserable and foolish.
10 autò poiein kai ós áλθηós ándra oúD' án eni tote ëxunθèzai to mýte adikeíoun mýte adikeissthai: maínthetai yap an. Í mèn oún ñi φósis dikaiouyhnis, ó Sókrates, aúth té kai toiaútì, kai ex ñi péfuke, toiaútì, ós ñi lógyos.

III. 'O$s dè kai oi eπitíthèounves aðunamía toù adikeíoun ãkontes autò eπitíthèounw s, máliost' an aísthóimeva eì toioúnde 'πoiqai'men étì diávola. | ðóntes éxousían ékateró poieí ein tì án boùlítai, tò C te dikaió kai tò ñíðiko, eìt' éptakolouthísmen theómenoi, ñoi ñi eπiti'mhva ékáteron åxei. ëpí autófóro oún lábòimevn án toû dikaiov to ñíðiko eís tòv tóntov ñónta dià tìn plenveúzì, ðo ñása 20 fósis diókein péfukev ñós ñíghóv, nómo dè Bìa parágyetai èptì tìn toû ìsou ñími'n. eìh ñì an ñi éxousia ñìn légo toíaûde máliosta, eì autòis ñéonito ñíaw ñptò fásuv dýnámì tòv 'Gývous toû Lúdou D proçgónov gênessthai. eìnai ñèn ñar autòn poimènâ θητεύontà parà tòv tóte Lúdias áρχontì, ómìbroù dè ñóllòv gênovenou 25 kai ñeísmou rághvai tì tìs ñíhí kai gênessthai ñásmà káta tòn tópon ñì ñènemo'n. ïðónta dè kai àvma mástanta kataβènav: kai ñidein ñìl̄a te ñìn ñuvòlògui'nn ñhaimástà kai ñpóov ñallkòv kóilov,

25. ñì A²: om. A¹.
have on 'wear,' i.e. 'orphis,' is tolerably frequent in Homer, though rarer in Attic: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. For the change of subject in ἐχειν—ἐκβιθνα cf. ΠΡ 414 D n. Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. II.

359 E 30 ἁπλικ. Herwerden's ἀκτόλυρ is unnecessary, and even unpleasant with ἀκτόλυρ so near. Cf. χρυσόξεια in Luc. Tim. 20. “Etiamnunc homines ita loquentur” (Hartman).

360 Α 4 σφεδόνην: the ‘collet’ or ‘bezel’ (Lat. funda or pala annulii)—which is as it were the sling in which the stone is set.

360 Β 12 ὡς δέξετε. “Optatius candem vim habet, quam solet in oratione obliqua habere, efficetque, ut verba oúdeis ὁ γένοιτο ὁφτως etc. ex aliorum ore missa videantur” (Schneider). This explanation appears to me better than any other, although I can discover no exact parallel in Greek. Glauco is most careful throughout the whole of this section to disclaim responsibility for the views he advocates: cf. ὡς ὁ λόγος 359 B, ἐπει—ἀδικείν in C, ὡς φῆσει κτλ. in D below: also 361 B al. Tucker would translate ‘as it might seem,’ defending the optative by Arr. Birds 180 ὥς ἐπεί ἐκα τις καὶ Eur. Andr. 330 ὡς ἐπεί τις. Others erroneously hold that ὡς may be supplied from ὡς γένοιτο, while Ast is desirous of inserting the particle on conjecture. I do not think that the optative can be explained as an instance of irregular assimilation or attraction.

360c 18 ἵσθεν ὄντα. The half-conscious irony of ἵσθεν foreshadows Plato's attack on the popular theology.

20 οὐδεὶς ἐκών δίκαιος here and in 360D sums up the Thrasymachean theory in a phrase which suggests the Socratic and Platonic antithesis οὐδεὶς ἐκών τυφώροι.

360D 23 περὶ—λέγων. περὶ can hardly be for ὑπερ, nor dare we write ὑπὲρ for περὶ (as Badham suggests). The words mean simply 'qui de loco argumento verba facit,' 'the exponent of such a theory,' Cf. 362D δικαίως ἐρήσεια περὶ τοῦ λόγου. Muretus seems to have desiderated παῖτρι for περὶ: cf. expressions like Phaedr. 275E (λόγοι) τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ δεῖται βοήθει. On the strength of this Herwerden would read ὅ παῖτρι τοῦ τοιοῦτον λόγου, rejecting λέγων ("posteaquam ex τηρί factum est περὶ, corrector addidit λέγων"). The 'father of the theory' would mean Thrasymachus; see on ὀ τείς in 368A. It is just possible that παῖτρι was read by Ficinus ("ut sermonis huius perhibent auctores"), and if so, the variant may have some ancient authority now lost; but Herwerden's proposal is too drastic, and the text is probably sound.

26 ἄθλωτατος. Apelt conjectures ἄθλωτος, but cf. (with Hartman) 1 344 A τούτω δὲ—ἀδικηθαίνω ὁὐκ ἀν ἐθέλουσα ἄθλωτος.
fensible. It should be noticed that κρίσις is at first a kind of pendent accusative, afterwards "resumed as a cognate accusative with κρίναι" (J. and C.). Tucker strangely makes κρίσις = 'choice.' The word means of course (our) 'judgment' concerning etc. Cf. 361 δ' φερότερον —κρίνωναι and εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαρίσεις.

360 ε 33 εἰς goes with τέλεον: cf. δόξαν εἰς 361 Α.

361 Α 2 οὕτω—λαβανέτω. ἐπι-χειρῶν ὀρθῶς means of course attempting possible, and abstaining from impossible, ἀδύκημα. But as an ἀδύκημα is possible only if the ἀδικῶν is able to conceal it (the alternative of open violence is recognised later 361 Β), it is necessary that the unjust man should escape detection. Hence λαβανέτω, although λαβάθαι was not attributed (because not essential) to the pilot and doctor (350 Β).

4 φακλὸν means a 'bungler' (D. and V.). With the sentiment cf. Prot. 317 Α τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δίνωσθαι ἀπο- δράσιν, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μορφα καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος: also Latus 345 Β, and the Spartan practice of punishing boys not for stealing, but for being caught ( Xen. Rep. Lec. 2. 8). With ἐξάχατη γὰρ ἀδίκια κτλ. the editors compare Cicero de Off. 1. 41 "totius autem inustitiae nulla capitalior est, quam eorum, qui, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri bona esse videantur."

361 Β 13 κατ' Ἀισχύλου—ἀγαθὸν. Sept. 592—594 (of Amphiaratus) οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἀριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θλεῖ | βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρένος καρποῦμενος, | εἰς ὑπὸ τὰ κενά πλαστάναι βουλεύομαι. Herwerden would expunge ἀγαθὸν ('mente repetatur ἄνω καὶ γεννών'), on the ground that if Plato had added any adjective, it would have been δικαῖον. (The Scholast sub-stitutes δίκαιος for ἀριστος in Aeschylus.) ἀγαθὸν gives excellent sense, and is nearer to the poet's words.
PLATÔNOS

361 c 17 ἐγί is explained by Stallbaum as an optative of wish (though in a subordinate clause): 'it is not clear therefore who he is to be just,' etc. This gives a fair sense, but the idiom is obscure, and unsupported by other examples. J. and C. remark that 'the optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future,' taking ἄδηλον as for ἄδηλον ἄν ἐγί. But an omitted ἄν ἐγί cannot be responsible for the mood of τοιοῦτος ἐγί, nor could ἄν ἐγί easily be omitted (see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33). Still less should we accept Hartman's ἄδηλον <ἀν> ὅν, sc. ἐγί. Madvig ejects ἐγί altogether, understanding ἄντι after τοιοῦτος. This may be right, but its intrusion is not easy to explain. I think the word is genuine, and means 'was': 'it is not clear then, say they, whether he was just,' etc. Glauco again disclaims responsibility: cf. 360 b 36. ἐγί would in direct speech be ὅν: and the idiom is like that in 357 b 36, where see note. For the sequence of moods and tenses cf. vi 490 a 36. Failing this interpretation, the word must (I think) be spurious. Herwerden's proposal—τοιοῦτο ἐγί, ἄδηλον ὅν (retaining ἐγί)—does not surmount the difficulty and is also wrong in point of sense.

20 ἀπ' αὐτής. See cr. n. The sense required is not 'what is produced by,' (ὑπό) 'it,' but 'what results from it': cf. γίγνεσθαι ἄντι (in a similar connexion) 357 c and 358 b. The scribe no doubt assimilated the preposition to the preceding ὅτα.

21 ἔτω. See cr. n. I formerly read ἔτω with Ἀ and the majority of editors, but I now agree with Schneider that ἔτω is right. ἔτω cannot be used by itself as a synonym for 'live,' or as a copula: we should require ἔτω διὰ βίων, instead of ἔτω μέχρι βανάτου (to transpose the two phrases would of course be too violent a change). The sole authority for ἔτω is the first hand in Ἀ: and this is certainly insufficient to outweigh the inherent superiority of ἔτω. Most MSS have ἄτω, a late form for ἔτω.

361 d 26 ἐκκαθαίρεις: not 'polish up' (J. and C.) but rather 'scour clean,' (D. and V.), 'purge' from all extraneous matter: see 361 c γυμνωτείον διὰ πάνω πλὴν δικαιοσύνης.

361 e 29 ἀγροικοτέρος is said with reference to the exaggeration and coarseness of the description: cf. Ἀρ. 32 d, Gorg. 509 a.
éροσι δὲ τάδε, ὥστε οὐτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστυγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τοῦβαλμός, τελευτών
πάντα κακὰ παθῶν ἀνασχινδυνεύθησεται καὶ γήρωσεται, ὥστε οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ εἴθελεν· τὸ δὲ τοῦ Δίσκυλον πολὺ ἦν ἀρά ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἁδίκου, τῷ ὡς ὄρη φήσοντι τὸν ἁδίκον, ἀτέ πεπιτέθευτα πράγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὔ πρὸς δάξαν ξώντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἁδίκον ἀλλ' εἶναι εἴθελεν,

βαθείαν ἀλοκα δία φρενὸς καρποῦμενον,

πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦμει δικαίον εἶναι, ἐπείτα γαμεῖν ὅποθεν ἄν δοῦληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἄν δοῦληται, ἐξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἄν ἐθέλη, καὶ παρὰ ταύτα πάντα ὕφελεσθαι τὸ κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνει τὸ ἁδίκειν· εἰς ἀγώνας τοιών καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημοσία περιγρευθεῖσαν καὶ πλεονεκτέοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτότα δὲ πλούτειν καὶ τούς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν

C καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροῦς πάλπατεν, καὶ θεοὶ θυσίας καὶ ἀνάθημα ἰκανός καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θείειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν 15 τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἁμείνον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗς ἄν

32 δεδήσεται· 'will be kept in chains,' δεδήσεται (so v and some other MSS) is required by Herwerden, and may be right. But in Xen. Cypr. iv 3. 18 δεδήσομαι is similarly combined with several first futures.

ἐκκαυθήσεται κτλ. Schneider refers to Hdt. vii 18 τρεθούσαι σιδήροις ἐκκαυθεῖσαν, and Gorg. 473 c ἦν·—στρεβλώσεται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσεται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκατήσεται. That ἐκκαυθήσεται (and not ἐκκαυθήσωμαι, the reading of some inferior MSS, and of the ancient authorities who cite this passage) is right here, is probable also from x 613 ε ἄροκα ἐφησα φίλοις εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων, είτα στρεβλώσωσαι καὶ ἐκκαυθήσωσαι, whether the last clause is genuine or not. It is not clear that Cicero (de Rep. ii 342) did not find ἐκκαυθήσασθαι in his text; for though he has essidiantur occili, he adds afterwards vinciantur, uratur. Herwerden recasts the words of Plato to suit Cicero's translation, but Cicero is a much less trustworthy witness than Paris A.

6 βαθείαν κτλ.: "reaping in his thoughts the fruit of the deep furrow, from which good counsel grows" (Ver- rall). Plato takes τὰ κεῖνα βουλεύματα more concretely, and places in apposition thereto ἀρχεῖν and the other infinitives down to ὕφελεσθαι, δοκοῦντι being the dative of interest after βλαστάνει. For the change from the dative δοκοῦντι to the accusative κερδαίνοντα cf. Euthyph. 5 A and infra IV 422 B, C.

362 Β οἱ κοινωνεῖν. Cobet deletes this word, as well as καὶ κοινωνήματα in Laws 738 A πρὸς ἀπαντα τὰ εὐμβάλλαι καὶ κοινωνήματα. In view of the same passage Platt (Cl. Rev. 111 p. 72) would read καὶ κοινωνεῖν. No change is necessary, for κοινωνεῖν is a term of wider connotation than εὐμβάλλειν (see i 353 A fi.), and the asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. iii 407 B, v 465 C, vi 488 C, ix 590 A miu.

12 πλεονεκτέοι recalls I 343 D, E 349 B ff., as tovs τε φίλους εἰς ποιεῖν κτλ. recalls the theory attributed to Simonides in i 334 B. Here however it is not Jus- tice, but Injustice masquerading as Justi- tice, which is said to benefit friends and injure enemies.
βούληται, ὡστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ή τὸν δίκαιον. οὔτω φασὶν, ὃ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ’ ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἀδικοὶ παρεσκευάζατο τὸν βιόν 20 ἀμείνον ἣ τῷ δίκαιῳ.

VI. Ταύτ’ εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκονος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῷ εἰχόν τι D λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ 'Ἔδειμαντος, ὃν τι που οἴει, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἵκανος εἰρήθη τοίν πο Λόγου; Ἀλλὰ τί μιν; εἴπον. Αὐτὸ, ἡ δ’ ὅς, οὐκ ἐκρήτη οἱ μάλιστα εἴει ῥηθήναι. 25 Ὀυκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρεῖν’ ὡστε καὶ σύ, εἰ τι ἀλλεἴπην, ἐπάμωνε. καὶ τοιοῦ ἐμὲ γε ἵκανα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτον ῥηθέντα καταπαλαϊσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη. Καὶ δ’, Ὀυκόν, ἐφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ’ ἐτί καὶ τάδε ἄκοιν; E

23. ἐφη II: om. A.

362 c 17 μᾶλλον προσήκειν. The comparative is attached to the verb as well as to the adjective, so as to combine the force of two expressions, viz. (1) ὡστε καὶ θεοφιλή αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν and (2) ὡστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι προσήκειν. In cases like λαθραίτερον μᾶλλον Λαυς 781 A, μᾶλλον is quite redundant: in Ἱππ. Μαί. 285 Α ἐτί δ’ ἐγε—ὦφελιμώτερον—παλαιεύσαντα μᾶλλον ἢ κτλ, it is resumptive. See on the whole subject Kühner Cr. Gr. II p. 25.

19 παρεσκευάσατα—ἄμεινον. For ἄμεινον Richards read ἄμεινων’ or ἄμεινων: cf. 358 C πολύ γάρ ἄμεινον ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἡ τοῦ δίκαιου βίος. The change is tempting at first sight; but Plato generally uses ἄμεινος and not ἄμεινων, and the adverb expresses what is virtually the same meaning, since a βίος ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένον (cf. πόλιν εὗ παρεσκευασμένην Λαυς 721 B) is (according to the views here described) a βίος ἄμεινων. Hermann’s χειρὸν for χέιρον in Πρaed. 85 B, though adopted by Schanz, is also unnecessary, for ἐγὼν may be transitive.

362 c—363 E At this point Glauco gives way to Adimantus. Glauco had maintained the superiority of Injustice over Justice by directly praising Injustice: Adimantus ‘will uphold the same thesis by describing the arguments usually advanced in favour of Justice. In the first place, when parents and friends exhort the young to follow Justice, they do not praise Jus-
tice herself, but the rewards which Justice earns from men and gods. Honier and Hesiod describe the benefits derived from Justice in this present life, while Musaeus and his son guarantee to her notaries sensual bliss hereafter, and others promise to the pious a long line of descendants, but relegate the wicked to punishment after death and unpopularity during life.

362 D 23 ἐφη. See cr. n. ἐφη is present in the majority of MSS, and cannot be dispensed with, where the interlocutor is specified, as here. See Introd. § 5.

25 ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρεῖν: frater adit fratris. Ast proposed to insert ἄν before ἀνδρὶ, making the sentence interrogative. The rhythm would thus approximate to the usual paroemiac rhythm of proverbs: but the brevity and force of the proverb would suffer. If change were needed it would be better to adopt Shilleto’s elegant suggestion ἀδελφός ἀνδρὶ παρεῖν (note on Dem. F. L. § 262), but even if this was the original expression, it would be quite in Plato’s manner to substitute the modern for the archaic word, in defiance of rhythm. The source of the proverb (which with compare συγγραμμένη ἀδελφός βοηθεῖν F. L. § 264) is found by the Scholiast in Od. XVI 97 f. ὡς τα καυσχείτως ἐυμιμέροις, οὖον περ ἄνηρ μαρφανουσι πένθους, καὶ εἰ μέγα νέκιος ὤρκησεν. Cf. also II. XXI 358 f. and Xen. Mem. II 3. 19.
362 & 29 ἐναντίους. Adimantus' λόγοι are ἐναντίου, because they praise Justice, and censure Injustice: whereas Glauco had done the reverse: κατατείναι ἐρώ τοῦ δίκαιον βιών ἐπαρχιῶν (358 D).

363 Α 1 αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην. Not αὐτοδικαιοσύνην (with the second hand in A), which would be the (chiefly post-Platonic) expression for the Idea of Justice (cf. αὐτοψωφάρωσας and the like). αὐτὸ is ἵπτεσι, 'by itself,' as in αὐτὸ γὰρ ἑσέμεν: cf. Thel. 146 E γνώσει ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ δὲ τι ποτὲ ἐστὶν, and infra v 472 C, x 612 B (cited by J. and C.). αὐτὸ may be thus used even when the feminine of the article is present, e.g. Prot. 361 A αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή: cf. also Crat. 411 D.

2 γίγνεται. The nominatives are treated as a neuter plural, as is the case with the singular verb. Cf. Symp. 188 B, Lato 925 E, Andocides i 145. γίγνεσθαι is the verb in each of these examples. See also infra v 462 E.

4 τῷ δικαίῳ. Schneider is right in refusing to change the δικαίῳ of A, II and most MSS to δίκαιος, which has the authority of a few inferior MSS. The reference in διῆλθεν ἁρπαί is no doubt to 352 B, where the benefits accrue to the man who seems to be just, although in reality he is unjust. But δύναται are to be taken, not with διῆλθεν, but as part of the parents' exhortation. This yields a better rhythm, and much better sense. The parents exhort their children to be just, in order that (ifa depends on χρῆ δικαίου εἴναι) they may obtain the rewards ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν δύναται τῷ δικαίῳ. They very properly assure that the surest way to seem to be just (and so to obtain the rewards of justice) is to be just: cf. Xen. Mem. ii 6. 39 συντομωτάτη τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη δόδω—διὰ τὸ ἀν ὁμολογεῖν δικαιόν ἀλασθον περάσθαι and ib. 1 7. 1 with Heracl. Fr. 137 ed. Bywaters συντομωτάτην δόδω—εἰς εὐδοξίαν τὸ γένεσθαι ἀγάθον. Glauco's picture of the just man as one who seems to be unjust is untrue to the facts of experience, as Socrates points out in x 612 D: nor did even Glauco go so far as to say that the unjust man, ἐγιασμόμεν, but only ὅ δοκεῖ δίκαιος εἶναι (who may, of course, be unjust). The divorce between appearance and reality is purely argumentative, and out of place in parental exhortations. Further, in order to make ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν δύναται etc. represent what Glauco said, we should have to read τῷ δίκαιῳ μὲν δοκοῦντι δὲ δικαίῳ: otherwise the words δοξαζομένων δὲ δίκαιων in the corresponding phrase (353 E) might just as well be omitted. If δύναται is construed with διῆλθεν, the words τῷ δικαίῳ must (with Ast) be expunged: but that the clause represents what the parents say is further proved by the exact correspondence of ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν δύναται τῷ δικαίῳ with τὰς ἀρτὶ αὐτητέ (sc. δικαιοσύνης) εὐδοκιμήσεις, which is what the parents praise. I have dwelt on this point at some length because recent English editors (except Tucker) have wrongly deserted Paris A.

6 τοῖς ὀργίοις depends on ἀγαθὰ (‘good things for the pious’): cf. ἀγαθὰ δῆλητε τῷ τοῦ δίκαιον i 348 A π. This is much simpler than to punctuate ἀγαθά, τοῖς ὀργίοις α as the other editors do. Such a postponement of the relative is rare, and
here, I think, unduly harsh, in spite of the analogy of III 390 H and IV 425 C. Cobet felt the difficulty in an unhappy moment he suggested ἀγαθά, ἢ τοὺς ὀνόματα κτλ.

7 Ἡσιόδος τε κτλ. Hesiod and Homer are appealed to as recognised theological authorities: see Hdt. II 53.

363 B 9 ἀκρας — καταβεβριθαί. O.D. 232 f. τοῖς (i.e. θυιδικῶν ἀνδραίοι) φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον, οὕτοις δὲ ὄρους ἢ ταῖς ἢ τῷ ἀκρας μὲν τῇ φέρει βαλάνους, μέσας δὲ μελίσσας. Further rewards of justice (ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθά) are enumerated in νν. 227—231, and 235—237. Many other illustrations in support of Plato’s attack on Greek religion throughout this passage will be found in Nægelsbach’s Hom. Theol. and Nachhom. Theol. passim.

12 ὥστε τεν—ἐχθρός. Od. XIX 109 ff. The ἢ before βασιλῆς is difficult: apparently the author intended to give two comparisons, but dropped the second. We are hardly justified, I think, in abolishing the anacoluthon by reading (with Platt) ὥστε τεν βασιλῆς or (with Ameis) ὥστε τεν ἢ.


19 συμπόσιον τῶν ὀνόματι. θαυμα was the regular appellation of the μύστα (ὁμών μυστάς ἡμῖν. Orph. 84, 3 ed. Abel). For the συμπόσια cf. [Ἀλιοχ.] 371 ὁ συμπόσιος τὸ εὔμελη καὶ εὐδαίμων αὐτοχρήστη καὶ ἄρειστός ἀλπιὰ καὶ ἡδεῖα δύνατα. The stock example in antiquity of earthly virtue rewarded by the delights of a sensuous paradise is Heracles: see e.g. Pind. Nem. I 71, Theoc. XVII 28 ff. and Horace Od. III 3, 9 ff. IV 8. 20 f. A somewhat higher note is struck in Pind. Ol. II 61 ff. and Fr. 129 f. Several of these passages shew traces of Orphic influence, but the special instance of Heracles is traceable to Homer (Od. XI 602 f.).

363 D 21 μὴν ἀλώνιον may be illustrated from the fragment of Pherocrates ap. Athen. vi 268 E ff.
22 ἀποτίνουσιν. See cr. n. The reading of A is defended by Stallbaum as an abbreviation for μακροτέρους λόγους ἀποτίνουσιν περὶ μαθῶν παρὰ θεῶν; but no other example of this harsh condensation has been adduced, and the sense is far from satisfactory. A better meaning is conveyed by Schneider's translation, "Andere aber lassen die Belohnungen der Götter noch weiter reichen als dieze"; for it is clear from the next clause that μακροτέρους ('more extensive,' not, of course, 'greater,' which would be μεῖζον) refers to the extension of the rewards of virtue beyond the personality of the individual concerned. But μακροτέρους ἀποτίνουσιν μισθοῦς is (to say the least) an obscure and difficult expression; and ἀποτίνουσιν (i.e. λέγουσιν ἀποτινεθαι) receives strong support from the parallel use of διάζωσιν in C above, and κατορθώσει, ἀναγκάζουσι, and ἀγνώστες below. The collocation of μακροτέρους with ἀποτίνουσι may easily have led to the corruption ἀποτείνουσι, owing to the frequency of such expressions as μακροὺς λόγους ἀποτείνειν. For the error see Introd. § 5.

παῖδας—κατοπτυθέν. The Scholiast remarks εἶ Ἡμοῦντο (VI 86) ἀπὸ τοῦ δοθέντος χρησίμῳ Γλαύκῳ τῷ Δέκωι ὃς Ἀνδρός δ' εὗρσον γεγένε μετάπτυχαν ἀμέλειας. The story of Glauce admirably illustrates the view herein expressed; but Plato is more probably thinking of Hesiod OD. 285 (a line which is identical with that quoted from the oracle), and also perhaps of some such lines as those of Tyrtaeus 12. 29 f. καὶ τύμβος καὶ παίδες ἐν αὐθρόσωσις ἄρσημοι καὶ παιδῶν παίδες καὶ γένους ἐξωτικός.

the use of which men are persuaded that their sins may be pardoned both in life and after death.


32 ἰδία has been understood of writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of private persons, e.g. parents, etc.] i.e. to poets, who were in a sense the professional teachers of Hellas; cf. X 606 c, *Latos* 890 λιδωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, and 366 E below.


5 ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος: i.e. ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλι. So also *Phaedr.* 275 B. The sentiment recurs in *Isocr.* de *Pace* § 31.

πονηρός is the substantive, and ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας balances πλουσίους. πλουσίους, parallel to ἄλλας δυνάμεις, and also dependent on ἔχοντας, might appear nearer. But there is no reason for deserting the MSS, although Plato is fond of the plural of πλοῦτος (cf. e.g. VI 495 A, x 618 B, 619 A). The sentiment is best illustrated from Polus's description of the happiness of Archelaus in *Gorg.* 471 A ff.

364 B 10 ὃς ἄρα—μοιραν. ἄρα hints dissent: cf. 358 C n. The gnomic poets often express themselves in this vein: e.g. *Solon* 15, 1 πολλοὶ γὰρ πλανεῖτε κακοὶ, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένθοι, *Theogn.* 373—380. A kindred sentiment occurs in Sophocles *Phil.* 447—453. For the most part however it is held that Justice asserts herself in the end: see for example *Solon* 4, 15 ff., 13, 7—32. Euripides expresses the general teaching of Greek tragedy on this subject when he writes *(Ion* 162 f.) ἐτέλεσα γὰρ ὃι μὲν ἐσθαλι τυχάνουσιν ἄξιον, ὃι κακοὶ δ', ὥσπερ περφικα', ὡσποτ' εὐ πράξειαν ἄν. There is no occasion to write (with Richards) πολλάκις τοῖς for πολλοῖς.

12 ἐπὶ πλουσίων θέρας ἱόντες. This semi-proverbial expression (cf. *vi* 489 n, c) stigmatises the avarice of seers and mendicant priests (ἀγγέλων, *cf.* infra 381 D). Plato's contempt for ἀμαθία in general is expressed in the *Euthyphro* and sporadically in various dialogues (see e.g. *Tim.* 71 E, with Archer-Hind's note); but his attack is here particularly directed (infra 364 E) against such ὀρφεο-λεσταί or Orphic friars as Theophrastus speaks of in his description of the ἀκο-

2. τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη II: om. Α.
daīmōn (Charact. 16) καὶ τελεσθησόμενος πρὸς τὸν Ὄρφεστελτάς κατὰ μὴνα πο-
ρείσαται μετὰ τῆς γίγαικός, ἐάν δὲ μὴ
σχολάξει ἢ γυνη, μετὰ τῆς τίτης καὶ τῶν
παιδίων. The kind of ceremonies which they
practised may be seen from Dem. de Cor. §§ 258 ff. Plato agreed with the
more enlightened section of his country-
men in condemning such degrading cults
and superstitions on the ground of their
immoral tendency: see especially Foucart
des Assoc. religieuses chez les Grecs pp. 153 —157, where the opinions of
writers on this subject are collected. On
ἀγόραι in general reference may be made to
J. H. Wright in Harvard Studies in
Cl. Philol. vi p. 66 n.

364 c 15 ἵντας—βλάψειν is in
oratio obliqua: 'et si quis inicum lae-
ceris velit, nocituros se parvo sumpto iusto
pariter et inimio' (Schneider Addit. p. 11).
This explanation (which Tucker also pro-
poses without knowing that Schneider had
forestalled him) is by far the best and
simplest. For other views see App. III.

17 ἐπαγωγαὶ—καταδειχμος. ἐπαγω-
γαὶ are ἀγωγαὶ daīmōνος φαῦλω ἐπὶ τῶν
γενόμεναι (Timaeus Lex. s.v.). The
datives are usually construed with πεῖδοντες,
and καταδειχμος understood as the binding
formulate "by which the seer compels the
invisible powers to work his will" (Rohde
Psychê II p. 88 n.). But in the καταδειχ-
μος which have been discovered it is the vic-
tim and not who the god is bound down;
see e.g. CIG 538 (an Athenian inscription
of about 380 B.C.)—καταδ Κτησίαν—καλ
Κλεοφάρδον καταδ—καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Κτη-
σίου ἀπέτας καταδ. This and other in-
stances from leaden tablets found in
graves are given by Wachsmuth Rhein.
Mus. xviii (1863) pp. 560 ff.; cf. also
Marquardt Röm. Staatsverwaltung 111
p. 109 n. 6. On this account I think it

better to connect ἐπαγωγαῖς τίσιν κα-
λιταδεῖμον with βλάψειν, exactly as in
Laws 933 D ἐὰς καταδειχσειν ἡ ἐπα-
γωγαίς ἢ τίσιν ἐφάρας ἢ τῶν τοιοῦτων
φαρμακειῶν ὑπονοιῶν δόξη βρῶμος εἶναι
βλάπτοτες—πεῖδοντα. Plato is still al-
luding to the debasing forms of oriental
superstition which had gained a footing
in Greece in his day: see Foucart l.c. p.
172.

19. περὶ Madvig: πέρι ΑΠΕ. ἐδόντες
Muretus: διδότες codd.

A. P.
20 ως την μεν κακότητα και ιλαδόν ἐστιν ἐλέσθαι ἡνίδιως: λειψ μεν ὄδος, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι μαίει: τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρώτα θεοί προπάροιθεν ἐθηκαν καὶ τινα ὀδόν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ύπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὀμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὡτι καὶ ἕκεινος
25 εἴπεν
λιστοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοὶ,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίασι καὶ εὐχολαίς ἀγαναίσιν
λοίβῇ τε κνίσθη τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἀνθρωποὶ
λισούμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβηθ' καὶ ἀμάρτη.
30 βιβλίων δὲ ὦμανθὸν παρέχονται Μοῦσαι καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης
tε καὶ Μοῦσῶν ἐγγύον, ὡς φασὶ, καθ' ὃς θυπτολούσιν, πειθοῦντες

23. ἀνάντη Α': καὶ τραχείαν addidit in mg. Α². 26. λιστοὶ δὲ τε a manu rec. Π: λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ τε Α¹: λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε Α²: στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε Π\'Εξ: λιστοὶ στρεπτοὶ δὲ τε Π².

Laws 854 c is different, but akin. For the corruption of ἀδόντες to ἄδοντες see Introd. § 5. The conjectures of Liebhold (Fr. Yahr. 1888 p. 107) and Zeller (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 11 p. 694) κακιάς πέρι εὐπετείας ἤδισθότες and κακιάς πέρι εὐπετείαν ἄδισθότες have little in their favour.

364 c, D 20 ὡς τὴν—Βηθαν. Hesiod OD. 287—289. ὡς is due to Plato: Hesiod has τήν μέν τοι κτλ. For λεία the mss of Hesiod read ὑλήν: λεία (also in Laws 718 E, Xen. Mem. II 1. 20 and elsewhere) proves the existence of a different recension. Cf. G. E. Howes Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. VI p. 165. The verses are partially quoted or referred to again in Laws 718 E, Prot. 340 D; their influence is also seen in Phaedr. 272 c.

364 D 23 καὶ τινα ὀδόν κτλ.: Hesiod OD. 290 μακράς δὲ καὶ ὀρθοὶ οἷοι ἐσ αὐτήν καὶ τραχὲς κτλ. The last two words account for the marginal addition καὶ τραχείαν in A.

364 D, E 26 λιστοὶ—ἀμάρτη. Seecr. ii. The words are spoken by Phoenix to Achilles in II. ix 497—501. Plato edits the lines to suit his own purposes. For λιστοὶ our text of Homer has στρεπτοί. The word λιστοὶ (though implied in ἄλαστος, τραχεῖος) does not occur elsewhere, a fact which is strongly in favour of its genuine-ness here. We must suppose that the recension which Plato used had λιστοὶ. The theology contained in these lines meets us continually in ancient literature: cf. also the words of the king in Hamlet 111 3 "And what’s in prayer but this twofold force To be forestalled ere we come to fall Or pardoned being down?" Plato expresses his dissent in Laws 716 E ff., 905 D: in Alc. 11 149 E we read ὅ γαρ οἷοι τοιοῦτον ὡστε τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὅτε ὄρτων δόμων παράγεθαι όνον κακὸν τοιοῦτον.

364 E 30 βιβλίων—ἐγγύον. The allusion is to Orphic liturgies. Museaus was the son of Selene, according to Philochorus quoted by the Scholiast on Ar. Frogs 1033: cf. φανοφόρον ἐγγυον Μήφης | Μουσαιν in Abel Orphic. P. 4. Orpheus' mother was the Muse Calliope (Suidas s.v. Ὀρφεύς). There is no solid basis for the old view that ἐγγὺον means 'son,' and ἐγγύον 'grandson.' The etymological form is ἐγγυον, but ἐγγυον was often assimilated to ἑγγυον before y during the 4th century B.C., particularly in this word: cf. also ἑγγύοτῶν etc. on Inscriptions. See Meisterhans 3 p. 107. Elsewhere in the Republic ἐγγύον is the regular spelling.

31 καθ' ὃς θυπτολούσιν: sacrificial liturgies. θυπτολόκων is mentioned by Suidas (s.v. Ὀρφεύς) as one of the 'works' of Orpheus: see also Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 371 and Rohde Psyche II pp. 112, 113 ἴνν.
οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἅρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ
365 ἀδικημάτων διὰ τιθείον καὶ παιδίας ἱδωνοῦ εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι ἣς,
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσειν, ἐς δὲ τιθείον καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεί
cάκων ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαιται δὲ δεινά περιμένει.

VIII. Ταύτα πάντα, ἐφι, δὴ φίλε Σωκρατε, τοιαύτα καὶ
tοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ ἐν
περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμή, τι οἰκείως ἀκούουσας νέων ψυχῆς ποιεῖν.

365 A—367 E. Finally, what is the
effect on the souls of the young? Young
men of ability are encouraged to practise
Injustice, while outwardly pretending to
be just. To escape detection by their fel-
low-men, they form political clubs, and
employ persuasion and force. The gods
they can afford to ignore; for either there
are no gods, or they regard not man, or—
according to those who are the sole autho-
rities for their existence—they can be pro-
stituted out of the proceeds of Injustice.
There are special rites and gods who can
deliver us from punishment after death:
so the gods' own children say. So strong
are the arguments in favour of Injustice
that even those who can refute them make
allowances, recognising that no one is
voluntarily just except from innate good-
ness of disposition or scientific knowledge.

It rests with you, Socrates (says Adi-
mantus), now for the first time to praise
Justice and censure Injustice in and by
themselves, apart from their accessories.
Nay more; you must assign to each
the reputation which is enjoyed by the other.
Do not merely show us that Justice is
better than Injustice; tell us what effect
they severally produce on their possessors,
in consequence of which the one is good,
and the other evil.

365 A τιμῆς τιμῶν τε, τιμῶν τε. Cf.
(359 Μ. 2) 359 c above.

The subject to ἐνεῦσιν is ταύτα
—ενεῦσιν: ψυχῆς is its secondary
object. Cf. infra 367 Β τι
ποιεῖν ἐκτέρα τῶν ἔχουσα κτλ. and 367 E.
This view, which Schneider also holds,
is better than to make ψυχῆς subject to
ποιεῖν and ταύτα κτλ. dependent
on ἀκούουσας.
7 *επιπτόμενοι*. The image, as Jowett remarks, suggests a bee gathering honey: cf. Iou 534 B λέγουσα γάρ—οἱ τοι θυταί δι' άτο κρυφῶν μελιρότων έκ Μονών κήπων τινών και οκτών δραπέκμενον τά μήλα· χλωρίου φύσεως άπερ αι μέλιστα, Simon. Fr. 47 δύμλη δ' ἄνθεσιν (viz. the poet) ὃτε μελίσσα ξανάμει μέλι κηδομένα καὶ Πινδ. Pyth. x. 51 f.

365 B 10 πότερον δίκαι—ανάβασι. The fragment (which appears tolerably often in ancient citations) is restored as follows by Bergk (Fr. 213) Πότερον δίκα τείχων ύψους | ἦ σκολίας ἀπάταις ἀνάβασιν | ἐπι-χθουνιῶν γένος ἀνδρῶν | δίκα μοι κύων ἀτρέκιαν εἵπειν. It is, I think, unlikely that ἄνθεσιν ἄπασε καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας but "si non a Pindaro, certe ex poetis petita sunt" (Bergk).

12 ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ has been commonly altered to ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ on the suggestion of Dobree and Boeckh (with a few inferior MSS): but the text is sound. We are dealing with τάτα πάντα—λεγόμενα κτλ.; and it has not been said that it is useless to be just, unless one is also believed to be just (ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ). This would imply that it is useful to be just, if one is also considered just; but what has been urged is that Justice is in itself never advantageous, although its εὔδαιμονες (363 A) are: see 358 C, E, 360 C (οὗτοι έκών δίκαιοι, ἀλλ' ἀνάβασιμοι, ὅς οὖν άγαθόν ἔργον διασώκησεν, 302 A (οὗτος εἶναι δίκαιος, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δέ εἶπεν). The words ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ mean "if I also seem unjust," for ὅποι δοκῶ δίκαιος εἶναι, not δοκῶ οὗ δίκαιος εἶναι is the Greek idiom. This meaning suits exactly. What has to be established is that δοκεῖν prevails over εἶναι in human life (δοκεῖ—βιάται). The proof is as follows. To be just and seem unjust is misery (see 361 E): to be unjust, and seem just is bliss (see 362 A, C): therefore δοκεῖν is everything, and ἐπὶ τοῦτο τρεπτόν ὅλως.

13 φασίν. Is τά λεγόμενα the subject? or is the sentence an anacoluthon? ("nam quo modo res ipsa comparata sit, nescio: quae quidem vulgo dicuntur, talia sunt, ut īusto mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur" Schneider). The latter view is the more likely. Similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Ἀνάκ. Pl. Spec. iii. p. 40.

365 C 15 οἱ σοφοί. Simonides (σοφός γὰρ καὶ θεός ἀνήρ 1 331 E) Fr. 76 Bergk. Plato himself sets no small store by a good name (coupled with virtue) in Latus 920 C.

17 πρόθυρα—σχήμα: 'as my porch and trappings.' The mixture of metaphors is thoroughly Platonic: cf. vii 527 D n. With σχήμα (any kind of external or adventitious means of impressing others or hiding one's own deficiencies) cf. Gorg. 511 επεριστατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. σκιαγραφίαν ('perspective drawing' vii 523 B, X 602 D) with its cognate words is continually used by Plato of things unreal, counterfeit, illusory: cf. infra i x 583 b n., 386 b al., and Wohlrab on Theaet. 108 E.

18 τοῦ σοφώτατος κτλ. Archilochus seems to have canonized the fox as the embodiment of cunning in Greek literature: fragments are preserved of at least two fables of his in which the fox appears (86—88 and 89 ed. Bergk). In the second (89, 5, 6) occur the lines τῷ δ' (sc. πίθηκο)
my it may be from Archilochus. For the sentiment

cf. 111 394 D.

An allusion to the political life of Athens: cf. Ap. 36 B, Thad. 173 D, Thuc. 112 43
ξυνωμοσίαις, αὕτη ἐνέχυροι πρέσεον ἐν τῷ πόλει οὖσα ἐκὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀρχαῖα.
In the Laws, Plato would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand: see 856 B ff. The πεισμός
dιδάσκαλος mentioned presently are the Sophists.

35 ὅσον ἐν τὸν θεόν, ὅτι ἔπειτα ἡ μέγας ἐκείνος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοῖς ἀδέλφοις ὕποι ὕποι

ξυνωμοσίαις, αὕτη ἐνέχυροι πρέσεον ἐν τῷ πόλει οὖσα ἐκὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀρχαῖα.
In the Laws, Plato would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand: see 856 B ff. The πεισμός
dιδάσκαλος mentioned presently are the Sophists.
the air was full of such heresies in Plato's day. The first was doubtless fostered by the sceptical attitude of Protagoras—περὶ μὲν θεών οὐκ ἦχω εἰδέναι οὐδὲ ὅσ εἰσόν οὐδ' ὡς οἶκ εἰσίν (ap. D. L. ix 51) : for the second cf. Aesch. Ag. 309—372 οὐκ ἔφη τις ἢ θεῶν βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσαί μέλειν ἢ χῶν ἀδίκτων χάριν | πασοῦ ὁ δὲ οὐκ εὐσέβης: the third—the most pernicious of all, according to Plato Laws 948 c—furnished the raison d'être of a degenerate priesthood.

27 τί καὶ ἡμῖν κτλ. 'If the gods do not care for us, why should we in our turn (καὶ) care?' etc. For the text see cr. n. and App. III.

365 E 29 ἀνακρόαμεν—ποιητῶν. The first ἦ is 'or' and the second 'than.' In λόγων Plato may be thinking inter alia of the works of early logograφοι like Pherecydes, who wrote genealogies of gods and heroes in prose; but there is no occasion to change λόγων into λογίαν with Muretus. γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν refers to Homer and the Hesiodic and Orphic theogonies.

31 θυσιασι—ἀγανασίαν: see 364 n.

33 ἀπὸ: 'from the proceeds of.' Cf. Laws 906 c, δὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀναγκαίων λέγειν τῶν λέγοντα ὡς εἰλικρινῶς ἢ ἠθεῖ τοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκους καὶ ἀδίκους, ἃν αὐτῶς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονεμεῖ, καθάπερ καὶ λόγου τῶν ἀρχαιών μικρὰ ἀπονεμεῖς, οἱ δὲ ἡμεροίμοις τοῖς διώρους σπουδοῦν τὰ ποίμνια διαράπαζεν.

366 A 2 τρεῖς ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀμαρτά-

νοντες are subordinate to λοιπομένους: "by praying when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them," etc. There is again a reference to λοιπομένους (ἔτε κεν τις ὑπερβην καὶ ἀμάρτηθη) quoted in 364 E. The position of the participles is justified by the allusion to this line.

5 ἦ καὶ ἦ παίδες παῖδων. ἦ παίδες παῖδων. Bailer conjectures <ἡ παίδες> ἦ παίδες παῖδων, and so I formerly printed. But παίδες παῖδων means little more than 'descendants' (cf. Laws 927 b), and the text may stand. Similarly in Ruskin Modern Painters Ch. 1 "all those labours which men have given their lives and their sons' lives to complete."

οὐ φιλε—λογιζόμενος. οὐ φιλε is the objector who urges ἄλλα γὰρ—παιδών. In φιλεῖ Plato recurs to the singular of 365 τῶν λέγοντα ἢ κτλ. λογιζόμενος is not 'reasoning,' but 'making his calculation;' 'calculos subducens': such a man's morality is nothing but a balancing of profit and loss. Hermann's devotion to Paris A led him to conjecture ἄλλα ὕφελθσονται ἀνυμίωμενοι αἱ τελεταί rather than admit a simple case of omission.
Β τελεταί αὐτὲς μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὅσι αἰ μέγισται τὸ πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παίδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφήται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὗτοι ἔχειν μηνύομεν.

IX. Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἄν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας ἀριστομεθ' ἂν; ἢν ἐὰν μετ' ἐνεχθομοσύνης κιβώθιον κτησομοῦν μεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεῶι καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ἵς ὄντες τε καὶ τελευτησάντες, ὅσι ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενοι λόγοι. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τὸς μηχανής, ὡς Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμῶν ἐθέλεις, ὥς τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινοῦν-15 μένος ἀκούοντα; ὡς δὴ τοι εἰ τίς ἔχειν θεουδὴ μὲν ἀποφημᾶν ἱ ἐρήμαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἐγκυνοκεν ὅτι ἀριστον δικαιοσύνην, πολλὴν ποὺ συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὁργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλὰ οἴδειν, ὅτι πλὴν ἐι τις θεία φύσει δυσχεραίνει τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστῆμην.

Δλαβῶν αὐτὲς κατάνυσιν αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλὰ 20 ὑπὸ ἀναβριάσις ἢ γηρῶς ἢ τίνως ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέπει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατών αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δὲ, δῆλον: ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων, εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὃσον ἂν οὗς τῇ. καὶ τούτων ἀπαλών οὐδεν ἄλλο στιπτῶν ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὀθεντερ ἀπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀρμήσει καὶ τάδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρῶσε. ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι 25 ἘΩ θαυμάσιε, πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινεῖται τα ὑποθήμεσις

6. αο μέγα δύνανται Ποι. Α. 22. ὡς δὲ ἈΠ: ὡς ἈΠ.

arising from homoioieutelon: see cr. n. 364 E. Certain Chthonian deities of the Orphic theology are meant, such as Hecate, Demeter, Dionysus λόις or λυεῖς, and above all Ζεὺς μελιχίος. See Lobeck Aiga³roph, p. 302. 366 B 7 θεῶν παιδές: e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus (Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγονοι 364 E). Madvig's rejection of οὖ ν (so also Fichius) before ταιτα in the last clause seriously impairs the rhythm of the sentence.

12 ἀκρον. ἀκρον was a fashionable expression to apply to the edile of any profession or Φ: cf. Theaet. 152 E τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἀκροὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἕκατέρας, Pol. 392 E, supra 360 E, infra 111 405, 1 459 B.

366 C 16 ὡς δὴ τοι: see on 1 337 C. 19 θεία φύσει—ἐπιστῆμῆν. θεία φύσει means a disposition which is good by divine grace or nature, not as the result of knowledge or compulsion. The virtue of such men is θεία μορφα παραγιγομενὴ ἄνει νου (Men. 90 B): they are ἄνει ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυός, θεία μορφα ἄγαθος (Lat. 642 C), resembling Wordsworth's "Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot, Who do thy work and know it not." Cf. VI 493 A υπ. ἐπιστήμην is scientific knowledge of the good in the Socratic, not yet in the Platonic, sense. 366 D 20 οὐδεὶς έκὼν δίκαιος gives the lie to the Socratic οὐδείς έκὼν ἀδίκος: cf. 360 C. For ἀναβριάσια below see on 359 B.
elvai, ato twn ek archhs hrovws arxameno, dsow logoi lelememeno, mekri twv nwn anbropwv oudeis powtote efevei adikian ou'd epitheusen dikaiosunh allas h dsoz te kai tima kai doroias tas 30 apt autwn ynovemenas; auto 5 ekateron tis autou dynamiw en tis ton ekontos psyxh enw kai lanthainon theous te kai anbropwv oudeis powtote ou't en poitoi fori en idiois logois epezeilhven ikanos ton logor, ws to m' m' megiston kakan osa echei psyxh en auti, dikaiosunh de megiston agathon. ei | yag ou'tos elegeto ek 367 archhs upo pantaiv mow kai, ek neon hmdas ekpithete, ouk an allhnikous evfylatomoymi h adikeiwn, all' autous autous hni ekastos fila, dediws hpi adikwn to megisto kakw xwnikos. tauta, 5 w Sokrates, lvas kai kai eti touton plieo Thranymachos te kai allas pou tis upo dikaiosunhs te kai adikias legoinen an meta-strefontes auton tis dynamim, forotikous, ws e moi dodei: all' egon, oudeiv yar se deomai apoekruptesbaai, sou epiwymwv akousai B tanantia, ws dynamiw maliota katateinas legon. hpi ouv hmin 10 monon evediez to lonw, oti dikaiosunh adikias kreston, allla ti poousa ekatera ton ekonta auti de autin h mev kakwn, h de agonon estin tis de dozaa afaiirei, wster Plavkon diekelevasto. ei yag hpi afairhseis ekaterwthen tais allheiseis, tais de psoudseis prosthiseis, ou to dikaiou phsoumewn epanuei se, allla to dodein, 15 oude to adikou i elvai yegwv, allla to dodein, kai parakeleusebhai C adikou outra lanhanein, kai omologein Thranymachos, oti to m'v


366 E 27 hromw. J. and C. think "Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes." It is simpler to understand the expression of Orpheus, Musaeus, and other deiv tadeis, poutai kai proorhetai twon theon yenvmenon; see 366 B n. So also Drevnhser Plato's Schrift iih. d. Staat nach Disposition u. Inhalt p. 2 n. 16.

39 allwos h. Praise of the dokei of Justice is somewhat inaccurately spoken of as praise of justice itself: but it is unnecessary to insert dia (with Richards) before doxeis. Cf. 367 D twon m' allwn apothenelhvn an o'tos evpanoviste dikaiosunh kai psyxhov adikian, doxeis te peri auton kai mounon egnomiaizonton kai

32 idiois: see on 363 E.

367 A 3 all' autous—xwvnikos. This thesis is developed and elaborated in Gorg. 472 D—481 E.

6 upo is here little if anything more than peri, cf. Laws 777 A upo toiv 'Aidh dyerevnon. This usage, which appears on Inscriptions after 300 B.C. (Meisterhans, p. 222), is very rare in Plato. It occurs occasionally in the Attic orators, especially with lyeiv, and is tolerably common in Polybius and later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v. upo and Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1685. I do not think we are justified in translating (with Tucker) 'on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.'

367 B 9 katateinw: 358 D n.
The KoX

Though is Frogs more possible. It is typical of 

the word "victory" as a Greek equivalent of the Latin "victoria." A word like "victoria" is used in the context of the debate to signify the importance of winning in the Greek context.

In this context, the speaker is arguing that the importance of winning is not as significant as the principles of fair play and justice. The use of "victoria" to refer to the idea of winning is an example of the way in which language can reflect cultural values and priorities.

The use of "victoria" in this context also highlights the importance of understanding the cultural context in which language is used. In ancient Greece, the concept of winning was closely tied to the idea of individual glory and personal honor. The speaker is suggesting that this focus on individual glory is misplaced and that the true value of winning lies in the principles of fair play and justice.

In this context, the use of "victoria" to refer to the idea of winning is an example of the way in which language can reflect cultural values and priorities. The speaker is arguing that the true value of winning lies in the principles of fair play and justice, not in individual glory.

The use of "victoria" in this context also highlights the importance of understanding the cultural context in which language is used. In ancient Greece, the concept of winning was closely tied to the idea of individual glory and personal honor. The speaker is suggesting that this focus on individual glory is misplaced and that the true value of winning lies in the principles of fair play and justice.
368 A 1 ὣ παιδε ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀνδρός. This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz. Phil. 36 D, where Protagoras is addressed in the words ὣ παῖ ἐκεῖνον τάνδρος. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has bequeathed to Protagoras, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appears from Phil. 11 A, B, 11 C δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τοῦ νῦν διδόμενον, ὣ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; Ἀναγκή δέχεσθαι: Φιλόδος γὰρ ἡμᾶς ὀ καλὸν ἄρειφηκεν, 12 A, 16 B, 10 A: cf. also 15 C and 28 B. In precisely the same way Glauco and Adimantus are the children of Thrasymachus. They are διάδοχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 A, 358 B (ἐπανασεισμός τοῦ Ῥασπεύχων λόγον), 357 A and 357 C, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 E), so Glauco and Adimantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀνδρός of Thrasymachus, Stallbaum is therefore not "ridiculous" (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in Cl. Rev. x p. 237.

2 ὁ Ἡλαύκωνος ἐραστῆς may be Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed; but there is no evidence in support of the conjecture: see Bergk Poet. Lyric. Gr. ii p. 263.

3 τὴν Μεγαρᾶ μάχην: perhaps in 409 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. xiii 65. If so, Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, supposing that the scene of the dialogue is laid in 410. See Introd. § 3.

4 παιδε—ἀνδρός. By Ἀρίστωνος, the author of the line of course meant Aristo, father of Glauco and Adimantus; but Ἀρίστων suggests ἀρσως (cf. ix 580 B) and the pun conveys a friendly, if half-ironical, compliment to 'his excellency' Thrasymachus, whose παιδε (so far as the argument is concerned) Glauco and his brother are: see on ὣ παιδε above. In Sym. 174 B, when inviting Aristodemus to come as an uninvited guest to sup with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a similarly playful pun: ἔτου τοὶς, ἐφι, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παρομοίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλωμε, ὥς ἥρα καὶ ἄγαθοι ἐπὶ διατάσας αὐθαίρετοι ἁγαθοὶ. (The διαφθορά consists in the substitution of ἁγαθῶν for δείλων, the form of the proverb which Plato had in view being αὐθαίρετοι δ' ἁγαθοὶ δείλω ἐπὶ διατάσας, as the Scholiast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to read Ἀγαθῶν i.e. Ἀγαθῶν for ἁγαθῶν: see Cl. Rev. x p. 238.) Other plays on proper names in Plato are collected by Riddell Digest pp. 230 f. In κλεινόν Stallbaum finds a 'fusus facetus' on ἐκείνων; but this particular fusus (if it exists) is accidental and unmeaning.

5 Θεόν. The addition of τι (proposed by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. iii 388 D n. θεός is here used, like ἐνθέος, of inspiration: if the speaker does not understand or believe what he says, he is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: cf. Phaedr. 248 A, Ion 533 E, 535 E—536 D.


368 c 18 τὶ τὸ ἐστὶν—ἐξῆι recalls the conclusion of Book 1 (354 B, C).

368 d 22 οὖντερ ἀν sc. ἐπωναμεθα, the verb being omitted as it frequently is with ὅπερ ἃν εἰ.

25 ἔρμαιον—τυγχάνει. I have followed Schneider in printing a colon before ἔρμαιον; for the sentence ἔρμαιον—τυγχάνει is not the grammatical apodosis to the εἰ clause, but a further result. The asyndeton with ἔρμαιον is the usual asyndeton of ampliative clauses. For the principle underlying the method of inquiry here enunciated, see Soph. 218 C ὥσα δὴ ἃ τὸν μεγάλον δὲι διαπονεώθηκα καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πάνι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν συμμερίσει καὶ ράσοιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγάστοις and Pol. 286 A. (Contrast Phil. 48 B, where the opposite course is recommended.) In the special case of the State versus the Individual, the words ἐν συμμερίσει, ἐν ἑλάττωσιν are not applicable, but ἐν ράσοιν πρότερον δεῖ μελετᾶν is the essential part of the principle, and Justice in the State is ὅπως καταμαθᾶν (368 E) than in the Individual. Cf. also infra 377 C ἐν τοῖς μειξούσι—ἀδύναται ὡς διαφορίζω μεθα καὶ τοῖς ἑλάττωσι. Illustrations from letters are tolerably frequent in Plato; cf. e.g. 402 A 1, Theat. 105 D—106 A, Pol. 277 E ff.

368 E 33—369 A 3 πρότερον—ἐπισκόπωσιν lays down the method to be pursued in the rest of the treatise, except in books V—VII, which are professedly a 'digression,' and X, which is of the nature of an epilogue. At each suc-
cessive stage in the exposition of his subject, Plato remarks more or less explicitly of the method which he here proposes to follow:—at the end of the first sketch of a State 371 Ε, in connection with the _Philogeumena_ πόλεως 372 Ε; before entering on the theory of education 376 Β, and again in ΠΙΙ 392 Α, when he has finished the treatment of λόγος; at Adimantus' objection ΙV 430 Β, Β; at the end of the picture of the just state 427 D ff.; in passing to Justice in the Individual ΙV 434 Α ff.; at 472 Β ff., where the question is raised 'Is this State possible?' on beginning the account of the degenerate commonwealths and men in VIII 545 Β; and finally when the whole argument draws to a head at IX 575 Α.

369 A 2 2 _ποιόν τού_ μείζονος ομοιότητα. Justice in the State is in fact to be used as a means of explaining Justice in the Individual, which is after all the real Justice: cf. ΙV 443 Β ff. _μν_. The relation between the two is that of a _parađειγμα_ and that which the _parađειγμα_ is intended to explain: see Pol. 278 Α _ούκοιν_ τόυτο _μὴ_ ικανός _συνεξίζωμεν_, οτι _parađειγματός_ γ' _ἐστιν_ τό ίσιν, ὅταν τοῦ τῶν _ἐκτέρω_ _διεσπασμένω_ _δοξαζόμενον_ ὥρθω _κυνήγη_ _εἰκόνα_ _μιᾶς_ _ἄλογος_ _δῶξαν_ _ἀστέρεθα_; _φαίνεται_. Plato has been severely blamed (as e.g. by Grote Plato III pp. 123 ff.) for representing the Commonwealth as the Individual "writ large." Plato, however, laid stress upon this view, as tending to cement the union between the citizen and the State, which was rapidly dissolving in his day. This is well brought out by Krohn Plat. Frag. p. 5. Cf. also Pohlmann Gesch. d. antik. _Kommmunismus_ etc. pp. 146 ff.

4 _εἰ_ _γνωμονέν_— _ἀδικίαν_. This would lead us to expect that we are to discover Justice and Injustice in the same State. In the sequel we find Justice only in the


369 B—372 D _The First Sketch of a City-state_.

A city is called into being by the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient. We may regard it as the union of many men mutually helping one another in one place. The individual gives and takes because he thinks it better for himself to do so.

Now man's first need is food, his second housing, his third clothing and the like. The smallest possible State will therefore consist of a farmer, a builder, a weaver and a shoemaker etc.—four or five men in all. Each of these must work for all, because Nature has adapted different men for different kinds of work, and because every kind of work has its critical moment when it must be done and cannot be neglected. Our principle is—One man, one work. We shall accordingly require carpenters and smiths to make instruments for the farmer, weaver, and shoemaker, as well as various kinds of herdsmen, to furnish cattle for ploughing and carrying, together with hides and fleeces for the makers of clothing. Since it is almost impossible to
make the city self-supporting, we shall require middlemen to introduce imports; and as imports necessarily imply exports, the number of farmers and manufacturers in our city will increase, and we shall need travelling merchants to dispose of their produce. Owners of transport-ships will also be necessary, if there is traffic by sea.

Moreover, to facilitate exchange within the city, there must be a market, and coined money, and retail traders to act as middlemen between the producer and the consumer. The retail traders should be those who are physically unfit to engage in any other pursuit. There will also be hired labourers in our city.

Where then in such a commonwealth are justice and injustice? Along with which of the component parts of the State do they make their appearance? Adimantus suggests that we should look for them in the reciprocal intercourse of the various classes in the city. Let us see, says Socrates. The citizens will live the simple easy-going life of vegetarians, satisfying only the modest demands of their natural appetites. On a hint from Glauco, a few vegetarian luxuries are conceded.

The present episode is ostensibly an historical account of the genesis of society, and from this point of view should be compared with Laws III 676 ff. Some of the features are derived from an analysis of the industrial basis of society as it exists in civilised times: others (see 372 B—D), are semi-mythical and idyllic, recalling pictures of the golden age such as we find in Pol. 269 C ff., and in the caricatures of the comedians (e.g. ap. Athen. vi 267 e ff.). But the prevailing atmosphere is not historical or legendary, but idealistic (note δι in 306 Ε and elsewhere), and Plato's πράγμα πόλις (Arist. Pol. Δ 4, 1291a 17) should primarily be regarded as—in its essential features—a preliminary and provisional description of the industrial foundation on which the higher parts of his own ideal city are to rest. Cf. also on 372 B, D, Rettig Proleg. in Plat. rep. p. 42 and Steinhart Einleitung p. 156.

12 τυχάνει as a mere copula is very rare in Attic prose, and it would be easy here to insert ὦν after πολλῶν: see Porson on Eur. Hec. 781. In the Platonic dialogues this usage recurs in Phaedr. 263 C, Gorg. 502 B, Alc. 1 129 A, 133 A, Hipp. Mai. 300 A, Laws 918 C, Tim. 61 C, nor is it possible in the last three examples to account for its omission by lipography. The idiom occurs in Sophocles and Euripides, once in Aristophanes (Eccl. 1141), and (though condemned by Phrynichus) must also be admitted (though rarely) in prose: see the instances cited by Blaydes on Αρ. (l.c.) and cf. Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 342.

πολλῶν ἑνεδής. In the account of the genesis of society given in the Laws (676 Α—680 Ε), more stress is laid on the social instinct of man: in Prot. 322 B ff. the operating cause is man's defencelessness against wild beasts. Grote (Plato III p. 139 n.) censures Plato for not mentioning the "reciprocal liability of injury" among the generative causes of civic life; but this (as well as assistance against external aggression) is hinted at in βοσθοῦς.

14 ἄλλος—χρεία. The words are short for ἄλλος ἄλλος, τὸν μὲν ἐπ' ἄλλον, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλον χρεία (for the omission of τὸν μὲν cf. Prot. 330 Α, Theat. 181 D al.): 'one taking to himself one man, another another—the one man for one, the other for another purpose.' Essentially the same meaning would no doubt be conveyed without τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλον, which Herwerden following two inferior MSS would omit; but the fuller form of expression is chosen in order, I think, to prepare us for the principle of 'One man, one work' to be presently enunciated.

16 ταύτη τῇ ἐνυνκία. Stallbaum rightly regards the sentence as an anaco-
lution, the antecedent to ταύτη being the words from παραλαμβάνον to βοηθοῖν. If the subject to εἰδέμενα (a gnomic aorist) were ἄλλος—δεῦμον—ἀγείραντες, we should probably have had παραλαμβάνοντες for παραλαμβάνον: and besides, Plato is not yet describing the particular city which we are ποιεῖν λόγο (infra line 19), but laying down the law as to the γένεσις of cities in general. For the anaclouhon see Engelhardt Ἀμασ. Πλ. Ἱ. 111 p. 40.

369 D 26 τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα: neuter, not masculine; otherwise Plato would have written θεραπευτῶν (as in φ and some other MSS).

27 ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις. Referring to this passage, Aristotle (Pol. Δ 4. 1291a 16—19) attacks Plato for making the end of his city not τὸ καλὸν, but τὰ ἁπαξλεξία. No doubt, the end of this 'first city'—so Aristotle calls it—is primarily τὰ ἁπαξλεξία; but Plato would reply that

the cities of the farmers, the auxiliaries, and the rulers, are in reality one city, γινομένη μὲν τὸν ἵππον ἔκειν, οὐκ ὡς τοῦ εἴναι ἢν (Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252b 29). Cf. Laws 828 D die δὲ αὐτήν καθάπερ ἐνα ἀνθρώπον ἢν εἶναι).


370 A 5 οὕτω βάρος ἢ κεῖνος. οὕτω refers to the alternative which is more familiar, although mentioned first: cf. (with Ast) Xen. Men. 1 3, 13 τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον—τὸ σώμα τοῦ ποίου ἢν τὰ φαλαγγάς δῶς ἐκείνα μὲν ἁφάμενα, τὸ τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ' ἀνθρώπον—ἐνέχει τι. On the corruption βάρον for βάρος (also in Men. 94 ε) see Introd. § 5.
7 φιτετι strikes the keynote of the City of Books II—IV. The first critic to lay sufficient stress on this point was Krohn: see Pl. St. pp. 59—61, where he collects the references to φόιν throughout Books I—IV. The City of II—IV is a κατά φόιν εἰκοσιά απόλις. What is meant by φόιν? Not inorganic Nature, but the 'nature' of a πόλις or aggregate of πόλεις, i.e. (as the unit in a city is the man) human nature, in other words, the nature of the human soul, which, according to Plato and Socrates, constitutes a man's true and proper individuality. It is not however human nature as it is, but as it ought to be, which is the foundation on which the Platonic State is built; so that, although the doctrine of transcendental Ideas is excluded from the first four books (see on 111 402 c), Idealism at all events is present. See also Krohn Plat. Frag. pp. 8—11, and (for the connotation of φόιν) Benn's article on 'The Idea of Nature in Plato' in Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. ix pp. 24—40 and Föhlmann l.c. pp. 110 ff.

370 B 10 ὅταν—εἰς μίαν. This principle—the cardinal principle of the Republic, reiterated also with great emphasis in Laws 846 D—847 ν—is deduced by Plato from φόιν, whose rule is specialization: cf. 370 C ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατά φόινι—πράτη. Plato (as usual in the Republic) is thinking of Man's nature, one man being naturally fitted for one pursuit, another for another: cf. 111 395 b, iv 433 A, 434 A, B. The principle of specialization had already been enunciated by Socrates: see e.g. Xen. Mem. 111 g, 3, 15, Cyrop. viii 2, 5, 6. Aristotle widens it into a general law of Nature: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις πολλὰ τούτων ὅσον ὣς ἀληθινότερον τὴν Δεινοκράτην μάχαιραν πενεχρών, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν (Pol. A 2. 125 2 b 1 ff.). In its application to politics, the principle becomes in Plato's hands a weapon for attacking the foundations of Athenian democracy (see Gorg. 455 A—C), to which, in this respect, his own Ideal City was a kind of counterblast.

370 C 15 καλλιόν. Did Plato write καλλία; καλλιόν γίγνεται may no doubt mean 'are better made,' which is fairly satisfactory in point of sense, but καλλίω forms a better balance to πλείω τε, and is more suited to καλλίον just below. With μᾶν immediately following, the corruption would be easy. On the other hand the collocation καλλίον καὶ μᾶς is unpleasing, and it is probably safer to adhere to the mss.
τῶς δ’ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτότομος. Ἀληθῆ. Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλεψὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοι τίνες πόλλοι δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιτισμοῦ γνώμενοι, συχνῶν υπόποιον, πάνω μὲν οὖν. 10
25 Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν πω πάνω γε μέγα τι ἐκή, εἰ αὐτῶς θουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τούτων τε ἀλλός νομάς προσθείμεν, ἵνα οἴς τε θεοργοὶ Ε ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχουσι βοῦς, οἴς τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγαθὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρήσαται ὑποξύνως, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτότομοι δέρμασιν τε καὶ ἔριοι. Οὐδὲ γε, ᾧ δ’ ἂς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἀν ἐκή 30 ἔχουσα πάντα ταύτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἤς ἐγὼ, κατοικίσασθε γε αὐτήν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, οὐ ἐπεσαργῳμένοι μὴ δείσατε, σχεδὸν τι ἄδυνατον. Ἀδύνατον γάρ. Προσθέσει μὴ ἐτί καὶ ἄλλοιν, οὐ ἐξ ἀλλῆς πόλεως αὐτὴ κομιόσθην ὅν δεῖται. Δέσσει. Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἔ ὁ δίακονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὅν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται, 35 παρ’ ὅν ἂν κομι.ReadAsStringAsync ὃν ἂν αὐτοῖς | χρεία, κενὸς ἀπεσιν. ᾦ γάρ; 371
27 Κοικὶ μοι. Δεὶ δὴ τα οἰκοὶ μή μένουν ἐαυτοὶ ποιεῖν ἰκανά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμαί καὶ ὅσα ἐκεῖνοι ὅν ἂν δέονται. Δεὶ γάρ. Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν δημιουργῶν δεί ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει. 5 Πλειόνων γάρ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν διακόνων ποι ὅτι τὸν τε εἰσαβγόντων καὶ ἐξαβγόντων ἐκαστα. οὕτω δὲ ἐσιν ἐμποροί· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Καὶ ἐμπορῶν δὴ δησομέθα. Πάνω γε. Καὶ εἶν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἡ ἐμπορία γίγνεται, συχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσθέν· Β σεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας. Συχνῶν 10 μέιτοι.

34. κενὸς ΑΠΠ: ἐκεῖνος Α1. ἑ γ’: ἑ γ’ ΑΠΠ.
XII. Ἦν δὲ δὴ; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλους μεταδόσονσιν ὅν ἄν ἐκαστοὶ ἐργᾶζονται; ὅν δὴ ἑνεκα καὶ κοινωνιαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν φικάσαμεν. Δῆλον δὴ, ἢ δὲ ὡς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ἰωνοῦμενοι.

Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἦμιν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἑνέκα γενέσθαι σεται ἐκ τούτου. Πάνω μὲν ὦν. Ἀν ὦν κομίσας ὁ ἑφωργὸς εἰς ἡν ἄργοραν τί ὄν ποιεῖ, ἢ τίς ἀλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν, μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἤκη τοῖς δεσμοῖς τὰ παρὰ αὐτὸν ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἄγορᾳ; Ὀνδὰμός, ἢ δὲ ὡς, ἀλλὰ εἰσίν οἱ τούτῳ ὀρώντες ἐκ τῆς διακοινίας τάπτουσιν ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχέδον τοῖς 2οῖς ἀσθενεστάτοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀρχεῖοι τὰ ἀλλὰ ἔργον πράττετε.

D αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἄγοράν τα μὲν ἀντ' ἄργυρινον ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τῶν δεσμοῖς ἀποδοθοῦντος, τοῖς δὲ ἄντι αὐτῷ ἄργυριον διαλάβοντες, ὦςοι τοίς δεόντως πρᾶσον. Ἀὐτῇ ἄρα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, ἥ χρεία κατηλύων ἦμιν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὔ 25 κατηλύον καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὅνῃ τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακοινοῦντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἄγορᾷ, τούς δὲ πλάνηται ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους; Πάνω μὲν ὦν. Ἐτι δὴ τινες, ὡς ἐγοῦμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, Ε οὐκ ἐν τὰ μὲν τῆς διαφορᾶς μὴ πάνω ἄξιοκοινώνῃτοι ὦσιν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἱερὰν ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόλους ἔχουσιν οὐ δὴ πολοῦντες 30 τὴν τῆς ἱσχύος χρείαν, τὴν τιμήν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληται, ὡς ἐγοῦμαι, μισθωτοί; ἡ γὰρ; Πάνω μὲν ὦν. Πληρωμα

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νεκρόχρυσι καὶ κατηλύον, Latus 831 ε, Xen. Vest. 3, 4, 5, 3. 12. ὄν δὴ ἑνεκα. ὦν can hardly (as J. and C. suppose) refer to μεταδόσονται: it must denote the same objects as the previous ὦν. The meaning is 'for the sake of which things we established the principle of community and founded a city.' Cf. 350 c κοινωνίος—κατηλύων δὴ ἄλλω κτλ.

14. νόμισμα—ἐνεκα. Cf. Latus 742 λ νόμισμα δ' ἑνέκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν. See also 370 ε πο. Plato regards coined money as a necessary evil—the offspring, not of φύσει, but of νόμῳ (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. v 8. 1132 b 30 ff. διά τούτου τόσομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἄλλα νόμῳ εστὶν (καὶ Pol. A 9. 1257 b 10 ff.), a mere conventional symbol, the private possession of which is denied to the highest classes of the State (112 416 b 9 ff.).

371 c 21. οἱ ἄσθενεστάτοι κτλ. Cf. Latus 918 λ—920 ε, where κατηλύει is confined by Plato to those ὧν διαφθειρο-μένων ὦν ἄν γίγνετο μεγάλη λύμη τῇ πόλει (919 c).

371 D 26. κατηλύον—ἐμπόρους. Soph. 223 D τῆς μεταβατικῆς ὦν ἄν πάντα τὸν ἀλλαγῆς, σχέδον αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος δυν. κατηλύων ἐπιστρέφεται; Ναί. Τοῦ δὲ γε ἐξ ἄλλης ἐξ ἄλλης πόλις διαλλατ-τόμους ὅνῃ καὶ πρᾶσει ἐμπόρικη; Τι δ' ὡς?

371 E 29. ἄξιοκοινωνοῖ: worthy of being admitted into the κοινωνία of our city. This explanation (Schneider's) is better than 'worthy of one's society' (L. and S.).

31. την τιμήν ταύτην. ταύτην is idiom. for ταύτης: see 1. 333 b n.

32. μισθωτοί. Plato does not admit slave labour in his city, unless perhaps in the persons of barbarians. The exclusion of slaves is also a touch of 'Nature': cf. Arist. Pol. A 3. 1253 b 20 tois δὲ παρὰ φύσιν (sc. δοκεῖ) τὸ δεσπόζειν with Suse-
mihl and Hicks ad loc. If barbarians may be enslaved, it is because they are φύσει δοῦλοι; cf. V 469 B ff., with 470 C and Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252 b 9 ταύτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον.

372 A 2 ἐν αὐτῶι—ἄλληλοιοι. The reply is to the first question, not to the second: see on V 465 E. In so far as δικαιοσύνη can be said to exist in so elementary a state, Plato would have identified it with the performance by each class (farmers, artisans, etc.) of their own work and no more. This is the first view of δικαιοσύνη in the Republic: for the second see IV 432 ff., 441 D ff., and for the third or metaphysical VI 504 B ff.

7 ὑποδήματα. I have placed the mark of interrogation after ὑποδήματα, as it is only the present participles which belong to διατησσομαι. 'And when they have built themselves houses' marks a fresh start, no longer interrogative, for which reason I have also departed from the usual punctuation after ἰκανῶι (in B) and πόλεμοιν (in C).

372 B 9 ἑρέφονται κτλ. The picture which Plato proceeds to draw represents the working of well-regulated ἐπιθυμία or appetite—the psychological groundwork of the third or lowest order in Plato's city. τὰ μὲν is the wheaten meal (ἄλευρα), τὰ δὲ the barley-meal (ἄλφιστα). Only the wheaten meal was as a rule baked (τέσσεραν ἢ ὀστάν) into loaves (ἄρτοι). the barley-meal was kneaded into a simple dough (μάσσευς, whence μᾶζα), dried in a mould, and afterwards moistened with water and eaten." (Blümner, Gr. Privatallt. p. 218). μάζα made of barley meal was the staple food of the common Greek: the wheaten loaf was a luxury. The double chiasmus ἄλφιστα, μάζατες, μάζας ἢ ἀλευρα, πέφαντες, ἄρτους is noticeable: cf. Crito 47 C.

It will be observed that the inhabitants of this 'First City' subsist upon a vegetable diet. Cattle are used for ploughing and carrying, and supply wool and skins to make clothing and shoes (370 D, E), but animal food is unknown. It is improbable that Plato deliberately borrowed this trait from the current legends about the golden age (cf. Pol. 271 D ff.): for he allows the slaughter of cattle for skins, whereas in the golden age animal life was held sacred (see Empedocles ap. Arist. Rhet. I 13. 1373 b 14 ff. and Robertson Smith Religion of the Semites pp. 282 ff.). He no doubt regarded vegetarianism as characteristic of the primitive innocence of a pastoral community (Laws 783 A—D).

In Plato's days, as now, the Greek peasant was almost a vegetarian. To argue from this and kindred passages (esp. Tim. 77 A—C and 80 E) as Teichmüller does (Liti. Fehd. II pp. 187—202), that Plato was himself a vegetarian, is somewhat hazardous. Whether Plato wished his farmers to be vegetarians or not, he permits the soldiers to eat flesh: cf. 111 404 B ff.
10 τὰ μὲν τέμπαιντες κτλ. The assyn-
deton (as usual) is ampliative. The punctuation
in the text avoids the diffi-
culty of the two verbs τέμπαιναι and εὐοιχίουσαι. Schneider places the colon before μέλαια, but this is much less natural. For μέλαια γενειας, ‘noble bannocks’ (J. and C), cf. (with Stallbaum) Laurus 844 Ε τὰ γενειαία σῶκα εὐοικομιζόμενα. κάλαμον is not ‘a mat of reeds’ (Jowett, with L. and S.), which would be much too artistic, but ‘reeds,’ κάλαμον being collective as in Arist. Hist. An. IX 36. 620a 35; and τῶν is contemptuous (cf. II 363 D n.).

12 παραβαλλόμενοι is also contemptu-
ous for the παραστάδεμον of civilised
society: it suggests throwing food before
animals (cf. 372 D).

13 στιβάδων: not ‘mattresses’ (L. and S.): why should they ‘strew’ mattresses? The whole point in the text avoids that in stead of reclining on manufactured
couches they lie on natural ones of bryony and myrtle boughs: contrast 372 D. στρωννίαι στιβάδαι is simply ‘to make
couches of leaves’: cf. στροφέας λέχος. The word μέλαια means bryony (as Schnei-

14 ἐπιπινώντες. ἐπὶ means ‘after’: cf. Xen. Cyr. VI 2 28 μετά δὲ τῶν σιτῶν εἰ σιτῶν ἐπιπίνομεν. In Greek banquets
there was little or no drinking during dinner. The conjecture ψηφιστάνσεσ (Stephanus-Hase Thes. s. v. ἐπιπίνω) is unnecessary.

372 C 16 η τόλεμον. The origin
of war is over-population (373 D).

17 ἄνευ δύσου κτλ. δύσοι is meant by
Glaucos in its narrower sense of animal food (whether fish or flesh); Socrates on the other hand uses the word in its wider sense of anything eaten in addition to, or along with, bread, e.g. vegetables (see Blümner Gr. Privatallt. p. 223). A spirited and athletic Athenian like Glaucus cannot tolerate a vegetarian diet: cf. 372 D.

18 ἐστιωμένοι: sarcastic, with refer-
ence to εὐοιχίουσαι: ‘you call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!’ (J. and C.).

19 ἀλας—ἐψησουσαι. Of course
they will make salt and olives and cheese
and vegetables whether wild’ (βολβοὺς
‘or cultivated’ (λάχανα) ‘into such boiled
dishes as can be prepared in the country.’
ἐψημα is not ‘something for boiling,’ but
something boiled; and ἐψησουσαι is used
with two accusatives, one external (ἀλας,
&c.) and the other internal (ἐψηματα). Plato hints that cookery in the country
(ἐν ἄγροις, cf. κατ’ ἄγροιν ΗΗ 309 D) is inferior to that in the town. For the kind of dishes in question cf. Ath. Π 64 ε περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν βολβῶν σκευασίας Φιλήμων φησι τὸν βολβὸν, ἐν βολβί, σκόπει ὅσα ἐπανάγησε εἰδοκείμενα, τῷ ρύγῳ μελὶ ἄστρα
μέν ἐλαίων κρίμων ἐξον ὀσμαν—ἀυτός
δ’ ἐφ’ αὐτῷ ὀστὶν πονηρός καὶ πικρός.

22 ὕφηγος: ‘acorns,’ not ‘beechnuts’ (D. and V.): see Blaydes on Ar. Peace 1137.
372 D 23. Υποτίνοντες. Wine was sipped during dessert. Υπο- in ινοντες emphasizes the moderation already expressed in μετρίοις: cf. Lys. 223 B ινοπετωκότες εν τοῖς Βρασιοῖς. Dr Jackson connects πρὸς τὸ πῦρ with ινοντες, comparing IV 430 E, Ar. Ach. 751 al. This may be right, but the ordinary view seems to me somewhat more natural.

372 D—373 C Glauco protests against the swinish character of such a life: more comfort, he thinks, should be allowed. While expressing his opinion that the healthy State is that which he has already described, Socrates is willing to describe the 'inflamed' (φλεγμαίνουσα) City, in case Justice and Injustice should be discovered in it (372 D—372 E).

The Second Sketch of a City now begins (372 E ff.).

Some will not be satisfied with the provisions of our first city, but will demand a variety of physical comforts and delicacies, and artistic delights. A crowd of hunters and imitative artists of different kinds will accordingly spring up, and the race of middlemen will be largely increased. As a flesh diet will come into fashion, swineherds will be in demand, and cattle will multiply. The new style of living will bring doctors to the front.

372 D ff. The provisions of the πρώτη πόλις are insufficient for the satisfaction of human needs: for there is δυσος as well as ἐπιθυμία in the soul of man. Hence we must advance a stage further. Plato's method is as follows. He begins by enumerating many of the features of ordinary Greek life, as he found it, without distinguishing the good from the bad. The resulting picture he calls a προφώσα or φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις. The next step is to purge this προφώσα πόλις (cf. 111 399 E λελθημένο γε διακαθαιρότες πόλιν ἦ δρτι τρυφών εφαμεν πόλιν) by excluding some of the features, and correcting and regulating others, both by prescriptive enactments and still more by the influence of education. It is this κακαθμένη πόλις which forms what we may call Plato's δευτέρα πόλις (11 372 E—IV): his third and crowning effort, the City of the Rulers, is contained in Books V—VII. Cf. viii 543 E n. and Hirtel der Dialog 1 pp. 335 ff.

372 D 26 ινόντες. The city of Pigs is supposed by Zeller 111 i pp. 325, 893, and Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 5 ff., Proleg. zuv Pl. Staat p. 61, to be a contemptuous allusion to Antisthenes' ideal commonwealth (on which see Susemihl in Fl. Jahrb. 1887 pp. 207—214). This conjecture requires us to interpret Plato's first sketch of a State as wholly ironical and intended 'to warn us against the false ideal of a Nature-City' (Zeller l. c.). I agree with Henkel (Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 8 f.) in thinking that there is no solid ground for Zeller's theory. The πρώτη πόλις is not of course Plato's ideal republic, and his description of it is plentifully bestrewed with irony, but it is nevertheless the foundation on which his city is built, and, in point of fact, although some of its features are implicitly corrected or superseded in the sequel, it still remains on the whole, and as far as it goes, a not unpleasing picture of the life of the lowest stratum in Plato's city, and it is nowhere expressly cancelled or abolished. See also on 369 B and 372 E. The εὐχέρη βίος (Pol. 266 C) of the πρώτη πόλις is inly compared to that of pigs, the εὐχέρηστατον γένος τῶν ὄντων (ib.) and it is appropriate that Glauco, who is nothing if not δυσος (Introd. § 2), should thus express his contempt for a life which hardly if at all rises above the level of ἐπιθυμία.

372 E 30 καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι: c. g.
fish, flesh, fowl: see on 372 c. The words ἀπερ—ἐκοιναὶ are to be taken with τραγιματα as well as with ὑπα. Glauco is thinking of delicateies like the preserved sorb-apples (δα τεταρχεύμενα) alluded to in Symp. 190 d. See Blümmer Gr. Privatalt. p. 222 n. 2.

31 τρυφώσαν πόλιν. Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 34, 72) thinks that Plato originally meant to look for ἀδίκια in this τρυφώσα πόλις: but see on 369 λ.

34 ἀλθύσι—φλεγμαίνουσαν. There is a vein of irony in ἀλθύσι: for the πρώτη πόλις is not the final form of Plato's city. The epithets τρυφώσαν, φλεγμαίνουσαν are not however ironical (as Dümmler seems to hold Proleg. p. 62): see III 390 κ.

35 οἶδ' ὧν—ἄποκολλεῖν. I have adopted Richards' suggestion, and printed a comma after βούλεθε, a colon before οὐδὲν. The meaning is: 'but if you wish it, let us contemplate also' etc. The scribe in Paris A must have understood καὶ ἑωρήσωμεν in the same way, for he assigns the words οὐδὲν ἄποκολλέει to Glauco. We are hardly justified in making ἑωρήσωμεν the subjunctive after βούλεθε, in the absence of other examples in which the subjunctive follows a dependent βούλεθε. A possible view would be to take ἑωρήσωμεν as = δεὶ ἑωρήσαι and construe 'but if you wish it and we are to contemplate' etc., cf. Crat. 425 D εἰ μὴ ἀρα δὴ (mss δεὶ)—καὶ ἦμει—ἀπαλλαγόμεν ("unless we too are to get quit"), and Postgate in Transactions of the Camb. Philol. Soc. III Pt. i pp. 50—55.

But Richards' proposal is a better one.

36 ταῦτα—τισιν. γὰρ is introductory and means not 'for' but 'well.' τῖσιν contains a sly allusion to Glauco: cf. v 465 Ε, VI 504 Ε.

373 Α 2 καὶ δὺα δή. For δή see 357 Ε c. n.

3 οὐαίραι. G. W. Nitzsch (Rhein. Mus. 1857, pp. 471 f.), Richter (Pl. Jahrb. 1867, p. 141), Madvig, and Stallbaum take offence at the juxtaposition of οὐαίραι and πέμματα and suggest respectively ἀδήραι (apparently an error for ἀθάραι, cf. Ar. Plit. 673), ἔραι (ἐψήματα in Schol. on 445 Ε), ἐσχάριτα 'panes delicati,' and ἔτρα (with the following καὶ deleted)—conjectures which are altogether needless and refute one another. The text is successfully defended by Hug (Hermes 1876, p. 254), who cites an exact parallel in Ar. Aich. 1090—1092 κλίναι, τραπέζα, προσκεφάλαμα, στρώματα, [στέφανοι, μύρον, τραγύμαθα, αἶ πόρναι πάρα, [ἀμφοί πλακωντες, σπαρομοιότες, ἔτρα] (varieties of πέμματα). Cf. also Amphis ap. Ath. XIV 642 Α ὄνοι ὤδε, ψά, σημαίται, [μύρον, στέφανοι, αὐλητρίς andinfra III 404 D, IX 573 D]. From these passages it may fairly be doubted whether Plato's mention of ἐτραί ραι is in any way even παρά προσδοκιάν (as the Oxford editors suggest): for αὐλητρίδες were almost as common a feature at dessert as the cakes (πέμματα) etc. which accompany them here: see e.g. Xen. Mem. 1 5. 4, Symp. 2, 1, Pl. Symp. 176 Ε, Prot. 347 D. Vahlen (Index Lect. per sem. hib. 1875—6 Berol.) quotes also Catullus’ "cencabris bene—si tecum attuleris bonam atque magnam | cenam non sine candida puella | et vino et sale et omnibus cachinissi" (13. 1 ff.).
6 καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν. ποικιλία means variety of colour as e.g. in embroidery: cf. 378 c, 11 401 A, Eurip. 6 c. On the omission in A see Intro. § 5.

χρυσόν καὶ ἑλάφια: with reference to chryselephantine statuary. Note that (according to Plato) the demand for decorative arts does not arise till the physical necessities of man are satisfied. Cf. Nettleship Lectures and Remains, 11 p. 73.

373 B 7 μειξόνα ταὶ την. τε ἐστὶ ἀνακόλουθον (Hocler de part. Pl. p. 14); for other instances in the Republic see ν 403 D, v 522 B, ix 575 A. In this passage Richter would change ταὶ την into τοιαύτην, comparing 372 E; but the text is sound, and τοιαύτην would be quite wrong. αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν (cf. 370 E), conjectured by Heller instead of αὐτῇ τὴν πόλιν, is neat but needless.

9 πλῆθος ἄ: i.e. πλῆθος τῶν ἄ, as Ficinus understood the words. Stallbaum's alternative suggestion (that ἄ refers directly to δύναμιν and πλῆθος) gives a poor sense. Cf. infra 373 E n.

10 θηρευταὶ πᾶντες. The addition of πᾶντες shows that θηρευταὶ is used in a wide sense, including every variety of fishing as well as hunting: θάλα 823 κ ἄμμα γὰρ πάμπολο τὰ πράγματα ἔστι, περιήγημένον ὑψώματι τὸν ἕχουν ἐν, πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐν χύδων, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτημονῶν, πάμπολον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ τῷ ἐθνεῦματα. In Euthyd. 290 b—d, Soph. 219 ff., and Laws (l.c.), Plato makes θηρευτικὴ include 'fishing for men' e.g. in war, or by Sophists etc. This wider meaning clearly rests upon a Platonic—or rather Socratic (see Xen. Mem. 11 6. 29, quoted by J. and C.)—metaphor, and is not intended here. Cf. Benseler in Fl. Jahrb. 1881, pp. 236 ff. Aristotle on the other hand regards hunting as characteristic of the most primitive society (Pol. A 8. 1256 δ 35 ff.), and so too Plato himself in Laws 679 A.

12 ράψονοι—ἐργαλαβοὶ are the poet's servants. In Athens and elsewhere they formed regular guilds or όνοματῶν τῶν περὶ τῶν Διώνυσον τεχνίτων: cf. Arist. Probl. xxx 10. 956 b 11 οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνίται. Ἑργαλάβοι contracted with the poet for the performance of his play, acting as a kind of financial agent or middleman between him and the όνοματος to which he belonged. See Müller Bühnenafterbitter, pp. 397—414.

373 C 15 παιδαγωγῶν—κούριων. We infer that in the 'healthy' State fathers were παιδαγωγοὶ, mothers suckled (παιδιά) and nursed (προβοῦλον) their own children, and the professional hair-dresser was unknown.

17 συμβοτῶν. See on 372 B.
In brief, we shall require a guardian to be naturally philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong.

373 E 23 Lέγομεν. Lέγομεν may be right, but the first hand of A was apt to err in these subjunctive forms (Intro. § 5), and the Indicative is somewhat more natural here: cf. (with Schneider) 377 E ἀλλὰ τῶν δὴ λέγομεν καὶ πόλεως;

373 D 23 Lέγομεν. Lέγομεν may be right, but the first hand of A was apt to err in these subjunctive forms (Intro. § 5), and the Indicative is somewhat more natural here: cf. (with Schneider) 377 E ἀλλὰ τῶν δὴ λέγομεν καὶ πόλεως;

373 D 20 χρείαις. Cobet's χρείαι is not, I think, necessary. The plural (for which cf. 369 D al.) refers to the different occasions when we may require the help of doctors.

373 D—376 C In consequence of the increase of population we shall require more land. We must accordingly appropriate some of our neighbours' territory, just as under similar conditions they will lay hands upon ours. Herein we have the genesis of War. The duties of War—according to our principle of the subdivision of labour—will involve us in a standing army of professional soldiers or 'Guardians.' Now as War demands not only concentration and application, but also a certain natural aptitude, our Guardians must be qualified by Nature for their duties: that is to say, like generous dogs, they must be quick to perceive, swift to pursue, and strong in actual fight. They should also be brave and spirited, but gentle to their fellow-citizens and one another. The union of gentleness with spirit in the same nature is rare, but not unknown among men, any more than it is among dogs. Our Guardians must in fact be 'philosophic' (philosophoi), like the dog, who is a true philosopher when he defines friend and for respectively by knowledge and by ignorance, hating the unknown, and welcoming the known. In

374 A 22 ζώνης. The correct form is ζώνης, as in 373 B 22. ζώνης is the definite article, and hence with οἱ τῶν πόλεων the article θείου is superfluous.

374 A 25 πολήμου—νέμων. War then arises from the acquisition of territory and wealth: cf. Phaed. 66 C ἄρα τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεωι ἠμῶν γίνονται, where war is farther traced to the body and its desires, to satisfy which we seek to multiply our possessions. Cf. Arist. Pol. A 8, 1250 b 23 ἡ πολεμική φόβως κτητική ποιεῖ ἔσται.

374 A 31 οὐ—γίνονται defines γίνεσιν. War comes εἷς οὖς i.e. οἱ τοῦτον οὐ κτλ. (ὡς for εἷς, according to the usual Greek idiom, cf. Euthyph. 10 c, and Π. 401 a ὁν ἄνασαν οἱ ἐστιν) al.), from which that which involves both cities and individuals in calamities, viz. from the desire of money. Cf. 373 B n. and (for the sentiment
making war a profession, and citizens synonymous with soldiers, Plato is laconizing. The language which Isocrates (Archid. 81) applies to Sparta might in point of fact be used of Plato’s State: τῶν ἔλληνων διεννόμων οὐ τῷ μεγεθεὶ τῆς πόλεως, οὐδὲ τῷ πλῆθεὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ἀλλὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ὡμολογεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐκαίστῳ ἢπιῶς ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν,

11. ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμων II: om. A.

Latius 870 A ff. ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλετοῦ καὶ ἀτέρων κτήσεως ἐροτᾶ μαρτων ἐντύλλουσα δίνημα διὰ φύσιν τέ καὶ ἀπαι- δεύειν τὰς κακίας κτλ. The love of money—so Plato held—is the root of all evil. This explanation is due to Schleiermacher; others (Schneider, Stallbaum, J. and C. as an alternative) refer εἴ ὧν to war and the like. It is an objection to such a view that it makes Plato say that evils come from War (and the like), directly after he has declined to say anything of the sort (μηθὲν γέ πω — ἐργάζεται). Further, if ὧν referred to war, the sentiment would in itself be a platitudinous and almost deserve to be expunged from the text, as it is by Herwerden. On the other hand εἴ ὧν—γίγνεται is on Schleiermacher’s view quite consistent with μηθὲν γέ πω—ἔργαζεται, for although war arises from that which harms a State, in itself it may (and does) actually do good. Good in other words may come out of evil; which is exactly the principle on which Plato evolves his ideal city out of the τρυφώσα πόλεις. δὴν γίγνεται (sc. κακὸν) is equivalent (as J. and C. remark) to ἐκάστοτε: cf. Phaed. 68 D φόβος μειῳ- νον κακῶν ὑπομένον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῶν βάιαντος δὴν ὑπομένωσι.

33 ὁφ. Herwerden’s conjecture με- γάλης seems to show that he connected σμικρῷ with στρατοπέδῳ, but the meaning is ‘not by a small amount, but by a whole army.’ For the datives cf. ix 579 cn.

374 a 3 αὐτοὶ οὖν ἰκανοί; Glauco speaks as an Athenian citizen-soldier. In
πρός ὁ επεφύκει ἐκαστὸς καὶ ἐφ’ ὑ’ ἐμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολῆν
C ἄγεν ὁ διὰ βιον αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος ὅμ παρεις τοὺς καίρους καλὸς
ἀπεργάζεσθαι. τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ 15
πλεῖστον ἐστίν εὑ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἦ οὔτω ράδιον, ὡστε καὶ
γεωργῶν τις ἁμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην
τέχνην ἵντινον ἐργαζόμενος, πεπτευτικός δέ η κυβευτικὸς ἰκανὸς
οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτήδευο, ἀλλὰ
D παρέργῳ χρώμενοι; καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἦ τι ἄλλο τῶν 20
πολεμικῶν ὅπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημεροῦ ὀπλιτικῆς ἦ τινος
ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἰκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ
ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα ἐν τράδει ἅθλησθήν ποιήσει, οὐδ’ ἔσται
χρήσιμων τῷ μῆτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστῳ λαβὼν μῆτε τὴν ἰκανὴν
παρασχομένων; Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἂν, 25
η δ’ ὅς, τὰ ὀργάνα ἄν ἄξια.
Ε ΧV. Ὡκουν, ἥν δ’ ἐγόν, ὅσον μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον,
toosuτῷ σχολῆς τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἰ, καὶ αὐ τέχνῃ τε
καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Όλοι ἔγγονε, ἦ δ’ ὅς. Ἄρ’ σον
οὐ καὶ ψύχεως ἐπιτήδειας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα;
Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 30
Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἰ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰπερ οἰοί τ’ ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι,
tίνες τε καὶ ποιοί φύσεις ἐπιτήδειας εἰς πόλεως φυλακῆν. Ἡμέτερον
μέντοι. Μά Δια, ἦν δ’ ἐγόν, οὐκ ἄρα φαίλουν πράγμα ἡράμεθα.
375 ὁμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατον, ὅσον γ’ ἂν δύναμις παρείκη. | Οὐ γὰρ
17. σκυτοτομῶν II: σκυτοτομῶν Λ.

13 ἐφ’ ὑ’ with σχολὴν ἄγεν (Schneider); cf. Ἀρ. 36 δ. The phraseology here
recalls 370 b and c.
374 C 16 ἦ οὔτω ράδιον: singular in spite of the plural τὰ περὶ. Cf. (with
Schneider) Ἡῷρ. Μαῖορ 299 Α, Λαυς
708 Β.
374 D 21 τε καὶ ὀργάνων is ejected by
Herwerden, who is also inclined to
denounce τὰ ὀργάνα below. But it is just
these words which “point the analogy:
the weapons of the warrior are his tools.”
(J. and C.) On similarly inadequate
grounds τῶν νέων has been condemned
in Euthyph. 3 Α τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς
βλάστας διαφθείρεται: see my note ad
loc. τῶν ἄλλης μάχης below refers for
example to ψυχαὶ or πελτασταὶ; the ἀσπίς
(it should be remembered) was
worn by the ὀπλιτῆς (whence ἀσπίδα
μὲν λαβὼν—ὀπλιτικῆς). The necessity
of special knowledge and training for
success in war is insisted on by the
27 φυλάκων. This is the first occur-
rence of φυλάκες in the technical sense
which it bears throughout the Repub.
It is important to remember that the
name includes not only the soldiers, but
also—after they have been introduced—
the rulers; when it becomes necessary to
distinguish between the two classes, the
former are called ἐπίκουροι (first named
in III 414 B), the latter φυλάκες παρ-
tελείς (III 414 B), τέλειοι φυλάκες
(IV 428 D) or the like, or more commonly
ἀρχιτετεχμέναι (first alluded to in III 389 B,
but not expressly separated off until 412 B ff.,
and finally and fully described only in
Books VI and VII).
374 E 34 δόρον γ’ ἂν δύναμις παρα-
eίκη. The phrase is not found elsewhere
in Plato, although παρείκει is found with a personal subject (ὁ θεός, θεός) again in Theae. 150 δ, Lat. 934 ε. Herwerden would eject θύμαι (cf. Sympos. 187 ε καθ’ θεόν παρείκει), but such a word is very unlikely to have been interpolated. θύμαι is simply 'our powers': the article is omitted as in the idiomatic κατά θύμας, εἰς θύμας.

375 a 2 σκύλακος. A play on σκλάξ and φίλαξ is intended. Analogies from the animal kingdom were freely employed by the historical Socrates: for the dog in particular cf. Xen. Mem. IV 1. 3 κατὰ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν ὑψιστών, φιλοσόφων τε οὖν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηριοῖς, τὰς μὲν καλὰς ἀθέλεις ἀρίστας γλυκεῖται,—ἀναγγέλους δὲ γεγομένας ματαίους ταῖς καὶ μανιβαίς καὶ δυσπειραστάς. Cf. Η on φίέται 370 Λ.

5 αἰσθανόμενον: 'the moment he perceives.' The present (where one might expect the aorist) emphasizes the rapidity with which pursuit follows upon sight.

7 ἀνδρεῖος. For ἀνδρεῖος applied to beasts cf. Isocr. 15. 211 εἰ περὶ τῶν ἔπτων καὶ τῶν κύων καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων ὀρόστεις τέχνας ἐγκόπου πιθανόν, αὐ̂ τὰ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοτέρα, τὰ δὲ πρατέστρα, τὰ δὲ φρονιμώστρα ποιοῦσι, περὶ τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεων μηδεμίων οἴκοται τὸ κολλήσαι παίδειαν κτλ. See also Lach. 150 D—


8 θυμοειδής. The technical term θυμοειδής is here for the first time used in the Republic. Plato probably inherited the word from Socrates (see Xen. Mem. IV 1. 3 τῶν τῶν ἔπτων τῶν εὐφυστάτων, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροίς ὄντας κτλ.): in practice he employs it as the adjective corresponding to θύμος (see e.g. III 411 A, B), as ἐπιθυμητικός corresponds to ἐπιθύμια. The usual translation 'spirited' probably expresses the meaning as nearly as can be done by a single word. For a full discussion of the word reference may be made to P. Meyer θυμός ap. Arist. Platonomique (1876), whose conclusion (p. 63) is 'τὸν θυμόν esse eam naturalem vim, qua ductus suamquisque propriam naturam explere studeat, quaque incitatus, quae canque hanc naturam ipsi propriam tollere vel laedere conentur, fugiat, quae contra perfectiorem reddere possint, adpetet.' See also on IV 439 Ε.

375 b 9 ᾠδακόν—ἀνίκητον. Ast may be right in supposing that Plato has in view the words of Heraclitus, often referred to in antiquity, θυμὸς μάκα σεβαι χαλεπὸν ἕτη τι γὰρ ἄν χρῆσθαι γλυκεῖσθαι, ψυχῆς ὡμὴται (Fr. 105 Bywater).


14. ἄλλος ἡ ἄλλοι ἀλήθειας.
au'to'n e'ina'i, pròs de toús polèmíous xalép'tou's: e'í de mú'i, ou perimenvoúin álloús sfásas dioléstai, ál' autó fíth'mou'tai autó drúsas'antai. 'Alýthh', éph. Ti oúv, ἢν δ' égō, pólios'men; tòthev áma prá'ôn kai megálóth'men ýh'dos evrí'se'men; évanta'ía gár pnu'ýmoeidei præaeia fús'es. Fài'netai. 'Allä ménu'toi toútoun ótotoér'oun 20 án stér'ntai, fílal'x ágáthos ou m' h gé'nntai: tаútai de ád'нia'tois
D' e'ouke,n kai óútou dí | e'vmba'i'nen ágátho'n fíl'aka ád'nuat'ou'g genván'θai. Kýndu'nue'i, éph. kai ég'w áp'trí'gasa te kai ép'tike'f'ámenos tа ému'r'tos'ë'n, Dé'kaí'wos ge, ἢν δ' ég'w, ó fíle, áp'tro'm'ën: ἢ tár pro'th'me'ma eîkónous áp'te'lep'b'hmen. Pòs' l'ég'wes; Ο'uk én'ños'am'en, 25 õte éisín árà fú'seis, òías h'meis ouk wép'b'hmen, ëxhounai tán'ntia tauto. Poò dí; 'Ἰδον mú'v án tís kai ev állois ς'ψ'ois, ou mú'e't án E' h'kí'sta én ὑ' h'meis pá'rebál'l'lo'men τυ' fú'l'aka. 1 o'shà gá'r pòu tón genva'liai kuv'nón, óti tóuto fú'sei au'tó'n tò ýh'dos, pròs mú'n tòús sú'n'h'leis te kai ynuorfí'mous ós ói'ón te prao'tá'tous éina'i, pròs dè 30 tòús ágrw'tas tǒnu'nat'ión. Oí'da mú'ntoi. Tóuto mú'en árà, ἢν δ' ég'w, duname'to'n, kai ou' pá'rá fú'si'n eith'tó'men toioú'ton éina'i tònu'f'íl'aka. Oúk e'ouke'n.

XVI. Ἀρ' oúv soi dòkei éti tòúde pρροσε'í'ñθai ὁ fυλακικός ἑσόμενος, πρός τῷ θυμοειδεῖ έτί προσγενέθαι φιλόσοφος τῆς 35

375 c 19 ἐναντία γάρ—φύσεις. Plato regarded this opposition as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman's foremost duty to blend the θυμοειδεῖς and πράων harmoniously together: see Pol. 306 c—311 c, infra III 410 ff., VI 503 c, Theaet. 144 A, B.

21 ταύτα—εἰοκέν. Van Heusde (Initia Phil. Plat. p. 471 n. 1) somewhat hastily declares these words to be corrupt, and supplies ἀμφότερα ἔχειν after ταύτα δε. ταύτα refers like τούτων simply to the two qualities πράων and μεγαλοθύμων: 'these—meaning the combination of these as opposed to one of them—'are apparently unattainable': cf. VI 499 D ou γάρ ἄδυνατος γενέσθαι, ou' h'meis ἄδυ'νατα λέγωμεν.

375 d 25 ἐνοήσαμεν—φύσεις. Ενο'ήσαμεν (with ὅ) is read by most of the editors, quite unnecessarily, as Schneider shews. νοεῖν is not 'putare,' nor—I think—'perpendere,' but simply 'anima'advertere,' 'notice,' as often. Such a meaning is peculiarly appropriate with ἰδον following. Presently ἀρά is not 'then' (J. and C.), but 'after all.'

28 τῶν φύλακι: not τῶν σκλακις, as Groen van Prinsterer conjectured (Plat. Prorp. p. 209). τῶν φύλακι of course depends on παρεβάλλομεν, and ἐν ψ is for ἐν τοῦτο δ.

375 e 29 αὐτῶν τὸ θῆσο. With αὐτῶν (unnecessary, but welcome, after τῶν γενναίων κων) cf. IV 428 a n.

πρὸς μὲν—τούνατιόν. In Od. XVI 4—10 the dogs of Eumaeus do not bark at Telemachus, and Odysseus remarks (8, 9) Ἐδομάι, ἣ μᾶλα τίς τοι ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδε ἐταίρος | ἢ καὶ γνώριμος ἄλλος, ἐτέι κύνες οὐχ ὑλάνουσι | ἄλλα περισσαύνεσι. See also Od. XIV 30, where they bark at the stranger Odysseus, and cf. Herac. 115 (Bywater) κύνες καὶ βαύζουσι δν ἀν μὴ γυνώσκωσι. In Aristotle similar characteristics are attributed to the lion: see Physiol. 5. 809b 34—36 μεγαλοφιμον καὶ φάλωνον, καὶ πράτον καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόσοφον πρός δ ἀν ὀμηλον, and Hist. An. IX 44. 679b 10—12.

35 πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεὶ κτλ. There
seems to be no other example in good Greek of προσεγένθαι meaning ‘to become in addition’; but we may compare προσέγνωνται II 373 A, προσέβην VII 531 B, προσείπομεν X 607 B, and similar instances with other verbs. I formerly wrote φιλόσοφος for φιλόσοφος (‘that to the element of spirit nature should have added’—προσεγένθαι, i.q. accessisse, cf. I 346 D —‘a philosophical temperament’). The accusative with infinitive has however a harsh effect. Herwerden cuts the knot by deleting ον of προσεγένθαι.

376 Α 3 δτι—προσπεπονθώς. Schneider justly observes that δτι is not likely to be an interpolation, and might easily have disappeared before δν, as it has in A (see cr. n.). In itself the presence of δτι is an improvement. For ονδεν δη ν (supported also by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 149) reads ονδεν, which may be right. Cobet's ονδέν εν is too emphatic.

5 ού πάνι—τον νοῦν: ‘I have hardly thought of the matter now,' μέχρι δεύτερο is more idiomatic than μέχρι τουτον in this sense, but Xen. Κυρ. VIII 8. 9 and Dem. de Cor. 48 are closely analogous instances. The alternative rendering 'my observation has hardly extended so far' is (in view of ονδεν τουτον θεαμασαι;) less suitable.

376 B 8 ὡς ἄλληθως φιλόσοφος. ὡς ἄλληθως indicates that φιλόσοφος is to be taken in its etymological sense: cf. I 343 c n. The dog shews 'a love of knowledge' because he loves the known, and hates the unknown. Brandt (Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelenlehren p. 10) ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as =σοφόν τοὺς φίλους: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. There is perhaps an allusion to the Cynics: see Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis (Berlin 1836) 23° 16 ff. τετάρτη δε (sc. αετία του κλη-θηκαν Κυρικόδ) δτι διακριτικών ὕψον δ κόσμων γνώσεως καὶ ἀγνόη τοῦ φιλον καὶ τοῦ ἀλλότριον ὄρθον δν γιργυρούκειν, νομίζει φιλον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπαλον ἐπιφέρομεν εἰς, ὁτερον οὐκ αὑτοι τοις μὲν ἐπιτη- δελοὺς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν φίλος ἐνδύματο καὶ εὐμενεῖς ἐδέχοτο, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιτηδελους ἀπῆλανου δικην κόσμων κατ' αὐτῶν ὑλα- κτοντες, and Philoponus ib. 35° 5—12. The Cynics were themselves very fond of pointing the moral from the lower animals to man (Dümmel Proleg. p. 58 n. 2). and Plato here paints them not unkindly in colours of their own. It should be noted that throughout II—IV Plato uses φιλοσοφοι and φιλοσοφια with less of an intellectual than of a moral connotation. In the earlier books the word is for the most part connected with a gentle considerate disposition or character, whether naturally implanted or the result of culture (cf. I 410 E, 411 C, 411 E): in 407 C the sense is somewhat different. See Nettleship in Hellenica pp. 77—79, and Krohn Pl. St. p. 71. It is not until the latter part of Book V (473 B ff.) where Plato is proposing to enter on the third and final stage of his ideal city, viz. the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχιτόνων, that the intellectual aspect of the word begins to predominate over the moral. Cf. IV 439 D n.
and youthful imitation of the gods; Oudamós, ἢ δ' ὥς, ὡτός ὦ. Αὐλὰ μὲντοι, ἐπτὸν ἐγὼ, τὸ γε φιλομαθῆς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταυτῶν; Ταὐτὸν γάρ, ἐφθ. Οὐκόνθε γαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ εἰ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἶ μὲλεί πρὸς τοὺς οἶκεῖς καὶ γιορμίους.

C πράος τις ἔσεσθαι, φῦνεί φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆς αὐτῶν δειν 15 εἶναι; Τιθῶμεν, ἐφθ. Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδῆς καὶ ταχύς καὶ ἱσχυρός ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἐσται οἱ μέλλον καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἐσεῖσθαί φύλαξ πόλεως; Πανταπάσι μὲν οὖν, ἐφθ. Οὕτως μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι. Θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὕτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα δ' ἀρα τι προσφυγόν ἡμῖν ἔσται αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς 20 τὸ κατείσθαι, οὕτε ἔνεκα πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται, ἵνα μὴ ἐδώμεν ἵκανον λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξίουμεν; καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἄδελφος Πάνου μὲν οὖν, ἐφθ., ἑγονε πρόσοκω προορυγόν εἶναι εἰς τούτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν. Μά Δία, ἕν τι ὅγ' ὁ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα 25 ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 'Ιθι οὖν, ἀστερ ἐν μῦθῳ μυθολογοῦντες τε καὶ σχόλιν ἀγονατες λόγος Ε' παιδευόμεν 'τοὺς ἀνδράς. Αὐλὰ χρή.

15. φιλόσοφον II et in mg. A²: om. A¹.


376 C 15 φύτει is better taken with φιλόσοφον than with πράος. Cf. 375 B. 20 ἀρα τι προσφυγόν κτλ. See on 368 E.

376 D 22 ἰνα μη—διεξίουμεν. See cr. n. The omission in the text of A may be accidental (see Introd. § 5), but the sentence is certainly a difficult one. If the ms are right, the meaning must be "For we do not want to be tedious,"—but συχνὸς is rather 'lengthy'—"and we do not want to leave unsaid what is not required for completeness" (J. and C., comparing for συχνὸς Theaet. 185 E, Phil. 23 B al.). The conjectures of Teuffel (Rhein. Mus. 1830 p. 469) and Herwerden (Mnem. N. S. xi p. 339)—τα ν' (so 9) ἐδώμεν συχνὸν (so 7i) λόγον ἢ ἰκανόν (so 7i) διεξίουμεν and τα μη ἐδώμεν συχνὸν λόγον ἢ οὐδ' ἰκανόν διεξίουμεν—improve the antithesis, but are much too violent. It is safest to retain the ms reading until a thoroughly satisfactory emendation appears. Dr Jackson suggests τα μη ἐδώμεν ἰκανόν λόγον ἢ οὐδ' ἰκανόν διεξίουμεν.

376 C—378 E Let us next consider how to educate our future Guardians; the enquiry may help us to discover the origin of Justice and Injustice.

We may accept the traditional view that Education consists in 'Music,' or culture of the soul, and Gymnastic, or culture of the body. 'Music' must be begun before Gymnastic. Now 'Music' includes literature (λόγος), and literature is either true or false (μῦθος). We shall educate our children by false literature before we teach them true; but we shall eschew all legends that inculcate views inconsistent with those which we desire our Guardians to entertain when they are men. Makers of legend or fable must be submitted to a censorship, and most of our present legends rejected. Caricatures of the gods, like the stories about Cronus and Oranes, Zeus and Cronus, are not only false in themselves, but ought not, even if they were true, to be told to children, lest they breed inhumanity and filial ineptitude; nor should children be persuaded by Poetry or other imitative arts to believe that the gods
quarrel and fight among themselves. No plea of a ‘deeper meaning’ (νυφωνα) can justify the telling of such tales to children; for children cannot distinguish the spirit from the letter, and impressions made thus early are difficult to efface.

376 E ff. τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; κτλ.

The educational scheme contained in Books II and III contributes to the purification of the ἐρωτευμα πόλις, and thereby helps to complete Plato’s second picture of an ideal city: see on 372 D ff. For the correct understanding of these regulations it is well to bear in mind (i) that Plato’s object in this preliminary discipline is to train the character rather than the intellect (cf. τ. 430 c n.), and (ii) that all the guardians have to pass through this curriculum. The higher scheme of education (in Book VII), on the other hand, is confined to those guardians who are to be made Rulers in the State, and its express aim is to educate the intellect rather than the will. See especially VI 501 E, VII 521 D—522 A mm.

The best discussion on Plato’s theory of education in its broader aspects is still, I think, Nettleship’s Essay in Hellenica pp. 67—180. Platon’s Erziehungstheorie n. s. Schrift. dargestellt von Dr A. Drygas. Schneidemühl 1880 is a useful summary. For Plato’s criticism of poetry, we may refer in particular to Heine’s excellent dissertation De rat. quaec Platonii c. poet. Gr. intercettit &c. Vratislaviae 1880, and to Reber’s Plato und die Poesie Leipzig, 1864.

376 E 30 ἔστιν δὲ τοῦ—μοισική.

The usual Greek view (see for example Isocr. 15. 180—185), corrected by Plato in III 410 C ff.

33 εἰπὼν. Richter (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 141) revives Muretus’ conjecture εἴδος: but εἰπὼν is alone satisfactory. The confusion of ὁ and ὁ occurs in Inscriptions from the third century B.C. onwards (Meisterhans3 p. 24 n. 128). See also Introd. § 5.

λόγων δὲ—ἐπερων.

The word ‘lies’ is here used by Plato in its popular sense of that which is false in fact: his own definition of the ‘veritable lie’ is different: see 382 Β n. ‘Lies’ are necessary—so Plato holds—in education: only they must be moral lies. Under ‘lies’ he includes stories (μῦθοι) about the gods, about the daemons and heroes long since dead, about a future life—all of them subjects where the alleged facts cannot be verified. The ἀληθεία λόγου are concerned with men, and are passed over by Plato, because he could not state his view without anticipating the conclusion which the Republic is intended to prove (see III 392 A—C). This point is missed by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 12).

377 A 4 ἀληθῆ: i.e. truths of fact or history, not yet with reference to moral truth, for nothing has been said to change the connotation of ἑυδος or its opposite ἀληθῆς. In Plato’s view legend contains some elements of historical truth.

6 ἀρχῆ—μέριστον: semi-proverbial, with reference to ἀρχή ἦμων πατὸς: cf.
377 D] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β

B παντός ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοι καὶ ἀπαλώ' ὀτροφοῖν; μάλιστα γὰρ δή τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδυόταί τυπόν, ὅταν τις βούληται ἐνσμήνασθαι ἐκάστῳ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ' οὖν ραδίως οὔτω παρῆσομεν τούς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων οἱ μῦθοι πλασθέντας ἁκοῦειν τοὺς παίδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δύοις ἐκείναις, ὡς, ἐπειδὴν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰςόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; Οὐδ' ὅπωστοι παρῆσομεν. 'Ἡρώτων δὲ ἦμῖν, ὡς ἐοίκειν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, τούτους δὲ ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τρόφοφες τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοὺς παιδίν καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μῦθοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σῶματα ταῖς χερερῖν· ὅν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον. Ποιοὺς δὲ; ἐφη. 'Εν τοῖς μείζοσιν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, μῦθοι ὑφόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δὲ σαρ δὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τύπων εἶναι 20 D καὶ ταύτων δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἦ οὐκ οἷοί; "Εγγον', ἐφη· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνοικο ὑπὲρ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις. Οὔς Ἱσίοδος τε, εἶπον, καὶ"Ομηρος ἦμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι

8. τύπων Richards: τύπως codd.

Laus 753 E, and (for the application of the sentiment) ib. 765 E.

377 B 8 μάλιστα — τύπως. See cr. n. To τύπος there are two objections: (1) the subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδυόταί should be the same; but the subject of πλάττεται is not τύπος, but the νέοι καὶ ἀπαλώ' ὀτροφοῖν, cf. πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς in c below: (2) it is more natural and correct to say that an object which 'is being moulded' 'puts on' a τύπος, than to say that the τύπος sinks into it. Reading τύπων we obtain the proper contrast between ἐνδυόται καὶ ἐντριγμασθαί: the youth puts on whatever impression or type the educator desires to stamp him with. The metaphor becomes more explicit in Plutarch De Lib. educ. 3 & καθάπερ γὰρ σφραγίζει τοὺς ἄκαλποι ἐναποτυπάτονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παιδίων ψυχαῖς ἐναποτύπωσιν. Cf. also Θεάτ. 191 D and Hor. Epfr. II 2. 8 argilla quidvis imitaberis uda.

10 ραδίως οὔτω· 'carelessly, without more ado': cf. 378 A and 1331 C. This idiomatric οὔτω is common with adverbs like ραδίως, εἰκῆ, ἀπλῶς, νῦν, εξαιρέσει: for examples see Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461.

377 C 15 καλῶν: sc. μῦθοι, which some mss (including II) insert. For μῦθοι understood from μυθοποιοῖς cf. III 399 D, where τούτῳ i.e. αὐλός is understood from αὐλοτοίνιοι, 410 A, where αὐτοῖ (i.e. λατροί) follows λατρεύειν, IV 421 E, and (with Schneider) Laus 886 C θεογονίαι διεξερχομαι, γενεμοίνα τε (sc. οἱ θεοί) ὡς πρὸς ἄλλους ὑμωλκησαν.


377 D 23 ἐλεγέτην. The dual links together Homer and Hesiod as jointly responsible for Greek theology; see on 363 A. Among the first to rebel against their authority were Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus (D. L. viii 21, IX 18, IX 1). Xenophanes' protest was particularly famous in antiquity: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. I 289 and IX 193 ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos. Gr. pp. 76, 77. Plato's attack on the Olympian
theology in this and the succeeding book was perhaps the severest blow that Paganism received before the Christian era, and pointed the way for those exaggerated diatribes against the heathen gods in which it afterwards became the fashion of early Christian apologists to indulge, beginning with the Apology of Aristides (cc. 8—11). Cf. x 607 b n.

26 ὅπερ—ψευδηται. ὅπερ is τὸ εἰκάζειν κακὸν περὶ θεῶν etc. A distinction is drawn between mere lies and the lie which is in itself οὐ καλὸν, unbeautiful and immoral in tendency, e.g. the story of Uranus and Cronus (ὁ εἶπὼν οὐ καλὸς ἐψεύσατο in E below). Such legends not merely misrepresent the gods, but also corrupt mankind.

377 E 28 εἰκάζῃ. It is taken for granted that Poetry is a species of imitation: cf. Λαύσις 668 A—C.

32 τῶν μεγίστων: masculine, not neuter: cf. 378 B.

33 Ὅσιόδος. Θεωρ. 154—181.

34 τὸ δὲ ἢ κτλ. δὴ emphasizes the case of Cronus as the most important (cf. Πρὸτ. 311 D, 312 E): it is so because the delinquent is Zeus, the reigning king of gods and men. The example set by Zeus on this occasion was no doubt sometimes used to justify wrong-doing: see for example Aesch. Εἰμι. 640, 641, Ar. Clouds 904—906 πῶς δήτα δίκης ὀφθαλμὸς ὃς ζεῖς | οὐκ ἀπόδωλεν τὸν πατέρα αὐτὸν | δήσας; ib. 1079 ff., Eur. H. F. 1317—1319, and especially Pl. Euthyphro. 5 E—6 A, where Euthyphro urges the analogy in all seriousness to justify his vexatious prosecution of his own father. The pernicious effect of such legends on human conduct is again pointed out in Λαύσις 886 c, 941 b: cf. also Isocr. Bus. 38—43, Luc. Men. 3, and Grote Plato III p. 194 n.

378 A 2 βαδίως οὕτω: 377 B n.

5 θυσιάμενοι—ἀκοῦσαί. ἀπορρήτων suggests the mysteries, whence the allusion to the 'mystic pig' (Ar. Αρχ. 764). For ἀπόρος, 'unprocurable' (Jowett), ἄπορος has been suggested, absurdly enough. ἀπορος is further explained by δώς—ἀκοῦσαί. It should be noted that ὄνειρα with a past tense of the indicative in clauses of this kind is rare in Plato: it occurs again only in Λαύσις 830 b, 929 c (where also should be expunged). Cf. Weber in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Sprache 11 2, p. 64.
θαυμαστὸν ποιοί, οὗτος αὐτός ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντι τρόπω,
ἀλλὰ δρᾶτ' ἄν ὑπὲρ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοι τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν τὸν
Δία, ἄδικον δέ, οὗτος αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτίθεμαι εἰναὶ λέγειν. Ὁδέ γε,
ἐν σὲ εὖς, τὸ παρὰ παντὸς, ὡς θεοὶ θεοὶ πολεμοῦσι τε καὶ ἐπιβου-
C λεύσουσι καὶ μᾶχονται: οὗτος γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἐντεῦθεν. Ἐτείχοις
κεφαλαίοι καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν πολλοὶ δεί γυμνομαχίας τοῖς μυθολογητέοις τοῖς
αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέοις, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξήρασαν πολλάς καὶ παντοδαπάς
θεῶν τε καὶ θρῶν πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν. ἄλλ' εἰ
ποιῶν μελλόμενον πείσει, ὡς οὖνείς πώποτε πολιτής ἐτερος ἐτέρω
ἀπίθανον ὁδ' ἐστὶν τούτῳ οἶσιν, τοιαύτα λεκτά μᾶλλον πρὸς
ὅτα παῖδια εὐθὺς ἱκετεύει καὶ γέρων καὶ γυναικώς, καὶ πρεσβυτέρως ἐπὶ
γυμνιμένως καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἑγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέοι λογο-

11. δοκεῖ ν. δοκὸν ΑΠΕ. 19. λεκτά Π: ὁμ. Α.

378 B 9 οὗτος αὐτὸς has been need-
lessly doubted by Richter (P. Jahrh. 1867 p. 142), who suggests οὗτος. The
words οὗτος—ποικιλτέοις correspond to the conduct of Uranus and Cronus towards
their children; οὗτος αὐτῷ—τρόπῳ to Cronus' treatment of Uranus, and Zeus' of Cronus.
Cf. Euthyph. 5 ε.—6 λ. The Euthyphro
presents so many parallels to § 378 that some have—erroneously, no doubt—sup-
posed it to be a spurious elaboration of
that section: see my edition of the dia-
logue p. xxix.

378 C 15 πολλοῦ δεὶ—ποικιλτέον.
πολλοῦ δεὶ is not adverbial (like ἧςκετα), as J. and C. assert: otherwise δεὶ would
be δεν (so Herwerden would read Μνεμ.
N. S. XI p. 339). The asyndeton is
justified by emphasis and the amplitative
character of the sentence. The verbs
are best explained (with Stallbaum)
by supposing an ellipse of εἴημι: cf. Schanz

16 ποικιλτέον. ποικίλλων is used of
depicting in a variety of colours (VIII 557
C), not necessarily by embroidery. Cf.
373 A n. There is probably a special
reference here to the πενίλος. At the
greater, if not also at the lesser, Pan-
thenaic festival, a robe woven by Athenian
maidenls and representing the triumph of
Athena and the Olympians over the giants,
together with other celestial fights, was
carried in procession to the Acropolis,
and presented to the statue of the goddess

in the Erechtheum: cf. Euthyph. 6 b, c
and Mommsen Peste d. Städte Athen
pp. 107 ff. The subject was depicted on
the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister
Denkm. d. kl. Alterth. II p. 1185. The
allusion to the ceremony is the more
appropriate in this connexion, if, as
appears to be probable, the action of the
dialogue takes place just before the great
Panathenaec of 410 b.c. See Introd.,
§ 3.

18 ύσι οὖνείς κτλ. Plato desires to
obtain a religious sanction for his institu-
tions, as in the myth III 414 θ b f. The
best δημιουργοί. according to Socrates,
is δ οὔτε εἰς ταύτα καί όμοιων ἐμπειρῶν
(Xen. Mem. IV 6. 14.): and the Platonic
State may from this point of view be
regarded as "an attempt to determine the
ways and means of securing political
ὀμοίων": (Krohn Pl. St. p. 369).

19 λεκτά—see cr. n.—cannot be dis-
pensed with. Madvig's suggestion, that
μᾶλλον is corrupt for φατέον or φατέον
or the like, and Liebhöld's μελετέον for
μᾶλλον, are much less probable than the
accidental omission of λεκτά in A. See
Introd. § 5. Vermehren (Pl. Stud. p. 92),
rejecting λεκτά, would carry on μυθολο-
γιστοι or the like; but this solution is
much too difficult.

378 D 20 καὶ προσβυτέρους γυμ-
νιμένους. The dative goes with λογοσαίοιν
('to make tales for them as they grow
older'), and καὶ before τούτοις means
etiam. This explanation was proposed by Richter (Fi. Jahrb. 1867 p. 138) and Vermehren (l. c. p. 91), and is probably right. Cf. Ar. Frag. 1944 l. Others connect the words with καὶ γέρους καὶ γραφές: old men, old women, and the boys themselves as they grow older, must tell such stories πρὸς τὰ παιδία εἴδεθος. But it is difficult to understand τῶν παιδίων τῶν γραμματέων unless πραξιβότεροι γραμματέων is construed with λογοτεχείς.

22 μέσος. Herphaestus. Δόσις is a false reading derived from a mistaken reference to ii. x 18 ff. The story (according to Clement ap. Suid. s. v.) Ἡρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ νέως was in Pindar: παρὰ Πυθέαρχον γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμεύεται εἰν τῷ ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ κατασκευασθεὶς θρόνον—καὶ φασὶ δεθήσαι αὐτὸν ἐπιζουλεύομεν Ἡρακλεῖ (Cf. Paus. i. 20. 3). Ἡφαίστου βίαις. ll. i 586—594.

23 θεομαχίαι—οὐ παραδεκτόν. Homer ii. xx i—74, xxii 385—513. Cf. Xenophanes Fr. 1. 19—22 (Bergk) and Pind. Ol. ix 43; 44 μὴ νῦν λαλάγης τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐὰν πληθών μάχαν τὰ πᾶσαν χωρὶς ἀνθρώπων.

24 ἐν ὑπονοίαις: adverbial, like εἰν' φαρμάκου εἶδε ΗΗ 389 B (J. and C.). The allegorical interpretation of Homer probably originated in the desire to save his character for piety and morality: πάντη γὰρ ἡσθίσαν (says Heraclides Alleg. Hom. ad init.), εἰ μὴν ἡλικιωμένον. Before the time of Plato it was practised by Theagenes of Rhegium, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampascus, Stesimbrotos of Thasos and others: see Wolf Proleg. ad Hom. ium ii. 161—166 and Jebb's Homer p. 89. In Plato's day the Cynics were the chief exponents of this school of criticism, especially Against Antisthenes; examples may be found in Winckelmann's Antisth. Frag. pp. 16, 23—28: cf. also Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 16 ff. Dümmler, many of whose combinations are highly speculative, regards the present passage as directed against Antisthenes, whose rivalry with Plato is well known: but there is nothing to suggest any personal reference. The historical Socrates occasionally played with the same weapons, as appears from Xen. Symp. 3. 6, and Mem. 1. 3. 7: so also does Plato, but seldom, if ever, without irony, e.g. Rep. i 332 B ήνίξατο—ὁ Σωκράτης ποιητικὸς: cf. also Theaet. 194 C, Al. Η 147 B—Δαλ. Plato's attacks upon Homer lent a great impetus to this method of exegesis—the only method, as it was thought, by which his animadversions could be met: cf. Schow's Heraclides pp. 223—234.
is the cause of little to the human race, for evil is far more common in the world than good. This is one of the canons which our poets are to observe; but it is constantly violated by Homer and others. Evil must never be attributed to the gods; or, if it is, it must be represented as a chastening visitation for the sufferer's good.

379 A 5 οίος τυχάνει—ἐν μέλεσιν. τυχάνει ὦν = 'really is': cf. 1 337 B n. On the omission of ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν in Α see Introd. § 5.

379 B 8 ἀλλὰ μὴ κτλ. It is first pointed out that good is not the cause of evil (ἀλλὰ μὴ—πῶς γὰρ;), and next that good is the cause of εὐπραγία (τι δὲ—ναι): the conclusions are then stated in the reverse order. The step by which each conclusion is reached—the identification of ἀγαθὸν and ἀφέλμον—is Socratic (cf. Xen. Mem. iv 6. 8); but it is doubtful if the historical Socrates ever went so far as to deny that God is sometimes the cause of real evil or adversity to man, in spite of his belief in Providence (Mem. I 4 and iv 3; yet 1 4, 16 σεὶ δὲ τῶν θεῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν ἐμφάνισε, ὡς ἰκανοὶ εἶσαν εἰ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν ἡσαύ). The moral goodness of the Deity himself was proclaimed before Socrates and Plato by Xenophon, Pindar, and the dramatists, but the inference, that God, because He is good, is never the cause of evil, is probably due to Plato. Bacchylides expresses a kindred sentiment in fr. 29 (Bergk) Καὶ ὦ ψυχέων, δι ἁπάντα δή-κεται, ὅ ποιος ἀνθρώποις αἰτίαις, πολλῶν δὲ αἰνίαις: πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν: καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὔδενα ἀλλον

6, 7. ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν Π: om. A.

κατακείσται ἐν Δίως οὐδεὶς

κηρῶν ἐμπλειοῖ, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν.

καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄν μείζος ὁ Ζεὺς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων,

ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακὸν ἔρχεται, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐσθλῶν,

ὁ δὲ ἄν μή, ἀλλ' ἀκρατὰ τὰ ἑτέρα,

τὸν δὲ κακὰ νομίζωσι ἐπὶ χθόνα διὰν ἐλαῖνει.

ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται.

XIX. Τὴν δὲ τῶν ὂρκων καὶ σπουδῶν σύγχυσιν, ἢν ὁ Πάν-

δαρος συνέχεεν, εἰν τις φή β' ἐν Ἀθηναῖς τε καὶ Δίως γεγονέων, οὐκ

ἐπαινεσώμεθα, οὐδὲ θεών ἐρίῳ τε καὶ κρίσιν διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ

Diwos: οὐδ' αὖ, ὡς Λισχύλος λέγει, ἔστεν οὐκοῦν τοὺς νέους, ὦτι

make room for it in their philosophies: see e.g. Pol. 273 D, Laws 906 A, and

Arist. Probl. x 45. 895 b 39 ff. η φώς

φαλα μὲν πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ πλεῖον καὶ

πλεῖον, σπουδαία δ' ἐλάττω, καὶ οὐ πάντα

διώκειται. The counterpart in the sphere

of morals is Bias's of οὐλοί κακοί; with

which may be compared Rep. IV 428 E,

431 A, 442 A, C, 1X 588 D. It is a melon-

choly cry born of the age of iron: in the

golden age—so Plato tells us Pol. 273 C

—the balance was the other way.

19 ἀλλ' ἀττά—τὰ αίτια. The dualism

should not be taken too seriously, in spite of

the good and evil souls in Laws 896 E.

Plato is not now constructing a philo-

sophy, but casting mounds for theology and

poetry.

379 d 23 δουλὶ πιθα. See II. xxiv

527—532 δουλὶ γάρ τε πιθήν κατακελαται

ἐν Δίως οὐδεὶς | δώγων εἰς δίδωσι κακῶν,

ἐτεροί δὲ ἔσων | ὤ μὲν κ' ἀμίζας δόγη

Ζεὺς τερπικέρανος, ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῷ

δὲ γε κυρεταί, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐσθλῶν | ὤ δὲ κε

τῶν λυγρῶν δόχη, λοξῆτοι θύγην | καὶ κακὴ

βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα διἀν ἐλαίνει.

31 ἀγαθῶν—τέτυκται is either

from a lost line of Homer, or from some

other poet (as Schneider inclines to think): note οὖν' ἀλλον ποιητόν just

above. There can hardly be any refer-

ence to II. 1V 84 Ζεὺς, δέ τ' ἀνθρώπων

tamivs ppolioi tétuktau, as Howes

imagines (I. c. p. 196). The sentiment

is common: cf. e.g. Hes. O. D. 569 and

Pind. Isthm. IV 52, 53 Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τά

νίκει, Ζεὺς οὶ παντων κύριοι.

32 σπουδῶν σύγχυσιν. II. IV 69 ff.

33 κακῶν ἐρίῳ τε καὶ κρίσιν. This is

usually explained as referring to the

Theomachy (II. XX 1—74), which was

caused by Zeus and Themis in the sense

that Zeus sent Themis to summon the

gods to the council at which it was
sanctioned (p. 4). But (1) Themis’ part in causing the Theomachy is very small, (2) the simplest and most natural meaning of κράσις is not ‘contention,’ but ‘judgment’ or ‘decision,’ and (3) the Theomachy in Homer is not productive of evil to men, but only to the gods themselves: its citation here would therefore be quite irrelevant. W. R. Hardie (in Cl. Rev. iv p. 182) is, I believe, right in supposing that the strife of the goddesses three and Paris’ judgment is meant. ἐπός and κράσις are regularly thus used: e.g. Eur. I. A. 1307 κράσιν—στοιγάν ἐπό τε καλλινάς; cf. ib. 581, Hel. 708, Troad. 924, Hec. 644 f. Κράσις was the name of Sophocles’ play on the judgment of Paris (Fr. 330). The referred to by Plato is the Cypria (so also Wilamowitz Hom. Unters. p. 367 n. 46), which traced the war of Troy to the judgment of Paris, and that to Zeus’ deliberations with Themis (Zeus bouleuetai μετὰ τῆς Θείμοδος περὶ τοῦ Τροικοῦ πόλεον Kinkel Epic. Graec. Fr. p. 17. Θείμωδος is Heyne’s emendation for Θέιμωδος: but it is scarcely open to doubt: for the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, at which the three goddesses quarrelled, was an episode of the poem, and Thetis could hardly therefore have been privy to the plot. See Kinkel l. c. pp. 20, 22 and Jebb’s Homer p. 153). Themis was Zeus’ δραχαί διοχός (Pind. Fr. 30 Bergk), and still appears as one of the Olympians in H. xv 87. The Cypria is quoted again by Plato in Euthyphr. 12 A. We may fairly suppose that θέου ἐπό τε καὶ κράσις was the heading of one of the introductory episodes in the poem: to this also the omission of the article with ἐπό τε καὶ κράσις seems to point. Mr Hardie thinks Plato may have attributed the poem to Homer; but Euthyphr. l. c. (ὁ ποιήσας ὁ ποιήσας) does not favour this view.

380 B 9 ἔνισχυστο κολαζόμενοι. An earlier generation looked upon punishment as retributory—δραχαί διοχός. This view appears in Hes. Fr. 217, ed. Goetting, and especially in Aeschylus, e.g. Ag. 1563 f., Choeph. 309—314, 400 —404, 886, 927: in Sophocles and Euripides it is rarer (Ant. 1074—1076, El. 1411 f., 1495 f., Andr. 438, Suppl. 614 —616), and Euripides expressly argues against it in Or. 508 ff. Traces of a milder theory were however contained in the doctrine πάθος μάδος (Ag. 176 ff.), as well as in the use of words like σφαροιδίζω, δικαιούμεν, εὐθέως, for ‘punish.’ In Plato punishment is remedial. Ignorance or vice is in the soul what disease is in the body (IV 444 c, cf. IX 591 A, b), and the judge is the soul’s physician (XI 400 E ff., Gorg. 478 D): hence (Gorg. 480 B ff.) the sinner should go before the judge as a patient visits his doctor, and we should even prosecute our guilty friends and relations. See also Latos 834 D, 862 E, 934 A, 944 D τὸν γὰρ κακὸν ἀνέ θεὶ κολαζέων, ὣς ἀμεῖλον ὑ. The punishment, again, which awaits the wicked after death is intended to cure
10 μέν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ην δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεὸς, οὐκ ἔστειν λέγειν τὸν ποιητὴν. ἀλλ' εἰ μέν ὁ δείκτης κολάσεως λέγοιν ὡς ἀθλοιοι οἱ κακοὶ, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὡφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔστειν· κακοὺς δὲ αἰτίους φάναι θεοὶ τινι γίγνεσθαι ἄγαθον ὑπά. διαμαχεῖτον παντὶ τρόπῳ μὴτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει 15 εὐνομῆσθαι, μὴν τινὰ ἀκούειν, μὴν νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, εἰ μὴν μέτρῳ μὴτε ἀνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡσ οὔτε ὡς αὖ λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτῶι. Σύμψηφος σοι εἴμι, ἐφι, τούτῳ τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι ἀρέσκει. Οὕτω, μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἄν εἰη τῶι περὶ θεοὺς 20 νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν ὁ δεησε τοὺς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιούντας ποιεῖν, μή πάντων αἰτίων τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶι ἄγαθων. Καὶ μαλ', ἐφι, ἀπόχρη.

Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δευτέρος οἶδε; ἀρα γούτα τον θεον οἴει εἰναι καὶ D οἰον εξ επιβουλής φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλως ἱδείας, τοτε μέν

16. μήτε ἐν Π: μή ἐν Α.

their souls, unless they are incurable; and such as are themselves incurable, help to cure others by their deterrent example (X 616 A): so that in its deepest relations this doctrine reaches to the very roots of Plato's philosophy, with all due deference to Mr W. S. Lilly, who with much intemperance of language denounces those who attribute such a view to Plato (Fortnightly Review N.S. XLVI. p. 116).

14 ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει: 'in one's own city,' with reference to the subject of διαμαχεῖτον, not to τῶι. Plato implies that the preachers of such theology must be suppressed in his ideal city. In all this Teichmüller (Lit. Félbd. I. p. 114) detects an assault upon Isocrates, but his evidence is of the slightest.

380 C 16 μυθολογοῦντα is rejected by Herwerden: Ast suggested μυθολογοῦμενα. The choice of the participle is determined by λέγειν, which is more important than ἀκούειν: for without saying hearing is impossible. μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον belongs both to λέγειν and to ἀκούειν.

20 νόμων τε καὶ τύπων. All laws are in Plato's view only moulds or outlines, within which our actions should fall. Cf. infra 383 C and especially Pol. 294 A ff.

380 D—383 C In the second place, God is changeless, and incapable of deceiving. He is changeless, since He is the best. That which is the best cannot be changed by others, and will not change itself, for it can only change to what is worse. Homer and the other poets err in attributing changefulness to the gods. Neither can God deceive, for while the true or veritable lie, that is to say, ignorance of truth within the soul, is hateful alike to gods and men, the spoken lie, which is but an image of the other, is admissible only when used against enemies, or on behalf of friends, or to invest the ancient and unknown with a semblance of reality. God has no need of lying for any of these ends: he is therefore wholly true. In this respect also Homer and Aeschylus misrepresent the divine nature.

380 D 23 ἀρα γούτα κτλ. Although the gods are constantly represented as deceivers in Greek poetry and legend, Plato was by no means the first to uphold the opposite view. In Pindar (Ol. 10. 4) Truth is the daughter of Zeus, and the dramatists often teach a similar doctrine: see Nägelsbach Nachkom. Theol. p. 46. There is a close imitation of Plato's argument throughout this passage in Arist. Fr. 15. 1476b 14 ff. ed. Rose.
The text is a portion of Plato's dialogue, specifically from the *Republic*. It discusses the nature of reality and the role of God in shaping the world. The excerpt highlights Plato's emphasis on the contrast between the changing and the unchanging, and his philosophical stance that the unchanging is superior. The dialogue explores the concept of forms, particularly the form of the stable and unchanging, and how it relates to the divine, suggesting that the divine is the ultimate reality that remains constant. The reference to *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* indicates further exploration of these themes in other dialogues. The passage showcases Plato's commitment to distinguishing between the changeable and the unchangeable, a key theme in his metaphysics.
metaβολήν ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται. 'Εσικεν. 'Αλλα μὴν ὁ θεὸς ἐγε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντη ἀριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Ταυτὴ μὲν ιο δὴ ἤκιστα ἀν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἱσχοι ὁ θεὸς. "Ηκιστα δήτα.

XX. 'Αλλ’ ἀρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἀν καὶ ἄλλοιοι;

Δήλοι, ἐφῆ, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἄλλοιούτα. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν, ἥ ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρον ἑαυτοῦ; 'Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον, εἴπερ ἄλλοιούτα. οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄν 15 που ἐνδέχεται γε φήσωμεν τοῦ θεοῦ κάλλιον ἢ ἄρετῆς εἶναι. 'Ορθότατα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις' καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ αν τὸς σοι, ὁ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκὸν αὐτὸν χείρον ποιεῖν ὁπηροῦ ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἁνθρώπων; Ἀδύνατον, ἐφη. 'Ἀδύνατον ἀρα, ἐφην, καὶ θεὺς ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄλλοιον. ἄλλ’ ὡς ἐικε, κάλλιοτος καὶ ἀριστός ὁν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκαστος αὐτοῦν 20 μὲν αἰε ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦν μορφῇ. "Απασα, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ἐμοιγε δοκεί. Μηδεὶς ἀρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ ἀριστε, λεγέτο ἤμιν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅς ἥλιοι ἀείδοισιν ἐοικότες ἄλλοιο αποσθ. παντοιοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόλησι.

25 μῆδε Πρωτέως καὶ Θετίδος καταψευδεῖσθω μηδεῖς, μηδ’ ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσαις εἰσαγάγετο Ηραν ἠλλοιομενήν ὡς ἵερειαν ἀγερουσαν

Τον Αργείον ποταμοῦ παισιν βιοιδώροις.

9. γε Π: τη Α.

381 C 20 ἀνάγκη: sc. ἐστίν. For ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ without ὅς see on 1. 332 E. Hartman needlessly suggests ἐμοιγε δοκείν.


25 Πρωτέως καὶ Θετίδος. For Proteses see Od. IV 456—458. Aeschylus also wrote a satyric drama called Proteses: Fragges. 208—213. The transformations of Thetis to escape marrying Peleus had been celebrated by Pindar (Nem. IV 62 ff.), Sophocles (Fr. 548), perhaps also (as Stallbaum thinks) by Hesiod in his ἐπιθαλάμιον εἰς Πηλέα καὶ Θέτιν (see Goettling’s Hesiod pp. XLIIX and 304).

27 ὅς ἵερειαν—βιοιδώροις: from Aesch. Ζαυρται (Schol. on Ar. Frgs 1344). Dindorf (Aesch. Fr. 170) restores as follows: ὅρωσιγύνοια | Νύμφας κρηπιάν κυδαίαι πειταίν ἀγείρω, ἵνα Ἴναχον Ἁργείου ποταμοῦ παισιν βιοιδώροις. Herwerden’s βιοιδώροις is a wanton change: the sons of the river-god are his tributaries, and life-giving like himself. It is not clear why Hera was disguised as a priestess. The incident in Inachus’ history most suited to dramatic treatment was the persecution of his daughter Io by Hera in consequence of her intrigue with Zeus. As Io was a priestess of Hera, Hera may have disguised herself as another priestess in order to discover her husband’s unfaithfulness: see Apollod. Bibl. II 1. 3 φωραθεῖς δὲ (sc. ὅ Ζεὺς) ύπ’ Ἡρας, τῆς μὲν κόρης ἄφαμεσος εἰς βοῦν μετεμόρφωσε λευκήν, αὐτήν δὲ ἀπωμόσατο μὴ συνελθεῖν. The subject seems to have been treated by Sophocles in his satyr play Inachus (Fragges. 255—278). With ὅς ἵερειαν ἄγελρουσαν cf. ἄγύρται in 364 B and note ad loc.
Ε καὶ ἀλλὰ τοιαύτα πολλὰ μὴ ἠμῶν ψευδόθων· μηδ’ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκείμετρον, λέ-30 γονοῦ τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περέχονται νῦκτορ πολλοῖς ἔξοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἱθαλλόμενοι, ἡμὴ ἀμὴ μὲν εἰς ἡθοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἀμα δὲ τοὺς παιδίας ἀπεργάζονται δειλότερος. Μὴ γὰρ, ἐφ’ negligent.” Ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ἢ δ’ ἔγω, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσιν οἱ μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσιν δοκεῖν σφάς παντοδαποὺς 35 φαίνεσθαι, ἡξαπατώντες καὶ γονητέοντες; ἵσως, ἐφ’. Τί δὲ; ἢν

382 δ’ ἔγω. ψευδόθων | θεοὶ ἐθέλησιν ἄβλογον ἢ λόγον ἢ ἔργον φάντασμα προτείνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἢ δ’ ὅς. Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ὅτι τὸ γε ὠς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἶνο τοῦτο εἰπέτειν, πάντες θεῖοι τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσι; Ὑπ’, ἐφ’ λέγεις; Ὅπως, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, ὅτι τὸ κυριωτάτον που ἐαυτὸν ψευδασθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὔδεις 5 ἐκῶν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μιλίστα φοβεῖται ἐκεί αὐτὸ κεκτήσθαι.

Β οὐδὲ νῦν πτω, ἢ δ’ ὅς, μανθανόμ. Ολεῖ γὰρ τί με, ἐφ’ negligent, ἰσιμύνων λέγειν; ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω, ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ δικτα ψευδόθαι τε καὶ

381 E 20 τοιαύτα πολλά. For examples see Heyne’s Virgil ii pp. 146—152 (cited by Ast on 381 B). πολλὰ ψευδόθων ἀοίδος, said the proverb.
31 κακῶς: like οὐ κακῶς 377 E. ἦν—ἰθαλλόμενοι. ἄρα expresses incredulity (358 C n.) and tudes contempt. Plato is thinking, inter alia, of the bug-bears of the nursery—Lamia, Mormo, and Empusa, whose power of self-transformation was unlimited: see Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 393. ἐξενο need not here be limited to the masculine gender. Cf. Strab. i 19 παίσῃ προσφέρομεν—εἰς ἀποτρήσῃ—τούσ φοβερούς (μυθούς). ἢ τε γὰρ ἡμῖν μόθος εστὶ καὶ ἡ Γοργώ καὶ ὁ Ἐφιάλης καὶ ἡ Μομολύκη.
382 A 1 φάντασμα is said with reference to φαίνεσθαι just above, and should be taken both with λόγῳ and ἔργῳ. The φάντασμα λόγῳ is the spoken lie: an example of the φάντασμα ἔργῳ is a φάντασια or unreal appearance (382 E). The words ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων must not be understood of actual self-transformations of the gods.
2 τὸ γε ὡς ἀληθὸς ψεῦδος κτλ. Cf. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ψευδός Theocr. 279 c, and (for the sentiment) Laws 720 c.
3 οὗν εἰκὼν κτλ. With Plato, as with Socrates, vice is ignorance, and involuntary. The doctrine reappears below in III 413 A, IX 589 c: it is further implied by the entire scheme of education in Books vi and vii. For other assertions of this view in Plato see Simson der Begriff d. Seele bei P1. p. 125 n. 359. Cf. also Soph. Fr. 663 ἢ δ’ μωρία | ἐκείνοις ἀδελφὴ τῆς πονηρᾶς ἐφ’.

382 B 8 τὰ δικτα κτλ. τὰ δικτα = ‘the truth.’ The contrast between the act and state in ψευδόθαι τε καὶ ἐφ’ negligent resembles 1 351 B: ἐφεύθον, moreover, suitably bridges the distance between ψευδόθαι and ἀμαθὴ εἰσὶν. ἐχειν τὸ ψεῦδος corresponds to ψευδόθαι, κεκτήσαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἔφευθα: the contrast is between ‘holding, ready for use, that which is already possessed,’ and permanent possession: cf. Soph. Ant. 1378 and Jebb ad loc. The words τὸ τούτῳ, in such a case, i.e. ἐν τῷ ἔφευθα τῇ ὑπόσ περὶ τὰ δικτα, are quite satisfactory (cf. III 393 C), and ought not to have caused Herwerden difficulty.
while but cf. it

15 ākratov ψευδος. ἢ οὖν οὐτω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

XXI. Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὑπερ ψευδός οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψευδός πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὅστε μὴ ᾧξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἄρ’ οὖν πρὸς τὸν τοῦτον πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλομένων φιλῶν, ὅταν διὰ


13. μιμημά τι—ψευδος. τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος must not be explained (with Bosanquet Companion p. 93) as the state of mind of him who tells a lie: for that is knowledge, and the spoken lie certainly is not an imitation of knowledge. They refer to the ‘true lie,’ which is a certain πάθημα in the soul of the ‘true liar,’ viz. ignorance, and of which the spoken lie is an imitation. It is a tolerably accurate definition of a lie to call it ‘an imitation of ignorance in the soul’; cf. IV 443 c m. The spoken lie is ‘not a wholly unmixed lie,’ because it implies that the speaker knôs the truth; in a certain sense therefore it is mixed with truth. It is ἀστερον γεγονός, because the spoken lie cannot be uttered until the truth is known. Inasmuch as the spoken lie is mixed with truth, it is better than the ‘veritable lie.’ We have here nothing but a special application of the old Socratic paradox ἐκ ἑκῶν ἀμαρτάνων ἀμέινων (see on 334 λ). I have placed a comma after γεγονός, to mark the antithesis between εἴδωλον and ἀκρατὸς ψευδός, and because εἴδωλον is not so much to be taken with τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος: rather it stands for εἴδωλον ψευδός, as οὐ πάντων ἀκρατον ψευδός shews. The distinction between veritable and spoken lies savours, no doubt, of idealism: but it enables Plato to call his ideal archons ideally truthful, even when practically they tell lies, and it is with this object in view that the distinction is introduced. See 389 b.

132 C ἐν τῷ ψεύδῳ—μίσους; τῷ is masculine: it is presently shewn that the spoken lie is useless to God. Plato does not permit a man to lie in his own interest. Ordinary Greek morality, in spite of Achilles’ ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖτο ὁμώς Ἀίδαο πόλημας etc., probably did. The saying of Democritus ἀληθομυθεῖνες χρεῶν, ὅτων λόγων (Stob. Flor. 12. 13) leaves us to infer that we may also lie ὅτων λόγων. Cf. Soph. Fr. 323 καλὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστι τα ἐποτί ζητεῖν; ἡ τον ὅ τοι ἀληθεῖν δεινόν ἀληθεῖν ἄγει, ὁ συγγνώσετον εἰσεῖν ἐστι καὶ τῷ μη καλόν. The cynical immorality of Hdt. 111 72 exceeds what Greek public opinion would have tolerated; cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv ch. 13. See also on 389 b and Nagelbach Nachkom. Theol. pp. 240 ff.

ἄρ’ οὐ—πολεμίους κτλ. Cf. 331 ε—

19 τῶν καλομένων φιλῶν depends on ἀποτροπῆς. Ἡ ὅταν διὰ μακανὰ—τότε had been omitted, the construction would be quite clear: as it is, some difficulty has been felt. Schneider understands τινες as subject to ἐπισχείροντος: by Hermann ὅταν is changed to οἱ ἄν: by Herwerden ὅταν to οἱ ἄν and τότε to τούτο: while Stallbaum resorts to an anacoluthon, as if Plato had intended to say τῶν καλομένων φιλῶν ἄνεκα. None of these expedients is so simple as to connect ἀποτροπής with φιλῶν. The clause ὅταν—πράττειν cancels out with τότε and does not affect the construction. καλομένων, ‘so-called,’ involves a theory of friendship, viz. that no one who is ἄνθρωπο καὶ μακάμενος can be a friend to man (any more than to God): cf. 382 e).
μανίαν ἡ τινα ἀνοιαν κακὸν τὴν ἐπιχειρεώς πράττειν, τότε ἀποτρο-
ποιεῖν. Δὴ πῆς ἐνεκα ὁς φάρμακον χρῆσιμον γίνεται; καὶ ἐν ᾧν νῦν. δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰληθὲς ἐξεῖ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀλληθεὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὑ π τι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρῆσιμον ποιοῦμεν; Καί μᾶλα, ἡ δὲ ὅς, οὖτως ἔχει. Καὶ τῆς τῆς ὅντων τῷ τῷ ἐπιθεός χρῆσιμος; πότερα διὰ τὸ μὴ 25 εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοίων ἀν ψευδότο; Γελοῦν μὲντ᾽ ἀν εἴη, ἐφ᾽. Ποιτής μὲν ἀρα ψευδῆς ἐνθεοί τιν ὅικ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Ε' Ἁλλὰ δἐδίως τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀντείθητο; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. Ἡ Ἁλλὰ δὲ οἰκεῖαν ἀνοιαν ἡ μανίαν; Ἡ Ἁλλ᾽ ὀμφάλους, ἐφ᾽, τῶν ἀνοίγων καὶ μανιωμένων ἑυθηλάς. Οὐκ ἀρα ἐστίν οὐ ἐνεκα ἀνθεος ψευδότο. 30 Οὐκ ἐστιν. Πάντη ἢρα ἀνθευέστε τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφ᾽. Κομιδὴ ἢρα ὁ θεός ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές ἐν τε ἐργο καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθέλησατ ὀὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατά, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας οὔτε κατὰ λόγους. οὔτε κατὰ

383 σημειῶν πομπᾶς ὑπαρ οὗ ὅναρ. | Οὕτως, ἐφ᾽, ἐρμοῖγε καὶ αὐτῷ 35 φανταστικοῦ σου οὐγοῦστον. Συγχωρεῖς ἢρα, ἐφ᾽, τούτων δεύτερων ἄνω οὖν, ἐν ὅ δει περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἢ μήτε αὐτῶν γόνης ὀντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοῦ μήτε ἡμᾶς ψευδοὶ παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἐν ἐργῷ; Συγχωρῶ. Πολλὰ ἢρα Ὅμηρον 5

34. οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας Π.: ὁμ. Α. ὅναρ ΑΠΕφ: οὔθ᾽ ὑπαρ οὔθ᾽ ὅναρ φ."
ëpavnoûtes àlla toûto oủ èpavneosömètha, ònê ton èvnuπion
pòmptôn utò Déos òn 'Aγamémmou, oủde Λισχūlon, òtan ò̄
ì Θètìs tòù 'Aπóllwv ev tois autìs | gamaous àdoủta

évdàsteisbài tás èdas èuvπaidìas,
nòswv t' àpeirous kai makràiônvas bíous.
ξύμπαντa t' èivwv, òthefilèis èmàs túxhàs
pàiòv' èpìnuftìmèsenèn, èuvnuòmèn èmè.
kàgò tò Ìôbou òthèon àfveudèstò stòma
èlπiζov èivnai, mautîkè bρýnov tékhv.
ò δ', autòs úmòwn, autòs èn òthìνη pàròwn,
autòs tâδ' èivwv, autòs èstìn ò kàtanw
τòv pàidà τòv èmòn.

10 ótan tìs tòmautìa lègì peri òthèon, xàlæpànuòmèn te kai xòròn oủ Ç
dòsòmèn, oủde tòus dìdaśkálous èásmèn èpì pàiedèa xhrìsthai tòv

8. 'Aπóllwv A"Π: 'Aπóllwv vel 'Aπóllwv' ut videtur A'.
autìs A"Π:
autòs Α'.

(conjectured by Richards) would be easier, but the slip, if such it be, is
excusable. òs—èwlias is not the accusa-
tive absolute: if it were, òs would express
the reason, and here it does not. We are
defining the túpsos: and the construction
is (they must òtauòv) òsìs òtauòs ègòntas
dèwras, 'represent the gods as neither
themselves being sorcerers,' etc. In
paràgoiv the construction is changed,
but the change is natural, for our rule
applies both to lègos and òtauòs (kai
lègèm kai òtauòv), and lègèm takes
the accusative and infinitive. Both lègèm
and òtauòv affect the construction, which
involves a sort of chiasmus. Cf. III
390 B n.
6 tòu ènuπion pòmptôn. Il. II 1—
34.
8 ì Θètìs κτλ. The verses are
perhaps, as Schneider conjectures, from
Aeschylus 'Òplow kriais, in which Thetis
was one of the characters (Schoel on Ar.
Ach. 883). Apollo with his harp (èxwv
fòròmμγγα) appears as present at
the marriage of Thetis also in Homer (Il.
XXIV 62, 63). Plato accommodates the
beginning of the quotation to his own
sentence: in Aeschylus perhaps it ran ó δ'
èvdàsteio tòs èmàs èuvπaidìas (so Butler,
quoted by Schneider). èvdàsteisoibài, 'to
dwell upon or emphasize,' is elsewhere
always used in an ominous sense (see
Jebb on O.T. 205): and here too,
perhaps, it strikes a foreboding note.
The words makràiônvas bíous were doubted
by Stephanus, who suggested makràiônvoi
bíov (so Euseb. Prae. Ev. XIII 3, 35) or
makràiounas bíov: but Apollo's prophecies
did not refer to Achilles only, so that the
plural is justified. àpeirous should be
taken not with èuvπaiòs, but with bíous,
which is in apposition to èuvπaiòs. In
the next line òthefilèis èmàs túxhàs
depends on the compound expression pàiòv'
èpìnuftìmèsen—a construction frequent
in Aeschylus, especially with verbs which
denote singing, celebrating, etc. (Ag. 154,
175 al.): after enumerating all the bless-
ings in store for Thetis (èfìmpàta t' èivwv) Apollo raised a paean over her
òthefilèis túxhàs. This explanation—
Schneider's—is much better than to con-
nect èfìmpàta adverbially with òthefilèis.

383 B 13 kàgò—èivnai. Contrast
Aesch. P. V. 1032 ψευδηγορέων γάρ οίκ νοίκ
èπισταται στόμα τò Ëðòv, èlalà πàν èπος
telei: see on 380 D above.
14 èlπìζον: 'fancied,' not 'hoped';
cf. V 451 A, 1X 573 C, and èlπìs in VII
517 B. This idiomatice usage is illustrated
by Rutherford on Babrius 9. 2.
νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, 2ο καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπί πλείστον οἶον τε. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἀν χρώμην.

tέλος πολιτείας 3'.

388 C 2ο θεῖοι—οἶον τε. The object of all worship and all religion, as of human action in general, is assimilation to God: cf. X 613 A n.
APPENDICES TO BOOK II.

I.

II 359 d. τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ.

Most of the emendations (e.g. Γυγγῃ τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ) which have been suggested in order to bring the present passage into harmony with the allusion in Book x 612 b, assume that the Gyges of ‘Gyges’ ring’ is identical with the famous Gyges (who reigned about 687—654 B.C.), founder of the third or Mermnad dynasty of Lydian kings (Hdt. i 8—13). On this assumption τοῦ Λυδοῦ cannot mean ‘Lydus’ (the eponymous ruler of Lydia: see Hdt. i 7), but must mean ‘the Lydian’ i.e. (according to the usual interpretation) Croesus, who was the πέμπτος απόγονος Γύγου (Hdt. i 13). There is however no proof to show that δ Λυδός could without further specification denote Croesus; and on this ground alone Wiegand’s proposal (adopted by Hermann, Baiter, and Hartman) τῷ [Γύγου] τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ breaks down: while Jowett and Campbell’s alternative suggestions τῷ Κροίσον τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, and Γυγγῃ τῷ Κροίσον τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, although satisfactory in point of sense, fail to account for the disappearance of Κροίσον. The proposals of Ast—τῷ Γυγγῃ τοῦ Λυδοῦ (or Λυδόου) προγόνῳ, and [τῷ] Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ—will hardly win favour, while Stallbaum’s τῷ Γυγγῃ [τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ] merely cuts the knot.

There is however no solid reason for connecting the Gyges of the proverb with the historical Gyges. In narrating the adventures of the latter, Herodotus makes no mention of a magic ring; but if such a legend had been told of the founder of the Mermnadas, Herodotus is hardly likely to have ignored it. In Plato’s narrative, on the other hand, everything hangs on the ring. Nor is the magic ring known to Nicolaus Damascenus, whose account of Gyges seems to follow a different tradition from that of Herodotus: see Müller’s Frag. Hist. Graec. iii pp. 382—386. It is therefore possible that Plato’s story refers not to Herodotus’ Gyges, but to some homonymous ancestor of his, perhaps (as Stein suggests on Hdt. i 13) the mythical founder of the family, whose name may have survived in the λύμνη Γυγαίη (Hdt. i 93). The Gyges of history was not the first member of his family to bear that name: his great-grandfather at least was also called Gyges (Nic. Dam. l.c.). The resemblance between the two stories—that of Herodotus and that of Plato—is confined to two incidents, viz. the joint murder of the reigning sovereign by the queen
and her paramour, and their succession to the throne. In these two features the history of the later Gyges may well have been embellished from the legends about his mythical namesake, or he may actually have copied his ancestor's example. It is noticeable that Cicero says nothing to shew that he identified the Gyges of Plato's story with the Gyges of history; and in a poem by Nizamí (as Mr J. G. Frazer has pointed out to me), where Plato tells the story of the ring, the name of Gyges is not even mentioned. (See Prof. Cowell's article in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. 30 pp. 151—157. Prof. Cowell thinks Nizamí became acquainted with the legend through Arabic translations of the Republic.) Thinking it probable, therefore, that the proverbial ring of Gyges belonged not to Herodotus' Gyges, but to one of his ancestors bearing the same name, I have retained the ms reading. I do not think that the suppression of the name is a difficulty, though it would be easy to write (as I formerly did) \<τῷ Γύγγη>, \τῷ Γύγγοι του Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ. See Introd. § 5. Such a solution would bring the text into strict verbal harmony with x 612 b, with Cicero De off. III 38 (where the story is related, not of an ancestor of Gyges, but of Gyges himself—hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone), with Lucian Nav. 41 and Bis Acc. 21, and with Philostratus Vit. Apoll. 101. In each of these places we hear of 'Gyges' ring,' not of 'Gyges' ancestor's ring.' But it is better to adhere to the almost unanimous testimony of the mss, especially as in this particular passage they are reinforced by Proclus. Schneider can hardly be right in supposing that the older Gyges is an invention of Plato's, although in other respects his note is deserving of attention: "Platoni vero licebat alterum Gygen fingere, ingenio et fortuna similem interfectori Candaulae, quem ideo genus ab illo ducentem facit, prioris nomen, quippe quod commune ei cum posteriori esset, reticens."

II.

II 359 E. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἐξευν οἴδεν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χερὶ χρυσῶν δακτύλων, ἐν περιελόμενον ἐκβάναι.

If (with A) we omit ἐξευν, the meaning must still be: 'the corpse (τοῦτον) <had> nothing else upon it, only on its hand a gold ring, which he (Gyges) took off and went out.' But it is impossible in Greek, as in English, to dispense with 'had.'

Dr Jackson proposes to read τοῦτον for τοῦτον, and omit ἐξευν and ὅν, understanding the sentence to mean 'he took nothing from the corpse except a gold ring on its hand, and then went out' (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philol. Soc. Vol. II 1882, p. 12). In favour of this view he urges that 'the nudity of the corpse is not mentioned, either in Cicero's paraphrase de Officiis III 9 § 38, or in that of Nizamí' (see App. I). Philostratus is also silent on the subject (Heroic. 28). If the principle of this solution is correct, I should prefer to retain τοῦτον: for there seems to be no reason why περιμείσθαι should not take two accusatives like ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, περικροῦειν, περικύπτειν, and the like; or, as Dr Verrall
APPENDICES TO BOOK II.

remarks (Proceedings, etc. I.c.)—I think with less probability—τοῦτον might be 'regarded as a second accusative after ποιήσατε understood with ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν.' The reading τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χερὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλων περιελάμενον ἐκβήναι is adopted also by the Zurich editors (1839) on the suggestion of Winckelmann.

Dr Jackson's view of the passage, in which I formerly concurred, gives excellent sense, and may be right. But it is to be noticed (1) that our chief authority for ἐξειν is Ven. II, a ms which is quite independent of Paris A and constantly enables us to restore lacunae in that ms, and (2) that there are other examples in Paris A of the omission of a single word without the excuse of homoioteleuton. See Introd. § 5. Ξ and Flor. B omit ἐξειν, but add φέρειν after δακτύλων—an obvious attempt to amend the error which survives in A.

Madvig conjectures πλοῦτον δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold (Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107) κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἐξοντ'> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to II.

III.

II 364 C. εάν τε τινα ἐχθρὸν πημὴναι ἑθελη, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὀμοίως δίκαιον ἀδύκω βλάψειν κτλ.

Instead of βλάψειν, the best ms read βλάψει. If βλάψει is retained, the subject must be either (1) τις or ὁ ἐθέλων πημήναις supplied out of πημήναι ἑθελη, or (2) the prophet consulted. The latter alternative gives the right sense, but the change from the singular to the plural (in πειθοντες) is very harsh. If we adopt the first alternative (to which J. and C. incline), we must regard the clause εάν τε τινα—βλάψει as semi-parenthetical, and connect πειθοντες with ἀγίρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις at the beginning of the sentence. Such a solution is not less harsh than (2). Βλάψει must, I think, be pronounced corrupt. Muretus read βλάψαι, depending, like ἀκείσθαι, on δύναμι; but βλάψαι is not likely to have been corrupted into βλάψει, nor is it clear why the aorist should take the place of the present (as in ἀκείσθαι). Reading βλάψειν, we might perhaps regard the construction as one of the rare cases in which δύναμις and the like are followed by a future infinitive: see Jebb's Soph. Phil. p. 252, Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 164, and cf. Phaed. 73 a οὐκ ἂν οὖσι τ' ἴσαν τοῦτο ποιήσεις (so the Bodleian ms). There is still however a serious difficulty in the collocation of the present ἀκείσθαι with the future βλάψει. The explanation given by Schneider in his Additamenta is linguistically unassailable and gives an excellent sense. For the common confusion of -ει and -ειν see Introd. § 5.

IV.

II 365 D, E. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσίν, ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τι καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν;

The reading of the best ms, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν, is defended by Shorey (A. J. Ph. xvi p. 231), but (as I think) unsuccessfully, and even the most conservative editors abandon it.
We have to choose between (1) \( <\tau i > \) \( \kappa a i \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \mu e l e t \acute{e} o n \ \tau o v \ \lambda a i t h \acute{a} - n e i v; \) (found in several inferior mss besides \( v \)), (2) \( o v \nu \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \mu e l e t \acute{e} o n \ k t l. \) (q Flor. U), (3) \( k a i \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \< o v \nu > \ \mu e l e t \acute{e} o n \ k t l. \) (Paris D in margin), (4) \( k a i \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \acute{a} \mu e l e t \acute{e} o n \) (a conjecture of Baiter’s). It is possible that each of these readings is due to conjecture, and we can scarcely hope to restore the hand of Plato with certainty in this passage.

I formerly (with Bekker and others) printed \( o v \nu \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu . \) The meaning is satisfactory, but the correction does not seem probable in itself. The same may be said of (3) and (4). I have now followed Stallbaum in supposing that \( \tau i \) was accidentally omitted after the -e\( \acute{i} \) of \( \mu \acute{e}l\acute{e}l. \) Such a slip is easy enough, and would be most likely to be corrected by the introduction of a negative, as in (2) and (3). Moreover, as Stallbaum says, \( \tau i \ k a i \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \"huius sermonis alacritati plane est accommodatum,\" \) and \( k a i \) is, I think, sufficiently justified by the obvious contrast between the gods and ourselves. Tucker objects that ‘‘If the gods do not care, why should we also care?’’ is as bad in Greek as in English: but \( k a i \) is hardly so much as ‘also’: it merely points the contrast. Cf. III 414 E n.

There is no difficulty in \( o v \kappa \acute{o} \nu \) followed by a question, so long as the question is merely rhetorical. Hermann proposes \( o v \kappa \acute{o} \nu \kappa a i \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \mu e l e t \acute{e} o n, \) but the negative would require to be reinforced before \( \hat{\eta} \mu \nu . \) I can see no probability in Tucker’s conjecture, viz. \( o v \kappa \acute{o} \nu \kappa a i \ \hat{\eta} \mu \nu \ \mu e l e t \acute{e} o n. \)
I. Τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοῦ, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τοιαύτ’ ἀττα, ὡς ἔοικεν, 386 ἀκουστέον τε καὶ οὐκ ἀκουστέον εὐθὺς ἐκ παῖδων τοῖς θεοῖς τε τιμήσουσιν καὶ γονέας τὴν τε ἄλληλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησομένους. Καὶ οἷμαι γ’, ἐφη, ὑρθὼς ἥμων φαίνεσθαι. Τί δὲ 5 δὴ; εἰ μέλλουσιν εἶναι ἄνδρείου, ἀρα οὗ ταῦτα τε λεκτέον καὶ οἷα αὐτούς ποίησαι ἥκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδείναι; ἢ ἢγει τινὰ ποτ’ ἢν γενέσθαι ἄνδρείου, ἡξοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ δείμα; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, οὐκ ἔγνως. Τί δὲ; τὰν’ Αἰδοὺς ἡγομένου εἶναι τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἱ τινὰ θανάτου ἄδει ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἱρήσεσθαι 10 πρὸ ἡττῆς τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; Οὐδαμῶς. Δεὶ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἥμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν

386 Α—389 Α So much for the doctrines by means of which we are to foster the sentiments of piety towards gods and parents and mutual friendship among the citizens.

In order to encourage Bravery, we shall require our poets to extol and not to decry the life which awaits us after death: otherwise their poetry will be not merely untrue, but detrimental to our future soldiers. Here again Homer deserves censure. Fear-inspiring names like Cocytus must be discarded, as well as lamentations put into the mouths of famous men: for the good man has no cause to bewail the death of a good comrade, either for his comrade’s sake or for his own. Homer offends against this canon when he represents Achilles and Priam as indulging in lamentations over their dead; and still more when he makes the gods, and even the greatest of the gods, give way to grief. Moreover, as excessive mirth is apt to rebound into the opposite extreme, our youths must not be laughter-loving. Homer errs in depicting good men and gods as overcome with laughter.

386 Α 1 τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοῦ κτλ. Rettig (Proleg. pp. 61 ff.) and others sup-
pose that the virtue of ὀσῶτρις is alluded to here—a virtue which in the earlier dialogues is sometimes placed by the side of the four cardinal virtues (Prot. 329 c, Men. 78 d, Gorg. 350 b). But ὀσῶτρις is not specifically named (in spite of 11 380 c), and it is clear from the words καὶ γονέας—ποιησομένους that Plato is thinking at least as much of duty to man as of duty to gods: cf. 11 378 B C, 381 E, 383 C. See also App. I.

5 ἄνδρείου. Plato has in view chiefly courage in war: hence the importance which he attaches to removing the fear of death. Cf. Tyrtaeus 10 (τεθά-
μεναι γάρ καλῶν κτλ.) and 12. 23—32. The poems of Tyrtaeus are not open to Plato’s censure in this connexion. Pfei-
derer (Zur Lösung der Phil. Fr. p. 23) wrongly represents the present passage as tantamount (or nearly so) to a denial of the immortality of the soul, which is affirmed in Book x. It is possible to criticise the popular conception of immortality without disbelieving in a higher form of the same doctrine, and this is just what Plato does here.

11 καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων should
be taken with ἐπιστατεῖς rather than with λέγει (sc. αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῦς μύθους). Hartman, connecting the words with λέγει, would expunge τῶν μύθων "cum poetae non de fabulis tā ἐν Ἀιδόν descriptibus λέγειν solent, sed ipsis Orci territamenta narrant"—a just criticism, and conclusive in favour of the construction which Hartman rejects.


386 C 13 λέγοντας. For the accusative after the dative ἐπισχερφώσι cf. Euthyph. 5 A, Crsto 51 D. Before λέγοντας Ἑ (with a few other MSS) adds ἄρ, as if εἰ λαυδορέων should be understood (cf. II 380 c); but we should supply not λαυδορέων, but εἰ λαυδορέων (Schneider).

15 τούθε τοῦ ἐποὺς κτλ. The singular ἐποὶ is sometimes used of more than one verse, e.g. Hdt. vii 143. The lines are addressed by the shade of Achilles to Odysseus: Od. x 490—491. On the omission of τοῦ ὑμᾶς πόλες εἶναι see Introd. § 5.

386 D 20 οἰκία—βοιὶ περ. II. xx 64, 65. The words in Homer are under the construction of δὲιας—ὑ.

23 ὁ πότοι. The exclamation of Achilles when the ghost of Patroclus eludes his embrace: II. xxiii 103, 104. On φρένες as the "physical basis of life" in Homer see Leaf 100 ad loc.

26 οἶοὶ—ἀδίστος. Tiresias retained in the other world something of the physical reality of his earthly existence: Od. X 493—495 τοῦ τε φρένες ἐμπεδοὶ ἐλαύν. τῷ καὶ τεθνητῷ νῦν χώρῃ Περσεφόνῃ οὐ πενίοναι τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀδίστος. Plato allows the force of attraction to alter τοὺς ταῖς: cf. Men. 100 A οὗς πενίναν τῶν ἐν "Αἰδόν, ἂν δὲ σκιαὶ ἀδίστος.

28 ψυχῆ—βῆμ. II. xvi 856, 857. ὑρθὼν, explained by the ancients as μέλη
ψυχῇ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς, ἦτε καπνὸς.

καὶ

ὅσ δ᾽ ὦτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεὶ κε τὶς ἀποπέσησιν ὀρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνὰ τ᾽ ἄλληλησιν ἔχονται, ὥσ αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἀμὺ̂ ἧσαν.

ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παραιτησόμεθα" Ὑμηρόν τε καὶ τοὺς Β ἄλλους ποιντάς μὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἀν διαγράφωμεν, οὐκ ὅσ οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ ἱδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἁκούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσο ποιητικότερα, τοσοῦτῳ ἤπτον ἁκουστέον παισὶ καὶ ἀνθράσω, οὐδὲ ἐξενθέρους εἶναι, δουλεῖαν θανάτου μᾶλλον πεφοβημένους. Παντάπασι μὲν ὁνήμων.

II. Οὐκόν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὅνοματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, κωκυτοὺς τε καὶ στῦγας καὶ ἐνέργους καὶ Λ ἀλβαντας, καὶ ἀλλὰ ὅσα τοῦτον τοῦ τύπου ὅνομαζόμενα φύττευον.

13. πεφοβημένους ΛII: πεφοβημένους ΑI.

tοῦ σῶματος (Hesych. s.v.), more probably denotes the mouth (as part of the face); cf. Leaf ad loc. and II. ix 409. Leaf plausibly suggests that ἀν in ἀνθρῶπος, "manhood"—found in all but two MSS of the Iliad—was only the written sign of the nasalis sound, and counted as a short vowel.

387 ά 2 ὑψηλὴ δὲ-τετριγυῖα. II. xxiii 100. "The voice," says Leaf, "is as weak a copy of the living voice as is the ethelōn of the ἀνθῶς": whence τετριγυῖα and τετριγυῖαι again just below.


387 C 16 ἐνέργους καὶ ἀλβαντας. The Scholiast writes: ἐνέργους τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἔρημῷ [ὁ ἐκεῖ ἐγὼ] κούσθαι. Cf. ἐραμε. Early psychology scarcely separated the dead body from the surviving spirit: the latter still lived where the body lay 'within the ground.' Hence 'those within the ground' (opposed to the ἐκπέθειον or living) became an expression for the spirits of the departed, and the denizens of the lower world in general; see II. xvi 188, xx 61. The Scholiast's derivation is more probable than that of Brugmann, who (Grundriss ii p. 180) derives the word from ἐν and a nominal suffix -epo. Plato at any rate would have preferred the Scholiast. On ἀλβαντας (not found in Homer or Hesiod) see Plut. Quaest. Symp. viii 736 ά (cited by Ast) ὃ ἄλβας καὶ ὁ σκέλος ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκρῶς γέγονεν, λαοδορουμένης ὅνοματα ἐξηράντησεν. The ancients derived the word from ἄ and the root of λέιβω λύς etc., calling the dead 'sakless' διὰ τὴν τῆς λιθάδος ἀμνηθεύον (Schol.). L. and S. object that the ἄ is long, relying perhaps on the line of Callimachus in Et. M. 63, 51 ἄβησαν οὖν ἀλβαντα κύουντες (where ἀλβαντα = ἄβησα). There, however, the right reading may be ἀλβαντα, i.e. of ἄλβαντα. But in Sophocles Fr. 751 ed. Dindorf the a is certainly long, unless the text is corrupt. Possibly the word is connected with ἄλβατος; cf. Hesych. s. v. ἄλβατων, where we are told that ἄλβατος ἂταρτον ἄλβατον τῶν βαθῶν λέγει.

tότον δὲ τὰ Πλάτων ἔτη ἄλλα δοκεῖν τοῦ τότου τοῦ τότου τοῦ τότου ὑμνάζομεν, with precisely the same meaning: τὸτοῦ τοῦ τότου τοῦ τότου therefore depends on the copula involved in ὑμνάζομεν. Σταλλμαυμ takes ὑμνάζομεν as "quum pronuntiantur"; but this is pointless. The words mean simply 'other names of this type which make all who hear them shudder' etc. Φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ. The remark ὃς οἶκεται, which appears in the best MSS—see cr. π.—after ποιεῖ gives no sense, and is admittedly corrupt. ὡς οὖν τε, found in four inferior MSS besides γ, is a rare phrase, occurring, I believe, nowhere else in Plato, though found in Aristotle (Pol. E 11. 1313b 39, where Bekker conjectured ὁωταί); but to shiver as much as possible' is painfully frigid. No emendation at all satisfactory has yet been proposed—neither Winckelmann's οἰκετας, nor Hermann's τὸν έτη (with reference to recitations of the rhapsodists!), nor Madvig's ὧς οἴκητα, nor Campbell's ὧς έτει. Ηέρτς (Pl. Jahrb. 1872 p. 852) supposes the words to be a gloss by some Christian reader, meaning 'as he' (i.e. Plato) 'imagines.' The author of the gloss wished to indicate that he at least could hear such tales without shivering. After ὥς οἰκετα found its way into the text, it was probably altered to ὁωται (to suit the plural ὅκωνται), from which οὖν τε is a corruption: cf. Π. 358 E, where γ shows οὐκοῦν as against οὖν τε of the best MSS. See also on VI 504 E.


19 μὴ εκ—ἡμῖν, φρίκη is a cold shiver, sometimes followed by sweat, whence εκ τῆς τοιατής φρίκης θερμότεροι. Cf. (with Hartman) Phaedr. 251 α Ἰδοντα δὴ αὐτὸν, οὖν εκ τῆς φρίκης, μεταβολὴ τε καὶ ἱδρος καὶ θερμάτησις ἀδήξη λαμβάνει, where Thompson remarks that φρίκη is used by Hippocrates of the 'cold fit of a fever,' In θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι Plato is thinking of the softening effect of heat upon iron: cf. (with J. and C.) infra 411 β ὁστερ σίθηρον ἔμαλαξε, Lat. 666 c, 671 β καθάπερ τω τάσι σίθηρον τάς ψυχὰς τῶν πύρων διασπᾶτο γεγοςεόμεναι μαλακακτέρας γίγνεται; see also Π. XVIII 468—477 and Whitelaw on Soph. Ajax 651 in Cl. Rev. v pp. 66, 230. In so far as it associates heat with cowardice, the comparison breaks down, for heat meant courage to the Greeks. For this reason Stephanus conjectured ἀθερμότεροι and Ast ἀθυμότεροι, a reading afterwards found in v. Ast's conjecture is thus refuted by Hartman (l.c.): "Astii conicetura inepta est, quam áthyma vitium sit, non vero ista ac temperata malacia (δίξιν enim malakóteroi τοῦ δέοντος)." In the next sentence Hartman expunges φοβούμεθα without sufficient cause.

387 D 23 τῶν ἐλλαγμένων ἀνδρῶν: a subjective, not an objective genitive: see E below, and 388 E. 390 D et τῶν τινων—καρπεται—και λέγονται καὶ πράττονται ὅποι ἐλλαγμένων ἀνδρῶν with X 609 D. 25 ὡς εἰρήκει τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ—προσφέραντι. This
passage is full of Socratic colouring. αὐτὸς καὶ εἶτα ἐστι contains a suggestion that only good men can be comrades: cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 19, 20 and Pl. Lys. 214.c. That death has no terrors for the good man is laid down in Ἀρ. 41 c.f. The self-sufficiency of virtue was illustrated in the person of Socrates himself (Mem. 1 2, 14, IV 8, 11), and continually preached by him (Mem. II 6, 2, cf. IV 7, 1). Steinhart appears to me to exaggerate the force of αὐτάρκης when he characterises the doctrine of this passage as anti-christian (Einleitung p. 160).

387 ετὸς. The fortitude of Pericles on receiving the news of the death of his two sons was a case in point, and may have been known to Plato. It is commemorated in a fine fragment of Protagoras preserved by Plut. Consol. ad Apoll. 33. 118 e, f.

33 ὀδυρεταί, φέρει. See cr. n. The infinitives ὀδυρεθαί and φέρει are explained by Stallbaum as dependent on ἀγώνες, but this is too harsh. The rhetorical repetition of ἱκίστα ἀλλά proves that like στερηθῆναι they should be under the government either of δεινῶν itself, or of some notion supplied out of δεινῶν. As the former alternative gives the wrong sense we must, if the text is sound, take refuge in the latter. Hartman by a tour de force resolves ἱκίστα δεινῶ into ἱκίστα εἰκὸς αὐτῶν δεδίκητα, and carries on the εἰκὸς. It would be somewhat easier, I think, though still very harsh, to supply ὀδυρεῖν out of δεινῶ, δεινῶ being used as δεινῶ καταράσασθαι τῷ ἄλῳ (Theophr. Char. 15, cf. infra 395 c): but it is difficult not to believe that the text is corrupt. In 9, ἀλλὰ has been corrected to χρὴ, and the insertion of ἀλλὰ before καὶ is suggested by Hartman. The question however is not what the good man ought to do, but what he actually does, and for this reason Richard's ἀλλὰ after ὀδυρεθαί is better, although otherwise unlikely. Stallbaum's alternative proposal to read ὀδυρεταί, φέρει δὲ seems to me far the best both in point of sense, and because it might easily pass into ὀδυρεθαί, φέρει δὲ under the influence of στερηθῆναι. For these reasons I have printed it in the text. Cf. Introd. § 5.

388 αἱ ἄλλοι—αὐτρυγέτου. The picture of Achilles sorrowing for Patroclus in Il. 24. 10—12. Plato accommodates the Homeric narrative to his own ποιεῖν, and reads πλαύζων—αὐτρυγέτου instead of διενέχεσθαι, ἄλλων παρὰ ἄλων, which appears in our Homer. πλαύζω elsewhere is always used of sail-
ing in the literal sense (yet ἐκ τοῦ νου ἐκπλήσσεται in Hdt. vi 12), but it cannot bear such a meaning here. If the mss are right, πλάσαρ' must be regarded (with Schneider) as a metaphor, the agitated movements of Achilles being compared to the unsteady motion of a ship upon the sea. Achilles is so to speak 'at sea' and shows it in his gait; cf. the metaphorical sense of χεῦμαμα. The picture savours of the burlesque, and Howes suggests that πλάσαρ may be a deliberate parody on Plato's part (Harvard Studies etc. vi p. 202). As no other example of such a use of πλασάρως has been adduced, the word is perhaps corrupt. Heyne's πρωθεντες 'matutinum se agentem' (οὐδὲ μὲν ἡώς θανομένη λήφθεκεν ὑπὲρ ἄλα, says Homer) will never command a wide assent: still less πλασάρως (Benedictus), πρῶτον (Ast), whose quantity is not above suspicion, or πρῶς λόγον (Liebhold Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 108). adiασαρ' (Herwerden and Naber) is better in point of sense, but the alteration is too great. I have thought of παλα' φαιν' (φαίνει 'cry φόν' and not φαινει is the spelling of the Codex Medicus in Aesch. Εμν. 124), or ἀφαίοντες (cf. ἀφοινομένος in II. xiv 607). Perhaps, however, πλασάρ' conceals some word meaning 'to rush wildly from his tent,' ἐπὶ δῶν being probably for ἐπὶ δῶν, not for ἐπὶ δόν. There is apparently a contrast between Achilles' anguish within his tent and without, and some word is needed to mark his exit. Nothing can be made of the variant πλάσαρ' (in a few inferior mss). In default of anything better we must (I suppose) provisionally acquiesce in Schneider's interpretation.

888 B 9 μηδὲ—κεφαλῆς. II. xviii 23, 24.

11 ἐκείνος. Homer. ἐγγὺς θεῶν. Zeus was Priam's seventh ancestor (Apollod. iii 13). The phrase has a dash of old-world romance about it: cf. 391 e infra and Stallbaum on Phil. 16 c 1. ἔμεν παλαιόν, κρεῖστον τιθημεῖν καὶ ἐγγυντόν θεῶν ἀκούστε. 12 λυτανεύντα τε—ἐκαστον. II. xxii 414, 415.

888 C 17 ὁμοί κτλ. Said by Thetis in II. xviii 54.

19 ὃ πότον. II. xxii 168, 169. The words are uttered by Zeus with reference to Hector. For ἀστό our Homer has τείχος.

23 αἱ αἱ—δαμηνία. II. xvi 433, 434. The only variant is ὁμοί for αἱ αἱ.
388 D 28 ei kal επίοι αυτή. καὶ is not 'even' (J. and C.), otherwise there would be too much emphasis on επίοι, but 'also': 'if it should also occur to himself' (sc. as Homer says it occurs to gods). The emphatic word is αυτή. For τοιοῦτον Hartman requires either τοιοῦτον τι or τοιοῦτον; but cf. 416 B, IV 426 B, 429 E, IX 590 E and II 368 A n. 29 σμικροίσιν. See on I 330 B. επί σμικροίσιν has a poetical rhythm, and may possibly be from a hexameter.

388 E 31 εσφ. αν τις—πεισά. Cf. Phaed. 85 C, D, Gorg. 527 A.

33 εφή—τοιοῦτον. See cr. n. The present εφή is slightly better than εφη for τοιοῦτον denotes the state or condition rather than the act. εφη comes rather nearer to the reading of A and II, and is preferred by Baiter and Hartman. For ζυγη H. Wolf conjectured τοιεί, Herwerden τίκτει or τικτεί, in both cases needlessly: cf. with J. and C. ἔθελε in II 370 B. The sentiment is generalised in VIII 593 E.

35 οὔτε ἄρα. otere followed by δὲ is rare (examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 832) but δὲ follows τε very often, especially in πολλ δὲ, μέγαστον δὲ etc.: see II 367 C n. Cobet's οὐτάρα i.q. οὐτοῖς ἄρα, though approved by Hartman, is therefore unnecessary.

389 A 2 οὐκοῦν—Λόγον. The lines are II. 1 599, 600. Hermann wished to read οὐκοῦν and reject ἀποδεξώμεθα περὶ θεῶν, placing τὰ τοιαῦτα under the government of ἀποδεκτέων. οὐκοῦν may be right, but the change is not necessary. τὰ τοιαῦτα does not refer specifically to the verses, but means τὸ κρατεῖται ὑπὸ γάλατος and the like; while the two verses are themselves the object of ἀποδεκτέων. I have accordingly placed a colon after θεῶν and removed the pause after ποινώντα; a remedy which removes, I think, the objections felt by Hermann to ἀποδεξώμεθα περὶ θεῶν, and by Herwerden to περὶ θεῶν. The asyndeton in ἀσβεστος δ' ἄρ' is unnecessary.

389 B—392 A A high value should also be placed upon truth. The medicinal lie may indeed be permitted to our rulers, in the interests of the State; but any others
who lie to be punished. To lie to the rulers is worse than lying to a physician about one’s illness.

Not less necessary is self-control, which will enable our citizens to obey the rulers, and to rule their own appetites. Homer frequently represents heroes and gods as lacking in this virtue—as insubordinate, gluttonous, lustful, aversive, prone to revenge, and mean. The effect is to discourage in the young the virtue which we desiderate, and all such representations must therefore be forbidden: they are both impious and untrue.

389 B 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἄλλων ἡ ἡμέρα. On the place of this section in the general plan of the Republic see App. I.

9 θεοὶ μὲν—οίδα. For the dative θεοὶ see I 330 B n. ἐν φαρμάκῳ εἰδεῖ (cf. II 382 C, 9) implies the usual Socratic analogy between body and soul: see on II 380 B.

11 οὐχ ἄπτεσθαι κτλ. Cf. Latus 916 eff.

389 C 15 τοιοῦτος is omitted by Hartman, and is certainly open to doubt. The balance of MS evidence is in its favour, although a few inferior MSS and one MS of Stobaeus (Flor. 46. 95), agree with A in omitting it. It must either mean rulers who act ἐν’ ὕψεια τῆς πόλεως, or else such rulers as Plato’s. The former alternative is not altogether satisfactory, and it is difficult not to believe that Plato was in reality referring to his own rulers. The serious objection to this view is that we have not yet heard anything of Plato’s rulers: they are not described till 412 B. I think the solution may be that the present section on truth is a later addition made by Plato after he had written his first account of the rulers in Book III. See also App. I.

10 λέγοντα has caused difficulty, and Madvig would expunge the word. The explanation is simple enough. μὴ τάληθη λέγειν should be repeated between η and πρό, and μὴ τὰ δότα λέγονται ὅτις taken closely together, ‘or to lie’ (μὴ τάληθη λέγειν understood) but to a pilot about the ship and its crew by misrepresenting the facts about one’s own condition etc.’ One MS of Stobaeus (I.c.) has λέγοντα, which is also possible, and could only be explained in this way. I have removed the comma usually printed after λέγοντα.

20 λαμβάνη: sc. ὁ ἄρχων. Cf. 1347 A n. λαμβάνη (Ficinus and Benedictus) gives a wrong sense.

389 D 21 τῶν οί—δούρων. Od. xvii 383, 384. κακῶν is of course neuter. If Schneider could shew that this quotation refers to a case in which a chieftain in Homer did or did not punish a δήμουργός for lying, he would make out a
koláseı̂sει ὡς ἐπιτήδευμα εἰσάγοντα πόλεως ὑσπερ νεώς ἀνατρεπτικῶν τε καὶ ὁλέθριον. Ἐάν ἦγε, ἢ δὲ ὦς, ἐπὶ γε λόγῳ ἔργα
25 τελήται.

Τὰ δὲ; σωφροσύνης ἀρα οὐ δεῖσει ἡμῖν τοῖς νεανίσι; Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων
μὲν ὑπηκόοις εἶναι, αὐτοῦς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ Εἴροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐξωδάς ἥδων; ἑμοῦνγε δοκεῖ. Τὰ δὴ τοιάδε
30 φήσομεν, οἴμαι, καλῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷς καὶ Ὀμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει, 
τέττα, σιωτῆ ἵσο, ἕμῶ δ’ ἐπιπείθεος μῦθῳ, 
καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔχόμενα, τὰ
ἰσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,
σιγῆ, δειδιότες σημαντοράς,
35 καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Καλῶς. Τὰ δὲ; τὰ τοιάδε
οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὅμματ’ ἔχων, κραδίην δ’ ἐλάφοιο
23. κολάσει ὡς Π. κολάσεως Α.

prima facie case for his view that Plato
is here prescribing canons for poetical
representations, but there is nothing of
this in Homer; and we must suppose
that Plato is speaking here of his own
rulers. See App. 1.

24 ἤν γε—τελήται does not mean ‘if
our theory is carried out’ (J. and C.) or
‘if our ideal city is ever realised’ (Rettig).
Such a remark would be frigid and super-
fluous. The meaning is merely that the
ruler will first use words, but, if these fail,
he will afterwards proceed to deeds i.e.
kolásei. The first γε assents: the second
enters a caveat. ἔργα τελήται = ἔργων τέλος
γίγνεται.

27 σωφροσύνης δὲ—μέγιστα: ‘for
the mass of men, are not the cardinal points
of temperance such as these?’ (Jebb on
Soph. O. C. 20 μακρὰν γὰρ ὡς γέροντι
προδιάληξις ὀδὸν—a precise parallel).
There is no authority for interpreting
these words (with Stallbaum, Hartman
etc.) as ‘plerumque’ ‘in universum.’
Plato is warning us not to regard his
account of σωφροσύνη here as scientifically
accurate and complete. It is the most
obvious and conspicuous aspects of
self-control which poets should chiefly
impress upon the multitude, and to these
Plato confines his attention. On the
Greek conception of σωφροσύνη see the
passages collected by Nägelsbach, Nach-

389 e 30 Ὀμήρῳ. For this Ε and a
few other MSS read παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ. Schneider
successfully defends Ὀμήρῳ by Arist.
Pol. Θ 5. 1339b 7 οὐ γάρ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἔδει
καὶ καθαρίζει τοὺς ποιητὰς. The line is
addressed by Diomed to Sthenelus in II.
IV 412.

32 τὰ τούτων ἔχομενα. The two
verses which Plato here quotes do not
follow τέττα, σιωτή κτλ., and do not even
occur together in our Homer. ἰσαν—
Ἀχαιοὶ is from Ἰ. III 8 (οἱ δ’ ἦσιν ἰσαν
σιγῆ μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί), σιγῆ—ση-
μαντοράς from iv 431. Some editors
bracket the first verse, but (as Hartman
points out) it is not likely that a scribe
should have interpolated a line from Ἰ. III
before one from Ἰ. IV. Plato may be
guilty of ‘contamination,’ or the lines
may really have occurred together in his
text of Homer. J. and C. suggest that
Plato perhaps did not mean the lines to
be connected. The objection to this
view is that σιγῆ (as in our text of
Homer, though there it is in a different
place) goes best with ἰσαν, and that ἰσαν
μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοὶ is not by itself
an illustration of obedience to rulers, and
therefore would not be relevant here.
See on the whole subject of Platonic quo-
tations from Homer, Howes in Harvard
Studies etc. vi pp. 153—237, with whose
conclusions (p. 210) I heartily agree.

36 οἰνοβαρές κτλ. Achilles to Aga-
memnon in II. 1 225. The point of this illustration is not in the abusive epithets, but in the insubordination which they and the rest of the speech (τὰ τούτων ἐξή) express.

390 Α 2 ναυείματα. See cr. n. The spelling seems established by the verb ναυείμεθα: e.g. Gorg. 483 C. ναυισκεύματα has however some authority, for ναυσκεύσιμα was used (Photius s.v.). ναυειματα, to say the least, is doubtful, nor is ναυκούν (Photius s.v.) enough to justify such a form, in spite of Schneider (Addit. p. 19).

8 παρὰ πλέαι—στεπάσσον. Odysseus in Od. ix 8—10. Our text of Homer has παρὰ δὲ πλῆθος. I have written παρὰ πλέαι for παράπλεια or παραπλειά of nearly all the MSS. Var. r. and Vind. B have παραπλειά, Cesenas M παράπλεια (sic), παράπλεια (which Howes Lc. p. 205 thinks Plato found in his text of Homer) is in reality a vox nihili; even if it did occur, it could not mean ‘almost full,’ as L. and S. say: and such a meaning would be ludicrously inappropriate here. With παρὰ δὲ πλέαι cf. Anacr. 94. 1 ed. Bergk κρητήρα παρὰ πλέω υλοποτάρων. See my article in Cl. Rev. xi p. 349.

390 Β 13 λιμῷ δ’—ἔπισπέιν. Od. xii 342.

14 η Δία—ἐπιλαπθανόμενον. μῦνος ἐγγραφῶς refers to II. ii 1—4; the incident itself is narrated in II. xiv 294 ff. For the postponement of the relative ἄ cf. IV 425 C. The effect is to throw emphasis on μῦνος ἐγγραφῶς—that Zeus should forget what he had purposely kept awake to devise makes the scandal all the worse—and brings it into sharper contrast with καθευδῶντων—ἀνθρώπων. ως must be taken with ἐπιλαπθανομένον, the construction being ὃ ποιεῖν Δία ὡς ἐπιλαπθανόμενον: cf. ii 383 A. Stallbaum explains ως μῦνος ἐγγραφῶς as “ut solus vigil”; while J. and C. supply ἀκούων after ἂ. Neither view seems to me at all satisfactory. The text has been often called in question. Instead of ὃς Hermann reads καί: Herwerden and Richards suggest δα (dropping ἄ before ἐβουλεύσατο). The best emendation is perhaps Jackson’s εἰς for ὃς (Journal of Phil. iv p. 147), but I see no good reason why ὃς cannot be
construed with ἐπιλαθανόμενον. The pause which on this view is necessary after ὤς helps still further to increase the stress on μόνος ἐγγραφός, which Plato certainly intended to emphasize. 390 c 18 βουλόμενον—τοκήα. βουλόμενον is not otiose after ἐθέλειν (as Hartman alleges): 'to wish' (βουλέσθαι) and 'to be willing' (ἐθέλειν) are different ideas. The same critic also rejects καί before λέγωνa "quia ea verba excursionem τοῦ ἐθέλειν humi consensuere continent?"; but it is more effective to represent so gross an utterance as an additional part of the picture. For φοτάν πρὸς cf. Lys. 15, 19, where the meaning is the same. Herwerden should not have wished to replace the preposition by παρά. In Homer the line εἰς εὕνη φοτάντες φίλους λήσαντες τοκήα (II. xiv. 295) is not said by Zeus, as Plato—doubtless intentionally, to increase the effect—makes it appear to be.

30 Ἀρεώς—δεσμόν. Od. viii. 266 ff. δεσμόν is still under the government of παῖεν. 390 d 23 καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττονται κτλ.: 'are either described or done by famous men' etc.: described e.g. in poetry by Homer's heroes, or done in actual life before our eyes. θεάτεον refers to πράττονται, ακουστέον to λέγονται by the usual chiasmus. J. and C. translate "performed by famous men or told concerning them," understanding περὶ ἐλλογιμῶν ἀνδρῶν with λέγονται, but this cannot be right.


27 δωροδοκοῦσιν κτλ. The excessive love of money is a sign of ἀκράτεια: so that its mention here is relevant enough, although the vice was not specifically named in 389 d.


32 συμβουλευόντων. II. ix. 515 ff. The genitive μνήμων, for which a few ms read μνεῶν, is natural in paraphrasing Homer. Cf. the form θάλεως in x. 600 a. 34 οὗτος ὀμολογήσαςμεν. "Dele futile interprettamentum" exclaims Hartman. The words are genuine, and add a new point: cf. 391 λάμαν καὶ ἄλλων λεγών τῶν πειθεοῦντε.
Γ. Μη τούτων, ἦν δ' εὔγω, μηδὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα μηδὲ ἐδώμεν 20

D λέγειν, ὡς Θησεύς Ποσειδόνος ὑδος Πειρίδουσι τε Δίος ἀρμήσαν

οὔτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγᾶς, μηδὲ τιν' ἄλλον θεοῦ παιδά τε καὶ ἥρω

22. ἄλλων II: ἄλλων A, sed v puncto notavit A2.

24 αὐτά is censured by Heller, who conjectures τοιαῦτα, while Hartman keeps αὐτά but rejects ἐργα. Stallbaum says we should expect ταῦτα for αὐτά: but ταῦτα would be too precise. αὐτά means simply 'the actions in question.' Cf. I 339 ε. n. The turn of the sentence recalls II 380 ετὸς βου. ἐργά ἔστε ἀντὶ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐκ τῆς. Cf. also infra 408 c.

26 κακά. Hartman approves Cobet's conjecture κακοὶς, 'cum γενέσαι hic translaticiam vim non obtineat.' Why not? Cf. κακά γίγνεσθαι just below. κακοῖς would be extremely tame and common-place.

291 ε 27 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν. II 378 b, 380 c.

31 ἄρα: II 358 κ. m.

32 οἱ—δαμαρίων. From Aeschylus' Niobe: see Dindorf Fr. 155. The passage is also quoted in part by Strabo (XII 8. 21), from whom it appears that Niobe is the speaker, and that οἱ θεοὶ ἀγχιστορεῖ οἱ τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ...
be said about men. But on this subject we cannot lay down rules until we have discovered the nature of justice, and proved that justice benefits the just, apart from all appearances.

392 Α 2 τί οὖν κτλ. This is the ἀλήθεις εἴδος λόγων. Plato has prescribed canons for the ψευδεῖς λόγοι or legends about gods etc.; but rules for ἀλήθεις λόγοι, i.e. λόγοι relating to men and human affairs, cannot be drawn up without begging the conclusion which the Republic seeks to establish. See also on Π. 376 ε.

ημῖν. See cr. n. Without ημῖν, we should have τὸ δὲ λόγων πέρι ὁριζόμενοι. I agree with Hartman and the majority of editors in retaining the word. See Introd. § 5.

6 ἀδύνατον δὴ. For δὴ Stallbaum approves Ast's conjecture δὲ δὲ would be too weak, if the meaning were adversative, but it is not. δὴ is only 'well': cf. Π. 368 Α (Schneider).

7 καὶ ποιητά καὶ λογοποι. Οἱ λο-

γοποι ἔστειλαν στὸν Λατόν 

660 ε., 661 β.

392 β 10 ἀλλότριον — ἀγαθόν. I 343 σ. ημῖν.

14 ηστούμεν. Stallbaum's conjecture — see cr. n. — is now generally accepted.

εστούμεν would imply that the discussion had changed, but it has not. Cf. IV 420 Α δάλα ηστούμεν.

392 Κ 15 τότε διομολογησόμεθα κτλ. This is not "an ironical or fanciful excise for varying the order of the subject" (J. and C.), for if Socrates declared at this stage that justice is a good for its possessor he would in point of fact be presupposing the results of the whole investigation. See IX 588 β—592 Α. Others (e.g. Hirzel der Dialog p. 237 n.) have taken τότε διομολογησόμεθα as a hint of the additional discussion on Poetry in Book Χ; but there is nothing either here or in that book to justify any such interpretation. Cf. Χ 595 λ. Α. What Plato's regulations about λόγοι περὶ ἀνθρώπων would have been may be easily gathered from the end of Book IX and Χ 602 δ. E., although the subject is nowhere specifically and expressly resumed in the Republic. Cf. I 347 ε. ημῖν.

392—394 D We have now finished our treatment of the subject-matter of poetry, and have next to discuss its form. All composition is in a certain sense narrative, narrating things past, present or future. Narration in this sense may be either (1) simple and unmixed, (2) imitative, (3) both simple and imitative. Homer furnishes
an example of the third kind: his poetry is purely narrative, when he is speaking in propria persona, it is imitative, when he puts his words into the mouth of any of his characters. Tragedy and Comedy exemplify the imitative style. The best example of the purely narrative is the Dithyramb, of the third or mixed variety, the Epic. Which of these forms shall we admit, and on what occasions?

392 C. ff. That Poetry and Art are a species of μιμησις, was an accepted canon in Greece even before the time of Plato: see Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art p. 121. Starting from this principle, Plato gradually deepens and intensifies the connotation of μιμησις as the dialogue advances. At first, the word denotes a specific variety of style—the dramatic as opposed to the narrative (392 d—394 d). But as according to Plato style is at once the expression of, and also exercises a reflex influence on, the soul (400 b n.), μιμησις begins to assume an ethical import and is used to express imitation or assimilation in matters appertaining to or bearing upon character and conduct (394 e, 395 c n.; cf. also 401 b—404 c). Finally, in Book X, after the psychological point of view has been superseded by the metaphysical, the word acquires an ontological or metaphysical significance: see on X 595 c. On the subject generally, reference may be made to the dissertation of Abeken de μιμησις apud Platonem et Aristotelem notione.

19 τὸ δὲ λέγειν. Hartman approves the variant τὰ δὲ λέγειν: but the subject of λέγειν is better treated as a unity until it has been subdivided.

392 D 23 μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν. μυθολόγων is said so as to include writers of μύθοι in prose: cf. 394 b and 356 e n. 28 ὡστε ὄνω κτλ. Plato means that poor speakers cannot grapple with an abstract notion, but use a part of it, i.e. a concrete example. ὃς κατὰ ὄνω κτλ. may be illustrated from Sympos. 205 b, C.

393 ι 3 καὶ ἔλεγετο—λαῶν. II. 115, 16. Leaf reads ἔλεγετο because
"\n\nλέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἠμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν 5 ἄλλοσ τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτὸς: τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα

Β ἀνέβει αὐτὸς ὁ Ὀμηρος δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα. και τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πάσαν σχεδὸν τι ὁτιοσοδότερα διήγησιν περὶ τῶν ἐν 'Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκη 10 καὶ δὴ Ὀδυσσέα παθημάτων. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ὑποκούν διήγησις μὲν ἐστὶν καὶ ὦτα τὰς ῥήσεις ἐκώστοτε λέγει καὶ ὦτα τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων; Ἡώς γὰρ οὖ; Ἀλλ' ὦταν γέ τινα λέγη

C ῥήσιν ὃς τις 1 ἄλλος ὁν, ἀρ' οὐ τότε ὡμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν τι τι μάλιστα τὴν τῶν λέγων ἐκώστος, ὥν ἂν προεῖπτην ὡς ἥρωντα; 15 Φήσομεν· τι γάρ; Ὑποκούν τὸ γε ὡμοιοῦν ἐαυτὸν ἄλλω ἢ κατὰ φωνήν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖται ἐστὶν έκέινου φ' ἂν τις ὡμοίοι; ἴτι μην; ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἑοίκεν, οὕτως τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί διὰ μυμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

Εἰ δὲ γε μιθαμβὸν ἐαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτωτο τοῦ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἡ αὐτῷ 20

D ἄνευ μυμήσεως ὁ ποιητής τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονόντα εἰπ. ἵνα δὲ μην εἴπης, ὃτι οὐκ αὐτοὶ μανθάνειν, ὡς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἐγὼ φάσομαι. εἰ γάρ ὢΜηρος εἰπόν, ὃτι ἠλέθεν ὁ Χρύσης τῆς τε θυγατρὸς λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἒκέτει τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μή ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος ἐλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἐτι ὡς Ὅμηρος, ὁ οἶσθ' 25 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησες ἵν ἀλλ' ἀπλή διήγησις. εἴρχε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοις· φάσος δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου· οὐ γάρ εἰμι ποιητικὸς· ἔλθων ὁ ἱερεύς

Ε καὶ κατοικεῖ 1 ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δοῦμαι ἐλύνοντα τὴν Τρισίαν αὐτοῦ σωθῆναι, τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ λύσαι δεξαμενοὺς ἀποτελέσας τὸν θέου αἰτιοθέτας· ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντως αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἑσθέμοντο

which the scene is Ithaca, were sometimes known collectively as 'Ἰθάκη.

393 D, E 23 ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος: 'as if he had been transformed into Chryses,' not merely 'in the person of Chryses' (Jowett). In 'simple narrative' he is Homer: when Chryses begins to speak, he becomes Chryses. Cf. 393 B ὁσπερ ἄλλω ὁ Χρύσης ("as if he himself were Chryses").

27 άδήν—αιδεθήθηται. Ἰ. 1 17—21. The emphatic ἄδην accurately represents Homer's ἄδην μέν. For λόγων ὃς ὃς ἄδην is Apollo. 30 ταῦτα δὲ—βλέπειν. Ἰ. 1 22—

A. P.
42. The paraphrase is accurate, and Plato leaves nothing essential out. There is no sign that his text differed from ours in this passage.

32 μη—οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι. ἐπαρκέσοι presupposes ἐπαρκέσει in the narrator's case: Homer has μη νῦ τοι οὐ χρᾶσμι σκῆπτρον καὶ στῆμα θεοῦ. It is usual to regard this sentence as final: if so, it is the solitary instance in Plato where the future after a final μη must be admitted. See Weber in Schanz's Bei-träge II 2, p. 60 and Goodwin MT, pp. 45, 91. The nearest parallel is Euthyph. 15 D ἀλλά καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀν ἔδεισα παρακινδυνεῖν, μη οὐκ ἱρὸς αὐτὸ ποῖσις, where μη depends on a verb of fearing. It is better, both in point of grammar and of sense, to regard this sentence also as expressing apprehension ('for fear lest'), although no verb of fearing is present. It is not final in any proper sense of the word. Bekker read ἐπαρκέσει, saying that Θ has ἐπαρκέσεις. 34 μη ἑρεθίσει. Valckenæer's conjecture μη ἐρεθίζειν (μη μ' ἑρεθίζε in Homer) is attractive in view of τὸ α ὅμαρκα in 394 A for Homer's ἑμά δάκρυα, and because it provides an object for ἑρεθίζειν. Plato uses the pronoun tolerably often (e.g. in 1 327 B, X 617 E, Symp. 175 C, 223 B): other Attic writers seldom, if ever (Kühner-Blass Gr. d. Gr. Spr. 1 p. 592). It is not however clear that ἑρεθίζειν could not be used without an object expressed, and I therefore revert to the MS reading. 394 A 4 ἐν ναίν οἰκοδομήσεσσω shows that Plato understood Homer's ἑρεφα (ἐι ποτε το χαρίεντ' ἐπι νῶν ἑρέφα) of building. According to Lest, ἑρέφα seems to denote the most primitive form of temple —"a mere roof to protect the image of a god standing in a grove." 6 τέσσαρι—βέλεσιν. Ἀχαϊος is of course the subject to τέσσαρι (pay for, 'expiate'): in Homer it is τέσσαρι Γαλαί ἑμά δάκρυα σώσε βέλεσιν. The translation 'that he would avenge his tears upon the Achaeans!' (D. and V.) is wrong. τ' is apparently a solitary instance of δε = 'suus' in Attic prose (Kühner-Blass l.c. 1 1, p. 602). Plato chooses the word because it expresses Homer's ἑμά briefly and neatly, rather than from any conscious desire to make the paraphrase archaic. 394 B 12 τραγῳδίας. Adimantus quotes a single concrete instance—'tragedies'—to show that he now apprehends the meaning of μῆλαια. Socrates, out of politeness and because he wishes to make progress, interprets this as a recognition of the imitative character of Tragedy and Comedy in general (ὡσπερ σοι λέγεις τραγῳδία τε καὶ κυμάδια), as in point of fact it virtually is. ὡσπερ σοι λέγεις is not
true in the beggarly literal sense of λέγεων, but it is sufficiently so for polite conversation. To insert—with Herwerden and Hartman—τε και κωμῳδίας after τραγῳδία seems to make unnecessary and pedantic. 394 c 16 ευροις δ' ἀν—διδυράμβοις. The dithyramb was at first purely narrative or nearly so; it afterwards became mimetic (Arist. Propl. xix 15, 918 ν 19). Only one of Findar's dithyrambic fragments appears to be mimetic (Frag. 74). On the growth and decline of the Dithyramb see Smyth Greek Melic Poets pp. xliii—lxviii.

17 τε—δὲ καί. II 357 c n.

18 οἱ μοι μανδάνεις: 'if I can make you understand,' with reference to μανδάνω in 392 c, 394 b, c. Heindorf's ei μοι μανδάνεις (as in Phil. 51 c) is attractive, but the corruption is not easy to explain, and the MS reading is sufficiently defended by 1 343 λ η συν γάρ νομίζειν—γαρ ἐκ εὐθύνεις (so also Hartman).

21 τούτο—αὕτω refers to εἰς χρείαν—μηκοῦσα. καὶ ἐγελοὺς ἐις τὴν πόλιν, εἰτέ καὶ 25 οὖ. 'Ισως, ἢν δ' εὐγείον; Ισώς δὲ καὶ πλείω ἐτὶ τούτων' ὁ γὰρ δὴ εἴγονά ποιόδος, ἀλλ' ὅπῃ ἀν ὁ λόγος ὁσπέρ πνεύμα φέρει, ταύτην εἰτέν. Καὶ καλῶς γ', εἰφή, λέγεις. 1 Tόδε τοινυν, ὥ τ' Ἀδείμαντε,
394 Ε 29. πότερον μιμητικός κτλ. The question is not 'Are our guardians to become dramatic poets?' but 'Are they to have the imitative habit of mind?' The answer is in the negative, and the drama is banished because it fosters this habit in spectators. Cf. 395 δ.ν.

30 δει—πολλα δ' ου explains τοις ἐμπροσθεν, as Hartman points out, and not τοιτο, as D. and V. translate. ἐμπροσθεν refers to II. 370 β.

32 πολλον κτλ. suggests, perhaps intentionally, π δλλ' ἕπιστατο ἐργα, κακῶς δ' ἕπιστατο πάντα. The words οὖτι—ἐλλογίμασι—equivalent to a neuter accusative—are undeservedly cancelled by Herwerden and Hartman. Translate 'he will fail in all of them to attain creditable distinction': cf. the adverb κακώς in κακῶς δ' ἕπιστατο πάντα.

33 οὐκόν κτλ. The reasoning is a fortiori: if two or more departments of merely imitative art cannot be represented by the same person, still less can imitation be combined with any serious pursuit (σχολή ἢρα κτλ.).

395 A 3 οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα—τοιοοῦντες. The reverse is affirmed by Socrates in Symposium. 223 Δ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἑπιστάσασθαι τοῖς, καὶ τὸν τέχνην τραγῳδοῦσιν ὄντα καὶ κωμῳδοῦσιν εἶναι. The solution is that in the Symposium Socrates is applying to the drama the Socratic principle μὲ ἐπιστήμην. σ. δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων: theoretically, therefore, and ideally, the tragedian is also capable of writing a comedy. In the Republic, on the other hand, he is describing Greek dramatic art as he found it: for which reason he writes δύνανται and not δύνανται ἢν (a corruption in ν, wrongly adopted by Stallbaum). Cf. Ion 534 c. Aristophanes did not write tragedy, nor the tragedians comedy. The passage in the Symposium is interesting as an unconscious prophecy of the Shakespearian drama. Cf. Reber Plato u. d. Poesie p. 11.

5 μιμήματα. See εἰ. Former editors variously read μιμήματα or μιμήματε. Either is admissible, so far as concerns the Greek, but the plural was perhaps—owing to the proximity of τοῦτο—something more likely to be corrupted to the dual in this instance than vice versa. Cf. X 614 οὕτω—χάσαμα ἐχάσων ἄλλοις with n. ad loc. The reading μιμήματα τε represents the correction μιμήματα.

This is, I think, a somewhat simpler view than to suppose that an original μιμήματα became μιμήματε τε by dittography, and τε was afterwards changed to τα. Roeper, however, pronounces in favour of the dual (de dual. καὶ Pl. p. 14), and it must be admitted that duals are peculiarly liable to corruption in the MSS of the Republic. See Introd. § 5.

6 ραφοδοί—ὑποκριται. Even ραφοδοί seem to have generally confined themselves to a particular poet: see Ion 531 c, 536 b.
7 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ—οἱ αὐτοί. This was true without exception till comparatively late times: see Müller Gr. Bühnenatt. pp. 185—188. κωμῳδίας and τραγῳδίας (literally 'at the tragedians,' etc.) are local—almost adverbal—datives, regularly used to denote the exhibitions of comedies and tragedies: see e.g. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 6, 1123a23, Aesch. in Clit. 36, and cf. the Latin use of 'gladiatoribus,' for 'at a gladiatorial show.'

395 B, C 11 ἡ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν. καλῶς should be repeated with πράττειν, and ἡ is simply 'or,' not 'or else.' The alternative rendering given by J. and C. 'or else—if able to imitate—is not able to do the things themselves,' does violence to both grammar and sense.

14 δημιουργοῖς ἔλευθερίας. An artificial and somewhat strained expression, selected in order at once to compare and contrast the guardians with other artists. They too are artists, and their ἔργον is Freedom. To ἔλευθερία Plato attaches his own meaning: true freedom lies in the subordination of the lower to the higher, both in private conduct and in political life: cf. Xen. Mem. 1 2. 5; 6 and infra 1x 577 D, E, x 617 E nn. It is in this sense that ἔλευθερος is used below.

17 τούτοις: viz. τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ἔλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως. 

20. μὴ II: om. A.
395 d 23 καὶ κατὰ σῶμα—diāνοιαν.
For σῶμα Stallbaum conjectured σχῆμα, but Plato would surely have said σχῆμα, as in 397 b. Hartman boldly ejects κατά φωνὰς and reads κατὰ <τὸ> σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν diāνοιαν, remarking that κατὰ τὸ σῶμα by itself includes "gestus, habitus, vocem, vultum, similia." This is in a sense true, but there is no reason why one particular instance of physical resemblance should not be selected for special remark. Plato differentiates the external from the internal characteristics by combining σῶμα and φωνὰς under a single preposition, and repeating κατὰ before τὴν diāνοιαν.
25 αὐτῶς. For αὐτῶς following ὄν see on 11 357 b. The rule against the repetition of the relative in such cases is sometimes dispensed with for the sake of rhetorical emphasis, e.g. in 11 374 b and perhaps Thet. 192 b.

396 μυείσθαι. In what sense can the guardians be said to 'imitate' in such a case, or in those specified in 396 a, b? Not as actors, but as spectators. Acting involves three elements—the character, the actor, and the spectator. In good acting the spectator identifies himself with the actor through sympathy; and as the actor 'imitates,' so does he. Such is Plato's theory, though merely glanced at here. Cf. x 605 c ff., Ion 533 d ff., and see the excellent remarks of Nettleship Lectures and Remains 11 pp. 100—104.

395 e 29 καίμουναν—diāνουσαν
glances at Euripides and his school: cf. Ar. Fr. 503, 504 and 1080, with the Scholiast's remark on 1080 ἐργαθεῖται τὸν ἄλλον ὑδίνουσαν ἐν ἑργ. Plato's strictures throughout this passage tell much more heavily against Euripides than against the other two dramatists.

396 a 1 ἢ καὶ άλλα. άλλα must be coordinated with αἰσχρολογοῦσα, not with ὑδίνουσα, so that Hartman's correction (καὶ for ἢ καὶ), though scarcely necessary, is an improvement, and may be right.

3 μανομένους. As in the Eumenides, Ajax, Hercules Furens.

4 γνωστέον κτλ. cf. 409 a.
Β τούτοις, ἦ τι ἄλλο τῶν περὶ ταύτα μιμητέον; Καὶ πῶς, ἐφη, οἷς ἔνεοι προσέχειν τοῖς νοῦν τοῦτον οὐδὲν ἐξέσται; Τί δέ; ὑπονοούν χρεμοτίζοντας καὶ ταύρους μικρομένους καὶ ποτηρίους ψυφούντας ιτι καὶ θαλατταν κυτταυτόν καὶ θρονοτας καὶ πάντα αὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἰ μιμησόνται; Αὐλλά ἀπειρήται αὐτοῖς, ἐφη, μὴν μαίνεσθαί μήτε μανομένους ἀφομοιοόρθα. Εἰ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω ἰ σὺ λέγεις, ἐστὶν τι εἰδὸς λέξεως τε καὶ διηγήσεως, ἐν δ̣ ἀν διηγήστο 

C ὁ τὸ ὁντὶ καλὸς, ταύτης, ὀπότε τι δεόν αὐτῶν λέγειν, καὶ ἔτερον 15 αὐτόν ἀνόμοιον τούτῳ εἰδὸς, ἰ ἄν ἐχοῦν ἀλί καὶ ἐν 6 διηγοῦ τὸ ἐναυτίος ἐκείνῳ φύς τε καὶ τραφεῖς. Ποιὰ δὴ, ἐφη, τάς; 'Ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἄνηρ, ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκεται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξι ἡ πράξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν οὐς αὐτὸς ἰν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλει καὶ οὐκ ἀἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαυτῇ μιμήσει, 20 μάλιστα μὲν μεμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόων 

D πράπτοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἤττον ἦ ὑπὸ νόσου ἦ ὑπὸ ἐρωτῶν ἐσφαλμένου ἦ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθησι ἦ τίνος ἄλλης ξυμφοράς· ὅταν δὲ γίγνεται κατὰ τινα ἐαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν σπονδὴ ἀπει-καζεῖν εαυτὸν τῷ χείρον, εἰ μὴ ἀρα κατὰ βραχὺ, ὅταν τι χρήστον 25 τοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἀμα μὲν ἀγυμναστὸς ὅν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι 

25. ἑαυτὸν II: ἑαυτὸν Α. 

396 B 8 μιμητέον. See on μειωθαῖ 395 D. 

9 ὑπονοοὶ—βροντάς. The reference is probably to stage machinery and musical effects etc. in dramatic poetry generally, as well as in the later and degenerate form of the dithyramb (see on 394 C). Cf. (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. 11 p. 105) Laws 609 C ff. and Ar. Plut. 290 ff. The βροντάς and κεραμοσκετῶν for producing thunder and lightning were familiar enough (Müller Gr. Bühnenart. p. 157 n. 2). It is clear, as Nettleship remarks, that "Plato felt strongly that Greek literature and music were declining" in his days: see Laws 659 A ff., 700 A ff., 797 A ff. 

396 C 17 ὃ μὲν—ἀνὴρ. It seems difficult (as Schneider remarked) either to connect ὃ μὲν with μέτριος ἄνηρ, or to understand ὃ μὲν as 'the one' and suppose that μέτριος ἄνηρ is in apposition to it. If the latter alternative is right, we should expect μέτριος < ὃ μὲν > ἄνηρ, or < ὃ > μέτριος ἄνηρ, and in view of other cases in which the article is placed at some distance from its noun (e.g. ὃ δὲ γε, ὃμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοσα v11 566 c), I still prefer the former view. Some may be inclined to regard μέτριος ἄνηρ as a gloss. I have sometimes been tempted to make μοι δοκεῖ parenthetical (exactly = 'methinks'), in which case ὃ μὲν can easily be connected with μέτριος. The idiom occurs in Phaed. 105 D ὃ βλέπ νοι: δοκεῖ ὃ ἐμὺ—τῇ μῆκῃ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἔσχαξει καὶ Μελημ. 236 B : cf. also Cris. 43 D, 50 B, and 1 332 E n. This solution would involve the change of θελήσεις to θελήσει—σο υ—and of ἀισχυνεῖσθαι to ἀισχυνεῖσθαι just below, as well as again in D. Such a corruption, once started, ἐρχεται—as Plato might say—ὡς κύκλος αἰσχυνεῖται; but I do not venture to change the text. 

396 D 22 καὶ ἢττον is not superfluous with ἐλάττω. ἐλάττω means 'in fewer respects,' and ἢττον 'to a less degree.' 

24 σπονδῆ. Cf. δ ἦν μὴ παυδίας χάρων in E and σπονδῆ 397 A.
toys touious, 하나 데 쌍헤평문이 이우니 엉마씩 토니 업스탄반이 이우 토니 홍기안 kontakte 토니 에이마자이, 티디 삼与众

30 IX. Ούκον διηγήσει χρήσται οία ἡμείς ὁλέγον πρότερον δηλήσουμεν περὶ τοῦ 'Ομήρου ἑπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφότεροι, μιμήσεως τε καὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δὲ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως: ἢ οὔδεν λέγον; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, οἶδ' ἐν ἀνάγκῃ τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιοῦτον

35 ῥήτορος. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ | τοιοῦτος αὐτῷ ὀἀρό ἄν φαινότερος 397 ἢ, πάντα τὰ μᾶλλον μιμήσεται καὶ οὔδὲν ἐαυτῷ ἀνάξιον οὐσίσται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι σπουδὴ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τοις καὶ χαλαξίων καὶ ἀξόνων καὶ τροχιλῶν, καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ σφυρίγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνᾶς, καὶ ἐτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρέων φύλων: καὶ ἔσται δι᾽ ἡ τούτου λέξεως ἀπάσα διὰ 1 μιμήσεως φωνᾶς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἢ σμικρὸν τι ἑνὸς διηγήσεως ἔχουσα; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, καὶ τοῦτο. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἢν 10 δ’ ἐγώ, ἐλέγον τὰ δύο ἔδη τῆς λέξεως. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἐφη.

32. ἀπλῆς nos: ἀλλὰς cod. 2. μιμήσεται 1: διηγήσεται ΑΠΕ. 4. δὴ ἐλέγομεν ΑΠΕ: διελέγομεν Α1. τε ΠΕ: γε Α.

396 ε 29 ὃ τι μὴ παιδίας χάριν. Cf. VII 518 ε. 30 οὔτι. According to Van Cleef (De Attract. usw. Plat. p. 36), oous is not else-where attracted in Plato.

32 τῆς ἀπλῆς. See cr. n. The reading of the MSS τῆς ἀλλὰς ought strictly speaking to mean ‘the rest of διήγησις,’ i.e., Besides μιμήσεις. A reference to 392 δ will show that the rest of διήγησις includes (1) simple διήγησις, (2) the mixed style. If the text is sound, Plato therefore says that the good man’s λέξις will resemble Homer’s in partaking of all these varie- ties. This is a cumbersome and unnecessary elaboration : for if style partakes both in μιμήσεις and in simple διήγησις, it is already τοσο φαστο ‘mixed.’ To take ἀλλὰς as ‘besides’ may be admissible, but in any case it is desirable to define the kind of διΗγήσις meant. I believe that Plato wrote ἀπλῆς. The good man’s style will resemble Homer’s, which has already been said to partake of μιμήσεις (393 c) and of ἀπλῆ διήγησις (394 b). The corrup-tion—common in uncial MSS—is illus-


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33 μέρος (as Schneider points out) depends on μετέχουσα : cf. Euthyd. 306 α ὄν ἀμφότεροι μέρος μετέχουσι.

397 A 2 μιμήσεται. See cr. n. The choice of reading lies between this and Madvig’s emendation <μιμήσεται ἢ> διηγήσεται. In favour of μιμήσεται is μᾶλλον, which correlates with ὀἀρό ἄν φαινότερος ἢ. The corruption doubtless arose from a misinterpretation of μᾶλλον. Thinking that an ἢ clause was needed to explain it, a scribe added ἢ διηγήσεται in the margin, and διηγήσεται was afterwards taken as a variant and ousted μιμήσεται. These arguments, which are Hartman’s, seem to me conclusive in favour of μιμήσεται, which Schneider first restored.

3 σπουδὴ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν: like the professional dramatist or actor.

5 τροχιλῶν κτλ. Cf. supra 396 b n.

397 B 8 σχήμασιν ‘gestures.’

10 ἐλέγον. 396 b, c.
Ουκοῦν αὐτοὶ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἤχει, καὶ ἕαν τις ἀποδείξει πρέπουσαι ἀρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὁλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἴσονται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῷ λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ. Σ μικραί γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί, καὶ δὴ ἐν ῥυθμῷ ὁσανῶς παραπλησίω τινὶ; Κομμιᾷ μὲν ὁμφ. ἐφε, ὅπως ἤχει. Τὴ δὲ; τὸ τοῦ 15 ἐτέρου εἴδος οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ, πασῶν μὲν ἀρμονίαν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὐτ ὀικείας λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπᾶς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἤχειν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε ὄσως ἤχει. 'Αρ’ οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ τι λέγοντες ἡ τὸ ἐτέρῳ τούτῳ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως, ἡ τὸ ἐτέρῳ, ἡ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων 20 διὰ τῶν ἐγκεκατευνύτες; 'Ανάγκη, ἐφε. 'Τι οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους παραδεξίμεθα ἡ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἐτέρον ἡ τῶν κεκραμένων; 'Εὰν ἡ ἐμὴ, ἐφε, νυκά, τοῦ τοῦ ἑπείκους μιμητὴν ἀκρατοῦ. 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Ἀδείμαντε, ἡδὸς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἢδιστος παίσι τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ 25 ἐναντίος οὐ σὺ αἰρέι, καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ. Ἡδιστος γὰρ. 'Αλλ’

13 πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν: sc. ἀρμονίαν, as Schneider saw. To supply λέξιν with Stallbaum, Hartman, and others is not satisfactory, nor is it easy to understand χρόνιν. On the other hand ἀρμονία may be readily supplied in view of ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ following. ὁ λόγος qualifies τὴν αὐτὴν. The somewhat vague expression πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν, where the musical sense of πρὸς may be illustrated by πρὸς Λευτῶν λακέων τοίνυν (Eur. Ἀλ. 346), is afterwards made more explicit and precise by ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμονίᾳ i.e. ‘in one musical mode’ (see on 398 E), as opposed to πασῶν—ἀρμονίαν in C. μεταβολή was technically used of passing from one ἀρμονία to another: see Cleonid. Ἀναγ. Harm. 13 and Bachi. Ἀναγ. 53 ed. von Jan. We shall best apprehend the full meaning of the whole passage if we read it in connexion with 399 A, B. The general sentiment may be illustrated from Arist. Ἐθ. Ἀν. IV 8. 1125� 13 ff. καὶ κύσιν δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοφύου δοκεῖ ἔριναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρβαρία, καὶ λέξις στάσιμως. Pl. Charm. 159 B, Dem. 37: 52 and elsewhere.

397 C 17 διὰ τὸ παντοδαπάς—ἐξίν. As the λέξιν itself is full of variety, it requires for its proper or appropriate (οἰκεῖον) expression every variety of mode and rhythm or musical time. μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν is surely good enough Greek: I cannot see the point of Richards' μορφὰς ἐκ τῶν μεταβολῶν, still less why Hartman should eject τῶν μεταβολῶν or—as an alternative—μορφάς.

20 ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν = ‘hit upon,’ ‘stumble upon,’ as if by accident and ἄνευ τοῦ, not ‘succeed,’ as J. B. Mayor is disposed to construe (Cl. Rev. X p. 109). The same scholar proposes to change ἐγκατευνύτες into ἐγκεκατευμένος, but the text is much more idiomatic as it stands.

397 D—398 B We shall therefore admit that style only which imitates the good man’s way of speaking. The mixed and mimetic varieties do not suit us, for the character of our citizens is simple and uniform. Those poets who refuse to comply we will dismiss with compliments into another city.

397 D 23. τὸν ἐτέρον: ‘one or other.’ Presently τὸν ἐπικεκοῦς ‘the good man’ is said for ‘the good man’s style of speaking;’ see 398 C and cf. 399 E, B. Before ἀκρατοῖς, many editors add τῶν (with Ζ): but the position of ἀκρατοῖς is normal: cf. τὰ ἐν ὑδάς φαντάσματα θεία VII 532 C and note ad loc.

25 πασί—τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ. The expression recurs in Laws 700 C (quoted by J. and C.).
There is probably a satirical reference to Athenian democracy: see *Iph. 319 D.

398 * autós—ἐπιδείξασθαι: 'anxious to shew himself off together with his poems.' *ἐπιδείξασθαι is intransitive—i.e., *ἐπίθειμον ποιήσασθαι, *cf. *Iph. 179 B—*with autós, but transitive with *ποίημα. This explanation, which is due to Schneider, gives a much better sense than if we regard *autós *te *kai *tā *ποίημα *as *subject *to *ἐκφάκοντο, *or *translate *'himself, *and *wanting *to *shew *his *poems' (*J. *and *C.). *A *reference *to *autós *te *kai *tων *ἀκέφων *παρακάλει *in *Iv. 427 D is therefore hardly to the point.


5 *οὐρ' *ἐστὶν—οὖν *θέμις. *It *is *perhaps *better *to *correct *οὐκ *into *οὐτ'—*see *cr. *n.—*than *the *second *οὐτ' *into *οὐδὲ * * (with *Bekker *and *the *other *editors).

6 *μύρων—στέφανες. *The *idea *suggested *by *προσκυνοῦμεν *and *ἱερόν, *that *the *poet *is *a *sort *of *θεός *or *θείοις *ἀγίῳ, *is *now *elaborated *with *ironical *politeness. *The *images *of *the *gods *were *anointed, *and *crowned *with *garlands, *not *only *on *great *occasions (cf. *Cic. *Verr. *Iv. 77), *but *also *at *other *times, *according *to *Proclus, *who *remarks *on *this *passage *μύρων *ἀγίῳ (sc. *τῆς *ποιησικῆς) *καταχέας, *ως *τῶν *ἐν *τοῖς *ἀγίω- *τάσις *ἱερῶν *ἀγαλμάτων *θεῶν, *καὶ *ωσ *ἱερῶν *στέφας *ἀγίων. *μύρων *ἐκθέναι, *ἐποικεῖν *δὲ *ἀν, *5 *οὐ *ἐστι φοιτότος *ἀνὴρ *ἐν *τῇ *πόλει *παρ' *ἡμῖν—οὖν *θέμις *ἐγγενέσθαι, *ἀποπτέμπομεν *τε *εἰς *ἄλλην *πόλιν *μύρον *κατὰ *τῆς *κεφαλῆς *καταχέαντες *καὶ *ἐρίῳ *στέφαναι, *αὐτοῖ *δὲ *ἀν *τὸ *αὐτή-
B rotērho kai ἀνδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρώμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὀφείλιας ἔνεκα, ὃς ἦμιν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεῖκος λέξειν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις, οἷς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετήσιμεθα, ὅτε ἵνα τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεξερούμεν παιδεύειν. Καὶ μάλιστα, ἐφι, οὕτως ἀν ποιοίμεν, εἰ ἐφὶ ἦμιν εὐθ. Νῦν δὴ, εἴπον, ἐγὼ, ὧν φίλε, κυνουμεῖν ἦμιν τῆς μονακίσι τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεράσθαι: ἢ τε γὰρ λεκτέων καὶ ὡς λεκτέων, εἰρηται. Καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφι.

C X. Ὀνκοῦν μετὰ τούτο, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, τὸ περὶ φῶς τρόπου καὶ

8. χρώμεθα Π: χρώμεθα Α.

(Proceedings of the American Philol. Association Vol. xxii pp. xliii ff.) thinks that Plato has in his mind the well-known χειλόνωμος of which we read in Athenaeus (viii 360 B ff.), remarking that in the swallow song 'the custom seems to have been to carry some sort of symbolic swallow from house to house.' It is perhaps more probable (as Mr. J. G. Frazer suggests to me) that 'the ceremony of anointing the swallows and crowning them with wool was performed on the children who went from door to door in spring, singing the swallow song and apparently personating the swallow.' But the tone of the whole passage, with its air of studiously exaggerated politeness and compliment, as well as the particular expressions προσκνύομεν, iēρόν, and θαυμάστων, are strongly in favour of Proclus' interpretation, although Plato's thoughts may have dwelt for a moment on the practices connected with the χειλόνωμος when he wrote the words ἀποτείματοι—στέφανοι.

398 B ἰο κατ' ἀρχάς. Π 379 A ff.
398 C—399 E We have now to treat of lyric poetry. Song involves three factors, viz. words, a certain musical mode, and a certain movement or time. Our regulations about words when unaccompanied by music apply equally to words when sung, and the musical mode and time must conform to the words. Now we proscribed all lamentation in our city, so that we must exclude the lugubrious modes; and those which are relaxing in their effects must be rejected on similar grounds. In short, we shall retain two modes and no more, one to imitate the brave man's utterances in times of stress and strain, the other to imitate his accents in seasons of peace and calm. We shall deal similarly with instruments of music, forbidding all those which lend themselves to a variety of modes. It is thus that we purge our 'luxurious city.'

398 C 16 τὸ περὶ φῶς κτλ. The discussion has hitherto confined itself chiefly to tragedy and comedy. It remains to discuss lyrical poetry also on its formal side. Now the chief formal characteristic of lyric poetry is its invariable association with music. It is therefore necessary to lay down canons for musical composition. This is the justification for the sections on 'harmony' and rhythm, which are wrongly pronounced to be irrelevant by Krohn (Pr. St. p. 15).

The present section, and its ancient commentators (Aríst. Pol. 67, 1342 a 28—1343 b 28, Arist. Quint. 1 pp. 21, 22 ed. Meibom), have been fully discussed by Westphal (Gr. Harmonie pp. 187—234). Westphal's views have been combatted by C. von Jan (see especially his article Die Tonarten bei Platon im dritten Buche der Republik in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 pp. 815 ff. and 1883, pp. 1354—1362 and 1568—1579), and more recently (in other respects) by Monro in his 'Modes of ancient Greek Music.' The last edition of the Harmonik (1886) contains Westphal's reply to von Jan's criticism (pp. 209—215). See also von Jan in Baumeister's Denkmäler d. K. Alt. pp. 976 ff., Susemihl and Hicks The Politics of Aristotle Vol. 1 pp. 595 ff. and 624—631, and H. S. Jones and Monro in the Cl. Rev. viii pp. 448—454 and ix pp. 79—81. The writers in Meibom's Antiquae Musicae anctores septem have
now been re-edited—Aristoxenus by Marquard (Berlin 1868), Aristides Quintilianus by A. Jahn (Berlin 1881), Alypius and others by von Jan in his Musici Scriptores Graeci (Lipsiae 1895), where also the passages of Aristotle bearing on the subject are carefully collected, together with all the extant remains of Greek Music. The account of Die Musik der Griechen by Gleditsch in Iwan Müller’s Handbuch will be found a useful and compendious introduction to the study of this part of the Republic. Von Kralik’s recent monograph Altgriechische Musik (Stuttgart und Wien) is interesting, but too slight to be of much service. Taken by itself, the language of Plato in this chapter seems to me to point to the existence of four leading or simple modes, viz. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian and Ionian (the last two having each two varieties, a σύντονος and a χαλαρά), and one composite mode, the Mixolydian. See App. II.

16 τρόπον. Hartman suggests τρόπος, in view of τὸ περὶ μυθᾶς 399 E; but cf. 392 C. τρόπος is not here used in its technical sense, for which see Mono I. c. p. 63.

19 συμφωνήσεως. The metaphor may be suggested by the subject under discussion: cf. Phaed. 92 C.

398 D 24 λόγου—ῥυθμοῦ. In the best period of Greek music, lyric poetry was written only for music, and music only for poetry, the separation of the two being condemned as illegitimate: see Mono l.c. pp. 119, 120. The elements of music are ῥυθμός and ἀρμονία. The former ‘reconciles’ ταχυ and βραδύ by arranging a proper sequence of short and long notes and syllables, the latter δέβ and βαρύ by a proper arrangement of notes of higher and lower pitch (Symp. 187 α—c). In the wider sense, therefore, any ὀμολογία of δεβ and βαρύ is a ἀρμονία, but in practice the word was used specifically of certain scales or modes, and it is in this sense (according to Westphal) that Plato uses it here and in 398 E, where see note.

27 ωσαίτως: i.e. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ λέξει as defined in 396 E, 397 D.

καὶ μὴν κτλ. The poet should be his own musician, and write the music to suit the words, not vice versa. This was another characteristic feature of classical Greek music, although a change set in during the fourth century B.C. See Westphal Cr. Rhythmik p. 1 and Laws 659 D, E, 812 D.

398 E 30 ἀρμονία (according to the orthodox view) are ‘musical modes’ and not simply ‘keys.’ They differed from each other both in the arrangement of the intervals (like our major and minor modes) and also in pitch. It must have been the former difference which chiefly—though not perhaps exclusively—accounted for the different effects of different modes upon the character and emotions, just as we are ourselves affected in different ways by music written in major and in minor keys. See H. S. Jones in Cl. Rev. VIII p. 449.
399 Β]

ΠΟΙΤΕΙΑΣ Γ

μουσικός. Μιξολυδιστή, ἐφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστή καὶ τοιαύτα
tīνες. Ὁντούς ἀυτά, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρέται; ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ
γυναῖξιν ὡς δεὶ ἑπιείκεις εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδρίσι. Πάντως, ἀλλὰ
μὴν μέθη γε φύλαξιν ἀπρέπεστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία.

399 Ἰαστὶ, ἢ δ' ὡς, καὶ λυδιστὶ αὐ tīnēs χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.
Ταῦτας οὖν, ὁ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ᾽ ὑ τι χρῆσι; Ὅδυσσως,
ἐφή: ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστὶ λείπεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστὶ. Ὅνικ
οἴδα, ἐφην ἐγώ, τὰς ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἑκείνην τὴν ἀρμονίαν,
ἡ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀρτίον ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἔργασίᾳ
προπόντως ἄν μιμήσαιτο φθόγγος τε καὶ προσῳδία, καὶ ἀποτυ-
χόντως ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς βανάτους ὡς τοὺς ἢ εἰς τινὰ ἄλλην
Β. ἔμφορῶν ἔπεσόντως, ἐν πάσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτε-

31. συντονολυδιστή Αζζ: συντονολυδιστή Α: σύντονοι λυδιστή Π.q.
36. αὐ tīnēs Α Π: αὐτίνες Αζζ: καὶ τοιαύτα tīnēs Π.q.

31 μιξόλυδιστή κτλ. The omission of the article has been questioned, but in
merely naming the scales it can be dispensed with: cf. (with Stallbaum) Arist.
Pol. Θ 5. 1340b 1 (τὴν μιξόλυδιστὴν καλουμένην). On the ἀρμονία recognized
by Plato see App. Π. —
36 Ἰαστὶ—καλοῦνται: 'there are also varieties of Lydian and Ionian which
are called 'slack'.' Jowett and Campbell, reading αὐτίνες (see cr. n.), remark
that the "indefinite relative suits with Plato's affected ignorance"; but the speaker
is Glauco, not Socrates, and Glauco is μου-
σικός. See note on 399 c. Richards
condemns αὐτίνες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται as
spurious because αὐτίνες "cannot be used
in this way in good Attic prose of Plato's
date." With the older and better att-
tested reading αὖ tīnēs, which I have
ventured to restore, everything is plain.
The words αὖ tīnēs establish once for
all what Westphal (l.c. p. 198) and von
Jan (l.c. p. 816) detected even when
αὐτίνες was read, viz. that Plato is refer-
ring not to Ionian and Lydian, but to slack
Ionian and slack Lydian, a point which
escaped Monro (l.c. p. 7) but not his
reviewer (Cr. Rev. viii p. 449). See
also my article in Cr. Rev. x pp. 378 ff.
We learn from Aristotle that certain
musical critics censured Plato for reject-
ting τὰς ἀνιμένας ἀρμονίας and for cha-
acterising them as μεθυστικὰ, βακχευ-
tικὸν γὰρ ἢ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον (Pol.
Θ 7. 1342b 23—27). It was partly per-
haps in deference to these criticisms that
Plato altered his view of μέθη in Laws
666 A ff. see also Grote Plato iii p. 328 n.
399 A 3 δωριστὶ καὶ φρυγιστὶ.
The absence of the Aeolic mode is mod-
ernative, for it must certainly have been known to Plato (see Pratinas quoted in
App. Π). Westphal agrees with Beller-
mann in supposing (l.c. p.195) that αὐτίνες
is included under δωριστὶ. Aristotle
also ignores αὐτίνες, unless indeed (as West-
phal holds ib. p. 196) it was identical with ἤπωδουστὶ. In Lach. 188 D φρυ-
γιστὶ is excluded (perhaps because the
speaker is Laches, whose ideal of courage
is military rather than pacific), and Do-
rian, "the only national Greek mode," alone
recognized.
4 ἔκεινην τὴν ἀρμονίαν: viz. Dorian, not Phrygian, as Ast seems to have thought.
6 μιμήσαιτο. Cf. Laws 798 D τὰ
περὶ τοὺς μυθοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μυσικὴν ἑστὶ
τρόπων μιμήματα διήρκων καὶ χειρών
ἀνθρώπων and 397 B above.
καὶ ἀποτυχόντως. καὶ connects ὡς
καὶ ἀτύχεται (which is itself logically subordinate to ἄμυνομενον)
has three subordinate alternatives (ἡ—πε-
σόντος), all of which are summarised in
ἐν πάσι τούτοις.
399 B 9 ἄλλης: viz. Phrygian. Aristotle blames Plato for retaining the Phrygian mode, while rejecting the αὐλὸς, with which it was usually associated: ἄφων γὰρ ὀργαστικαλ παθητικα (Pol. Θ 7. 1342b 3). Plato, however, rejects the flute, not because it is orgastic, but because it is πολυμορφον (399 D).

In Plato's opinion the Phrygian mode expressed sobriety and resignation: Aristotle thought it ecstatic and purgative (I.e. 1341b 23). The difference of view is interesting and important as showing that the ethical effect of different modes was a disputed point even among the ancients.

41 ἡ εὐχὴ—ἀνθρωπον is subordinate to πειθόντος τε καὶ δειμένου.

13 ὑπέχοντα. ἔπεχον—see cr. n.—cannot, I think, be right. ἐπέχου τὴν διάνοιαν (Laws 926b) certainly does not justify ἐπέχεω εἰσόν, and even if it did, 'submitting to' and not merely 'attending to' is the sense required. With ὑπέχοντα cf. Gorg. 497 B ὑπέσχεσε ὁρκότατε ἐξελέγχει ὡς ἂν βουληταί, where the reflexive pronoun is omitted, as often with παρέχειν. Here it is better to take εἰσόν with ὑπέχοντα than with μεταπείθοντι. By changing the construction and writing accusatives instead of genitives, Plato makes the man himself rather than his φθόγγον appear the object of imitation (cf. 397 D. n.). This is natural enough, because the situations described in ἡ τοι-νωτιον—ἀγαπῶτα give less scope for φθόγγον. Stephanus wished to read the genitive throughout (ὑπέχοντος, πρᾶξαντος etc.: so also 7 and two Florence times), but there is also inscriptionsal evidence for a genitive or dative participle followed by an accusative in the course of a long sentence: see Meisterhans' p. 205.

κατὰ νοῦν: τὸ his liking') cf. ἐνυπαίσχοντος below.

399 C 15 ταύτας—λαίτη. The style is intentionally weighty and formal, as befits a solemn pronouncement: cf. Χ 617 D, E. After ταύτας there is a slight pause: 'Just these, two modes and none other.' The insertion of τάς would impair the effect. Besides suggesting that Socrates had in view two of the current modes, which, not being himself μουσικός, he professedly had not. It is Glauco's business to fit the cap (398 E, 399 A); Socrates only makes it. The indefinite αἴτιες (before φθόγγον) is therefore strictly appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, although it would not be in Glauco's. ἀρμονίας is rejected by Her- werden in both places (see cr. n.), but it is almost as indispensable here as it is wrong after ἀνδρεῖων, although Stallbaum rejects the word here and retains it there. The genitives δυστυχώντων etc. must depend on φθόγγον. For βιαίου, ἐκοῦσιν (‘one involuntary, one voluntary’), Ast suggests βιαίου, ἐκοῦσιν, Hartman βιαιῶν ἐκοὑσιν. A human being cannot however be called βιαιος because he is engaged ἐν βιαίῳ πρᾶξει, although the mode which imitates his accents may be so described with propriety and even elegance: cf. (with Schneider) such expressions as φῶνος ἐγγενῆς for the slaughter of kindred. The words δυστυχώντων—καλλίστα simply define the meaning of βιαίον and ἐκοῦσιν (‘whatever musical modes they be that shall best imitate the accents of etc.): the relative is postponed in order to keep the essential marks of the ἀρμονίας together, but the careful reader will note that Plato begins a chiasmus with δυστυ- χώντων, as if to separate the genitives from what precedes and prepare us to
find their construction in the sequel. Had he written ενυγχωνων, διστυχοντων, ἄνδρειων, ωσφρονων the double chiasmus would have compelled us to connect the genitives with δό διμονιας.

17 οὐκ ἄλλας—ἔλεγον. The Dorian to express ἄνδρεα, the Phrygian ωσφρο¬σιν. These are the two contrasting virtues which Plato’s μονικη endeavours to combine (410 E).

19 παναρμονιον. In Plato the noun παναρμονιον occurs only here and in 404 D ψηφι τη ἐν το παναρμοι καὶ ἐν πασι βυθοις πεποιμην. In the latter passage it certainly does not denote a musical instrument of any kind. Here the word is sometimes understood of a particular and definite musical instrument, but a careful study of the context shews that it does not bear this meaning even here. Plato has decided to admit only two modes, the Dorian and the Phrygian. ‘Consequently,’ he continues, ‘we shall have no need in our songs and melodies of πολύχορδα or παναρμονιον, and therefore (ἀρα) we shall dispense with τρίγωνον, πυτήδες etc., with all instruments, in short, which are πολύχορδα and παναρμονιον.’ The prohibition of certain musical instruments is an inference from the general principle that πολύχορδα and παναρμονιον are unnecessary, so that παναρμονιον cannot itself be a particular musical instrument. Probably, as Mr Archer-Hind has suggested to me, the παναρμονιον was ‘not a mode or modes, but a style of composition, in which the ‘Tondichter’ passed freely from δωραι to φρυγατι and ηδυστι and as many others as he chose. The name may even have been given to well-known compositions in this style—cf. νόμος πολύχορδος—the fantasia with many subjects. The effect, I should think, may have been analogous to a series of bold and sudden modulations in modern music.” See also on αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμονια in 399 D.

20 τριγώνων—πυκτίδων. These were foreign instruments of high pitch, and many strings. The τριγώνον in particular was associated with loose and voluptuous melodies. For an exhaustive account of both see Susemihl and Hicks’ Politics of Arist. vol. 1 pp. 632—636 or von Jan’s de fidibus Graecorum pp. 29 ff., 33 ff.

399 D 23 αὐλήτας. The αὐλὸς resembled the clarinet. It had a “mouthpiece (ζέγων) in which a vibrating reed (γλώττα) was fitted,” and was sometimes played in pairs. See Dict. Ant. s.v. ηδύα. Plato banishes the ‘flute’ and retains the Dorian mode, although Dorian melodies were often played on it, as Milton well knew: see the noble description of the “Dorian mood of flutes and soft recorders” in Par. Lost 1 550 ff. In Boeotia, where the αὐλὸς was highly esteemed, it was supposed rather to calm than to excite the feelings. See Rhys Roberts The Ancient Boeotians pp. 33—35.

ἡ οὐ τοῦτο πολύχορδοτατον; τοῦτο is that with which ἀλώσιον and αὐλήτα is concerned, viz. the ‘flute’: cf. ii 377 C. οὐτος instead of τοῦτο would have been a trifle harsh. πολύχορδοτατον has been repeatedly called in question, and there is the usual crop of emendations, intended to obliterate the metaphor. Schneider has however shewn that the ms reading is sound, by citing Pollux IV 67 Πλάτων δὲ καὶ πολύχορδον ἐφηκε τὸν αὐλὸν, and Simon. Fr. 16 ὁ καλλίτοτος πολύχορδος αὐλὸς, and comparing expressions like αὐλὸν κρέκινα, ἄρμοξεν, κροκόνα. Many other illustrations are given by Smyth, Greek Melic Poets p. 326. Here the metaphor is intended to arrest attention by its boldness and prepare us for the theory of the origin of παναρμονια in the next clause; but πολύχορδοτατον in itself, like τάμφωνος in Pindar (Pyth. 12. 19 al.), refers only to the number of different notes which the flute, thanks to various contrivances, such as plugs, wax, etc., was capable of producing.
See Abdy Williams in *Proceedings of the Musical Association* 1897–8 p. 135. Plato objects to the multiplicity of strings and notes as admitting and even inviting change and fusion of modes. We are told by Paus. ix 12. 5 (cited by Monro l.c. p. 38: cf. Ath. xiv 631 e) that it was one Pronomos of Thebes who πρῶτος ἐπενδύσας αὐλόν ἐς ἀπαν ἀρμονίας εἶδός ἔχοντας ἐπιτυχίας. Down to his day there were three forms of 'flutes,' intended for the Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian modes respectively. On the means by which this change was effected see *Dict. Ant. s.v. tibia*.

24 αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια: sc. ὀργανα, such as πυκτίδες and τρίγωνοι. Plato means those instruments on which panharmonic melodies could be played (cf. Proclus in *remp.* p. 63 ed. Kroll): but we must beware of translating (with D. and V.) 'the panharmonium itself,' for no single specific instrument is here intended, as some later lexicographers appear to have supposed. The gloss in Hesychius παναρμόνιον: εἶδός ὀργάνου, εἶς ἰδίου τεταγμένον is not quite clean, and may conceivably refer to a whole class of instruments, but Photius apparently thought that there was a special instrument called παναρμόνιον. His note (p. 388, 26 ed. Porson) is as follows: παναρμόνιον ὀργανον μονακτίκον: 'Ἀλέξις, έν οὖ το παναρμόνιον το καίνου ἐντευκόν τεχνών (Τέχνων Μεινεκο). Photius may of course be right in his interpretation of Alexis' line: but παναρμόνιον in Plato never, I believe, refers to one particular instrument: and even Alexis may mean no more than 'perform the new panharmonic melody,' ἐντευκόν being used as in το κάλλιστον ἐντευκάμα μέλος, Dionys. Hal. de admir. vi diciendi in Dem. c. 48.

25 λύρα—κιθάρα. The λύρα was the stringed instrument in common use; the κιθάρα was employed chiefly by professional musicians or κιθαρίσται. See Monro in *Dict. Ant. s.v. Lyra*, where illustrations of the two instruments are given, and von Jan de fid. Gr. pp. 5–26. By admitting the professional κιθάρα, Plato perhaps lends his sanction to musical festivals or contests in the approved modes.

καὶ κατὰ κτίλα. After χρῆσις supply ἐστίν. This is better than to eject κατὰ (with Ast and—according to Bekker—Vat. 9), Demetrius (περὶ ἐρυμ. § 185, cited by Schneider) finds in the words καὶ κατὰ ἄρτρος τοῦ ποιμένος (sic, not νομεῖν) σύμφωνα ἄν τις ἐγια ἄν εἰς ἀμμίαν ἔρχησεν, ἀμμίαν ἄν. The σύμφωνα was either μουσικός, resembling our flute, or τοῦ θυγαταγός (like Pan's pipe): see *Dict. Ant. s.v.* The indefinite τοῦ shows that Plato did not wish to specify which variety he intended. 399 E 27 οἴδην γε—δραγάνων. Plato puts himself in the position of the Muses, who preferred Apollo's performance on the κιθάρα to that of Marsyas on the flute (Apollod. 1. 4. 2). This is the force of οἴδην γε καίνου ποιαίων. The words τοῦ 'Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα must not be pressed; for although Apollo invented the cithara, the lyre was ascribed to Hermes (Paus. v 14. 8: cf. the Homeric *Hymin to Hermes*), and the syrinx to Pan. The discovery of the flute was also ascribed to Athena, especially by the Boeotians. A third account represents Marsyas as picking up the instrument after Athena had discovered and discarded it. This legend may be an attempt to reconcile the two conflicting stories, and probably dates from the decline of the flute as an instrument of education in Athens during the fourth century (Arist. *Pol. Θ 6. 1341d 32ff. Cf. Peller *Gr. Myth.* p. 223). In making Marsyas its discoverer, Plato declares the flute a
foreign instrument, and appropriately excludes it from his 'Greek city' (v 47o E).

This peculiarly Socratic oath occurs only once again in the Republic (IX 592 A). In both passages it marks the highest degree of emphasis. On the oath itself see my note on Ap. 21 e and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 85.

31 ἀρτι: II 372 E n.

399 E—401 A. Let us now continue the purgation of our city by laying down rules for rhythm and time. Our rhythm must not be varied or manifold; for time as well as tune should conform to words, and not conversely. It is agreed that there are certain rhythms expressive of sobriety and courage. These and these only will be admitted into our city. For particulars, we shall apply to Damon; but we can enunciate the general principle ourselves. Rhythm and Mode reflect style, and style expresses character. It is to promote the growth of character that we shall require the young to pursue the beautiful throughout the realms alike of Art and Nature.

The section on Rhythms is hardly less difficult than that on Modes. Westphal translates it with a short commentary in his Gr. Rhythmic pp. 237—239, but without shedding any light upon the darkest places. Schneider and Stallbaum give little help. I have found Gleditsch's summary account of die Metrik der Grie-
chen (in Iwan Müller's Handbuch) a most useful guide in dealing with the subject.

35 βάσεις. The word βάσις, in the technical writers on Rhythm generally means a dipody or combination of two feet under one main ictus: cf. Schol. in Heph. 1. 3. 1 p. 124 ed. Westphal βάσις δὲ εστί τὸ ἐκ δύο ποδῶν συνεπτικός, τῶν μὲν ἀρθεῖ, τῶν δὲ θεός παραλαμβανόμενον. Such a technical use of the word would be out of place here, especially in the mouth of Socrates; and the word is employed throughout as equivalent simply to 'step' or 'foot.' Even technical writers sometimes so use it: cf. the Scholiast already cited δelsinki δὲ (sc. the Iambic metre) ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ βάσει ἡμῶν· καὶ σπονδόνιον II 5. p. 151 and Gleditsch I.c. p. 702.

36 κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου recalls 399 c σωφρόνων ἀνδρέων, and would seem to point to the necessity of two kinds of rhythm, one to go with the Phrygian mode and express sobriety and self-control, the other to join the Dorian mode in expressing courage. On the ethical qualities of Greek rhythm in general, consult Westphal Gr. Rhythmic pp. 226—239 and Arist. Rhet. III 8, with Cope's notes.

400 A 2 μη λόγον—μέλει. See 398 D n.

5 τρὶς ἀττα ἑδη. Arist. Quint. I 34 ed. Meibom γένη τοιῶν ἐστὶν ῥυμικά τρία το ἅμων (τ), το ἡμιόλων (το), το διπλάσιον (το). To the first belong dactyls, spon-
dees, anapaests: the second includes paoes, cretes, and bacches: under the third fall trechees, iambics, iotics. See Gleditsch I.c. p. 694.

6 ὡσπέρ—ἀρμονίαι. What are the τέσσαρα εἰδή? The following answers (among others) have been given: 1° the eruls of the fourth, fifth, octave, and
double octave (Ast): 2° the four notes of the tetrachord, which was probably the historical and at all events the 'theoretical unit of the scale' (Stallbaum, Jowett and Campbell): 3° "the four ratios which give the primary musical intervals—viz. the ratios 2 : 1, 3 : 2, 4 : 3 and 9 : 8, which give the octave, fifth, fourth, and tone" (Monro l.c. p. 106 n.; cf. also Dict. Ant. II p. 193): 4° the four áρμωνια Φυρσωτί, Λυδιάτι, Δωριάτι, Λεκτριάτι (Westphal Rhythmik p. 238). Ast's view cannot be right, unless we suppose that áρμωνια here includes scales of double compass, which is most unlikely. Westphal's explanation is improbable, for Plato has said nothing of Λεκτριάτι, and (though perhaps no great stress should be laid on this) it is awkward to derive the áρμωνια (θὲν αἱ πασι áρμωνια) from themselves. If the principle of Westphal's interpretation is right, I should be inclined to substitute Ιαοτί for Λεκτριάτι, having regard to 398 ε, where see n. Cf. Cl. Rec. x p. 379. (I have since found that Prantl also took this view: see n. 116 in his translation.) I do not think that Stallbaum has hit the truth, for Plato's language is not suggestive of any allusion to the origin of the octave from the combination of two tetrachords, and a single tetrachord cannot produce a áρμωνια (θὲν αἱ πάσα áρμωνια). Possibly the τέταρα εἴδος εὐτοι φόβιγγος denote simply the keynote, its octave, and the intervals of a tone and a semitone: for these are as it were the threads out of which all modes are woven' (πλέκονται should be repeated with áρμωνια), the difference between the modes depending on the difference in position of the tones and semitones: Betuclid lays the greatest stress upon the ratios 3 : 2 and 4 : 3 as the component elements of the octave: see for example Sect. Can. 6 τὸ διδασκήνιον διάστημα ἐκ δύο τῶν μεγαλῶν ἐπιμερίων συνέστηκεν, ἐκ τε τοῦ ἡμιολαίου καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτρώνων and cf. ib. 8, 12, and for this reason I now believe that Monro's view has most in its favour.

7 ποία δὲ ὀπόλοι βιον II: om. A.

In general, πόδες ἀπὸ ἀρκτεριον is a well-established colloquialism: cf. Charm. 173 Α, Συμφ. 175 ε. ὀμαίες, ἀκρόκοια, and οὐ σαφῶς ὁμοιόμορφον are just the words one might employ in giving one's recollections of an abstruse and half-understood lecture, and this is just what Plato is either doing or, more probably, affecting to do. A few technical terms and a vague idea (οἷς ἄλα ὄντως) of some of the processes are all that he remembers.

ἐνόπλοιος ἡμιολαίον γε. ἐνόπλοιος ἐνθύπτως, διάκτυλος, ἤφρος are expressions from the lecture: in English they would be in inverted commas. The ἐνόπλοιος is not ἐνοπλίτων (Proclus in Parm. p. 61, if, as appears probable, by παραμήλις he means the παράλειμμα or pyrrich), nor the cretic (J. and C.), nor, strictly speaking, the anaepastic foot (Hartman), but οὐτος οὗτος, a common processional.
σμούντος καὶ ἵσον ἰνώ καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, εἰς βραχύ τέ καὶ μακρόν γιγνόμενον, καὶ, ὡς ἐγώ οἶμαι, ἵαμβον, καὶ τίν ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὑώμαζε, μήκε δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας 1 προσήπτε. καὶ τούτων τισὶν

14. των Α不清楚: fortasse τῶν Α不清楚: τι Π, q, qui sequentia ἄλλον—βραχύτητας omittunt.

(prosodiakon) or marching rhythm, consisting of an iambic οὖν μείζονος and a choriambus (Hephaestion c. 15), or (as the Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 651 measures it) a spondee, pyrrich, trochee and iambus. For examples we may cite Sappho’s αἰστα ὅπεν Ἰωλάπη (Fr. 82) and Tyrtaeus’ ἀγετ’ ὄ Σιμπτας ἐνοπλοῖ (Fr. 16).

See Gleditsch l.c. pp. 717, 722, and Bacchius Isag. 101 ed. von Jan, whose example is ὁ τῶν πίτων στέφανος. ζυγίτων probably refers to the composite character of the rhythm, as described, for example, by the Scholiast on the Clouds. The later technical expression for this peculiarity was ἐπισύνιτες (Gleditsch p. 746). δάκτυλον must be understood as a foot, not as a rhythm, although the ἐνόπλοιοι ζυγίτων certainly, and probably also the ἵμεροι, are rhythms. There is no difficulty about this, provided we remember that Plato is quoting (or pretending to quote) isolated technical expressions from Damon’s lecture. The ingenious, though hazardous, proposal of Blaydes, to read καὶ < κατὰ > δάκτυλον (cf. Clouds 651), would confine the instances to rhythms until we reach iambus. Dr Jackson suggests δακτυλικόν in place of δάκτυλον. It is tempting (with J. and C.) to take ἵμεροι as ‘spondee’, but there seems to be no authority for such a use of the word. The ἵμεροι ποῖς is apparently a dactyl; although the ἵμερος ρυθμός admits of the spondee. Unless, therefore, we take ἵμεροι as a rhythm, the spondee seems to be altogether excluded. It is unnecessary to do more than allude to Hartman’s exclusion of ἐνόπλοιοι καὶ δάκτυλον.

I3 ἦσον—τιθέντος. ἰνώ καὶ κάτω refer of course to the position of the arsis and thesis (cf. ὁ ἰνώ, ὁ κάτω χρόνος said of the notes at which the foot or báton is raised and brought down respectively), but Westphal’s remark that Plato uses ὁ ἰνώ and ὁ κάτω is misleading (Rhythmik p. 104). The words must be taken as adverbs, and can only be explained by supposing that when Damon was demonstrating the equality of arsis and thesis he ‘placed’—τιθέντος is not ‘assuming’ as διακοσμούντος shews—the former in a diagram above the latter, in some such way as —. The position of the iactus —ὁνω καὶ κάτω, not κάτω καὶ ὦνω—shews that Plato is speaking of the dactyl and spondee which replace the anaepast in the anaepastic rhythm: for in the dactylic rhythm proper the iactus falls on the first syllable (see Gleditsch p. 693).

Now the ἐνόπλοιος is also anaepastic, so that it looks as if Damon had taken as the subject of his demonstration some passage like Persae 9, 10 ἣν τὰ διδακτήρια ἐθνὸς ἀρσολογεῖταί, and analysed it into an ἐνόπλοιος ἐνόπλετος, a dactyl, and a spondee (included, as stated above, under the ἵμερος ρυθμός). εἰς βραχύ—γιγνόμενον. These words can only mean ‘passing into a short and a long’, “mit kurzem und langen Ausgang” (Schneider), “so dass er sowohl in eine kurze als auch in eine lange Silbe auslieft” (Prantl); see on II 380 D. The slight inaccuracy involved in saying γιγνόμενον, where τελευτάντα (cf. VI 511 C) would have been more precise, is perhaps in keeping with the airy nonchalance of Socrates’ description. The construction is missed by Westphal (Rhythmik p. 237) and the English translators and editors. γιγνόμενον agrees with ἵμερον: the ἵμερος ρυθμός γίγνεται εἰς βραχύ when it uses a dactyl, εἰς μακρόν when it uses a spondee (or anaepast), the two alternatives being denoted by τε καὶ. I have sometimes felt disposed to take the words as referring to the iambus, and place them just before ὁ ἰνώ said. Translating ‘and when it’ (the rhythm) ‘changed to a short and a long, I think he called it an iambus’: but although this interpretation gives a somewhat better sense to γιγνόμενον, I am not convinced that the MSS are wrong. Hartman also suggests the transposition of καὶ, but he might have spared his “minime audax conjectura” εἰ βραχέων τε καὶ μακρόν μακρόμενον. See also the next note.

15 μήκε—προσήπτε. Hartman takes these words as explaining the trochee only, laying emphasis on the precedence given to μήκε; but the use of the plural shews that the iambus is also included.
The meaning is simply 'and he assigned them longs and shorts,' i.e. to each one long, and one short. This clause is in favour of keeping εἰς βραχὺ—γεγραμμένον in its place; if we transpose (as suggested in the last note), the short and long of the iambus will be alluded to twice.

400c 16 άγωγή. άγωγή is temple (Gleditsch p. 688). The unit of measurement was the χρόνος πρώτος or — and hence the dactyl, for example, has usually a τετράπασμον άγωγή, the iambus a τρι- σμος, and so on. See Excerpta Neapol. in von Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. § 14. The duration of the χρόνος πρώτος was of course relative, and not absolute, so that the time occupied in singing or declaiming a foot often varied, and we are told that ἦσιν οὗται καὶ ἐν δισύμῳ (sc. άγωγή) γίνεται δακτυλικός ποίος (Exc. Neapol. I. c.). But it is clear that in general the άγωγή of the different kinds of feet was different from one another. Hartman ejects τοῦ ποίος, "cum apud Platonem ποῖος εἰς ρυθμόν non discrepant." The distinction between ποίος and ρυθμός is not always preserved by writers on metre (e.g. Bacchius Isag. 100 ff. ed. von Jan), but Plato seems to make the τοῖς differ from the ρυθμοῖς as the unit from the whole.

17 ήτοι. See on 1 344 E.

20 έυχημοσύνης: grace or beauty of form in the widest sense. The word is introduced in view of the application of these principles to objects appealing to the eye: see 401 A.

400d 24 άνάρμοστον. The article (which Baiter and Hartman require) is unnecessary. See on 1 334 E.

26 άκολουθεῖτον (i.e. δεί άκολουθεῖν) has ταύτα for its subject, as Stallbaum points out: cf. Laus 803 (δὲ ταύτα έκείνοι είστε διαβουλεύοντες) and infra ν 407 C.

27 τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥλει ἐπεταί. Le style c'est l'Homme. Conversely, thought is the dialogue of the soul with itself: see Theaet. 189 E (with Wohlrab's note) and Soph. 263 E. Cf. also IV 437 c. n. and Homer's διελέγατο θυμός.

400e 30 άσα γενόμενα is expunged by Herwerden; Baiter would omit ὦς. If ως belonged to ενεργεῖαν (as these critics apparently supposed), it would deserve expulsion; but it goes with ὃσαν understood. The antithesis is between ἄνων and ενεργεῖαν: and if the sentence is read so as to lay stress on these two words, it will be seen how easily ὃσαν can be repeated after ενεργεῖαν. The sense is: not the ενεργεία which is really ἄνω, but which we euphemistically designate as if it were ενεργεία (i.e., as before, in the good sense of the word), but ενεργεία in
its true and etymological sense (ὡς ἀληθὲς)—the εὖ τὸ ἡθὸς κατεσκευασμένων διάνοιαν. This explanation seems to me better than to regard ὡς εὐθείαν as attracted for ὡς εὐθεία (sc. ἑστιν), a construction for which we may compare Prot. 357 D: see my note ad loc. For ὡς ἀληθὲς cf. I 343 C n.

33 τὸ αὐτὸν πράττειν. The principle of ἀλήθεια, which is the corner-stone of Plato’s city, presents itself in the education of the young, as the pursuit of εὐθεία.

ἑστιν δὲ γέ του κτλ. This lofty conception of ἀρμονία and ὑμηθὼ— for αὐτῶν shews that these are included no less than ἀεικλημοσύνη—stretching throughout all the whole domain of art and nature, may have been suggested by Pythagorean teaching: but the view of education as the pursuit and assimilation of all this beauty is due to Plato himself. Cf. 403 C n.

401 A 2 ποικὶλα. Η 378 c n.

401 A—403 C To these canons not only poets but all other artists must conform. We shall admit no artists save only those who are able to track out the nature of the beautiful, and beguile our children even in their earliest years into unconscious harmony with the beauty of reason. The value of a musical training lies in its peculiar power of imparting grace and beauty to the soul. It enables the learner to discriminate between the fair and the foul in other spheres, admitting only that which is beautiful and fair, at first instinctively, but afterwards, when reason comes, with fullest consciousness, and joyful recognition of the beauty to which he is himself akin. No one is truly imbued with musical culture until he can recognise the originals of virtue wherever they are found, as well as their copies everywhere. Such an one will love supremely the union of a beautiful soul with physical beauty, but will let inner beauty alone in part for outward defect, and his passion will be pure from sensual taint. Our account of Music is now ended; for the end of Music is the love of Beauty.

401 Β 10 τὴν τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ κτλ. This famous section describes in glowing language, like that of the Symposium, Plato’s ideal of art. He does not desire to banish art, as is sometimes asserted, but rather idealises it by effecting—as he believed—its reconciliation with beauty and truth. Art aspired to be καθὼς in his day: Plato wished it to be so in the fullest sense of the word: and his idea of beauty is sufficiently comprehensive to include moral and spiritual beauty as well as physical. Plato was doubtless unfair in the application of his principle to some of the Greek artists and poets, but in itself his ideal—the love of spiritual beauty—is one to which the best and most enduring art—which alone can find a place in an ideal city—consciously or unconsciously ever seeks to conform. See Nettleship Lect., and Rem. II pp. 112—116.

τοῦ ποιήματος κτλ. Cf. Laws 656 D, E. Nettleship (Heli. pp. 117 f.) remarks on the fact that “Plato in his criticism of
Greek art has almost ignored the painters and sculptors, and confined his assaults to the musicians and still more to the poets. This is true, although the present passage shows that his canons were intended to regulate painting, sculpture, architecture, and the minor arts as well as music and poetry. Among other reasons, Nettle-
ship plausibly suggests that Plato "did not see in the sculptors and architects of his time the signs of degeneracy which drew his attention to the poets and musicians." Cf. 401 C.

401 C 21 ὅπωθεν ἐν κτλ. No Greek could read these words without thinking of Olympia; no Athenian without recalling the glories of the Acropolis. It was probably in the spirit of this ideal that Epaminondas—himself a man of Platonic sympathies, if not a Platonist—hinted to his countrymen that their city could not be truly great until the Propylaea crowned their citadel (Aesch. περὶ παραπεριβείαις 105. See also Netteship Hett. pp. 115—123). Partly on grounds of style, and partly for grammatical reasons, I believe that Plato wrote τῆς and not τῷ (see cr. n.). 'Whenever anything strikes on their eyes or ears from fair works of art' sounds material and gross in a passage so full of poetic feeling; and in the second place ἄγουσα agrees with ἀμφος, whereas it should be ἄγων and agree with τῆς if τῆς is right. Translate 'Whensoever from beautiful works of art there smites upon their eyes or ears as it were a salubrious breath from healthful regions.' In the same way a sort of ἐμοῖος flows into the soul from beauty, awakening love and admiration (Phaedr. 251 c). The melodious current of Plato's rhythmic utterance flows onward like the steady though gentle breeze which it describes. With ἀμφος—ὑγεῖα cf. Arist. Probl. 152. 865 b 19 πόσε ὑγεία καὶ τόπος ἐπισύν (διὸ καὶ ἡ ἑλάσσα ὑγεία). For the syntax of τῆς—ὁπωτέρον ἄμφος cf. τᾶς τῶν γενεσέως ἐνυγγενεῖς ὡσπερ μαλακόβιδας VII 519 B, where a similar corruption occurs in some of the MSS: see n. ad loc. Paris A has τῆς for τῆς again in 11 360 E.

401 D 27 ἐν μονοική τροφή. The insertion of ἦ before ἐν (suggested by Rückert) is needless: cf. 404 B.
autēs, phærōta tēn eúsχημοσύνηn, kai poiei eúsχημoνa, eán tis
E ōrbdos τραφη, eī dé μή, τοῦναττίον; kai ótī aútōn παραλειπο-
ménovn kai μη kalodós δημιουργθέντων ἢ μη kalodós φύσων ὁξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεῖς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραινών
tα μὲν καλά ἐπαινοὶ καὶ χαῖρων καὶ καταδεχόμενοι εἰς τὴν ψυχήν
402 τρέφοντ' ἂν ἀπ' αὕτων καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τὸ κάγαθος, | τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοὶ ἐτι νέος ὦν, πρὶν λόγον
δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐκθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσάπαντ' ἂν αὐτῶν
γνωρίζων δὲ ὀικεῖότητα, μάλιστα ὁ ὀφθων τραφεῖς; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν
dοκεῖ, ἐφι, τῶν ποιουτῶν ἐνεκα ἐν μονικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή. "Ὤσπερ
ἀρα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἰκανός εἰχομεν, οὔτε τὰ
στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὁλίγα ὑπάρχουν ἐν ἀπαισίσ οἰσ ἔστιν
περιφερέμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἥτιμάζομεν

B αὐτῇ, ὡς οὐ̈ δεό ϑανέσθαι, ἀλλα πανταχοῦ προθυμούμεθα
dιαγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικόι πρὶν οὕτως
ἐχομεν—Ἀληθῆ. Ὑνκον καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εϊ που η ἐν

30. αὐτῶν II: αὐτῶν Λ. 4. ἐμοὶ γοῦν ΛΠ: ἐμοῦ' γοῦν A. 11. εἰκόνας
ΞΩ: εϊ εἰκόνας ΑΠ.

29 φήσοντα: not 'imparting' (Jowett), but 'bearing,' 'carrying,' like φέρωσα in
the simile: cf. Symp. 188 A ἤκει φήσοντα εὐεργείαν.
401 E 31 καὶ μὴ καλῶς. Herwer-
den's conjecture ἢ for καὶ misses the pre-
cise force of παραλειπόμενων 'falling
short': cf. Critias 107 D ὄψεως αἰσθαν-
μένου τὸ παραλειπόμενον. The word is
explained in καὶ μὴ—φύσων, where the
contrast is between imperfections of art
and imperfections of nature.
32 ἐκεῖ: i.e. ἐν μονικῇ.
ὁρθῶς δὴ κτλ. I formerly (with Baiter
and others) adopted Vermehren's proposal
(Pl. Stud. p. 94) to read ὀρθῶς δὴ <χαῖ-
ρων καὶ> δυσχεραινῶν τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοὶ
cαι [χαῖρων καὶ] καταδεχόμενος κτλ. The
correction is certainly an attractive one,
in view especially of Laws 653 b, c;
where education is defined as μακεν μὲν ἄ
χρη μακεν—στρέφει δὲ ἄ χρη στρέφει,
and 654 D τὰ μὲν ἀσάπαρμος δεκαλά, τὰ δὲ
δυσχεραινῶν ὀπόκα μὴ καλά, and
Arist. Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104b 11 ff. But the
MS reading, though less pointed and
pregnant, is in itself satisfactory enough,
if δυσχεραινῶν be understood with refer-
ence to what precedes (τῶν παραλειπο-
μένων), and we are therefore hardly justi-
fied in altering the text. (The omission
of χαῖρων καὶ in q should not be used as
evidence of dislocation.) Hartman (after
Stallbaum) excises καὶ between χαῖρων
and καταδεχόμενος, but this too is un-
necessary. We may translate (with
Jowett) 'and rejoicing in them' (as op-
posed to δυσχεραινων just before) 'and
receiving them into his soul.' The pre-
position κατα- in καταδεχόμενος suggests
that beauty is an exile coming home
again: the return of exiled truth and
beauty is indeed with Plato the aim of
education and of life. Cf. Phaedr. 250 a
—251 a.
34 τρέφοντα. For the metaphor cf.
Phaedr. 248 b ff.
402 A 6 γραμμάτων. See on II
368 D. The reference in εἴχομεν, how-
ever, is not to that passage, but to the
actual experience of the speakers.
7 εν ἄπασιν οἷς ἐστιν: i.e. εν ἄπασιν
ἐν οἷς ἔστι, by a common idiom: see on
II 373 E and cf. VII 520 D, IX 590 C.
402 B 9 ὡς ὦν δεόν depends on the
idea of thinking involved in ἄτιμᾶζον.
Richards suggested δέον, "sine causa," as
Hartman observes.
11 εἰκόνας γραμμάτων. The refer-
ence to letters throughout this part of the
Republic is only by way of illustration, and we must beware of reading more into Plato's words than they are capable of meaning in the context where they occur. No doubt it is true, as Dr. Jackson remarks, that "this passage makes us acquainted with the relation of copy and model which is to become important later," but Bosanquet goes too far when he asserts that "the expression 'images of letters' points forward to the classification of grades of knowledge, at the end of Book VI, the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book VII, and the argument of Book X."  

13 αὐτά is emphatic: 'the letters themselves' as opposed to their εἰκόνες. There is of course no allusion to 'Ideas' of letters.

402 c 16 τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη kτλ. Are the εἶδη Plato's Ideas? So Zeller (11 p. 560 n.), and many other critics, understand the word; nor can it be denied that the language of Plato, if interpreted in the light of Book VII, can bear this meaning. Nevertheless we are bound in the first instance to interpret this passage by itself, and not by Book VII, the more so as the doctrine of transcendent or separate (χωρισταί) Ideas appears nowhere else in 1—I, and seems to be expressly reserved by Plato for his philosophical, as distinct from his musical education (see IV 435 D and VI 504 B n.). What is meant by the words εἰκόνες αὐτῶν? The context shews conclusively that εἰκόνες refers to copies (sc. of the virtues σωφροσύνη etc.) represented in poetry and the fine arts (so also Krohn Pl. Frase p. 47). On any other interpretation the introduction of these εἰκόνες is irrelevant in a discussion on the rules which imitative art must obey. This being so, if εἶδη means the Ideas, Poetry will be a direct imitation of the Ideas, which is inconsistent with x 395 c —598 D. Or does Plato mean to suggest that Poetry and Art in his ideal city are really to imitate the Ideas directly? This is a bold and attractive solution, and there are several hints elsewhere to the same or nearly the same effect, but Plato expressly speaks of the εἶδη here only as immanent, and not transcendent (ἐνωτα ἐν ἄλλη ἐνωσιων), and we must therefore suppose that the artist copies from the life (cf. εἰς τῇ ψυχῇ καλά ἐνώθη δ'). The word εἶδη is repeatedly used by Plato without reference to transcendent Ideas, as has been amply proved by Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 65, 66), Pfeiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 17), and Campbell (11 pp. 296 ff.). Here it does not mean 'varieties' (as if there were more than one variety of σωφροσύνη), but simply 'forms' or 'kinds,' in the sense in which the immanent reality which every general notion attempts to express is a 'form' or 'kind' —a genus or species—of the totality of things. Cf. IV 435 B n. The genitives are genitives of definition. The use of εἶδη in the sense of "immanente Seinsformen" (Krohn) is interesting as a harbinger of the Ideal theory of VI and VII—a sort of half-way house between the Socratic λόγοι and Plato's ideas. It recurs in IV 434 D, 435 B, 437 D. See further Krohn Pl. Frase pp. 54—58, and cf. VI 504 D n. But although the separatists have (as I think) made out their claim that transcendent Ideas do not appear in Books 1—I, I agree with Hirmer (Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 645) in thinking their deductions from this fact unwarrantable.

17 μεγαλοπρεπείας μεγαλοπρεπεία in Plato is 'highmindedness,' not, as in Aristotle, 'magnificence': cf. VI 486 A B. In like manner Plato's ἀλεξιβολείται denotes the virtue proper to an ἀλέξιον, and is not restricted to liberality in spending money. Contrast Arist. Eth. Nic. IV cc. 2—6.
ονία χαί εικόνας αυτῶν, καὶ μήτε εν σμικρῷς μήτε εν μεγαλοῖς ἀτυμιάξομεν, 20 ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἶωμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη,

403 ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δὲ εὖ, ὅτου ἄν ξυμπίπτῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἡθῆ εὐνοῦντα καὶ εἰς τῷ εἰδεὶ ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκεῖνοι καὶ ξυμπιπτοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχουντα τύπον, τοῦτο ἄν εἴη καλλίστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεάθαι;</p>

Πολὺ γε. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε καλλίστον ἑρασμῷ ἐταιρεῖν. Πῶς δὲ οὖ; Τῶν δή ὃ τι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπου ὃς μενοικός ἐρώτησεν ἁπέρ. τῶν ἕκατον ἐρώτης. Οὐκ ἄν, εἰ γε τί, ἐφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποτοι, οἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. Ε ὑπομενεῖν ἂν, ὡστε ἐθέλειν ἀσπάξεθαι. Μαθήματι, ἦν δὲ εὖ· ὅτι ἦστι σοι ἡ σέγονεν παιδικά τοιαύτα· καὶ συγχωροῦ. ἀλλὰ τόδε μου εἰπέ· σοφοφυσία καὶ ἡδονή ὑπερβαλλοῦση ἐστὶ τις κοινωνία; Καὶ πῶς, ἐφη, ἦ γε ἐκήρυνε πούς οὐκ ἦτων ἡ λύπη; 403 Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀλλη ἀρετῇ; Ἕ σοιδάμως. Τί δέ; ὡβρεί τε καὶ ἀκολούθια; Πάντων μάλιστα. Μείζον δὲ τίνα καὶ δικύτεραν ἐχεῖς εἰπεῖς ἥδυνη τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια; Οὐκ ἐξω, ἦ δὲ ὁς, οὔδε γέ μανικωτέραν. 'Ο δὲ ὅρθος ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνοι τε καὶ μουσικός ἐραν; Καὶ μίλα, ἦ δὲ ὁς. Οὐδέν ἁρὰ προσοιστέων ἀν πανικὸν οὔδε ἤγγελες ἀκολούθια τῷ ὁρθῷ ἔρωτι; Οὐ προσοιστέον. Β Οὐ προσοιστέων ἁρὰ ἄυτη ἡ ἠδονη, οὔδε κοινωνητέων ἀυτής ἐραστῆ τε καὶ παιδικῶς ὁρθοὶ ἐρώτησι τε καὶ ἐρωμένους; Οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δί', ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον. Οὕτω δή, ός ἐκίκοι, νομοθετήσεις εἰς τῇ ὁικζομένῃ πόλει, φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ἔπειναι καὶ

19, 20. γρωφίζομεν—αἰσθανόμεθα—ἀτυμιάξομεν ΑΠ: γρωφίζομεν—αἰσθανόμεθα—

ἀτυμιάξομεν Α. 21. οἰωμέθα Π: οἴωμεθα Α. 26. δή δ τι Π: δίδτι Α. 10. νομοθετήσεις Π: ὁ νομοθέτης (sic) εἰς Α, sed ὁ addidit Α.

403 Β 26 τῶν δῆ—ἀσπάζεσθαι. Cf. 

Συμπ. 290 B. and 210 B, C. The whole of Diotima's wonderful speech (210 D—

212 A) should be compared with the closing sections of this chapter. In point of 

language the words καλλίστον θέαμα—

ἐρασμώσιται closely resemble Τίμ. 87 D.

27 ἀξιόμφωνοι: i.e. (as Glauco's answer 

shews) strictly speaking one whose soul 

and body do not harmonise in point of 

beauty, but the word also suggests "the 

man who has no music in his soul." Cf. 

Συμπ. 206 C τὰ δὲ (κύριας καὶ γέννησις) 

ἐν τῷ ἀναμιστῶν δίδωσιν γενέσθαι. With 

the sentiment in general cf. 

Τίμ. 87 D ff. 402 Ε 29 μαθήματι—ὅτι: 'I under-

stand: (you say so) because' etc.: see 

I 332 A n.

403 Α 7 οὐ προσοιστέων ἁρα. This 

somewhat extreme example of a common 

liberty in concord serves to increase 

the rhetorical emphasis by the energetic 

repetition of Glauco's ἐπίσσιμα ψεύδα. 

The emphasis becomes still greater in 

Glauco's reply οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δία, προ-

σοιστέον. The particle μέντοι is espe-

cially used in replies when the words of 

a previous speaker are repeated (Hoefert 

de part. Plut. p. 32). q and Flor. U have 

προσοιστέα. 403 Β 10 φίλειν is 'kiss' (as Schnei-

der rightly translates the word): cf.
170

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

The text is a natural reading of a page from Plato's work, discussing the nature of love and beauty, and the role of physical training in personal development. It addresses questions about the relationship between the passions and the soul, and the importance of virtues in achieving moral and intellectual excellence. The excerpt includes a section from Plato's Symposium, where Socrates debates the nature of love, and another from his Phaedo, discussing the nature of beauty and the soul.
By J. and C. from Democrit. Fr. Mor. 128 (Mühlach) άνθρώπους ἁμέλειας ψυχῆς μάλλον ὧν σώματος πολύτιμοι λόγοι ουκ ἢ γάρ τελευτάτη σκέφτεσαι μοχθήρην ὅρθον, σκέφτεσαι δὲ λαχὺς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχῆς οὐδὲν τι άμείοντο ποιεῖ." 

123—126. Plato deals here chiefly with the hygienic aspect of gymnastic—a subject which was much discussed in his day: see Dict. Ant. 1 p. 929, where we are reminded that gymnasia were dedicated to Apollo, father of Asclepius, and himself a god of health. In his interesting treatise Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippokratischen Schriften (Landshut 1882) Poschenrieder has shewn that Plato was strongly influenced throughout this passage by the views of Hippocrates and his school. See also Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. 1 pp. 94 ff. The athletics of Gymnastic were treated of in Laws 795 D ff., 833 ff.

403 D 22 ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς—βλαστονοι. No very recondite theory of the relation of body and soul is here involved. Plato simply means that the soul has more power over the body than the body over the soul. (The restriction in ὃς οἷον ς should be noted.) On this principle some doctors held that to cure the body one should minister to the mind diseased: see the curious passage in Charm. 156 B—157 C. The general sentiment is well illustrated by cf. 425 C n. With Plato's strutures on Greek athletics cf. Arist. Pol. Θ. 4. 1338 b 10 (with Susemihl and Hicks note) and especially Eur. Fr. 284: for his attack on the diet and training of athletes cf. Dict. Ant. 1 pp. 98, 928 and the authorities there cited.

404 A 3 ιᾶν σμικρά ἐκθείοις κτλ. Poschenrieder (I.c.) cites the Hippocratica Practiciones 11 c. 1 Littre θείς ἄθλητας γιγνόμενοι—ἡ τοῦ στίγμαν ἀπελιπώσαι, ἡ ἐπισκέψεις τι φάγωσαι γενὸς ὑπὸ πλεονα ὀρθοστασίας τοῦ παντοῦ οὐδὲν λατάθεις, οὐδ' εἰ σμικρόν τι εἰς ἀπειθήσας ὑπέρωσι.
6  ὅσπερ κύνας ἀγρύπνους τε ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δ' τι μᾶλλον ὃς ὀρᾶν καὶ ἀκοῦειν καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ἐν ταῖς στρατεύεισι μεταβάλλουσιν ὑδάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων καὶ εἰλήφειν Β' καὶ χειμώνων μὴ ἀκροφαλάξει εἶναι πρὸς ύγίειαν. Φαίνεται μια.

10 Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βελτίστη ὑγμαστικὴ ἀδελφή τις ἂν εἰς τής μουσικής, ἥν ὄλιγον πρότερον διήμεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Ἀπλὴ ποι καὶ ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστικὴ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμοι. Η'/ δή; Καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρου, ἥν δ' ἔγο, τὰ γε τοιαῦτα μάθοι ἂν τις. οἶσα γὰρ ὅτι ἐπὶ στρατεύεις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἱρών ἔστισενοι ὀυτέ 15 ἱχθύσων αὐτούς ἐστία, καὶ τάυτα ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντων συνταξιδομάζει· πανταχοῦ γὰρ, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, αὐτῷ τῷ πυρὶ χρήσατο εὐπροσέτερον, ἡ ἀγγεία ἐξυπερφέρειν. Καὶ μᾶλα.

21 καὶ ὁρθῶς γε—ἀπέχονται. ὁρθῶς must be taken with both verbs: 'Yes, and they do well in knowing it and in abstaining.'

204 δ. 22 Συρακοσιαν—δῆσῳ. For de ('autem') Stallbaum unnecessarily reads δῆ. The Συρακοσία γρατέσα was proverbial: see Blyades on Ar. Fr. 206 and the curious account of Syracusan gluttony in Pl. Epfr. vii 326 b ff. There is no sufficient basis for Cobet's idea that Plato is here borrowing from some comic poet. Later scandal insinuated that it was the delights of Syracusan living that drew Plato thence to Sicily (Hermann Gesch. u. System p. 116 n. 133, where the authorities are cited).

24 Κορυβιάν κόρην. Cf. II 373 A n. Κορυβία κόρη is a grissette: see the commentators on Ar. Plot. 149, and on the general subject Blümner Privatale. pp. 254—256. φίλης is more refined for 'mistress' (ἐταίρα). The word κόρην has been doubted: "innocentem puellam cicer ex Platonis republica voluerunt triumviri praestantissimi Buttmannus, Morgensternius, et nuperrime Astius." So says Stallbaum, her successful champion.

26 Ἀττικῶν πειμάτων. The fame of Athenian pastry was as great as its variety: see Athen. xiv cc. 51—58 and other references in Blümner l. c. p. 230.

28 παναρμονίας. See on 399 c.

405 Α λατρεία were both dispensers and consulting-rooms etc. See Laws 646 c and other references in Blümner l. c. p. 359. In some lατρεία patients were also housed and treated by doctors (Häser Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. i pp. 86 ff.), so that in certain cases they resembled a sort of private hospital. For the remedial conception of punishment prevailing in the whole of this section see II 380 B n.

diakuky. Cobet calls for δικαστική, and at first sight δικαστόν just below seems to favour his view. But Plato deliberately selects the less reputable word, meaning by it the arts by which men try to lead the true δικαστής (cf. Ar. 40 λ) astray: see infra B, c. In his own city there is no δικακύ, but only δικαστική (409 E, 410 A). It appears from Laws iv 720 c ff. that a doctor's assistants were usually slaves, and that slaves for the most part treated slaves, and freemen freemen, but the rule was not universal (see Blümner l. c. p. 359 n. 1). Plato holds that the increase of citizen doctors points to the spread of self-indulgence among the free-born population.
punishment of wrong-doing by the aid of legal subterfuges. We should also be ashamed to enlarge the terminology of medicine by our self-indulgence. It was otherwise with medical science in the time of Homer, although Herodicus has now invented a new sort of treatment, whose only result is to prolong the process of dying. Asclepius knew better; for he saw that work was more than life. We recognise this fact in the case of artisans and mechanics; but Asclepius knew that rich men also have a work to do, and in the interests both of his patients and their country, declined to treat incurable diseases. Legends to the contrary effect are false. Yet we cannot dispense with doctors and judges: only they must be good doctors and good judges. The most skilled physicians are those who, besides having learnt their art, have had the largest experience of disease in their own persons; but no one can be a good judge whose soul is not stained. Our judges must be old, and gain their knowledge of crime by science, not by personal experience. The vicious judge cannot recognise innocence when he sees it. Vice will never know Virtue, but Virtue may be taught to know Vice as well as herself. Our doctors will permit the physically incurable to die; the morally incurable our judges will put to death.

405 B 11 καὶ ἀτομία οίκειων has suffered severely at the hands of critics, who have bracketed καὶ (Ast and others), or read καὶ ἀτομία οίκειων (Hermann), or δικαίων ἀτομία οίκειων (Madvig), or finally denounced the words as a 'futile interpretamentum.' Schneider explains καί as 'idque.' ('und zwar' in his translation), and so also Prantl, and Shilleto (on Dem. F. L. § 101). This interpretation appears to me forced and unnatural. It is simplest to make ἀτομία as well as τῷ δικαίῳ depend on χρῆσθαι, and regard χρῆσθαι ἀτομία as equivalent to εἰναὶ ἄτομοι, just as χρῆσθαι ἀμαθία (for example) means no more than εἰναὶ ἀμαθεῖς. The plural οίκειων does not refer to δισπότων, but is the generic of οίκεια, which means ‘resources of one’s own,’ ‘personal resources’ (εἴπατκῶ παρ’ ἄλλων. Cf. the use of τὰ οίκεια in the literal sense for res familiaris I 343 E al.

ἡ δοκεῖ κτλ. Glauco has said that χρῆσθαι ἐπακτῷ τῷ δικαίῳ is the most disgraceful thing of all. Socrates asks him whether it (τοὔνομα) is more disgraceful than the other case (τοὔνομα) which he is about to mention; and Glauco’s reply is ‘no: this other case is even more disgraceful than the first’ (infra c.). The meaning was missed by the critic who (see Reit. de Philol. XV p. 83) ingeniously suggested the insertion of τίς; after δικαστῷ just before Glauco’s reply. In what follows the litigiousness of the Athenian nature is satirised.
μενος, οστε μη παρασχειν δίκην, και ταυτα σμικρων τα και ουδενος αξιων ένεκα, άγριων. διο καλλιον και άμεινον το παρασκευαιες των βλο καιτω μεδε δεισθαι νυπταξουντος δικαστου; Ουκ, άλλα τουτο, ἤφη, ἢκεινουν ἢτι αίτηχιν. Το δε ιατρικής, ήν δ' έγω, δεισθαι, τοι τι μη τραυματιν ένεκα ἢ τινων επήτειων νοσηματων επιπεσοντων, Δ' άλλα δ' ἀργην τα και διαται οιαν δυναθομεν ρεωματων τα και πνευματων οσπερ λιμνας εμπτυπλαμενους φυσας τα και καταρρους νοσηματων ονοματα τιθεσθαι αναγκαιειν τους κομψους Άσκληπιαδας, ουκ αισχρων δοκει; Και μαλ', ἤφη, ως αληθος καινα ταυτα 25 και ἀτοπα νοσηματων ονοματα. Οια, ην δ' έγω, ως οιμαι, ουκ ήν επ 'Ασκληπιοι τεκμαϊρομαι δε, ὅτι αυτου οι υεσ εν Τροια.

for ἀκολουθησαι στρεφόμενοι. Λογιζόμενοι is rightly explained by the Scholiast as στρεφόμενοι, καπτόμενοι, άπο των λογών. Λογος δε ετι φυτων μικρατες. The cor-
nuption λογιζόμενοι (found in all mss except A and—according to Rostagno
—M) was easy and almost inevitable.

17 παρασχειν δικην. The same phrase
appears in Eur. Hipp. 49, 50, and Her-
werden should not have proposed στρο-
χειν. Plato's view in the Gorgias is that
the guilty should denounce themselves
to the judge and be cured by suffering
punishment: see ιη 380 n.

405 D 23 φύσας τε και κατάρρους. The
order is chaotic, φύσας referring to
πνευμάτων, and κατάρρους to ρεωμάτων.
Plato clearly indicates that the medical
use of these words was only beginning
in his day, and it is the application of
these words to diseases which he derides,
not the words themselves when used of
bellows, blasts, and torrents (see the
Lexicon). The experiment in language is
better preserved by rendering ' blasts and
torrents' than 'flatulence and catarrh.'
For φύσα cf. (with Poschenrieder l.c.
p. 47) [Hippocr.] de flatibus vi p. 94 c. 3
Littre πνεύματα δε τα μεν εν τοις σώματι
φύσας καλεσται, τα δε εξω των σώματων
άηρ, και ib. c. 7 δεν ουν το σώμα ειτων
tplesη, και πνεύματος πληρωθη, επι
πλοο γίγνεται των στιων χρωμίζουν
χρωνίζεται δε τα στιω δια το πλήθος ου
dynaima diathetων εμφραχθεις δε της
κατω κολητι, εις δολον το σώμα διδραμαν
αι φύσας. Other examples of the use of
the term in the Hippocratic corpus
are cited by Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.
With κατάρρους cf. Crat. 440 C ἀτεχνως
ωσπερ οι κατάρρες νοσούτες ἀνθρώποι.

The word is found in the Hippocratic
writings, and denotes "deflexionem aut
omnem humoris ex capite ad os et asperam
arteriam, atque per eam ad pulmonem,
delationem ac descensum." (Stephanus-
Hase s.v., where examples are quoted).

24 των κομψους Άσκληπιάδας. The
epithets κομψοι and χαριτες were often
applied to the more advanced and sci-
centific sort of physicians (Blümner Privatalt.
p. 358 n. 2). The Άσκληπιάδα was a
well-recognised sect or college of physi-
cians, with schools in Cyrene, Rhodes,
Cos and Cnidos. See Günther in Iwan
Müller's Handbuch v i p. 103, and Hug
on Symp. 186 n.

25 και μαλ'-ονοματα: 'Yes, indeed,
these are truly' etc. Glauco does not
reply to ουκ αληθον δοκει, but simply
corroborates what Socrates has said about
the new medical terminology. This is
simpler than to place (with Schneider)
a colon after ἤφη, and take και μαλα with
αληθων. The asyndeton on Schneider's
view is too harsh, and would almost
require the insertion of και before ων,
or (if ου αληθως were taken as ουν αληθως
αληθων) before καιρα; neither of which
alternatives is satisfying. For similar
ineffectness in replies see ιη 465 n.

406 D E 27 οι δεις—επτημήσατι. In
themselves these words can only mean
that Machaon and Podalirius (the two
chief army doctors to the Greek host,
II. XI 833) found no fault with the damsel
who gave the wounded Eurypylus an
inflammatory potion, or with Patroclus,
who was curing him, for directing or per-
mitting her to do so. In our Homer,
however, the potion is given, not to Eu-
rypilus but to the wounded Machaon, by
Hecamede, Nestor's slave (II. xI 612); and this is correctly related in Ion 538 b. The inconsistency led Ast to suspect the genuineness both of Εύρυντώς—see however 408 a—and of οὐδε Πατρόκλω τῷ ἰομένῳ: but there can be little doubt that the text is sound. We must suppose either that Plato is confused, or else that in his text of Homer such a potion was administered, not only to the wounded Maechoan (as in the Ion l.c.), but also to the wounded Eurypylus, with Patroclus' sanction. The first alternative is possible, and approved by Howes (Harvard Studies etc. vi p. 198): but as it is clear from the Ion—if the Ion is genuine—that Plato was familiar with the story of Maechoan's treatment, I think it more likely that Plato's Homer related a similar incident in connexion with the treatment of Eurypylus also. For the healing of Eurypylus see II. xI 844 ff., xv 394.

405 E 28 οἶνον Πράμνευον. Athenaeus, alluding to this passage, informs us that Franneían wine was παχιές καὶ πολυτρόφος (10 b).

406 Α' ή λεγεῖν οὐκ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δηλοῖ μὲν ἀλλάζειν, ὡς δεικτέοι πανίμην. 

4 τῇ παλαιωγώγῃ—ιατρικῇ. Cf. Tlm. 89 c παλαιωγώγειν δει διαίτας πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα—ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φαρμακεύοντα κακῶν δύσκολον ἔρεθιτον.

5 Ἡρόδικος. Herodicus, a native of Megara, and afterwards a citizen of Selymbria, is mentioned by Plato again in Prot. 316 b and Phaedr. 227 d. He was one of the earliest to study scientifically the therapeutics of exercise and diet, and particularly recommended long walks, according to Plato (Phaedr. l.c. τῶν περιπατῶν Μεγαρῶν. Cf. Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. i p. 94). The description of his health given here is confirmed by Aristotle Ῥητ. 1 i 1361 b 4—6 πολλαὶ—ὑγιαίνουσαν ωσπέρ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὐδὲ υγιαίνουσας τῆς ὑγείας διὰ τῶν πάντων ἀπέχεσαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ τῶν πλείστων (a passage curiously misunderstood by J. and C., who seem to take λέγεται for λέγει). Plato himself thoroughly appreciates the connection between γυμναστική and ιατρική; see for example Gorg. 453 a ff., 404 b ff., Soph. 218 e, Pol. 295 c.

6 νοσοῦδος γενόμενος. εἰς φθινόν ἀνήκεστον πάθος ἐμπεδὼν, says Plutarch (de his mediis etc. 554 c).

D XV. Téktow mén, ἦν δ' ἔγω, κάμνων ἄξιοι παρὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ φάρμακον πιὸν ἐξέμεισα τὸ νόσημα, ἢ κατό καθαρθεὶς ἢ καύσει ἢ τομῆ χρησάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι· εὰν δὲ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν διάταν προστάτη, πιλίδια τε περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περιτειθεῖ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐπόμενα, ταχὺ ἐίπέν, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ κάμμενε, οὐδὲ λυστελεῖ οὕτω 25 ζῆν, νοσηματὶ τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα, δὲ δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἐμελοῦντα. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χαίρεν εἰπὼν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἱατρῷ, ἕις τὴν εἰσδοθανὰ διάταν ἐμβάς, ὑγίης γενόμενος ζῆ τὰ ἑαυτῷ πράττων· εὰν δὲ μὴ ἱκανὸν ἢ τὸ σῶμα ὑπενεγκείν, τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγῃ. Καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ μέν γ', ἐφῄ, δοκεῖ πρέπει ποίω 30

23. μακρὰν Σ: μικρὰν ΑΠ: σμικρὰν γ.

**13** καλὸν. Because he was the first to profit by his own invention. The assonance γῆς—γέρας is quite in Plato's manner: cf. IV 439 C, VI 487 C, VIII 557 c mm.

406 C 18 οὐδένι σχολὴ κτλ. Steinhart (Plato's Werke v. p. 172) thinks it strange that so idealistic a thinker as Plato should not recognise the power of spiritual strength to rise superior to bodily weakness. This truth was not ignored by Plato (see infra 408 E and VI 496 B), although here, perhaps, he forgets that conspicuous examples of fortitude and resignation have a political as well as a private value: "they also serve who only stand and wait."

406 D 22 καύσει ἢ τομῆ. The two methods of ancient surgery: see Blümner Privatatt. p. 353 n.

23 μακρὰν has less authority than μικρὰν (see cr. n.), but is probably right. The contrast with the immediate remedies just described seems to require an allusion to the duration of the regimen: cf. also μακρὰν—τῶν δάνατον in B above. μακρὰν is not sufficiently defined by a reference to κατὰ σμικρὸν in 407 D, nor by the allusion to πιλίδια καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐπόμενα. Moreover σμικρὸς, and not μικρὸς, is the prevailing form throughout the Republic. μικρὸς appears to occur only in IV 453 D and VI 498 D. On the inscriptional usage see Meisterhans p. 89.

24 πιλίδια. Felt caps were worn by the sick and delicate (see the references in Blümner Lc. p. 180 n. 5); but as artisans and sailors usually wore felt caps too (Dict. Ant. II p. 427), Plato perhaps alludes to some special coverings for the head prescribed by doctors from time to time in a course of medical treatment. The plural also points to this. If not, he uses the expression quite generally, as an example of the treatment he condemns. Well-to-do Greeks generally went bareheaded.

25 ἐπεν. The 'momentary' aorist well expresses the carpenter's decided business-like tone. His view of life resembles that of the meditative 'skipper' in Gorg. 511 D ff.

406 E 28 ψυχή—ἀπηλλάγῃ. He regains his health on losing his doctor, or if he dies, dies without help. Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 231 A τοῦ δὲ ἱατροῦ εἰτὸνως

A. P.
Ara, ἡν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἡν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, | δ' εἰ 407 μὴ πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζην; Δῆλον, ἐφι. Ὅ δ' ἐδ' πλοῦσις, ὡς φαμεν, οὔδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκειμένον, οὐ ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἄβιστον. Οὕκουν δὴ λέγεται γέ. Φωκυλίδου γάρ, 5 ἡν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις, πῶς φησί δεῖν, ὅταν τῷ ἡδη βιος ἣ, ἀρετὴν ἄσκειν; Ομιᾷ δὲ γε, ἐφι, καὶ πρότερον. Μηδὲν, εἴπον, περὶ τούτου αὐτῷ μαχόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξομεν, πότερον μελητήτων τοῦτο τῷ πλοῦσι καί ἄβιστον τῷ μή μελετῶντι Β ἡ νοσοτροφία τεκτονική μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἀκλαίς τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ 10 προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου παρακλήσεια οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει. Ναι μ' τὸν Διά, ἡ δ' ἡς, σχεδὸν γε τι πάντων μάλιστα ἡ γε 9. ἡ II: ἡ Α.

αὐτῷ, Γέρων γέγονας, Διότι, εἴπον, οὐκ ἔχρισμαν σοι ἱατρῷ. (The anecdote is told of Pausanias the Spartan king.)

31 ἡν. The carpenter is now dismissed: hence the imperfect ἡν, which should be retained in translating. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) explains ἡν as the 'philosophic' imperfect = εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν (in 406 c). This is much more simple and lively. "Wohl" well er ein Geschäft hatte, bei dessen Unterlassung es ihm nicht erspiessen war zu leben?" Schneider, rightly. Cf. II. 261 c n.

407 A 3 ἐργον προκειμένον. The view of work and duty here presented recalls 1. 352 E—353 E.

5 ἀκούεις. Phocylides, being dead, yet speaketh. The present ἀκούεις is just as legitimate as φησί, and well expresses the living voice of poetry in oral circulation. Heindorf (on Gorg. 503 c) misses the point of the idiom when he says that ἀκούεις is for ἀκύκοας; while Stallbaum’s explanation ‘probas’ is positively wrong. The line, as restored by Bergk Phoc. Fr. 10, is δίξησει βιωτίν, ἀρετήν δ' ὅταν ἡ βλασ ὧν. The Horatian ‘quaerenda pecunia primum, | virtus post nummos’ gives the meaning, if primum and post are understood in a strictly temporal sense. Phocylides’ maxim is one of the earliest expressions of the all but universal cry χρήσματα χρήσματι ἀνήρ (first in Alcaeus Fr. 49 Bergk), which Socrates and Plato continually preached against. It will be noticed that Plato for his own purposes represents Phocylides as laying the stress on ἀρετήν ἄσκειν rather than on δίξησει βιωτίν, where it really falls.

8 τοῦτο: viz. τὸ ἀρετήν ἄσκειν, as explained in the margin of A.

407 B 9 τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ is added as a kind of afterthought or additional specification, precisely like the infinitives in Gorg. 513 E ἐπιχειρησθῶν ἐστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν πολέμων τεχνευτῶν, infra 407 c, IV 437 B, 444 B, V 450 B, x 458 B, Crilo 52 B. The datives τεκτονικη etc. depend grammatically on ἐμπόδιον only, and have nothing to do with προσέξει. παρακλήσεια presently is of course the accusative, the subject to ἐμπόδιζει being νοσοτροφία, and οὐδὲν adverbial. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 140) should not have revived the reading of Bekker μελετῶντι Β νοσοτροφία: τεκτονική μὲν γάρ κτλ., which is lacking both in authority and point.

11 ναί μᾶ τὸν Δία—ἐἰκὸς γε, ἐφὴν (in c). See cr. n. With the MS reading ἐικός γ' ἐφη, the distribution of the speeches causes difficulty. It will be enough to mention three alternatives, for no one has adopted or is likely to adopt the punctuation of A, where σχεδὸν γε τι —περὶ τοῦ σώματος is assigned to Socrates. We may give either (1) the whole speech ναί μᾶ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Glauco, exciting ἐικός γε, ἐφήν with II q and some other MSS (so Schneider 1830); or (2) ναί μᾶ—ἐπιμελεία τοῦ σώματος to Glauco, and καί γάρ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Socrates (Stallbaum); or (3) ναί μᾶ—δόξασος to Glauco, and τὸ δὲ δὴ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Socrates (Baiter and others, including Schneider 1842). The first view fails to account for the appearance of ἐικός γε ἐφή in A, but is right, I think, in assigning the whole speech to Glauco. Neither

πΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
peraite-rov γυμναστικῆς, ἡ περιττή αὐτῆ ἐπιμελέα τοῦ σώματος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας καὶ πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἐδραίων ἐν πόλει ἄρχας δύσκολος. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς μαθήσεις ἀστινάσουν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας 15 χαλεπῆ, κεφαλῆς τών ἀεί διατάσεις καὶ ἱλάγγυς ὑποτευόντα καὶ αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγυνεσθαι, ὡστε, ὅπη αὐτῆ, ἀρέτῃ ἀσκείσθαι καὶ δοκιμάσθει πάντῃ ἐμπόδιον· καίμενε γὰρ ὀφειλεῖ τοιεῖ ἀεί καὶ ὀδύνοντα μῆποτε λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος. Εἰκός γε, ἐφην. οὐκὼν ταῦτα γινώσκοντα φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπίου τοὺς 20 μὲν φύσει τε καὶ διαίτῃ ὑγείνοντα ἔχοντας τὰ σώματα, νόσημα δὲ τι ἀποκεκριμένου ἔσχονται ἐν αὐτοῖς, τοῦτοι μὲν καὶ ταύτη τῇ

16. τῶν Ἑλ. των (sic) ΑΠΙ.  
17. ἀφή Εἰ: τάτη ΑΠΙ.  
18. ἀφή Εἰ: τάτη ἄρετη ἀσκείται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, ἀφὴ πάντῃ ἐμπόδιος.  
19. ἀσκείται καὶ δοκιμάζεται Εἰ: ἀσκείται καὶ δοκιμάζεται ΑΠΙ.  
20. ἐφην: ἐφη ΑΠΙ: ἐκάς γ' ἐφη ομ.  

at καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας nor at τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον is it easy and natural to change the speakers. The simple expedient of writing ἐφη for ἐφη appears to me to set matters straight. For the corruption see Introd. § 5. οὐκὼν ταῦτα etc. is also said by Socrates.

Ἠ γε περαιτέρῳ κτλ.  ‘This excessive care of the body, which goes beyond what sound bodily norms permits.’ The Greek has a rhetorical effect like τὸ δὲ ἔκνων, τὸ μὲν ἔκνων—βίβλια ΙΧ εὑρο. With περαιτέρῳ and the genitive cf. Οὐρων. 184 C περαιτέρῳ τοῦ δέκεως. I once conjectured ἥ γε περαιτέρῳ γυμναστικῆ, ἥ (cuius est?) etc. (Cl. Ker. x p. 385), but Plato seems to mean that treatment of this kind has no claim to the name γυμναστικῆ at all, and not that it is γυμναστικῆ run mad. The ms reading is defended also by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena xx p. 252.

407 C 15 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν: with μελέτας, as in μελέταν, φροντίζειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν etc.

16 διατάσεως, though its ms authority (see Cr. n.) is slight, can hardly fail to be what Plato wrote. Similarly in 540 C Α1 has ἕκαστον twice for ἑκάστον. See Introd. § 5.

17 ἀφη—ἐμπόδιος. The reading of Εἰ (followed by Stallbaum and the older editors) is certainly right. αφη (sc. ἑαυτίν) is νοσοτροφία; and ἐμπόδιος ἄρετή ἀσκείσθαι is exactly like ἐπικείμεν τῇ πόλει θεραπεύειν (see 407 b n.). The presence of νοσοτροφία makes it impossible for virtue to be practised or tested, as when, for example, to take a pedant’s illustration, a boy evades both lectures and examinations by cherishing a nervous headache. Recent English editors have followed Baiter, and read ἀφη τάτη ἄρετη ἀσκείται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, taking τάτη as ἐν φιλοσοφία, but this gives a much less satisfactory meaning. After ἀφη had been changed to τάτη, the rest of the corruption was easy; but a trace of the original reading may survive in the ἄρετη (not ἄρετη) of Δ.

32 ἀποκεκριμένον: an isolated, local malady; “morbum separatum, non totum corpus afficientem” (Asi). Unnecessary difficulty has been raised. The word is in no sense technical, and ἀποκρίμων in the sense of ‘separate’ is common enough. The corruption ἀποκεκριμένον might have been foretold.

407 D τοῦτος μὲν κτλ. The words τοῦτος μὲν ὑγείνοντα ἔχοντας led us to expect ἱδίαν, but the construction changes in order to introduce the invention of medicine, and the ‘healing’ reappears in a different form in φαρμάκοις τε—διαίταιν. The sentence is bad grammar, but good conversational style of the looser kind. It is not easy to say whether τε after φαρμάκοι connects the clauses, or only φαρμάκοι with τοῦτος. The former use is comparatively rare in Plato (Hoefer, de part. Plat. p. 7). Partly on this ground, and partly because the union of the aorist
καταδείξαι with προστάτευεις is a little awkward, I prefer the second alternative. The parenthesis, which is of the usual explanatory or ampliative kind, is in keeping with the loose structure of the whole sentence, and seems to me to add a certain didactic impressiveness here: cf. 309 B. τὰ δὲ εἴσι—σώματα depends not so much on ἀπαντλοῦντα directly as on the composite notion ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ εἰπεῖχοντα, which expresses a certain mode of treatment, and is as it were a species of the general idiom ποιεῖν τὰ τι. φωτείνεις must depend on ποιεῖν. Plato's sentences are seldom so disjointed as this: cf. however vi 488 ff., VIII 558 A. 407 E 29 μὴ οἰσεβαί: for the negative (which is the more natural here, as it belongs logically to δεῖ, though grammatically to οἰσεβαί) see 346 E. οἰσεβαί, like ἐπιχειρεῖν, depends on φώμεν. 30 οὐσιτελὴ is taken by Schneider as the accusative neuter in apposition to the idea in θεραπεύεις. If so, αὐτῷ for αὐτῷ must be written (with A). It is however so natural to take οὐσιτελὴ as masculine that Plato would surely have expressed the other meaning in a less ambiguous way. The usual view yields a satisfactory sense, and should be preferred. 31 δήλον κτλ. See cr. n. The awkwardness of taking οὗτος as ‘because’ was early felt and led to the insertion of διέκνυόν τοι in several MSS (καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ δείκνυόν τοι ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν)—a reading adopted by the older editors. Few will now dispute that δείκνυον ἦν is a gloss. Besides Schneider's suggestion, which I adopt, two other proposals merit consideration: (1) δήλον, ὦ δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν (Sauppe, comparing Crito 44 D), (2) δήλον, ὦ δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτος. ἦν οὐχ ὀρᾶς κτλ. (Madvig). The first, though regarded as possible by Schneider (Addit. p. 25), involves what is, to say the least, a very exceptional use of ὄρας, with which "subiectum sententiae verbo ὅτι incipientis idem esse solet quod sententiae primar iae" (Hartman). Sauppe's parallel from the Crito is a doubtful exception to Hartman's rule. Moreover οὐχ ὀρᾶς κτλ. is too lively: we should expect ὅτι (so Π 2 Σ 2 and other MSS) οὐχ ὀρᾶς κτλ. Madvig's correction already involves two changes (τοιοῦτος and ὅτι), but would be improved by making a third, viz. δήλος for δήλον. The minimum of dislocation which yields a satisfactory sense is the reading which suggested itself to Schneider, although he did not himself adopt it. Some may be inclined to pronounce ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν a marginal gloss on δήλον, as once occurred to Hartman. 408 A 2 ὅς ἐγώ λέγω. ὦς is emphatic, "in the way I describe." 4 αἷμ—ἐπασασον. II. 1V 218 αἷμ' ἐκμυθησας ἐν ὧρ ἡ ζπια φάρμακα εἰδώλ | πάσας, said of Machaon only. Plato
ingeniously accommodates the line to his own purposes. ἐκμυθήσαντι is of course the aorist indicative ἐκμύθησαντο, not the dual participle as J. and C. hold. This was pointed out by Schneider. Verbs denoting any kind of organic action are apt to be middle in Attic (Rutherford New Phrynichus pp. 138 ff.). It would be easy to write ἐκμύθησαντις (as I once did) and retain Homer’s active, but it is not worth while.

408 B 8 καὶ εἶ has come to mean no more than καὶ εἰ: cf. infra v. 477 λ, 1x 579 D, x 612 C and Jebb on Soph. El. pp. 224 f. The change from the plural πίστεως to the singular πίστεως has been doubted by Herwerden; but see τ. 347 λ. In illustration of κυκέων πίστεως Schneider (Additt. p. 25) refers to Hippocr. περὶ διάτησις δέξεων 11 p. 304 f. Littre οἱ γὰρ ἀρχόμενοι τῶν δέξεων νοσημάτων ἐστιν ὅτε οἱ μὲν στία τῇ ἔργῳ—οἱ δὲ καὶ κυκέων ἐρρόθενσιν ἀπαντᾷ ἡ ταῦτα κακῶς μὲν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτεροια τισ. διαίσθητι κτλ.


408 C 17 πεδόμεθα was much more likely to be corrupted to πεδομεθα (so ὑ., with Stallbaum and others) than πεδομεθα, on account of φίσομε. The present is more pointed and expressive; our rule has been laid down (391 D), and we abide by it now and always.

21 ὁσοὶ κτλ. Glauco’s conception of the medical art resembles that of the later ἐπειροί: see Celsus de med. Proem. pp. 5—6 ed. Daremberg, and infra 408 D v. 408 D 23 καὶ μάλα—λέγω. Socrates replies to ἀρ’ ὅνει—ἱτατρος: ignoring, or nearly ignoring, εἶνθ’ ἀρ’ ὑμηλκότες: cf. v. 165 ε. καὶ μάλα is simply ‘certainly,’ and ἄγαθοις λέγω lays stress on ἄγαθοις: ‘that is, if they are really good,’ ‘good ones, I mean.’ There is perhaps a hint that the good physician and the good judge must also be good men: cf. 409 C. To substitute with Hartman μάλιστα for μάλα (as in many MSS) is to mistake the force of λέγο.
25 πειράσματα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. σὺ μέντοι οὐχ ὄμοιον πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἦρου. Πώς; ἐφη. Ἡμιτροι μὲν, εἰσὶν, δεινότατοι ἢ γένοιντο, εἴ ἐκ παῖδων ἁρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ μαθήματι τὴν τέχνην ὡς πλείστοις τε καὶ πνημοτάτους ὄμηλίσκειαν καὶ αὐτοὶ πᾶσας νόσους καμοῦν καὶ ἐδώ μὴ πάνυ ὑμεινοί φύσει. οὐ γὰρ, οὐμαί, σώματι σώμα δερέωντοι. οὐ γὰρ ἀντὰ δυνατόν εἰσεχώρει κακὰ εἰναι ποτὲ καὶ γενέσθαι: ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς σώμα. ἦν οὐκ ἔγχωρει κακὴν γενομένην τε καὶ οὕσαν εὐ τι θεραπευέων. Ὅρθως, ἐφη. Δικαστής γε ἐγένετο, ὦ φίλε, ψυχῆς ἐρήμει, ὦ | οὐκ ἔγχωρει ἐκ νέας ἐν πονηρᾶς ψυχαίς 409 τεθρόφθαι τε καὶ ὁμιληκέναι καὶ πάντα ἁδικήματα αὐτὴν ἁδική- κυίαι διεξελήμεναν, ὅτε δὲ ἄξεως ἄφ’ αὐτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἁλλῶν ἁδικήματα, οἶνον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους. ἀλλ’ ἀπειρον αὐτὴν ἤ και ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἡθῶν νέαν οὕσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μὲν καὶ κάθη ὀσμα κρίνειν ύμίως τὰ δίκαια. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐθέεις νέοι ὀντες οἱ ἐπίτεικεις φανεραί καὶ εὐεξιπαίητοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁδικῶν, ὦτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἐαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἐφη, σφάδρα γε αὐτοί πάσχοντοι. Τοιαύτατον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, 10 οὐ νῦν ἄλλα γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστήν εἶναι, ὁμομαθα γεγονότα τῆς ἁδίκαις οἷς ἔστων, οὐκ οἰκεῖαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐνωσαν ἰδικεμένων, ἀλλὰ ἀλλοτριάν ἐν ἀλλοτρίας μεμελετηκότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι, οἶνον πέφυκε κακῶν, ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἐμπειρία ὑποκρίμενον. Γενναίότατος γοῦν, ἐφη, ἐοίκειν εἶναι C.


26 Ἡμιτροι κτλ. The combination of scientific knowledge (πρὸς τῷ μαθήματι τὴν τέχνην) and medical experience which Plato desiderates reminds us of the standpoint of the μεθοδόκοι, whose principles were in some respects a compromise between those of the δογματικοί or Theorists, and those of the Empirics; see Celsus I.c. pp. 9—13 and Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. pp. 245 ff., 268 ff.


6 δυδὴ καὶ εὐθέεις. “For unstained thoughts do seldom dream on evil: Birds never limed no secret bushes fear” (Rape of Lucrce). Cf. infra vii 517 D ff., Theaet. 174 C ff. The use of παραδείγματα recalls Theaet. 176 E, though the idea is somewhat different here. The word means ‘models,’ ‘standards,’ not ‘samples of experience’ (J. and C.), and tois poneirous is equivalent to tois tois poneirous paraideigmai. Cf. infra c, D, where paraideigma tois tison est as a model (not as a sample) of such a character.' So also Schneider, who translates by 'Vorbild.'

10 ὁμομαθή κτλ. The common taunt ὁμομαθή is in such a case an epithet of praise.

11 οὐκ οἰκείαν κτλ. For the asyndeton see 407 D n. δεὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί for διαισθάνεσθαί (Stob. Flor. 45. 96) is ingenious, but weak. As Steinhart remarks (Einleitung p. 173), the scientific knowledge of virtue, according to Socrates and Plato, implies a knowledge of its opposite, viz. vice: see on I 334 A, and cf. infra 409 D.
ο τοιούτους δικαστής. Καὶ ἀγαθός τε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ σὺ ἡρώτας: ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ψυχὴν ἀγαθήν ἀγαθός· ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποτος, τὸ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἰδικηκὼς καὶ πανούργος τε καὶ σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὦμοιοι ὦμιλῇ, δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβοῦμενος, πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοποῦν· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθοὶ

καὶ πρεσβυτέροισι ἦδη πλησιάσῃ, ἀβέλετρος αὐτ' φαίνεται, ἀπιστῶν 20 παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἄγρον ὑγίεις ἢθος, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχων παραδείγματα τοῦ τοιούτου. πλεονάκις δὲ πονηρὸς ἢ χρηστὸς ἐνυγχάνων σοφότερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἥπη, ἀληθῆ.

XVII. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τοιούτουν χρὴ τοῦ δικαστῆς 25 ζητεῖν τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ σοφὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρότερον. πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν ὑπότ' ἂν γυνайд, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευόμενης χρόνῳ ἢμα αὐτής τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήφθαι, σοφὸς οὖν οὕτως, ὅσ' μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' οὖν ὁ κακὸς γίνεται. Καὶ ἐμοὶ, ἥπη, ἐυνοοῦνες. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρικὴν οἴαν ἐπιτρέπει μετὰ τῆς 30 τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, αἰ τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφενεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ | τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μη, ὡσὶ μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιούτου, ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐάσουσιν, τοὺς

23. σοφότερος Λπειγ.: ἀσοφότερος Α"Π: ἀσαφότερος (sic) Π."
which it is good to live and good to die. See Grote Plato i p. 362.

3 *ἀντίλι* is said in opposition to the mere ‘permission to die’ which bodily disease requires. *ἀντίλι* (suggested by Richards) is unnecessary: see II 375 c ii.

410 Α—412 Β Our young men need seldom be helped by judges and doctors, thanks to their education in Music and Gymnastics. They will pursue both arts with a view to the cultivation of the soul rather than of the body. Exclusive devotion to one of the two makes men in the one case hard and fierce, in the other, effeminate and mild. The psychological elements of Spirit and the Love of Knowledge must be attuned to one another. Music and Gymnastic are intended to effect this harmony: and excess or deficiency in either of these educative instruments reflects itself in morbid and degenerate phases of character. He who can best blend Music with Gymnastics is the true musician; and such an one we must provide in our city, if it is to last.

410 Α 7 ἄρ ὁν κτλ. This epilogue describes concisely the aim and underlying principle of Plato’s earlier scheme of education. Its object is to produce citizens who shall combine gentleness and strength, sensibility and courage, intellectual activity and moral steadfastness. It is an ideal in which the distinctive virtues of Athens and Sparta—of Greece and Rome—are united and transfigured.

See II 375 c and the passages referred to there. The ideal of Pericles (φιλοσοφεῖν ἅνευ μελακάται) in many ways resembles Plato’s (Thuc. ii 40). Cf. also Nettleship Hell. pp. 88—90 and Bosanquet Companion pp. 115—117. It is noteworthy that the doctrine of this section is best explained by a comparison with one of the dialogues often held to be late (Pol. 306 C—311 C): see also Laws 773 c, d. This is not pointed out by Krohn in his otherwise acute analysis (Pl. St. pp. 24—28).

410 Β 8 ὁ μουσικός—ἀιρήσει. ὁ μουσικός is ὃ τῇ ἀπλῇ μουσικῇ χρώμενος, as defined in the last sentence. ἄρη διάκων καὶ ἄιρήσει are metaphors from the chase: see II 375 Α.

10 αὐτά μὴν—ἰςχύν. The theory of gymnastic propounded here was apparently new in Plato’s time (see on II 376 E), although the practice of athletics as an educative discipline, especially at Sparta, conformed to it in no small measure (see Plut. Lyc. 17 ff., Xen. Rep. Lac. 2 ff.).

13 μεταχειριζόμεναι. See cr. n. i have followed Hermann in adopting Galen’s text. With ὁδὴ (μη) ὁς or ὁντερ the verb should have for its subject the nominative contained in the ὁς clause: cf. vii 539 D, x 610 D. Symp. 179 E is in reality no exception to this rule.

410 C 15 τινες. It has been supposed that τινες refers to Isocrates, who in his Ἀντίδοσις (180—185) expounds at
length the usual Greek view of gymnastic. This is possible only if the present section was added within the last four years or so of Plato’s life, which is most improbable. See Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. p. 653, and Introd. § 4. In other passages the Antidosis has been held to presuppose the Republic; see Dümmler Chronologische Beitr. etc. pp. 12, 13.

καθιστάσαι. Cf. Dem. 24. 145 οὗτος γάρ (sc. δὲ νῦν)—οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς κεκρυμένοι—κεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρυτῶν, ὡς μὴ—ἀλαγάκασιν ἀγωνιζεῖσθαι, and Phil. 34 ε (where however it is easy to write λάβωμεν). In the first of these cases the reference is, as here, to the establishment of laws or ordinances. καθιστάναι is used somewhat like φησὶν 407 Α. Madvig’s emendation καθιστᾶσαι commends itself to Weber (Entwirk. d. Absichtssätze in Schanz’s Beiträge II 2 p. 88) and others, but has not yet been proved to be necessary, and καθιστάναι below tells rather against it. For other examples of the idiom see Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 897, 898. Cases like Soph. O. C. 11 and El. 57, 760 are different, and have been justly emended. As regards the sentiment, it is characteristic of Plato to invent a ‘historical’ sanction for his theories (cf. 414 b ff.); but he doubtless sincerely believed that the spirit of Greek gymnastics had degenerated.

 inser the words after σκληρότητος without any ms authority. If change is needed, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ had better be omitted (so q), whose reading is very different here. But it is better to note than to obliterate such peculiarities. 24. οὐς is not ‘pro simplici ἂν vel οὐ positum’ (Stallbaum), but = ‘quam quomodo.’

410 E. 29 αὐτός. Does the pronoun mean τοῦ ἡμέρον οτ̣ τοῦ φιλόσοφον? Four qualities are first distinguished: viz. the wild, the hard, the soft and the tame. The source of wildness is the spirited element, which if rightly cultivated becomes brave, if unduly strained, hard. So far, all is clear; but difficulties now begin. We should expect Plato to continue: τὸ ἡμέρον is an attribute of τὸ φιλόσοφον, and τὸ φιλόσοφον—not τὸ ἡμέρον—when relaxed becomes too soft, when rightly educated becomes κόσμον (the virtue which contrasts with τὸ ἄνδρειον). At first sight, then, it looks as if αὐτός meant ‘the philosophic temperament’ (so Stallbaum and J. and C.); but this is grammatically impossible, unless we make τὸ ἡμέρον the subject to μαλακότερον εἰς and therefore to ἡμέρον τε καὶ κόσμον, which is hardly tolerable. We must therefore acquiesce in taking αὐτός as τοῦ ἡμέρου, unless there is corruption somewhere. If Plato had written καὶ μάλλον μὲν ἀρετῆν μαλακότερον εἰς τοῦ δέντος, καὶ δὲ τραφὲν ὁφρὸν τε καὶ κόσμον, everything would be clear,
but I do not venture to change the text. σώφρων for ἃμερον is suggested also by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 26). Apelt proposes ἁμετρον (Berl. Philol. Wochenschr. 1895 p. 969).

31 ἁμφοτέρα—φύσις: viz. τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ φιλοσοφόν.

33 σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία. σωφροσύνη is the virtue of τὸ φιλοσοφόν, ἀνδρεία of τὸ θυμοειδές: cf. 399 c and Pol. 307 c. The meaning would be caught more easily if Plato had written—as perhaps he did—σώφρων τε καὶ κόσμον for ἃμερον τε καὶ κόσμοι above, just as he wrote ἀνδρείας (410 D). ἄγαρκος (implying, like ἀνέλυθθος, ἀνδραποδόθης, with which it is coupled in Laus 890 A, lack of power to control the feelings) is properly opposed to σώφρων here.

411 A 3 καταυλεῖν—ἀρμονίας. καταυλεῖν (as Ast observes) does not govern ἀρμονίας, but is used absolutely: cf. Laus 750 ε (of mothers singing and rocking their children to sleep) ἄτεχνως οἴον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἰ όν ἐκφράσεις βασικείων λάσεις, ταύτη τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἀμα χορεία καὶ μουσή χρώματοι. So expressive a word could ill be spared, although van Heusde's καταυλεῖν is ingenious enough. Cobet would read καταστελλεῖν and cut out καταυλεῖν, while Hartman inclines to eject καταυλεῖν, but the text is sound. ἀρμονίας depends on καταυλεῖν. With χώνης cf. (with Hiller Pl. Jahrb. 1874 p. 174) Ar. Thesm. 18 δίκαι δὲ χώνης ὥτα: see Blaydes ad loc. The context in Aristophanes lends some colour to Hiller's notion that the comparison was taken from some earlier philosopher: cf. Theophr. de sensu § 9.

411 B 7 σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε κτλ. See on 387 c. Apparently then the first effect even of the μαλακὴς ἀρμονίας is good. This apparent inconsistency with 398 εβ. is emphasized by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 25), but Krohn fails to observe that Plato is here describing the facts of common experience, whereas before he was making laws of his own. It is quite possible to admit that the relaxing modes are beneficial in moderation, and yet forbid them, because moderation in them is difficult to maintain.

8 ὅταν—τίκηι. The object of τίκηι, τίκηι καὶ λείψει is τὸ θυμοειδές: that of ποιήσας is τὴν ψυχήν. So much is, I think, certain; but ἐπέχων is less easy. The word has been interpreted as (1) 'listening to' (Schneider, comparing 399 B, where, however, ἐπέχων should probably be read), (2) 'pressing on,' 'persevering,' 'continuing': cf. Theaet. 195 D ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἄνεις (J. and C.). The sense which Schneider gives to ἐπέχων is ill-supported: and we must accept the second alternative. Morgenstern's emendation ἐπίχων (accepted by Herwerden and Hartman) is attractive but not quite convincing ('when he ceases not to pour the music in' etc.). ἐπίχων would preserve the metaphor, which is clearly intended (in καταυλεῖν, χώνης, καὶ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε) to suggest the process of smelting, and of which an echo still survives in τίκηι, λείψει and ἐκτήσῃ. See
Blümmer Technologie etc. iv pp. 148 ff. nn. The θυμοειδής is the iron which music softens, and may even dissolve: farther than this the comparison is not to be pressed.

9 κηλή: as one might charm or fascinate a snake: Euthyd. 290a, Phaedr. 259 A. καὶ λείβα—αἰχμητήν. For λείβα thus used cf. Ar. Knights 327. μαλβάκος αἰχμητής is said of Menelaus in II. xvii. 588.

12 ἐὰν—λάβῃ: 'if he has received,' not 'if he act upon' (J. and C.). Plato means that if the individual in question received at the beginning a soul—ψυχή is understood—naturally spiritless, he soon makes it a 'feeble warrior.' "Wenn er gleich eine von Natur zornlose Seele bekommen hat" (Schneider). The subject throughout is the τιματικόν which with the sentence began. For the usual Greek idiom, by which the person concerned is represented as acting on himself (ἐκτιθέν τὸν θυμὸν etc.) instead of being acted on, cf. Eur. I. A. 187 φωνήσουσα παραδ' ἐμὸν | αἰσχών νεοθαλεῖ with Headlam's note: also v. 462 C, D. nn. and IX 517 A. nn.

411 c 14 ἐρεθιζόμενον, ἰτιζόμενον, suggested by Herwerden, is picturesque enough: but 'provoked and extinguished' is even more natural in Greek than in English, for ἐρεθιζω could readily be used of fanning a fire: see the lexica s. v.

15 ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς—ἐμπλεκόντος θυμοειδοῦς is of course masculine and not neuter (as J. and C. suggest). Even if we allow that the dative is neuter in cases like Sympr. 145 c νέος—ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός, and Theaet. 185 E, the presence of the article makes all the difference. Ast (with ξ) reads θυμοειδῶν. So harsh a change from plural to singular (ὁργάλον) is remarkable, but hardly more so than ἀποθανομένους δε in iv 426 C. Cf. also I 347 A n. Krohn points out that ἀνδρεῖον is here represented as a μεσοτήτις between αἰκληρόν and ὁργάλον (Pl. St. p. 27).

17 εἰσωχότατο: should be understood literally, of good living.
οίμαι, ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, καὶ πειθοὶ μὲν διὰ λόγων ὀφθεὶ ἐτείχηται, βία δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὄσπερ θηρίων πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται, καὶ ἐν ἀμαθία καὶ σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀχαριστίας ξη. Παντόπασι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅπως ἔχει. 'Επὶ δὴ δῷ 30 ὄντε τοῦτω, ὡς ἐοικέ, δύο τέχνα θεῶν ἔγον ἄν τινα φαίνῃ διδακέων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μονακτικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοεἶδες καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχήν καὶ σώμα, εἰ μὴ εἰπὶ πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὅπως ἄν ἀλλήλους ξυναρμοσθῆτον | ἐπιτειωμένοι καὶ ἀνυμένῳ μέχρι τοῦ προσήκουτος. Καὶ γὰρ ἐοικέν, ἔφη. Τὸν κάλλιστ' ἀρα μονακτικὴ γυμναστικὴ κεραυνύτα καὶ μετρίωτα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέρουσα τοῦτον ὀρθότατ' ἄν φαίμεν εἰναι τελεοῦ 5 μουσικῶτατον καὶ εὐαρμοστῶτατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἦ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς ἀλλήλαις ἔνυπταντα. Εἰκότος γ', ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῖν, ὁ Πλάνκου, δείησι τοῦ τοιοῦτον τινὸς αἰεί.

29. ἀχαριστίας Α' Π: ἀχαριστίας corr. Α". ἐπὶ δὴ χ. ἐπειδὴ Α: ἐπεὶ δὴ ΠΞ. 32. ἐπὶ πάρεργον Π' τοι: ἐπὶ εργῇ (sic) Α': ἐπὶ πάρεργον Α": ἐπὶ πάρεργον Π': ἐπὶ πάρεργον Δ: ἐπὶ πάρεργον Σ. 3. μετρώτατα Στ: μετρώτατα ΑΠ.γ'.

411 D 27 ὄσπερ θηρίων—διαπράττεται. If the ms is right, πάντα is masculine. But although διαπράττεται by itself can be used without an expressed object (Prot. 319 c al.), it is strange to find διαπράττεται πρὸς τινα so used: see Crat. 395 b, Alc. Π 143 c. On this account διαπράττεται has been by some ejected (Hermann), by others emended into διαράττεται (Morgenstern), διαπάττεται (Madvig and one Florentine ms); while others read θηρίον τα πάντα διαπράττεται (Lambrechts), or πρὸς διαπράττεται πάντα (Chandler), or expunge πρὸς (Bywater). Perhaps we should read ὄσπερ θηρίων πρὸς γθρίων > κτλ. (attains all his ends by violence and ferocity, like one wild beast with another). Cf. Shakespeare Rape of Lucrece "The rough beast that knows no gentle right."


29 ἀχαριστίας is 'ungraciousness,' 32 εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πάρεργον occurs also in Phaed. 91 Λ (according to the Bodleian ms). Phrases of this kind seldom admit of variation; for which reason we should hesitate to admit the εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον of Π'.

33 ὅτως ἐν κτλ. The soul has, so to speak, two strings, the φιλόσοφον and the θυμοεἶδες, which make a kind of ἀρμονία when they are tuned to the proper pitch by Music and Gymnastic. The θυμοεἶδες is slackened (ἀνείσται) by μονακτική, tightened or braced (ἐπιτεινέται) by γυμναστική (410 D, 411 Α—Ε); conversely, we must suppose that the φιλόσοφον is slackened by γυμναστική, and tightened by μονακτική. Music and Gymnastic are therefore both of them necessary for each of the two strings (cf. IV 441 E n.), although the slackening of the θυμοεἶδες of itself also tightens the φιλόσοφον, which is likewise slackened when the tension of the other is increased. Cf. Tim. 88 b, c. The effect of all this musical imagery is to suggest that Character is the Music of the Soul; cf. Lach. 188 D. 412 Α 7 τοῦ—ἐπιστάτων. Some ms (including Ζ and χ) omit τοῦ, and no precise parallel has yet been adduced for ὁ τοιοῦτος τις used in this way. In Χ 581 E, cited by Schneider (Addit. p. 27), Paris Α has ἐν τοιοῦτῳ τι, not ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τι. The article may perhaps be justified by the description of the ἐπιστάτης in the last sentence, and τις taken closely with τοιοῦτον ('some such superintendent as we have described'); but there is certainly some ground for suspecting interpolation (with Bekker and others). The ἐπιστάτης, as Jowett observes, is a sort of minister of education,
such as we find in *Laws* 765 D ff. The same function is in *Pol.* 308 D ff. assigned to the Regal or Political Art.

412 B 8 ως οἶνον τέ γε μάλιστα. I have placed a comma before ως; cf. *Phaed.* 74 B φόμεν μεντὸν νὴ Δ', ἐφι οὐκ Σύμμαχος, διαφαντῶν γε (Hoeber Part. Plat. p. 33).

412 B—414 B So much for Education. It remains to ask 'Which of the guardians are to be our rulers?' The elder shall rule the younger, and the better the worse. Now the best guardians are those who care most for their country and her interests. We shall make our selection on this principle; and we must further try those whom we select and see whether their patriotism is proof against all seductive influences. Every true opinion or belief—and the belief on which patriotism rests is true,—like everything else which we call good, is unwillingly discarded, and may be forcibly expelled by persuasion or forgetfulness, by pain, pleasure and the like. We shall apply these tests to prove our guardians. Those who emerge unscathed will become our rulers. They are the true Guardians; the others should be called Auxiliaries.

412 B ff. This is the first appearance of the Rulers in Plato's State, if we except the passing allusion in 389 C. Their presence is necessary to take the place of the original *φωνεθήσας* when the State has once been founded (VI 497 D); they represent in fact the Royal or Kingly art, whose business it is to prescribe to others their specific good or end. See on 410 A and Nohle *die Statthshre Platos* pp. 47 ff., 83 ff., 113 ff. Such is their duty according to the later books; but here it is not so described, and the whole subject is treated in an exoteric way. The full and esoteric discussion of this subject is reserved for VI and VII. To this later treatment reference is made in 414 A and 416 B. The advocates of the original unity of the *Republic* justly lay stress upon the tentative and provisional nature of the regulations here laid down (e.g. Susemihl *Gen. Enst.* p. 143, Zeller* II 1. p. 560 n.*); whereas the separatists hold that Plato's wider conception of the Ruling class is chronologically later than the account now given (Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 28—31). An excellent defence of the conservative view will be found in *Hirmer Enst.* u. *Komp.* d. pl. *Pol.* pp. 613 ff. See also *Introil.* 8. 4. 11 χαρίας—ιππικοῦς. See *Laws* 814 D ff., 812 D ff., 830 C ff., 832 D ff.


412 C 16 προσβυτέρους κτλ. The different principles on which rulers may be appointed are fully discussed in *Laws* 690 A ff.

21 φρονίμους κτλ. Intellectual ability and accomplishments, authority, and pa-
irotic sentiment are the three requisites of the Rulers as laid down here. In vii it is the first which is emphasized, here it is the last. This is in harmony with the whole spirit of i—iv, in which, as Krohn remarks (Pl. St. p. 29), "the intellect is subordinated to the moral powers, and with the education of the character in richly-endowed natures the fruits of insight ripen of themselves."

412 D 24 καὶ ἑκείνου. See cr. n. Sto-baeus (Flor. 43. 152) reads καὶ δὴ (or ὅ τι) μάλιστα ἑκείνου κτλ., which is good enough Greek, and would mean 'whatever policy he thinks by bringing prosperity to the other brings prosperity also to himself,' ὅ τι being an accusative of respect belonging to εἶδον πράττοντος. If the principle of this interpretation is right. I should read ὅ τι ἄν ὅταν, taking ἄν with ἐξεύθεν. ἄν loves the shelter of a relative, particularly ὅ τι, and the corruption is the easier because ὅταν in A and other MSS is written ὅτ' ἄν. But φαίνει cannot well be said of one's attitude to a policy or course of action; and Hermann's proposal gives a more satisfactory sense. The occurrence of τοῦτο ἃ ἂν μάλιστα just before may be responsible for the slip. It is to be understood—though Plato has not expressly said so—that the guardians believe their own interests to be best consulted by promoting those of their country. μὴ δὲ ἡμῖν δὲ εἶδον πράττοντος, and τούτον ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἑκείνῳ κακός πράττειν.

35 ἑκουσίως ἡ ἀκουσίως: with reference to the usual Socratic theory that Knowledge or Virtue is voluntary, Ignorance or Vice involuntary; see on Π 382 A.
413 A 4 των μὲν ἀγαθῶν—ἐκοινώσεως. See τν. 438 Α. 4.
6 ἦ δὲ οὖ—ἐπινόητά. It is necessary expressly to equate ἀληθείας with ἀληθῆς δόξα, because ordinarily it means to speak rather than to think what is true. Cf. 91 382 σ. Hartman approves of Ast for bracketing the words "quod argumentationem turbant," but the contrary is true. Men unwillingly relinquish what is good, ἀληθῆς good; and ἀληθῆς δόξα is ἀληθείας: therefore we unwillingly relinquish ἀληθῆς δόξα—which is just what we wished to prove.

413 B τοι τραγικὸς: i.e. ὀψιλολογομεμόρις, in lofty high-flown metaphorical language such as may well become obscure: cf. 88 545 Ε. κλέπτεσθαι thus used is tragic: cf. (with J. and C.) Soph. Ant. 681 εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλέπτε με θα. 13 τοῦν = 'praeterea here, not 'igitiur': 1 339 D n.

413 C 17 τι δείκταιντας = 'having some fear' (J. and C.).

20 τοῦτο ὡς ποιητῶν κτ.: 'that it is their duty to do that which on each occasion they think it is best for them to do in the interests of the State.' I have provisionally retained the reading of the best MSS, although it is open to suspicion on several grounds. The position of τοῦτο is unusual, and αὐτοῖς τοιεῖν is, to say the least, superfluous. Gaisford (with whom Cobet agrees) wished to expunge the entire clause as a gloss on δόγματος. This solution, though drastic, may be right: for an explanation of δόγματος is hardly needed after 412 D, E, and τοῦτο looks like the commencement of an explanatory note 'this, viz.' etc. A simpler alternative, adopted by most editors, is to cancel αὐτοῖς τοιεῖν, but it is difficult to see why a scribe should have introduced the words. The sentence, if genuine, seems to want the finishing touch. Cf. 407 D n.

22 προθεμένων ἔργα. It is clear that Plato is referring to specific tests, and not (as Bosanquet seems to think) to the duties of war and the public service generally. So also Susemihl (Gen. Entw. II p. 143), and Steinhart (Einleitung p. 173), the latter of whom compares, not very aptly, the tests of the Pythagorean brotherhood and the appalling spectacles displayed in the mysteries. Three kinds of tests are required: (1) κλονίς, (2) βία, (3) γονεῖα. Examples of the second kind are furnished by the severer discipline of gymnastic, the chase etc.: cf.
amplevanthanoito kai ekapatapto, kai tov mev mnima kai dusexe-
pathtov | egkritleov, ton de me apokritenov. h yar; Nai. Kal D |
25 pionous ge av kal agiandonas kai agionas autous theteon, en ois tau-
ta tauta tηρhten. 'Orobo, ephi. Oukouv, hyn de evo, kai tritou 
eidoun tov tis gyneteias amyllan poihten, kai theateon—ωστερ 
touς πόλους επι τους; ψόφους te kai thorubous agontes skopousoin 
ei faoberoi, ou'tou 'neou ointas eis dieimat' atta komistovn kai eis 
30 ̮δονας av metaβλητεων, basaniatzantas polu malloν h xronon en E 
turni,—eii duoseheutevos kai evsichmion en passi faiveita, filaze 
autoi ωn agadoi kai mouvnikis ḫis emánathanen, evurubmon te kai 
euarmostov eautov en pαsi touτou parèchov, oidos de en foc kai 
eautov kai polèi χρησιμωτατος eii. kai tov aei en te paios kai 
35 nevaniskois kai ev anadrisi basanioumenov kai akhratos ekbaivonta |
katastateov arhonta tis polèos kai filaka, kai timas dotëov 414 
kai xoniti kai telounthsanta, τάφων te kai touς allyov mnimeioin 
megista nptera lauxháonta: τον de me tou toutov apokritenov. touai-
tis, hyn de evo, dokei moi, o Plaunikos, h eklogei einai kai katastas 
5 των arhonton te kai filakwv, ows en vutfo, me de ukebheias, 
eirhserai. Kαι emoi, ḫi de ois, ou'tous πι faiveita. 'Ar ouν ois 
αληθως orboτatov kaleyin touτous mev filakaς panteleis touς B 

27. tou tis E: touτow A9: touτow II.

Lauros 633 B ff., where the probationary 
value of these and similar exercises is 
appropriately insisted on by the Spartan 
stranger. It was fully recognised in the 
Spartan anargy (Plut. Lyc. 17. 4 ff.). The 
third order of tests may be illustrated from 
Lauros 634 A, B, 635 C, 647 D ff., 649 A, 
673 E ff. h en olw basanos (649 D) cons- 
sists in giving wine to test men's self-
control (tou savoronein evka melent (673 E). 
Plato gives no account of the first va-
riety; but a good illustration of one 
species of it (cf. tous metapaxevéitas 
413 B) is provided by the speeches of 
self-seeking statesmen and unpatriotic 
sophists and poets. It is a curious fact 
that Plato's klespi̇ still leaves a loophole 
by which vicious poetry may creep in 
again. On the general question, Plato 
does well to insist on the educational 
value of temptation; the theory and prac-
tice of modern times recognises it in 
connexion with filia, but experience too 
often shews that klespi̇ and gyneteia mean 
playing with fire. Cf. Grote Plato III 
p. 328.

413 D 27 tou tis—theateon. Two 
evos of tests have been described, klespi̇ 
and filia; the third is gyneteia. I incline 
to think that Stallbaum is right in re-
storing tou tis: see cr. n. and Introd. 
§ 5. toous 'misere languet,' and if a 
dative were needed, it should rather be 
autous. Herwerden expunges theateon; 
but asyndeton before wsper is frequent 
in sentences of this kind.

413 E 31 duoseheutevos. For the 
change from plural to singular cf. 1 
347 A n.

414 A3 lauxhánonta. The accusa-
tive recurs to filaka, and is all the easier 
because timas dotëov is little more than 
timhtev. Plato's usage is lax in such 
matters, and it is better not to emend: 
cf. (with Schneider) Lauros 760 E, 577 A 
5 os en tuttoi—eirhserai. Cf. vi 
502 D n.
The wolfish πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντὸς φιλίων, ὁποίως ὃι μὲν μὴ βουλήσονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνήσονται κακοῦργείν, τοὺς δὲ νέους, οὓς νῦν δὴ φύλακας ἐκάλωμεν, ἐπίκουρος τε καὶ βοηθός τοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων 10 δόγμασιν; "Εμού γε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

XXI. Τίς ἄν οὖν ἦμι, ἃν δέ εὔο, μηχανή γένοστο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι ἴμμομέοιν, οὖν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, γενναίον τι ἐν 10 ψευδομέων πεῖται μάλιστα μέν καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἀλλὴν πόλιν; Πιοῦ τι; ἔφη. Μηδὲν καίνον, ἃν δ’ 15

9. νῦν δὴ II: δὴ νῦν Α. 13. νῦν δὴ ν.; δὴ νῦν ΑΠΙΣ."
16 Φοινικικόν τι: because the story of the Στρατιωτών was Phoenician, Cadmus the Phoenician having sown the dragon's teeth from which they sprang (Apollod. Π Ι 4. 1). Cf. Lato 663 e. Steinhardt (Einleit. p. 177) and Susemihl (Gen. Einle. II p. 144) find in Φοινικικόν a further hint that the institution of caste was something foreign and non-Hellenic: but the words cannot be thus interpreted. The Egyptian system of caste (see Hdt. ΙΙ 164 ff.) differed from Plato's in essential points, and there is no real evidence to show that he was influenced by it in any way: nor is Φοινικικόν ('Sidonian' in Lato i.e.) equivalent to 'Egyptian.' Cf. Hermann Geisch. u. Smyth. p. 55 and ην. Ψευδαι Φοινικίκων afterwards became a proverb, perhaps owing to this passage.

πολλαχοῦ γεγονός means simply 'which has happened in many places,' γεγονός and γεγένειν in themselves refer to the actual occurrences, which δε φανερον—πεπεικασω reduces again to legend and matter of faith. πολλαχοῦ is plenitely illustrated in Preller Gr. Myth. pp. 79 ff. Presently οὐδενδαι ει γεγένειν ων (for which Herodotus neat but needlessly suggests οὐδεν οὐδεν ων ει γεγένειν) hints that the age of miracles is past.

414 D 21 ὅποιοι—ἡ ποιος. Cf. 400 A n. It is very exceptional to find the indirect interrogative preceding the direct: cf. Soph. O. Τ. 71 with Jebb's note.

ἐρω. I have removed the colon after ἐρω on Richards' suggestion.

24 ὁστερ ὑνερτα—αὐτοι: lit. 'all these things which they fancied themselves suffering and happening to them were so to speak dreams.' ἐδοκουν is 'imagined' as in Aesch. Pers. 188 (also of a dream) and elsewhere. The object of πάσχειν, viz. ταῦτα ταύτα, becomes the subject of γιγνεσθαι: cf. (for the change of subject) Ἀρπ. 40 a, Synp. 200 D and supra I 333 C, Μ 259 D, Ε, 360 A. It must be allowed that the effect of this idiom is here unusually harsh. I once conjectured ὑπάρχειν for πάσχειν, taking ἐδοκουν still as 'fancied': but the text is probably sound.

25 ὑπὸ γῆς κτλ. Herwerden bids us bracket either ὅτε or ἔντος: but Plato rarely if ever lets the preposition ἔντος follow its nom. ὅτε is 'under,' not 'by' (it is ὃ θεος, not ἥ γῆ, who πλατειν, infra 415 Α), and ἔντος is adverbial; 'drinnen unter der Erde' (Schneider). Mortal creatures are similarly moulded within the earth in Protagoras' prehistoric myth (τυπουσιν αὑτὰ θεοι γῆς ἐνόθ 320 D): cf. also Synp. 191 C, Πολ. 272 A, Τιμ. 42 D. The myth of the Politicus (269 A ff.) connects the autochthonous origin of man with the golden age, in agreement with a wide-spread tradition, which gave rise to a considerable literature (Dümmler Proleg. zu Platos Staat p. 46). It is in the spirit of this tradition that Plato here represents the first generation of his ideal city as autochthonous.

414 E 28 καὶ—καὶ. The double καὶ marks 'the correspondence of the
two clauses" (J. and C.). As the Earth proved herself their mother, so they must shew themselves her sons. If the text is sound, it must be explained in this way; but exact parallels are rare. Thuc. 1 iv. 8. 9 (cited by Schneider Addit. p. 27) is different: see Classen ad loc. and on viii 27-5. More to the point is Soph. Ant. 1192 f. καὶ παρὼν ἐρω, ἵκοδὲν παρῆκεν τῆς ἀληθείας ἔστο: see Jebb ad loc. Ast expunges καὶ before ἴ ἱγ, while Hermann alters it to ὄς (carrying on the ὄς of ὃς ἢρω). Neither change can be called satisfactory. I formerly suggested δημοφιλεμένην ἔτι. ἴδῃ δὲ κτλ. (Cl. Rev. x p. 385): cf. Synrh. 220 c ἴδην ἥλιος σήματος, καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπον. The change is slight, but ἐτι 'languet,' and it is better to retain the ms reading.

ὡς περὶ μητρὸς — διανοεῖσθαι. Cf. (with J. and C.) Aesch. Sept. 10—20, 412—416, and infra v 470 D. For the omission of the preposition before τῆς χώρας cf. viii 553 b n. ὑπὲρ with τῶν ἀλλων is scarcely more than περὶ: see 11 367 A n. 415 A 3 ὡς φήσομεν. The sense (as Schneider observes) is ὡς ὁ μήδες λέγει, διὸ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐρωμένων. Hartman cancels ὡς, but it was more likely to have been wrongly omitted here than inserted. ἵ κρύσων κτλ. The metals are borrowed from Hesiod (O. D. 109—201), as Plato indicates in viii 546 b. Hesiod enumerates five ages of men (interposing the age of heroes between those of copper and iron), but the older legend probably recognised four only: see Rohde Psych. I p. 87. Plato makes the golden and the other classes coexist—a truer and profounder view than Hesiod’s. In other respects, the myth (as Jackson has pointed out in Susemihl and Hicks Politics of Aristotle p. 244) is not to be pressed: for "it does not recognise the promotion of ἑπίκουροι" to be ἀρχιτέκτονες. We should expect the ὕδαι to contain admixtures, both of gold and silver, such as are to be Rulers receiving more gold than silver, and conversely; but the Greek does not favour this idea. Iron again seems to be exclusively (though less emphatically) reserved for the farmers, and copper for the artisans: cf. infra B, C, viii 547 A, B, and Arist. Pol. B 5. 1264<sup>b</sup> 14. It makes the χεισσοί all the more γενναίοι and effective to tell the citizens that the classes are even more distinct than they really are.

7 ἄτε οὖν ἐγγενεῖς ὄντες is said with reference to the ἐδε clause, on which the stress falls. The fundamental kinship of the different classes will occasionally re-assert itself in their offspring. So J. and C., rightly.

415 B 9 ἵ κρύσων: sc. ἑγχύμων, which should also be supplied with χρύσων. Plato sees in fancy the onward march of generations καθάπερ λαμπάδα τῶν βίων παραδόντες: cf. IV 424 A. Ast’s proposal ἀργυρῷ should not have received the approval of Hartman; and D. and V. miss a characteristic touch by translating ἀργυρῷ "a silver parent."
13 έαν τε κτλ. This provision is the corner-stone of Plato’s State, and as soon as it gives way, the edifice is doomed (VIII 546 E—547 A). It is only by the elevation of the worthy and the degradation of the unfit that class-distinctions can be made to coincide with those of Nature (cf. IV 423 d); and unless they do, the foundation of the city, which is τό εαυτόν πάρτευε, is sapped. Hence the emphasis with which Plato introduces this subject. His theory, it should be noted, conforms at least as much to the interest of the individual as to that of the State; for it provides congenial work for all according to their natural capacities, and uncongenial labour, whether above or below one’s powers, is a fertile source of misery and crime. Aristotle (Pol. B 4. 1263b 27) seems to doubt if Plato’s scheme was feasible. Granted rulers who are φρονίμοι εις τούτο, δυνατοί, and κηδημόνες τής πόλεως (412 e), in a small city—a thousand warriors, says Plato, will suffice (IV 423 A, cf. Grote Plato III p. 206 n.)—it could probably be worked without much difficulty. See also IV 423 e ff. We are not of course to suppose that the child was once for all assigned to his class at birth; he would be watched and tested again and again, before being finally disposed of, so that the likelihood of mistakes on the part of the Rulers is greatly lessened. Cf. Tim. 19 a.

146 c 17 τιμήσαντες: not “having estimated their values” (J. and C.); but simply ‘they will do him honour and’ etc. The suggestions, αντιτιμήσαντες or τιμήσαντες κατ’ εξίαν will hardly command assent. τιμή in τιμή τοις πολεος above may also be translated ‘honour’ if τήν τη φόσι προσήκουσαν is taken in its full force; the honour appropriate to his nature and no more.

415 d 21 ὅπως μέντ’ ἐν κτλ. Cf. Latus 663 E—664 A. Grote justly observes that “Plato has fair reason for his confident assertion that if such legends could once be imprinted on the minds of his citizens, as portions of an established creed, they would maintain themselves for a long time in unimpaired force and credit” (I. c. III p. 188). The first generation of citizens would remain incredulous, but the γενεάιοι ψεῦδος would be impressed upon their children, and soon be universally believed. It would require but little effort for a Greek city like Plato’s (V 470 E) to entertain in course of time a view which has so many points of contact with Greek tradition. Here Plato seems to hint that even his Rulers (for οἱ τοις ἕνεκεν must include these also) will in time believe; the Rulers of VI—VII might teach the legend as an ἐν διότι ψεῦδος, but would themselves refuse their assent. 

24 σχεδόν—λέγειν: viz. that the story
XXII. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἐξει ὅτι ἢν αὐτὸ ἢ φήμη ἀγάμη. 25 ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους τοὺς γρηγενεῖς ὑπόλαυσαντες προϊόμενοι ἡγομένων τῶν ἀρχόντων. ἐλθόντες δὲ θεασάτως τῆς πόλεως ὅπου κάλλι-
Ε στὸν στρατοπεδεύσασθαι, οὗν τοὺς τε ἐνδῆν μάλιστ' ἀν κατέχοιες, eι τις μὴ ἔθελοι τοὺς νόμους πείθεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἐξωθεὶν ἀπαμίνοιεν, eι πολέμους ὄστερ λύκος ἐπὶ ποίμνην τις ίοι, στρατοπεδεύσασθεν 30 δὲ, θύσαντες οἷς χρή, εὖνας ποιησάθων, ἥ τῶς; Ὅπως, ἐφη. Οὐκόν τοιαύτας, οίας χειμῶνος τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἰκάνας εἶναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὔχι; οἰκήσεις γὰρ, ἐφη, δοκείς μοι λέγειν. Ναί, 416 ἢ δ' εὖγο, στρατιωτικάς γε, ἀλλ' οὗ χρηματιοτικάς. Πῶς, ἐφη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγεις διαφέρειν ἑκαίνων; Ἡγώ σοι, ἢν δ' εὖγο, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν. δεινόστατον γὰρ τοὺς πάντων καὶ αἰσχίστων ποιμέσι τοιοῦτος γε καὶ οὐτω τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμώνιω, ὡστε ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ λυμοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἑθους αὐτοῦς τοὺς κύνας 5

3. αἰσχίστων Ἐξ: αἰσχίστων τοῦ Α.: αἰσχίνων τοῦ ΙΙ.

is intended to form part of the city’s permanent religious creed, and so encourage patriotism and fraternity. 415—417 B Our Rulers and Auxiliaries shall have a camp within the city, so as to check lawless citizens and ward off foreign foes. Their education will prevent them from preying on the others, provided we arrange their circumstances rightly. We shall assign them common property and houses, as well as common meals, to be furnished by the other citizens in return for the protection they enjoy. The use of gold and silver must be forbidden to our Guardians. 415 D ff. The communism of the Republic is, next to its educational curricula, the principal guarantee which Plato provides against the abuse of political power on the part of his Guardians (Nohle die Staatslehre Platos pp. 179 ff.). At the present stage Socrates gives only a brief and exoteric account of the system, reserving the full and final exposition for Book V. Plato may have been thinking of certain Spartan and Pythagorean institutions when he framed some of the regulations in this section: but his communism is much more thorough-going than anything of the kind before his day. See Steinhart Einleitung pp. 179—181, and especially Grote l.c. 111 pp. 207—216. Aristotle’s criticisms (Pol. B 5. 1262b 37—1263b 29) are interesting and acute, although he ignores some essential points, and is unable throughout to rise to the level of Plato’s idealism. See also Jowett Introd. pp. 175—179 and Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 136 f.

25 τοῦτο—ἀγάμη: ‘this will be as the vox populi shall determine’; i.e. it will depend upon φήμη whether our fable is believed or not. φήμη is not of course an oracle (as Ficinus supposed), but the half-personified voice of popular belief. Cf. Laws 838 C. 12.

28 τοῦς τεῦχος ἐκλ. Henkel (Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 52 n. 13) remarks that the prevention of faction inside the city is characteristically put in the foreground. The greatest danger to a Greek city was from internal dissension: cf. ν 470 c ff. nn.

415 E 30 στρατοπεδεύσασθαι. The Spartan government was compared to that of a στρατόπεδον (Isocr. 6. 81: cf. Gilbert Gr. Const. Ant. E. T. pp. 61 ff.). Plato’s city is literally a camp. His proposals would probably strike the average Athenian as a dangerous and tyrannical exaggeration of Spartan usages. See Jowett Introd. p. 176.

416 A 2 διαφέρειν ἑκαίνοις is rejected by Herwerden; but Schneider’s explanation hits the mark: “aŭ alterum hoc de discrimine insolentius dictum notat: prius fuerat quod domos eivás dixerat.”
6 κακουργεῖν. See 407 b n. The idiom is abundantly attested, both in Plato and in other Greek authors, although Madvig and Cobet have done their best to expel it from Plato’s text here and wherever else it occurs. 1416 b 8 μὴ τοιούτον—ποιήσωμεν. For τοιούτον cf. 388 d m. Richter conjectured μὴ τοιοῦτον—παντειθέω, “parum venustus,” as Hartman mercifully says.

9 ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων—ἀφομοιωθῶσιν. For the usual ampliative or explanatory asyndeton cf. 409 b. Aristotle objects that Plato’s regulations would virtually divide his city into two hostile camps (Pol. B 5. 1264a 24), and Grote does not see “what reply the Platonic Republic furnishes to this objection” (l.c. 111 p. 213). In reply to Aristotle, Plato might have pointed to his regulations about the interchange of classes (415 b ff.), which would have the effect of binding them together more securely. Moreover, where each individual has the work to do for which he is best qualified, one fruitful cause of discontent and sedition is removed. The wives and families of the lower class would also tend to keep them quiet. Nor does Aristotle’s objection allow sufficient weight to the training by which Plato tries to protect his guardians from such ‘spiritual pride’ as would alienate their subjects.

12 καὶ ἔγω ἔπον. See cr. n. καὶ ἔγω’ ἔπον, though generally retained, is surely wrong: it could only mean ‘I too,’ said I.’ No editor cites any other instance of ἔγω’ in this formula.

13 τοῦτο μὲν κτλ. prepares us for the second scheme of education in Book VII: cf. 412 b, 414 a mn.

1416 C 19 ἢτις—ἐπαροι. αὐτῶς is emphatic: “ipseis per se” (Schneider). The contrast is between the guardians in themselves, and in their dealings with the others. It is difficult to decide between παιδεία—ἐπαρεῖ (Bekker and others) and παιδεία—ἐπαρεῖ. The latter is exquisitum, and better supported on the whole. For the confusion between ἢ (subjunctive) and -οι (optative) in A see Introd. § 5. Cobet calls for τῶν instead of τῶν before φοιλάκας, but φοιλάκας requires the article. παῖνεν with the infinitive is rare, and means ‘prevent,’ not ‘make to cease’: cf. Hdt. v 67 (with Stein’s note) and Ar. Ach. 634, where Reiske’s conjecture πείσασ should not be accepted.
416 D 22 πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. A certain measure of communism in property seems to have existed among the Pythagoreans (RP. p. 43); but there is no reason to suppose that Plato is deliberately borrowing from them here: cf. Steinhardt Einleitung p. 179. The main object of Plato is of course to prevent the formation of private interests likely to compete with the claims of public duty. We remark that there has been no hint so far of common wives and children, although Blaschke (der Zusammenhang d. Fam. u. Gütengemeinschaft d. pl. St. m. d. pol. u. phil. Syst. Platos p. 7) thinks he finds one in 415 A. Cf. 415 D n.

23 ἀν μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη. For ἰ for ἰ (Herwerden) is elegant, but superfluous.

25 τὰ δ’ ἐπιτηδεία—μισθόν. It is fair that the lower classes should provide the others with the means of leisure, for it is they who ‘reap all the benefit of the laborious training bestowed on the guardians.’ They are the ‘ultimate and capital objects’ of Plato’s solicitude. Grote justly adds that ‘this is a larger and more generous view of the purpose of political institutions than we find either in Aristotle or in Xenophon’ (l.c. 111 p. 213).

416 E 20 ἡξυσία. A Spartan feature. see Gilbert Gk. Const. Ant. E. T. p. 65. Cf. Lasus 762 B ff. χρυσόν κτλ. So also in Sparta, according to Xen. Rep. Lac. 7. 6; with which cf. Plut. Lyc. 19. 6, where the ephors are said to have put to death a friend of Lysander λαβώνεις ἀργυρὸν ἵδα κεκτημένων. Plato is keenly conscious of the corrupting influence of wealth; see Gorg. 525 D ff., and cf. 111 373 E, IV 421 D n. His guardians are φόσει πλουσίων τὰς ψυχὰς (VIII 547 B) and need no other riches.

417 A 4 ὑπὸ—λέναι: as though Wealth communicated a taint, like a murderer sub isdem trahibus (ὁμοφῶρος). The Greek is much more expressive and picturesque than Apelt’s conjecture ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄροφον προσέλαβε (Observ. Cr. p. 11).

5 σφιχοῦτο τ’ ἀν καὶ σφιχοῦεν.
πόλιν. ὃπότε δ' αυτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτίσονται, οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, δεσπόται δ' ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων 1 τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσονται, Ἡ μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσαι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσαι δεσπόται διάξονσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἐνδοῦ τῇ τοὺς έξωθεν πολεμίους, θέουσαι ἡδὴ τότε: ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθροι αὐτοῖ τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. τούτων όν πάντων ἐνεκα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, φῶμεν οὔτω δεῖν κατεσκεύασθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεως τε περὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσωμεν, ἡ μή; 15 Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

tέλος πολιτείας γ'.

621 οὐ μὴν ἐσώθη—καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀλλ' σώσειν. σώζεσθαι of moral salvation is common in Plato; cf. e.g. VI 402 E, 502 B.

6 ὃπότε δ' αὐτοὶ ἔσονται. From this sentence it seems clear that the community of goods does not extend to the lower classes, although Aristotle complains that Plato has not said anything precise upon the matter (Pol. B 5. 1264b 15). Aristotle seems, however, to have understood that they were not to have common wives, for he cynically observes that it would have been better if they had, as then they would have been more divided and less likely to combine against the guardians (ib. 4. 1262a 40 ff).
APPENDICES TO BOOK III.

I.

III 389 B—D. The section on truth offers some serious difficulties. Throughout the whole of this division of the Republic (377 A—392 A) Plato is laying down precepts to which the μῦθοι of poets are to conform (cf. 377 B and 392 A), and in each case it is pointed out how the precept in question has been violated by Homer and other poets. Here, however, nothing is said to shew that we are prescribing for the poets, and no illustrations, either of our precept or of its violation, are cited from them. Schneider, indeed, attempts to extort this meaning from the section; but his theory, strictly understood, would require us to suppose that λατρεῖς δοτέον, ἴδιωταις οὐχ ἄπτεον, προσήκει ψευδόσθαι, οὐχ ἄπτεον τοὺς τοιούτους in B, ψεύσασθαι, ψευδόμενον in C, and κολάσας in D refer not to Plato’s own representations; that τῆς πόλεως in B is not Plato’s city, but any city figuring in poetry; and that τοὺς τοιούτους ἀρχηγός in C are not Plato’s rulers, but others. Such a supposition is hardly possible, if τοιούτους in C is genuine (see note ad loc.), and in any case it is neither natural nor obvious. It may with safety be asserted that if the section had occurred in any other context no one would have supposed it to contain rules for poetical fables: in itself it merely lays down the duty of the lower classes to speak the truth, with the conditions under which the rulers may lie. Cf. Rettig Proleg. pp. 62, 63 and notes on 389 D. Rettig, following up a hint of Schleiermacher’s, thinks the section was introduced to prepare the way for the rulers’ ‘lie’ from the origin of the State; while Susemihl (Genet. Entw. II p. 120) in some mysterious way appears to connect it with the theory of Ideas “as the true and higher Measure of the correct representation of Gods, Daemons, Heroes and the lower world.” The latter view is altogether fanciful; and neither of these explanations justifies Plato for having inserted the passage in this particular connexion, where he is discussing poetical legend, however much Rettig may extol the “art” with which he has concealed his art. The following seems to me a more probable explanation. We are professedly dealing with poetical representations of the gods and heroes, and we should expect Plato to require the poets to represent them as truthful and to enforce his remarks by poetical illustrations. He does not do so, because it has
already been done in ii 382—383. Instead of this, he reverts to 382 c (tôte ἀποτροπὴς ἔνεκα ὡς φαρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται sc. τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἡμῶν), and emphasizes, more than he has hitherto done, the reason why truthfulness must be ascribed to the gods, viz. in order to encourage the virtue among men. That Plato laid the greatest stress upon the virtue of Truth appears from the fine passage in Laws 730 b, c, beginning Αἰθήσει δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοὶ ἥγεσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων: thus it is not unnatural that he should recur to the subject here. The section should be taken as a kind of afterthought to 382—383, which it is intended partly to explain and partly to supplement. The whole section on Truth is for this and other reasons possibly later than the context in which it appears: see also on τῶν τοιούτων ἄρχοντας, 389 c.

A further question has been raised as to what Plato intended by the virtue of ἄλθεια. Rettig (l.c. pp. 61 and 65 ff.) and Stallbaum, anxious to find in all this a preliminary sketch of the cardinal virtues, interpret it as a sort of wisdom; but in that case, why did not Plato call it by its name? He is content to use the names of two other cardinal virtues, ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, although they have not yet been defined. Nor does this account of ἄλθεια contain any of the distinctive features of Wisdom, either in its popular sense or in the sense which it bears in Book iv. There is no reason to suppose that Plato means anything but what he says, and he himself describes the virtue as 'speaking the truth.' The whole attempt to see in this division of the dialogue a foreshadowing of the psychological theory of the virtues is, I believe, a mistake: only two of the virtues are named at all, ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, and these quite without any ulterior meaning or motive. Plato is simply describing in a somewhat desultory way (ὅποι ἄν ὁ λόγος ὀπέρ πνεύμα φέρῃ)—since a rigid plan is not necessary here—the kind of character which Poetry should endeavour to foster: a character which shall honour gods and parents, set value on reciprocal friendship (386 α'), be courageous, truthful, and distinguished for self-control. To force this description into the strait-jacket of the cardinal virtues would be pedantic. As it is, no essential feature of the καλὸς κἀγαθὸς is omitted.

II.

On Plato's ἀρμονίαι.

III 398 e—399 b. Plato enumerates in all six scales in three groups. The first group is θρησκείας, and includes Mixo-Lydian, Syntono-Lydian, and such like; the second is μαλακών, and embraces Chalaro-Ionian and Chalaro-Lydian; to the third, which occupies a middle position between the other two, belong Dorian and Phrygian. Chalaro-Ionian seems further to imply the existence of Syntono-Ionian, and we read of both in Pratinas Fr. 5 Bergk, μὴτε σύντονον διόκε, μὴτε τὰν ἀνεμέναν Ἰαστι μοῦσαι, ἄλλα τὰν μέσαν... νεὼν ἄρουραν αἰώλιε τῷ μέλει, if Westphal's
interpretation is (as I believe) right (Harmonik p. 186. See also Monro Modes of Greek Music pp. 5, 6). It has been supposed that Plato's μεσολυδική is only συντονοιωτή under another name; but the name Mixo-Lydian seems rather to point to a compromise between two distinct modes, one of which was the Lydian. Possibly the συντονοιωτή is included under τουαγράμμενες, as von Jan holds Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 823.

According to Westphal (l.c. pp. 21 ff.), whose theory is partly based upon what must, I fear, be regarded as a speculative deduction from Aristides Quintil. i pp. 21, 22 ed. Meibom, Plato's ἀρμονίαι were as follows:

(1) Mixo-Lydian  B C D E F G A B,
(2) Syntono-Lydian  A B C' D' E' F' G' A',
(3) Chalaro-Ionian  G A B C' D' E' F' G',
(4) Chalaro-Lydian  F G A B C' D' E' F',
(5) Dorian  E F G A B C' D' E',
(6) Phrygian  D E F G A B C' D'.

It will be observed that Westphal's scales are all of them ἀρμονίαι in the strict sense of the term, i.e. they differ in the order of their intervals; and that the Syntono-Lydian begins a major third higher than the Chalaro-Lydian.

An entirely different theory has been propounded by von Jan (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 pp. 815 ff.), who gives the following series of scales:

(1) Mixo-Lydian  E♯ F♯ G♯ A♯ B C' D' E'♯,
(2) Syntono-Lydian  E F G A B C' D' E',
(3) Chalaro-Ionian  E♭ F G A♭ B♭ C' D♭ E♭',
(4) Chalaro-Lydian  E♭ F G A♭ B♭ C' D' E♭',
(5) Dorian  E F G A B C' D' E',
(6) Phrygian  E F G A B C' D' E'.

According to this view, the Syntono-Lydian and the Chalaro-Lydian are in reality the same mode, differing from one another only in pitch. Plato's language appears to me to point to such a conclusion (see on 398 c, e), but it is not altogether easy for us to believe that the difference of a semitone in pitch could have converted τὸ θρηνῶδες into τὸ συμπωσικὸν. It will further be remarked that if we take the Dorian as the original and fundamental ἀρμονία (Lach. 188 iv), the θρηνῶδεις ἀρμονία, according to von Jan's theory, can be made from it by tuning different strings a semitone higher, and the χαλαραί by tuning different strings a semitone lower.
Von Jan’s hypothesis is severely censured by Westphal (I.e. pp. 209—215), and strong arguments can be urged against it from the standpoint of modern music. I have quoted it in this Appendix because of its symmetry, and also because, so far as it goes, it seems to me to be more in harmony with the scanty indications furnished by Plato’s language than the theory of Westphal. It is true, as Westphal urges, that Plato applies the term ἄρμονία to Syntono-Lydian and Chalaro-Lydian as well as to Dorian, Phrygian etc.; but I do not think it follows that Syntono-Lydian and Chalaro-Lydian differed in the arrangement of intervals: for σύντονος and χαλαρά ought to refer to pitch alone: and συντονολυθιστή or χαλαραλυθιστή may have been called a ἄρμονία not ημα σύντονος or χαλαρά, but ημα λυθιστή. The references to Plato’s ἄρμονίαι in Arist. Pol. Θ 5. 1340α 40 ff. may be explained in the same way. Wherever Aristotle speaks of ἀνεμέναι and σύντονοι ἄρμονίαι, he is referring, as the editors hold, to Chalaro-Lyidian, Chalaro-Ionian, and Syntono-Lyidian, Syntono-Ionian; and these are properly called ἄρμονίαι as being varieties of λυθιστή and ἱστή. See my article in Cl. Rev. x pp. 378 ff. The passage on the modes or (as he calls them) τρόποι in Bacchius’ Isagoge § 46 ff. seems—as far as concerns the relative pitch of the scales—to point to a solution with which neither Westphal nor von Jan agrees, but Bacchius gives us no information about the order of intervals in Plato’s ἄρμονίαι.
I. Kai ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ὑπολαβὼν Τι οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀπολογήσει, εἰώ τις σε φῇ μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαιμονιας ποιεῖν τούτοις τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἕαυτος, ὥν ἐστὶ μὲν ἡ πόλις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολαύουναν ἀγαθὸν τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἄλλοι ἄγρους τε

comes from self-victory than from in| dumgulence (v 465 d ff.; cf. IX 583 c n).
Compare the conversation of Socrates with Aristippus in Mem. II 1. 17 ff.
2 μη. On μὴ with the infinitive after verbs of saying see I 346 E n. p. 152 susp.
3 δὲ ἐαυτοῦ: i.e. they have them| selves to thank for not being eὐδαιμονες.
Cf. v 465 οὐκ οἴδα ὄντων λόγου ἡμῶν ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς φιλακάς οὐκ εὐδαιμονιας ποιοίμεν, οἰς ἔχων πάντα ἔχειν τά τῶν πολιτῶν οὔδεν ἔχον; and Solon 33 οὐκ ἔφο Σδόνων βαθὺφων οὐδὲ βουλής ἀνήρ | εὐθέω γὰρ θεοῦ διδώσων αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδέχητο (he of his own initiative refused). άδα is used exactly as in I 354 B. This view, which is Ast's, gives an excellent mean| ing, and Schneider, who at first proposed a subtler explanation, adopts it in his translation ("durch ihre eigene Schuld"). The various conjectures δὴ, αὐτοῖς ὡν (Stephanus), δὴ αὐτοῖς ὡν (Buttmann), αὐτοῖς δὲ ὡν (Herwerden) need no refu| tation.
4 ἄλλοι: not οἱ ἄλλοι (Bekker, Stall| baum, etc.), which might be taken as referring to the lower classes in Plato's State. Plato would not be likely to permit these to have οἰκίας καλὰι καὶ μεγάλαι. ἄλλοι means 'other rulers,' i.e. rulers in other cities; and κεκτημένοι belongs to οἱ δὲ: 'possessing, like other rulers, lands,' etc. So Schneider, rightly.
For the idiomatic position of οἷον ἄλλοι cf. vii 515 A, 528 B, IX 589 B al.
5 κεκτημένοι καὶ οίκιας οἰκοδομοῦμενοι καλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ
tαύταις πρέπουσαν κατασκευὴν κτώμενοι καὶ θυσίας θεοίς ιδίας
θύντες καὶ ξεινοδοκοῦντες καὶ δὴ καὶ, ἢ νῦν ἢ σὺ ἔλεγες, χρυσὸν
tε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι καὶ πάντα ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσι
μακαρίους εἶναι; ἄλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φαίη ἂν, ἀστερ' ἐπικουροὶ μισθω-
τοί ἐν τῇ πάλαι φαίνονται | καθίσσαι οὐδέν άλλο ή χρωμούντες. 420
Ναὶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτα γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοὺς
στίνοις λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ οἱ άλλοι, ὡστε οὔδ' ἂν ἀποδημήσῃ
βουλῶνται ἴδια, ἐξεῖσται αὐτοῖς, οὔδ' ἐταίραις διδόναι οὔδ' ἀνα-
5 λίσκαιν ἂν τοι βουλῶνται ἄλλοσε, οἶα δὴ οἱ εὐδαιμονές δοκοῦντες
εἶναι ἀναλίσκοντοι. ταύτα καὶ άλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ τῆς κατη-
γορίας ἀπόλειτες. 'Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ὡς, ἐστο καὶ ταύτα κατηγορημένα.
Τι οὖν δὴ ἀπολογοσύνεθα, φής; Ναϊ. Τὸν αὐτὸν όμον, ἦν δ' Β
ἐγώ, πορευόμενοι εὐρήσαμεν, ὡς' ἐγξὺμα, ἀ ξέρετα. ἐρωμένοι γὰρ,
10 ὅτι θαυμαστὸν μὲν ἂν οὐδὲν εἶχα, εἰ καὶ οὔτοι οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστατοι
eἰσιν, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τούτο ἐλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζεμεν, ὅπως ἐν
τῇ ἡμῖν ἐθνὸς ἐσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμονή, ἄλλος ὅπως δ' τι μάλιστα
オリジὴ τῆς πόλεως. οἰδὴμεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὑρεῖν
dικαιοσύνην καὶ αὐ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκομένη ἀδικίαιν, κατιδόντες
13. ἂν εὑρεῖν II: ἀνευρέων Λ.
C de 1 κρίναι ἂν, δ' πάλαι ξητοῦμεν. νῦν μὲν ὄν, ὡς οἶόμεθα, τὴν 15 εὐδαιμονία πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες ὀλγοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτω τίμιας τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην: αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκέψῳμεθα. ὀσπέρ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γραφόντας προσελθῶν τις ἐξεφει λέγων, ὅτι οὐ τοῖς καλλιστοῖς τοῦ φιλοῦ τὰ καλλίστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν· οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοί, καλλιστὸν ὄν, οὐκ 20 ὀστρεῖον ἐναλληλιμένοι εἰεν, ἀλλὰ μέλαν· μετρίως ἀν ἐδοκοῦμεν. D πρὸς αὐτῶν ἀπολογείοιης λέγοντες: 2 Ω θαυμᾶσι, μὴ οἶον δεῖν ἡμᾶς οὔτω καλῶς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδ' αὐ τάλλα μέρη, ἀλλ' ἀπεὶ εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστως ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλῶν ποιούμεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ 25 ἀνύγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φιλαξὶ προσάπτεν· E ἐ ἐκείνους πάν μαλλόν ἀπεργάσεται ἡ φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα γαρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἔστινίς αὐτὲς ἀμφιέσταντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιβέθετο πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμείας κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντας τε καὶ εὐώχον- 30. ἐπὶ δεξιὰ Σ. ζ: ἐπὶ δεξία (sic) II.

420 c 16 οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες—τιθέντες. ἀπολαβόντες is absolute, almost adverbial (cf. Gorg. 405 E); and ὀλγοὺς goes with τιθέντες. So Schneider and others rightly explain the construction.

17 αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν κτλ. Here we have the first express promise of Books VIII and IX, although the promise is afterwards fulfilled in an ampler manner than is indicated here. See also 427 D. 18 ὀσπέρ οὖν ἂν—μελάν. Cf. (with J. and C.) Hipp. Maj. 390 b. ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας means 'painting statues of men.' Cf. Eupirides Fr. 764. 2 γραφότοις εἰ δεσια προσβλέπων τύποις. The question whether statues were ever painted in the best period is an old controversy, the echoes of which have hardly yet died away. Schubart (Fl. Jahr. 1874, pp. 20 ff.) and others prefer to take ἀνδριάντας merely as 'likenesses of men,' but the word was regularly, if not indeed always, used of statues. That the surface of archaic statues was regularly painted is now no longer doubtful: see Gardner Handbook of Greek Sculpture pp. 28 ff. During the best period, in the case of marble or other polished surfaces, the painting was regularly confined to the eyes, eyelids, eyebrows, hair and the like. See on the whole subject Sittl's Arch. der Kunst (in Iwan Müller's Handbuch) pp. 413, 414. μελάν does not necessarily mean jet black, but only some dark and quiet colour. In point of fact, the eyes of the early marble statues on the Acropolis "are painted with a dark pigment, almost black" (Gardner L.c. p. 30). The use—regular in Greek—of γραφέω for painting is an interesting survival of the time when decorative art was little beyond carving in relief (Sittl L.c. p. 416). The present passage is strangely ignored by Sertorius in his interesting article "Plato und die Malerei" in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. IX pp. 123—148.

420 ε 28 ἔστινίς. The name ἔστις was given to various kinds of purple robes or mantles—among them those worn by kings upon the stage, and by riders in festal processions. The authorities are cited in Müller Gr. Bühnennl. p. 234 n. 1. If the Scholiasts on Ar. Clouds 70 and Theocr. 11 74 are to be trusted, we should write ἔστινίς, not ἔστινίς.

30 ἐπὶ δεξιὰ. Whether we read ἐπὶ δεξιὰ or ἐπὶ δεξία the word should be understood as 'from left to right.' At a Greek banquet, the guests were always placed ἐπὶ δεξιὰ, i.e. so that the guest on your right hand occupied a lower place.
μένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραδεμένους, ὅσον ἀν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιοῦτο τρόπον μακάριον ποιεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ὅκη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονίῃ. ἀλλὰ ἡμᾶς μὴ οὔτω νοητέει· ὥς, ἀν σοι πειθόμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἐστι, οὔτε ὁ κεραμεύς κεραμεύειν· οὔτε ἄλλοι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχουσι σχῆμα εὖ ἡ πόλις γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος· νευρορραφοὶ γὰρ φαύλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθάρεταις καὶ προσποιημένοι εἶναι μὴ ὅντες 5 πόλει οὐδὲν δεινόν ὕλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὅντες ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὅρας δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαι ἄρνη τοῖς πόλιν ἀπολλύσαι καὶ αὐ τοῦ εὐ οἰκεῖω καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τοῦ καρποῦ ἔχουσιν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν ὕλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιοῦμεν, ἥκιστα κακοῦργους Β τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνο λέγων γεωργὸς τίνας καὶ ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πανηγυρεῖ ἀλλὰ οὖν ἐν πόλει ἐστι αὐτοὺς εὐδαιμονία ἐγγενεῖ· σπευδῶν οὖν, πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τοὺς ὕλακες καθιστώμεν, ὅπως ὁ τε πλειστάν αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονία ἐγγενεῖ· συνεται, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατῶν εἰ ἐκείνην

(ὑποκατακεκλιμένον) than you, and the wine circulated from left to right of the banqueters. See Blümmer Privatall. p. 237 n. 7 and Darbishire Rellig. Philol. p. 78. The word suggests a banquet with all the formalities, and heightens the incongruity of the situation, like the purple robes and golden crowns of the farmers. Schneider's exhaustive discussion seems to me conclusive in favour of writing ἐπὶ δὲξιὰ as two words. Casaubon has been followed by most of the editors (except Schneider) in taking ἐπὶ δὲξια as an adverb = 'commode' (Ast), 'commode et elegantem' (Stallbaum etc.), or 'dexterously,' 'cleverly' (J. and C.); but it may well be doubted if the word could mean 'commode,' and 'dexterously' is inappropriate. Cf. Darbishire l.c. p. 78 n. 1. ἐπὶ δὲξιά goes with κατακλίναστες and πρὸς τὸ τῷπ (cf. Blaydes on Ar. Ach. 751) with διαπίνονται. The fire is that by which the potters bake their pottery; their workshop has for the nonce become a hall of banqueting.

421 A 2 ἐξ ὄνω: i.e. τοῦτων τῶν σχημάτων ἐξ ὄνω. Cf. II 373 E n.
6 καὶ αὐ: νυμισυρὲ (Ficinus), i.e. σικιτυ et contra, as Ast observes.
7 εὶ μὲν οὖν—λέγοι. This difficult passage has suffered severely at the hands of critics, but the text is probably nearly, if not quite, sound. If we take the words as they stand in A, they mean, broadly speaking, that if we are making true guardians, and he (ὁ εἰκείνο λέγων means the τις in 419 A) is making something different, he cannot, like ourselves, be speaking of a πόλις, but of something else. This is logical and gives an excellent sense: cf. 422 E εὐδαιμῶν ἐί· ὅτι μὲν ἄξον εἶναι ἄλλην τινα προσεῖπτες πολέως ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οὖν ἡμεῖς κατεκεκλιμένους. Now we are making guardians in the true sense of the term, such as are least likely to harm the city; whereas the author of the other proposals is making (not guardians, but since he gives them ἄξονοι 419 A) a sort of farmers (cf. III 417 B οἰκονόμους μὲν καὶ γεωργὸι ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἐσονταῖς) and men who do harm their city, because they "for their bellies' sake, Creep, and intrude and climb into the fold." The advocates of such a theory must mean something different from a city—something like the "shearers' feast" in Lycidas: cf. I 343 A n. γεωργὸς is possibly corrupt; if so, I think we should read λεωργὸς to contrast with ἥκιστα κακοῦργος. The word occurs in the Memorabilia, if not in Plato. See Cl. Rev. x p. 385. Other emendations are enumerated in App. I.
But let us pluck the most essential Idioms—

421 E] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Δ

22. διαφθειρει II: διαφθειρε Α.

14 ἐκεῖνο κτλ.: i.e. to pursue the other policy, which we enjoin. ἐκεῖνο does more than merely anticipate ὁπως—έσονται.

421 C 18 ἐ ατέον. The infinitive, which would naturally follow ἐ ατέον, is 'drawn into construction' with ὁπως—ἀποδίδουν. I once thought of ἐ ατέον (i.e. ἐχει, cf. V 468 Ἄ.), taking the genitive as in πῶς ἔχεις τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαμονίας; But the ms reading is satisfactory enough.

421 D 22 άστε—γίγνεσθαι: 'so that they also become bad.' These words, though expounded by Hartman, are welcome, if not necessary, in view of κακῶν χυτρεῶν γίγνεσθαι and χείρων δὲ αὐτῶν in D and Ε. καὶ indicates that κακῶν γίγνεσθαι is more than διαφθειρέω; and so it is represented in the sequel. The reading of Α (see cr. u.) perhaps points to a variant διαθεσθεί.

24 πλαυτύτας—τέχνης. Ar. Plut. 510—534 (cited by Ast) furnishes an excellent commentary on this text. See also on 111 416 ε.

28 παρέξεσθαι is 'to provide out of his own resources' (de suo praebere): cf. VIII 554 Α. Cobet cancels the word; Herwerden and Hartman prefer πορίζεσθαι, for which there is no ms authority. πορίζεσθαι would imply that the χυτρεῦσε buys his ὄργανα ready-made from others, whereas παρέξεσθαι expresses no opinion on this point.

421 E 30 διδάσκεται. Thompson, Cobet, and others peremptorily call for διδάσκεται. See however Riddell Digest of Idioms § 87. Riddell conclusively shews (1) that in Men. 93 D διδάσκατο as well as εὑρεθέτωσον is said of a parent teaching his own son (a passage misunderstood—I think—by Jebb on Soph. Ant. 356: cf. Men. 93 C). (2) that εἰδανε is used of a parent getting his sons taught by others in Men. 94 D and 94 D (bis). Another example of the second usage is Prot. 324 D. The fact is that the "Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another'; neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle, that qui facit per alium factum per se," Riddell. Jebb (l.c.) observes that "once or twice ἐδιδάσκατο is merely εἰδε ἔδιδα with the idea of
the teacher's interest superadded"; it may be doubted if "once or twice" is strong enough, but at all events this is the usage here, and in v 467 E. The active ἔδιδαχθη is appropriately used of teaching others (Ἄλλος κτῆ;) ; in ἔδιδα-

entlich the personal interest reappears, for it is the sons who are the prominent pupils (whence Ἐδίδω and not καὶ Ἀλλος). Richter's view (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 147) that ἔδιδαχθη denotes the result of the action rather than the action itself is partly true, but it is not the middle which gives it this force. In Ar. Clouds 783, as Socrates is not Strepsiades' father, we may accept Elmsley's emendation ἔδιδαχθη ἃν for ἔδαδαλαμη without prejudice to the present case.

32 αὐτῷ: viz. οἱ τεχνίται: see II 377 C n. We need not change τεχνών to τεχνητῶν.

422 Α 2 ποιοῦντος = 'producing', gives a satisfactory sense. Wealth and Poverty are not to be allowed παραδώσαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, because—we have here the statement of a general law—they are the authors of luxury etc. ἐμποιοῦντος (in Ξ and other ms) is an obvious 'emenda-

tion,' though adopted by Stallbaum and others: cf. 444 D. κακορρηγίαν. If the form is right, Plato must intend to draw attention to the etymology of the word. κακορρηγίαν appears in two or three inferior ms, and (as ε seems to be written over an erased) was perhaps the original reading in Paris A.

422 C 14 πολλάκις: not 'perhaps', (one of J. and C.'s alternative suggestions) but 'frequently,' 'repeatedly.' πολλάκις does not mean 'perhaps,' except after εἰ, εἶναι, ἡμήν and the like: see Ast's lex. Plat. III p. 144 and Heindorf on Phad. 60 E.
οἱ ἄθληται ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δυσπλασίως τε καὶ τρεπλασίως αὐτῶν μαχοῦνται. Συγχαρθοῦμαι σοι, ἐφι' δοκεῖσ γὰρ μοι ὁρθῶς λέγειν. 30

D'Tl δ'; ἄν πρεσβείην πέμψαντες εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν πόλιν τάλαθη εἰπτοσίν, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν οὗτον χρυσίῳ οὐδ' ἀργυρῷ χρόμεθα, οὐδ' ἠμῖν θέμις, ὑμῖν δὲ· συμπολεμώσαντες οὐν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐχέτε τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων· οτι τινὰς ἀκούσαντας ταύτα αἱρήσεθαι κυσὶ πολεμεῖν στρεφοῖς τε καὶ ἵσχυοις μᾶλλον ἡ μετὰ κυνῶν προβάτους πίωι τε 25 καὶ ἀπαλοῖς; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς μίαν, ἐφη, πόλιν συνα- 31. πάμπολαι A²Π: πάμπολαι A¹.

422 D 21 τί δ' ἢ τί; κτλ. ἄν πρεσβείην κτλ. has for its apodosis οτι τινὰς κτλ. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τί δ'. The alternatives are to place it after τῶν ἐτέρων, or else to suppose with Ast that the construction is suddenly changed at οτι. Neither solution is so simple as to write τί δ'; Cf. 425 c, 426 a, and (for the elision before a pause) 428 c.

24 κυσί. In the game of πόλεις, the counters were called 'Dogs' (Pollux ix 98). The comparison of our auxiliaries to dogs prepares the way for the allusion in 422 β 1, where see note. This has been pointed out by Ridgeway (Journal of Hell. Studies xvi p. 288), who gives illustrations of three 'dogs' of this description found in Egypt and now in the British Museum.

422 E 28 εὐδαίμων εἰ κτλ.: 'you are fortunate to be able to think etc.' cf. v. 450 c. εὐδαίμων is less common in this ironical sense than μακάριον.

31 ἔκαστη γὰρ κτλ.: 'for each of them is, as the saying goes, no city, but a-many cities.' The phrase τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν in Plato seems always to mean 'as they say in the proverb' or 'proverbial saying': see 1x 573 c, Latin 780 c, and cf. ib. 773 b. Now it is probable from the position of τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν that ἄλλ' οὐ πόλις forms part of the proverb: so that the whole saying may have run πολίεις μὲν εἰς παμπόλαις, ἄλλ' οὐ πόλις. (Her-
for believing that each of the players' sides was called collectively his polis. In Su-
semihl and Hicks Politics of Aristotle p.
148 n., Dr Jackson remarks that the words παύσηλαι πόλεις, ἀλλ' ὁ πόλις make it like-
ly "that a compact body of pieces was called πόλις." If we may go further, and
suppose that the whole of a player's side was called his πόλις, the words of Plato
do μὲν—πολεμία ἄλληλαις, ἢ μὲν πενήτων, ἢ ἀναπλασίας πολλαί receive additional point by be-
coming an exact counterpart of the game. A defeated player, gazing ruefully at his
depopulated squares, each of which, as well as the whole of his side, is a 'city,'
might therefore well exclaim, 'Cities upon cities, but no city!' for there can be no
city without men (ἐρημοὺς ἀνδρόν μη ἐρω-
kοινῶν ἐσῳ Soph. O. T. 57). I have thought of other possibilities, but this
hypothesis as to the origin of the proverb suits the words of Plato better than any
other which I can devise. For a different view see Hoffmann in Fl. Jahrb. 1863
pp. 240 ff. Cf. also Meineke Fr. Com. Gr. II pp. 44 f. It should be mention-
ed that Stewart (Cl. Rev. VII p. 359)
thinks there need be no allusion to the
game of πόλεις in this passage, but only
a jest about making one into many (cf.
Men. 77 θάνατοι πολλὰ ποιῶν έκ τοῦ ένός, ὡτε φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι έκθε-
stoτε οἱ σκεύουστοι), while Schneider
finds only a "lusus in verbis atque in con-
sociatione singularis et pluralis." Neither of
these suggestions meets the situation.

32. πολεμία II: πολεμία Α.
2. πολλαὶ ΑΠ: πολλαὶ Α'.
5. \(\text{έως v; ως ΑΠΕ: ωύτω q.}\)

32. δύο—καὶ ὁποῖον ἢ: 'two, in any
case,' lit. 'if there be even anything at all,' i.e. 'whatever there be.' So also
Schneider. The subject to ὁποῖον ἢ is
impersonal, and not the city, as Jowett
seems to suppose.

πολεμία. On this—comparatively rare
—termination of the dual feminine in
Plato see Roep er de dual. usu Pl.
pp. 3 ff. Cf. IX 587 b n.

423 Α 6 εὐδοκιμεῖν. Stallbaum and
others read δοκεῖν with one inferior
ms. But εὐδοκιμεῖν is at least equally
good: 'great, I do not say in fame, but
great in the true sense of the word
'great.' σωφροσύνη is a city's truest
greatness, not aggression, and "the ap-
plauding thunder at its heels, Which men
call Fame."
III. Our city, ἵνα δ' ἑγώ, οὗτος ἄν εἶη καὶ κάλλιστος ὅρος τοῖς ἴμματέρων ἀρχουσιν, ὅσην δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἱλικὴ ὀφθη ὅσην χώραν ἀφορισμένους τὴν ἅλλην χαίρειν εἶναι. Τε, ἐφη, ὅρος; ὅλως μὲν, ἵνα δ' ἑγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὐ ἂν ἐθέλη ἀξιομενή εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὐξεῖν, πέρα δὲ μή. Καὶ καλῶς 15 C γ', ἐφη. Ὅνος καὶ τούτο αὐτὸ ἄλλο πρόσταγμα τοῖς φύλαξι προστάξομεν, φυλάττειν παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἡ πόλις ἑσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα, ἅλλα τις ἱκανή καὶ μία. Καὶ φαύλοις γ', ἐφη, ἵσως αὐτοῖς προστάξομεν. Καὶ τούτου γε, ἵνα δ' ἑγώ, ἔτι φανδείν τόδε, οὔ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπεμνήσθημεν λέγοντες, 20 ὡς δέοι, εάν τε τῶν φυλάκων τις φαύλος ἐγκοινὸν γένηται, εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸν ἀπότεμενεθαί, εάν τ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων σπουδαίοι, εἰς τοὺς φύλακας. τούτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τούτο ἐνα πρὸς ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἔργον δει κοιμιζεῖν, ὅπως ἄν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ἑπιτηδεύων ἑκαστὸς µὴ πολλοὶ, 25 ἅλλ' εἰς γίγνεται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἔξυπνασα ἡ πόλις μία φόνται, ἅλλα µὴ πολλαί. Ἐστὶ γὰρ, ἐφη, τούτο ἐκείνου σμικρότερον.

423 B—424 C Our city must not be increased beyond the limits essential to its unity. It will be the duty of the Guardians to see to this, as well as to assign the children to their proper classes in the State. These and similar duties will be easy, if our educational curriculum is steadfastly upheld; and it will readily appear that the principle of community should also be applied to maternity and procreation. Our citizens will thus improve as one generation succeeds another. We must forbid all innovations in music and gymnastic because they are productive of political change.

423 B 14 μέχρι—πέρα δι μή. The extent to which the city may safely increase beyond 1000 προτελευώντες (and the necessary farmers etc.) is therefore left to the judgment of the guardians. Like every natural organism, it should grow to the limits prescribed for it by nature (cf. 424 A θ.); but Plato probably conceived of it even in its maturity as relatively small. The regulations about marriage and the interchange between the different classes would be easier to work if the State was not too large. See also on χαλών in 423 A, and on the general subject New- man's Politics of Aristotle I pp. 313—315.

423 C 18 μεγάλη δοκοῦσα: 'seeming-great': see 422 E.

19 ἵσως points the irony, which is continued in φαύλοτερον.

20 πρόσθεν. III 415 B, C η.ν.

423 D 24 ἐκαστὸν: with ἕνα, not of course with ἔργον, as Hartman seems to suppose. With what follows cf. Laws 847 B ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἕνα µίνων ἅλλα µὴ πολλοὺς εἶναι αἱν ἐκαστοὶ 443 E.

26 μία—ἄλλα µὴ πολλαὶ. Aristotle's criticism (Pol. B 2. 1361a 17—b 15) is interesting, but captious. Plato would entirely agree with him that τὸ λεγὼ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σφέίτα τὰ πολιτεῖα. 'The reciprocity of services and functions' between the three classes is the very foundation of Plato's city, which is far from being an undifferentiated unity. It is rather a ἐν ἑκ πολλῷ, the πολλὰ being the three divisions of the State. See Susemihl and Hicks I.e. 1 p. 215. φόντα should be noted; unity of this kind is κατὰ φόνα.

27 σμικρότερον is still ironical. In what follows Plato speaks his real mind: cf. Laws 813 D.
423 E. 30 ἐν μέγα. Ἡ balances πολλά: we need but one regulation, ‘the proverbial one great thing, or rather not great, but adequate.’ J. and C. err in translating ἰκανῶν “to a sufficient extent”; and Stallbaum in making ἰκανῶν “quod dicebamus,” ἐν μέγα is illustrated by J. and C. from Pol. 307 a.

32 εὗ παιδεύομενοι. Does this refer to the scheme of education already given, or is it a promise of the philosopher’s training in Books vii and vii? Krohn takes the former view (Pl. St. p. 127), and (if we have regard only to the preceding discussion) it must be allowed that this is the natural interpretation of Plato’s words. At the same time, it is not easy to see how the musical education of ἰ and ΙΙ would enable the guardians to grasp such a conception as the community of wives and children. And in the later books Plato expressly declares that the training necessary for the Rulers was inadequately discussed before: see vi 497 c ff., 502 D. For these reasons we must, I think, suppose that Plato when he wrote these words was thinking of the education still to be provided. Cf. also ΙΙΙ 414 A.

33 τὴν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ. is the first mention of communism in wives and children. According to an ingenious choralistic theory, it was this sentence which inspired the Ecclesiastae of Aristophanes, to whose caricature Plato replies in Book v (Stein de Ar. Eccles. arg. etc. and Brandt Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre v. d. Seelentheilen, p. 6). See on the whole subject App. i to Book v.

In γάμων and παιδοτοιας there is a kind of zeugma: for κτῆσιν suits only γυναικῶν. Plato marks the difference by placing τε after τὴν and not after τῶν. γάμων (conjectured by Richards) would depend on διαφερομαι; but διαφερομαι γάμων καὶ παιδοτοιας is surely an impossible expression.

424 A. 2 κοινὰ τὰ φιλων. “Locus brevitatem loquendi paullo insolentiorum habet, quam sic explicco: δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τι ταῖς μάλιστα ποιοθετεῖ κοινά, ὡστε κατὰ τὰ κοινὰ μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φιλών εἶναι” (Schneider). Hartman’s proposal to omit τὰ φιλών has much in its favour. It is more elegant to suggest than quote so familiar a proverb; and the note τὰ φιλών might well have been added by a scribe upon the margin. In ν 449 C on the other hand the addition of τὰ φιλών is appropriate and right.

3 ὀρθότατα κτλ. Adimantus accepts the principle, both here and in ν 449 C. The doubts which he expresses later concern not the principle, but the τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας (ib.). It is obvious that the principle κοινὰ τὰ φιλών might be applied to marriage etc. in a sentimental kind of way, without involving such a kind of community as is afterwards described. As Rettig points out (Proleg. p. 95 n.), Adimantus takes τι ταῖς μάλιστα as “in quantum fieri posset maxime.”

4 ἔρχεται κτλ.: “goes on growing like a circle.” So Schneider, rightly. Others take κύκλος (1) as a hoop or wheel—“goes on with accumulating force like a wheel” (J. and C.), or (2) as an ever-widening circle in ruffled water (Krohn, Herwerden etc.). As to (2), κύκλος cannot mean a circle in water, unless we insert ἐν ἰδιαί, which Herwerden has the audacity to do. If we adopt the first solution, we make
κόκλος a specific kind of circle; but nothing in the context warrants this. It is also very doubtful if αὐξανομένη can = 'with accumulating force': certainly κόκλος αὐξάνεται could not bear this meaning; and to exclude αὐξανομένη from the comparison (as J. and C. also suggest) renders ὅσπερ κόκλος practically otiose. The fact is that the growth of a natural (κατὰ φύσιν) city is just like the drawing of a circle in Plato's way of thinking. Like a circle it grows and expands, like a circle too, when its zenith is passed, it narrows to the inevitable end. Here it is only the growth which is dwelt upon; but ὅσπερ κόκλος seems to warn us of impending decay and foreshadow Books VIII—IX. For more on this point see my *Number of Plato* pp. 58—62. αὔξανομένη is 'growing' in the widest sense i.e. reaching its full maturity of size and strength and beauty; but in what follows Plato characteristically confines himself to what he conceived to be a city's truest growth, the improvement of the citizens.

τροφή γάρ κτλ. Plato seems therefore to hold that acquired characters can be transmitted to posterity. The general sentiment may be illustrated by the quaint catches sung by choirs of old men, men in their prime, and boys at Sparta:


424 B 9 τοῦτο is not intended to anticipate the ὅτως clause, but means—like αὕτη below—our system of education. This is clear from διαφθάνειν, which is the antithesis to σφυξμένη above, and like it, is said of the παιδεία. τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν is in loose apposition to αὕτη.

13 τὴν ἀμφιτέλητα. *Od.* 1 351 f. τὴν γάρ αὐτὴν μᾶλλον εἰ πικλειοῦντ' ἀνθρωποί κτλ. Plato's variant probably points to a different recension; for ἐπιφρονεώσην (sic) ἐπακούωσεν in Hesychius seems to refer to the same passage (Schneider). For the sentiment cf. *Pind.* *Ol.* 9. 48 αἰνεὶ δὲ παλαιὸν μὲν ὄνομα, ἀνθρέα δὲ γὰρ νεοτέρον, *Xen.* *Cyr.* 1 6. 38 and many other illustrations in *Smyth Greek Melic Poets* p. 174.

424 C 16 πολλάκις. 422 C n.

17 τρόπον ὄνομαν. *Pind.* *Ol.* 3. 4 Μοίσα δὲ οὗτος μοι παραστάσα νεοσιγάλον εὑρότι τρόπον. Pindar would inculc Plato's censure for these words.

18 ὑπολαμβάνειν: i.e. understand such to be the poet's meaning.
20 MOUSIKEIS TRÔPOI. In later musical theory τρόποι was technically used to denote the three varieties of musical composition—νομικός, διθυραμβικός, τραγικός. They were called τρόποι (according to Aristid. Quint. p. 30 Meib.) because they expressed different psychological characters (Dia to symphatous to the ήδος κατά τά μέλη τῆς διανοίας), because, in short, they were μυσχική τρόπων. Plato's μουσική τρόποι need not however be confined to Aristides' three varieties. On the connexion between musical and political changes see Laws 700 A—701 D. The connexion was recognised universally throughout Greece, and particularly at Sparta, where—as Pausanias (III 12. 10) tells us—Timotheus had his lyre confiscated for adding to it four new strings: cf. also Cic. de Leg. II 39. Wherever in the ancient Greek πόλις the conception of the individual is hardly separated from that of the citizen, moral and political changes are believed to go hand in hand; and the effect of music on morality is explained in III 400 D—401 A: cf. Laws 673 A τά μέν τούν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρέτην παίδεσθαι οὐκ αἰδ' οὖν τρόπον ὑφομόσαμεν μουσικήν. Bosanquet raises the question whether musical innovations are the cause or only the symptoms of political. Plato, I think, regarded them primarily as the cause (Laws II cc.). We can better understand their effect if we remember that they were accompanied by changes not only in rhythm, but also in the quality, ethical and otherwise, of the words sung; and if we also bear in mind the enormous influence of the theatre in Greek life. The latter point is emphasized in this connexion by Plato (II cc.) and Aristoxenus (ap. Ath. xiv 31). See on the whole subject Newman's Politics of Aristotle pp. 359—369 and Nettleship Hell. 700 B 8. 130.

21 TOVUN = 'also': see 339 B n. 4.

[424 D—427 A] Our Guardians must above all things guard against changes in musical education. Musical innovations even if sanctioned only in play soon make themselves felt in every quarter of the State. The spirit of law and virtue must be infused into children even through their pastimes. For this reason, we should not neglect details of dress and manners, although they call for no special enactments, but will readily conform to the spirit of our rules about education. Many other individual points may safely be left to our guardians, if only God vouchsafe to them the preservation of our laws; otherwise it is in vain for them to pass law upon law, acting like those who hope to cure their diseases by continually changing their medicines. As nothing but a complete change in their habits will benefit such men, so only a revolution will cure a state which is similarly situated. Such cities honour and make proud the men who minister to their desires; but the true statesman does not care to cut the Hydra. In a bad city, petty legislation is useless: in a good, superficial.

[424 D ff.] This section has a certain historical interest from its scarcely-veiled impeachment of Athenian politics and manners: see on 425 A, 425 C, 426 C.

23 FVLLAEXT1R'OJN—Mouacikign. Mouasikin is at once the vital and the most vulnerable—see next note—part of our State; hence the guard-house must be built in Music. év is quasi-local, as εὐταθὰ τῶν shews; we shall confuse the metaphor if we suppose (as some have done) that Music is itself the guard-house.

24. Η Ἕνον αὐτή. Aute is Ἕ εἰς μουσική. Madvig's suggestion ἀυτή should not be accepted; it would make παρανομα 'lawlessness' in general, whereas Socrates' reply and Adimantus' next remark show that only ἡ ἴμωσον παρανομα (Laws 700 D) is meant. Paranoima is aptly used of heretodoxy in music, thanks to the musical sense of ἴμωσον. Cf infra 424 E and Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. I p. 222 n. 4. The position of αὐτή increases its emphasis.
25 εν παιδίας γε μέρει. Plato is animadverting on the common view that music should be cultivated πρὸς παιδίαν rather than πρὸς παιδείαν. Aristotle allows a threefold use of music—for pastime (παιδία), education, and the rational employment of leisure: Pol. Θ 5. 1339a 16 and b 14 ff.

27 ὠπορρεῖ κτλ.: as a gentle river may become a destructive torrent before its course is ended. The sentence eloquently describes the decay of Athenian music, character, and politics from the simplicity of earlier times, as appears from Latos 700 a—701 D. See also on οἱ πρότερον 425 A. For πολιτείας Hartman would read the singular; but the plural is more forcible. Laws and constitutions are overthrown by the devouring flood. σὺν Plato (as in good Attic generally) is rare; one of its recognised uses is in modal phrases of this kind, especially where (as here and in vi 402 B, vii 564 C, X 619 B) the style seeks elevation: cf. Lina De praep. usu. Plat. pp. 32—34 and Mommsen Beiträge z. d. Lehre v. d. Gr. Praep. pp. 376 ff.

424 E 32 δὲ ἔλεγομεν: 'as we were trying to say at the outset,' i.e. of this discussion 424 A. No specific reference to an earlier part of the dialogue is intended: at all events II 317 B is not in point. According to Plato παιδία should—(to borrow a saying of Aristotle's)—παιδεύειν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν—educate children in the spirit of their commonwealth: Laws 798 B ff. Conversely, Aristotle reminds us, education is itself the older boys' rattle (Pol. Θ 6. 1340σ 30). It should be noted that παιδίας (cf. παιδίων in 425 A) refers like παιδίας in δ above to music; if music is to be a pastime, it must be one which is ἐνυμοτέρον and παρασώμων there may also be a play on the musical sense of νόμος: cf. 424 D 6.

34 τοιούτων: viz. παρασώμων.

425 A 4 ἱδέα: those whom Adimantus in effect described in 424 D. See also next note.

6 οἱ πρότεροι: 'their predecessors' (Jowett), i.e. the predecessors of our citizens. The expression betrays the fact that Plato is now censuring the decay of Athenian manners, as of Athenian music and character in 424 D. In ἐξεφιλοκοσιοῦν —πάντα Plato speaks as if his regulations were a programme for the reform of his native city. Cf. Krohn Pl. St. pp. 32, 33.
neotéron | parà presebventóres, ás prépeie, kai katapklésis kai B υπαναστάσεις kai γονέων θεραπείας, kai kourás ge kai ámptexánas
10 kai úpoodéseis kai ólon tòu σώματος σχηματισμόν kai tálλα ósa toiaúta. ἡ οὐκ οἶει; 'Εγογε. Νομοθετεῖν δ' αὐτά οἶμαι
eûndes: οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὔτ' ἂν μείνειν λόγῳ τε καὶ
grámmasin νομοθετήθηντα. Πῶς γάρ; Κινδυνεύει γονών, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς 'Αδείμαντε, ἐκ τῆς παιδείας οὗτοι ἂν τις ὁρίμησῃ, τοιαῦτα kai C
15 tā ἐπώμενα εἶναι. ἡ οὐκ οἶεi τὸ ὁμοίον ὅν ὁμοίον παρακαλεῖ;
Τί μὲν; Καὶ τελευτῶν δή, οἶμαι, φαίμεν ἂν εἰς ἢ τι τέλεον καὶ
nεανίκον ἀποβαίνειν αὐτό ἡ ἀγάθων ἢ καὶ τοιναντίον. Τί γάρ οὐκ;
.sendKeys()<br><textarea>"EGW μεν τοινων, εἴπον, διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὰ τοιαύτα
eπιχειρήσαμι μονοθετεῖν. Εἰκότως γ', ἐφι. Τί δὲ; ὡ πρὸς θεῶν,\
</textarea>
emphasis on ὁ πρὸς θεῶν: cf. I 332 c ὁ πρὸς Δίας, ἦν δὲ ἔγω, εἰ ὄνω κτλ. Herwerden puts the pause after τάδε, where it is less suitable; others wrongly omit the word. τάδε (see cr. n.) cannot well be dispensed with: it means ‘these familiar’: cf. III 403 e, and for the omission in A Introdr. § 5. Herwerden also cuts out ἀγοραία on account of κατ’ ἀγοράν, but the reduplication is quite in Plato’s way. The postponement of ἐκ throws emphasis on κατ’ ἀγοράν, and thereby helps to contrast ἄγορα ἐξωβλαία with χειροτεχνικά etc.: cf. III 390 b. It is natural to see in this sentence a reference to the judicial and mercantile arrangements of Athens and her empire: see 424 D n.

425 D 21 χειροτεχνικῶν κτλ. χειροτεχνικά ἐξωβλαία are contracts with builders and the like (Laws 920 d).

22 δικών λήξεως means simply ‘the bringing of lawsuits’: originally ‘obtaining (by lot) one’s rights,’ hence ‘obtaining leave to claim one’s rights’ (Meier and Schömann Alt. Process pp. 790—794). The reading λήξεις (see cr. n.) cannot be defended.

23 θέσεις: not ‘the imposition of taxes’ (L. and S.), but ‘the payments,’ as πράξεις is ‘the exactions.’

24 τὸ παράπαν means ‘in general,’ generally.’ τὸ πάμπαν (see cr. n.) is never (I believe) so used, not even in Tim. 64 e cited by Baier. Regulations on nearly all the points here specified are laid down in the Laws: on ἐξωβλαία 913 A ff., 920 D ff., on λεοντα 934 e ff., on αἰκεία (unprovoked assault) 879 b ff., on δικών λήξεις 949 c, on δικαστῶν κατάστασις 767 A ff., 956 b ff., on ἄστινομα and ἀγοραφόμα 763 c ff. There is no taxation in the city of the Laws (847 b).

27 καλοῖς κάγαδοις. Cf. vi 480 e n. ὅσα δὲ νομοθετήσασθαι shows that Plato does not wish to leave all these matters undefined by legislation; but the legislation is to come from the guardians he has educated. One reason is that laws on matters of this kind can never be final: cf. Laws 769 D. If the guardians are true to the spirit of Plato’s commonwealth, they will easily frame such minor regulations, and re-adjust them—should it prove necessary—from time to time. The effort to obtain finality (ὁλοκληρώσεις τοῦ βελτίστου) in such matters is foredoomed to failure (cf. 426 e), and no one makes it, until he has forgotten the real foundation of a nation’s greatness, and lost his sense of the proportion of things. This is Plato’s meaning.
426 A 2 πλην γε κτλ. If the text is sound we must take πλην γε as πλην γε δη (which H. Wolf was wishful to restore) and καί before ἐδείκισεν as = ἔχειν (with Stallbaum), unless we supply διάγει or the like by a sort of zeugma after ἐδείκισεν. As regards καί ἐδείκισεν, J. and C. hold that the participle is resumed from ἰατρεύμενοι; but the effect of this interpretation is very harsh. because ἰατρεύμενοι goes so closely with οἷς ἑξήλθοντοι as almost to form a single expression. It is not 'they make no advance, submitting to a cure and always hoping,' but 'they make no advance under treatment.' The troublesome καί before ἐδείκισεν is omitted by some inferior MSS, is dotted in q, and apparently erased in Σ. I once conjectured τοιούτου, comparing Critias 109 B πλήν οἷς—βιβλίαμενοι, but it is perhaps safer to acquiesce in the MS reading. Dümmler (Chron. Beitr. pp. 9—11) believes that Isocrates Antid. 62 expressly alludes to this passage. Isocrates at all events censures τῶν ἑπιπλήσεως τῶν νῦν ἀμμαρτασμένοιν in words that might easily refer to Plato. See also on 426 C.

426 Α 15 προαγορεύουσι κτλ. Athens is plainly in Plato's mind. The Athenians carefully guarded their constitution by means of the γραφή παραμόρφων and the ἑσάγγελα (see Gilbert's Gr. Const. Ant. E.T. pp. 299, 304 ff.); but nowhere were ὕψοματα so common, and in these the demagogue found a wide field for exercising the arts of flattery and insinuation. Cf. Gilbert Beiträge zur inneren Gesch. Athens pp. 73—93. With ἀποθανατοῦν δς cf. III 411 C n., VIII 566 D (πάντας ὃν περιτυχάντας). Dümmler (I.c.) takes this to be Isocrates, who is also—so he thinks—satirised in the similar passage VI 493 A ff., and elsewhere. If so, σφάς τα μεγάλα, ὅλωτα τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ οὖν, and ἐρί—περὶ αὐτόν (D, ε') are sufficiently true and scathing. We must however observe that Plato is describing a type, and the type is that of the demagogue rather than the merely academic and sophistical rhetorician, as appears from δεινὸς ὃν ἀποτυχοῦν.
These two types are cast in similar moulds; and Dümmler may be right in supposing that Plato thought of Isocrates as he wrote this satire, and pointed his shafts accordingly. If so, they hit the mark, and ranked, as it was natural they should. Isocrates apparently attempts a reply in his Antidosis (Dümmler l.c. p. 9).

To insert as after would spoil the effect, and be grammatically awkward. Plato wishes to suggest the language of a proclamation that he shall be a good man and true, etc. is enough (as Hartman notes) to mark the indirect: cf. 11 358 c n.

426 D 24: The word meaning which the word never bears in Plato; but is, kind, obliging behaviour. 

427 οὐτὸς: a six-footer. Dümmler (l.c.) questions this word, without saying why. It is more appropriate than a word expressing greater height; especially if any personal allusion is intended. Isocrates was not an intellectual giant, nor would even his applauding contemporaries (I think) have called him so.

426 E 29: The point of is that Antidatus returned an affirmative answer last time (426 b). which is generally read, has not sufficient authority, and is difficult to justify. For cf. 111 393 D and infra 442 A.

To this Isocrates replies in Antid. 62: which bears the second dependent on the third, or the third subordinate to them. For this reason I have placed a comma after .

427 A 3: ‘I should not have thought so’ were it not for these
great authorities. Jowett misses the irony by neglecting the tense (‘I conceive that the true legislator will not trouble himself,’ etc.). τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην καὶ κάν ὀστισοῦν εὑροῖς would strike home, if Isocrates is meant.

5 ἀνωφελὴ — ἐπιτηθευμάτων. For ἀνωφελὴ Σ has ἀνωφελὲς, an obvious ‘correction.’ The plural, as Schneider observes, is supported by τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (where αὑτῶν is also neutral). ἄτι after τὰ δὲ has been called in question by Stallbaum and Hartman. Taken strictly, it must depend on a verbal notion supplied out of πραγματεύεσθαι (Stallbaum) or καὶ ὀστισοῦν εὑροί; but in a half-adverbal phrase like τὰ δὲ, we should not pay too closely into the grammatical construction. The effect is exactly like the English ‘because some of them, etc., in other cases, because,’ etc.

427 b, c In all that pertains to temples and religious worship, as well as services paid to the dead, Apollo, the guide of our fathers, and indeed of all mankind, shall direct us.

427 b τὶ οὖν κτλ. With this section of the Republic we should compare v. 461 e, 469 a, vii. 540 c, and Lact. 738 f ff. Plato would fain be no iconoclast: his object is to purify, rather than to abolish, the old religion. He tries, in short, to put new wine into old bottles. In particular, when he makes Apollo preside at the foundation of his city (οἰκίζοντες τε πόλιν οὐδεὶς ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα), he is acting in accordance with the universal custom of the Greeks, who consulted the oracle at Delphi before planting colonies, and revered him as the universal ἄρχηγος and οἰκοστής (Preller Gr. Myth. p. 269). It is equally in harmony with Hellenic, and especially Athenian, usage to refer all matters of public worship to Apollo: see on 427 c. Delphi was the abiding centre of Greek religious and political unity; and it is therefore right that a Greek city (v. 470 e), one of whose objects is to promote unity and comity among Greeks (ib. 469 ff), should attach itself to Apollo.

9 τῷ μέντῳ Ἀπόλλωνι κτλ. Cf. Mem. i. 3. 1 (of Socrates) φανερὸς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγουν, ἕπερ ἡ Πυθία ἀποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτοῦσιν, πῶς δὲν ποιεῖν ἐπὶ προφήτειας ἐπὶ προγόνων θεραπείαις ἐπὶ ἄλλου τῶν τοιούτων. The answer of the priestess was ‘Serve the gods καὶ πόλεως’ (l.c. and iv. 3. 16). The spirit in which we worship matters, rather than whom or how we worship. So large and tolerant a sentiment is worthy of the Delphic priesthood and of Plato.

12 τελευτησάντων τε. See cr. n. Asyndeton is indefensible here. We must either with all the editors (except J. and C.) read τε, or add καὶ after θεραπεία.

427 c 15 ἔγγυτη—πατρίῳ. πατρίῳ instead of πατρίῳ is called for by Ast on slight ms. authority. Ἀπόλλων was ancestor of the Ionians, being father of Ion
(Euthyd. 302 D), and was worshipped by them as 'Aπολλόνιος πατρίως (Peller Gr. Myth. p. 272). But (as Schneider observes) "Socrates his non magis quam alibi in his liberis tanquam Atheniensis loquitur, sed tanquam Graecus. Graecis autem omnibus πάτρος, hoc est, a maioribus traditus harum rerum arbiter et interpretes erat Delphicus Apollo." An allusion to the special connexion of Ionians with Apollo would be out of place, particularly as πάσιν ἀνθρώποις follows. In Athens the ἐξηγητὴς formed a college of three members, charged with religious duties. According to Schöll (in Hermes vi pp. 36 ff.) the members were partly chosen by Apollo in his capacity of πάτρος ἐξηγητής; apparently the Athenians chose nine, out of whom three were selected—one from each triad—by the representatives of the god: whence their designation παθύφραστοι. It is on this model that Plato perhaps frames his regulations in Laws 759 D.

16 πάσιν ἀνθρώποις. Delphi is then a religious centre, not for Greeks only, but for all mankind. It was certainly the nearest approach to such a centre that antiquity provided, for it commanded the homage of barbarians as well as Greeks. See Middleton Journ. of Hell. Studies IX p. 308. Middleton cites Livy XXXVIII 48. 2 "commune humani generis oraculum," Cicero pro Font. 30 "oraculum orbis terrae," and gives examples of the offerings paid by foreigners at Apollo's shrine. Even now, perhaps, Plato would deny that the oracle is dumb, though—true to its own principle of worshipping νόμων πόλεως—it speaks through other voices, and of other gods. See also on 470 c.

17 ἐν μέσῳ—ἐξηγητή. Cf. Eur. Ion 5, ὁ ὄμφαλον | μέσον καθίζων Φοῖος ὤμοιος βροτοίς. The ὄμφαλος was "a conical mass of 'white marble or stone'" (Paus. x 16) in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, "said to mark the centre of the earth." Two gold eagles stood at its sides, representing the eagles which, according to the legend, met there, having been despatched simultaneously by Zeus from the extreme East and West of the world (Strabo ix 3. 6). The ὄμφαλος is frequently represented as the seat of Apollo (ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμφαλοι καθήμενοι), "especially upon coins, when he is represented in the character of the giver of oracles"; see for example Imhoof-Blumer and P. Gardner in J. H. S. viii p. 18, and Plate lxxiv vii. Middleton, on whose article "The Temple of Apollo at Delphi" (cited above) this note is chiefly based, thinks "the word ὄμφαλος was probably derived from δρόφη, a voice, because the divine voice was heard there." If this is true, the legends associating the shrine with the 'navel' or centre of the earth may be due to popular etymology. ὄμφαλος, 'navel,' is an Indo-Germanic word (Brugmann Grundrisse ii p. 187). Herderwen's excision of the words ἐν μέσῳ betrays ignorance of what the ὄμφαλος really was. See also Frazer on Paus. l.c.

427 D—429 A Our city is now founded. Where then is Justice, where Injustice? How do they differ, and which is essential to happiness? Let us approach the question thus. Our city is perfectly virtuous, and must therefore be wise, brave, temperate and just. If we discover three of these elements in the city, the residue will be the fourth.

Let us take Wisdom first. It is not the technical knowledge or skill of the lower classes which renders our city wise, but rather the knowledge which deliberates for the whole city's interests. Now this knowledge is embodied in the Rulers. They form the smallest section of the State, but it is none the less in virtue of their presence that we call the whole city wise.

427 D ff. The process of purgation has now been ended, and Plato's δευτερα πόλις is complete (see II 372 E ff.). We are therefore ready to look for the second view of Justice. See on II 372 A. It
should be observed that this part of the Republic has an independent value in the history of Ethics as the first explicit assertion of the doctrine of four cardinal virtues (427 E n.). For an account of Plato's teaching on the Virtues we may refer to Michaelis die Entwicklungsstufen in Plato's Tugendlehre, and especially to Hammond On the Notion of Virtue in the Dialogues of Plato Boston 1892.

427 D 22 αὐτὸς τε καὶ—παρακάλει. For the idiom cf. (with Schneider) Phaedr. 253 β μιμοῦμεν αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πελώμες.

24 ποῦ ἡ ἄδικαια. If our city is τελέως ἀγαθή (427 E), it is useless to look for ἄδικα in it. On this difficulty see II 369 A n.

25 πότερον. Herderwen's τετέραν is quite unnecessary, as Hartman shews; cf. 428 A, 433 D, 434 C, 445 B, V 449 D.

427 E 27 ἀπὸ τῆς λαχδᾶνης κτλ. recalls II 367 E.

427 E 27 ἀπὸ τῆς λαχδᾶνης κτλ. recalls II 367 E.

427 e 27 ὡς οὖν δισοιον—τρόπῳ: II 368 B, C.

33 σοφὴ· δικαία. This is apparently the earliest passage in Greek literature where the doctrine of four cardinal virtues if by cardinal virtues we mean those which make up the sum of perfect goodness) is expressly enunciated. The doctrine may of course be Pythagorean, but evidence is wanting, and it is doubtful whether Pindar's τέσσαρες ἁρπεταί Nem. 111 74 are to be interpreted as the cardinal virtues: see Bury ad loc. The nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in Xen. Mem. 111 9. 1—5 (as Krohn has pointed out Pl. St. p. 372), with which compare IV 6. 1—12, where Justice, Wisdom, and Courage are named, as well as other virtues, including ἐπιθέματα. Cf. also Aesch. Sept. 610 σοφῶν δίκαιον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιθέματα ἀνήρ. From other passages in Plato, none of which are so precise and technical as this, it would seem that διάταγμα made a good fight for a fifth place: Prot. 329 c, Lach. 199 d, Mem. 78 b, Gorg. 507 b. In Phaed. 50 c and Laws 631 A σωφρόσυνος, δικαιοσύνη, ἀθροῖα καὶ φιλόσοφοι (not σοφία) are named together, without διάταγμα, which in the Euthyp. (12 Dff.) is a subdivision of δικαίωσις. From Adimantus' readily assent (cf. V 476 A n.), we may reasonably infer that the doctrine of four cardinal virtues was already a familiar tenet of the Platonic school. Schleiermacher thinks it may have been taken over "aus dem allgemeinen Gebrauch" (Einleitung p. 26). There is however no evidence to show that these four virtues and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato. If the theory was originated by Plato himself, it is possible enough that in restricting the number to four, Plato was not uninfluenced by the sacred character of the number four in Pythagoreanism, just as Aristotle has been supposed to have limited his categories to ten on similar grounds. An interesting conjecture is
suggested by the remarks of Schleiermacher (I. c. p. 21). Our city is ev hypo-
thesi perfectly virtuous. Its constituent elements are Rulers, Auxiliaries, Farmers and Artisans. Now the virtues which are exhibited in the lives and method of these classes are, as Plato holds, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. Consequently these virtues are the component factors of moral perfection; in other words they are the cardinal virtues. We may admit that there is no pettico principti in such a method of investigation, which is, in fact, akin to the perfectly legitimate method described in Mem. 86 B: cf. also v 458 A. If this suggestion is correct, the doctrine of four cardinal virtues will be directly and definitively arrived at from the method of arrangement of Plato’s ideal city. But it is clear from what Plato himself says, both here and in 420 A, 430 D, 432 B, 433 B ff., that the doctrine is already an accepted part of his ethical system, and not merely a provisional hypothesis which is intended to be confirmed by what follows. For the relative value and importance of the four cardinal virtues in Plato’s way of thinking see Laws 630 D ff.

οὐκόν — ἡμημένον. Essentially the same method is used by Aristotle to reach his conclusion that virtue is a ἔγεις (Eth. Nic. 11 4). Cf. also (with J. and C.) Lys. 216 D, E. Jowett observes that the true function of “this half-logical, half-methodological method of residues” is in dealing with “abstract quantity” and “the laws of Nature.” It is undeniable that this method is much more likely to lead us astray in ethics than in mathematics or the natural sciences, owing to the nature of the subject; but it is valid if our analysis of the phenomena is exhaustive and exact. A similar method was frequently employed in the Eleatic school: see 11 380 D n. Plato not unfruitfully extends the methods of mathematical reasoning beyond what we should consider their proper sphere: the whole of the preliminary studies, for example, in Book vii are to be pursued according to the methods of pure mathematics. See on vii 528 E ff. and the Appendix to Book vii “On the propaedeutic studies of the Republic.”

438 A 1 ωστερ τοινυ—αὐτῶν. For the logically superfluous (though welcome) αὐτῶν cf. 11 375 B, infra 430 B, viii 558 A, and Heindorf on Corp. 482 D. Theaet. 155 E is a much harsher example, and has often been emended. The apodosis to the ωστερ clause is contained in οὐκόν—ζητητέων.

4 οὐκ ἄλλο ἐπὶ η. On ἐπὶ (i.e. “after the other three were found”) J. and C.) see III 412 B n.

7 ιτ. A corrobot in q wrote αὐτῆς, which Schleiermacher preferred. Hartman suggests αὐτοῖς. αὐτῆς is, however, not the city, but simply ‘the matter,’ ‘the subject under discussion’; an idiomatic usage for which cf. 1 339 E n. For the neuter κατάθελον cf. 427 D n. Hartman’s κατάθελος is unnecessary.

428 B 8 τοινυa as here described means φρόνησις—so it is called in 433 B, c— in its application to politics, not metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. It deliberates for the good of the whole city (428 D), but the good is not yet elevated to the rank of an Idea. This point has been rightly emphasized by Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 40, 362), who points out the essentially Socratic character of this virtue, comparing Xen. Mem. 1 2. 64 and IV 1 2 (a sentiment of which Books II—IV of the Republic are an amplification and exposition in detail).
See also Proz. 352 B and Laws III 689 B. Commentators before Krohn (Steinhart for example Einleit. p. 185, and Busemihl Gen. Einleit. II p. 153) did not sufficiently grasp the almost exclusively political character of sofia here, although it is expressely dwelt upon by Plato throughout, and particularly in 429 a. I say ‘almost,’ because here, as elsewhere, Plato, as his manner is, contrives to drop some hints preparing us for a still higher conception of the virtue of the guardians. See on 429 c and 442 c.


9 eβουλος. eβουλια was primarily a political virtue: see on I 348 D.

428 c 16 bouleuméne. Heindorf’s emendation (see cr. n.), which is accepted by Ast, Stallbaum, Baiter and Hartman, appears to me certain for these reasons. First, in την υπέρ των έκ του χαλκού η τινα άλλων των τουιοτων below we must understand επιστήμην bouleuméne, so that bouleuméne and not bouleuméne must have been written before. Secondly, if we read bouleuméne, we must write (with Hermann etc. and a few inferior MSS) γαι for η before ουκ υπέρ των below. Schneider retains bouleuméne, but understands bouleuméne before epistémēn—an indefensible construction, which Laws 807 c (to which he appeals in Addit. p. 31) in no way justifies.

17 την υπέρ—τουιοτων. For the carrying on of the preposition (here δα) cf. (with Schneider) Phaed. 64 έκ τουπουβακενα περι τα άδικα καλουμενας τα τουιοτα, ολον σεισων κτλ. ‘Πιστωσε γα κτλ. Τη δε; τα των αφορισιων.

428 D 22 δυν’ at Ast: δυν’—δμολι. at cannot, I think, be dispensed with here. It is better to insert it after δυνα than (with Baiter) after άρσω, for (as Schneider shews by many examples) at likes to attach itself to the relative in sentences of this kind. The political wisdom here described is akin to the βασιλική τέχνη of Euthyd. 291 c ff. and elsewhere, as well as to Aristotle’s view of πολιτική as the architectonic art (Eth. Nic. Ι 1094 b 27 with Stewart’s note). It knows what is good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.

23 νυν δη. III 414 B (φιλακας παντελεις).
26 τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις. It should be noted that 'wise' (to confine ourselves for the present to the virtue of wisdom) is used (1) of the rulers in the State and the λογιστικά in man, (2) of the city and the individual as wholes: cf. Arist. Τούτ. ν 8. 138 b 1 ff., where τὸ πρῶτον φόρμων is said to be ἰδιὸν λογιστικόν. The same, mutatis mutandis, holds good of Courage; and also, though with a difference, of Temperance and Justice. In calling the whole city wise because the rulers are wise, Plato is influenced by its analogy with the individual man, whom we readily and easily call wise, although strictly speaking he is wise only by reason of the λογιστικά within him. Comparing 443 c ff., we observe that the city is wise because its rulers are wise, and its rulers are wise because their λογιστικά is wise. In other words the wisdom of the λογιστικά is the unit out of which the wisdom of the whole city is constructed. See on 443 b ff.

27 πότερον οὖν. See cr. n. We have still to explain τὶ ἄροσον in 428 b, for Adimantus' τὶ has not yet been answered. For this reason οὖν after πότερον is welcome, if not (as Schneider thinks) indispensable.

428 Ε 29 πολι—χαλκέας. Cf. II 379 c n.

33 ἡ σοφή κτλ. The subject is πόλις κατὰ φύσιν ἀκιδεδήσα, 'a city founded in accordance with Nature.' On κατὰ φύσιν see II 370 a n.

429 Α 2 τῆς μόνης—σοφίαν κα- λείσθαι. Pfileiderer (Zur Lösung d. Pl. Frag. pp. 46 ff.) compares Symp. 209 a ff. πολὺ δὲ μεγάλῃ—καὶ καλλίστῃ τῆς φρονή- σεως ἡ περὶ τῶν πόλεων τε καὶ οἰκετείων διακοσμήσεις, ἡ δὲ ὄνομα ἐστὶ σωφρόσυνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη. The difference in phraseology does not obscure the essential kinship of the two passages.

429 Α—430 C The virtue of Courage will reside in the Warrior-class. It is owing to their bravery that we call the city brave; for the general character of the city as a whole cannot be determined by any courage or cowardice present among the others. The Soldiers will in spite of every temptation continue true to the principles laid down by law concerning what should, and what should not, be feared; and they will do so the more steadfastly, because their musical and gymnastic training has already prepared them for the legislation in question. It is in the
VII. 'Alla μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτή τε καὶ ἐν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τὸς πόλεως, δι᾽ ὅτι τοιαύτη κλητεά ἡ πόλις, οὐ πάνυ χαλεποῦ ἱδείων.

Πάς δὴ; Τίς ἄν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποσβέλησα ἡ δειλὴ ἐν ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἶποι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνοχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μέρος, ὡς προπολεμεῖ
tαι καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. 

Οὐ δ᾽ ἐν εἰς, ἐφῴ, εἰς ἄλλο τι.

Οὐ γὰρ οἷμαι, ἐποῦν, οὐ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτή ἡ δειλι ἡ ἀνδρείοι ὅτες κυριοῦ ἢ εἰν ὑπὸ τοῖς αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ ποιαν. 

Διὸ γὰρ. Καὶ ἀνδρεία ἀρα πόλις μέρει των εἀυτῆς ἐστί, διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκεῖνο ἐχειν ὑπὸ μικρῶν τοῖς τοια ἐν διειπεῖ ταύτα ὑπὸ
tαι αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τοιαῦτα, ἀ τε καὶ οἶα ο νομοθέτης παράγγειλεν ἐν τῇ παίδεια, ἤν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρείαν καλείς.

Οὐ πάνω, ἐφῄσ, ἐμαθοῦ ὑπὸ εἰπτε, ἀλλ᾽ αὕτης εἰπτε. 

Σωτηρίαν ἐγεροῦ, ἐποῦν, λέγω τινα εἶναι τῆν ἀνδρείαν. 

Ποιαν δὴ σωτηρίαν; Τὴν τής δοξῆς τῆς ὑπὸ νόμον 

διὰ τῆς παίδειας γεγονοῦνα περὶ τῶν δεινῶν, ἦ τε ἐστι καὶ οἶα: 

διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτής σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τῇ λύπαις ὑπὸ

16. παράγγειλεν ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρείαν (sic) Α: παράγγειλεν ΑΠΠΙΑ: παράγγειλεν (sic) Ξ. 

is necessary to correspond to διασώζεσθαι αὐτὴν, but διὰ παντὸς takes the first place, because it is the phrase requiring elucidation. The corruption of αὐτής to αὐτὴν is of a piece with that of γεγονώς to γεγονων (see cr. ii.) and its all but inevitable consequence. The correction printed above is accepted by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252.

ρόπαις—φόβους. III 412 E ff. 429 D 25 ἀλουργὰ = 'purple': see Tim. 68 B, with Archer-Hind's note. Herwerden cuts out ὡς' εἶναι, but without these words the wool which we are dyeing would be purple, whereas it is white, and we are making it purple. See on ἐὰν τε καὶ ταῦτα in E.

26 πρῶτον μὲν κτλ. As far as concerns the language and grammatical construction of this passage it is clear that the object of ἑκλέγονται should be the same as that of προπαρασκευάζουσιν, προπαρασκεύαστε, and καὶ τοὺς, and identical with the subject of δέχεται. Now the object of καὶ τοὺς is the wool selected to be dyed; it is therefore the wool which is subjected to προπαρασκεύαστε, and consequently white substances of wool are meant by μὲν φύσιν τὴν τῶν λευκῶν (so also Blümner Technologie etc. i pp. 221 ff.). That this interpretation is right, appears also from the application of the simile. The guardians are the white woollen substances specially selected (note ἐξελεγάμενα 429 E), their education is the προπαρασκεύαστι; and the δόξα περὶ δεινῶν κτλ. is the dye. This is expressly pointed out in 429 E—430 A. τοσοῦτον is strictly in point, for woollen substances may be of any colour, since they may have been already dyed. Plato informs us that dyers selected white woollen substances when they wished to impart a lasting purple hue. Cf. Tim. 50 D, E. The προπαρασκεύαστι included the process called στύμι, i.e. steeping the wool in an astringent solution (πρόστυμα) to make it take the dye better (Arist. de Col. 4. 794a 29 and Probl. XXII 11. 931a 13 ff. προσβείχουσιν ἐν τοῖς στρεμφοῖς τῷ διεργασθὲν μᾶλλον δέχεσθαι τὴν βαφήν: cf. also Theophr. de Odor. 17 ὑποστορούσα γὰρ πᾶν εἰς τὸ δέχασθαι μᾶλλον τὴν σιγήν ὡστε τὰ ἑρὰ εἰς τὴν βαφήν). Aristotle uses a metaphor from dyeing in a similar way in Eth. Nic. II 2. 1105a 3. Cf. also Cicero Hortens. Fr. 62 ed. Nobbe "ut ei qui combi purpuream volunt, sufficient prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam, sic litteris talibusbusque doctrinis ante ecolis animos et ad sapientiam conciipiandam imbii et praeparare deceat," and see on the whole subject Blümner l. c. i pp. 221 ff, 238 ff.

28 θεραπεύοντες. If the text is sound, we must suppose either that two processes of preparation are alluded to, viz. θεραπεύει and προπαρασκεύει; or else that θεραπεύοντες is used for θεραπεύοντες. The first alternative is inadmissible: for προπαρασκευασται in E shews that the δόξα and προπαρασκευαστε are identical. As for the second, Schneider remarks "aoristum ipsum pro praesenti positum vix credo." There are some instances in which "an aorist participle denoting that in which the action of the verb of past time consists may express time coincident with that of the verb, when the actions of the verb and the participle are practically one" (Goodwin MT. p. 52: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II pp. 161 ff., but as προπαρασκευαστον is a verb of present or universal time, Goodwin's rule is inapplicable here. Hartman ejects the participle, and Schneider is anxious to read θεραπεύοντες. In my edition of the Text, I had recourse to transposition, and placed θεραπεύοντες before οὕτω δῆ ('and they do not dip the wool till they have finished dressing it'). It is, however, safer to adhere to the mss and regard θεραπεύοντες as one of those 'timeless aorists,' of which many examples are quoted by F. Carter in Cl. Rev. V pp. 4 ff. The ms reading is supported not only by Stobaeus (Flor. 43.
βάλτουσι. καὶ ὃ θεῦν ἀν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῇ, δευσοποίων Ε'
γίγνεται τὸ βαφέν, καὶ ἡ πλάσις οῦτ' ἀνευ ρυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ
ρυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἀνθός αφαιρεῖσθαι. ἄ ὢν ἂν μῆ, οὐδὲν
οὐδ' ἡ γίγνεται, εἰώ τέ τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτη ἐὰν τε καὶ ταύτα
μὴ προθεραπεύσας. Οἶδα, ἐφη, ὅτι ἐκπλύνα καὶ γελοία. Τοιούτων
tοινών, ἢν ὃ 'εγὼ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς,
οὔτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπανείδησον. [μουσική]

γυμναστική· μηδὲν οὖν ἄλλο μηχανάζει, ἢ ὅπως ἢμὲν ὃ τι
καλλίστα τοὺς νόμους πειθεῖτε δεξιότω ὦστε βαφήν, ηὐν
dευσοποίοις αὐτῶν ἢ δόξα γίγνοσκαὶ καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν
5 ἄλλων διὰ τὸ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν προθύμου ἐπιτεθεῖσαν ἐσχήκεναι,
καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι τὴν βαφήν τὰ ρυμμάτα ταύτα, δεινὰ ὄντα
ἐκκλίνειν, ἢ τε Ἧδυνη, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δευτέρα ὑσσα τοῦτο
1 δρᾶν καὶ κοινά, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου Β'
ρύμματος. τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς

97), but also (as Jackson has pointed
tout to me) by Theo Smyrnaeus de utilit.
28 τὸ ἀνθός: the colour, as appears
from Arist. de Col. l. c. 794a 34 et al.
Though it is used of purple here, it was
not confined to purple: see on VIII. 557 C.
429 E 29 δευσοποίων—βαφέν. δευσο-
ποιῶν: ἔμμονον καὶ δισαστέπλυτον (Timaeus
Lex. s.v. δευσοποίων, where Ruhnken
illustrates the word very fully). The point
of course is that such προτασαρεκεν ren-
dered the colour proof against washing,
dευσοποίως, ἀντίκλιντο, and μόνωμοι were
constantly in connexion with dyeing:
see Blümner l. c. p. 212 n. The words
τὸ βαφέν are bracketed by Herwerden;
bet δ ἄν is not 'quod,' but 'si quid'
(Schneider).
30 ρύμματων. ρύμματα is the generic
word for detergents of any kind (Blümner
Privatalt. p. 214 n. 1): cf. παντὸς ἄλλου
ρύμματος 430 B.
32 εἰώ τε καὶ ταύτα. ταύτα is τὰ
λευκά i.e. white substances: cf. τῶν λευκῶν
in Ε above. Even white wool, unless
specially prepared, will not retain the
dye when it is dipped: much less other
colours. This is the force of καὶ in καὶ ταύτα.
The words ἄλλα χρώματα refer to the colour
of the wool which is dipped, not to the colour
of the dye, as Herwerden supposes when
he calls for τούτο: cf. n. on ὅτι εἶναι
in Ε above.

33 ἐκπλυνα καὶ γελοία: a sort of
hendiadys: cf. VIII. 558 A θεσποία καὶ
ἡδεία. Stallbaum's suggestion ἀγελάδα for
γελοία is itself γελοίοτερον. For τοιούτων
cf. III. 388 D. π. 430 A 6 ἐκπλύναι.
Νοὴι ἐκπλύναι (with Herwerden); for the action of ἐκ-
πλύναι is more rapid than that of γίγνομαι.
7 χαλεστραίου κτλ. χαλεστραίου
λίτρον (or νίτρον, but λίτρον is the Attic
form) came from Χαλέστρα, a lake and
city in Macedonia. λίτρον is supposed to
be 'native carbonate of soda': see
Blaydes on Ar. Frogs 712. The spelling
χαλεστράιου is established (as against
χαλεστραίου in Tim. Lex. s.v. and
the Scholiast) by Hdt. vii 123 (χαλέστρα)
and other authorities quoted by Schneider.
κοῖνα as appears from ψευδόλίτρων κοῖνας
in Ar. l. c. was a preparation of λίτρων,
whence Plato couples them here. See on
the subject generally Dict. Ant. p. 881.
430 B 8 παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος
is cancelled by Badham and others. It
is difficult however not to feel that some-
thing is wanted to balance χαλεστράιου
and κοῖνας, especially as these are two
specific detergents of the same class.
Further, without παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος
Plato would probably have written καὶ
λύπη κτλ. The sentence as it stands
rings Platonic; nor was παντὸς ἄλλου
ρύμματος at all likely to be added by a
scribe. The words were also in the text
δόξης ὁρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἐγώγη ἑκατον καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μὴ τε σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. Ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ δ' ἔστι, λέγω. δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι τὴν ὁρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παθείας γεγονοῦσα, τὴν τε θηριωδὴ καὶ ἀνδραποδοτή, οὔτε εἰς πάνυ μόνιμου ἱγεῖςοι ἄλλο τε τὴ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἡν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχοι τούτον τούτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. 15 Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχομαι, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὁρθῶς ἀποδέξει.

14. μόνιμων Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 97): νόμιμων codd.

appears to me almost certainly right, although it has been adopted by no recent editor. νόμιμος, as Rettig shows (Proleg. p. 110), must be used in precisely the same sense as in δόξης ὁρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου just before. If so, Plato flatly (except for the osτε πάνυ) contradicts himself. For the only reason why a δόξα is ὁρθή is that it is νόμιμος 'in accordance with the law': nor is it possible for even a dog to possess an ὁρθή δόξα which is not νόμιμος. In obeying a just command, the δόξα of a dog is therefore not osτε πάνυ νόμιμος, but wholly νόμιμος. On the other hand μόνιμων is not only appropriate but necessary in what is practically a résumé of Socrates' whole account of courage (δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι —καλεῖν). The only difference between the ὁρθὴ δόξα of a guardian and a dog lies in this, that the former has received παθεία, while the latter has not. And it is precisely this difference which makes the guardian's δόξα lasting, as the whole of the simile from dyeing was intended to shew. In δoνυσομις κτλ. 430 a). Finally, the soldier's ὁρθὴ δόξα has just been defined (in 430 b) as σωτηριαν διὰ παντὸς κτλ. To δὰ παντὸς the words οὐ πάνυ μόνιμον are the necessary contrast: the δόξα is in both cases ὁρθὴ τε καὶ νόμιμος, only you can depend on the guardian always, ἐν τε λύπαι καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις (429 b), but not always on your dog and slave. Cf. Men. 97 ε.ο.

ἀλλο τε—ἀνδρείαν. With the sentiment cf. Lach. 197 a ff., where however it is because they are destitute of knowledge that courage is denied to the lower animals. Isocrates Antid. 211 speaks of dogs etc. as brave.

430 c 16 πολιτικὴν γε—δικέων. In this passage πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν means, I think, primarily the virtue of a τόλμη as opposed to that of an ἰδιώτης: cf. 442 D
20 VIII. Δύο μήν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢτι λοιπά, ἢ δει κατιδεῖν ἐν τῇ D πόλει, ἢ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὗ δῇ ἐνεκα πάντα ξηποτούμεν, δικαιοσύνη.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὐρομένην, ήνα μὴκετί πραγματευόμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης; 'Εγώ μὲν τοίνυν, εφή, οὔτε...
his ideal city falls to pieces. Cf. Rettig Prolog. p. 137. Hirzel succeeds in shewing that Justice and Temperance are different, and both of them necessary to Plato's perfect city; nor does he employ any other method than a strict interpretation of Plato's own words as they occur. See on 432 A.

430 D 24 πρότερον is omitted by Richards as illogical. So slight a flaw is easy to forgive; and επι in μικρεῖς suggests that πρότερον is genuine. Nor could Adimantus well have said that in any event he did not wish Justice—ος δὲ ἑνεκα πάντα ἁρμοσι ναυτιῶν— to be discovered.

430 E 27 εἰ μὴ ἄδικως. Cf. x 608 D, 612 D, Charm. 156 A, Menex. 236 B. The translation "as I am an honest man" (D. and V.) is inaccurate; but Schneider's "ich thät' ja sonst nichts recht" hits the mark. In English we require an independent clause, 'I have no right to refuse.'

ος γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν: 'seen from where we stand,' i.e. on a first view: cf. οὐ εὑρεθεὶς ἰδεῖν Pol. 280 D;infra 432 B, x 595 B, and see Grünenwald in Schanz's Beiträge etc. II 3 pp. 1—37.

28 ξυμφωνία—ἀρμονία. On ἀρμονία see III 398 E n. In its musical application συμφωνία is used both of consonance as in the octave or double octave and also of other musical intervals: cf. vii 531 A and van Jan's Misc. Script. Gr. p. 102 and passim. The ξυμφωνία in which συμφωνία consists is apparently of the former kind: cf. 432 A n.

30 ἡδονῶν—ἐγκράτεια. It is chiefly this which is insisted on in the popular view of συμφωνία taken in III 389 D ff. Cf. Xen. Cyr. vii 1. 32, Isocr. 3. 44, and other passages cited by Nagelsbach Nachh. Theol. II p. 233. Here the essential mark of συμφωνία is ξυμφωνία as to who shall be rulers, and who subjects; a point which is not mentioned in III. In other fundamental respects, also, the two descriptions differ; and Hirzel rightly insists that the συμφωνία of Book IV must be examined independently and by itself (I.c. p. 409).

κρείττων—αὐτῶν: a common formula in the popular acceptation of συμφωνία: see Nagelsbach I.c.

31 Λέγοντες. See cr. n. Λέγοντες is found also in Flor. A, in some ms's of Stobaeus (Flor. 43, 97) and in Cesenas M. Λέγοντες should (with Stallbaum) be taken as agreeing with the nominative of φασι, 'as men say, calling one lord of oneself in some mysterious way.' οὖ δὲ, 'forsooth,' helps out οὐ κινδυνεύοντος. For other views on this passage see App. II.

33 κρείττων αὐτῶν. Stallbaum reads κρείττων αὐτῶν, and wishes to do so also in 431 A below. The accusative is more natural in both places, partly because it suggests τὸ κρείττων αὐτῶν εἶναι (cf. ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ κρείττων καὶ ἦττων—ἀν αὐτῶν εἶναι), partly because of κρείττων αὐτῶν just before.
431 D 27 καὶ μην—σφόδρα gives a third feature of the σωφροσύνη of a city. We have shewn our city to be (1) κρείττων αὐτής, (2) κρείττων ἥδουν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίων. It is also (3) διαφορετικὴ γιὰ τοῦ ὄντως δὲ ἄρχειν, (3) corresponds to κόψων, (2) to ἐγκράτεια, (1) to κρείττων αὐτῶν in 430 E. Thus the discussion in this chapter follows a chaotic order.

431 E 32 ἐν ἀμφότεροις. Cf. 442 C, D. Aristotle and others seem to have supposed that σωφροσύνη was the special virtue of the lowest class in the State and the lowest element in the soul: see Ἱερ. v 6. 136b 10 ff. and 8. 138a 1 ff. and [Arist.] περὶ ἀρέτων καὶ κακῶν 1. 1249δ 30 ff. ἐν ἀμφότεροις proves this view erroneous. The error arose partly perhaps from a desire to make the theory superficially symmetrical, partly perhaps from a notion that Plato's rulers would not be likely to dispute their own right to rule. But σωφροσύνη in Plato's sense is necessary for his Rulers as well as for their subjects; without it, they might nolle episcopari: cf. 1 346 D n.

432 A 2 δι' ὀλης—διὰ πασῶν. δι' ὀλης sc. τῆς πόλεως, not λίπας, as J. and C. strangely suppose. διὰ πασῶν sc. τῶν χρησίων should be taken with ἐξωδοτασ (so also Schneider). ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία is the octave (Arist. Probl. xix 35. 930b 27 ff.), the καλλιτή συμφωνία, according to the Greeks (Arist. l.c.), readily sounding to the ear as absolute unison; hence the point of πασῶν, which is an accusative depending directly on ἐξωδοτασ. See Arist. l.c. 14. 118b 7 ff. διὰ τὶ λανθάνει τὸ διὰ πασῶν καὶ δοκεῖ ὅμορφον εἶναι, οἷον ἐν τῷ φωνεικῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: The whole expression διὰ πασῶν ἐξωδοτασ πασῶν therefore means that the concord of the citizens on the matter in question is absolute and complete. Further than this I do not think the comparison is to be pressed. If we seek to find analogies between ἀδελθενστάτους, ἵσχυροτάτους, μέσους and the ὑπάτη, νήπη and μέση of the scale, we are met by the difficulty that the μέση cannot be said to produce the same (πασῶν) note as the ὑπάτη and νήπη, and we are not at liberty
to suppose that Plato is thinking of ἡ ἔση διὰ τοῦ πασῶν in the face of his own words, which refer only to a single octave (διὰ τοῦ πασῶν παρεχομαι νη κτλ.). In talking of σωφροσύνη Plato usually distinguishes only between two classes—rulers and ruled: 431 D, E and infra χειρονος τε καὶ ἀμέινονος. See also on 443 D.

4 φρόνησις—ισχύς—πλῆθει define ἀσθενεστάτος, ἰσχυρότατος, μέσους. The equipoise and measured cadence of this stately sentence may well suggest a chorus of voices singing in unison. Cf. 311 401 c. Cobet's excision of the second βοῦλει is sadly out of tune.

6 ταύτη τῆς ὁμάνοιαν prepares us for the definition about to follow. There are various ὁμάνοια: this one is agreement ὅποτερον δει ἄρχειν etc. 7 χειρονος κτλ.: 'concord between the naturally better and the naturally worse, on the question which should rule, whether in a city or in an individual.' εν ἐνι ἐκαστῷ anticipates 442 c f.; but is justified here by 431 A, B.

We may now sum up Plato's account of σωφροσύνη so far as it is a virtue of the State. It involves three elements: (1) the rule of the better over the worse, (2) the rule of φρόνησις over the desires, (3) the agreement of better and worse as to which shall rule. (1) and (2) are different ways of expressing the same thing; neither is fundamental, for (granted the presence of σοφία and ἄνδρεία) both of them follow from (3), whereas (3) does not follow from either. Plato accordingly admits (3) only into his final definition. It follows from (3) that σωφροσύνη, unlike σοφία and ἄνδρεία, is a virtue possessed by all the three classes of the City. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 372) pronounces σωφροσύνη otiōse and "ornamental." The charge is best refuted by considering whether the City is complete without it. (The part played by Justice will be discussed later.) Apart from σωφροσύνη, what virtue remains for the third class of citizens? and what guarantee is there that σοφία will consent to rule? (see on εν ἀμφοτέροις 431 E). Whereas σωφροσύνη not only provides for the third class, but furnishes a point of union in which all the classes may meet, and the City, so far, become μια ἐκ πολλῶν (cf. 443 E). If we bear in mind that the Rulers are only select Guardians, and that φόλακες includes both Rulers and Auxiliaries, we may tabulate the virtues of the three classes thus:—

Virtues of Rulers,

σοφία + ἄνδρεία + σωφροσύνη.

Virtues of Soldiers, etc., σωφροσύνη.

Virtues of Farmers, etc., ἄνδρεία + σωφροσύνη.

Hirzel is, I think, mistaken in holding that σωφροσύνη is a virtue of the whole and not of the parts; the fact is that it is a virtue both of the whole and of each of the parts. Strictly speaking, of course, ὁμάνοια or ξυμφονία implies more parts than one, and concord is impossible to a unit; but the essence of the virtue consists in the view that the best shall rule, and this view is present in each of the three classes. For δικαιοσύνη see 434 c n.

Plato's account of σωφροσύνη in other dialogues differs in many respects from this, and is rather a hindrance than a help in elucidating the present passage. Cf. Hirzel Lc. p. 490. The σωφροσύνη of the Charmides is fully discussed by Knuth Quaestiones de not. τῆς σωφροσύνης Plat. criticae (1874): cf. also Hammond Lc. pp. 138 f., 157 f.

432 B—434 C Where then is Justice? We must beware lest she escape us. Socrates presently explains that he has found the trail. "Justice is the principle, or else one form of the principle, which we laid down at the beginning, viz. that each individual shall fulfill that function only for which he is naturally best fitted. In other words,
Justice is, in a certain sense, 'minding one's own business.' Four considerations point to this conclusion. In the first place, it is in order to make the other three take root that we require a fourth virtue; and it is just the division of duty according to natural capacity which renders the other three virtues possible. Secondly, this is the only principle which can be compared with the other three virtues in respect of benefit conferred upon the State; and Justice must be comparable with them in this respect. Thirdly, it is by this principle that the Rulers will direct their judicial decisions, and Justice is the principle by which our Rulers judge. Lastly, the violation of this principle works the greatest mischief in the City. So does Injustice; so that the principle itself is identical with Justice.

For Plato's view of Civic Justice see on 432 C.

The image is a favourite one with Plato: cf. Laws 654 E, Parm. 128 C, Lys. 218 C. Other examples may be found in Stallbaum's note on this passage. The particular kind of hunting from which Plato takes his illustration is clearly described in Xen. de Ven. 8. 4—8. A net was drawn round the bush where the hare was, and the hunters stood round, ready metathēs kath tā tēmi, tān evkulisthē ek tōn diktōn.
Alla gar omous iteou, | Iteou gar, ephe, | kai egw katidow 11ou iod, D | eitou, o Gammaikoiv | kivdunwoumen tis eixein ixnos, kai mou dokiei ou
paimn ti ekphuezetai hymas. Ei augeleis, h' de os. 'H hym, | hym 25 de' egw, Blakakion ye hymo to padoi. To poioi; | Pailai, o makarie, faivetai pro podon hymen ezi arxhiz kivlidexetai, kai ouv exowmen
'ar' autou, all hemen kataxalastotato. Osperoi eiv en taix xerai
exountes zetoumin! Eiviste o' exousin, kai hymis eis autou men ouk E
apeblesomew, torro de poi apeskopoiwe, h' dei kai elainanen
30 isos hymas. Pwos, ephe, legeis; Ouvtao, eitou, ouv kodomen mou
kai legeoutes autou kai akountes pailai ouv manthines hymen autovn,
oti elogeomven trupon tina autou. Makron, ephe, to proomioin to
epithymomvou akoudai.

X. 'Alla, hym de' egw, akuve, | eis ti ara legei. O gar ezi arxhiz 433
ebemetha deiin poiein dia paitos, ote tin polin katoxizomen, touto
estin, ows emoi dokiei, houti toouto ti eidos h dikaiosunh. Eitremeia
de deipnu kai pollakis elogeomven, eiv meumhais, oti eiva ekosta
5 en deoi epitithenein twon peri tin polin, eis o autou h fvis
epitithesiathe perifwia ephi. 'Elogeomven gar. Kai miin oti ge
to ta autov propettein kai mu polupragomeven dikaiosunh esti,


432 D 22 iou, iou: 'Joy! Joy!' iou dolentis, iou gaudentis, according to the
Scholast on Ar. Peace 318: cf. Suidas s.v. Ancient authorities differed on the
point (see Blaydes' critical note l.c.), but modern scholars for the most part agree
with Suidas.

24. ekfezeugthai—eis ayngelleis. The contracted form of the future of philw
is established by the authority both of the Paris ms, and also of Aristophanes
and Euripides, as Schanz has proved (Vol. xxi p. xvi). Schanz may be right in
supposing that it is borrowed "ex ore populi." For eis ayngelleis Phrynichus
(s.v. eisayngelleiai se) apparently read eisayngelleia, on which see Lobeck Phryn.,
p. 632 and Cobet M. L. p. 163, eisayngelleia does not seem to be used in Attic prose.
In Thaeta. 144 B eis ayngelleis is read by B, eis ayngelleis by T.


ti eidos, like trpovn twa in 432 E and 433 B, hints, I think, that Civic
Justice is not, after all, the true and
original form of Justice. Hence, in 434 D,
Plato is careful to warn us that the subject
of Justice is not exhausted till individual
Justice has been discussed. See on tovto in
443 C.

6 epitithesiathe. epitithesiathe (Herwerden) is not good: cf. II 574 E
and supra 430 Α. A few MSS omit pevfu-
ktia, not unnaturally; but the redupli-
cation in fousis—pevfkia adds to the
emphasis. Plato never tires of emphasizing
the 'natural' features of his city in
Books II—IV.

7 dikaiosunh has been questioned by Richards, on the ground that
the inference announced in tovto tvwn ktl.

is already stated in kai miin dei ktl.,
which from its form (kai miν) is yet
evidently only a step in the reasoning.
Richards suggests dikaioin, and Hartman
dikaioynhs, neatly but needlessly.

tvwn in B does not express an inference, but is
simply 'well,' as in II 369 B, III 413 C,
IV 436 B and a host of other passages
collected by Kugler (de part. to et al.etc.
p. 35). Plato first states a popular view,
and then proceeds to show that it is
mainly right on grounds presently to be
stated (whence oδοθ δδεν τεκαιορησαι:).
No stress should be laid on the fact that 

\[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \] is in one case the predicate, and in the other the subject: complete identity is predicated in both cases, as the abstract \[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \] shews. It might be different if we read \[ \text{δίκαιος} \], but for this there is no occasion. There is still however a difficulty in \[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \]: see next note.

433 B 9 \[ \varepsilon\rho\kappaαμεν \] γάρ. This has not been said in the \textit{Republic}, nor (so far as I know) in any of Plato's earlier dialogues (if we except \textit{Alt.} 1127 c), so that \[ \varepsilon\rho\kappaαμεν \] refers to ordinary conversation. Such a view has affinities with the legal view of \textit{Justice} as the virtue which respects the rights of others (cf. 433 e and 1331 A ff.), and is natural enough, especially with the loose connotation which \[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \] had in popular language. It is however curious that in \textit{Charm.} 161 B ff. precisely the same account is given of \textit{Temperance}: 

\[ \text{ἄριστον γὰρ ἄνευμηθήνων δ ἥν τὸν ἤκουσα λέγοντος, οὐκ ὁρθώσειν ἃν εἰς τὸ τὰ ἐαυτὸν πράττειν: cf. Tim. 72 A ἂν καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὸ πράττειν καὶ γνώσει τὰ τὸ ἐαυτὸ καὶ ἑαυτόν σώφρον μὴν προσήκει. \]

In its popular connotation, \[ \text{σωφρόσυνη} \] was not always distinguished from \[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \], and even the philosophers (as Strabo vii 3. 4 observes) sometimes used the words in nearly an identical sense. See Nægelsbach \textit{Nach-}

\[ \text{nom. Theol.} \] p. 238. Steinhart and others find in the difference between this passage and the \textit{Charmides} i.e. an indication of the Socratic and Platonic doctrine of the unity of Virtue. No doubt there is a certain sense in which virtue is one (see below on 434 c), but we must insist that the specific virtues are represented by Plato in the \textit{Republic} as distinct; on any other hypothesis, the perfect City falls to pieces. Perhaps \[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \] after \[ \text{κολπυφραγμονέων} \] is an error for \[ \text{σωφρό-

\[ \text{σύνη} \], and Plato is here deliberately correcting the popular view. If so, καὶ \[ \muὴν—γε \] means 'and yet,' i.e. in spite of what we now say that \textit{Justice} is \textit{eis ἐν κατὰ φύσιν}, 'we and others have also said that \textit{Temperance} is τὰ ἀυτὸν πράττειν.' This view gives a much better sense to καὶ in καὶ τῶν, and \[ \text{Δικαίωσις} \] receives the proper emphasis.

11 \[ \text{δικαίου}—\varepsilon\ρομεν. \] Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Now (1) the Virtue which enables the others to take root, and (2) Justice, each \[ τὰ ὑπόλοιπα. \] Therefore Justice enables the other Virtues to take root. <But that which does so is τὰ ἀυτὸν πράττειν. Consequently Justice is τὰ ἀυτὸν πράττειν.> Plato seldom leaves so much to be mentally supplied in his reasoning.

15 \[ \text{παρέχει.} \] See \textit{cr. n.} Former editors (except \textit{Ast}) retain \[ \text{παρέχει} \] and explain it as depending directly on \[ \text{δικαίου}. \] If this is right, καὶ before \[ \text{ἐγγενεμένοις} \] joins τῶν ἐναι καί \[ \text{παρέχει} \; \text{καὶ} \] \[ \text{ἐγγενεμένοις} \; \gammaε, \] following immediately on \[ \text{ἐγγενεθαι}, \] naturally suggests that \[ \text{παρέχει} \; \text{καὶ} \] \[ \text{ἐγγενεθαι} \; \text{καὶ} \] \[ \text{ἐγγενεμένοις} \; \gammaε, \] are coordinate and both under the government of \[ 

[\text{δίκαιον}. \] That was felt in antiquity is proved by the variant \[ \text{ἐγγενεθαι} \; \text{καὶ} \] \[ \text{ἐγγενεμένοις} \; \gammaε, \] preserved in \textit{Stobaeus} (\textit{Flor.} 43. 98) and in \[ \text{Σ}. \] The author of the reading \[ \text{ἐγγενεθαι} \] must have understood Plato to mean 'which enabled them all to make their appearance in the city, and having done so, to keep it safe, so long as they are there,' and this, I think, is the natural meaning of Plato's words, if \[ \text{παρέχει} \] is retained. But the sentiment is compara-
tively weak; and consequently Ast and Hartman wish to cancel parêkeis, making σωτηρίαν depend upon παρόζενον; but a present tense is necessary. parêkeis seems to me what Plato wrote, 'aye, and after they have appeared it preserves them, so long as it is present in the city.' A relative clause often passes into an independent sentence (see on Π 357 b); and the idiom is appropriate here because it responds to the emphatic καὶ—γέ. For καὶ—γέ cf. 425 b n.

433 D 23 δοῦλο—ἀρχομένῳ. On δοῦλῳ see Π 409 C n. Richards would insert καὶ γεωργῷ after δημοιργῆς, pointing out that the other words go in pairs; but the difference between δημοιργῇς and γεωργῷ is insignificant, since both artisan and farmer belong to the same class in the city.

24 εἰς ὄν. Most of Stobaeus' MSS (Flor. l.c.) read εἰς ὃν ἐν. ἐν is unnecessary with καὶ οὖν ἐπολυπραγμονεῖ following (Schneider).

433 Ε 30 σκότηι κτλ. This tek-mēhνον turns on the judicial sense of δικαιοσύνη: cf. Ι 331 Ε ff. The judicial functions of the rulers follow naturally from 438 D, where it is said that σοφία δοξιέσται—οὕτω ἄν τρόπον αὐτῆς τε (sc. ἡ πόλις) πρὸς αὐτὴν—ἀριστο ὑπάλλη κτλ. It is clear that no class except the rulers can be judges in the State, and judges are necessary; see ΙΙΙ 408 D ff.

35 ἐαυτοῦ κτλ. ἐαυτοῦ is a possessive genitive depending on τῶν. It should be noted that although εἶς τοῦ οἰκείου is not the same thing as πρᾶξις τοῦ οἰκείου, the latter involves the former. Plato is looking for a point of contact between his own view of Justice and the popular judicial meaning of the word, and finds it in εἶς τοῦ οἰκείου. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 49) appears to me to attach too much weight to εἶς τοῦ οἰκείου when he calls it a new "Begriffselement," and complains that it is "weder sachlich erläutert, noch logisch streng abgeleitet."
It should be mentioned that the poet Gray (with less than his usual critical acumen) conjectured τοῦ υπεροχῆς to oikeioν τε καὶ τοῦ ἕναυτον, comparing oikeiopragia in 434 C.

434 A 5 πάντα τάλλα means everything except what Socrates is about to mention, that is everything except the interchange of rulers and ruled. So J. and C., rightly, I think: cf. 421 A, VII 518 D and Laws 798 D. Other editors explain τάλλα as "reliquorum opinicum opera"; and so also q, reading ἕνα πάντα τάλλα τὰ γε τοιάτα; but it is difficult to extract this meaning out of tάλλα without τὰ γε τοιάτα, and the asyndeton is also very harsh. Madvig's conjecture τώτα is improbable, though adopted by Bailer. Adimantus would catch the meaning of the more easily on account of the similar statement in 421 A, and because πάντα would be pronounced with emphasis, as the asyndeton also indicates. I have removed the comma usually printed after μεταλαττόμενα; for πάντα τάλλα includes within its scope all the cases mentioned, and is directly the subject of δοκεῖ.

6 ἀλλ' ἰδαν κτλ. Plato is probably thinking of Athens again: cf. supra 424 D n. and Krohn Pl. St. p. 46. φοβεί belongs to ἐν. Hartman needlessly expunges ἐν and reads φοβεί for φοβεί. The subject to ἐν is simply the pronoun 'he,' used loosely, as often in English.

434 B 10 βουλευτικοῦ — ὧν. "Valde miror editt. verba bouleutikou kai philakos ἀνάξιοι ὑν conosceisse" cries Hartman. The genitives of course depend on τὸ (εἴδος), and ἀνάξιος is used absolutely, as often.

434 C 16 μάλιστα κακουργία. μάλιστα is omitted in Ξ and one or two other MSS; but cf. VII 532 B ἐτὶ ἀδύνατα, VIII 564 A ἐς ἄγαν δουλεῖαν (with Stallbaum ad loc.), and other examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 526. That μάλιστα should be taken with κακουργία is clear from μεγάλητη βλάβη and κακουργίαν τὴν μεγάλητιν.

19 πάλιν: not 'again,' but 'conversely,' "umgekehrt" (Schneider).
20 ἐκάστου—πέλα is cancelled by Herwerden as a marginal note on ὀικειοπραγία. The words add to the weight and impressiveness of the sentence, and have a decidedly Platonic sound.

1 21 τούναντιον ἐκεῖνον. ἐκεῖνον is ‘the other,’ i.e. πολυπραγμόσωσιν (rather than ἀδικίας); and τούναντιον is probably nominative, and not adverbial accusative. So also Schneider. It is not necessary to add ὄν after τούναντιον as I formerly did. The style of argument is the familiar τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων (see Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1307b 7 ff.).

To sum up. Civic Justice is the fulfillment of the maxim τὸ αὐτὸ πράττεων by the three classes in the City. There is nothing transcendental or metaphysical about it, as Kohroh rightly observes (Pl. St. p. 48); it is simply the principle ἐσ ἐν κατὰ φύσιν applied to the three component units or factors of the State. Cf. II 370 A n. It is moreover the soil out of which all the other virtues grow; its fruits are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, of which the last appears in the Farmers and Artisans, the last two in the Auxiliary, while the Rulers possess all three (432 A n.). Thus all the Virtues meet in Justice (ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνην συλλήψθην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐτῷ) and in Justice, in so far (as the historical Socrates held Mem. III 9. 5), that the true unity of Virtue consists. Plato’s Justice is in reality not so much a specific virtue, as Virtue or Righteousness in general: καὶ ὅσον ἐστιν ὅσον ἐστι σωφροσύνη (Arist. l.c.): cf. 442 B n. He desired to build a City, wherein Righteousness dwelleth (καὶ ὅσον δὲ ὁμογενὲς καὶ γὰρ καὶ—is probably a parenthesis, in ὅσον δικαιοσύνην κατοκάτω) 1 Pet. 3. 13, and interpreted Righteousness as the law of ἐσ ἐν κατὰ φύσιν. In taking this view of political diakoiou, there is every reason to suppose (with Kohroh l.c. p. 46) that Plato was not un influenced by the πολυπραγμόσωσιν (as he conceived it) of Athenian democracy, although it is in reality a particular psychological interpretation of Nature’s law of ἀπόλτης that forms the true philosophical basis of the City described in Books II—IV. See also on II 370 A.

434 D—435 A Adimantus agrees; but Socrates will wait until he has discovered Justice in Man before being sure that he is right. If the features of Justice are the same in Man and in the State, we shall be satisfied.

434 D 23 παγίως—λέγωμεν: cf. V 479 C παγίως νοήσαι, Theaeet. 157 A νοήσαι—παγίως, Tim. 49 D. οὐκ ἔστι παγίως νοήσαι was probably a phrase in vogue among Heraclitus’ followers: see Wohlrab on Theaet. l.c.

24 ἴν πάντα ἐδός. ἐδός is not yet the Idea (III 402 C) but refers to ὀικειοπραγία. For šβο Richards conjectures λόγον; but surely ἐδός would then be wrong. How can ‘we be’ said to pass into an individual? The ἐδός is half personified (cf. ὅσον—ὁσον ἐρωτημα ἐρημαίη VII 538 D); it is said to ‘pass into’ the individual merely because we have discovered it first in the State. See also on ἀπαθενών 443 D. The passage in Phaedr. 249 B is different, whether we accept Badham’s conjecture lówr or not.

27 ἕν is a loose internal accusative, exactly like δ in 443 B below. The reference is to II 368 D.

28 ἐκεί. The reading ἐκείνο, found in Σ and other second-rate MSS, would probably have been discarded sooner, if it had been known that Ἀ as well as Π reads ἐκεί. Campbell first pointed this out. ἐκείνο is not quite suitable because,
435 A]

Although it must mean justice, it suggests something more remote. 

E 435 e 29 τούτο: i.e. το μείζον τῶν ἐξόρων δικαιοσύνην. 

435 A 4 καθ' ὄδον. Cf. (with Schneider) infra VII 533 B and Crat. 425 B. μέθοδον for καθ' ὄδον (Herwerden) is a sorry piece of criticism. 

435 A—435 D The point to be determined is this: are there three psychological forms or kinds in the soul of the Individual, corresponding to the three orders in our City? And is the Individual temperate, brave, wise and just in virtue of the corresponding affections of these kinds? Our present methods of investigation are wanting in exactness; but they are sufficient for our immediate object. 

435 A ff. The passages in Plato dealing with psychology have been collected and carefully expounded by E. W. Simson Der Begriff der Seele bei Plato (Leipzig 1889). I have found Simson's treatise more serviceable than Chainget De la Psychologie de Platon (Paris 1861). Dr Brandt's Programm Zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Lehre von den Seeletheilen (Leipzig 1890) will also be found useful in studying the psychological theory here unfolded. For an attempt to shew that Plato always believed in the unity of soul see Archer-Hind in J. Ph. x pp. 120—131. The fundamental principle on which the theory of Book IV should be interpreted is that the just soul is an image of the just city. Now the just city is a Ἐθνὶ with three πολλά; so therefore is the just soul. Plato states this quite clearly in 443 E ἐνα γενομένον ἐκ πολλῶν. In this sense, therefore—and to Plato it was something real and no mere figure of speech—the soul has unity; but not, strictly speaking, in any other sense; otherwise we are in danger of obliterating the distinction between the three orders of the city, and so destroying the whole fabric. Of course nothing which Plato now says should be taken as prejudging the question about the nature of soul in its ἀλήθειά, φύσις, i.e. when exempt from all the evils which are inseparable from matter (X 611 B ff.): if wholly separated from material accretions it is probably μορφώσεις (612 A), λογιστικόν alone remaining. See on X 611 B. But for the present we are concerned with soul incarnate; and Plato certainly speaks of this as having three parts. Cf. Zeller 11 II, pp 845 ff. In what sense an immaterial thing like the soul even when present in body can be said to contain 'parts' or 'kinds' (μέρη, ἔδοχη, γένη) is a further question, which Plato does not here raise, although his followers have done so. It is doubtless true (as Archer-Hind holds i.e.) that 'parts' of soul can only be different modes of its operation; and a consciousness of this fact seems to betray itself in 439 B, D; but we shall best apprehend the meaning of Plato in this passage by treating the analogy as Plato does, i.e. as valid throughout, and speaking, in common with Plato and his commentators, of 'parts' of soul. See also on 435 B.

16—2
tauton an tis prospeitoi meizoun te kar ekattov, anomoion turyxanei on tauth, tis tauton prosagoreuitai, o omioi; "Omoioi, ephi. Ka dikaios ara anh dikaliai polemosi kata autou to tis dikaiou-
B sthnes eldos oudein dioseis, alla omoi estai. "Omoioi, ephi. 'Alla
10 mnentois poleis ge edoxen einai diakiai, oti en auti tripta geni
phiuseon enontai to auton ekaston epipatten. sowerfon de au kai
andreiia kai sorph dia ton auton twn genwn alll ata theta
te ka exeis. 'Alhethi, ephi. Kai ton ena ara, o filo, outos
axiosomei, ta auta tauta eidi en ti autou yuvchi exouta, dia C
15 ta auta paide ekibois tov auton onomatoiv orbois axiousthai ti
polei. Pasa anagkhi, ephi. Eis faulon ge au, o d' eug, o
bounarisie, skema epistotokamen peri yuvchi, hiti exei ta tria
eidi tauta en auti eite mh. Ou paisi mois dokoumen, ephi, eis
faulon. Isos ypar, o Skraters, to legumeno anibthes, oti calopeta
20 ta kalai. Faivetai, hni d' eug. kai ev y' isbi, o Plaikon, wos D
h emi doxa, akribos men touto ek toioouton mebodon, oias vin en

10. oti II: ote A. auti II: eauti A.

435 A 6 meizoun—ekattov: 'whether
greater or smaller.' The insertion of ov
after ekattov, suggested by Dobree, is
unnecessary.

435 B 14 ta auta tauta eidi. eidi
used in this sense is slightly confusing
after eldos has just been applied to dia-
ontos; and ton auton touwn gevwn would
lead us to expect geni. The psychological
elements are called eidi, geni, or mei:
edi in 435 B, C, E, 439 E, geni in 441 C,
443 D, mei in 442 B, C and (by im-
Brandt l.c. p. 17 and Zeller 11 II 1, p. 845.
Eidi yuvchi does not, strictly speaking,
mean 'varieties of soul' but rather 'kinds'
belonging to or present in soul (eidi en
yuvchi 439 E: see also on III 402 C), and
much the same is true of geni. There
is some authority for holding that the
Pythagoreans before the time of Plato
recognised at least two 'parts' of soul—
an eldos and a logos (see Diels Dox.
Gr. pp. 389 f. and other evidence in
Rohde Psych. II p. 170 n.); but Zeller 19
pp. 447, 448 may be right in regarding
the Pythagorean form of this theory as
post-Platonic.

435 C 16 faulov is of course ironi-
cal, although Glauc pretends to take it
seriously. Cf. (with J. and C.) 423 C—E,
426 A, B.

435 D 20 kaiv y'—eirhikosu. The
difficulties connected with this passage
have led to much discussion: see for
eample Rettig Proleg. pp. 126 ff., Krohn
Pl. St. pp. 128 ff., 144, Pfleiderer Zur
Lösung etc. pp. 25, 73, Hirmer Entw. u.
Komp. etc. p. 618. tvto in akribwv men
tuto and in ei tvto apana ought, so
far as grammar goes, to mean the question
whether the soul has tvta eidi or not.
But the makropeta periodos in VI 504 B ff.,
where Plato expressly refers back to this
passage, eschews the psychological prob-
lem altogether. The makropeta periodos
of Books VI—VII is in harmony with the
present enquiry in so far as it seeks to
determine the nature of Justice and the
other virtues (VI 504 D, 506 A), but it is
nowhere in the Republic expressly used
either to confirm or to overthrow the
triple division of soul which is here pro-
pounded. (The analysis of mental faculties
in VI 500 D—511 E is introductory to the
makropeta periodos, not a result obtained
by it; nor has that analysis, strictly speak-
ing, any bearing on the question whether
soul has three eidi or not: cf. Pfleiderer
Zur Lösung etc. p. 25.) Krohn accordingly
holds that the ‘longer ways’ of IV and VI are different and distinct (Pl. St. p. 128); and Schleiermacher supposes (Einleitung p. 71) that the *πλεον ὄδος* of IV is to be found in the psychology of the *Timaeus*; but that Plato meant the two ways to be identical is certain, for he explicitly says that they are (VI 504 b ff.). The only way out of these difficulties is to suppose that τὸῦτο here was not intended by Plato to refer to the psychological, but to the ethical question, to which the psychological enquiry is introductory. τὸῦτο must then be taken as διακρίσις τοῖς πέρα καὶ σωφρόνεις καὶ ἀνδρέας καὶ σοφίας δ ἦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦτο (VI 504 a). This view becomes easy if we suppose that the words καὶ ὁ γε—ἐξαρκεῖα were not written by Plato immediately after he wrote 435 C, but at a later time, when VI 504 A—D was composed. It is in itself highly probable that the most important passages referring forward or backward to one another throughout the dialogue were either written together, or at all events revised by Plato side by side. Cf. Brandt l. c. p. 13 n. 3, where a kindred view is taken. In any case, we must adhere to our explanation of τοῦτο, if we would preserve the artistic unity of the *Republic*. See also on VI 504 A—D.

22 ἄλλη. See cr. n. ἄλλη is in itself much better, to say the least, than ἄλλα, and is confirmed by ἄλλη μακροτέρα—περιδοὺς in VI 504 b. The corruption was easy, owing to the frequency of ἄλλα γὰρ.

435 E—439 E The presence of three kinds or characters in the city establishes *the existence of the same characters in the individual*; but the question is, do they exist in him as three separate elements, or not? Do we employ the whole soul in every psychical act, or do we learn with one part, feel angry with a second, desire with a third? In examining this question we begin by laying it down that the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites at the same time in the same part of itself, and with reference to the same thing. This rule is of universal application; apparent exceptions there may be, but never real. *Desire and Aversion are opposites*; and *Hunger and Thirst are two specific varieties of Desire, relating to meat and drink*, considered absolutely and without qualification. Now it sometimes happens that we are at one and the same moment both thirsty and unwilling to drink, in other words, experience both Desire and Aversion. *But Desire and Aversion are opposites. They must therefore spring from different psychical elements*. The truth is, in such cases it is one part of soul, the Rational part, which says ‘Refrain!’, another, the Appetitive, which bids us drink.

435 E 28 ὅτι γε—πόλει. Broadly speaking, what Plato says is true, that the predominant character of a State depends on the predominant character of the individual citizens (cf. Bosanquet *Companion* pp. 147 f.): but it does not necessarily follow, because a city contains three psychologically different classes of citizens, that each of us (ἐκδιαργῷ ἡμῶν) has within his soul the three corresponding psychological elements. In making this assertion, Plato relies upon the fundamental hypothesis of the *Republic*, viz. that the individual is a commonwealth writ small. See on 11 350 A. γε after ὅτι, though omitted in Σ, is strictly appropriate, and warns us of a further point—*ὅτε δὲ ἢπιον χαλεπῶς* 436 A—on which agreement is not so easy.
30 ενη, ει τις νιθθεθη το θυμοειδες μη ικ τον ιδιωτουν εν ταις πολεοις έγγεγονειν, οι δη και έχουσι ταυτην την αιτιαν, οιον οι κατα την Θρακην τε και Σκυθικην και σχεδον τι κατα τουν άνω τοπον, η το φιλομαθες, δη δη περι τον παρε’ ήμιν μαλιστα αν την αιτιασαυτο τοπον, η το | φιλοχρηματου, δε περι τους το Φοινικας ειναι και 436 τους κατα Αθηναν φαι της αν ουχ ήκειστα. Και μαλα, εφη.
Τοτε μεν δη ουτος έχει, ην δ’ έγω, και ουδεν χαλεπον γνωαι. Ου δητα.

5 XII. Τοδε δε ήδη χαλεπον, ει το αιτω τοιτων έκαστα πραττομεν η τριςιν ουσιν άλλο άλλωσ. μανθανουμεν μεν έτερω, θυμουμεθα δε άλλω των εν ήμιν, επιθυμουμεν δ’ αυ τριτο των των περι την τροφην τε και γανησιν ήδουν και οσα τουτων β άδελφα, η δη τη φυκη καθε έκαστον αυτων πραττομεν, οταν οριμητουμεν. ταυτ’ έσται τα χαλεπα διορισασθαι αξιως λογου.
Και έμοι δοκει, εφη. Υδε τοινυν επιχειρουμεν αυτα οριζεσθαι, ειτε τα αυτα αλληλοις ειτε έτερα έστι. Πως; Δηλον οτι ταιτων ταναντια’ ποιειν η παςχειν κατα ταιτων γε και προ ταιτων ουκ έθελησεν άμα, ωστε αν που ευρισκομεν εν αυτοις ταυτα γενομενα,

1. δ ζ ετ in mg. q2: το ΑΠΕν.
5. τοιτων Apeit (cum q2): τοιτων ΑΠΕν.

31 οι δη—αιτιαν: ‘that is, among peoples who bear this reputation.’ ταυτην is τον θυμοειδες ειναι. The phrase aitiasan έχειν is used both in a good and in a bad sense as the passive of aitismai: for the good sense cf. (with Ast) Gorg. 503 B. What follows is (as Teichmüller observes Lit. Pheid. 1 p. 146) conceived in the vein of Hippocrates’ enquiries as to the influence of climate on character: see his treatise de aere aquis locis 12 ff. ed. Kuchlewein, and cf. also Arist. Physig. 2. 806b15, Probl. XIV 8, 15, 16, and especially Ἰβόλ. Η 7. 1327b 23—33 with Susemihl’s note. Aristotle for his part represents the Greek nature as the mean between the two extremes of oriental di- νομητικων and τεχνικων and northerly thyaios. There is no good reason for supposing (with Steinhart Einleitung p. 191) that Plato was thinking of the wild races of the North when he instituted his second order of citizens, and of Egyptians etc. when he established his third. On the Phoenician and Egyptian characters cf. Laws 747 c ff.

32 τον άνω τοπον; ‘the Northern region,’ not ‘the highland country’ (L.; and S.); cf. Arist. Meteor. Η 5. 362b 33 τον άνω πόλων and Hdt. 1 142 al.

33 aitiasato. ειναι should be understood. For the construction cf. X 599 E.

436 A ι φιλοχρηματου is another name for έπιθυμητων, οτι δια χρηματων μαλιστα αποτελονται αυς ταιται έπιθυμιαι (IX 580 E).
5 τοιτων έκαστα refers to the actions described in μανθανουμεν μεν έτερω etc. τοιτων (see cr. n.) can only be defended by referring it (with Schneider) “to the subject of the triple predicate το θυμο- ειδες, το φιλομαθες, and το φιλοχρηματος.” There is a certain obscurity in this construction, and τοιτων έκαστα prepares us for μανθανουμεν μεν έτερω, δυναμεθα δε etc. better than έκαστα alone would do.

436 B 12 ταυτω—έμα is the earliest explicit statement in Greek literature of the maxim of Contradiction; cf. Thaet. 188 A, Phaed. 102 E, 103 B, Soph. 230 B and infra X 602 E. Plato may have been led to formulate it in opposition to Heracliteanism, which was supposed by some to be the negation of the principle (see Arist. Met. Η 3. 1005b 24 and Thaet. 152 Dff.), or against the Megarian puzzles
436 E] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Δ 247

C eiσόμεθα ὦτι ὅν ταῦτάν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείων. Εἰεν. Σκόπτει δὴ ὁ Ἰ5 λέγω. Λέγε, ἐφη, Ἐστάναι, εἰπον, καὶ κινεσθαὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμα κατὰ τὸ ἀυτὰ ἅρα δυνατόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἐτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησόμεθα, μὴ τῇ προϊόντες ἀμφισβητήσομεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ἀνθρωπον ἑστηκότα, κινοῦντα δὲ τὰς χειρὰς τε καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἑστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται ἁμα, ὡς ἀν, ὡμοι, 20 δ ἄξιοίμεν οὕτω λέγειν ἀδιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὦτι τὸ μὲν τι ἑαυτόν ἑστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. ὡς ὦτο; Ὀντό. Οὐκόνω καὶ εἰ ἐτι μᾶλλον χαριντιζοῦτο ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, κομψόφιμονον ὥσ οὐ γε πρόβιλοι ὀλο ἑστάσι τε ἁμα καὶ κινοῦνται ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῳ πῆξαντες τὸ κέντρον περιβρωνιτα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι κύκλο περιον ἐν τῇ αὐτή 25 ἔδρα τοῦτο ἐδρα, οὐκ ἀν ἀποδεχομέθαν ὥσ ὥν κατὰ ταῦτα ἑαυτῶν Ετὰ τοιοῦτα τοτε μενοντων τε και φερομενων, ἀλλὰ 1 φαίμεν ἀν 36. ἀποδεχομέθα γ᾽: ἀποδεχομέθα ΑΣ: ἀποδεχόμεθα Α.Π.

(see RP? § 226), or as a counterblast to both. Many of the sophistries of the Euthydemus turn on the violation of this law. In Aristotle's formula (Met. l.c. 1006 b 19) πρὸς ταῦτα does not occur; and Hartman would cancel καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα here and πρὸς τὸ αὐτό in 436 e, on the ground that it means the same as κατὰ ταῦτα. But assuredly it does not. κατὰ ταῦτα is 'in the same part of it' as the instances presently cited shew; while πρὸς ταῦτα is 'relatively to the same thing,' viz. to something other than the subject actually to the past. πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα are also both of them found in the parallel passage Soph. 230 b. πρὸς ταῦτα covers such cases as are adduced in Theaet. 154 c—155 c: six dice are πλείους πρὸς τέταρας, ἐλάκτων πρὸς δωδεκα, but they are not ἐναντία πρὸς ταῦταν. Cf. VII 524 A ff., and see also on η καὶ εἶν in 437 A.

436 c 15 ἢν is not precisely ἄτιν ὤσπερ φύμεθα (Stallbaum); for the reference is actually to the past, and the past tense should be kept in translating it. See II 357 a n. and cf. x 609 b. The so-called 'philosophic imperfect' gets credit for more than it deserves, because we are apt to suppose that the past excludes the present, which is not always true: cf. vi 497 c n.

elev by itself in replies is rare. It occurs (if the MSs are right) in Symp. 206 e, Crat. 410 c, Men. 75 c. In the last two passages, Heindorf (on Crat. l.c.) is inclined to rearrange the speakers; but it is safer, both there and here, to keep the traditional arrangement. See on I 332 D.

436 D 23 χαριντιζοῦτο—κομψόφιμονον may refer to some Megarian quibbles on this subject. Zeno's argument to shew that ἡ οἰκία φερομεν ἑστηκεν proceeded on a different principle: see Arist. Phys. vi 9. 239 b 30 ff.

25 ἢ καὶ—δρα. "Repetendum ὦς ex praegressis" (Stallbaum). Schneider connects δρα with ἄτια: in that case we must understand after τοῦτο δρα something like ὥς καὶ ταῦτο βλον ἑστρεχε τε ἁμα καὶ κινεῖαι. Stallbaum's view is the simpler, and should, I think, be preferred. I have accordingly removed the comma usually printed after κινοῦν-

c.

26 ᾧς οὐ—φερομενων. This clause has proved a source of great perplexity. Schneider suggests that μενονων is a partitive genitive, ἢτι being omitted; Stallbaum, that τὰ τοιαῦτα is adverbial, like τοιοωστρᾶτος; while, according to J. and C., τὰ τοιαῦτα "is to be taken as cognate accusative with the participles." Rather than accept any of these suggestions, it would, I think, be preferable to expunge τὰ τοιαῦτα altogether (with Ast), or to place it after ἀποδεχόμεθα (as Gildersleeve suggests, A. J. Ph. vi p. 333 n. 2), or even perhaps to read τῶν τοιωτων with Richards, although little short of a miracle could have corrupted
έχειν αὐτά εὐθὺ τε καὶ περιφερέσ ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐθὺ ἐστίναι, οὐδαμὴ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ περιφερές κύκλῳ 30 κωινῶς: ὅταν δὲ τὴν εὐθυρίαν ἢ εἰς δεξίαν ἢ εἰς ἀριστερὰν ἢ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἢ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσθεν ἐγκλίνη ἂμα περιφερόμενον, τότε οὐδαμῇ ἐστὶν ἐστίναι. Καὶ ὅρθος γε, ἐφη. Ὅτεν δὲρ ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενοι ἐκπλήξειν, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον τι πεῖσει, ὥσ ποτὲ τι ἀν τὸ αὐτό ὢν ἂμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τάναντία | πάθοι 437 ʹ ἦ καὶ εἴη ἦ καὶ ποιήσειεν. Οὕκουν ἐμὲ γε, ἐφη. Ἅλλα ὅμως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ὡς μὴ ἀναγκαζόμεθα πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξίσυντες καὶ βεβαιώμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἄλληθες οὔσας μηκύνειοι, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προϊόμενον, ὁμολογήσαντες εὰν ποτὲ ἀλλή φανῇ ταύτα ἡ ταύτη, τάντα ἡμῖν

30. ἦ εἰς δεξίαν II: ἦ καὶ εἰς δεξιὰν Α. 2. ἦ καὶ εἴη Α.ΙΙ: punctis notavit A.²

tῶν τοιούτων τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα. The following interpretation, which appears to me right, has not, so far as I know, been hitherto suggested. τὰ ἄτρα goes closely with the partitive genitive ἄτων, and is a predicate to τὰ τοιαῦτα, which is also governed by κατά (cf. the familiar usage with ὁπερ and a preposition in similis, e.g. Thesact. 170 A ὁπερ πρὸς θεοῦ ἥχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάσταις ἄρχονται etc.: see on VIII 553 B). μενόντων τε καὶ φερομένων is a genitive absolute. The sentence is in every respect an elegant and idiomatic piece of Greek, and means: 'because such parts, in respect of which they both stand still and move on these occasions, are different parts of them,' τὰ τοιαῦτα—the meaning of which is easy to catch after the examples given above—forms a welcome preparation for εὐθὺ τε καὶ περιφέρεσ in the following clause.

436 E 32 ἔστεν. I formerly rejected this word (with Galen de Hipp. et Plat. decr. IX Vol. v p. 799 ed. Kühn, Herwerden, and Flor. U). It is certainly more pointed to connect ἐστίναι with φαίμεν ἂν, and Glauco's καὶ ὅρθως γε (sc. φαίμεν ἂν) is easier without ἐστίν. But there is not sufficient ground for deserting the best MSS. For other examples of replies referring to the earlier part of the previous sentence see V 465 B n.

437 A 2 ἦ καὶ εἴη. I agree with Bekker, Schneider, and J. and C. in retaining these words, which Galen l.c. also read, and only a few inferior MSS (with the majority of editors) omit. If the words are spurious, no satisfactory theory has yet been advanced to account for their presence in the text; certainly no scribe is at all likely to have added them. A fuller and more emphatic statement of the maxim is natural enough after the emphasis with which the sentence opens (οὖν—ἐκπλήξει), and Schneider truly observes: "obiter et quodam modo praeter expectationem eius" (i.e. τοῦ εἰναι), "mentionem fieri adiectum cum indicat, quod semel postum mox sine offense repetitione, omissis vero verbis ἦ καὶ εἴη ante τοιχεῖα non magis quam supra p. 436 B ante πᾶσχειν locum habetur fuisset." πάθοι καὶ τοιχεῖα have reference to actions, εἴη to a state, and εἴη naturally follows πάθοι because e.g. πλείους γὰίγνεσθαι (an example of πᾶσχειν) leads up to πλείους εἰναι. It should also be observed that the meaning of πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ, which the discussion has not yet brought out, is best apprehended in examples not of πᾶσχειν or ποιεῖν, but of εἰναι τάναντια: see 436 B n.

ἄλλα ὅμως κτλ. The usual Greek idiom, as shewn for example in ἄλγω τὴν κεφαλὴν (cf. V 462 C ff.), rests on a psychological theory which is inconsistent with that now proposed by Plato. This may be one reason why Plato is at such pains to establish and emphasize his point.
II. ἢν Baiter: om. codd. 19. ἐρωτῶντος Α' Π: ἐρωτῶντος Α".

III. ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ ἐπινεύει τῷ ἀνανεῦει καὶ τὸ ἐφίσει τῷ λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιούτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃν ἀλλήλοις θεὶς εἴτε ποιμένας εἴτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν ἢ ἄρτη ὁ διοίσει. 'Ἀλλά, ἢ δ' ὅσ', τῶν ἐναντίων. Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ἐγὼ. διψῆ καὶ πεινῆ καὶ ὅλος τὰς ἐπιθυμιάς, καὶ αὐ τὸ ἐθέλει καὶ τὸ βουλέσθαι, οὐ πάντα

tα ἀπὸ τούτου ξυμβαίνουτα λειμένα ἐσεθαι. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ἕφη,
tαῦτα ποιεῖν.

187 D 19 λαβεῖν has been doubted: but see III 407 B n.
11 ἢν (see cr. n.) is better inserted after ἐναντίων than after θεὶς (Ast) or τοιοῦτα (Hartman). Stallbaum (who formerly read ἢν θείος) in his last edition acquiesces, like Schneider, in the omission of ἢν: but few will agree with him. I have noted the—certain or probably—omission of ἢν in all or the best mss in Phaed. 61 C, 109 E, Euthyd. 291 E (?), Rep. V 457 D, VII 516 E, VIII 558 D, where the omission is lipographical; also in Phaed. 72 B, Euthyd. 281 C, Crai. 389 E, 409 A, Alc. I 132 B, 133 E, Soph. 269 A, Phil. 47 B, H. Mat. 295 A. Sometimes (as occasionally after πρὶν) the omission is perhaps a poetical touch: see my note in Cl. Rev. IV p. 103.

καὶ αὗ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 57) presses ἢν too much when he says that ἐθέλει and βουλέσθαι are definitely represented as not belonging to the category of ἐπιθυμία. Plato expresses no opinion on this point; for ἢν, 'also,' merely marks the introduction of two new terms.

19 ἐρωτῶντος. The difference between ἐθέλει, 'is willing,' and βουλέσθαι, 'wishes,' is well brought out by the contrast between the more active process described in προσάγεσθαι and the passive assent which ἐπινεύει expresses. The point is missed by translating (with J. and C.) 'beckons this with a nod towards herself: it is merely a nod assent to this in reply to herself.' One part of the soul asks, and the other answers, the psychological process being compared to a kind of dialectic or question and answer inside the soul: see III 400 D n. and cf. Isocr. Antid. 256. For the confusion of ἐρωτῶντος and ἐρωτῶντος—ἐρωτῶντος is found in several mss—cf. [Erast.] 132 D, and Euthyphr. 14 C. With the analysis of desire in this passage cf. Phil. 34 ff.

21 ἢν ἀνθή. ἢν ἀπή' ἀπή' Hartman (with Vind. E only), but ἀπελαύνειν is active, not middle. The actions are described as though by a spectator ἄντερα.
This discussion (down to 438 E) is apparently regarded by Susemihl (Gen. Entw. ii pp. 163 f.) as unnecessary for the immediate purposes of the argument, but it is not so. Plato's object is to remove a difficulty which might be felt in holding that desire is restrained, and that by the λογιστικον. Why should thirst be restrained? An objector might ask. You yourself, Socrates, hold that (1) desire is always of the good; consequently (2) thirst is always the desire of good drink, and (3) is therefore always good. See 438 A, where the gist of the objection is contained. Socrates would reply: The fallacy lurks in (2), for 'good' drink is ambiguous. If 'good' drink means drink which desire thinks good, then (2) is true; if it means drink which is in reality good, (2) is not true. Desire cannot know what is good. We must therefore amend (2) by omitting 'good,' for in reality it is sometimes good and sometimes bad to drink. To what then is the final appeal? To the λογιστικον.

It is this which decides on each occasion whether it is really good or bad to drink, and gives or refuses its assent accordingly (439 C). Bosanquet takes a somewhat similar view (Companion p. 154). See also notes on 438 A.

27 οἶνον δίψα—ψυχρόν. 'Thus thirst is thirst—of hot drink, is it, or of cold?' For the genitive with δίψα (which Richards doubts) cf. 439 A. The repetition of δίψα is like that of ἐπιστήμη in 438 C, and makes the statement formal and precise.

437 E 29 ψυχρόν—θερμόν. Hermann transposes these words and is followed by Stallbaum, Baier, and others. "Palmaria emendatio," cries Stallbaum; whereas J. and C. hold that it "makes nonsense of the passage." It is not at first sight quite easy to decide between these conflicting views. The words ἐὰν μὲν τις—προσπάρεχον' ἄν clearly mean that the desire of cold drink is due to thirst plus heat, i.e. thirst supplies the desire of drink, and the heat present in the thirst supplies in addition (προσπάρεχον' ἄν) the desire of cold: see also on τὸ δὲ—προογνεύμενα below. This is in harmony with common sense and also with the theory of Λύσ. 215 E ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τὸ ποτόν (sc. ἐναυσίων) ἑκαστῶν, ἀλλ' οὕτω τῷ όμοιοι, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔριξιν ἔγρα τὸ δὲ ψυχρόν θερμοῦ κτλ: cf. also Symp. 186 B. But ἄν δὲ—πολλὴ ἡ δίψα ἃ seems to proceed on the opposite or homeopathic principle. The presence of πλῆθος produces a desire not for its opposite but for itself. The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the different character of the notions θερμότης and πλῆθος. θερμότης is something distinct from δίψα, though superadded to it, for which reason Plato does not use the expression θερμῶν δίψας; whereas πλῆθος is in reality πλῆθος δίψης, and πολλὴ δίψα, as experience shews, desires much drink. The common sense point of view is taken by Plato throughout, and is expressly justified by him in 438 E οὕτω τῷ λέγειν ὡς οἶνον ἂν ἂν, τοιαύτα καὶ έτειν. For these reasons I heartily agree with the Oxford editors. Hermann's proposal is a product of the inveterate tendency to suppose that wherever we turn in Plato we rub against the theory of Ideas; but the use of παροσωσία here (in spite of Peiper's Ontol. Pl. pp. 602 ff., Zeller's 11 t. p. 560 n., and many other critics) is not metaphysical, but logical, and πλῆθος is certainly not an Idea in this passage. See on this point 438 B, 438 C nn.
33 **αὐτοῦ πῶματος**: merely of drink

(1) much drink, cold drink, etc. Cf. *viii* 559 A αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ δύου. For καὶ αὐτὸ κτλ. Herwerden would expect καὶ αὐτὸ <τὸ> πεινὺν <αὐτοῦ> βρῶματος. Further specification than Plato gives is unnecessary, for τὸ πεινῦν as well as αὐτὸ τὸ δίψος is subject to οὐ μὴ ποτὲ—οὖντε φέρικεν. The voice pauses slightly after πεινῦν.

35 **τὸ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα**: as e.g. θερμώτης, where it προσγιγνέται τῷ δίψει (cf. *e* above), is the desire of ψυχροῦ, ψυχρότης of ψερμοῦ. The type of desires illustrated by the desire of ψυχρῶν πῶμα appears to Plato composite and not simple.

**436 A 1 μῆτοι** has been doubted, and is not, apparently, elsewhere so used in Plato (Kugler *de part. tole* etc. p. 11), though often in Tragedy. Here too it strikes, I think, a lofty note 'Wherefore let not any' etc. θερμώτης is also highly dramatic. All this parade is affected because it is a deduction from one of his own favourite commonplaces which Socrates is about to parry: see next note.

3 **πάντες γὰρ κτλ. γὰρ δὲ—** a rare combination—occurs also in *Prot. 315 D*, *Symph. 205 b* (according to Ven. *T*, but the Bodleian reads γὰρ), *Laws 608 D*. δὲ indicates that the objector is quoting another man's view (*ii 358 C n.*), and the doctrine that all men desire the good was in point of fact a commonplace in the Platonic school. See for example Gorg. 468 A, *Men. 77 C ff.*, *Symph. 204 E and Rep. 111 413 A, VI 505 D*. Here, as always, Socrates would of course concede that all men desire the good; but we need the logistikoi in each act of desire to specify what the good really is (437 D n.). Moreover, according to our present theory, the desire of good drink is the product of two desires, viz. (1) thirst or the desire of drink, and (2) the desire of good. That (2) is in a certain sense universal, does not alter the fact that the two desires are logically distinct. See on τὸ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα 437 E.

**438 B 8 αὐτὰ ἕκαστα. αὐτὰ is ἐπίδα. i.e. by themselves, alone, without qualification: cf. αὐτὰ—μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων in D and αὐτοῦ πῶματος etc. 437 E. Plato now proceeds to establish the universality of his rule. It is obvious that the reasons for believing the rule true of ἐπιθυμία are confirmed if we can shew that it is true universally. The phraseology of this passage—πλῆθος παρουσία, αὐτὰ ἕκαστα, αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία— is no doubt interesting for the light which it throws on the origin of the terminology adopted in the Theory of Ideas (cf. *vi 507 B n.*): but we could make no greater mistake than to suppose that Plato is here speaking of hypostasized Ideas. Cf. Pfeiderer *Zur Lösung* etc. p. 19.

9 **τὸ μείζων—μείζων.** Cf. (with Stallbaum) *Charm. 168 B ff.*, where the nature of relative notions is similarly defined: also Gorg. 476 B ff.
ELATTONOS, καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον μεῖζον ἐσομένου ἐλάττωνος; 'Αλλὰ τι μὴν; ἦ δ' ὅσι. Καὶ τὰ πλεῖον δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττων ἐν τούτοις διπλάσιας πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεια καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὐτὸ βαρύτερα πρὸς 15 κοινομετρεῖ καὶ θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα, καὶ ἐτί γε τὰ θερμα πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις ὀμοίων ἀρ' ὦν ὦτως ἔχει: Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὖν ό αὐτὸς τρόπος, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτῇ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη έστιν, ἢ ὦτος δὴ δεὶ θειόγενος τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιοῦ τινός 20 καὶ τινός. Λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιαῦτα: οὐκ, ἐπειδῆ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμης ἐγένετο, διήμερες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὅπετε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθήναι; Τί μὴν; 'Αρ' οὐ τῷ ποίᾳ τις εἶναι, οἷα ἔτερα οὐδεμιὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ποιοῦ τινός, καὶ αὐτῇ ποιά τις ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως τέχναι τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαι; "Εστίν 25 οὕτω.

XIV. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαθὶ μὲ τότε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἁρα νῦν ἐμαθεῖς, ὅτι δὲ αὐτῷ τις εἶναι τοῦ, αὐτῇ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστὶν, τῶν δὲ ποιῶν τινῶν ποιὰ ἅττα. καὶ οὗ τῇ Ε. λέγω, ὡς, ὦν ἄν ἢ, τοιαύτα καὶ ἐστῖν, ὡς ἁρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄνεισον 30 καὶ νοσώνδων ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἄνεισον καὶ νοσώνδως καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἄναθων κακῆ καὶ ἄγαθη: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμημα, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦ τινός, τοῦτο δ' ἦν

20. οἰκίας έξ: οἰκίας ΑΠΙ.

438 C 15 τὰ βραδύτερα. Stallbaum and others read βραδύτερα without the article (on slight MS authority), but praestat lectio difficilior. Cf. εἰς ἑγγελον εἰς τῶν ζώων. VI 49 D. τὰ is certainly not wrong, and the variety of expression is pleasing: 'and heavier also to lighten, and swifter to that which is slower—do they not stand to one another in this relation?' i.e. such that if βραδύτερα, for example, is qualified, κοινομετρεῖ is qualified too.

18 ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτῆ. 'Knowledge and nothing more,' as opposed to knowledge plus some specification, e.g. astronomical knowledge, literary knowledge etc. It is interesting and instructive to study Parm. 134 A ff. side by side with this passage. There αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη has for its object τῆς δ' ἐσθιν ἀλήθεια, i.e. the Ideas; here we do not soarso high, for μαθηματὸς αὐτῶ is only 'learning and nothing more' (e.g. physical learning, classical learning, etc.

438 D 20 ἐπειδὴ—κληθήναι. Plato's theory is very clearly conceived. οἰκοδομικὴ ἐπιστήμη is a combination of αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη and οἰκοδομία: ἐπιστήμη correlates with μάθημα, οἰκοδομία with οἰκίας ἐργασία, so that ἐπιστήμη οἰκοδομικῆς is ἐπιστήμη οἰκίας ἐργασίας μαθήματος: it is therefore ποιοῦ τινὸς (i.e. in this case οἰκοδομικοῦ) μαθήματος. Cf. note on τοῦ δὲ—προσγεγραμμένα in 437 E.

438 E 29 τῶν ἄνεισον καὶ νοσώδων. If we carry the analysis less far than Plato, we can still make the added determinants the same by saying that ἑπατή ἐπιστήμη is of λατρευκὸν μάθημα. But this will not suit with καθη, for 'bad knowledge' is not 'knowledge of bad things'; nor does it—in many cases—apply to desires. Cf. 437 E n.

31 αὐτοῦ οὕτως—εὐτίν: i.e. μαθημάτως αὐτῶ. αὐτοῦ is emphatic and contrasted with ποιοῦ τινὸς.
the application of the argument on Relativity. 439 A 1 ού τούτων κτλ.: i.q. ού θέσεις τὸ δίψος εἶναι τούτο, ὅπερ ἐστι, τούτων τῶν τινὸς situm esse id, quod est, inter ea s. tantum umum cognos, quae aliaeius sunt (Schneider). We must, I think, acquiesce in this interpretation, if the text is sound; but there is grave difficulty in taking εἶναι twice over, as Schneider virtually does (is that which it inclined is, and is one of, etc.). I am strongly inclined to think that Plato wrote οὐ τούτων θέσεις τῶν τινῶν, <καὶ τῶν> εἶναι τούτο ὅπερ ἐστιν κτλ. With this emendation the meaning is: 'Well now, about thirst, will you not place it in this category of things relative and hold that it is what it is—that is, of course, thirst—relatively to something? Yes, said he, relatively to drink.' τὸ τινὸς i.e. 'the things relative to something' for 'the category of things relative,' is further explained in καὶ τῶν —ὅπερ ἐστίν. Έγωνε answers the first part of Socrates' question, and πώματος ye the second. For other views on this passage see App. III.

4 δίψος δ' οὖν κτλ. δ' ὄνω = 'however,' as in I 337 C. The reading δ' ὄν (Q and some other inferior MSS) is unpleasantly cacophonous before αὐτό.

439 B 10 οὐ γὰρ δὴ—πράττει. See cr. n. Ast's emendation πράττει is preferable to inserting ἄν or changing δὴ to ἄν (with Schanz). The particle δὴ could ill be spared. The infinitive πράττει is read by Galen (de Hipp. et Plat. decr. v p. 488 ed. Kühn) and two inferior MSS. Those who retain the MS reading suppose that ἄν is carried on from έτερον ἅν ἔστι; but the instances cited in support (I 352 Ε, II 360 C, 382 D, III 398 Α) are very much easier than this. περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ refers of course to the object of the action in question: πώμα for instance in a case of thirst. Note that Plato betrays a sense of the unity of soul when he uses the expressions αὕτη—διψῶσα, and τὸ γε αὐτὸ—πράττει. So also in D below φιλουσία. See on 435 Α ff.

13 αὐτός. See 428 Α. The illustration, as Bosanquet conjectures, may have been suggested by Heracletus' πάλιντροπος ἀρμονίη δικαίωσα τόξου καὶ Μήτης (Fr. 45 Byw.).
21. ἐγγύγηνται coniecit Schneider: ἐγγύγηνται codd.

439 C 16 οὐκ ἐθέλειν: 'refuse': cf. infra τὸ κυλέον — κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος. So also Bosanquet 'decline to drink.'

18 ἐνείαν δὲ. The repetition of ἐνείαν with μὲν and δὲ has almost the force of a conjunction: cf. Phaed. 83 A ἀπάτης μὲν μετῆ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὄτων. It is quite unnecessary to insert καλ after δὲ (with Ast and Hartman). For the verbal play in κελεύον — κυλέον cf. III 406 b n.

21 οταν ἐγγύγηνται — παραγύγηνται. See cr. n. The present ἐγγύγηνται is, I think, necessary, and the corruption (through ἐγγύγηνται) easy enough. ὅταν ἐγγύγηνται could scarcely mean ἐκάστοτε, which is the meaning here required. The subject to ἐγγύγηνται is τὸ κυλέον. It is not hinted that 'all men have not right reason' (J. and C.), but only that there is not on every occasion a conflict between reason and desire. See 431 c and 437 d n. Reason readily acquiesces when it is good to gratify desire. τὰ — ὄγωντα καὶ ἐλκύοντα is translated by Jowett 'that which bids and attracts': but ὄγωντα is said like ἄγωντος in 439 b and ἐλκύοντα is 'dragging.' The plural should also be retained in the translation, otherwise τὰ ὄγωντα may be identified with the ἐπιθυμητικοῖς, which would be a mistake, for the appetitive part of soul is certainly not produced by παθήματα of any kind. τὰ ὄγωντα καὶ ἐλκύοντα are in reality 'impulses leading and dragging' the soul, impulses engendered by 'particular conditions and diseases' (not 'passive states' or 'passion,' etc. with the English translators), i.e. in other words by abnormal bodily states favourable to desires, as for example fevers etc.: cf. Phil. 45 A, B. These impulses are no doubt special instances of the action of ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, but should be distinguished from the appetitive principle itself.

439 D 24 λογιστικὸν. The φιλοσοφὸν of II and III shewed itself in moral rather than in intellectual relations; see II 376 b n. λογιστικὸν, though as yet directed only to moral questions, is intellectual more than moral. Intellect gradually asserts its predominance over will until in Books VI and VII it achieves its final triumph. Cf. 439 E, 441 E nn.

439 E—441 C There is also a third element or part of soul, that which we call the element of Spirit. It is distinct from the Appetitive element, with which, indeed, it frequently contents. Its function is to support the Rational part of the soul. In a man of noble character the spirited element is quiescent or the reverse in accordance with the commands of Reason. It must not however be identified with Reason; for it is present in children and the lower animals, whereas Reason is not. Homer also recognises that the two elements are distinct.

439 E ff. The analogy between the righteous city and the righteous soul is
continued throughout this section. It should be noted however that the parallel is no longer quite exact. The difference between the θυμοειδε and λογιστικόν in the soul is greater than that between auxiliarys and rulers in the State: for the λογιστικόν is not a select part of the θυμοειδέ— as the rulers are of the soldiers—but something generically distinct from it. Otherwise the analogy holds (with the reservations mentioned on 435 A). Cf. Steinhara Einleitung p. 192 and Susemihl Gen. Entw. II p. 166.

439 Ε 29 τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ κτλ. Hitherto θυμοειδες has been chiefly the source of courage and the natural anti-thesis of φιλόσοφος (II 375 A ff., II 410 D, 411 C). It now enters on a wider sphere as the ally of λογιστικόν, and becomes, thus far, more intellectual, as Krohn points out: note also the ἄρα δόξα of 430 B. Its ethical connotation is also intensified; for it is not now simply spirit, but the sentiment of moral indignation at everything evil—"eine edler Unwille über alles Schlechte" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 55) —everything which tends to destroy the πολέμια ἐν ἡμῖν. It becomes in short, as Brandt (Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelenheilen p. 18) says truly enough though ponderously, "leiden-schaftlicher Selbsterhaltungs- und Selbstvervollkommnungstrieb." Cf. Simson der Begriff der Seele bei Plato p. 110, and see also on II 375 Α.

30 ἵσως κτλ. The θυτην εἴδος πυχῆς of the Timaeus includes both the θυμοειδες and the ἐπιθυμητικόν: see 69 c ff. and cf. Pol. 309 C. Similarly in the Phaedrus the two lower faculties are figured as the two horses, and the highest as the charioteer of the soul's chariot (253 D): cf. Simson l.c. p. 109 nn.

31 ποτὲ—ποτῷ. The antecedent of ποτῷ is τί: 'having once heard something I trust to this,' i.e. 'I rely on an incident which I once heard.' πιστεύω means that he relies on it for a proof; and ὃ ἀρα goes with ἀκούσας. So Schneider correctly explains the Greek. The precise force of πιστεύω τοῦτῳ has, I think, been missed by most of those who have suspected corruption. For ἢ there have been various conjectures: ἢτι (Madvig), ἢτι (Liebhhed Pl. Jahrb. 1888 p. 110), τὸν (Zeller Archf. Gesch. d. Phil. II p. 694)—all superfluous, and the first two very weak; while Campbell suggests that ἢ has dropped before πιστεύω, taking τοῦτῳ to refer to Glauco's suggestion. But in that case τοῦτῳ would be unnecessary.

32 Δεόντιον. 'Ad hunc Leonium eiusque insanam cupiditatem spectat depravatissimum Theopompi comici Καπηλίων locus" (Herwerden Mn. N.S. xi p. 346). The fragment is emended by Kock (Com. Att. Frag. 1 p. 739) into Δεότατον ὅ τρίμονον (τρίμου λιθαρίων hom., i.e. levissimum) Δεότατον εὐχρὼν τε φαίνεται χαρίες θ' ὃς περι τεκρός. Bergk was the first to connect the two passages.

ὑπὸ—ἐκτός: 'close to the outer side of the North wall.' Cf. (with Stallbaum) Λυσ. 203 Α τὴν ἔξω τείχους ὤν ἀυτὸ τὸ τείχος. The North wall was the outer of the two walls connecting Athens with the Piraeus; the other, or South wall, was called τὸ δία μέσου τείχος, because it lay between the βόρειον and the Φαληρίκον, which connected Athens and the Phalerum. See Gorg. 455 E and the other authorities cited by Milchhofner Schriftenzur Topographie von Athen pp. cxiii ff., and Curtius u. Kaupert Atlas von Athen Bl. II.

33 παρὰ—κείμενος: 'lying by' or 'near the executioner'; not of course 'at the executioner's' as has been suggested. When seen by Leontius, the hangman was engaged in throwing the bodies into the pit (ὄρυγμα οἱ βαραθροί, from which he was often called ὁ ἐμί s. πρὸς τῷ ὀρυγματί). The βαραθρόν into which the bodies of executed criminals
were thrown, was a deep ravine outside the walls, in the deme Keiradâ. Leontius would pass near it, just before entering the city (probably by the Melitides πύλαι): see Curtius u. Kaupert l.c. Bl. 11. The place is still pointed out to visitors to Athens on the western declivity of the Hill of the Nymphs. For the ancient authorities see Milchhöfer l.c. pp. 1—11. Various suggestions have been made for δημιωγές. Valckenaer's δημιωγές is a coinage of his own, and otherwise objectionable; Αυκελω (also Valckenaer) is topographically impossible, and so is Δωμιωγέ (Hemsterhuis), if it has anything to do with the Δωμιωγέ πύλη. The explanation which I have given seems also to have been held by Milchhöfer, for he quotes the present passage among the authorities for the βέβαθρον.  

440 A 3 ὁ κακοδαιμόνες. 'Confound you!'

5 τῆς ὀργῆς. ὡ reads τοῦ θυμοῦ, which Ast and others have preferred. But, as Schneider observes, ὀργῆ is to θυμός, as ἐπιθυμίαι to ἐπιθυμητικοί. If anger fights with desire, the source of anger, θυμοειδές, must be different from that of desire, ἐπιθυμητικόν. This is the whole moral of the anecdote, which is intended to establish the difference between θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν only, not also λογιστικόν.

440 B 11 ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις κτλ. αὐτὸν is τοῦ θυμοῦ: ἀντιπράττειν "ad singularem aliquam actionem referendum esi, quam ratio suscipere enaque in re sibi repugnare prohibeat, quasi dictum sit: μὴ δέν τι πράττεν καὶ τοῦτο ὀργῆν ἀντιπράττειν" (Schneider). The words γενομένου τοῦ τοιοῦτον refer to ταῖς—κοινονησαντα. The anacoluthon is an easy one. Plato means merely that θυμός does not unite with the desires against the reason. For αἰρόντος λόγου cf. X 664 c n. On other views on this passage consult App. iv.

440 C 15 ὄροφ—ἡ. The restriction will be noted. It is not οἱ γενεάι who, as the saying is, hate those whom they have injured.
19. οὐκ ἐν τοῦτῳ κτλ.: 'does not he in fume and chafe—and fight on the side of what he believes to be just—both hunger and at cold and all such inflictions, and hide his ground and conquer, toting not his noble indignation, until he has achieved his purpose, or perished, has been called back and soothed by reason within him, as a herdsman calls his dog?' The words καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν—πάσχει must be taken with ζεί τε χαλεπαίνει, but possibly καὶ ξυμαχεῖ δοκοῦντι δικαίως has been displaced, as we should read ζεί τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει διὰ τὸ πένην—πάσχει, καὶ ξυμαχεῖ δοκοῦντι δικαίως, καὶ υπομένων κτλ.

27. ἂν: See εἰδ. n. el in direct interrogation is unclassical, and ἐρωτάω cannot be supplied. Nor can el be well be taken as conditional (with Stallbaum) and τὸ πῶς as a sudden interruption. For the confusion of et and ἂν see Introd. § 5.

440 ε. ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

31. τίθεσθαι κτλ.: 'defends the rational element.' I have retained the accusative on the strength of CIA 11 317. 9 λαβώντος τοῦ δίκαιον τὰ δὲ πληροφάργησα τῇ τὴν ἐπεξεργασίαν καὶ καταστάσεις τίθεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. The inscription dates from about 280 B.C. Other editors read τοῦ λογιστικοῦ (with Σ alone among the MSS), but do not cite any example of the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ δὲ πληροφάργησα τοῦ λογιστικοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, although πρὸς with the genitive is common enough in similar expressions. Thucydides (11 2. 4) has παρά with the accusative like πρὸς here. The original meaning of the idiom was to take up a position in arms by the side of: see Schneider's Xen. Anabasis pp. 537—540 and the commentators on Thuc. Ic. For the metaphor cf. Arist. Pol. Ath. 8. 5. F. K. Hertlein (quoted in Hartman) also defends the accusative, citing Xen. Polior. 4. 3 ἐπιθετοντο τὰ δὲ πληροφάργησα πάντα τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ὡς παρὰ φίλον.
441 A 3 ἐὰν μὴ κτλ. See App. IV.
441 B II ἐκεῖ: 'in the other place,' viz. III 390 D. If Kühn is to be trusted, Galen (Vol. v p. 500) does not, as Hartman asserts, omit the word; and there is no good reason for suspecting corruption.
441 C—443 B Thus we see that the soul contains within itself the same kinds or elements as our city. It follows that the individual is wise, brave etc. in the same way and in virtue of the same internal elements. We are therefore just when each of our psychological factors does its own work. Reason should rule, with Spirit for its obedient ally; and both of them together, harmonised by music and gymnastic, will control Desire, and ward off foreign enemies from soul and body. The individual is brave in virtue of the element of Spirit, if in spite of pain and pleasure that element continues faithful to the commands of Reason touching what should and should not be feared; wise, by reason of the part of soul that rules and knows; temperate, through the harmony of ruled and ruler on the question which shall rule; and just, in virtue of our oft-repeated principle. We may examine our view of Justice by various tests derived from the popular connotation of the word, and we shall find that we are right.
441 C ff. The parallel between the City and the Soul is maintained throughout this section. Like the City, the Soul is also wise and brave, in virtue of the wisdom and courage of its parts, and temperate and just for similar reasons (see on τ̂ον πόλιν προσάγορεῖς 428 D); the relation between logistikōn, ἰθυμοδείκνυται, and ἐπιθυμητικόν is the same as that between the three orders of the city (see however on 442 C); and the specific virtues are defined in the same way. Finally, as Justice in the State was at last identified with Righteousness or Moral Perfection, so likewise is Justice in the soul (442 E—443 B).
441 C 18 ὀμολογεῖται. ὀμολογεῖται (sic) φ1: ὀμολογοῦται φ2 (with Stob. Flor. 9. 64). The present, 'we pretty well agree,' is satisfactory enough.
441 [D] 22 ἀνδρείαν. See cr. n., and for the error in A cf. ix 373 B n.
23 ἐξελά is intransitive, and not transitive as D. and V. suppose.
441 [E] 34 ὀστήρ ἔλεγομεν. III 411 E —412 A. This passage enables us to
identify the λογιστικὸν with the φιλόσοφον of Books II—III. See on 439 D, and cf.
Krohn Pl. St. p. 57.
35 τὸ μὲν: i.e. τὸ λογιστικὸν, as τὸ δὲ is τὸ τυμηλοῖο. As the subject to the 
participles is κράσις, we see again that 
Plato did not intend 'music' and Gymnastic 
each to affect one part of Soul 
exclusively. It is curious however that the 
participles here describe the effect of 
music only; for it is music (not gymnastic) which 
ἐπιτείχει to φιλόσοφον: see 
on διὰ τὸ —προσήνοντος III 411 E. The 
partial ignoring of gymnastic in this passage 
is perhaps premonitory of the intellectualism of VI and VII: cf. on 439 D 
and e.
442 [A] 2 ἀνείσας κτλ.: 'slackening 
the other by soothing address, taming it,' 
etc. The three participles are not 
coordinate, but παραμυθοῦσα explains the action of 
ἀνείσας. It is unnecessary to 
desert the best mss (as I once did) and 
read ἀνείσας, παραμυθοῦσα καὶ ἡμερόνια 
with Ξ ν and the older editors.
5 προστατήσετον κτλ. Bekker's 
emendation—see cr. n.—is now generally 
accepted. τὸν means λογιστικὸν and 
θυμοεῖτα: so also in b below. On δ ἐπ 
πλείστον etc. see II 379 C n.
7 καλομένων κτλ. καλομένων is 
said because such pleasures are no true
pleasures: cf. I 336 A n. and (for the implication itself) IX 583 B ff., Phil. 36 C ff. On ov n. ad see 426 E n. The imagery of this passage suggests that the ἐπιδυμικών is a sort of θηρίων: cf. IX 588 E ff.

442 B 9 ὄν—γένε: sc. ἄρχειν. 'Dativus causam indicat, cur tertiae parti non conveniat dubius reliquis praeset et imperare, emque in ipsis genere et inde positarum demonstrat' (Schneider). If this is the meaning, we should expect φέρει rather than γένει. Perhaps Plato wrote γενέων (so q Flor. U. Stallbaum etc.): cf. γένε in 441 C. To προσηκόν Campbell prefers προσέχειν, but the present (προσηκόν sc. εἰστί) is better here.

12 φιλαττοτέρην. The two higher parts of soul are to be φίλακες both of the lower part and (in a different sense) 'also' (καί) 'of external enemies': cf. III 415 D, E. Dobree's φιλαττολέχην fails to give its proper force to καί before τοῦ ἐξάνθ. For φιλάττω used in this way cf. II 367 A ov ἄρη ἄλλης ἐφιλάττομεν μὴ ἄλλης: ἄλλη αὐτός αὐτῶν ἦν ἐκατός φίλακς.

442 C 16 ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου. In this particular the analogy between the city and the soul is not quite exact, otherwise it would be the rulers in the city who prescribe τοῦ δεινὸν τε καὶ μῆ, whereas it is the legislator (see on δ. νομοθέτης 439 C). This point is emphasized, perhaps unduly so, by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 43). Unless Plato made the Deity the οἰκιστής of the soul, as the original legislator is of the city, it was impossible for him to avoid placing the λογιστικῶν in a position of even greater authority than the rulers. In Books VI and VII the inequality is redressed by making the power of the Rulers in the city commensurate with that of λόγος in the soul: see VI 497 C n.

18 ἄρχειν τε κτλ.: 'ruled within him and issued these instructions.' The imperfect is used because the instructions must be given before they can be obeyed by τύμαιδες, as described in the last sentence. J. and C. say that ἄρχει refers to 428 E.; but Plato is not there speaking of the individual, only of the State. Although a reference to 439 C or 441 E is barely possible, it is much simpler to regard the imperfect as real, and not 'philosophic.' See above on III 406 E. Schneider, to judge from his translation, takes the same view. With σιωρό μέρει cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 7, 1117 b 34 ff. εἰ γάρ καὶ τὸ δικαίον μικρὸν ἐστὶ (sc. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ) κτλ.

19 αὐτό κάκεινον κτλ. αὐτῷ καί has been interpreted (1) as implying that the τύμαιδες also has a sort of knowledge: cf. 429 C and 439 E n.; (2) as 'like the rulers in the State': cf. 428 B ff. The first view is slightly more natural on linguistic grounds, but I think Plato would hardly have attributed ἐπιστήμη in any shape to the τύμαιδες. Probably (2) is right, for the analogy between the
city and the soul is in Plato's mind all through this section: see 441 C, D, and 442 D.

442 D 25 ὁ πολλάκις κτλ.: 'in virtue of our oft-repeated maxim and in that way': i.e. τῶν τὰ ἀντίστοιο πράττειν. Ficinus seems to have read καί ὑπὸ ἑνεχώμεν. At first sight καὶ οὕτως appears to demand the insertion; but Plato is speaking with less formality and than in 441 C, D. The reading of Vind. E καὶ οὕτως (for καὶ οὕτως), i.e. 'the individual, as well as the city,' is attractive, but unnecessary. Hartman proposes ὁ <τὸλω> πολλάκις <ἐ> λέγομεν, τούτω καὶ οὕτως ἐστα, a solution which will commend itself to few.

26 ὁ μὴ τῇ — εἶναι. 'Do we find Justice growing dimmer in any way? Does it appear something different from what it was discovered to be in the city?' lit. 'blunted, so as to appear.' etc. In the language of 434 D (to which Socrates' question refers) Justice has now 'passed into' the Individual; and no feature has been blunted, or lost its clearness of outline. We are therefore confirmed in our view of Justice, both civic and individual. Hartman would read ἀπῆλθεν ταῦτα, taking ἢμων as 'by us,' but the present is more expressive, and (with ἢμων) represents us as in a certain sense spectators of the self-evolution of Justice: cf. ἐὰν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἑνα ἑνδὸν τὸ ἄνθρωπον κτλ. 434 D. ἀπαμβλύνεται = retunditur' (Schneider).

442 E 29 τὰ φορτικά. Plato tests his view of Justice by four criteria taken as it were de foro and turning on various popular associations of the word: cf. IX 573 B ff. Of these the first three are concerned with honesty and trustworthiness in public and private life; while the last (μοιχεία = ἄθεραπευτικὸς) refers to morality in general, including the service of the gods. Taken together, they sum up the leading features of the perfect character, and shew that Plato's conception of private, as of political, Justice is in reality Righteousness or Moral Perfection, whereof the other virtues are the fruit. Plato's innovation lay in interpreting Righteousness as τὰ ἀντίστοιο πράττειν, or rather in the peculiar meaning which he attached to this phrase: see on 434 C and infra 443 B n.

32 παρακαταθήκην χρυσοῦ κτλ. Honesty and truthfulness were generally recognised as characteristic of the δίκαιος ἄνδρος: see the passages collected by Nagelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240—246.

34 τοῦτο αὐτῶν. See cr. n. "Fortasse Plato τοῦτον αὐτὸν scripsit" (Schneider).
Oudèv' án, ἐφή. Ὑποκόην καὶ ἱεροσυλλόγον καὶ κλωτὼν καὶ προδοσίων ἢ ἑιδι ἐταίρων ἢ δημοσίᾳ πόλεων ἐκτὸς ἀν ὑποτὸς ἐφή; Ἐπτός. Καὶ μὴν οὐδὶ ὀπωστιοῦν ἀπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὁρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ὁμολογίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἀν; Μοιχείαι μὴν καὶ γονεόν ἀμέλειαι καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπευταί παντὶ ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσήκουσι. Παντὶ μέντοι, ἐφή. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον 1 πάντων ἀπιστον, ὅτι αὐτῶν β τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκαστὸν τὰ αὐτῶν πράττει ἀρχῆς τε περὶ καὶ τοῦ ἁρχεσθα; Τούτῳ μὲν οὐ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο. Ἡτε τι οὖν ἔτερον ἤξτεις δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ τάυτην τὴν δυνάμει, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις; Μᾶ Δία, ἦ δ' ὥς, οὐκ ἔγογε. 

XVII. Τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτελεσται, ὦ ἐφαμεν.


443 A 2 ἱεροσυλλόγων — προδοσιων. See Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 293 ff., 298 f.

4 ἀπιστος — κατὰ ὁρκου. εὐφέρεια was an indispensable element in Greek morality; see Nägelsbach l.c. p. 242, and the interesting monograph of Augustin Der Eid im Gr. Volksleben u. in d. Pl. Ethik Elbing 1894.

5 μοιχεία — ἀθεραπευσία. Nägelsbach l.c. pp. 264 ff., 275 ff., 191 ff. The virtue of εὐφέρεια was commonly regarded as δικαιοσύνη ἐπὶ τῶν θεων (e.g. Euthyph. 124), and εὐφέρεια is concerned with θεων θεραπεια. See Euthyph. l.c. and cf. also the Stoic Zeno in D. L. 711 119 εἰναι την εὐφέρειαν ἐπιστήμην θεων θεραπειας, and Sext. Emp. adv. Math. IX 123.

443 A 2 — 444 A We were right then in suspecting that Justice in a certain shape was with us from the first when we founded our city. But the principle that every one should do his professional work and no more, is in reality only an image or shadow of Justice. True Justice is concerned with the inner man and consists in the performance of its own peculiar office by each of the three elements within the soul. It is this which produces spiritual unity, and spiritual unity shows itself in outward acts. We may now claim to have discovered Justice both in the City and in the Individual.

443 B ff. This section deals with the relation between Civic and Individual virtue. Although we discovered the latter by means of the former, it is the virtue of the soul which is alone original; the other, its outward expression, is but a copy. All true virtue therefore rests upon psychology; not yet, as in vii and viii, on the metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. The full meaning of Plato's 'natural city' (κατὰ φύσιν οἰκουθείαι πόλεις) now appears. It is a commonwealth whose institutions and political life are the outward expression or embodiment of the true and uncorrupted nature of the soul, regarded as in very truth a φύσιν οὐκ ἔγγειον, ἀλλ' οἰδαίον (Th. 90 A). Hence arise the three orders of the city; hence too, each order performs its own function; for it is part of soul's 'nature' τα εἰσόδημα πράττειν, and ποιεῖν πραγματεύειν is a consequence of unnatural degeneration (441 A). This optimistic view of 'nature' is noteworthy. It rests on the wide-spread Greek belief that good is natural, and evil unnatural; cf. infra 444 D and Aristotle's ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσι (de Caelo 1 4. 271a 33), οὐδὲν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλῶν (Pol. H 3. 1325β 10) and the like. For more on this subject I may be allowed to refer to my essay on Classical Education, Deighton, Bell and Co. 1895 pp. 12 ff. Although not itself expressly a deduction from the theory of Ideas, Plato's conception of 'nature' as good and not evil is altogether in harmony with the sovereignty of the Idea of Good in Book vi: see on 505 A ff.

12 τέλεον κτλ. The language is suggested by Homer's οὐκ ἄναρ, ἀλλ' ὑπὸρ ἀπόδον, ὃ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔστι (Od. XIX 547). ὁ is a vague internal accusative: see on ἦν ψηφημεν in 434 D.

ἐφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 433 A.
On ὁδὲ ἡμέρας see III. 407 B n. For κυνιδευόμενον Hartman suggests εἰκωνιδευόμενον; but presents do not of course become imperfects in indirect.

443 c 15 τὸ δὲ γε: ‘yes, but in point of fact.’ For τὸ δὲ in this sense cf. I. 340 D n. τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθές below expresses the same meaning more fully and emphatically.

16 δὴ—οὖσας. The imperfect ὁφέλες (see cr. n.), ‘for which reason also it was of service to us,’ viz. in discovering the real or original justice, seems to me better than the present. See II. 368 D ff. Plato is justifying himself for having taken so much trouble about a mere εἴδωλον; it was in order to learn the original through the copy. So also Hartman. The present could only mean ‘benefits the city’ (so Schneider, Retig and others). Madvig, strangely enough, suspects the whole phrase. Civic Justice is an εἴδωλον of Justice in the soul as being its reflection in outward conduct. See also on 443 B ff. above.

19 τοιοῦτο takes its meaning from τὸ τῶν μὲν σκυτοσωμάτων etc. ‘Justice was indeed something of this kind’ (i.e. a sort of τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν), but οὐ περὶ τὴν ἐξω πράξεω. The warning conveyed by εἰδωλόν and τρόπον τών in 433 A (where see note), 433 n and 432 E is now justified: for Justice is said to be περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς πράξεω, and is therefore not, strictly speaking, that which we have called ‘Civic Justice.’

443 D 20 ὅς ἀληθές should be construed with περὶ εἰαυτῶν. The soul is the true self, as Socrates continually maintained. It is better to regard περὶ before εἰαυτῶν as coordinate with περὶ in περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς, than to translate ‘with internal actions which are in very truth concerned with himself’ (J. and C.). ὅς ἀληθῶς περὶ εἰαυτῶν etc. merely emphasizes and explains περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς.

22 ἐκαστὸν. Ast would read ἐκαστὸν τῶν; but the meaning is easily caught after τὰ εἰαυτῶν just before.

23 τὸ ἐντὸ κτλ.: ‘having set his house in order in the true sense.’ So Schneider, rightly. For ἐκεῖα cf. III. 405 B n.

24 ἐκαστὰ—ἐιρμοσμένον. Cf. 432 A, where a similar image is employed. The figure here is taken from the Octachord, the ἀρμοστῆς being represented by the ὑπάτη or highest string (which gave out the lowest note), the ἐπιδιομένων by the νεάτη (an octave higher in pitch), and the ἐπιμελητὴς by the μέση or fourth. See Dict. Ant. II p. 105 or Gleditsch Die Musik d. Gr. p. 800.

The single notes of a ἀρμοστία could be called ὤφα because they were in reality terms in a proportion and depended on the relative length of the string: cf. Tim. 35 B, C. Hartman’s correction of νεάτης, ὑπάτης, μέσης τοῦ νεάτη, ὑπάτης, μέση ταύτης is very attractive: for the genitives can only be explained as ὄφα ταύτης etc., and the effect is unpleasing, especially with
the preposlogomenos of course is (see Gleditsch l. c. p. 861 and Euclid Sec. Can. 10 ed. von Jan): so that according to the Scholast there is a serious breach of συμφωνια. It seems to me quite clear that in δισερ δρους τρεις—μεση Plato is thinking of three ξυμφωνι ϕθονοι, and in the single octave or diα πασων, the υπατη, μεση or fourth, and νεατη were συμφωνα ἀλλας: see Cleonid. Isag. Harn. 5 ed. von Jan. In 432 A also, Plato contemplates only a single octave: see note ad loc.

443 E 27 ≠να—πολλων. Cf. 423 D n. and [Erpin.] 992 B εκ πολλων ὑπανθησε. The phrase εις εκ πολλων is a sort of Platonic motto or text (like the φωναί of post-Aristotelian ethics).

29 οὕτω δή—ὑπόθεν: emphatic, as Hirzel points out (Hermes viii p. 393): for the just man will not take part in practical affairs until he has ordered his own soul aright. Cf. Alc. 113 B ff., Ap. 36 C, and Xen. Mem. iii 7. 9, iv 3. 1.

29 ἦ καὶ. Stallbaum and others add περὶ (with ἐς) before πολιτικων, but τι πρατήρ περὶ πολιτικων τι is very unpleasing. πολιτικων depends directly on πρατήρ and is equivalent to περὶ πολίων. The slight variety of expression is easy and elegant after ἦ καὶ 'aut etiam.'

33 ἐπιστήμην—δόξαν. This is, as Kohrn points out (Pl. St. p. 68), the first precise and explicit separation of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in the Republic. Each of them, however, is still concerned with conduct, and not, as in the end of ν, with the theory of knowledge.

444 A 4 τυχανει—δν = 'really is': 1 337 B n.
444 A—444 E

Injustice, like every variety of Vice, implies sedition and confusion among the parts of the soul. It is spiritual disease, deformity and weakness; while Virtue is the reverse. Virtuous institutions promote virtue, vicious institutions vice.

444 A 8 ἀδικιαν. Now that we have discovered Justice, it is necessary to look for Injustice, in order that we may compare the two and decide the question at issue, viz. πότεν δει κεκτῆσαι τὸν μέλλοντα ειδοῦσαν εἶναι, εάν τε λαυ-θάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-πους (427 D: cf. 11 368 E n.). The full exposition of Injustice is reserved for Books VIII and IX, where Plato takes the subject in its proper order, considering civic injustice first, and afterwards that of the individual. At present he contents himself with a preliminary or exoteric sketch of Injustice in the soul, representing it as unrighteousness in general, just as Justice, both in the State and in the individual, has been identified with righteousness or moral perfection (434 C, 442 E n.).

444 B II ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτον—δυτι. See cr. n.

The reading of Ζ and other inferior MSS, which (in common with all the editors) I have printed above, seems to be an attempt to emend the older and more difficult reading preserved in A and II. Stallbaum supposes that A here represents a corruption of Ζ, αὐτῷ δούλευεν being presumably a correction (of αὐτῷ δούλευεν) which has crept into the text; but this is unlikely in itself, and also leaves τοῦ δ' before αὐτῷ δούλευεν unexplained. The text of Ζ is not in itself quite satisfactory, as Richards has pointed out. οὐ πρέπειν αὐτῷ for ὡστε πρέπειν αὐτῷ seems unexampled, although οὐν δούλευεν would of course be right. The expression τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους δυτι, 'that which is of the ruling class,' is also curious for the more direct and accurate τῷ ἀρχικῷ γένει. The reading of A and II yields no tolerable sense, and certainly cannot come from Plato. Madvig (with Vind. E) proposes οὗν πρέπειν αὐτῷ δο-ύλευεν, τῷ δ' αὐτῷ <μὴ> δούλευεν ἀρχικών γένους δυτι, which is intelligible, if weak. I have thought of οὐν πρέπειν αὐτῷ δο-ύλευεν, τῷ δ' αὐτῷ δούλευεν (or δοῦλοις, after Schneider) ἀρχικῶν γένους δυτι, but there are obvious objections. I should not be surprised if the whole clause ἀλλὰ —δυτι, as it appears in A and II, is only an attempt by some illiterate scribe to work out the antithesis of προσήκοι: lit. 'being by nature such as to be proper for it to be a slave, and the slavery again <being such as to be slavery> to that which is of the ruling class.' The clause, even as read in Ζ, adds nothing to the sense, and the references in τοιοῦτον ἄττα and τοῦτον just below are caught more easily without the obnoxious words. See 442 B ἀρχεῖν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσήκοιν αὐτῷ γένει. Cf. III 413 C n.

13 τοιοῦτον: sc. τόν γενόμενον.

15 ταὐτά—ταῦτα. μὲν οὖν corrects τοιοῦτον ἄττα: "immo haec eadem" (Schneider). For ταὐτά some prefer, with one MS of Stobaeus Flor. 9. 64, αὐτά ("immo-
The text is a page from a Greek text, possibly from Plato's works. The text is discussing various philosophical concepts and arguments, including the nature of justice, the role of analogy, and the distinction between soul and body. The page contains references to earlier philosophers and texts, such as Aristotle and Hippocrates. The text is a mixture of prose and dialogue, typical of Plato's work.
35 πότερον αὐτό κτλ. See I 354 B, C, and note on 444 A. 
445 A 2 ἕω τε λανθάνῃ. Cf. 427 D and II 357 E.
3 βελτίων—κολαζόμενος. II 380 B, n.
8 ὦ ζωήν. Cf. I 353 D τί δ' αὖ τῷ ἔμε; ψυχής φήσομεν ἐργον εἶναι; μιλιστά γε et note ad loc. βιωτὸν ἄρα ἄστι should not be made interrogative. The sentence means: 'if life, which men deem unbearable when the bodily constitution decays, even when they are surrounded by every variety of food and drink and wealth and power, shall be, forsooth, when tumult and decay affect the constitution of the very principle whereby we live, worth living, if so be we do what we desire, and take no steps to escape from wickedness and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue.' Life is nor (says Plato) βιωτός to the guilty man who works his will; it may become so if he takes steps to rid himself of vice, i.e. ἕω διὸ δίκην καὶ βελτίων γένηται κολαζόμενος. For the sentiment cf. Crit. 47 D. E., Gorg. 477 B—E., Prot. 313 A, B. 
445 B 13 ὅσον—σαφέστατα. "Quam certissime fieri potest?" is Ficinus' render-
ing, with which Schneider and later editors agree, taking κατάδεικ. as explanatory of ἐντάθι. But it is hard to find another instance of ὅσον ὁδόν τε, although καθ' ὅσον ὁδόν τε and ὅσον ὁδόν (Thuc. I 22. 2) occur. ὃς ὁδόν τε is the almost invariable phrase. For ὅσον Stephanus proposed ἀδειν, Ast ὅσον. I think the meaning is 'now that we have come far enough to be able most clearly to descend that these things are so,' ἐντάθι being equivalent to ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, and ὅσον ὁδόν τε to ὅσον ἐδοκότας ὁδόν ἄστιν. 
445 C 15 ἄποκρητην. I have re
tered to the ms reading. Bekker's emendation ἄποκρητην is very attractive, but ἄποκρητην gives excellent sense (cf. I 349 A), and there is no real reason why Glauco should repeat the word employed by Socrates (see on ν 465 E); nor does there appear to be any instance in Greek literature of the verbal of ἀποκρώσαμεν.

16 ἐξαθάν. Plato does not claim that his enumeration of degenerate common-
weaths is complete. Cf. VIII 544 D.
18 ἐν—κακίας. An old Pythagorean principle, whence the paradise with which
Plato announces it. See Arist. Met. 1 5.
986a 22 ff. (RP.7 § 55) and Eth. Nic. 1 4. 1096b 6 with Stewart’s note.
21 ἐνδή ἐχοντες: ‘having’ (i.e. as we should say ‘forming’) ‘specific kinds’: cf. viii 544 D.

445 D 25 ἐγγενομένου—ἀριστοκρατία. Knowledge, not number, is the criterion of good government: cf. Pol. 292 C. Hitherto however the rulers have always been represented as a plurality, and we have heard nothing of a king. In the later books (from Ⅳ 473 C onwards) we often hear of kingship; and in Ⅸ 576 D (as Newman points out Politics of Aristotle Ⅰ p. 413 n.) the ideal city is called βασιλευομένη, ὅπως τὸ πρῶτον διόφθομεν. With the present passage cf. vii 540 D ἡ πλείους ἡ ἐλι and Ⅸ 587 D, where the ἀριστοκρατικός and the βασιλικός are identified. The fact is, as Henkel has pointed out (Stud. zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehr. v. St. p. 57), that “Kingship is only a form of Aristocracy throughout the whole political theory of antiquity, and rests on no distinct and independent basis of its own.” It must be regarded as exceptional when in the Politicus (Ⅲ 302 C ff.), probably a later dialogue, Plato distinguishes between kingship and aristocracy and places aristocracy on a lower plane. See also Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 15 ff.

445 E 28 τῶν—νόμων. For the genitive cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 514 A δημοσία πράξαντα τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, and infra Ⅵ 485 B.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IV.

I.

IV 421 a, b.  et μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φύλακας ὡς ἄλληθρος πουῦμεν, ἢκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων γεωργοὺς τινας καὶ ὠσπερ ἐν παντγάφει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας εὐδαιμονίας, ἀλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι.

I hope my note has proved that this sentence is sound in the main; but Madvig's emendation has obtained such a wide currency, owing to its adoption by Baiter, that the text has fallen under grave suspicion, and it may be well to record the different conjectures.

They are as follows:

(1) εἶνεν οὖν ἡμεῖς κτλ. (Orelli, cited by Schneider): (2) ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν φύλακας κτλ. (Asg in his third edition): (3) μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς κ.λ.μ., φύλακας κτλ. (Herwerden, with whom Hartman agrees so far, although Hartman goes further and expunges καί before ὠσπερ as well as the entire clause ἀλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι): (4) εἶ μὲν οὖν—ἑστιάτορας, εὐδαιμον ἀλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι (Madvig): (5) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς—λέγων ἄργους (or κακούργους) τινας—εὐδαιμονίας, ἀλλο δὴ τι ἢ πόλιν λέγει (Richards).

It should be mentioned also that Wyttenschab (quoted by Stallbaum) had conjectured ἑστιάτορας καὶ δαιμονίας instead of ἑστιάτορας εὐδαιμονίας (ἑστιάτορας καὶ εὐδαιμονίας in a few inferior MSS).

A glance at these proposals will shew that the difficulties felt have been chiefly in connexion with (a) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν, (b) γεωργοὺς, (c) ἑστιάτορας εὐδαιμονίας and (d) ἀλλο ἂν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι. I can see no reason for Richards' correction of (d): 'mixed' conditional sentences of this kind are surely common enough.

For ἑστιάτορας εὐδαιμονίας cf. ΙΙΙ 420 a οἱ εὐδαιμόνες δοκοῦτες εἶναι and especially Χ 612 a τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἑστιάτων. The μὲν after εἰ is omitted in one Florentine ms, but μὲν without δὲ occurs tolerably often in Plato (cf. ν 475 e n.). Here it has the effect of italicising the preceding word by suggesting a possible antithesis. The only real difficulty is in γεωργοὺς, and in view of 419 a to which ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων refers, some may doubt whether even γεωργοῦς is not also genuine. For my own part I am inclined to think that Plato wrote λεγομένους.

II.

IV 430 e.  Κόσμος πού τις, ἤν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν καὶ ἦδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπίθυμῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὡς φασί, κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οίκ οἷον ὄντων τρόπον. καὶ ἄλλα ἃττα τοιαῦτα ὠσπερ ἰχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται.
The reading φαινονται, which replaces λέγοντες in A, II and a majority of MSS, is admittedly corrupt. One Florentine MS has λέγοντες φαινονται, another φαινονται λέγοντες; and it is possible that φαινονται was originally only an adscript intended to be taken with λέγοντες. The emendations proceed for the most part on the assumption that λέγοντες and not φαινονται is the gloss. This may be so, but unfortunately no satisfactory remedy has yet been suggested on these lines. The most important corrections are ἀποφαινονται (Cornarius), φαινοντα (Madvig, taking the participle in agreement with κόσμοις and ἐγκράτεια, but φαινοντα cannot be used for ἀπεργαζόμενα, as Hartman points out), φάινεσθαι (Hartman, who connects the infinitive with φασί, and construes ἡς boldly as quoniam). Other corrections enumerated by Hartman are ἄφαιτν οὖν (Dobree), φαμέν (Badham), ἀποφαινονται (Richards). Apelt has thought of cancelling the entire clause κρείττω δή—τρόπον as an "interpretatio etymologica ad praegressam vocem ἐγκράτεια pertinent" (Obs. cr. in Pl. dialogos, p. 11). It would be easy to multiply conjectures of this sort; but until something better is proposed, we should hold fast to λέγοντες. The λέγοντες of the next sentence suits λέγοντες very well, for the phrase κρείττω αὐτοῦ is itself one of the ἵχνη. I have placed a full stop before καί ἄλλα. Ast suggested a colon, and wished to add ἃ after τοιαῦτα, but no change is necessary.

III.

IV 438 e—439 a. Τὸ δὲ δὴ δάψος, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινῶν εἰναι τούτῳ ὀπερ ἐστὶν—ἐστὶ δὲ δῆπον δάψος—; Ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὥσποτας γε.

In this difficult passage Stallbaum, who is followed by the Oxford editors, construes εἰναι with τούτων ("is one of" etc.), and regards τούτων ὀπερ ἐστὶν as no more than "ipsam per se" ("as far as its essence is concerned," J. and C.). This interpretation is grammatically awkward, and otherwise objectionable, inasmuch as it anticipates δῆπος δ' ὥσποτας γε below. Plato evidently means to present his argument in two steps: (1) Thirst, as you will agree, is something relative to drink, (2) Thirst qualified is relative to drink qualified, and thirst by itself, without qualification, to drink by itself, without qualification.

A large number of emendations has been proposed. The late Mr W. A. Gill was inclined to omit τούτῳ ὀπερ ἐστὶν (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philol. Soc. xvi p. 35), and Hartman boldly expunges the words, leaving ἐστὶ δὲ δῆπον δάψος, as it appears to me, in a lonely and unsheltered situation. The suggestion τῶν ὧν τίνως (Madvig), i.e. "which are such as to be that which they are relatively to something," is very cumbrous, and renders ἐστὶ δὲ δῆπον δάψος far from natural. Mr Cook Wilson's defence or explanation of Madvig's proposal in the Academy no. 824 (Feb. 18, 1888) does not carry conviction to my mind. Baiter combines the conjecture of Madvig with Morgenstern's δή του for δῆπον, in which case Socrates repeats his question, if ἐστὶ δὲ δῆπον δάψος is interrogative, or, if not, answers it himself. It
seems to me clear that ἐστι δὲ δῆτον δίψος is intended to explain τὸῦτο δπερ ἐστίν and nothing more. J. and C. translate "Thirst is, I imagine—Yes, said he, thirst is of drink," remarking that "two questions are asked; before the second is completed Glauco breaks in with a reply to the first (ἐγώγε): and in παματός γε he completes and answers the second." I can see no occasion for so much impatience on Glauco's part. The insertion of καὶ τινός after τῶν τινός appears to me to solve all the difficulties, and the error is of a kind that frequently occurs in our oldest ms. See Introduct. § 5.

IV.

IV 440 b. ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν κοινωνήσαντα, αἱρόυντο λόγου μὴ δείν ἀντιπράττειν, οἷςα σε οὐκ ἀν φάναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σαυτῷ τού τοιοῦτον αἰσθέσθαι, οἷμα δ' οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ.

The difficulties of this passage have been much canvassed. The only important variant is ἐν ἑαυτῷ (II and corr. A, with several other mss) instead of ἐν σαυτῷ. II does not, as Bekker asserted, give μηδὲν, but μὴ δείν like A. The τὰ τι πράττειν for ἀντιπράττειν of q, although adopted by Bekker, is indefensible, as other editors have observed, for ἄν has no meaning or construction.

Against the ordinary interpretation, which I have given in the notes, it has been urged that θυμῶς does, in point of fact, sometimes join with the Desires against the Reason. Thus in the degenerate phases of character depicted in vii 553 c ff. and elsewhere, θυμοειδές is the slave and minister of the ἐπιθυμητικῶν, and in 441 a ἐπίκουρον ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει εἶναι μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφφαρῆ, the same implication appears to be involved. Cf. Krohn Pl. St. pp. 52 ff. But in such cases the λογιστικῶν would seem also to be corrupted (τὸ δὲ γε, οἷμαι, λογιστικῶν τε καὶ θυμοειδές χαμαί ἐνθὲ καὶ ἐνθὲ παρακαθίσας ὑπ' εκείνω—sc. τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ—καὶ καταδουλωσαμένος viii 1 c), so that there is no conflict between the allied forces of the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικῶν on the one hand and the λογιστικῶν on the other. It is true that the language of 441 a, taken in its full force, appears to imply that the θυμοειδές can be corrupted without the λογιστικῶν, but Plato would hardly, I think, have held such a view, and the implication is not to be pressed. See Phaedr. 253 d—256 e. There is some difficulty about the construction of ἀντιπράττειν, and Hartman would expunge the word. Schneider's punctuation, which I have adopted, connects it with δεῖν. Others make its subject αὐτῶν ("but that θυμῦς, having made common cause with the desires, when Reason forbids, should oppose Reason—this' etc.). The explanation of Hermann (adopted also by Schmelzer) avoids the anacoluthon, but is exceedingly tortuous and unpleasing: 'I think you would not say that you have perceived θυμὸς making common cause with the desires and opposing Reason when Reason forbade' etc. Richter also (Pl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 139) evades the anacoluthon by defending the more than dubious construction αἰσθέσθαι αὐτῶν κοινωνήσαντα.
Finally Nitzsch conjectures (Rh. Mus. 1857 p. 472) μη δειν <τι πράττειν>, αντιπράττειν, ορ μηδ ελιν-αι τι πράττειν, αντιπράττειν. None of these devices seems to me so probable as Schneider's view.

An entirely different view of this passage is suggested by a Scholiast's note, to which Warren has recently again called attention. The Scholium runs: ο δε νοις ουτος... τας δε ἐπιθυμιας σε κοινωνισαντα τας ευλογιστους, και γινωσκοντα σε τουτο έκ της πειρας, ουχ οπολαμβανω σε ειπεν δι ησοθμαν εν τας τοιαυτας αγαθας ηδοναις των θυμων αντιπραττοντα τας επιθυμιας, ωσπερ επι τας του Δεοτιου αλγοις ηδοναις αντιπραττεν.

It is obvious that the Scholiast connected σε with αυτων and took the sentence to mean, broadly speaking, that when Reason on the other hand sanctions indulgence (αιροντος λογου μη δειν ματραττεν σε. τας επιθυμιας), we do not find any conflict between θυμως and the desires. The meaning is satisfactory, and furnishes a fair antithesis to the first half of the sentence οταν βιαζονται—του τοιουτου, but it is difficult to reconcile this view with the Greek as we have it. Warren, who sympathises in general with the Scholiast, translates "that dealing with desires it"—viz. θυμως—"should, when reason says it ought not, oppose them, this I imagine" etc. κοινωνισαντα must however be more than 'dealing with,' and the aorist (which on the ordinary view means 'having joined,' 'made common cause with') presents a serious difficulty in this interpretation.

Reading εν εαυτω, for which there is good authority (see cr. n.), I formerly construed the passage as follows: 'but when he' (αυτων with reference not to των θυμων, but to των and του τοιουτου alone) 'has joined partnership with his desires, because reason decides that he ought not to oppose them, you will not, I imagine, say that he has observed anything of the sort' (i.e. such internal στοιχεια as has just been described) 'ever happen in his own soul, or in the soul of another? Assuredly not.' By this solution we get rid of the anacoluthon, while adopting generally the Scholiast's view; but it is an unnecessary and irrelevant elaboration to make Glauco speak of what the hypothetical person has observed in himself or in another: we wish to know what Glauco has himself observed.

On the whole I am now inclined to believe that the traditional interpretation is correct.

V.

IV 440 c. Τι δε; οταν αδικεισθαι τις ηγηται, ουκ εν τουτω ξει τε και χαλεπαινει, και ξυμαχει τω δοκουντι δικαιο, και δια το πεινη και δια το μεγαν και ταντα τα τοιαυτα πασχειν, και υπομενων νικαι, και ου ληγει των γενναιων, πριν αν η διαπραξηται η τελευτηση η ωσπερ κων υπο νομεως υπο του λογου του παρ' αυτω ανακληθεις πρανοθη;

The interpretation of this sentence is very difficult, and has given rise to a vast amount of discussion. The only important variants are καi δια του πεινην και δια του μεγουν in g and Flor. U, and υπομενων καi (Λ, Π etc.) instead of καi υπομενων.
On account of ὤργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ρίγων καὶ ἄλλο ὁπίων τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν in the previous sentence, it appears to me certain (1) that καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινὴν etc., is right as against καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν etc., and (2) that these words should be construed with ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει. That which in the first case was represented as the cause of anger should be so represented in the second case also. The same view was held by Schneider. It is more difficult to defend ὑπομένων καὶ, and Schneider is probably justifified in preferring the less authoritative reading καὶ ὑπομένων. The expression πάσχειν ὑπομένων can hardly be a mere periphrasis for πάσχειν, nor is πάσχειν ὑπομένων altogether equivalent to ὑπομένειν πάσχειν, as Jowett supposes. If the best mss are right in placing καὶ after ὑπομένων, it is possible that ὑπομένων is corrupt, and conceals ὑπὸ with a genitive (cf. πάσχων ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου in the parallel passage just before), but until the right correction has been proposed, we must adhere to the text of Ε.

The subject of ζεῖ and the other verbs is supposed by J. and C. to be not the man himself, but ὁ θυμὸς. This is unlikely, on account of πεινὴν etc., and still more of τελευτήσῃ. The parallel with 440 C τοσοῦτο ὡς τὸν δύναται ὤργίζεσθαι κτλ. is also in favour of making the individual the subject.

That the text of A is in the main sound I have no doubt, although I should like to read καὶ ἔμμαχε τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ after πάσχειν rather than after χαλεπαίνει.

There is an unusually large supply of emendations. That of Madvig is peculiarly unhappy, though adopted by Baiter in his text, and apparently approved by Apelt (Berl. Philol. Wochenschr. 1895 p. 968): καὶ δὶ αὐτὸ πεινὴν καὶ δὶ αὐτὸ ρίγον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν ὑπομένων, κἂν νικᾶται, οὐ λήγει κτλ. The other proposals are enumerated by Hartman. They are as follows: καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ—πάσχειν καὶ ὑπομένειν νικᾶν καὶ οὐ λήγει κτλ. (Ast): καὶ δὶ αὐτὸ πεινὴν καὶ δὶ αὐτὸ—πάσχειν ὑπομένων διανεκῇ οὐ λήγει κτλ. (H. Sauppe, quoted by Hartman): καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ—πάσχειν ὑπομένειν νικᾶ καὶ κτλ. (Liebhold): καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ κτλ. (Campbell, who in other respects acquiesces in the text of A): καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ—ὑπομένων καὶ νικῶν καὶ οὐ λήγει κτλ. (Hartman). Richards apparently accepts the suggestion of Madvig as far as it goes, but thinks that τῶν γενναίων 'is most feeble. Plainly Plato wrote οὐ λήγει ἀγανακτῶν, possibly with some additional word before ἀγανακτῶν' (Cl. Rev. vii p. 254). The reading printed above is not only more authoritative but also in my judgment infinitely better than any of these rash and unjustifiable alterations.
E.

I. 'Aγαθῆν μὲν τοῖς τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν 449 καὶ ὅρθῃν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον· κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἴπερ αὐτὴ ὅρθη, περὶ τὲ πόλεως διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευῆς, ἐν τέταρτῳ ποιήσας εἶδεν

449 A—451 C Socrates is about to describe the different kinds of depraved politics, when Adimantus, prompted by Polemarchus, and supported by Glauco and Thrasymachus, demands from him a fuller explanation of the community of wives and children, and of the arrangements for begetting and rearing offspring. Socrates professes reluctance, both because it will be doubted whether his scheme is either practicable or expedient, and because he is himself uncertain of his ground and unwilling to involve his friends in possible discomfiture. At last, after propitiating Nemesis, and being exonerated by his friends, he proceeds to comply with their request.

449 A ff. Considered in its merely formal aspect, the portion of the Republic contained in Books V—VII may be described as a digression (ἀναμεθώον πόθεν δὲ ὅπερ ἐξετασθήμενα VIII 543 C). In reality, these books fulfil the hopes held out in sundry parts of III and IV (see III 414 A, 416 B, IV 423 E, 435 D, 439 E, 442 C ff.), and complete the picture of the perfect city and the perfect man by giving us Plato's third or crowning effort—the philosophic City and the Philosopher-King. See on II 372 D. As we often find in Plato (see e.g. Phaed. 84 C ff.), the new departure is occasioned by an objection, or rather a request for further information, on the part of one of the interlocutors. Adimantus invites Socrates to explain the remark made by him in IV 423 E ff. and fully expound the principle of κοινὰ τὰ φύλα as it affects women and children. The challenge is accepted, and Socrates deals with the question under three main heads, which he figures as waves through which the argument must swim in safety. The first wave concerns Community of Education between the male and female Guardians (451 C—457 B): the second, Community in wives and children (457 B—466 D): the third and greatest, whose advent is long delayed, deals with the question whether Communism and therewithal the perfect city itself can be realised in the world (471 C ff.). The last of these three waves is not finally surmounted until the description of the Philosopher and his City reaches its conclusion at the end of VII: so that Books V—VII closely cohere together. In the first two divisions (V 451 C—466 D), the dominating principle is still φύσις or Nature (see on 451 C); but from 474 D onwards the psychological standpoint is gradually superseded by the metaphysical, until in Book VII the idea of Good becomes the supreme inspiring force—at once the formal, the efficient, and the final cause—of Plato's City. See on VI 506 E, 509 B ff. On the alleged connexion between the earlier part of Book V (451 C—466 D) and the Ecclesiastes of Aristophanes see App. I. 4 ἰδιωτῶν—κατασκευῆ: 'the organization of the character of the individual soul.' ψυχῆς was doubted by ASt; but cf. IV 445 C τοιοῦτοι κυνῳδεύονται καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι, and for the collocation
of genitives VII 535 C autēs tīs ψυχῆς ἀρατέως μεταστροφῆς, VIII 544 D, 559 B, 560 B, Tim. 24 B and other cases in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 289. ψυχῆς τρόπον is practically a single word like 'soul-character' ("Seelenbeschaffenheit" Schnei-der). 449 B 7 σμικρὸν κτλ. explains ἐκτείνει τὴν χείρα: 'paullo longius ab Adimanto, quam clandestinem colloquium requirebat' or 'paullo remotor, quam reliqui a suis vicinis,' not "a little further away from Socrates than Adimantis" (J. and C.): for "currepterea manum propterem et Adimantium attraxerit, non appararet" (Schneider).

449 B, C 12 τὶ μαλαστά κτλ. 'What particular thing is it that you (decline to let off)?' 'You,' said he. 'Because of what particular remark of mine?' (lit. 'because I said what in particular?'). There is not, as J. and C. suppose, a play on the two senses of τὶ μαλαστά—cur potissimum and sed potissimum: for it must be observed that ἀφικόμεν has no expressed object, and Socrates could not have known that it was intended to refer to him. The removal of the commas usually printed after ὅτι and εἰπὼν restores sense, I think, to the remainder of this passage. ὅτι for ὅτι (see cr. n.) can scarcely stand, for ὅτι εἰγὼ εἴπων cannot mean 'I repeated' (Jowett), nor can we read ἐγὼ εἴπων, τὶ μάλαστα 'once more, said I' etc. In none of the parallels hitherto cited does ὅτι mean merely 'once more' or 'again.' Those who print δὲ, εἰγὼ εἴπων, τὶ μάλαστα (Stallbaum) mostly take δὲ—τὶ μάλαστα as in 1 343 A ὅτι δὲ τὶ μάλαστα; ἄδε γὰρ. Ὄτι κτλ. But in such cases (as Schneider points out) there must be a second ὅτι to introduce the answer, and here there is not.

14 ἐκκλέπτων = 'to cheat out of' as in μὴ—ἐκκλέπτως λόγων Soph. Trach. 436 f.: see Jebb ad loc.

16 κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. See IV 423 E, 424 A nii. κοινὰ τὰ φίλων is preferred by Ast and Stallbaum (with two late MSS), but the shorter form is far more racy of the soil, and occurs also in Lys. 207 c, Latus 739 c (Schneider on IV 424 A).

449 D 22 καὶ ὅλην κτλ.: i.e. καὶ
te καὶ παίδων: μέγα γὰρ τι οἶδομεθά φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὁρθός ἢ μὴ ὁρθὸς γυγύμονον. νῦν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀλλὰς ἐπιλαμβάνει

25 πολιτείας πρῶν ταῦτα ἰκανῶς διελέσθαι, δέδοκται ἡμῖν τούτο, ὥ σὺ ἢκουσας, τὸ σὲ | μὴ μεθείναι, πρῶν ὑ σὺ ταῦτα πάντα ὡσπερ τάλλα διελέσθης. Καὶ ἐμὲ τούσσι, ὁ Πλαύκον ἐφί, κοινονοῦ τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε. Ἀμέλει, ἐφί ὁ Θρασύμαχος, πάσι ταύτα δεδομένα ἡμῖν νόμιμα, ὁ Σώκρατες.

5 II. Ὅλον, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, εἰρήγασασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοι μου. ὅσον λόγον πάλιν ὡσπερ εξ ἀρχῆς κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας· ἢν ὅς ἡδι διεληλυθὼς ἔγον ἔχαιρον, ἀγαπών εἰ τίς εἰσού ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη. ἂν νῦν ψεις | παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ ἱστε Β ὅσον ἐσμύν λόγον ἐπεγείρετε· ὅν ὅρων ἐγὼ παρῆκα τότε, μὴ

10 παράσχοι πολὺν ὄχλον. Τῇ δὲ; ἢ δ’ ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοίσοντας οἰει τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφίξικα, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγον ἀκουσο-

3. ταῦτα II: τάντα (sic, ut solet) A.

ἐγυγμέθαυ or the like, supplied from μνημήθεσθαι. The construction cannot (as J. and C. suggest) go back to μὴ οὖν παρη.

23 μέγα κτλ. καὶ after φέρειν = 'or rather' [atque] as in ἀλῶν τινὸς—καὶ οὐδενός (Ἀρ. 23, 4). For γυγμόνων Liebhold proposes γυγμομένων, but see on IV 427 D. The feminine would be awkward after πολιτείαν, and κοινοναν—παίδων, though grammatically feminine, is logically neuter.

24 ἀλλὰ—πολιτείας is explained by γὰ τὰς ἐφέξ’ ἔρων (449 A). Stallbaum makes a curious slip: "quoniam ad alias poiliteias partes considerandas celeriter accedisse."

450 ἔννοι—ἐφράζασθε κτλ. Chappelli (Riv. di Filologia etc. XI p. 195) finds in this and the following a sentences a cat i cinium ex eventu of Aristophanes' Eccles sia sacse. But the word παρῆκα shews that the ἐφέξ ἔρων does not refer to swarms of adverse criticism, but merely to the topics which Socrates must now discuss. See App. I, and (on the subject in general) Latzis 779 E.

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6 ὅν πἶν ψεις κτλ.: in appealing to these topics now you’ etc. παρακαλοῦντες means literally ‘calling to you’: ‘das ruft ihr nun herbei’ (Schneider). This interpretation is in harmony with ἐπεγείρετε, and gives the right antithesis to ἔδωκαν. Neither "exci-

23 tantes" (Ast), nor "in disputacionem vocantes" (Stallbaum) is quite accurate. J. and C. give two alternative renderings (1) "and in now calling in this fresh argu-

mence," (2) "and in now urging me to this," But the antecedent can only be ταῦτα.

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8 τοῦτο IV 423 E.

9 νῦν ψεις κτλ.: in appealing to these topics now you’ etc. παρακαλοῦντες means literally ‘calling to you’: ‘das ruft ihr nun herbei’ (Schneider). This interpretation is in harmony with ἐπεγείρετε, and gives the right antithesis to ἔδωκαν. Neither "exci-

mence," (2) "and in now urging me to this," But the antecedent can only be ταῦτα.
Gr. I p. 464, II pp. 91, 727. A gloss in Bekker’s Anc. Gr. I p. 316 (cited by Schneider) explains χρυσόδωξ in Dinarchus as proverbial for πορφερόν; but it cannot have so offensive a meaning here, for (among other reasons) Thrasymachus and Socrates are now reconciled. Ast’s explanation “aurum fundere proverbialiter dictum, quam magna, quam animo consecratum, spe frustratur” expresses only one side of the proverb: the other—neglecting the duty which lies nearest—is more important and relevant here. “To find an Eldorado” (Warren) may perhaps meet the case. Thomas Gray’s explanation is not altogether right: “a proverbial expression used of such as are idly employed or sent (as we say) on a fool’s errand.”

12 μέτρον δὲ κτλ. An argumentum ad hominem, for the sentiment is Socratic: cf. VI 504 C. δὲ γε = ‘yes, but’ helps to bring out this point. Akómen is the common epexegetical infinitive: cf. III 407 B N. To insert τὸ before τοιοῦτον (with Herwerden and Richards) is both unnecessary and inelegant.

14 τὸ μὲν ἥμετερον ἦα: ‘never mind us’: we are equal to a long discourse (so also J. and C.).
eidēnai ἄ λέγω, καλῶς εἰχεν ἡ παραμυθία· ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε Ε καὶ φίλων περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων τάλαθη εἰδότα λέγειν ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον, ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἢμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, δὴ ἐγὼ δρό, φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλέρον, οὐ τι γέλωτα | ὀφλεῖν· παιδικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο γε· ἀλλὰ μή σφαλεῖς τῆς 451 ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτός ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φίλων ἥνεκαι παρεῖσιμένοις κείσομαι περὶ ἥκιστα δὲ οὐφαλεσθοῦν. προσκυνοῦ δὲ Ἄδραστειαν, οὐ Πλαύκων, χάριν οὐ μέλλω λέγειν· ἐλπίζομεν γὰρ οὖν ἐλαττον 5 ἀμάρτημα ἡκουσίως τίνος φονέα γενέσθαι, η ἀπατεώνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων περὶ. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κινδύνουσα κινδύνευεν ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρείττον ἥ φίλων· ὡςτε ἔν | με παραμυθεῖ. Β

450 Ε 29 φίλων κτλ. φίλων though neuter is of course intended to balance φίλων. The conjecture φιλίς τῶν (Richards, Hartman) destroys the balance and is in itself superfluous: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 23. Note the characteristic chiasmus ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον—φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλέρον.

451 Α 1 ὀφλεῖν κτλ. The infinitive depends on φοβερὸν, and is like the infinitive after φοβοῦμαι. In the antithetical clause Plato substitutes the more usual construction with μὴ. The future indicative (κείσομαι) is rare after words of fearing (Goodwin MT. p. 132), and represents the danger as imminent. To regard ὅ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν as a reference to the Ecclesiastaeae is rash and unjustifiable: see App. I.

3 προσκυνών κτλ. The apology looks forward, and not backward; whence δὲ rather than δή (which Herwerden would read).

'Ἄδραστειαν. Aдраsteia was originally, perhaps, a personification of ἀνάγκη in its relation to humanity and the issues of human conduct. This meaning survived in the Orphic theology (Abel Orph. Fr. 36, 109—111) and appears in Phaedr. 248 c. Specifically, she was viewed as a variety of Nemesis, θεά τίσ τινος ὑπερφάνους τιμωρίας (Schol. on Aesch. Prom. 936), and in this sense Aeschylus (l.c.) writes οἱ προσκυνοῦτες τὴν 'Αδράστειαν σφολί (the first mention of Aдраsteia in Greek literature). Aдраsteia is in a still more special sense the punisher of proud words; so that προσκυνώ 'Ἄδραστειαν becomes, as here, a sort of apologetic preface to a bold assertion or rash utterance: cf. Eur. Rhes. 342, 468 (ὁν


4 ἐλπίζω κτλ. ἐλπίζω is 'I fancy,' not 'I expect': cf. Π 383 ἔν. The omission of εἶναι is curious: Madvig would restore it after ἀμάρτημα. I can find no parallel to its omission with ἐλπίζω, but συμβαι, ἔρχομαι, and other verbs of thinking often dispense with it. For examples see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 34.

5 καλῶν κτλ.: "concerning noble and good and just institutions" (D. and V.), not "about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws" (J. and C.). The latter explanation gives a good sense, but it is harsh to separate δικαίων from νομίμων, and still harsher to take καλῶν as equivalent to περὶ καλῶν. Schneider was inclined to treat δικαίων as a gloss on νομίμων. But 'about things beautiful and good and institutions' is an anti-climax; and, besides, it is of institutions in conjunction with, not as distinct from, justice etc. that Plato is about to speak. In his translation Schneider takes the right view.

7 εἰ. ζα has οὐκ εἰ, an obvious but audacious correction, suggested, no doubt, by καλῶς εἰχεν ἡ παραμυθία in 450 D. εἰ is ironical. Glaucó had comforted Socrates by saying inter alia that his hearers were friendly (ὁστε δύσιν οἱ ἄκουσαν τοὺς καλοῦντες 450 D). Excellent comfort! says Socrates: I had rather, in the circumstances, that they were enemies! Stallbaum and others read οὐκ εἰ, and Hermann οὐ, for εἰ, thinking the irony misplaced; but Glaucó's smile (γελάσας)
favours the ironical interpretation, and so does the 'Socratic irony' with which the whole sentence is overflowing. I agree with J. and C. in rejecting the pointless alternative rendering 'you do well to comfort me.'

451 b. ὅσπερ φόνον κτλ. See cr. n. kal before kataxor is absent (the great majority of MSS and can scarcely, I think, be sound: for the difference in meaning between kataxor and μὴ ἀπα
textos is hardly enough to carry off the double kal. ὅσπερ belongs to the whole expression φόνον καθαρόν, which is virtually one word. Hartman would expunge kal μὴ ἀπα
textos ἡμῶν, but it is quite in Plato’s way to subjoin the interpretation of a metaphor or simile (cf. 470 c, VIII 553 d, 555 d, and my note on Prot. 314 a), nor have we any right to excise such expressions wholesale, as many Dutch critics would do (especially J. J. Hartman de embl. in Pl. text. obiit 1898).

451 c. ἐκεῖ: viz. in cases of φόνος ἀκόσιος (so Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.), not (with D. and V.) 'in the next world.' καθάδε is relevant only if it means 'in this case too,' i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀπατεώνᾳ εἶναι καλὸν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν κτλ.: and this fixes the meaning of ἐκεῖ.

ὁς ὁ νόμος λέγει is explained by Dem. πρὸς Πανταίνετον 58 καὶ γάρ ἀκόσιον φόνον—καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα τοιαύτα γίγνεται—ἀιλ’ ὠμοὶ ἀπάτῃς τούτων δρός καὶ λύσει τοῖς παθονί τέτακτα τὸ πεισθέντας ἄφειται, and ib. 59. See also Laws 896 e.

451 c. 14 ἀνδρείων δράμα κτλ. There is probably a playful allusion to the mimes of Sophron, as was first pointed out by R. Förster in Rhein. Mus. XXX (1875) p. 316. According to Suidas (s.v. Σωφρόν) and others, Sophron’s mimes were classified as ἀνδρείων μύσιν and γυναικεῖοι μύσιν. In the former, as may be inferred from Choricus’ Defence of Mimes (first published by Graux in Revue de Philologie 1 pp. 209 ff.) Sophron represented male characters, in the latter female (μμιμεῖται μὲν ἄνδρας, μμιμεῖται δὲ γυναικεία ib. p. 215). This is corroborated by many of the titles of his plays, such as ὁ ἀγροιώτας, ὁ θυγγο
tήρας, ὁ ἀγέλος contrasted with ταῖς ἀκεστραί, ἡ νυμφόπως, ἡ πενθέρα etc. Sophron’s mimes are called δράματα (cf. ἀνδρείων δράμα) by Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας σ. 150 χεδός τε πᾶσας ἐκ τῶν δραμάτων αὐτοῦ τὰς παρουσίας ἔκλειμι εἶσιν. The point here is that just as custom required an ἀνδρείων μύος to pre
cede a γυναικεῖο—this is not otherwise attested, so far as I can discover—so it will be proper (ὁρθῶς ἂν ἔχω) for Plato’s women to come on the stage after his men have played their part. Plato’s partiality for Sophron is frequently mentioned by ancient authors, as for example by D. L. 111 18, Quintil. I 10. 17: see Schuster in Rhein. Mus. XXIX (1874) pp. 605 ff., where these and other authorities are cited. Sussemihl (Bursian’s Jahresbericht 1874—1875 III p. 343) doubted whether Plato has Sophron in view here; but the allusion, which was admitted by Graux (L.c. p. 215 n.), and successfully reaffirmed by Förster (Rhein. Mus. for 1880 p. 472), is highly probable. I can see no point in making δράμα γυναικεῖον an ironical refer
tence to the Ecclesiasticae of Aristophanes (with Munk die nat. Ordnung d. Pl. Schr. p. 296, and Chiappelli l.c. p. 196), nor is it likely that the words allude to a dra
tic caricature of Plato’s policy by some other comedian, as is supposed by Bergk Gr. Literaturgesch. IV p. 462 n. 134. On Sophron’s prose-mimes as a pre

451 C—452 E We declared at the
outset that our men were to be as it were guardians of the flock. Now the principle of community requires that our female watch-dogs shall share the active duties of the males, allowance being made for their inferiority in strength. Their education must therefore be the same: they will have to learn music, gymnastic, and the art of war. No doubt the spectacle of women, especially old women, exercising themselves naked along with men, will seem ludicrous at first; but it is not long since the Greeks would have thought it ludicrous even for men to strip for athletic exercises. Nothing is truly ludicrous except what is mischievous.

451 c ff. Socrates now prepares to encounter the first ‘wave’ (451 C—457 B): see on 449 A ff. The outstanding feature in his argument throughout this part of the dialogue is the constant appeal which he makes to φύσις (452 E, 453 B, C, E, 454 B, C, D, 455 A, D, E, 456 A, B, C, D). He maintains that community of work and education between certain selected men and women is ‘natural’ in two senses. In the first place, it is, he maintains, in harmony with human nature, that is, with the nature of man and woman (455 E ff.), and in the second place, it is recommended by the analogy of Nature’s other children, the lower animals (451 B). See also on 11 370 A. Pöhlmann (Gesch. d. antik. Kommunismus etc. pp. 114—146) has shewn that the desire for a ‘return to Nature’ found frequent and manifold expression in the literature of Plato’s times, and we can see that Plato was himself powerfully affected by the same impulse, although his interpretation of ‘Nature’ is coloured by an Idealism which is peculiarly his own (IV 443 B n.). The special regulations of Book V may be illustrated in some particulars from the practices of certain ‘Natur-völker’ before the time of Plato (see e.g. Hdt. IV 116 and infra 463 c n.), as well as by certain features of the Pythagorean and Spartan disciplines (see RP, 48 A f. and nun. on 452 B al.), but it is more important and relevant to observe that Plato’s assignment of common duties and common training to the two sexes is part of a well-reasoned and deliberate attempt by the Socratic school to improve the position of women in Greece. In this respect, as in many others, the teaching of Socrates inaugurated an era of protest against the old Hellenic view of things. See in particular, for the views of Socrates himself, Xen. Mem. II 2, 5, Symp. 2, 9 ἡ γυναικεία φύσις οἴεθεν χειρῶν τής τοῦ ἀνδρός οἴεθα τυχάνει, γνώμην ὧν καὶ ἀγάπην δεῖ. Oecon. 3, 12—15, 7, 11 ff.; for Plato, Symp. 201 D ff. and Laws 750 ff.; and for the opinion of Antisthenes consult D. L. VI 12 ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικός ἡ αὐτῆς ἀρετή. It is possible that some of Euripides’ pictures of noble and disinterested women were also inspired in some measure by the influence of the same movement. In later times the Stoics constituted themselves the champions of similar views, and Cleanthes wrote a treatise entitled περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἡ αὐτῆς ἀρετῆ καὶ ἀνδρός καὶ γυναικός: see Dyroff Ethik d. alien Stoic pp. 311—314, where other evidence is cited. A learned and acute discussion on the attitude of the Socratic school in this matter will be found in Chiappelli Riv. di Filologia etc. XI pp. 229 ff. Finally it should be observed that, from Plato’s point of view, the selection of suitable women as φαλάκες is strictly in harmony with the fundamental principle of our city, viz. ‘to each one work according to his or her nature’ (11 370 A n.); that it removes a dangerous source of unrest, intrigue, and sedition, by providing an outlet for the energies of able and politically-minded women in legitimate channels and silencing them with the responsibilities of rule, while it at the same time secures for the service of the State all that is best in the other half of the population (Laws 751 A), and justifies the claim of the perfect city to be in literal truth an Aristocracy.

451 c 19 καὶ ἐκείνη κτή.: ‘in following out that original impulse which we communicated to them’ (D. and V.).
πρῶτον ὁμοίσαμεν· ἐπεξερήσαμεν δὲ ποῦ ὁς ἀγέλης φύλακας 20

D τοὺς ἀνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ. Ναί. Ἀκολουθοῦμεν τοῖςν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφήν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἤμιν πρέπει ἢ οὐ. Πῶς; ἐφη. "Ὡδε. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα ξυμφολάττειν οἶμεθα δειν, ἀπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττωμεν, καὶ ξυνθρεπέως καὶ τάλλα κοινὴ πράττειν, 25 ἢ τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἐνδον ὡς ἀδινάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμελεῖαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποιμία; Κοινὴ, ἐφη, πάντα· πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεῖς

Ε στέραις χρόμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις. Οἶον τ' οὖν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσαι τινι ζῷῳ, ἀν μή τινι αὐτὴν τροφήν τε 30 καὶ παιδείαν ἀποδίδος; Οὐχ οἶον τε. Εἰ ἀρὰ ταῖς γυναιξίν ἐπὶ ταύτα χρησίμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῦτα καὶ διδακτέον αὐτάς.

452 | Ναί. Μονικὴ μὲν ἐκεῖνοις τε καὶ γυμναστικῇ ἐδόθη. Ναί. Καὶ ταῖς γυναιξίν ἀρὰ τοῦτῳ τὸ τέχνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀποδοτέον καὶ χρηστεύον κατὰ ταύτα. Εἰκὸς εῖ δὲν λέγεις, ἐφη. Ἡσώς δή, εἰπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γέλεια ἃν φαίνοιτο πολλά περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ἣ λέγεται. Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Τι, ἢν δ' 32 οὗ διδακτέων ΑΠΠ: διδακτέον Α.
452 b 8 ἡδῆς = demum adds emphasis to ἀλλά καί. We may translate; 'but positively also the older women.' On this use of ἡδῆς ('now that we have reached this point') and kindred words see Cope Aristot. Rhetoric Vol. 1 pp. 13 ff. J. and C. (with other editors) suppose a hyperbaton for τὰς ἡδης προσβύτερας (which Herwerden would actually read): but the hyperbaton is harsh, and no parallel has yet been adduced. The rules laid down by Plato in this passage are an exaggeration of Spartan usage: cf. Plat. Lyc. 14 and the passages cited by Paley on Eur. Androm. 560 ff. Σπαρτάδως — αἳ ξύν νόσιμαι ἑξερμυνοῦν δόμους | γυμνοὺσι μηραῖς καὶ πέπλοις ἀνεμισόντων | δρόμους παλαίστρα τ' οὐκ ἀνασχέτων ἐοί | κοινᾶς ἐχουσι, and by Blaydes on Ar. Lys. 82: cf. also Lact. 813 E ff., 833 C ff. and infra 457 A. The words ἦν ῥεῖσι—φιλογυμναστῶσι are a characteristically Hellenic touch: cf. Thaet. 162 b.

12 τῶν χαριτῶν. It is tempting to see in this an allusion to the see of the Ecclesiasae (with Krohn Pl. St. p. 81 and Chiappelli Rev. di Filol. x. p. 198). If —with the majority of modern critics— we hold that the Ecclesiasae is earlier than Book V, and if we consider the play as at least in some measure directed against theories on communism and the position of women with which the Socratic school

sympathised, it is easy to interpret Plato here as addressing a rebuke to the comic stage in the form of a further challenge. In any case, however, the words οὐ φοβητέων—ὀχισίσει are not a vaticinium ex eventu, for the Ecclesiasae does not touch on any of the points specifically mentioned here. See also on 452 D, 455 A, 457 B, 464 B, and 473 E ff. In each of these passages there is some prima facie ground for suspecting a personal or polemical motive of some kind. See on the whole subject App. I.

452 C 16 τῶν αὐτῶν πράττειν: i.e. παίζειν. Herwerden's conjectural τοιούτα παίζειν is both needless and inelegant.

17 οὐ παλέω χρόνος κτλ. Stallbaum cites Hdt. I 10 παρὰ γὰρ τοῦτο Λυδίων, σχέδον δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο ἄλλους βαρβάρους, καὶ ἄνδρα φόβηθην γυμνών ἐς αἰσχρὰν μεγάλην φήσει, and Thuc. I 6 ἐγγυμνώσθης τὸ πρᾶτον (Δακεδαμίων) κτλ.

20 γυμνασίων is used in its strict etymological sense of γυμνοὺς ἀγώνες; we ought not to insert γυμνῶν (with Richards) or τοιοῦτων (with Herwerden) before γυμνασίων.

452 D 23 καὶ κτλ. καὶ begins the apodosis: 'then too' etc. The general idea is that when experience proved that it was better to take exercise in a nude condition, nudity also ceased to be ludicrous. Plato thus prepares the way for the identification to be presently made (see next note). The particle δὴ ('forsooth') hints that the eye is less trustworthy than the reason; and the contrast is further accentuated by the somewhat artificial balance between ἐν τοῖς φθαλμοῖς and ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. D. and V. wrongly make the apodosis begin with καὶ τοῦτο (where τοῦτο is of course nominative).

25 μᾶταιος κτλ. I have (with the Oxford editors) retained the text of A. It at least affords an intelligible sense, and none of the numerous variants or emendations is at all convincing. The general drift of the passage is clear enough. Nothing is γελόιον except what is κακόν (μᾶταιος—κακόν), and, conversely, nothing is σπουδάιον except what is ἄγαθόν (καὶ καλόν—ἄγαθόν). σπουδαῖον is involved in σπουδάσει. Both inferences are expressed in such a way as to suggest a personal reference: cf. χαρίντων in B, and see App. I. γελοτοποιεῖν, especially after κωμῳδεῖν just above, points to the comic stage: and Aristophanes is perhaps intended. See on 452 B. The whole sentence means: ' Foolish is the man who identifies the laughable with anything but the bad, and he who attempts to raise a laugh by looking at any spectacle as laughable except the spectacle of folly and evil aims in all seriousness also at another standard of beauty, which he has set up for himself, than the standard of the good.' The analysis of τὸ γελόιον, so far as it goes, is in harmony with Phil. 48 A ff.; cf especially 49 A. With στηθάμενоι we must supply αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν σκοτών. On the difficulties of this passage see App. II.

452 E—456 C Let us first determine whether our proposal is possible—in other words, whether woman is naturally able to share the duties of man—all, or none, or some, and, if some, whether war is one of these. It may be argued: 'man's nature is different from that of woman: we should therefore assign them different duties.' A little analysis will show the superficial and eristic character of such reasoning. The word 'different' is ambiguous. Nature may differ without differing at all in respect of the powers by which certain duties are performed. Consequently, if man and woman differ only in sex, they may each perform those duties in which sex plays no part. Among such duties are those which appertain to the administration of a city. Doubtless man is superior, as a whole, in capacity and strength, although many women excel many men; but the natural aptitudes of individual women are as various as those of men, and there is no administrative duty which is by Nature exclusively appropriated either to men, or to women. Thus Nature produces women who are fitted to guard our city. These we shall select as the wives and colleagues of the male guardians. Our proposal is possible, because it is natural: the term 'unnatural' may sooner be applied to the present condition of women.

452 E ff. On the principle laid down in this part of Socrates' argument see 451 C ff. π.π.
eîte σπουδαστικῶς ἑθέλει ἀμφισβητῆσαι, πότερον δυνατῇ φύσις ἢ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡ θῆλεια τῇ τοῦ ἀρέσκον γενός κοινωνίσαι εἰς 453 ἀπαντά τὰ ἐργά, ἢ οὐδ’ εἰς ἐν, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὲν οἶα τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὐ, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ περὶ τῶν πόλεμων ποτέρων ἔστιν; ἅρ’ οὐχ οὕτως ἄν κάλλιστά τις ἀρχόμενος ὥς τὸ εἰκός καὶ κάλλιστα τελευτήσειν; 5 Πολύ γε, ἐφι, Βούλει οὐν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶς ὑπέρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα μή ἐρμή τα τοῦ ἐτέρου λόγου πολυρκήται; 'Οὐδὲν, ἐφι, κωλύει. Δέγγομεν δὴ ὑπέρ Β αὐτῶν ὅτι Ἡ Ἑκατομαίρει τε καὶ Πλαύκουν, οὐδὲν δει ἦμιν ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοκίσεως, ἢν ψυχεῖτε 10 πόλιν, ὁμολογεῖτε δειν κατὰ φύσιν ἔκαστον ἐνά εν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. Ὁμολογήσαμεν, οἴμαι, πῶς γὰρ οὖ; "Εστίν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει γνώρι ἄνδρος τὴν φύσιν; Πῶς δ’ οὐ διαφέρει; Οὐκοῦν ἀλλά καὶ ἐργον ἐκατέρω προσκήνει προστάτευται τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχήν; Τί μήν; Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνετε νῦν καὶ 15 τάναντια ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε, φάσκοντες αὐ τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας δείν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλεῖστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντας; ἔξεις τι, ὁ θαυμάσε, πρὸς τάντα' ἀπολογεῖσθαι; 'Ως μὲν ἐξαίφης, ἐφι, οὐ πάνω ράδιον' ἀλλὰ σοῦ ἐς εἰρήσομαι τε καὶ δέομαι καὶ τὸν ἐπίρη ἡμῶν λόγον, ὡστε ποτ’ ἐστίν, ἐρμηνεύσαι. 20 Ταύτ’ ἐστίν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ο Γλαύκουν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαύτα, ἢ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβούμης τε καὶ οἴκουν ἀπειθεῖας τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν κτήσιν καὶ τροφῆν. Ὡν μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἐφι, οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ εὐκείκει. Οὐ γὰρ, εἶπον' ἀλλὰ

33 ἡ ἄνθρωπινη was objected to by Cobet; but ἡ θῆλεια alone would be too general: we are dealing only with 'female human nature.'

453 a 4 καὶ κάλλιστα. Dobree conjectured κάλλιστα καὶ, neatly, but needlessly, for καὶ τελευτή, like καὶ ἄρχη, may be treated as a single notion. Cf. III 404 B n.

453 b 9 κατοκίσεως: sc. τῆς πόλεως, but the antecedent is attracted into the relative clause (ἡν ψυχεῖτε πόλιν), as often: cf. I 350 C n.

10 ὁμολογεῖτε. II 369 E ff.

12 ποὺ δ’ οὐ διαφέρει; Baiter follows Hirschig in bracketing διαφέρει. The formula ποὺ δ’ οὐ; is however so common, that no scribe is likely to have added διαφέρει. Cf. διαφέρει in vI 496 A. For the sentiment see Xen. Oec. 7. 22 τῆς φύσιν—εὔθυς παρεσκευάσει ὁ θεὸς—τῆν μὲν τῆς γυναικὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔρωτα ἔργα καὶ ἐπιμελήματα, τῆν δὲ τῶν ἄνδρος ἐπὶ τὰ ἔρωτα ἔργα καὶ ἐπιμελήματα—the orthodox Greek view.

453 d 23 οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ κτλ. The ms reading has been defended in two ways. Schneider prints a colon after ἐφι, and explains οὐ μά τὸν Δία as ‘mini-me, per Jovem, <temere tu et sine causa hanc rem tractare dubitabas >’; but it is exceedingly difficult to supply the words in brackets. This difficulty induced Apelt (Odes Crit. p. 12) to suggest οὐ <μάτην> μά τὸν Δία, ἐφι, οὐ γὰρ κτλ. Others explain the oath as emphasizing οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν, and compare X 605 E οὐ μά τὸν Δίλ, ἐφι, οὐκ εὐθύρω ἔοικεν and Parm. 131 E οὐ μά τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλων εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον διορίσσασθαι. But the whole difficulty centres round γὰρ,
and γάρ is absent from each of these passages. Hartman strangely explains γάρ as 'profecto'; while Stallbaum inclines to cut it out. Groen van Prinsterer (Prosop. Plat. p. 209) proposed to read οὐ γάρ εὐκλώδεις. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, εὖρον. Οὐ γάρ, εἶτον. It appears to me that the emphatic οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία is more appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, who is continually dwelling on the difficulty of his task, and I therefore think that Plato wrote οὐ γάρ εὐκλώδεις, εὖρον. Οὐ γάρ, εἶτον, οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, although I have not ventured to change the text. εὐκλώδεις is of course neuter, not masculine, as Richter supposed (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 143).

24 κολυμβήθραν: a swimming tank. See Blümner Privatalli. p. 210 n. 2. In what follows we have the first suggestion of the wave metaphor, which dominates nearly the whole of Book V: see on 449 Α. 28 άπορον. As ἄλλην here means 'other' and not 'else,' the epithet άπορον ('difficult to procure,' cf. II 375 A) must be applicable to the dolphin also. Thé Platonian Τητεῖα seems delicately to suggest that the miraculous story of Arion and the dolphin is not above suspicion. Herderwen conjectured άπορον, but no change is necessary.

453 E 31 κατηγορεῖται. Socrates identifies his audience with the imaginary opponents of 453 A — C, and Glauco replies in their name. As ήμων means primarily Socrates and Glauco (453 B), the situation is somewhat confusing: and some may wish to read κατηγορηθῆται, as I formerly printed (with Vind. F, Flor. R T, Ficinus and Hartman). The confusion of ε and αι is of course common (see Introd. § 5), but it is better to adhere to the best MSS. Cf. VI 489 B.

454 A 2 άντιλογικής τέχνης. άντιλογική is defined in Soph. 275 B as a variety of ἀμφασματικῶν: viz. τὸ ἐν ἰδίοις—opposed to τὸ δικαίων, which is δημοσία—αὐτ καὶ κατακεκραματισμένον ἐρωτήσει πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις. It is described in Phaedr. 261 D ff., and practical illustrations are given in the sophisms of Euthyd. 275 C ff. The 'Αντιλογικοὶ are spoken of as almost a distinct sect in Plato's time: see Lys. 216 A and Isocr. peri άντιδιάσως 45 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τίνις τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις—οἱ άντιλογικοὶ καλοῦσιν. Here Plato probably has in view some of the 'Sophists' (as in VI 499 Α) as well as the Megarian school, whose well-known puzzles—ὁ πειδευόμενος, ὁ διαλαμβάνων, Ἡλέκτρα, ο ἐγκεκαλυμμένος: see D. L. II 108—are excellent examples of verbal fallacies. The same class of people are also called έρωτικοὶ and ἀγωνιστικοὶ: see Men. 75 C and cf. Theaet. 167 e, Phil. 17 A and Isocr. in Soph. 20 τῶν τίς πέρας τὰς ἐριδάς καλυπούμενων—τοιαῦτα λογία διεξέτας οἱ εἰ τίς ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ἐρωτήμενες; εἰδήν ἄν ἐν πάσῳ ἔργῳ κακοῖς. On the history and place of Eristic in Greek philosophy see E. S. Thompson's elaborate excursus in his edition of the Meno pp. 272—285.

4 κατ’ εἰδή διαμορφωμένοι. εἰδή is not of course 'the Ideas'; but 'species'
that), i.e. ‘we are insisting that.’ The way for this somewhat strained use is prepared by διώκειν the ἐναντίωσιν just above. Plato is in fact applying the expression τοῦ λέγετος τῆς ἐναντίωσιν to the special case before us. τὸ λέγειν would in this case be that ‘different natures are to follow the same pursuits’ (453 E τὰς ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτὰ φαίμεν ὑπὸ δεῖ ἐπιτρέψασι). Its ἐναντίωσις is that ‘different natures are not to have the same pursuits.’ For τὴν ἄνθρωπον we must therefore read either <μὴ> τὴν ἄντρον or else τὴν ἄλλην (with Baiter). I prefer the former, both because it has some MS authority, and also because, if Plato had chosen to use ἄλλος, he would probably have written τὰς ἄλλας φύσεις as in 453 E. It is also true, as J. and C. observe, that ‘the opposition of μὴ τὴν ἄντρον, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν is more like Plato than the conjectural reading τὴν ἄλλην.’ Translate ‘we cling to the verbal point and insist that what is not the same nature ought not to have the same pursuits.’

454 C 16 ὃς διώκειν marks the irony. For ἦν ἔναντι in the next line a few MSS have ἔναντι, which Hartman approves. If ἦν ἄντρον were predicative, Plato would have written ἔναντι, but, as it is, ἦν ἔναντι is correct, being, like ἦν φίλος, the subject to ἔστιν understood.
D 22. "pros—tein" corresponds to πρός τείνων in Β above. On the corruption in Α see Introd. § 5.

23. *latrikos* κτλ.* Plato is illustrating that particular variety of ἀρμονίαs and ἀλλοιωσις which πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνει τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. As an instance of ἀρμονία he gives two *latrikoi* (cf. 350 Λ): these clearly have the same nature πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, i.e. in this case πρὸς τὸ διατρέσσα. ἀλλοιωσις he illustrates by the difference between an *latrikos* and a *tektonikos*: these have different natures πρὸς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, for the one is qualified διατρέσσα, the other *tektonévθα.* Nothing could be more clear; but the text has been plunged into confusion by the introduction of the words τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα after the second *latrikos.* The reading of Α—see *cr. n.—is indefensible; and the majority of recent editors print *latrikou* μὲν καὶ *latrikou* τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα with *q.* But τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα adds nothing to *latrikou.* It has indeed been thought that *latrikou* by itself suggests a doctor in actual practice, whereas an *latrikou* τὴν ψυχὴν need not practise. If so, we may fairly doubt whether the two have the same nature; and at all events the difference between them renders them inapt illustrations of Plato's argument. Jowett and Campbell attempt to escape these difficulties by taking τὴν ψυχὴν δύναται with the first *latrikou* as well as with the second; but the Greek does not permit of this solution. Similar objections apply to the readings of Bekker (and apparently Ficinus) *latriou* μὲν καὶ *latriou* τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα, of Stephanus and other early editors *latriou* μὲν καὶ *latriou* τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχουσα (partly supported by 0), and also, with some modifications, to Richards' otherwise unhappy proposal *latriou* μὲν καὶ *latriou* <εὐφῦς> τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα. Hermann reads *latriou* μὲν καὶ *latriou* τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα, but the introduction of women is of course premature. I regard τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα as a relic of *latriou* τὴν ψυχὴν δύνατα, a marginal annotation on *latriou.* Cf. Introd. § 5.

24. ἔλεγομεν: 'we were saying,' i.e. 'we meant.' Nothing of the sort was actually said before.

27. διαφέρων: 'excelling' rather than 'differing' (D. and V.); hence τούτο δὴ—ἀποδιδόναι. Richards proposes διαφέρειν, to avoid the singular. But the subjects are distributed, as appears from καὶ τὸ—καὶ τὸ, as well as from ἐκατέρως; and the infinitive is somewhat less suitable here than it is below. Translate 'if either the male or the female sex plainly excels the other' etc.

454 Ε 33. οὐκοῦν κτλ. 'Is not our next step to invite?' &c. Β reads *κελεύσμεν,* which may be right, but the
λέγοντα τούτο αὐτὸ διὰ δάσκαιν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα τέχνην ἢ τί 455 ἐπιτίθεμαι τῶν περὶ πόλεως κατασκευῆν ὦν ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρα φύσις γυναικὸς τε καὶ ἀνήρ; Δύκαιον γοῦν. Τάχα τούνιν ἀν, ὅπερ σὺ ὄλιγον πρότερον ἔλεγχε, εἶτοι ἄν καὶ ἀλλος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν 5 τῷ παραχρῆμα ἰκανῶς εἰπεῖν οὐ βαδίσιν, ἐπισκεφήμενο δὲ οὐδέν χαλεπών. Εἶποι γὰρ ἄν. Βουλείς οὖν δεόμεθα τὸ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀντιλέγοντος ἀκολουθήσαι ἡμῖν, εάν πως ἡμεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἐνδειξόμεθα, B ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἐπιτίθεμαι ὑδίον γυναικὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν πόλεως; Πάνω γε. Ἡ τί δή, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀποκρινών ἀρα οὕτως 10 ἔλεγες τῶν μὲν εὐφυή πρὸς τί εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἄφυ, εν ὃ ὅ μὲν βραδίος τι μανθάνοι, ὃ δὲ χαλεπός, καὶ ὃ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εἰρητικὸς εἰθ ὑμ ἐμαθεν, ὃ δὲ πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης μηδ' ἀ ἐμαθε σοζότο, καὶ τὸ μὲν τὰ τῶν σώματος ἰκανῶς ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίοτο; ἀρ' ἄλλα ἀττὰ ἐστιν ἦ 15 ταύτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυὴ πρὸς ἐκαστα καὶ τὸν μὴ ὀρίζου; Οὐδείς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ φήσει. Οἰσθαὶ τι οὖν ύπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετῶμεν, ἐν ὃ οὐ πάντα ταύτα τὸ τῶν ἀνήρδρων γένους διαφεροῦστος ἤχει ἦ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογώμεν τὰ τε ύφαντικὴν λέγομεν τα τῶν τῶν πολιῶν τε καὶ ἐγχόρτων τραπεζίων, εν οἷς δή τι δοκεῖ 20 τὸ γυναικεῖον γένους εἶναι, οὐ καὶ καταγελαστότατον ἐστὶ πάντων D ἡπτῶμεν; Ἀληθῆ, ἦφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἀπασίαν ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν τὸ γένους τοῦ γένους. γυναίκες μέντοι πολλαὶ

indicative is quite defensible. With τῶν τὰ ἐναυτὰ λέγοντα cf. infra 455 A. It is not likely that a specific allusion to Aristophanes is here intended (see Chiappelli in F. L. 1 p. 200), but there is some plausibility in the conjecture that the coming argument may be inspired in some measure by the Ecclesiastisæa, where the essentially domestic qualities of women are contrasted with their incapacity for government. See App. I. 455 A 4 διάγγον πρότερον. 453 C. 6 τῶν—ἀντιλέγοντος. 454 E s. 455 c 18 ἢ μακρολογώμεν κτλ. Socrates is unwilling to bore us (μακρολογοῦν) by enumerating the exceptions, which are—he implies—quite trivial. Cf. Xen. Mem. III 9, 11 ἐν δὲ ταλασία καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἐπεδεικνύει ἀρχάγχος τῶν ἀνήρδρων, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι ὧνος χρῆ ταλασιουργεῖν, τῶν δὲ μὴ εἶδενα. It is hinted in oδ—ἡπτῶμεν that, even in these, women may sometimes be excelled by men; but the general rule was the other way, otherwise the ridicule would be pointless. Grote somewhat exaggerates the significance of the clause oδ—ἡπτῶμεν, when he suggests that Plato may have seen finer webs in Egypt—where weaving was performed by men—than in Greece (Plato III p. 200 n.). Cf. Proclus in remp. 1 pp. 242, 253 ed. Kroll. 455 D 21 κρατεῖαι is construed like ἡττάται, μενοῦται, νικάται and the like; but a parallel instance is hard to find. (In Aesch. F. L. 152, cited by J. and C., the reading is ποία κρατεῖαι ἰδοῦν). Richards proposes κρατέει, in which case τὸ γένος would be the male sex—an awkward change of subject. 22 ὡς ἐποταίτεν. See I 341 B n. The sentiment is illustrated by J. and C. from Crat. 392 C πρότερον οὕν αἱ γυναίκες εν τοῖς πόλεμοι φρονιμοθεραὶ σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ αἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ δλον εἶτεν γένε; Ol καὶ ἄνδρες.
26 πάντων μὲν κτλ. Plato, in short, makes government a question of capacity, and not of sex. With what follows cf. the passages cited above on 451 c. For the relative weakness of woman cf. infra 457 a and Laws 781 a.

455 E 27 ἐπί πάσι εἶναι is doubted by Herwarde, who proposes ἐν πάσι or ἐν ἀπάσι. ἐπί may however mean 'with a view to,' 'for,' as in 471 a.
30 η 8' οὐ. η μὲν is idiomatically omitted: see 451 D 11.
31 ἄρα is better, I think, than ἄρα, though somewhat more difficult: the interrogative ἄρα is moreover generally elided before ω. The sentence (as J. and C. remark) is 'an ironical negation with an interrogative tone.' The irony in this passage lies in ἄρα. As might be expected from the accumulation of negatives, late ms shows a great variety of readings. Bekker follows q and reads καὶ γυναικικὴ ἄρα καὶ πολεμική—an obvious but wholly superfluous attempt to simplify the authoritative text.

456 A 7 πλὴν ὅσα κτλ. For ὅσα Eusebius (Præp. Ev. xii 32. 5) read ὅσωι followed by ἀδεινετέρα, ἢ δὲ ἱσχυρότερα ἢστι, and the dative was also preferred by Schneider (Addit. p. 38). The neuter plural of ὅσος is however used adverbially as well as the neuter singular; and the dative of 'amount of difference' is scarcely to the point. Instead of ἀδεινετέρα ἢ ἱσχυρότερα we might read (with A') ἀδεινετέρα ἱσχυρότερα. But the reading in the text is preferable, because it lays more stress on the identity of the male and female nature. It is the same nature, only it is stronger in men, and weaker in women. ἢ = 'or' and not 'than.'

456 B 10 ἱσχυρεῖσιν—τὴν φύσιν. J. and C. remark that 'in the Politics and Laws, on the other hand, the aim of the legislator is rather to unite in marriage opposite natures that they may supplement each other: Pol. 309, 310, Laws 773 ff.' Such a marriage law is unnecessary in the République, where the opposite qualities of strength and sensibility are already united in the character of each of the parents. See on II 375 c.
15 εὐχαίς ὁμοία ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπείπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθημεν τῶν νόμων· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταύτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς οἴκε, γίγνεται. "Εἰσκεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῖν ἢ, εἰ δύνατα τε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγομεν; Ἡν γὰρ. Καὶ οὖτι μὲν δὴ δυνάτα, διωμολόγηται; Ναί. "Οτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, τὸ μετὰ 20 τοῦτο δεὶ διωμολογηθήναι; Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναῖκα γενέσθαι οὐκ ἄλλῃ μὲν ἡμῖν ἄνδρας ποιῆσει παίδεια, ἄλλῃ δὲ γυναίκας, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραλαβοῦσα; D Οὐκ ἄλλῃ. Πῶς οὖν ἐξείς δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦτο πέρι; Τίνος δὴ; Τὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν παρὰ σεαυτῷ τὸν μὲν ἁμείνω ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ 25 κεῖρον· ἡ πάντας ὁμοίως ἦγει; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἔν οὖν τῇ πόλει, ἦν φιλίζομεν, πότερον οἰεί ἡμῖν ἁμείνους ἄνδρας ἐξειργάζασθαι τοὺς φίλακας τυχόντας ἡ διήλθομεν παίδειας, ἡ τούς σκυτοτόμους τῇ σκυτικῇ παίδευθεντας; Γελοῖον, ἐφή, ἔρωτας. Μανθάνω, ἐφήν. τὶ δὲ; τῶν ἅλλων πολιτῶν οὐχ οὕτῳ ἀριστοί; Πολὺ γε. Τί δὲ; Ε 30 αἱ γυναίκες τῶν γυναικῶν οὐχ αὐταὶ ἔσονται βέλτιστα; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἐφή, πολὺ. Ἐστι δὲ τὶ πόλει ἁμείνων ἡ γυναῖκας τε καὶ ἄνδρας ὡς ἀρίστους ἐγγίγνοσθαι; Οὐκ ἔστων. Τοῦτο δὲ μουσικὴ τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ παραγνυνομέναι, ὡς ἡμεῖς | διήλθομεν, ἀπεργάσων; 457 18. τε Flor. T: γε ΑΠΞ. q.

We are agreed that the training which qualifies a man to be a guardian will qualify a woman also, if their natural capacities are the same to start with. Now our male guardians, owing to their education, are the best men in the city. Our female guardians will in like manner be the best women. And there is nothing better for a city than to be peopled by the best women and the best men. This end is secured by our system of guardianship, in spite of the foolish laughter of those who forget that utility is the true standard of good taste.
"γυναιξίν, ἐπείπερ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἰματίων ἀμφιεστοῦται, καὶ κοινωνητέον πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τῆς πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ 5 ἄλλα πρακτέων τοῦτων δ' αὐτῶν τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξίν

Β ἦ τοῖς ἀνδράσις δοτέων διὰ τῆς τοῦ γένους ἄσθενειαν. ὦ δὲ γελῶν ἀνήρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἑνεκα γυμναζομέναις, ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου δρέπων καρπῶν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς ἐνικεί, ἐφὶ ὑ γελὰ οὐδ' ὦ τι πράττει. κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λεγεται ἰο


457 A 4 ἀρετὴν—ἀμφιεστοῦται: 'they will clothe themselves with excellence instead of garments,' viz. by thus stripping for exercise, because τοῦ βελτίστου ἑνεκα γυμναζομέναις, the correct explanation is given by Schneider on p. 300 of his translation. ἀμφιεστοῦται (for the usual Attic ἀμφιεστά, which Herderen would write) has a certain archaic effect (cf. I. 320 B. n.), and the saying may be borrowed or adapted from some earlier author. The same metaphor is found in Plutarch De dec. Con. 10. 139 C τοῦ ἄνδρος γὰρ ἂν φόρων ἀντιδεῖαι τὴν ἀἰσθήσεως (with reference to Hdt. 1. 8, a passage which is hardly likely—as Ast supposed—to have suggested Plato's phrase), but Plutarch's meaning is different from Plato's. So—for except for the metaphor—is Tennyson's in the line quoted by Warren from Godiva "Then she rode forth, clothed on with chastity."

κοινωνητέον πολέμου κτλ. The wives of the Sauromatae are described by Herodotus (iv 116) as ἐπὶ θήρεν ἐπὶ ἱππών ἐκφαντάζουσιν ἀμα τοῖς ἀνδραῖς καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ ἐς τόλμους φοιτεῖον καὶ στολήν τὴν αὐτήν τοίς ἀνδράσις φορέουσαι. Cf. also Lwtw 804 E—506 E. See also on 451 c ff. 1—107, 150.

7 δοτέων. There is no reason whatever for thinking (as some critics have thought) that Plato is not serious in making these regulations. Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 100) has ἀπὸδοτοῦν: but see 452 A n.

457 B 7 γελῶν ἀνήρ. ἀνήρ is said with a fine touch of scorn. It is difficult to read this passage without suspecting a personal reference, perhaps to some representative of the comic stage. J. and C. remark that jests of the kind objected to by Plato occur in Ar. Lys. 80—83.

See also next note and App. I. Spartan precedents are cited by Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. p. 180 n. 3.

9 ἀτελῆ—καρπῶν: 'plucking unripe fruit of laughter.' Pindar (P. 290 Bergk) satirised physical speculation (τὰ φυσιολογούμενα) in the words ἀτελῆ σοφίας δρέπων καρπῶν, where σοφίας is a defining genitive, denoting not the tree, but the fruit. Pindar means that their σοφία is ἀτελῆς or inconsummate—misses its mark—is no real σοφία at all. More so Plato adapts the Pindaric fragment to his own purpose. The object of his attack is Comedy, and Comedy cultivates, not σοφία, but τὸ γελοίον. Hence—according to the reading of the text—Plato replaces Pindar's σοφίας by the words τοῦ γελούλων. The humour of his adversary is ἀτελῆς or inconsummate—no real humour at all: for οὐδὲν οἴδει—ἐφὶ ὑ γελᾶ οὐδ' ὦ τι πράττει. Cf. 452 D μάταιος δε γελοίον ἄλλη τι γενεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν. This interpretation assumes that σοφία in Plato is a gloss interpolated to complete the quotation. See cf. n. and App. III.

10 κάλλιστα κτλ. The doctrine of this famous sentence, which sounds like a manifesto, and was characteristically selected by Grote as one of the mottoes to his Plato, is essentially Socratic: see especially Xen. Mem. iv 6. 8, 9 and other passages quoted by Zeller 2 Π 1. pp. 149—153. Utilitarianism of this kind pervades the Republic, as is shown has amply proved (Pl. St. p. 370), and asserts itself even in the highest flights of Plato's idealism (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἱδέα—ἡ δικαια καὶ τῆλα προσχημάτων χρήσει καὶ ὑφήλαιμα γίγνεται ἢ 505 A). But even Socrates ennobles his utilitarianism by placing soul far above body in dignity and worth. In Plato utilitarianism becomes transfigured by Idealism and the doctrine of Immortality. Here it should be noted that καλῶν
combines, as often, the ideas of artistic fitness or propriety, and propriety of conduct. The moral sense of the Greeks lay in their appreciation of the beautiful.

_457 B—458 B_ Thus do we successfully evade one of the waves which threatened us, but a more formidable wave is now approaching. The women and children are to belong to all the guardians in common. No one shall know his father or his child. That such a state of society is both possible and beneficial, we shall have to prove; but for the present, we will assume its possibility, and try to show that community of wives and children is the best of all policies for the city and its guardians.

_457 B_ ff. We now confront the second wave (see _449 A_ ff. _n._). The Platonic doctrine of community in wives and children, as a certain critic drily remarks, has been more often censured than understood. The object of the present note is not to sit in judgment upon Plato, but to endeavour to explain his attitude on this subject. In its general aspect, the theory should be regarded as an extreme development of the Naturalism prevailing in Books _II—IV_; see on _II 370_ a. f. and supr. _451_ C ff. Several precedents have been cited from the institutions of various primitive peoples who were sometimes regarded by the Greeks as types of "natural" societies, as for example the Scythians (see on _453_ C and other references in Pohllmann _Gesch. d. antik. Kommunismus_ etc. pp. _131_ ff., with Newman’s _Politics of Aristotle_ Vol. _II_ p. _283_ and especially Riese’s interesting tract on _Die Idealisirung der Naturvölker d. Nordens in d. gr. u. röm. Literatur 1875_), and even Sparta, a State which was constantly extolled by Greek political theorists as a model of the κατὰ φόνον οἰκουσῶν πόλις (Pohllmann _i.e._ pp. _125_ ff., Grote _Plato III_ p. _209_ f.), furnished some parallels to the Platonic communism in this respect (Plut. _Lyc. 15, 9—11, Xen. _Rep. Lac. 1, 8, 9_). But Plato’s real motive in advocating his theory is simply and solely the good of the commonwealth (_462_ A). On the one hand, he dreaded the effect of domestic ties in encouraging selfishness and weakening the bonds of civic obligation; and, with his customary disregard of the limitations of ordinary human nature, he expected his citizens to transfer the domestic affections, without surrendering aught of their intensity, from the family to the State. We may therefore truly say that Plato’s intention was not to abolish the family, but rather to enlarge its borders and make it coincident with the State. "Die Sonderfamilie," as Nohl remarks (die _Staatslehre Platos_ etc. p. _133_), "wird nur aufgehoben, damit das Ganze eine grosse Familie sei." On the other hand, he was profoundly impressed with the necessity of restricting the population, and at the same time maintaining and improving the breed of guardians, and the measures which he here prescribes are to a large extent devised with a view to securing these ends ( _459 A—461_ E). In this respect Plato might fairly hope that his proposals would not be abhorrent to a nation whose idea of marriage was primarily only a legalised union for the procreation of legitimate children. It may be argued that Plato sacrifices more than he gains, even if we judge him from the standpoint of his own political idealism, but it shews a complete misapprehension of the situation to charge him with deliberate encouragement of vice: the community of wives and children "hat mit ‘freier Liebe’ nichts zu thun" (Pohllmann _i.e._ p. _280_). Finally, we should remember that it is only the Guardians and Auxiliaries who are subject to these rules (see on _III 417_ A), and that in the second-best city depicted in the _Laws_ Plato revives the institution of marriage, as we understand the word, without, however, surrendering in the smallest degree his earlier ideal ( _807_ B). Perhaps the wisest and most temperate discussion on Plato’s conception of marriage and the family is that of Grote (_Plato III_ pp. _220—234_). Some judicious remarks will also be found in Jowett’s _Introduction_ pp. _cclxxi—ccxiv_, and Nettleship’s _Lectures and Remains_ _II_ pp. _174—180_; but Jowett goes beyond the province of the interpreter, and lays too much stress on the antagonism between the views of Plato and those of modern civilised communities. See also on _458_ E and App. I ad fin.

13 διαφεύγειν. The present is less
presumptuous than διαφυγεῖν conjectured by Herwerden. It is proved to be right by διαφύγειοι below, which Herwerden more misconjectures.

14 γυναικεῖον—νόμον. If γυναικεῖον is equivalent only to περὶ γυναικῶν, it is strangely used. I suspect that Plato is playing on the musical sense of νόμος, as in VII 532 A: cf. IV 424 D, E nn. γυναι- 
sειον νόμον—a melody sung by women— is thus exactly parallel to the γυναικεῖον δράμα (451 C n.), which it is clearly intended to recall.

457 C 19 λέγε is changed to φέρε by Cobet, to ἀγέ by Richards. ἀγέ may of course be right: the confusion occurs in the ms of Plato "Theaet." 162 D and 169 C (see Schanz's critical notes on these two passages), and doubtless elsewhere also. But in default of ms authority, it is safer to retain λέγε. Praestat lectio difficilius. 'Say on: let me see it' gives an excellent meaning, and could not have been otherwise expressed. The hortatory subjunctive of the first person is occasionally used after imperatives other than ἀγέ and φέρε, as in Eur. "Hipp. 567. See

Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 p. 185.

21 τὰς γυναίκας κτλ. Plato imitates the emphasis and precision of a legal enactment. The Aristophanic parallel is και ταῦτα γάρ κοινά ποιῶ τὸι ἀνδρᾶς συγκατακληθέω (Eccl. 614, 615). See App. I.

457 D 25 οὐκ ὀμαί κτλ. Aristotle disappointed Plato's expectations: for he will not admit that such arrangements are even ωφέλιμα ("Pol. B 1. 1261a 2 ff.").

28 πλείστῳν ἀν κτλ. On the omission of αν see IV 437 B n. and Prot. 316 c, with my note ad loc. Without αν, the reference must, I think, be to the past, in which case πλείστῃν—γενέσθαι will allude to some controversy which the doctrine of the community of wives may have occasioned before these words were written. But εὐ μάλι ἀν ἀμφιβοληθηκέν makes it pretty clear that Plato is thinking of the future.

457 E 30 λόγων συντασσων: "ser-monum conspirationem." Ficinus, rightly. The passage which follows is an excellent example of Socratic elpōveia.
έσεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δύνατον καὶ μή. 'Αλλ' οὐκ ἐλάθεις, ἡ δ' ὅσ, ἀποδιδράσκων' ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέροιν πέρι διδοῦ λόγον. 'Τφεκτεόν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, δίκην. τοσούτεροι μέντοι χάρισαι μοι. ἐανόμον με | ἐορτάσασι, 458 ὅσπερ οἱ ἀρχιοὶ τῆς διάνοιαν εἰδόθαιν εὐστίαισαι υψ' ἑαύτων, ὅταν μόνοι πορεύσανται. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ποιειν, τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τῷ ὑπείρημον, τοῦτο παρέντες, ἦν μὴ κάμμωσιν 5 διαλέουμενοι περὶ τοῦ δύνατον καὶ μή, θεντες ὡς ὑπάρχου ἑναι ὧν βουλοῦνται, ἢδη τὰ λοιπά διατάγγοντι καὶ χαίρουσιν διεξείστοιν οἷα δράσοντι γεγομένου, ἁργὸν καὶ ἄλλους ψυχῆς ἔτι ἀργοτέρων ποιοῦντες. ἢδη ὑν' καὶ αὐτὸς μαλακίζομαι, καὶ ἐκείνα μὲν Ἐπείθειμον ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ὑστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἢ δύνατα, νῦν 10 ὑπὸ ὧν δύνατων ὄντων θεῖς σκέψομαι, ἦν μοι παρήγη, πῶς διατάξοντι αὐτὰ οἱ ἄρχοντες γεγομένα, καὶ ὃτι πάντων ἐμφορῶτάν'
age has been passed, we shall remove the restrictions on sexual intercourse, observing only such regulations as are necessary to prevent incest; but, if possible, these unofficial unions shall be barren, and, in any case, their offspring must not be reared. Socrates lays down some further regulations about new meanings to be attached to names of family relationships, and adds that 'brothers' and 'sisters' may marry, with the sanction of the lot and the Pythian priestess's approval.

458 c 18 αὐτοῖς—νόμοις. In issuing their commands, the rulers will either impose laws (i.e. issue such orders as the laws direct) or act in accordance with the spirit of the laws: see next note. αὐτοῖς = ἰπσος sc. as well as τοὺς ἀρχηγούνες. The reading αὐτοῖς (K and Ficinus) is intrinsically good, and may be right: for it accentuates the contrast between cases prescribed for by actual law, and such as are left to the rulers' discretion. But there is hardly sufficient ground for deserting Α. μιμουμένους: sc. τῶν νόμοις. In matters not actually prescribed for by legislative enactment, the rulers will 'imitate,' i.e. will issue commands in harmony with the spirit of such laws as do exist. The reading of ὃς, μὴ πειθομένους, recommended by Herwerden, gives a poor, if not actually an erroneous, meaning.

21 ὀμοφεῖς. See on 456 b.

458 D 23 ἀναμεμηγμένων. ἀναμε-

migμένω would be more usual, but the genitive lays more stress on the participial clause: cf. Thuc. III 13. 6 βοσθη-

sαντων δε ἵμων προθύμων πῶλον τε προσθυ-

ῃσθα κτλ., and other examples quoted in Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 666. See also infra on 459 C. Here, too, it should be noted that the addition of a parenthetical ὀμαί helps to render ἀναμεμηγμένων independent of ὀσοι. The genitive absolu-

te in ὀμαί δὲ—κεκτημένου may also, as Jackson suggests, have influenced Plato's choice of construction in this clause. Plato perhaps thought of Sparta when he wrote the present sentence: cf. Plat. Lyc. 15. 1 ἢ μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα παραρημη-

τικά πρὸς γάμους: λέγω δὲ τὰς ποιμάς τῶν παρθένων καὶ τὰς ἀπόδοσιν καὶ τοὺς ἀγώνας ἐν ὀφεὶ τῶν νέων, ἄγωνον οὖν γεωμετρ-

τικάς, ἀλλ' ἑρωτικάς, ώς φήσοι δ' Πλάτων, ἀνάγκαιas.

26 γεωμετρικάς γε: sc. ἀναγκαία, with which the dative goes, as in Soph. 252 D ταῖς μεγάλαις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατων (cited by J. and C.). We have here one of the earliest assertions of the famous doctrine which has played so large and important a part in the history of philo-

sophy—the doctrine of the so-called 'necessity of mathematical reasoning.' See for instance Mill's Logic Book II c. 5. In the rest of this sentence Schneider suspects that Glaucce is paraphrasing some passage of poetry. τὸν ποίον λεῶ certain sounds tragic.
PLATONOS

[458 D]

καίς, αἰ κωνδυνεύοντι ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἐλκεῖν τὸν πολὺν λέον.  

VIII. Καὶ μάλα, εἴπον, ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὁ Γλαύκων,  

30 ἀπάντησις μὲν μέγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἠ ἄλλο ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίεῖν οὔτε ὁσιον Ε  

ἐν εὐδαιμονίαν πολεῖ οὔτ' ἐπάσωσιν οἱ ἀρχιντες. Οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἐφη. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γνίμους τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ ποιήσομεν ἱερόν εἰς  

dύναμιν οἱ τῷ μᾶλιστα: εἰς δὲ ἄν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὀφελμώτατοι. Παντά-  
pασι μὲν οὖν. | Πώς οὖν δὴ ὀφελμώτατοι ἑσοῦνται; τὸδὲ μοι λέγε, 459  

ὁ Γλαύκων· ὄρδο γὰρ σον ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ κύνας θηρευτικόν καὶ  
tῶν γενναίων ὀρνίθων μάλα συμφώνοι· ἄρ' οὖν, ὁ πρὸς Διός,  

προσέσχήκας τι τοῖς τοῦτον γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιίαις; Τὸ  

5 ποίου; ἐφη. Πρὸτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καὶπέρ ὑπότην γενναῖον,  

ἄρ' οὖν εἰς τινες καὶ γίγνονται ἁριστοί; ἔκειν. Πότερον οὖν εἰς  

ἀπάντων ὁμοῖος γεννᾶς, ἡ προθμεί φί τι μᾶλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἁρίστων;  

Ἐκ τῶν ἁρίστων. | Τί δ; ἐκ τῶν νεωτάτων ἡ ἐκ τῶν γεραιτάτων Β  

ἡ εἰς ἀκμαζόντων οἱ τῷ μᾶλιστα; Ἑξ ἀκμαζόντων. Καὶ ἄν ἡ  

10 οὔτω γεννᾶται, πολὺ σοι ἡγεί χείρον ἐσεθάθα τὸ τε τῶν ὀρνίθων  

30. μέγνυσθαι II: γνίμνυσθαι A.  

4. παιδοποιίαι Ε: παιδοποία Α: παιδοποία (sic) II.  

458 Ε 32 γάμοις—ἱεροῖς. Cf. Latox  

841 D ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἐλθοῦμαί εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. The nuptials of  

Zeus and Hera were known as the Θεο-  

γαμία, or ἱερός γάμος, and were celebrated by  

a special festival in Athens and else-  

where; see H. Graillot's article on ἱεροῖς  

γάμοις in Darenberg and Saglio's dic-  

tionary, where the authorities are cited,  

or Farnell's Cults of the Greek States I  

pp. 184—192. To Greek religious senti-  

ment the marriage of Zeus and Hera was  

(as Graillot says) the ideal type of all  

human marriages, and for this reason  

Plato characteristically applies the ex-  

pression ἱερός γάμος to his ideal of  

marriage in his ideal city. Cf. also  

Proclus in Tim. 16 v τῶν ἐν ἀπορρή-  

tοις λεγομένων ἱερῶν γάμων, οἰς καὶ οἱ  

Πλάτων εἰς δύναμιν ἔξομασι περὶ τοῦ  

πολιτίας καὶ τοῦ τώδε γάμους ἱεροῖς  

gammais προστρέψεις, and see Abel Or-  

phic. p. 243. It is clear from Plato's  

words that he would have repudiated with  

scorn the charge of seeking to abolish  

marriage. We have already seen that he  

endeavours to make the State into one vast  

family (457 v n.); and it is in the same  

spirit that he now tries to raise marriage  

from a private into a public institution,  

without sacrificing any of the religious  
ceremonies and associations by which  
the union of the sexes was hallowed in  
the eyes of his contemporaries; cf.  
459 E. If his vaulting idealism "o'er-  
leaps itself and falls on the other,"  
that is no reason why we should impugn  
his motives, or refuse our homage to his  
unquenchable faith in the possibilities of  
human nature.  

459 A 2 κύνας θηρευτικοῖς κτλ.  

Cf. 451 D and 'Plut. Lyk. 15.12 πολλὴν  
�示ελτριάν καὶ τύφων ἐνεώρα τοῖς περὶ  
tαῦτα τῶν ἄλλων νομοθέτημασθήσαι οἱ κύνας  
μὲν καὶ ἱπποὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατίστοι τῶν  
ὄχεων βιβάζομεν· τὰς δὲ γεγαίκας εὐκλε-  
sάμενοι φρουροῦσιν κτλ. See also on  
451 C, 460 C.  

6 γίγνονται: 'prove themselves to be' (J. and C.), rather than 'grow to be'  
(D. and V.); cf. ιιι 412 C οὶ δὲ γεγορυγάν  
ἀριστοί ὁδ' οὐ γεγορυγμένατοι γίγνονται;  

459 B 10 γεννάται: vīz. τὸ ὰ-γένος,  
not τὸ γεννάμενον (suggested as an alter-  
native explanation by J. and C.). For  
the sense cf. Xen. Mem. I v 23 (Jackson).
Neither explanation is simple or natural; and Schneider, Madvig, and others have in my judgment some reason for expunging εἰναι, although its intrusion is not altogether easy to explain. It is possible enough that Plato wrote ἄνδρειστέρον δὲ <εἰναι> τοῦ ἅτροφος in line 19 (cf. δὲ ἄκρων εἰναι τῶν ἄρχοντων in b above); and the possibility is raised, I think, into a probability, when we thus obtain a natural explanation of the erroneous εἰναι after ἵγοςμεθα. εἰναι following δὲ appeared difficult, and was omitted, as it is in b above by q: "a later scribe reinserted it in the wrong place. I have therefore ventured to transpose the word.

19 ἄνδρειστέρον. It needs no courage to use drugs than to prescribe a regimen, because the risk is greater. Nothing could be more appropriate than Plato's use of the word, although it has been doubted by Richards, who proposed αὖ δραμέτερον at first, and afterwards ἄνδρειστέρον. With the general sentiment Poschenrieder (die Plat. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippocr. Schr. p. 57) compares [Hippocr.] de vitius ratione VI p. 592 c. 67 Λίττει προκαταλαμβάνει τὴν ὑγείαν, ὥστε τᾶς νοῦς μὴ προσπελάζειν, εἰ μὴ τις μεγάλος πάντως ἐξαιρετικός ταῦτα δὲ φαρμάκων δέστα. αὐτοί. 459 D 22, 23 389 B. Cf. also II 382 C, D.

24 τὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο: i.e. this which
25 γίγνεται οὐκ ἐλάχιστον. Πώς δὴ; Δεῖ μὲν, εἴπον, ἐκ τῶν ἁρμονικοῖς τοὺς ἁριστους ταῖς ἁρισταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοῦναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μη, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποιμνὸν Ε ὁ τι ἄκροτατον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γεγονόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν 30 αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ ἄγγελον τῶν φυλάκων ἡ τι μάλιστα ἀστασίατος ἦσσατ. Ὁρθότατα, ἐφή. Οὐκοῦν δὴ ἐορτάται τινες νομοθετεῖαν, ἐν αὐτὶς ἔξυμαξομεν ταῖς τε νῦμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους, καὶ θυσίας, καὶ ψυκῆς ποιητέω τοὺς ἡμετέρους ποιηταῖς πρέπουν ἄρχοντας τοῖς γεγονόμονοι γάμους; τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τῶν 460 ἄρχοντων ποιησομεν, ἐν ὑπὸ μάλιστα διασώσως τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἄνδρων, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ μῆτε μεγάλη ἥμιν ἡ πόλις κατὰ τὸ ἐνυκτὸν 5 μῆτε σμικρὰ γίγνεται. Ὁρθῶς, ἐφή. Κλάρου δὴ τινες, οἴμαι, ποιητέω κομψοί, ὡστε τὸν φαύλον εκείνου αἰτίασθαι ἐφ’ ἐκάστης συνέργεως τύχην, ἄλλα μὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφή.

IX. Καὶ τοῖς ἂναθοίς ἡ ποιος τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ ἀλλοθεὶ ἢ 460 γέρα δοτέων καὶ ἄθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφθονεστέρα ἡ ἕξουσία τῆς

you call right, viz. τὸ γεῦδος. The medicinal lie frequently appears (γίγνεται οὐκ ἐλάχιστον) in connexion with the marriages of the guardians, as Plato proceeds to shew. τοῖς γάμοις should not be made general; the reference is specific.

25 δεῖ μὲν κτλ. "The case resembles that of a breeding stud of horses and mares, to which Plato compares it: nothing else is wanted but the finest progeny attainable" Grote Plato III p. 205. It is worth while to compare Plato's arrangements with those of Aristophanes in *Écl.* 616—634, in spite of the comedian's lewdness and buffoonery.

459 ε. 28 τῶν δὲ μη. Cf. 460 c and 461 c. It seems to me certain from these passages that Plato in this book lends his sanction to infanticide. This has often been denied, but without sufficient reason. The subject is discussed in App. IV.

460 49 ἄρκτατον. Cf. (with Schneider) σφόδρα άκρων in B above and ὅς ἄρκτατον in *Laws* 730 ε. Stephanus' ἄρκτατον is neat, but unnecessary, in spite of καθαρὰν in 460 c.

30 άγάλη, like τόμυον, is intended "to recall the analogy of the lower animals" (J. and C.). Cf. 451 c n. αὐθ' serves the same purpose, by suggesting that άγάλη has another and a more primitive signification.

31 ἐορταλ κτλ. As the ἱερὸς γάμος was celebrated with a procession and sacrifices, ending with the ἱλίει τῆς Ἡπα, so Plato's ἱερὸς γάμοι are attended with religious rites and ceremonies: see 458 e μ. Plato apparently does not intend these State-marriages to last beyond the duration of a single festival. At each successive festival fresh unions would be tried.

460 ε 2 τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρμιβεν. See IV 423 ε μ.

460 τ 9 γέρα κτλ. Special privileges seem to have been awarded at Sparta for bravery in the field (cf. *Tyrtaeus Fr.* 12. 35—44); it is certain at all events that cowardice was visited with every mark of disgrace (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 9. 4—6 and other references in Gilbert's *Gk. Const. Ant.* E. T. p. 77). γέρα must be nominative, and δοτέω passive, in spite of its singular number: cf. *Symp.* 188 B πάχυναι καὶ ξύλαξαι καὶ ἑρωτισάι—γέρανται. Examples like *Crat.* 410 c αύ μὲν δὴ ὄραμι Ἀττικαί ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρτέρον (cited by Schneider and others) are not to the point, because αὐ—ὄραμ
means τὸ ὄνομα 'αἱ ὀραί.' It is scarcely possible to take ὄνομα as active, and understand from it a passive ὄντων with ἔσωσια, because the connexion between γέρα, ἄρκα, and ἔσωσια—note ἄξαλα τε καὶ κτλ.—is too close to permit of γέρα being in the accusative case.

12 ἐπὶ τοιτῶν. For the construction cf. Dem. F. L. 298 τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας and de Cor. 247 τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων.

13 ἀμφότερα. ὧν and some other MSS read ἀμφότερα, which is quite wrong: cf. Lach. 187 ἄ πειθόμεν ἢ δόρος ἢ χάρις ἢ ἀμφότερα.

14 καὶ ἀρχαί: sc. as well as the other duties of guardians. It has not yet been specifically said that magistrates are to be open to women as well as to men. J. and C. observe that "Plato seems to betray a certain consciousness that the office immediately in question might be specially suitable for women." Kindred duties are actually assigned to a female vigilance committee in Ῥως 784 Α, 794 Α. ff.

460 C 15 τῶν σηκῶν. Α σηκός is an enclosed pen or fold in which the young of animals may be reared. Hartman prefers τῶν σηκῶν (with ὑ and a Florentine MS), because the σηκός has not been mentioned before. The way has, however, been prepared for it by 459 Λ, 459 Β (τι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κτλ.), τούτων (459 Ε), ἄγελη (ιβ.), and σύνεργες (460 Λ). The comparison referred to a sort of 'breeding-stud'—see above on 459 Β—runs through all this passage and supplies the metaphors. See also on 460 Ε. The whole discussion affords an excellent example of the uncompromising rationalism with which Plato carries out his theories to their logical conclusion.

17 ἀνάπτηρον. Pollux (II 61) explains this word as οἱ πάν τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένος; but it is little more than πτερός: cf. ανάπτυξος, ἀναπτυκτάναι etc. The present passage is not inconsistent with Π. 415 Β, for ἵπποικος and ἰπποίδηροι do not imply deformity.

18 ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ. is a euphemism for infanticide: see App. IV. Compare the Spartan usage: εἰ δ' ἀγνένες καὶ ἀμορφον, ἀπέσειμον εἰς τὰς λεγομένας Ἀποθέτας, παρὰ Ταυγέτον βαραβρόθη τόσον (Plut. Lyg. 16. 1). (The word for the exposure of infants was ἀπόθετος.) See also Whibley Greek Oligarchies p. 113 ΜΜ.

ἐπερ μέλλει. μέλλει (see cr. n.) might possibly be defended, if it referred to a previous statement to the same effect ('if, as we saw,' etc.). But there has been no such statement, unless with Stephanus we write ἀκρατότατον for ἀκράτατον in 459 Ε. ἐπερ γε μέλλει, conjectured by Herwerden, would be in danger of meaning κατακρύψωναι, επερ μέλλει κτλ. As it is, ἐπερ μέλλει qualifies ὡς πρέπει 'as is proper.' Cl. 'If the class of guardians is to be kept pure,' Glanu, in fact, takes the words out of Socrates' mouth. On the meaning and usage of ἐπερ in Greek see E. S. Thompson's edition of the Meno pp. 258—264.
24.  θηλάσωνται Σ: θηλάσωνται ΑΠ γ. 27.  προσθέμεθα ν (cum Stobaeo Flor. 116. 50): προθύμοιμεθα Α et (antecedente non δ sed ω) Σ᾽: πρωθυμοιμεθα ΠΙΣ 9.  

21 πάσαν μηχανήν κτλ. Aristotle (Pol. B 3. 1263 ι 14 ff.) argues that no precautions would prevent parents from occasionally recognising their children. In such cases Plato might reasonably hope that the general weakening of parental sentiment would secure his city against serious harm. 

460 D 22 ἀλλας. The mothers of the children who have been exposed. 

23 αὐτῶν τοῦτων: viz. the mothers. This provision is conceived in their interests, rather than in the interests of the children, as the next clause also shows. 

24 θηλάσωνται. θηλάσωνται has more MS authority than θηλάσωνται; but the future indicative (and not the aorist subjunctive) is the regular construction after ὅσως in semi-final clauses: cf. IV 429 D, VII 519 E. The exceptions are—besides this passage—Symb. 198 B, Phaed. 91 A, Gorg. 480 A, B, 510 A. In most of these places there is inferior MS authority for the future, which editors now for the most part read. See Weber Entwicklung d. Absichtssätze in Schanz’s Beiträge II 2. p. 66; and for the confusion in Paris A of α and ω Introd., § 5. 

27 προθύμεθα. See cr. n. προθύμεθα is intrinsically so much better than προθυμοιμεθα that we can hardly refuse to regard this as one of the passages in which Σ has preserved the right reading. See Introd. § 5. 

έφαμεν. Cf. 429 B. 

28 εἰς ἀκμαίοντων. The same principle was observed in Sparta (Xen. Rep. Loc. 1. 6 and Plut. Lyc. 13. 4). It is possible, though I believe incapable of proof, that Plato’s limits of age were in agreement with Spartan usage. 

460 E 29 τὰ εἰκοσὶ ἐτη κτλ. A woman’s ἀκμή lasts ‘the twenty,’ a man’s ‘the thirty’ years. Glauco asks ‘which twenty and which thirty?’ and Socrates then explains, τά before εἰκοσὶ is correctly explained by Stallbaum: ‘articulum ponti de certo quodam cogitans temporis spatio quo deinceps definit accuratiss.’ The antecedent to αὐτῶν is not simply ἐτή (so J. and C., with the English translators), but the duplicate expression εἰκοσὶ ἐτῆ and τριάκοσιν. In γυναίκη μὲν κτλ. Socrates proceeds as if Glauco had not interrupted: the construction is μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς—γυναικεῖ—ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοσιν, γυναικὶ μὲν—τίκτειν, ἀνδρὶ δὲ—γεννᾶν, τὰ πῶνα, τὰ ποῖα and the like are idiometrically used in asking for further specification, and are sometimes only impatient interruptions, intended to draw attention to the important point and add liveliness to the style: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II 11 p. 340. Schneider takes τὰ εἰκοσὶ ἐτῆ and τὰ τριάκοσιν as twenty and thirty years of age respectively, comparing τῶν ἑνεκήκατα ἑτῶν in Tim. 21 A, but χρόνος in χρόνος ἀκμῆς means duration, as is clear from ἀμφότεροι—φρονήσων below. It should be observed that in the Lato Plato fixes the inferior limit for men sometimes at 23 (772 D), sometimes at 30 (721 A, 785 B). By thirty-five he expected them to marry (ib.). Girls are to marry between 16 (785 B) or 18 (833 D) and 20 (ib.). Cf. Hesiod Od. 606 ff., pseudo-Solon Fr. 27. 9 and Arist. Pol. H 16. 1335 τ. 28. The Greeks seem generally to have recommended men to marry a little under or a little over thirty. See on this subject Blümmer Privatalterthümmer p. 36 n. 1.
461 A] 

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΚΕ Ἔ 

301

ἀνδὲ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα: Ἄμφιστορος | γοῦν, ἐφη, ἀν' ἀκμὴ σώματος τε καὶ φρονήσεως. 

Οὐκοῦν ἦν τε πρεσβύτερος τούτων ἦν τε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοίνον γεννήσεων ἀρνήται, οὐτε ὅσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἀμίρτητα, ὥς παίδα φιλότοντος τῇ πόλει, ὡς ἀλάθη, γεννήσεται οὐχ ὑπὸ θυσίων οὐδὲ ὑπὸ εὐχῶν φῦς, ὡς ἐφ' ἐκόστοις 5 τοῖς γάμοις εὔξονται καὶ ἵερειαι καὶ ἵερειαι καὶ ἐμπάσα ἡ πόλις εὖ ἄγαθὸν ἀμείνους καὶ εὖ ωφελέμον ὡφελιμωτέρους ἢτοι τοὺς ἐκγόνους.

4. φήσομεν Α' II: θήσομεν corr. Α'.

5. φῦς Ἑρ: φῦςα ΑΙ."
gliwcesthai, ἀλλὰ ἕπο σκότου μετὰ δεινής ἀκρατείας γεγονός. Β Ὁρθώς, ἐφι. Ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ γ', εἰπον, νόμος, εάν τις τῶν ἔτι 10 γεννώντων μὴ συνεργάσοντος ἀρχοντος ἀπηταῖ τῶν ἐν ἡλικίαν γυναικῶν νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνέγγυνον καὶ ἀνίερον φήσωμεν αὐτὸν παῖδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναι. Ὁρθότατα, ἐφι. Ὁταν δὲ δῆ, οἵμα, ἀι τε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γεννῶν ἐκβάως τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσωμεν ποὺ ἐλευθέρως αὐτοὺς συγγίνεσθαι φ ἄν ἐθέλωσι, 15 πλὴν θυγατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ταῖς τῶν θυγατέρων παίαι καὶ ταῖς C ἀνῶ μητρῶς, καὶ γυναῖκας αὖ πλὴν ἦδε καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτον εἰς τὸ κάτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ταῦτα γ' ἡδι πάντα διακελεύα- μενοι προθυμεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύμη μηδὲ ἐν, εάν γένηται, εάν δὲ τι βιάζεται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ


461 b 8 ἕπο σκότου. Cf. (with J. and C.) σκότος = 'an unlawful child.'

γεγονός = 'produced,' 'a product of,' is cancelled by Hartman; but φὸς is too far away, and γίγνεσθαι (to 'be produced') is sufficiently accurate: cf. γένηται in 461 c.

11 ἀνέγγυνον: 'unauthorised,' because the child of an irregular union. An ἀνέγγυνος γάμος is a marriage without an ἔγγυσ or contract between the parents of the betrothing parties (Blümmer Privatatt. p. 262 n. 2).

14. ἐφ. ἐφ. is read by Ζ, Vind. E and Eusebius (Præp. Ev. xiii 19. 18); but αὐτὸς includes both sexes, and in such cases the masculine is preferred to the feminine. Hartman strangely thinks φ neuter.

15 θυγατρὶ κτλ. The cases enumerated are all in the direct line, and nothing is said forbidding unions between 'brothers' and 'sisters.' See however 461 E n. Greek law permitted the marriage of uncles with nieces, aunts with nephews, and even half-brothers and half-sisters, provided they were not ἓμιμηρτοι (Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 478, with the passages there cited). Some of Plato's contemporaries, notably the Cynics, entertained peculiarly revolting views on this subject, and the question was frequently agitated in his time: see Dümmler Proleg. zu Pl. St. pp. 53 ff. The Stoics agreed with the Cynics: see the authorities cited in Henkel Stud. zur Geschichte d. Gr. Lehre vom Staaf p. 30.

461 c 17 καὶ ταῦτα γ' ἡδι κτλ.: 'and all this only after we have exorted them' etc. ἡδι goes with ἀφήσωμεν (or the like) understood after πάντα. J. and C. wrongly connect πάντα with προθυμεῖσθαι ('to use all diligence'). The voice should pause a little before διακελεύασμοι.

18 μηδ' εἰς φῶς κτλ.: ne in lucem quidem efferre. Much less shall we permit it to live if born: see App. IV. μηδὲ prepares the way for ἐνέ, δὲ τι βιάζεται κτλ. Hartman strangely prefers μηδ', 'cum post μάλιστα coniunctio μηδὲ prorsus frigeat.' But μάλιστα μὲν is, of course, 'if possible.'

19 μηδὲ ἐν. See cr. n. μηδὲ γ' ἐν occurs in a few inferior MSS besides Α, and is read by Baiter and others, but we do not find γε thus interposed between φῶς (μηδὲ) and εἰς. 

γένηται κτλ. γένηται sc. κύμα. βιά- 

σμενοι means 'force its way' sc. εἰς τὸ φῶς (J. and C.). The extreme emphasis shews what importance Plato attached to this provision. The procuring of abortion, though perhaps in certain cases punishable by law (Meier und Schömman Att. Process p. 381), was in practice common enough: see Blümmer Privatatt. p. 76. Plato permits it also in the Laws (740 D). The general Greek sentiment on this matter is fairly represented by Aristotle when he says (Pol. H 16. 1335b
22 fl.] ἀφίειν γὰρ δὲ τῆς τεκνοποίου τὸ πλήθος. οἷς δὲ τις γίνεται παρὰ ταῦτα συνυπάρξεται, πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐγγενεθεὶς καὶ θηλή, ἐμπείρειτο δὲ τὴν ἀμβλύωσιν τὸ γὰρ βασιλεύτω καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ δήν ἐστι.

τῦθέναι κτλ.: 'so deal with them.'

τυθέναι is more delicate than ἐκτιθέναι, which was read before Bekker, although it has no ms authority. Herderen suggests that τυθέναι means θάπτευν (as in 459 A), but Plato expresses himself with more refinement. τροφή does not mean, as some are fain to believe, merely the educational system reserved for the guardians: see on 459 E and App. IV.

21 πατέρας κτλ.: 'how will they distinguish one another's fathers' etc.? The Aristophanes parallel is here very close: Πάντα όντως δοῦντων οἴμων τοῦ αὐτοῦ παῖδες ἔκαστος [ἐστά] διυπότας διαγνώσεις; Τὸ δὲ δὲ; πατέρας γὰρ ἄπαντας τῷ προσβοτέρους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς χρόνων νομοῦν (Eccl. 633—637). The question touches an obvious difficulty in any system of the community of children; but, as a link in the chain of evidence connecting the Ecclesiasticus and the Republic, the parallel deserves to carry weight, although it has sometimes been pressed too far. See on the one hand Teichmüller Lit. Feld. I pp. 18—19 and Chiappelli Rit. di Filolog. XI p. 213, and on the other Zellerii II 1 p. 531 n. 2. Cf. also App. I.

461 D 23 δεκάτῳ κτλ.: 'in the tenth month and also in the seventh month.'

δὴ (as J. and C. remark) draws attention to the more exceptional case: cf. 11 367 C n. The Greek cannot, I think, be taken as an inexact way of saying 'seven to ten months after' (J. and C.). In point of fact the majority of ancient writers on the subject denied that children were ever born in the eighth month of pregnancy: see Gellius Noct. Att. 111 16 and Censorinus de die natali 7. 2.

28 ἑγέννων: 'were engaged in betrothing children': cf. 460 E, and 461 B (τῶν ἐν γεννών). Richards has pointed out (Cl. Rev. IV p. 7) that the imperfect refers 'to the whole time of life during which father and mother were allowed, if the lot fell upon them, to take part in the regular unions.' Cf. Tim. 18 D ἡμοίοι δὲ πάντες πάντας αὐτῶν ὁμογενεῖς, ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ὑπερ ἕν τις πρεσβύτερος ἐντὸς ἥλικιας γέγονεν τοῖς ἑγέννοις. Jowett's version—'all who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together'—mistakes both εν and ἑγέννοις. Schneider translates the passage correctly.

29 ὀστί—ἀπεντεία. I agree with Richards in understanding this of the 'irregular unions which were last mentioned' (461 C). But in spite of the explicit reference in δ ἡμῶν ἐγέννωμεν, Plato has not as yet forbidden such unions between 'brothers' and 'sisters': see 461 C n. The discrepancy is hard to explain, especially as the list in 461 C seems intended to be exhaustive. The effect of the prohibition (owing to the meaning now given to 'brother' and 'sister') would be greatly to restrict, but not to abolish, unauthorised liaisons.

461 E 29 ἀδελφοὺς κτλ. refers only to State-marriages, as ἡ κλῆρος shews. Without this exemption Plato's proposals would (according to Richards i.e.) 'have rendered all unions whatever practically
impossible." Surely not; although they would have unduly favoured the τηλόγετος παῖς. A son, for example, who is born when his mother is 21 and his father 26, cannot marry till he is 49, because he is 29 before his bride can possibly be born, and she cannot marry under 20; whereas a son, whose father is 54 and mother 39 when he is born, can marry a girl only one year younger than himself, because his father and mother retire at 55 and 40 respectively. Did Plato intend the sons of elderly couples to marry young, and those of young couples to marry late? Such an inference is unlikely, although it is the logical outcome of his theories. In any case Plato did well to introduce a saving clause. The κοινὸς κλήρος, obedient to the archons, would couple 'brothers' and 'sisters,' whenever it seemed desirable in the interests of the State, so long as they were not really blood-relations. (This the archons of course would know.) Apollo's priestess would platonize. We must suppose that her assent is given in advance, and once for all (although προσαναρχή is present and follows εἰμιτίπτη, unless she had an accredited representative on the spot, which there is nothing to indicate. On Plato's attitude to Apollo see IV 427 c n.

461 E—464 B Let us now endeavour to show that community of wives and children is best, and in agreement with the general plan of our constitution. That it is the best policy Plato proves as follows. A legislator should above all things aim at maintaining unity within his city. The most effective instrument for this purpose is community of pleasure and pain. As in an individual man, the sufferings of a single member affect the whole, so also in a well-governed city, the joys and sorrows of every citizen are shared by all. It is easy to show that our ideal city fulfils this condition in a unique degree, both by means of its other institutions, and more especially through the community of wives and children.

33. ως δὲ Ξρ. ὥδε (sic) Α, eraso super ὥ accentu: ὥδε Π. 34. ἐπομένη—βελτίστη Π. ἐπομένη—βελτίστη Λ.

461 E 34 ἐπομένη—πολιτεία. This topic was not specified in the original distribution of the subject (458 B), but it is closely connected with ὃς κακῷ βελτίστη. Plato does not deal with it till 464 B.

35 βεβαιώσασθαι κτλ. Hirschig cancelled παρά τοῦ λόγου: but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 489 A ἢν—βεβαιώσαμαι ἢν παρά σοῦ. 'The argument' is personified, as often.

462 A 5 ἄρα. <cf> ἄρα was suggested by Dобree; but cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 475 B πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεφτόμεθα, ἄρα—ὑπερβάλλει κτλ. The exact translation is 'to enquire, Do the institutions we have described,' etc.

7 ἐξομεν οὖν κτλ. Cf. IV 422 E. στάσις was the greatest evil which a Greek city had to fear, and Athens had suffered from it grievously. Now individualism was the peculiar pride and glory of the Athenian State (Thuc. II 37), so that, we need not wonder if Plato traced στάσις to individualism, and rushed to the
assert that Plato has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences—to antithesos sumpfereos,” and Aristotle argues to the same effect in Pol. B 2. 1261a 22 ff. But it is in fact on such a unity that the entire fabric of Plato’s city rests: see IV 433 D n., and cf. also 432 A, 443 D. The perfect city is a ευ with three πολλα—rulers, auxiliaries, farmers and artisans, or, if rulers and auxiliaries are classed together as guardians, then with two. Plato’s object throughout this episode is to keep the whole city ‘one’ by preventing one of its constituent factors, viz. the guardians, from becoming ‘many.’ If the guardians are united—so he holds—no danger to the city’s unity need be apprehended from the others (465 B). With the sentiment generally cf. Ar. Eccl. 594 and 674 (μιαν οκονομ ημου ποιησεν συρρηξα εις ευ απαιτα | ωστε βαδιζειν εις Αλληλου). See also on 463 E and App. I.

13 οι μεν—της πολεως. As when a national disaster is made the occasion of a party victory. Plato may be thinking of scenes which he had witnessed in his native city. Bosanquet cites an excellent illustration from Dem. de Cor. 217.

162 B 9 ποιη μιαν. J. and C. assert that Plato has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences—to antithos sumpheros;“ and Aristotle argues to the same effect in Pol. B 2. 1261a 22 ff. But it is in fact on such a unity that the entire fabric of Plato's city rests: see IV 433 D n., and cf. also 432 A, 443 D. The perfect city is a ευ with three πολλα—rulers, auxiliaries, farmers and artisans, or, if rulers and auxiliaries are classed together as guardians, then with two. Plato's object throughout this episode is to keep the whole city 'one' by preventing one of its constituent factors, viz. the guardians, from becoming 'many.' If the guardians are united—so he holds—no danger to the city's unity need be apprehended from the others (465 B). With the sentiment generally cf. Ar. Eccl. 594 and 674 (μιαν οκονομ φημο ποιησεν συρρηξα εις ευ απαιτα | ωστε βαδιζειν εις Αλληλου). See also on 463 E and App. I.

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partnership pervading the body with the soul, organized into a single composite organization, viz. that of the ruling power in the partnership' etc. Plato's language is precise, but difficult. I take ἡ—ψυχή as defining the κοινωνία. κατά τὸ σῶμα is written rather than τὸ σῶμα, because the partnership is not only a partnership of body with soul, but also a partnership of the different parts of body with one another. τεταγμένη—see cr. n. and App. V—appears to suit σύνταξις better than τεταγμένη. A σύνταξις is the ordered combination of two or more elements: cf. Tim. 24 C and Latos 903 D ἡ ψυχή συντεταγμένη σῶματι. The words τὸ ἄρχοντος define the σύνταξις; although nenter in gender, they really refer, not to the soul, but to the whole σύνταξις or σύνολον, i.e. ὁ ἄρχων. It is ὁ ἄρχων who rules in the partnership, although he is himself a partner only in the sense in which the whole is partner with its parts. The expression ὁ ἄρχων τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεὶ is thus seen to be as exact as possible. The confusion between τεταγμένον and τεταμένον is easy: συντεταμένως, for example, and συντεταγμένως are often confused in mss; see Ast's Lex. Plat. s.v. ξυστεταγμένως and my edition of the Apology p. 127. Cf. also infra 474 A n. 23. ἐν αὐτῷ: i.e. ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ (so also Schneider), not (as Stallbaum) ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Plato means that every single man (ἡς ἄρχωσιν above) is a single organized whole—a partnership in which the whole is partner with, and rules, the parts. See also App. V. 462 D 23 ὁδετό—ψυχήν: 'momentary' aorists; cf. Thaet. 156 E. 25 ἄλλου ὀνομαῖον: sc. besides the finger.
28 évos δὴ ktl. We may compare the Stoic doctrine "incommoda autem et commoda (ita enim εὐχρηστήματα et δυνάχρηστήματα appello) communia (sc. inter sapientes) esse voluerunt" (see Cicero de Fin. III 69, and Madvig's note). Not a few of Plato's regulations in Book v foreshadow the communistic theories of Stoicism: see Dyroff Ethik. d. alten Stoa pp. 211 f., 226—231. Plato however contrives to make his communism live; whereas the Stoics seldom did.

462 E 34 αὐτή. See cf. n. Schneider says αὐτή is "ea potissimum," referring to νυν 516 B, where however we should (I believe) read ὀφθα. See note ad loc. Here αὐτή is required by the contrast with εἶτε καὶ ἀλλή τις μᾶλλον. For the error cf. νυν 552 A, where ζ and several ms wrongly read αὐθή. See also Introd. § 5.

36 ἑστι. For the syntax see on νυν 11 363 A. ἑστι is a privileged verb in Attic prose: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 61.

463 A 5 δεσπότας. Demosthenes remarks that the subjects in an oligarchy are 'cowards and slaves' (ἄναρχοι καὶ δοῦλοι). See in Timocr. 75 and Whibley Gk. Oligarchies p. 143.

6 ἄρχοντας. Plato is thinking of the Athenian Archons. The object of this chapter, which seems at first sight somewhat loosely constructed, is to prove that συμπάθεια prevails to a unique extent in the Platonic city. The appellations σωτήρεις and ἐπίκοιροι, on the one hand, and μαθητάς and τροφεῖς on the other, involve a greater degree of interdepend- ence than is expressed by the corresponding names in other cities. The archons too are more than fellow-rulers: they are fellow-guardians, their official designation among one another serving continually to remind them of their duty to the lower classes. Among themselves they use the terms of family relationship, and with these their actions correspond. Thus the distinction between meas and taim is more nearly obliterated than in any other city. Everything is meas.

463 B 7 ἐπίκοιροι. The official designation of the second order is applied by the people to the ruling class as a whole. They are expected to look upon the ἐπίκοιροι as 'helpers of the people' rather than as the rulers' auxiliaries, although it is the latter function which gave them their name (νυν 414 B). This is clear from σωτήρας τε καὶ ἐπίκοιρος, both of which epithets are suggestive of protecting deities. See also on 464 B.

20—2
Τι δ' οὗτοι τῶν δήμων; Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφεὰς. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχοντες τοὺς δήμους; Δούλους, ἐφη. Τι δ' οἱ ἀρχοντες ἄλληλοι; Ἐξυπάρχοντας, ἐφη. Τι δ' οἱ ἠμετέροι; Ἐξεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν εἰ τίς τινα ἔχει προσεπείν τῶν ἐξυπάρχοντων τὸν μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλότριον; Καὶ πολλοὺς γε. Οὐκούν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτὸν νομίζει τε καὶ λεγεῖ, τὸν δ' ἀλλότριον ὡς οὖν εἰς εἰς τοὺς φίλακες; ἐσθ' ὥστε αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἂν τὸν ἐξυπάρχοντα νομίζαι τινα ἢ προσεπείν ὡς ἀλλότριον; Ὀδομαῖς, ἐφη· παντὶ γὰρ, δ' ἂν ἐντυχχάνῃ τις, ἡ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ µητρὶ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τοῦτον ἐκγονοῦ ἢ προγόνοις νομεῖ ἐντυχχάνει. Κάλλιστα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις.

20 ἀλλ' ἐτι καὶ τάδε εἰτέ· ποτερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὁνόματα μοῦν οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὁνόματα πράττειν, D περὶ τε τῶν πατέρας, ὡσ νόμος· περὶ πατέρας αίδους τε πέρι καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκοου δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἡ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῶ· ἄμεινον ἔσσεθα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσα 25 οὔτε δικαία πράττοντος αὐν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ταῦτα; αὐταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φήμαι εἰς ἄπαντων τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμνήσουσιν εὐθὺς περὶ τὰ τῶν παιδόν ὅτα καὶ παίδεουν, οὗν ἂν αὐτοῖς τις ἀπόφηγη, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξύγγρεων; Λαται, ἐφη· γελοίον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, E εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων οἰκεῖα ὁνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μοῦν φθέγγοντο.

30 Πασῶν ἄρα πόλεως μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξυμφονῆσουσιν ενὸς τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακὸς πράττοντος ὃ τῶν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ βήμα, τό ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν

11. τῶν ἐν ὑ: ἐν ΑΠΕ.

463 c 17 παντὶ γάρ—ἐντυχχάνειν. A slight exaggeration; see 461 d, E mm. Cf. Hdt. iv 104 ἐπίκουν δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν τὴν μὲν τίνι ποιεῖται (οἱ 'Αγάθυροι), ιδιαίτερα τοι τῆς ἑλλήνης ἑσώ χωρίς μὴν ἐστὶν πότες μὴν φῶς μὴν ἐξεις χρεώνται ἢ ἑλλήνους καὶ ἑλλήνων ἐξεις ἑστὶ καὶ ἑστὶν ἑστὶν. Similar motivations for domestic communism are mentioned by Diod. Sic. ii 58. See also, for other traces, whether real or legendary, of community of wives and children in antiquity Xanthus Fr. 28, Ephorus Fr. 76 and Theopompos Fr. 222 (in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. Vol. i), together with Arist. Pol. B 3. 163 a 19.

463 d 22 περὶ τε κτῆ. τε is ἀνα-κάθοδον: we should expect καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξύγγρεων to follow. Instead, we have a change of construction, and καὶ περὶ πατέρων—καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξύγγρεων (line 27). Cf. ii 373 b n. ἢ = 'all-oquinn', as often after a verb of obligation (here δίων): cf. vi 489 E, 503 A. νόμος: sc. ἐστὶ πράττειν. 24 αὐτῷ: though αὐτοῖς in c, cf. i 347 a n.

26 φήμα. See on iii 415 d. φήμῃ is the half-personified τοις πορολη, τοις Νεί: cf. Nägelsbach NachHom. Theol. p. 165. It is the quasi-personification of φήμα which accounts for the active ζυγγρεων ('will sing in the ears of' etc.).: cf. ix 573 a περὶ αὐτῶν ἀπαθών. 463 e 31 δ'-βήμα is the object of the ἐξυμφονήσουσιν (Schneider), just as in iv 432 α· ταῦτα depends upon ἐλέγομεν.
Aristotle’s criticism deserves to be quoted (Pol. B 3. 1262 b 1 ff.) othws ekastos ἵματις ἐργάζεται τῶν ἐκ πράττομα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ κακῶς, ὑπόκατοι τυγχάνει τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὡς ἠμός ἦνος τοῦ διοικοῦν τῶν τρόπων λέγων καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν χίλων, ἡ δῶρον ἡ πόλεως ἐστὶν, καὶ πώς ἀπαράκτως ἀδήλως γὰρ ὃς ἑνεξεχθῆ γενέσθαι τέκνων καὶ συνόδηραι γεννθεῖσαν. There is a far deeper truth in Plato’s saying than in Aristotle’s animadversions thereupon, and “das schöne Wort, that all the same, I think, must be acknowledged to have a different sense from what Scholasticism understood of it.” (Noble Die Staatslehre Platos etc. p. 133). See also on 457 B ff. 464 a 1 οἰκονομ. κτλ. 462 b, C. οὐκοῦν ἐξουσιαστεῖται δὴ—οἰκονομοῦσιν is parenthetical, “to which, as we have seen, they will apply the name “mine.”” 464 b 9 οἰκονομ. κτλ. See on 462 c and App. V. 12 ἐπίκουρος. Why not φῶλας? The word φῶλαι regularly includes both the ἀρχόντες and the ἐπίκουροι, but it is strange to find ἐπίκουροι including the τέλειοι φῶλαι or rulers (see on II 374 D), as it appears to do here and in 466 A. The following explanations may be suggested. (1) Plato intends the community of women and children to extend only to the Auxiliaries, and not also to the Guardians. This view is taken by Blaschke (Familien- u. Gütergem. d. Pl. St. p. 10), who asserts that the Rulers proper have already past the limits of age prescribed for matrimony. In point of fact, however, a man may become a τέλειοι φίλακες at 50 (vii 540 A, B), whereas he can marry till he is 55 (460 E). (2) As by far the largest number of husbands would be only Auxiliaries, Plato speaks somewhat loosely, as if matrimonial community were confined to them. This explanation is possible enough in itself, but fails to explain the usage in 466 A. (3) ἐπίκουρος is used with the new and deeper meaning given to it in 463 b (where see note), ‘helpers of the people,’ rather than in its original and technical sense of the rulers’ auxiliaries. This suits all the passages, and is in my judgment what Plato intended. ἐπίκουρος is not the only term whose connotation deepens as the Republic proceeds: cf. II 376 B, III 392 c mm. 464 b—465 D Domestic communism is also in harmony with the general communist character of the city. It will cement the union of the guardians and so consolidate the State. It will also deliver us from lawsuits arising out of disputes about the family and property. In cases of attempted violence to the person, we shall expect a man’s fellows to defend him. The older citizens will exercise disciplinary powers over the younger; reverence and fear will keep the latter from retaliating. All these arrangements will tend to keep the rulers at peace with one another, and,
γυναικῶν. Καὶ μᾶλτε, ἐφη. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἐφαμέν γὰρ ποὺ οὔτε οἰκίας τούτους ἴδιας δεῖν 15 εἶναι οὔτε γῆν οὔτε τι κτήμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφῆν ἐλαμβάνοντας μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς κοινῆ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιν οὖν φύλακες εἶναι. Ὄρθως, ἐφη. Ἀρ' οὖν οὖχ, ὅπερ λέγο, τά τε πρόσθεν εἰρήμενα καὶ τά νῦν λεγόμενα ἐτι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθεὺν φύλακας καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ 20 διαστὰν τὴν πόλιν τῷ ἐμὸν ὑπομάχοντας μὴ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν εαυτοῦ οἰκίαν ἔλκοντα, τὸ τι ἄν δύνηται χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν εαυτοῦ ἑτέρων οὖν, καὶ δ' γυναῖκα τε καὶ παιδῶν ἑτέρους, ἤδονας τε καὶ ἀληθῶνας ἐμποιοῦντας ἴδιαν οὖν τῶν ἴδιας, ἀλλ' ἐνι δόγματι τοῦ οἰκεῖου πέρι ἐπὶ τὸ 25 αὐτὸ τείνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύτης τε καὶ ἤδονης εἶναι; Κομιδή μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί δὲ; δικαί τε καὶ καὶ ἐγκληματικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχήσεται εἰς αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐποίησεν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά; ὅθεν δὴ ὑπάρχει τούτων ἀστασιάσωτος εἶναι δάσει γε διὰ χρημάτων Ε 30 ὡς παιδῶν καὶ ἠγγεγεκριμένην κτήσιν ἀνθρωποῦ στασιάζονσιν; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἀπηλλάχθαι. Καὶ μὴν οὖν βιαίως γε οὔτε ἄλεικες δικαίως ἂν εἰεν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἦλξε μὲν γὰρ ἴλακας ἀμύνεσθαι

if they are united, we shall not expect sedition in the rest of the State. Other minor advantages there are, too trivial to specify.

464 B 14 ὁμολογοῦμεν. I formerly read ὁμολογοῦμεν with Σ, Stallbaum, and others; but Schneider, as I now think, is right in retaining the imperfect and referring it to the original mention of domestic communism in Book IV. The whole of this discussion may in fact be regarded as a defence in the form of an explanation of the sentence IV 423 E—424 A. See also App. I.

464 C 15 τροφῆνα λαμβάνοντας κτλ. summarises III 416 D, E.

464 D 23 ἑτέρους = μὴ τοὺς αὐτοῖς depends on ἄνυπαντας understood. D. and V. make ἕλκοντα govern γυναικα—ἑτέρους, as Stallbaum formerly did, but Plato could not have said anything so ludicrous.

25 ὁμοπαθεῖς: 'simultaneously affected by' D. and V. ὁμοπαθής (Astr) would mean 'of like passions with.'

27 ὡς ἐποίησεν ἠξιώδει with οἰχήσει = 'almost have disappeared,' 'so gut wie ver-

schwunden sein" (Schneider): see on 1 344 b. The English translators either omit or misinterpret the phrase. Aristophanes furnishes several pretty close parallels to Plato's reasoning here: cf. Eccl. 560—610 and especially 567 (ἀλλ' ὁδὲ δικαί πρῶτον ὑποταί—)672. See Chiappelli Rév. d.l'Écol. xvi pp. 212 ff. and on the whole subject App. I.

464 E 31 οὐδὲ—αὐτοῖς. The first οὐδὲ is of course ne—quidem. Hesomer should not have conjectured οὔτε—οὔτε (de part. Pl. p. 41).

32 δικαίως is ejected by Cobet and Herverden, but δικαίων just below supports it. There cannot justly be any lawsuits for outrages on the person, if we declare it just and honourable for a man to take the law into his own hands. This explanation is perhaps better than to translate 'we may fairly suppose that there will not be' etc.

ἡλξε κτλ. Cf. (with J. and C.) Laws 879 ε ἡλίξε δὲ ἴλικα—ἀμύνεσθω κατὰ φόνον ἄνω βελωνί φύλας ταῖς χεραῖ. It should be remembered that in cases of aikeia the guilty party was the one δὲ ἂν
καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον που φήσομεν, ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελείαν
τιθέντες. 'Ορθώς, ἐφι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον ἕξει, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, οὔτος ὁ νόμος· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῷ θυμῷ, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πληρῶν τὸν
θυμὸν ἤττον ἐπὶ μείζον ἃν ὦ στύσεις, Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πρεσβυ-
τέρῳ μὴν νεατρῶν πάντων ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ κοιλάδεις προστατέξαι. 
Δῆλον. Καὶ μήν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον, ἂν μὴ ἄρχοντες 5
προστατάσσων, οὔτε ἄλλο βιασθεῖ τε ἐπιστευθεῖ ποτέ οὖτε τύπτειν,
ὡς το ἐκίς· οἴμαι δ' οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτίμασθε· ἰκανὸν γὰρ τῷ φύλακε
καλώντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἴδως μὲν ὡς ἑονέως μὴ ἀπτεθαί
εἰργοῦσα, δέος δὲ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν

33. ἐπιμελεία ἈΠ: ἐπιμελείαν ἈΣ: ἐπιμελείας q. 4. πάντων ἈΠ:


33 ἀνάγκη—τιθέντες = 'cura cor-
porum necessitatem imponentes,' 'compelling
them to keep themselves in condi-
tion.' Cf. Xen. Rep. Lec. 4. 6 ἀνάγκη
ὄ αιτοὺς εὐεξίας ἐπιμελείσθαι· καὶ γὰρ
πικτέοναι διὰ τὴν ἐρωτ., δύον ἐν εὐμβάλλων.
It is probably of Sparta that Plato is thinking. I have now reverted to the best
supported reading, although the use of τιθέντες as virtually equivalent to ἐπί-
τιθέντες is not free from difficulty. There is considerable MS authority
(including II) for ἀνάγκη, and as ἐπιμελείαν was read
by Λ1 (see cr. n.) and several other MSS,
I once conjectured <ἐν> ἀνάγκη σωμά-
των ἐπιμελείαν τιθέντες, taking ἐν ἀνάγκη
as meaning ἀναγκαίον; but this idiom
is very rare except with ἐρωτ., ἤν and
the like. Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 102) and Stall-
baum read ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας.
In 2 and two other MSS the text runs
ἀνάγκη (or ἀνάγκη) σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας
tiithentes. Does this mean 'requiring them
to guard against violence to the person'
(ἀνάγκη σωμάτων)? If Plato meant to
convey this meaning, it would be preferable
to read ἀνάγκη σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας
tiithentes (for which there is also better
MS authority), or possibly ἀνάγκη σωμάτων
ἐπιμελείας <ἀντι> τιθέντες, but ἀνάγκη
σωμάτων would be a fantastic expression,
though perhaps intelligible after μιαῖων
and αἰκείας. On the whole, I think the
reading printed above has most in its fav-
Patriarchal discipline is in perfect harmony
with Plato's conception of the State as a
single family.

5 καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε κτλ. An anaco-
 lonium, the construction being broken by
οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ κτλ.: see 1 352 n. and
infra 471 c. Here the apodosis would
have been δῆλον ἐν ἐρωτ. or the like: cf.
Stallbaum on Latos 677 B. Schneider and
others suppose that ὅτι ἐκίς is substi-
tuted ἀνακολουθοῦσα for ἐκίς ἐστι—
a tolerably common form of anacoluthon
in Plato and elsewhere (1 347 a n.): but
such an idiom is awkward here. It is
difficult again to supply δῆλον from
Glauco's answer, though the presence of
δῆλον may render the anacoluthon a trifle
easier; nor can a governing verb be elicited
from προστατέξαι. Others propose to
abolish the anacoluthon: Ast by reading
ὅ γε νεώτερος, Hartman by emending
προστατάσθαι <δῆλον> ἄλλου. Καὶ
μὴν κτλ. Neither alternative is satisf-
factory: and Hartman's is not even
Greek. It should be noted that Arist-
ophanes deals with the same subject in
Eccl. 638 ff. See App. I.

Ἀρχοντες. Stallbaum reads οἱ ἄρ-
 χοντες with q. "At variis sunt in civi-
tate magistraeus, neque semper eorumund
nendum omnium est, tale quid mandare
junioribus" (Schneider).

465 9 τὸ—βοηθεῖν. τὸ belongs
to δέος, "ut sensus idem sit, ac sì dictum
esse δέος δέ το τῆς τῶν ἄλλου βοηθείας τῷ
πάσχοντι. δέος εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν
quin recte dicatur, nemo ambiguigt; quidni
etiam το τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν δέος dicere
liceat?" (Schneider). Cf. οὐ παρά φύσιν
10 ὡς ἦν τός, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας. Ἐνυπάρισσε γὰρ ὀντός, ἐφι. Πανταχώ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἀνδρὲς ἄξονες; Πολλὴν γε. Τούτων μὲν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασια-ζόντων οὐδὲν δεινόν μὴ ποτὲ ἡ ἀλλή πάλις πρὸς τούτου ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διειστάτησι. Οὐ γὰρ ὦν. Τά γε μὴν συμκρότατε 15 τῶν κακῶν δι᾽ ἀπρεπεῖαν ὁκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, διὸν ἄπηλλαγμένου ἀλ ἐκεῖν, κολακείας τε πλούσιον πένιατε ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ὀσιάς ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηστικομοίῳ διὰ τροφήν οἰκετῶν ἄναγκαιαν ἵσχυοι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξαρνούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάνως πορισμένα, δέμενοι παρὰ γυναικὶς τε καὶ οἰκέταις,
20 ταμιεύει ταραδοῦντες, ὅσα τε, ὁ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οὐ πάσχουσιν, ἀδήλι τε ὅτι καὶ ἀγενή καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

14. διειστάτησιν ἈΣῃ: διειστάτησει ΑΠ.Ι.

τὴν τοῦ θηλείου πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν (465 b). Madvig's change of τὸ τοῦ has met with much favour, and is accepted even by J. and C. To my mind it destroys the balance of the two clauses, by dropping the personification of ἑσθο, while retaining that of αἰδὼς. For the sense cf. Ar. Eccl. 641—643 ἀλλ᾽ ὁ παρεστῶσ ἕκεν ἐπιτρέψει τότε ὅ αὐτοίς ἔκλεψ ὁδηγὲν τῶν ἀλληλῶν (sc. πατέρων) ὅστις τοῦτω νῦν ὧν πληγήνετο ἄκοψη, ἐκ τῶν ἀντίκειν (illum ipsum sc. suum ipsius parentem, as Blaydes explains) τόσο ἄπεις ὑπὲρ τοῦ διδήσει τοῦ ἄνδρον τοῦτο μάχεσθαι. Aristophanes' verses illustrate τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἄκεφα; the parallel could scarcely be closer. Cf. App. I.
13 ὁδηγὸν δεινῶν μη. This construction occurs only four times in the Platonic corpus: viz. in Ap. 28 a, Phaed. 84 b, Gorg. 520 b, and Erp. 7. 344 e (Weber in Schanz's Beiträge ii 2, p. 50).

465 c 16 κολακείας κτλ. πένιες has been variously explained as (1) for <αις ἐνοχὸν ἐν εἰς> πένιες or the like (Schneider), (2) in partitive apposition with the subject of ἀπηλλαγμένον ἐν εἰς (one of J. and C.'s alternatives), (3) nominative to ἵσχυοι (Shoney in A. J. Ph. XI p. 237). J. and C. also suggest that κολακείας is "genitive singular in the same case as ὡς." If so, we should read ἀληθῶς with q: but there is no room for doubt that κολακείας is the accusative plural. Of these interpretations (1) is too difficult, while (3) is hardly possible, unless πένιες is placed after ἵσχυοι, as was once proposed by Ast, who afterwards preferred to read ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἐν εἰς <πένιες>, and finally wished to excise the word altogether. (2) is, I think, defensible, if we remember the Greek partiality for this kind of construction (IV 431 a n.), and the occasional irregularities of Platonic style. See also on VIII 556 c, d. Jackson conjectures πένιες ('the poor man's flatteries of the rich'), Stallbaum πενιά in the sense of πενιάτων. I think πένιες is probably due to Plato: but if not, the word may be a gloss on κολακείας τε πλούσιον or on ἵσχυοι.

17 οἰκετῶν: note = oikeioi as the Scho- liast says, but domestici, 'those of the household' (οὶ κατὰ τὸν οἰκὸν πάντες Hesychius), including, of course, slaves. Where there is no oikia, as in Plato's city, there can be no oikēta. Plato's communism involves the abolition of domestic slavery as well as of family ties. See also on 460 b, c.
18 τα μὴ—παραδόντες: an interesting glimpse of the economic condition of the Athenian poor. Cf. Ar. Clouds 1172 ff. The agreement in tense makes it probable that παραδόμενοι, θέμενοι, and παραδόντες are grammatically coordinate; although the money must of course be procured before it is deposited. The asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. i 302 b n. Hartman would omit παρα- δόντες; but παραδόδαι takes an infinitive more easily than πιθεόται.
20 ὅσα τε κτλ.: 'and the various and
manifold troubles which men suffer in connexion with such matters, all of them obvious enough and ignoble, and not worth spending words upon. δεδομένη therefore has slight MS authority, but is only an absurd attempt to represent δι' ἀπέρεσσιν in c above. Still worse is the conjecture δοῦλα, which Herwerden approving.

465 D—466 D The life of our guardians will be more glorious than that of victors in the games. So far from being unhappy, they are the happiest of the citizens, and any attempt to aggravate themselves at the expense of their country will only make them miserable. We conclude that the best policy for a city is to make women share with men in everything, and such community is in harmony with the natural relations between the sexes.

465 D 23 ἀπαλλάξονται. I formerly adopted Cobet's conjecture ἀπηλλάξονται (N. L. p. 243), which is attractive in itself, and also because of its correspondence with ἀπηλλαγμένον ἀν ἐνεῳ in c. But even on the score of meaning the change can hardly be called a necessary one, and there is no MS authority for the form ἀπαλλάξονται either here or (so far as I can discover) elsewhere.

ολυμπιονικά κτλ. 'To him that overcometh' etc. Plato frequently borrows similitudes and phrases from the national games. Cf. vi 503 A, 504 A, 583 B ἡ, x 613 B, C, 621 D, and Phaedr. 256 B. Here he sings a sort of paean in honour of his more than Olympic conquerors. μίκη, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή (cf. Αρ. 36 B), ἀπαλλάξονται, γῆρα (such as προεστὴς Xenophanes Fr. 2, 7) and ταφῆς ἀξιᾶς μετέχονσιν are each of them significant points in the comparison.

25 ὃν—ὑπάρχει. The nominative of a relative pronoun is very rarely attracted into the genitive. Van Cleef (in attract. in enunt. rel. unu Plat. p. 42) cites only two other certain instances in Plato, viz. Theaet. 158 A and Ἀλ. 148 A. περὶ τῶν ὅτι γέγονε is found in an Attic inscription about the end of the fourth century B.C. (Meisterhans p. 238). In Phaed. 69 A the nominative passes into a dative: cf. also οἷς ἐξον in 466 A and Gorg. 492 B.

466 E. 29 ἱστοῦ τε. We should expect τε to follow γέρα, but cf. 452 A. Here, as there, one or two MSS (with Stobaeus Flor. 43. 102 ad fin.) omit τε. Hartman is suspicious of ταφῆς ἀξιᾶς μετέχονσιν, especially as καὶ μάλα—καλά refers to γέρα. καλά might conceivably be the marginal comment of an approving reader; but this kind of looseness is not uncommon in replies (cf. II 372 A, III 405 D, IV 436 E, 468 A, VI 500 B, VII 535 C, VIII 558 A, B, Gorg. 467 E and elsewhere, with Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms § 306), and the expression ταφῆς ἀξιᾶς μετέχονσιν is much too quiet and refined for the ordinary scribe.

31 οὕτω οἶδα ὃντον: said with a glance at Adimantus, who had been the spokesman of these views (IV 419 A ff.). Cf. the use of ταῖν in II 372 E.

466 A 1 ποιοίμεν—σκεφτοίμεθα. See cr. in. I agree with most of the recent editors in writing the optative.
πολιτών οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν; ἦμεις δὲ ποι εἰπομεν, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν, εἰ που παραπίπτοι, εἰσαύθυς σκεφώμεθα, νῦν δὲ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας φύλακας ποιοίμεν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οἷοι τ᾽ εἰμεν εὐθαμονεστάτην, 5 ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰς ἐν ἔθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τούτῳ εὐθαμον πλάττομεν; Μέμημαι, ἔφη. Τι οὖν; νῦν ὢμοι τὸν ἐπικούρων βίον, εἰπτε τοῦ γε τῶν ὀλυμπιονικῶν πολύ τε καλλίου καὶ ἀμείνων φαίνεται, μὴ πὴν κατὰ τῶν τοίνυν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον τῇ τῶν β ἄλλων δημουργῶν ἡ τῶν τῶν γεωργῶν; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

10 Ἀλλὰ μὲντοι, ὃς τε καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔλεγον, δίκαιον καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰπτεῖν, ὅτι εἰ οὔτως ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐθαμον ὡς γίνεται, ὅστε μηδὲ φύλαξ εἰναι, μηδ᾽ ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ βίος οὕτω μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ὡς ἦμεις φαιμέν ἁρίστος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόητος τε καὶ μετακινιὸς δόξα ἐμπεσοῦσα εὐθαμονίας πέρι ὁρμήσει αὐτὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ 15 ἁπάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκειοῦνθαι, γνῶσεται τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὅτι ζ τῷ ὄντι ἡν σοφὸς λέγων πλέον εἰναι ποι ἢμιν παντὸς. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ἔφη, ἐμβαυλὼ χρῶμενοι μενεὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ βίον. Συγχροιεις ἄρα, ἴν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τόις ἀνδράσιν, ἦν

3. σκεφώμεθα νῦν σκεφώμεθα ΑΠΕΖ. 4. ποιοὶμεν ΙΙ ποιοίμεν Α.

σκεφώμεθα is perhaps defensible, for we may regard τοῦτο μὲν—σκεφώμεθα as oratio recta; but ποιομεν would be very awkward, if not positively wrong, in view of the optative ὃς οἷοι τ᾽ εἰμεν. It is noticeable that Plato did not expressly promise to examine this point; although the solution is already hinted at in IV 420 B.

ὅς ἐγών. Hirschig would write οί for οῖ, but see 465 B n. The same attraction is found in other authors besides Plato; see Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 p. 925.

6 ἑπικούρων has now a more exalted sense than formerly (see 463 B, 464 B n.), and includes the Rulers. Aristotle perversely misrepresents Plato’s position in regard to the happiness of the guardians when he remarks ἡτὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐθαμονίαν ἀφαιρομένος τῶν φυλάκων, δὴν φημὶ δὲν εὐθαμονία ποιεῖν τὴν κόλον τῶν μονοβέτησιν (Pol. B 5, 1364b 15 ff.); see Susemihl ad loc.

466 Β 10 ἐκεί. IV 420 ff.

14 διὰ δύναμιν: 'because he has the power,' "weil er kann" (Schneider). The possession of the power to do wrong is itself a temptation, according to Plato: cf. Gorg. 525 D οὔτω (tyrants etc.) γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξοσιαί σύμεστας καὶ ἀποσιαί τοῦτο πορφυράματα πορφυράνουσιν, καὶ ι. 526 Α. Whibley points out that in the language of Greek politics and political science δύναμις was often used in a quasi-technical sense, denoting ‘power due to wealth, connexions,’ etc. (Cf. Olig. p. 125 n. 7), but it can hardly have such a meaning here. Madvig conjectures, absurdly enough, διάκοσμον. 466 C 15 Ἡσίοδον. OD. 40. 17 μενε ἐπὶ: 'will remain true to,' as in VI 496 B.

συγχροιεις is followed first by the accusative κοινωνίαν and afterwards by the accusative with infinitive κατὰ τα πόλει—ἀβίν (J. and C.). As desired to cancel καὶ before παῖδων, and is commented for this by Hartman, who remarks "quasi unquam παῖδες gigni possint sine mulleris et viri κοινωνία!" "Nodum in scirpo," as Schneider caustically observes. Plato is speaking of κοινωνία περὶ παῖδων not between one woman and one man, but between several women and several men (τῶν γυναικῶν τόσο ἀνδράσι). The children are common to all the guardians of either sex.
467 B]

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Ε

315

διελήθυμαν, παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ παίδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, κατὰ τε πόλιν μενούσας εἰς πόλεμόν τε ίνούσας 20

καὶ ξυμφώλατεν δεῖν καὶ ξυνθηρείν ὡσπερ κύνας καὶ πάντα πάντη κατά τὸ δυνατὸν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταύτα πραττούσας τὰ τε βέλτιστα πράξεως καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θῆλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ἡ πεφύκατον πρὸς ἀλλήλων κοινωνεῖν; Ἡν γυμνωρός έφη.

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ εἴγοι, ἐκείνοι λοιπῶν διελέσθαι, εἰ ἁρὰ καὶ 25 ἐν ἀνθρώπων δυνατὸν, ὡσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄγοις, ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν ἐγγενεῖται, καὶ ὑπὶ δυνατῶν; "Εφθης, ἐφη, εἰσπον ἢ ἐμέλλουν

Ε ὑπολήψεσθαι. Περὶ μὲν ὑδῆμα τῶν ἐν τῷ πόλεμῳ ὁμιλεῖ, ἐφη, δηλοῦν τὸν τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν. Πῶς; ἢ δ’ ὡς. "Οτι οἰκίᾳ

στρατεύσουνται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ζὸ ὁσοῦ ἄδροι, ἢν ὡσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημομυργῶν θεότατα ταύτα,

d τελεωθείται δεησε δημομυργεῖν πρὸς δὲ τῇ θέα διακοινεῖν καὶ 467 | ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας

t καὶ μητέρας. ἢ οὐκ ἂσθησα τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ὀοὶ τῶν τῶν κεραμεῶν παίδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακοινοῦτες θεωροῦσι

πρίν ἄπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύσεως; Καὶ μίλα. "Η οὕν εἰκεῖνοι

ἐπιμελέστερον παιδευτέον ἢ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς αὐτῶν εἰμπειρία 5

t καὶ θέα τῶν προσηκόπτων; Καταγελαστὸν μὲν ἢν, ἐφη,

Β εὗρ. Ἄλλα μὴν καὶ μαχεῖταί γε πᾶν ζῶον διαφερόντων παρούτων

466 D 23 οὐ παρὰ φύσιν. Before
taking leave of the subject, Plato reiter-
ates the principle on which his com-
munism rests. "Equal companionship
in the work and interests of life is the
natural relation of the sexes, whereas it
is the existing relation which is unnatural"
(Bosanquet). Cf. 456 C n.

466 D—467 E We have still to deter-
mine whether such a state of society is
possible among men, as it is among the
lower animals. But first let us provide
for the management of war.

Our men and our women will take the
field in common, accompanied by such of
their offspring as are not too young. The
children will attend to their parents' wants
and encourage them by their presence on
the ground. They will thus have the
advantage of witnessing the actual exercise
of the profession which awaits them in
later life. The risk is considerable, but
the issues at stake require it to be run:
and we shall take every precaution to
ensure the children's safety.

466 D 26 ὡσπερ—ζώοις. Cf. 451 D.

28 περὶ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. = 'for as to
war' etc. is a dexterous way of making
room for the episode on war, and at the
same time postponing the 'great peri-
peteia, the on-rushing of the third wave,'
which "is made more impressive by being
delayed" (J. and C.). For μὲν γὰρ cf.
VIII 562 A n.

466 E 31 ὡσπερ κτλ. Handicrafts
were usually hereditary among the Greeks:
cf. Prot. 328 A and Blümmer Privatat.
Pr. 395 m. diakoneō should be taken
with ἀξειωσι. The change of construction
is illustrated by Schneider (Addit. p. 41)
from Ἰών. 74 B ἐμπωγώσατο, ἐν α—παρέ-
χοι, τὴν δὲ σάρκα—ἐφοῦσα κτλ. Her-
werden inserts δὲ, and Richards διδά-
σκοται, after θέα, but the text is probably
sound.

467 Α 7 μαχεῖται—τεκη. Cf. Xen.
Cyr. IV 3. 2 and Tac. Germ. 7 quodque
praeceptum fortitudinis incitamentum est
—in proximo pigmenta, unde feminarum
ululatus audiri, unde vagitus infantium.
467 B 10. ἀναλαβεῖν = 'to recover.' This intransitive use of ἀναλαβέων is especially common in medical writers; see Stephanus-Hase LEX. s.v. It arises from the omission of the reflexive pronoun, which is a common way of making transitive verbs into intransitive: see on I. 336 a.

467 C 15. παιδας τοις ἄνδρας. Ξ with several other MSS reads τοὺς παιδας instead of παιδας. But παιδας is predicative, and goes with θεωρεῖν. "Socrates plurimum referre dicit, ut qui adulteri bellicosus futuri sint, iam puni re, bellicas spectent." (Schneider.) Hartman seriously weakens the contrast between παιδας and ἄνδρας by reading ἄνδρας <τοὺς> πολεμικοῖς.

16 διαφέρεται. We should at first sight expect <τοὺς> διαφέρει, and so Richards suggests. But (as Hartman points out) the introduction of οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου breaks the continuity between the original question and the reply. Hence, too, the reply has διαφέρει, not διαφέρειν (the reading of Ξ and a few other MSS, wrongly preferred by Hartman).

tοῦτο μὲν κτλ. ὑπαρχέων = δεὶ ὑπάρχειν (intransitive), not 'we must begin with,' as J. and C. suppose. Cf. εκτέων 468 A. τούτο (accusative: see on Η. 380 6) is explained by θεωρεῖν—ποιεῖν. With προσμυχαναῖσθαι, δει or the like is understood out of ὑπαρχεῖν: cf. Ἱσ. 492 D τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φησὶ οἱ κολαστεῖν—ἐσταὶ δὲ αὐτῶν ὡς μεγίστα πνήματα—ἐποιήματεν and Cris. 51 c. Richards needlessly proposes to read προσμυχανητέων or to insert "something like δεβήσει."
467 E 29 dixadzhèntas. Schneider reads dixadzhèntas, while preferring his own conjecture dixadzàmènoi. The future dixadzhèntas cannot be right: for the children would certainly be taught to ride, before going on such expeditions (J. and C.). It would be too hazardous in such a case év πίθω κεραμεύων. Against Schneider's conjecture it may be urged that the future perfect particle should not be used where the aorist particle is enough. dixadzhèntas is an obvious 'correction.' With dixadzhèntas the meaning is simply 'when they have taught them to ride.' The middle expresses personal interest; and does not imply that the étkíwou get them taught by others. See on this point IV 421 E n. It may be noted that in Sparta great importance was attached to learning the accomplishment of riding (Müller Doriáns 11 p. 316).

468 A—469 B Touching the citizens' duty to one another in the field, Socrates enumerates various means by which cowardice will be discouraged and bravery rewarded.

468 A 2 Τι δέ δή κτλ. This punctuation is better than to place the mark of interrogation after δή, and take τα περὶ τῶν πόλεμων as an internal accusative with πῶς ἐκέντρον κτλ., because τα περὶ τῶν πόλεμων is already practically involved in the word στρατιωτάτα. I agree with Hartman that Richards' proposal—τι δέ δή; εἴτεν τα περὶ τῶν πόλεμων, πῶς—polemos, ἀρα κτλ.;—is far from elegant.

4 ποιά. See cr. n. ποι' ἄν, which is generally read, surely cannot be right. Schneider remarks "ποι' ἄν breviter dictum accipio pro ποιά ἄν ὑπάν τα περὶ τῶν πόλεμων ὅρθως ἔχεις λέγεις," J. and C. are content with supplying εἰθα τά σοι καταφανήμενα. But ellipses of this kind are too severe a strain upon the imagination. ποιά δή is suggested by Richards, πὴ δή by Hartman: but is δή in place here? I think not. I take ποιά sc. έστι to refer to τα περὶ τῶν πόλεμων. Glauco addresses himself to the first of Socrates' questions: cf. 465 E n. and Soph. Trach. 421—423. The corruption is common enough: see Intro.  § 5.

αὐτῶν —'ipsorum' contrasts Plato's soldiers with their enemies (cf. πρὸς αὐτῶν τα καὶ τῶν πόλεμων just before). μὲν prepares us for the second part of this topic, beginning at 409 B. We certainly should not read μην (with Hartman). Plato's treatment of cowardice in battle may be compared with the punishment of τράσαντες in Sparta: see Gilbert. Oe. Const. Ant. E.T. p. 77. Cf. also Laws 943 D ff.

8 ολοκληρ. Van Leeuwen's emendation—see cr. n.—seems to me admirable. The contrast between ἀλώστα and ἐλώσα is precisely what is wanted: cf. Xen. Cyr. VII 5. 73 νύμφος γὰρ ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώπων ἀλώσα ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεμοῦντες πῶς ἄλλως, τῶν ἐλώσατοι είναι καὶ τά σώματα—καὶ τά χρήματα. With the infinitive van Leeuwen compares Laws 879 A παραδότω τῶν δοῦλων—χρήσαται δ' τι ἄν
The principle underlying Glauco's remark was widely accepted by Greek military authorities (see Hug on Symp. l.c. and Dugas l.c. pp. 90—104). The Theban Sacred Band, composed of ératiai and éphemerai, is the best-known instance of its actual occurrence in interstate affairs (Athen. xiii 561 f).

15 aíphēsis means selections by the rulers (so also Schneider): cf. 460 b, to which éphēsi δῆδη refers. J. and C.'s alternative rendering "success in winning such prizes" cannot stand: still less the translation of D. and V. "to exercise more than the usual liberty of choice in such matters."

τῶν τοιούτων: i.e. τῶν ἀγαθῶν. 468 D 23 "Ομήρος κτλ. II. 7. 321 f. νότοιον δ' Ἀλοντα διπρέπετο χέραμεν ἢρως Ἀτριδῆς. In Plato, Ἀλοντα is omitted by φ, and three other MSS: one MS places it before νότοιον, and four after ἠφη. The word may be a gloss; but as it is present in ΑΠΕΣ, in the same position as in Homer, it is safer to retain it. Plato often makes his Homeric quotations complete, even at the cost of a little awkwardness: cf. 11 363 b. Aristophanes, it may be noted, has the converse of Plato's proposal in Ἐκλ. 680.
to polemei nombrein Lianta eph diynnekeessi theiraesbhai, 
ws taution oikeiav oousai timi tao nthanti te kai andrews, ehoi 25 
ima to toimadhai kai tnu ischn auwhezei. Oorotata, ephi. 
Peiosimbaara, hy de egy, taute gae Oimhro. kai gar hemeis en 
theousiais kai tois toioutois pasi tois agadous, kadoise sou an 
agadoi faivontai, kai umnoi kai ois vini dh elag感情 tiemosmene. 
E pros de toiaus eidei te kai krea siin idei pleiosi depa-30 
esiav, {na ima to timat anwkomene tois agadous andras te kai 
gyanaikes. Keplwota, ephi, lengeis. Eleni twn de de aposthainontou 
eti stratetias de an evdokimisa telewths, aor ou prwto toin mewn 
physosmen tou chrusou geinou evnai; Plantwv yge malista. Alar 
oi peiosimba "Hsiodo, epedvnav tines to toiuouton geinou telewth-35 
soseen, ois ara

469 | oi men daimones anhnoi epixhnoi telthousin, 
esbloi, alexiakaioi, filakes meropwv anthetaotev; 
Peiosimba mev oyon. Diapthomevnoi ara tov theou, tov chor tov 
daiovounis te kai theous tinean kai tin diaphoro, outw kai taute 
thetaume n an exechyetai; Ti de ou mellemone; 
Kai toin loipon 5 
dh chrontov, ois daiovoun, ouw therapewswmen te kai proskunvstesmen 
B antwv tas sthikes; taute de tauta vnomizev, ouw tis gyna n

33. stratetes II: stratia A. 
proskunstesmen A'II; proskunstesmen A'.

6. therapeusomen II: therapeusomen A.
7. taute v: tauta A'IE'.

27 γε reminds us that Homer is not in 
other respects a persona grata in our 
city.

468 E 30 ieraias kta. ephi the kre- 
sin te idei pleioi deпасseion in II. VIII 
162 al.

33 stratetias: not of course stratetias 
(Herwerden), for stratetia is 'army,' 
stratetia 'campaign.'

34 tou chrusou geinous. III 415 A. Cf. 
Heracle. Fr. 102 ed. Bywater araphatos 
thei tlmoun kai adthwosu.

35 tou toioutou geinous. Plato com- 
pares his 'golden citizens' with the 
heroes of the Hesiodic golden age. He 
would fain surround them with some of 
the romantic and religious sentiment that 
clung around the golden age of Greek 
poetry and legend.

469 A I oi men anadropwton. Cf. 
Crat. 397 E. The nearest approach to 
these lines in our Hesiod is to be found 
in OD. 122 f. tov men—the departed 
children of the golden age—daimones eiws 
Dios megalon dia boulaia; esbalo, epik 
leitoun, filakes thngetos anadropwton. 
3. tou theou. Apollo, our patrios epx 
yyouth: see IV 427 B n.

4. tiveia: 'to bury.' 
apirn diapofwe: 'with what distinction' 
("mit welcher Auszeichnung") 
Schneider). The occurrence of thek 
Diapofwos in Laws 947 B is no ground for 
reading <theke> tiv diapofwe here, as 
Richards bids us read.

6 ws daimoun—theikes is another 
1000 fl. kai tie doximai kelvenon | en 
baism tao | epe | "anta potu probov 
anob, | kow B | eti makhira daimwv. |
chaiv prwto, evo de dokei." toiai vun 
prokroinovi phainu, and other passages 
cited by Naegelesbach Nachhom. Theol. 

469 B—471 C We have also a duty 
to our enemies. No Greek city is to be
enslaved, and there must be no unseemly plundering of the dead. Armour captured in the field shall not be dedicated in temples, least of all such armour as we take from Greeks, unless the God shall otherwise decree. We forbid Greek territory to be ravaged, or Greek houses to be burnt. The entire Hellenic race are children of one family, and conflicts between its members should not be called war, but civil strife. Our natural enemy is the Barbarian, and if we plunder Greece, we do but ravage our nurse and mother. Remember that our city is a Greek city. She may chastise, but will not enslave, other Greek States. Glauco agrees: he thinks our citizens should treat the Barbarian as Greeks now treat their fellow-countrymen.

469 B ff. In this episode Plato discusses the principles which are to regulate the international policy of his city in her dealings both with Greeks and Barbarians. The Greeks themselves recognised certain unwritten laws or usages (νόμοι κοινοί τῆς Ἑλλάδος, νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων) in matters of this kind, and to these Plato frequently makes allusion throughout his argument: see on 469 E, 470 C at. Cf. Nägelsbach Nachh. Theol. pp. 300—307. The policy which Plato here prescribes for his ideal city was clearly intended by him to have a direct and immediate bearing on the circumstances of his own day; and this part of the Republic is in no small degree, as Jackson remarks, "a contribution to practical politics." See on 470 C. 12 Ἑλλάνων—Ἀλλη. Ἑλλάνων is the object, not, as is sometimes held, the subject, of ἀνδραποδίζεται. It rightly occupies the emphatic place, because the point is that Greek cities should not enslave Greeks—not one objects to their enslaving barbarians,—and not that Greeks (as opposed to barbarians) should not enslave Greek cities. Cf. the order in 471 A oδή ἀρὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδας Ἑλλάνων ὅτες κερδῶσαι. A further reason for taking this view is that Ἑλλάνων πόλεις points the allusion to Plato's city, which is a Ἑλλάνως πόλις (470 E), and therefore will not reduce Greeks to slavery. Finally, μηδὲ ἄλλη ἐπιτρέπεται κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τούτο εὖθεϊν, τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ γένους φείδεσθαι, ἐυλαβουμένους τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλείαν; C 15 Ὀλφ καὶ παντὶ, ἐφη, διαφέρει τὸ φείδεσθαι. Μηδὲ Ἑλλᾶνα ἀρὰ...
asserts that Plato expressly recognises slavery in his State. It is clear from the present section that Plato does not impugn the principle of slavery, so long as the slaves are of barbarian origin; but he nowhere says that his perfect city is actually to contain slaves, nor is it easy to see what there would be for them to do, unless they were employed to work under the farmers and artizans, or as personal attendants at the σωσία and the like. Slaves are present, of course, in the city of the Laws (776 c ff.).

18 σκυλεύειν — καλῶς ἔχει. Cf. Xen. Hell. II 4. 19 (quoted by J. and C.) καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ θλίβον, τοὺς δὲ χιτώνας οὐδενὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐκκύλευσαν. Such moderation was unusual.

469 D 25 ἀποταμένου is (as Schule points out in H. Jahrb. 1887 pp. 226 ff.) a reminiscence of Homer's ἀπὸ δ' ἐπάταθι θυμός (II. 16. 469 and elsewhere). Hence the poetic form, as in ἄχων ἀποτάμες εἰσὶν (Symh. 183 B from II. 11 71). The ordinary aorist in prose is ἐπήλθεν, as in II 365 A. Compare Phaed. 114 C f. and Eur. Fr. 176. 3—6 τίς γὰρ πετραῖον ἀκόμην ὕπατου δόσας ὡς διάφανα δῶσει τίς δ' ἀτμιῶσαν νέος, | εἰ μὲν αὐθανασίως τῶν παθημάτων; and Plut. Aρποθ. λ. 228 f.

469 E 27 αἱ — ἀποτέμεναι. Aristotle read βάλλοντος, and not βάλλωντος (see cr. n.), as appears from Rhet. III 4. 1406 b 33, where he refers to Plato's illustration as follows: καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνι, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς πεθευσάς σκυλεύσατε ιὸκκα τοῖς κυνηίδοις, ἀ τοὺς λύθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος σοι ἀπότεμεν. The present is more picturesque and true to nature: the dog worries the stones, while his tormentor amuses himself by throwing more. It is true that the simile is not quite accurate, because a 'flown antagonist' cannot continue to do mischief; but βάλλωντος, which is generally read, though not by Schneider, is also inexact, because you cannot attack a vanished foe. In either case, the analogy is near enough. Moreover the consensus of all the other MSS, coupled with Aristotle, outweighs the authority of A where lipography is possible. See Introd. § 5.

29 ἀναιρέσων. The laws of Greek warfare permitted ἀναιρέσων of the dead, unless the petitioning parties had forfeited their rights by robbing a temple or desecrating a shrine (Busolt Gr. Alterth. p. 55, where the authorities are cited).

31 οὖθε μὴ — Ἐλλήνων: as was usual in Greece: see for example Thuc. III
Plutarch however implies that the Spartans were an honourable exception to this rule (Apophtheg. Lac. 224 b). With Plato's sentiment cf. "acternum inimicitiarum monumentum Graios de Graii statuere non oportet" (Cic. de Inv. ii 70). Cicero is referring to an incident arising out of a war between Sparta and Thebes.

470 a 2 εὰν μή τι—λέγη. Apollo might not wish to surrender his rights, and Plato would do no violence to the patron god of his city (iv 427 b). It was usual to dedicate a tithe of the spoil to the gods (Xen. Hell. iii 3. 1).

3 τί δέ; κτλ. So Schneider punctuates. Stallbaum and others place the mark of interrogation after ἐμπρήσεως, comparing vii 515 b, 1 x 582 c (where however see my notes), and other examples: but the analogy of 469 b and 469 c, as well as the emphasis on γῆ, is in favour of Schneider's view. We may compare the use of the genitive instead of πεί with the genitive after verbs of speaking, asking about etc.; cf. 1 x 576 b and Jebb on Soph. 7/track. 169.

470 b 8 ὡστερ καὶ—δύο. Literally 'as these names, war and civil discord, are named two, so also they are two.' ὡμοίασται δύο is opposed to εἶναι δύο, which means δύο συνέοις εἶναι 'are,' 'express two realities,' as is further explained in ὡντα—διαφοράν. Instead of ταῦτα τὰ δύοματα, ταῦτα δύοματα—see cr. n.—is now usually read. With this reading, the sense would be 'as these things' (viz. War and Discord) 'are called by two names, so also they are in reality two,' ὡντα ἐπὶ κτλ. That is to say, ὡντα ἐπὶ would be said of things; but it is clearly intended to be said of names: cf. κέκληται ἐπὶ just below. Schneider noticed the difficulty, but thought the confusion between names and things excusable. It is surely a grave blemish in a passage which is written expressly to distinguish between the two. Richards would transpose and read ὡστερ καὶ—στάσις, ὡντα ἐπὶ δυοὶ τινῶν διαφοράς, ὡντω καὶ εἶναι δύο, or make ὡντα—διαφοράς follow δύοματα. This solution effects, at great cost, what is only after all a partial care.

10 δύοντα ἐπὶ κτλ. ἐπὶ governs διαφοράν, and δυοὶ τινῶν, which is neuter, depends on διαφοράν. The literal meaning is 'being applied to two kinds of disagreements, arising in two things.' The two things—continues Plato—are τὸ οἰκεῖον (ήγερνες), and τὸ ἀλλότριον (ὁδείεν). Disagreement—for διαφορά is substituted ἔχθρα—in τὸ οἰκεῖον is called στάσις, in τὸ ἀλλότριον, τίλεμος. ὡντα—διαφοράν is a marvellous example of Greek brevity, simplicity, and precision. Schneider, and J. and C., explain the words correctly; but D. and V. plunge everything into confusion by taking δυοὶ τινῶν with διαφοράν.
πολέμος. Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἐφθ., ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις. "Ορα δὴ καὶ εἰ
C τὸδὲ πρὸς τρόπου λέγο. φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ
αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενῆς, τὸ δὲ βαρβαρικὸ δινεῖ τοι καὶ 15
ἀλλότριον. Καλός γε, ἐφθ. "Ἑλλήνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάρους καὶ
βαρβάρους Ἑλληνεῖ πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολεμίως
φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμος τὴν εἴχραν ταύτην κλητέον. "Ἑλλήνας
dὲ "Ἑλληνον, ὅταν τοιοῦτο δρόσιν, φύσει μὲν φίλως εἶναι,
D νοσεῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῆν Ἑλλάδα καὶ στασάζειν, καὶ στάσιν 20
τὴν τοιαύτην εἴχραν κλητέον. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἐφθ., συγχωρῶ οὕτω
νομίζειν. Σκόπει δὴ, εἰπον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ νῦν ὀμολογομένῃ στάσει,
ὅταν ἂν τοιοῦτον γένηται, καὶ διαστῇ πῶς, ἐὰν ἐκάτεροι
ἐκατέρων τέμνωσιν ἄγροι καὶ οἰκίας ἑπιμπρῶσιν, ὡς ἀληθειώδης

470 C 14 φημὶ γὰρ κτλ.: a formal declaration of Plato's political faith in
the Panhellenic ideal, which Cimon—
Πανελλήνων πρόμας, as Cratinus calls him
(Archil. i ed. Meineke)—and Callisthenes (see Grote vii pp. 406—415) had striven
to realise in fact, and which Isocrates as well as Plato constantly proclaimed in
theory. See on I 336 a, and cf. Spengel
Isokrates u. Plato pp. 7 ff. and Isocrates
Panegyricus passim. The rallying points
of Plato's Panhellenism are two—internally,
the Delphic oracle (iv 427 B, c.445.),
and externally, hostility with Persia: cf.
Menex. 245 c ff. See also on πολέμους
φύσει below.
17 πολεμεῖν μαχομένους. Hirschig
and others transpose these words, on
slight ms authority, including a marginal
correction in A. But it is hard to see
why they should have become displaced.
By adopting the order in the text Plato
restricts μαχομένους to πολεμεῖν: other-
wise the participle would naturally go with
πολεμοῦντος φύσει too. The ms order also
lays more stress on the emphatic πολεμεῖν
than Hirschig's transposition would do.
Cf. (with Stallbaum) Ap. 18 b.
πολεμουῖν φύσει. The universal Greek
view: see e.g. Hdt. 1 4 ad fin., Eur.
Hec. 1199, Isocrates Paneg. 158 al., and
Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theat. pp. 304—
307. "We should bear in mind," says
Bosanquet, "that Greek civilisation was
to Plato much what white civilization is
to us." This is, in part at least, true;
but sentiments of chivalry and romance
were far more powerful factors in fostering
the ancestral feud with Persia than
any apprehensions for the safety of Greek
civilisation. The idea of a war against
Persia always stirred the pulse of Hellas
with a sense of continuity with the heroic
past; and it was more than a meaningless
ceremony when Agesilaus sacrificed at
Aulis, and Alexander visited Achilles'
tomb. See Grote ix p. 81 and xi pp.
395—397. None the less, in spite of his
emphatic expression of the old Greek
policy of splendid isolation, it is difficult
to overestimate the effect of Plato's writ-
ing, and especially, of the Republic,
in breaking down the barrier between Bar-
barian and Greek. See on 470 e.
20 νοσεῖν κτλ. Compare the melancholy
picture of the state of contemporary
Greece in Isocr. Paneg. 115—117. Hart-
man would cancel καὶ στασάζειν; but see
451 b n.
470 D 21 συγχωρῶ κτλ. 'I agree
to view the matter in this way.' ὡς ἄλλως
νομίζειν would be more pointed, but is
unnecessary. We are hardly justified in
making νομίζειν = 'to hold this language'
(with J. and C.): for φωνῆς νομίζειν,
φωνή νομίζειν and the like have some-
what different meaning. See Stephanus-
Hase Thes. s.v. νομίζειν.
21 δὴ—ὡς. ὡς can hardly be excl-
amatory, as J. and C. suppose. For
the anacoluthon cf. Hdt. III 71 ad fin.
late ὅπως ὃτι, ἡ ὑπερέτα ἡ νῦν ὡμηρον,
ὡς οὐκ ἄλλος φθαν ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἕται
and other examples cited in Kühner Gr.
Gr. II p. 886. τῆς—στάσει is not 'that
which we have acknowledged to be
sedition' (Jowett), but 'that which, as
things now are, is allowed to be sedition,'
25 τε δοκεῖ ἡ στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοσόφοις: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ ἐπόλμην τὴν τροφὴν οὐ καὶ μητέρα κείρειν; ἄλλα μέτρου ἐστίν τοὺς καρποὺς ᾠφιαρείσθαι τοῖς κρατοῦσι τῶν κρατοῦσιν, καὶ διανοοῦσθαι ὡς διαλλαγμασμένοι καὶ οὐκ οἱ πολέμισόντων. Πολὺ γὰρ, ἐφι, ἡμερωτέρων αὐτὴ ἡ διάνοια ἐκείνης. Τί δὲ δή; 30 ἐφιν. ἐν οὐ πόλιν οἰκίξεις, οὐχ Ἐλληνις ἔσται; Δεί γ’ αὐτήν, ἐπιί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἅγαθοί τε καὶ ἡμεροί ἔσονται; Σφόδρα γε. 'Αλλ’ οὐ φιλέλληνες; οὐδὲ οἰκίαν τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἡγήσονται, οὐδὲ κωννυνόσουσιν ὄντερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Οὐκοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλλάνας διαφορὰν ὁ οἰκεῖοι στάσις ἡγήσονται 471 καὶ οὐδὲ οἰνόμασον τὸν λόγον; Οὐ γὰρ. Καὶ ὡς διαλλαγμασμένοι ἢρα διδόσονται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Εὐμενός δ’ σωφρονισοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπ’ δουλείᾳ κολάζοντες οὐδ’ ἐπ’ ἀλεθρῷ, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες, οὐκ

33. οἱ Α Greece: om. A’Π’q.

viz. when one city is divided against itself (διαστὶ πόλει). Plato, it will be observed, does not deny that the abuses which he condemns occasionally happened in Greek civil strife: they certainly often did. He only asserts (and the admission is interesting and important) that the public conscience of Greece condemned them. The conduct of Athens in emergencies of this kind was sometimes honourable and patriotic; see for example Grote vii p. 318, viii pp. 69, 70.

26 τρόφον τε καὶ μητέρα. Cf. iii 414 E. Not patriotism only, but filial love, such as Virgil felt for Italy (Georg. ii 136—170), inspires these words.

μέτρου εἶναι: sc. δοκεῖ. Plato is still describing Greek public opinion.

470 E 28 διανοείσθαι κτλ. The converse of Bias’s maxim φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας (D. L. 1 87). ἐκείνης = ‘than the other,’ viz. the γνώμη which διανοεῖται ὡς οὐ διαλλαγμασμένοι καὶ οἱ πολεμίσοντων. In view of Arist. Rhet. ii 21. 139a 25, where an orator is recommended, if he wished to seem amiable, to say οὐ δε’ ὡς προφαίρειν, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας, ἄλλα μᾶλλον μείων ὡς φιλήσοντας, it is tempting on a first glance to regard ἐκείνης as the maxim of Bias itself: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. On Bias’ saying see Jebb’s Appendix on Soph. Δ αἰαξ 679 Β.

30 οὐχ Ἐλλην ἔσται; Plato speaks hopefully, as if his perfect city were but one Greek city among many—a living example to the brotherhood of Hellas. It may be admitted that the city of ii—iv has not a few claims to be called Hellenic. But the ‘third city’—that of the philosopher-king—is not Hellenic, nor even, in any proper sense, an earthly city at all: it is an ideal, an ensample in the heavens—ἐν οὐρανῷ παράδειγμα τῷ βουλευμένῳ ὄραν καὶ ὀρῶντι ἐναντίоν κατοικίζειν (ix 592 Β). The animating spirit of v 473 Β—vii is assuredly not Hellenic exclusiveness, but the enthusiasm of humanity, if by ‘humanity’ we understand (with Plato) the divine element in man, in virtue of which we are most distinctively and truly human. See on vi 501 Β, vi 589 Β. In a certain sense it is even true that Platonism is the ‘strongest protest ever raised against pre-Christian hellenism’ (Krohn Pl. St. p. 33). But Plato’s is no barren protest; for his city foreshadows the future while it passes judgment on the past. Cf. vi 499 c n. and ix 593 Β n., with Zeller4 ii 1. pp. 931—923 and the same author’s article on Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit in his Vorträge u. Abhandlungen i pp. 68—88.

471 A 2 οὐδὲ οἰνόμασον: much less consider it so.

3 σωφρονισοῦν. The word σωφρο-

νίζω (‘make σωφρονεῖν, i.e. ‘chastise’) implies the remedial view of punishment: see on ii 380 β.

4 οὐ πολέμιοι. A few inferior ms. read ὡς οὐ πολέμιοι, and ὡς appears also
πολέμιοι. Οὕτως, ἐφι. Οὔδ' ἀρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἑλλήνες ὄντες 5 κεροῦσιν, οὐδ' οἰκήσεις ἐμπρήσουσιν, οὔδ' ὀμολογήσουσιν ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει πάντας ἐξθροῦν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἀνδρὰς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ πάθαις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγους ἀεὶ ἐχθροὺς τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς διαφοράς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα πάντα οὕτε τὴν γῆν ἐθελήσουσιν κείρειν αὐτοῦ, ὡς φίλων τῶν πολλῶν, οὕτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπεις, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τοῦ τούτου ποιήσονται τὴν διαφοράν, μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ αἰτίοι ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγοῦντων δοῦναι δίκην. Ἐγὼ μέν, ἐφι, ὀμολογοῦσιν οὕτω δεῖ πρὸς τούς ἐναιτίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολιτὰς προσφέρεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τούς βαρβάρους ὑπὸ νῦν οἱ Ἑλληνες πρὸς 

C ἀλλήλους. Τιθῶμεν δὴ καὶ τούτου τὸν νόμον τοὺς φύλαξι, μὴ ἴτα 15 γῆν τέμενες μίτα οἰκίας ἐμπιμπράναι; Θῶμεν, ἐφι, καὶ ἔχειν γε καλὸς ταύτα τε καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν.]

XVII. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖσ, ὡς Σωκράτες, εὰν τὶς σοι τὰ τοιαύτα ἐπιτρέπῃ λέγειν, οὐδὲποτε μνησθῆσεθα ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταύτα εἰρήκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὐτὴ ἡ πολιτεία 20

20. αὐτή II et in mg. A²; om. Α¹.

in the margin of A. Campbell suggests <καὶ> οὐ πολέμω, Förster <ὡς> σωφρονισταί; but neither suggestion is nearly so expressive and good as the reading of the best MSS.

7 αὐτοῖς. The ambiguity in αὐτοῖς can mislead nobody, and αὐτοῖς (Hartman, with A etc.) would be very unpleasing. In such cases the authority of Plato's MSS is nought. The behaviour of Athens in connexion with the Mitylenean revolt is a conspicuous example of the inhumanity which Plato here condemns: see Thuc. III 36 ff.

471 B 12 ἀλγοῦντων. "Significatur necessitas innocentius quoddam damnum inferendi, quo nocentes punire et ad pacem adigerem cogantur." Schneider.

13 τοὺς ἐυαιτοῦν. "Graecos adversarios vocat, non hostes" Stallbaum. ἐστιν 'Ἑλλήνας for 'ἐυαιτοῦν—an obvious 'interpretamentum.'

14 πρὸς δὲ—ἀλλήλους. A bitter commentary on the foreign policy of Greek cities. The 'natural' relations between Greece and Barbary had been reversed: not only did Greeks treat Greeks as enemies, but they had begun to treat barbarians as friends. Christ (Pl. Stud. pp. 37—39) supposes that Plato wrote this passage in 374, when Plataea was destroyed by Thebes, and the surviving inhabitants fled to Athens ( Xen. Hell. VI 3. 1, Isocr. Plat. 1 ff.). The same view is held by Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc. p. 662. Plato's rebuke would have been equally or even more telling in 386, when Greece was exhausted by the Corinthian war, and friendship with the 'natural enemy' had forced the peace of Antalcidas upon the Greeks, to the bitter grief and shame of patriots: cf. Isocr. Paneg. 130, 121. In any case νῦν should no doubt be referred to the time when Plato wrote these words, and not to the date of action of the dialogue. See also Introd. § 4.

471 C—472 B Glauce recalls Socrates to the task, already twice postponed, of demonstrating that such a State is possible.

471 C Here begins the transition to the 'third' or philosophic city. See on 449 A.

20 ὡς δυνατῇ. In a certain sense, this has already been proved, for the city is κατὰ φύσιν: cf. 456 C, 466 D. We have, however, still to shew that the harmony with nature can be attained, and this is what Plato proceeds to do.
...
the effect of 'Justice and Injustice upon happiness in human life. Our object was not to prove that perfect justice is attainable, and therefore we are not obliged to show that our city can be realised.

472 B 12 allya ti touto; See cr. n. ye after touto is certainly wrong. It has no ms authority except that of A2, and (as Stallbaum shews) allα ti touto is the regular form of this phrase in Plato: cf. Gorg. 497 e, Charm. 164 α. In both these cases the reply is Oδέη, followed by allya, as here.

472 C 16 paradesigma ktl. paradesigma is not here an 'illustration,' but a ‘model’ or ‘standard’ ("Musterbild") Schneider exactly as in IX 592 B and Thetet. 176 E.

17 avto — dikaiosynē: ‘justice by itself’: see II 363 a n. Here however the expression means ‘abstract justice’ rather than merely 'justice apart from its consequences.' It is not yet a metaphysical 'Idea' in the sense of VI and VII: see on III 402 c, and cf. Pfeiderer zur Lösung etc. p. 19 with Susemihl Gen. Entw. II pp. 176 f.

cαι andra ktl.: ‘and the man who is perfectly just if he should come into existence, and what his character would be if he did.’ ei ἱένῳ must be understood as a kind of protasis to tôn teléos dikaiow (i.e. tôn teléos ὡστά or ὡστά dikaiow). Schneider's explanation is less simple: "virum perfecte iustum quaesituri ea conditione rem susceperant, si fieri et existere talis posset." We must beware of translating 'num existeret' (Stallbaum): for it is just in order to shew the irrelevancy of the question, 'Can such a man exist?' that Plato wrote this sentence. Mädvig omits και before ὡστά. In that case ei τένοιρα goes with the following clause (cf. IV 419 a n.), and the meaning is: 'if he should come into existence, what his character would be when he did.' By this means we obtain an exact parallel between dikaiosynēn ὡστά and ἀνδρα—ὡσι—ἂν ei. It must be admitted, I think, that the emendation is an improvement: but the ms reading may stand. Campbell needlessly questions ei τένοιρα, thinking it a gloss on γενόμενου. The pleonasm is characteristic: cf. 471 c ei τένοιρα, πάντα ἄν ei ἀγαθά τένοιρα. 18 καὶ διδίκαια ἄν κτλ. See IV 420 c n.

19 ἦν—ἐξει. Cf. VIII 544 a.

22 ekeioun. See cr. n. ekeiwn, which Schneider alone retains, can hardly be defended. For the error see Introd. § 5.

472 D 23 touto μέν. On μέν without δὲ see 475 E n.
 Plato's view: 'Philosophers' must become kings or kings 'philosophers.' Till this shall come to pass, there will be no respite from trouble, either to cities or to mankind, nor will our hypothetical city ever become (so far as may be) a reality. A paradox, you say, and certain to arouse hostility and scorn; but let us explain what we mean by 'philosophers.'

With the breaking of the third and greatest wave (473 C. n.) begins the transition to the third and final stage of Plato's ideal city. See on 449 A.

Superlativus facultatem, quam relativam dicunt, indicat" Schneider. It is important to observe that Plato does not expect a perfect realisation even when philosophers become kings: cf. 473 E. Why he does not, is explained in 473 A. πάλα refers to 472 C.

Kāv el μῆτω δοκεῖ shews that Plato is contradicting a common view: cf. 1x 577 D. Most men would of course admit that a perfect scheme must usually be modified if it is to be put in force. But they would not allow that λέξις has more truth than πρᾶξις; for the truth of a theory—they would say—is best tested by experience. Not so Plato, according to whom the world of Mind is not only more perfect, but truer than the world of Matter: cf. ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής 5102 D and note ad loc. The pointed ἄλλα σο invites the assent of Glauco as a Platonist: cf. infra 475 E.
5 deōn kτλ. deōn is tautological after ἀνάγκαζε, but the addition of τοῦτο μὲν makes it easier. II has deō, perhaps a mistake for δῆ, which was read by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 109. For γεγραμεν Bywater (7. Ph. x. p. 73) would write γεγραμεν' ἵνα οἵν τοις ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται, ἵνα οὗ ὅτως οἴκονται, καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικρότατον μεταβάλντος ἔθαλοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις, μᾶλιστα μὲν εὖν, εἰ δὲ μὴν, δοῦν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τὸ ὁλιγόστον τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ σμικρότατον τὴν δύναμιν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 'Ενὸς μὲν 15 τοῖνοι, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, μεταβάλντος δοκοῦμεν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέτον ἄν, οὐ μέντοι σμικρὸν γε οὐδὲ βαδίον, δυνατὸν δὲ. Τίνος; ἐφη. 'Επ' αὐτὸ δῆ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, εἶμι, ὅ τὸ μεγαίτιον προσηκάζομεν κύματι, εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτε τε ἀτεχνὸς

16. μεταβάλντος Α' Π: μεταβάλντος σοτ. Α'.
18. προσηκάζομεν ιν: προεικάζομεν Α'; περεικάζομεν Σ.
19. ἀτεχνὸς Α'; ἀτέχνω σοτ. Α'.

5 deēn ktl. deēn is tautological after ἀνάγκαζε, but the addition of τοῦτο μὲν makes it easier. II has deē, perhaps a mistake for δῆ, which was read by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 109. For γεγραμεν Bywater (7. Ph. x. p. 73) would write γεγραμεν' ἵνα or ἰν τοις ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται. 'Do not compel me to shew what we described in words is in all respects reproduced by experience.' See also on ἐπιτάσσεις below.

6 φαναί: infinitive for imperative as in in VI 508 B, 509 B, all of them examples of φαναί, although Plato is not averse to φάθι (VI 508 E) and ἐκμαθαί (VII 523 A). The imperative infinitive is very common in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans 8 p. 244).

7 ἐπιτάσσεις: sc. γέγραμεν. It is hardly possible to understand ἐξερέων ὡς δυνάτα ταῦτα γέγραμαι (with J. and C.). As in γεγραμεν above, so also here Socrates represents Glauco as requiring that the city should be made into a reality: cf. ἵνα οὗ τοίνυν οἴκετε in 470 B.


473 C 18 επ' αὐτῷ—εἰμι: 'well, said I, I will enter on the very topic which' etc. Cf. Thuc. 11 36. 4 εἰμι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῶνδε ἐπαίνων. I have returned to the most authoritative reading, though previously I read (with Richards) ἐπ' αὐτῷ δῆ—εἰμι. In point of sense, εἰμι is only a sort of quasi-future, and should be compared with ἀλλ' εἰμι in the mouth of characters just about to leave the stage (e.g. Soph. Trach. 86). Cf. also Phaed. 100 Μ ἐρχομαι—ἐπιχειρῶσι—καὶ εἰμι πάλιν επ' ἐκείνω—καὶ ἀρχομαι κτλ. According to Kühner-Blass (Gr. Gr. i 2, p. 217) the present use of εἰμι is found only in poetry and later prose; but ἀπαίνω in VII 531 C is a certain case, and so also in my opinion are ἐπαίνως and ἀπαίνως in Thuc. iv 61. 3, 8. It should also be remembered that Plato by no means abjures archaic and poetic forms and idioms: see I 330 B ι'ν. Vind. F reads ἐπ' αὐτῷ (i. q. αὐτῷ) δῆ εἰμι, and εἰμι was the reading of q'. ἐπ' αὐτῷ δῆ εἰμι is highly idiomatic and may be supported (with Richards) by VI 490 D, Pol. 274 B; but it is safer to follow the MSS, which are all but unanimous.

19 εἰ καὶ—κατακλύσειν: 'even al-
though it is likely—just like a wave with its cachieations—to swamp me with laughter and disgrace.' Hartman would insert <με> before μέλλει, but the object is easily supplied; and με before μέλλει is very cacophonous. For other views of this passage see App. VI.

21 έαν μή κτλ. Cf. Latus 709 ff. Plato's famous and often quoted paradox is not in its essence so paradoxical as it appears. The abiding truth of Plato's suggestion is "that somehow or other the best and deepest ideas about life and the world must be brought to bear on the conduct of social and political administration if any real progress is to take place in society" (Bosanquet). But it was a paradox in the Athenian democracy, or so at least Plato, like Socrates, thought: hence πολύ παρά δέεαι ήθησαται 473 E. See for example Prot. 319 A—323 A and Gorg. 514 A—519 D; and cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 93. Political evil is in Plato's view the result of a divorce between political power and knowledge of the good; it can only be cured by effecting their reconciliation. In the Politicus Plato's remedy is to make the philosopher (who is the true king) act through the statesman (305 ε. ff.: cf. Noble Die Staatlehrlehr Platui pp. 82, 88, whose interpretation is—wrongly, as I think—questioned by Zeller 4 11 i. p. 901 n. 5): but in the Republic the union between Thought and Action is complete, and the philosopher is himself a statesman. Whether even then he would be strong enough to found the perfect city of the Republic, depends upon the amount of resistance which he would be likely to encounter: see on VI 499 B and IX 577 A.

473 D 22 λεγόμενοι. Though called kings and potentates, they are so in nothing but the name: cf. 1 336 A n. True kingship belongs only to the scientific ruler: Enbild. 291 B ff. It is probable that Plato was already thinking throughout this passage of the hopes which he seems to have formed of the Syracusan dynasty; see Ἑρ. vii and xiii with n. on VI 499 B.

23 τοῦτο κτλ.: 'unless this coalition of political power and philosophy come to pass,' lit. 'unless this coalescence,' i.e. unless there be this coalescence, viz. 'political power and philosophy.' For a somewhat similar idiom see VII 527 B n. δύναμις—φιλοσοφία is in explanatory apposition to the whole phrase τοῦτο—εὐμερήσῃ, rather than to τοῦτο alone. Otherwise we must suppose that τοῦτο is virtually for τοῦτα, the singular number emphasizing by anticipation the union of political power and philosophy (so J. and C.). But on this explanation the singular τοῦτο goes ill with εἰ ταύτων εὐμερήσῃ, and with εἰκάτερον; nor are we justified in writing τοῦτα (with Richards). The dual τοῦτω might easily have been corrupted into τοῦτο, but τοῦτω εὐμερήσῃ is hardly defensible, in spite of ei &ai τοῦτω διὶ τῶν βίων (Gorg. 500 D): cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 57.

χ 24 τῶν δὲ νῦν κτλ.: 'while the numerous names who at present pursue either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarr'd,' sc. from exclusively pursuing either. The genitive τῶν—πολεομένων is not partitive (Schneider, Stallbaum, and others), but rather possessive, and depends on φόνεος. Had Plato meant to say 'most of those who pursue' he would have written οἱ πολλοί instead of αἱ πολλαί φόνεος, as Hartman points out. There is moreover no reason to suppose that Plato wishes to allow any exceptions whatever to his rule. Nor is πολλαὶ 'volgares' (Baiter), or 'commoner' (Jowett), but simply 'numerous,' 'plenteous': cf. the usage of ὁ πολὺς in ii 376 e ἡ τοῦ πολύ τοῦ πολύν χρόνου γερμήνης (παύεισι) and τὸν πολὺν λέον 458 D. Exclusive devotion either to politics or philosophia was common, but by no means universal, as the examples of Pythagoras, Solon, and many others sufficiently attest: see Arist. Ῥhet. 11 23. 1399 ᾧ 16—19. Various emendations have been proposed for πολλαί, such as χωκαί (Adnig), τωμαῖοι (Lichfeld), and πολλακαί (Apelt), but the above explanation removes the difficulty. As regards the sentiment, it
should be noted that Plato refuses to sanction the exclusive pursuit of knowledge as well as of politics. He holds "that a specialised study of merely abstract questions unfit a man for the true grasp of life and character which is the centre of real philosophy" (Bosanquet), and on this ground he would probably have condemned the one-sided enthusiasm which many persons now profess for what is usually called by them 'research.' Cf. vi 497 A n. and 499 b.

31. ἄλλα γ᾽: ἄλλα ΑΠΕ. 2. ἐργασομένους ΑΣΕθ: ἐργασαμένους ΑΠθ.

Thead. 172 d—175 b. The attitude of Isocrates and his adherents would also be hostile and contemptuous (Dümmler Chron. Beiträge pp. 43—45). Glauco clearly anticipates a combined assault from different quarters.

νῦν οὕτως: "jetzt ohne weiteres" (Schneider). οὕτως is used as in ἐξαιρέσις οὕτως and the like: cf. II 377 b n.

34. διατατμένος: Here and in VI 501 c Σ (with a few other MSS) reads διατατμένον, which is less appropriate: "nulla enim tāsēs in turba tumultuantium" (Stallbaum). Cf. 462 c n.


3. τῷ ὄντι—δίκην: 'you will learn to your cost what flouting means.' τῷ ὄντι indicates that τωθαξάμενος is to be taken in the fullest sense of the word: cf. IX 579 D, I 343 c, VI 511 b mm. τωθάξεω always implies personal abuse, often of an indecent kind: see Cope's interesting account of the word in Aristotle's Rhetoric Vol. II pp. 49 f.
474 b 13 ἀμύνονται. The promise is fulfilled in vi 501—502 c.

474 c—480 a The philosopher, as analogy proves, is one who loves not a part of knowledge, but the whole. His passion is for Truth, and Truth means the Ideas. The Ideas are each of them One, but they appear many by union with particular things and one another. Lovers of sights and sounds and such like persons believe only in the many beautifuls; they cannot understand the One. Like dreamers, they mistake the copy for the original. Their condition of mind may be described as Opinion, that of the philosophers as Knowledge.

Let us proceed to prove this statement. The object of Knowledge 'is': that of Ignorance 'is not.' If therefore anything both 'is' and 'is not,' it must lie between Being and not-Being, and the faculty which cognizes it will be something between Knowledge and Ignorance.

'Powers' differ from one another according to the objects over which they preside, and the effects which they produce. The 'power' called Knowledge presides over Being, and produces the act of knowing. It is therefore different from the 'power' called Opinion, whose result is opinion. What then is the object over which Opinion presides? We have seen that it is not Being; neither is it not-Being. Therefore Opinion is different both from Knowledge and from Ignorance. It is, in fact, something between Knowledge and Ignorance, less luminous than the one, more luminous than the other. Its object will therefore be that which both 'is' and 'is not.'

Now it is just the many beautifuls etc. which both are and are not. There is not one of them which 'is' more than it 'is not' that which we say it is. We are therefore justified in saying that the many beautifuls etc. lie between Being and not-Being. Thus we have discovered the object of Opinion.

We conclude that those who have eyes for the many beautifuls etc., opine; while those who see the Beautiful itself, know. The former are lovers of Opinion, the latter lovers of Knowledge or philosophers.

474 d ff. The δευτέρα πόλις of Books ii—iv rested on a psychological basis and was the expression of a moral rather than of an intellectual ideal: see on ii 370 a and iv 443 b. In harmony with this conception Plato formerly used the word φιλοσοφός primarily and for the most part in its ethical sense (ii 376 b n.). Now that he is about to leave psychology for metaphysics, and describe the kingship of Knowledge, it becomes necessary to analyse again the meaning of φιλοσοφός. Henceforward, throughout Books vi and vii, the φιλοσοφός is one whose consuming passion is the love of Truth, that is, of the Ideas. See 480 a and vi 486 e n.

22 ἐνον: i.e. νοὶ ἐξω, 'remember,' not 'understand' (as D. and V.). Cf. Euthyphr. 2 b, Polit. 296 a. The illus-
tration which follows is all the more appropriate because the φιλοσόφος is himself an ἀραστής, in love with Truth: cf. vi 490 b.

23 πάντες οἱ ἐν ὃρᾳ κτλ. So in Charm. 154 b (cited by J. and C.) Socrates, an ἄνθρωπος (Συμφ. 177 d), confesses ἀρετήν γὰρ λευκή στάθμη εἰς πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς: σχεδὸν γάρ τι μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ ἥλιον καλοὶ φανονται.

26 ὁ μὲν, ὁ σιμώς κτλ. The point is that the ἄνθρωπος, loving πάντας τοὺς ἐν ὧρα, finds beauty even where there is none. He sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt. The passage has often been imitated, and may have suggested the well-known satirical outburst of Lucretius (iv 1160—1170).


474 E 29 λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας is in harmony with Latov 956 Λ χρώματα δὲ λευκὰ πρέπουν ἀν θεῶς εἶπ καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ. See also Dieterich Nekyia pp. 39 ff.

μεληχλάφωρος κτλ.: ‘and honey-pale darlings, with their name—do you suppose they are the creation of anybody but a fond and euphemistic lover, who readily excuses pallor, if appearing on the cheek of youth?’ Plato is ridiculing the idea, as well as the name, μεληχλάφωρ: there never was a μεληχλάφωρ except in the lover’s brain. The word is not, apparently, earlier than Plato, and does not occur again till Aristotle (Physig. 6. 813 b 19): Theocritus uses it hypocoristically of the silkworm (to. 27). It is difficult, if not impossible, to connect τοῦνα with μεληχλάφωρ, as is usually done, translating—‘and the name honey-pale, too,’ etc. Hartman proposes μελη-χλάφωρ, which is ungrammatical, Richards μεληχλάφωρ. μεληχλάφωρ (which the poet Gray had already conjectured) is harmless enough: but emendation is unnecessary if καὶ is ‘and.’ μεληχλάφωροι—see cr. n.—has less ms authority than μεληχλάφωροι, though supported by the Scholiast on vi 485 b, by μεληχλάφωρ in Aristotle and Theocritus (ll. cc.), and by the suitability of the word in the mouth of an ἀραστῆς ὑποκορίζομενος. μεληχλάφωρ was apparently read by Plutarch (de recta rat. audiendi 45 a) and other ancient authorities: see Schneider’s note.

475 A 3 ἐπ’ ἰμοῦ: ‘in my case,’ ‘taking me as your example’: cf. vii 524 ἐ νόστερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν and x 597 b.
5 at any rate taunt orbás, panta oinon épi páthis propháseos ἀσπαζόμενοις; Kai mala. Kai μην ϕιλοτίμοισιν γε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, καθορᾶς, ὅτι, ἂν μη στρατηγήσαι δύνωνται, τριτταρχοῦ&alpha;i, κἂν μη ὑπὸ μειζόνων καὶ σεμιοντέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σιμικρότερων καὶ B φαινότερων τιμόμενοι ἀγαπῶν, ὡς διὸς τιμῆς ἐπιθυμητάν ὄντες.

10 Κωμιδή μὲν οὖν. Τοῦτο δὴ φαθή ἡ μή: ἄρα δὲν ἀν τινος ἐπιθυμητικόν λέγομεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἰδοὺς τοῦτον ϕήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἡ τοῦ μὲν, του δὲ οὐ; Παιτώς, ἐφι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ϕιλόσοφον σοφίας ϕήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὔ τις μὲν, τις δ' οὖ, ἀλλὰ πάσης; Ἀληθῇ. Τὸν αὐτὸ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως τε ἡ 15 καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μὴπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστῶν καὶ μή, οὐ ϕήσομεν ϕιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ ϕιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὡσπερ τοῦ περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερή οὔτε πεινήν φαμέν οὔτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων, οὐδὲ διάλογόν ς ἀλλὰ κακόστιν εἶναι. Και ὁρθός γε ϕήσομεν. Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γένεσθαι καὶ ἀκμέως ἐπὶ 20 τὸ μανθάνειν ἦντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τούτον δ' ἐν διήκ ϕήσομεν ϕιλόσοφον. ἡ γὰρ; καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐφῆ, Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἀποτοῦ ἐσονταί σοι τοιούτοι. οἳ τε γὰρ ϕιλοθεάμονες πάντες δ' ἐμοιηγε δοκοῦν τῷ καταμαθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτο εἰναι, οἳ τε ϕιλήκουσι ἀποτοπωται τινες εἰσιν ὡς γ' ἐν ϕιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, οἳ 25 πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἐκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἑθέλοιν ἐλθεῖν, ὡσπερ δὲ ἀπομεισθωκότες τὰ ὅτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χρών περιέχειν τοὺς Διονύσιος, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε

7 tripttaraχοῦν. If they cannot become (not 'be' as J. and C.) στρατηγοῦ, they are glad to be τριτταρχοῦ. In time of war, a στρατηγός was commander in chief; next to him came the τεταρχοῦ, or ‘commanders of the 10 tâxes of hoplites corresponding to the 10 φιλαί’; under the τεταρχοῦ were the τριτταρχοῦ, who each commanded the hoplites of a single τριτός. There were in all 30 τριτῶν, 3 in each tribe. See Gilbert's Gk. Const. Ant. pp. 209 f. and Sandys on Arist. Pol. Ath. 61 §§ 1—3.


475 D 23 καταμαθάνειν. Apelt conjectures καλὰ μανθάνειν, but the text is free from objection.

τοιοῦτο εἶναι: i.e. ϕιλοθεάμονες εἶναι, not ϕιλόσοφοι εἶναι, as the English translators appear to suppose. Glauco has clearly indicated that he does not consider such men philosophers. But as it is the love of learning which produces them, they will have to be included, unless Socrates narrows his definition, as Glauco is in fact inviting him to do. σοφία in ϕιλόσοφο is presently defined so as to exclude sense-perception; hence 'lovers of sights and sounds' are not 'lovers of knowledge.' See also on ὁμοίους μὲν ϕιλόσοφοι in E.

25 πρὸς μὲν λόγους κτλ. Cf. Prot. 347 C, D with my note ad loc. ἐπακούσαι should be taken with ἀπομεισθωκότες.

27 οὔτε—κἀμας. Hartman would read πολίων for πόλεις, "verum non Atticis solis urbana et ruralia erant Dionysia."
29. μαθητικῶς Α¹: μαθηματικῶς ΑΠΩΩ et corr. Α².

(Schneider, quoting Laws 637 A, B). In Attica rural Dionysia were held during the month of Poseidon in many κώμαι, e.g. Eleusis, Phlya, etc. "Prizes were offered by the different demes, and companies seem to have been formed in Athens for the purpose of travelling about the country and taking part in these provincial competitions" (Halbj Att. Theatre pp. 42 ff. Cf. Mommsen Fest. d. Stadt Athen pp. 349—359).

475 ε 29 τῶν τῶν τεχνιδρῶν: sc. μαθητικῶς, or rather perhaps φίλους or the like, supplied from the termination of μαθητικῶς. Cf. φιλοτέχνους in 476 λ. Athenaeus (X 452 c) wrongly connects τοῖς with φιλοτέχνους.

30 ὁμοίως μὲν φιλοσόφους. μὲν without ἐστι common enough after ἀλλά, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative: cf. Prov. 344 A and Crit. 43 D. It is also found in other cases where the antithesis is easy to supply: cf. IV 431 A, V 472 D, and Heindorf on Theaet. 161 E. Such men resemble φιλόσοφον as the shadow resembles the substance; for the objects of sense, which they love, are shadows or copies of the objects of knowledge. The phrase receives its fullest interpretation from the simile of the Cave in Book vii.

33 οὐδαμῶς—τοιοῦδε. Cf. 473 A n. Socrates again appeals to Glauco as one Platonist to another. We are to infer that the Theory of Ideas was already familiar in the school of Plato.

35 δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι should not be translated 'that they are two things' (D. and V.), but simply 'that they are two.'
expression ‘Idea,’ although it is not a translation, but a transliteration, whose unfortunate identity with the English word ‘idea’ is responsible in no small measure for many imperfect and erroneous interpretations of Plato’s Ideal Theory. The German translators mostly render by ‘Begriff.’ The further specifications of the Ideal Theory in this passage are as follows. Each Idea is, in and by itself, one (476 a), changeless (479 a, 479 E), and perfect (vi 484 c, d), contrasting, in each of these respects, with the phenomena which ‘partake’ of or ‘imitate’ it (476 d n.). Plato does not now touch on the question how it is that Mind has knowledge of a perfection above and beyond what can be derived from observation and experience. This faculty of Mind is elsewhere—in the Meno and the Phaedo—explained by the pre-existence of the Soul. See on 476 c.

Krohn has pointed out (Pl. St. p. 96) that the examples of ἔδοι now cited by Plato are all of them attributes—δίκαιον, ἀθάνατον, καλόν, etc. It does not however follow from this that the theory of Ideas is still in process of formation: on the contrary, the appeal to Glauco just above (475 e) implies that it was already a recognised dogma of the Platonic school. The simple explanation is that Plato prefers to cite relevant examples. The ἔδοι of δίκαιον, ἀθάνατον, καλόν etc. are precisely those which it is the philosopher’s duty to introduce into the practical administration of the State: cf. vi 484 c and x 596 a n.

4 αὐτὸ μὲν κτλ.: ‘each is, in itself’ (i.e. viewed apart from its association with πράξεις etc.), ‘one, but by reason of their partnership with actions and bodies and one another, they each of them make their appearance everywhere and appear many.’ The eidos of Beautiful, for example, is, in itself, one, but by κοινωνία with e.g. an act of heroism, a sunset, a river, etc., it appears many. Similarly the eidos of Beautiful appears many by κοινωνία with other ἐδοι, as when we say ‘the Good is beautiful,’ the ‘ Useful is beautiful’ etc. The expression πανταχόν φανταζόμενα is better suited to describe Ideas allied with sensible particulars, than Ideas allied with Ideas; but statements involving the κοινωνία of Ideas with Ideas ‘make their appearance everywhere’ as well as those which connect the objects of sense with Ideas. In all such cases the statements themselves are of course true or false according as the κοινωνία is real or imaginary: but whether they are false or true, the appearance of plurality which they give to the Idea is always fallacious. Cf. Zeller II 11, p. 738 n. 3 and see on 479 d. The words ἀλλήλων κοινωνία are further discussed in App. VII.

8 πρακτικοῖς: ‘men of action.’ These were not mentioned in 475 d, but they clearly belong to the same category.

476 b 13 τὴν φύσιν. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 95) justly observes that the φύσις τοῦ καλοῦ of III 401 c is ‘the true beauty, which has an adequate external form, whereas that of Book v is the essence of Beauty, which is never fully expressed in any outward form.’ The contrast significantly marks the greater Idealism of Books v—vii. Cf. X 597 b n.
476 D] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ E 337

οὐν δὴ, ἔφη, οὔτως. Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἔπει αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἦναι ὁ τε καὶ ὅραν καθ’ αὐτὸ ἄρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἀν’ εἶεν; Καὶ μάλα. 15 ’Ο οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ καλὸς μὴτε νομίζων μήτε, ἂν τις ἡγηται ἐπὶ τὴν ὑγρῶς αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἐπεσθαί, ὅναρ ὡς ὑπ' ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι χῦν; σκόπει δὲ, τὸ ὀνειροττέεν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστιν, ἐὰν τε ἐν ὑπνω τις ἐὰν τ’ ἐγγραφοῖ τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ μὴ ὁμοῖον ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἡγηται εἶναι ὃ ἐπικεῖν; Ἐγὼ γούν ἂν, ἐὰν ὃς, 20 φαίην ὀνειροττέετο τὸν τοιοῦτον. Τί δὲ; ὁ τάναιτα, τούτου

476 C 16 καλὰ—πράγματα. πράγματα is a sufficiently general term to include all the φαινόμενα πολλά which are specified in 476 A. The persons in question may be willing to assert that a σῶμα, a πρόξεις, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀγαθόν etc. are καλά. But they refuse to go beyond isolated observations of this sort and admit that Beauty itself exists αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό μὲθ’ αὐτοῦ μονοείδες ἄει ὀν (Sympr. 211 b); and hence their notions of beauty are uncoordinated, inconsistent, unstable.

17 ἀν τις ἡγηται κτλ. Cf. Sympr. 210 A.

19 εἰς τε ἐν ὑπνῷ κτλ. It is the pre-existing of the soul which qualifies her by nature to distinguish between the Idea or Original, and the phenomenon or copy. But as we lost at birth our ante-natal knowledge of the Idea, we cannot distinguish between Ideas and phenomena until we recover that knowledge. To effect this recovery is the aim of education. The uneducated wander in a sort of dreamland, taking shadows for realities, the copy for the Original. Cf. Phaed. 74 A—76 D, Mem. 81 A ff., Sympr. 209 E—212 A.

476 D 23 μετέχουσα. Cf. Phaed. 100 D. The words by which Plato describes the relation of Ideas and particulars are of necessity figurative. κοινωνία is the vaguest, and least metaphorical; side by side with it comes παρωσία (of the Idea) and μεθέξεις (of the particular). A somewhat different figure is involved when the Idea is regarded as the Original (Urbild), and the particular as its likeness. Plato does not scruple to use both figures side by side: here, for example, the Idea was a παράδειγμα just above (αὐτὸ—ἐπικεῖν 476 C: cf. VI 500 E ff., X 506 B).

27 οὕτως. Dümmler (Antisthenica p. 42) supposes that Plato means Antisthenes. There was undoubtedly no love lost between the two philosophers: see the authorities cited in Urban Uber die Erwähnungen der Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schr. (Konigsberg 1882), and Zeller's H 1, p. 296 n. 2. Antisthenes was in particular a bitter opponent of the Theory of Ideas. The passage of arms between Plato and him is well known: ὁ Πλάτων, ἐπικον μὲν ὄρα, ἐπιτύπτη σε ὁχὺ ὄρα, καὶ ὃς ἔχει ἔχεις μὲν ὣς ἐπικον ὀρᾶται, τάδε τὸ ὄρα, ὦ δὲ ἐπιτύπτη τιθέονται, ὁδεῖον κέιτεραι (Simplicius in Schol. Arist. 66° 44 ed. Brandis, and other authorities quoted by Urban l.c. p. 3). It is no doubt true, as Stein observes in his Geschichte des Platonismus, that Plato’s “Kunst verallgemeinert nicht bloss das Historische, sondern individualisiert auch das Allgemeine”; but Antisthenes himself could scarcely deny that the cap fits. The deictic οὕτως is in favour of Dümmler’s view, which certainly adds point to the whole passage; note in particular χαλεπαίνη, παραμυθείσα, πείθεις ἡρέμα (allusions perhaps to the ferocity of his opponent: Antisthenes had nicknamed Plato Σάθων! cf. Ath. v 220 d), ὅς
... on the contrary, Antisthenes held that the objects of knowledge are, the kind of ovalia which he means is substantial, self-existent ovalia. If it is really Antisthenes for whom Glauco is answering (ὑπὲρ ἑκεῖνον ἀποκρινόμενον), the words πῶς—γνωσθεὶν are exceedingly well chosen; for Antisthenes (perhaps in his περὶ δόξης ἣ ἐπιστήμη, perhaps in Σάδων, ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀντλεγέναι) had argued in almost exactly the same way to prove the impossibility of contradiction. See *Iproclus in Crat.* 37 (Zeller* Π. 1 p. 302 n. 1) Αντιστηθένος ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντλεγέναι πᾶσα γὰρ, φησὶ, λόγος ἀληθευεί· δ' ἐγὼ λέγων τί λέγει: ὁ δ' ἐγὼ λέγων τὸν ψεπὸν λέγει: ὁ δὲ τὸν λέγων ἀληθευεί· καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀληθευεί· cf. *Plat. Crat.* 439 D. It is by no means improbable that Plato has this or some similar argument of Antisthenes in view, and feathers his arrows from his victim's wing. Antisthenes and his friends would not of course admit the comutation which Plato gives to ὁ, but Plato is not attempting to prove the Ideal theory. The object of the whole investigation is to shew that his opponents possess only δῶδα, on the assumption that the theory of Ideas is true: cf. 476 A 11.

Further investigation from other points of view cannot weaken the conviction which Socrates and Glaucos have already formed. The phrase is another indication that we are not here proving the Ideal Theory: see last note. *Hartman should not have revived *A's conjecture ἔχομεν <ἡ> καὶ Πλεοναχῆ σκοτώμεν. *
metαξ' δε κτλ., but the reading of q is intrinsically better, and the error an easier one. The reference in ἐν (‘is, as we saw’) is to 476 Ε—477 A.

477 B II κατ' αὐτὴν—αὐτῆς: ‘each of them in accordance just with its own peculiar power,’ i.e. in accordance with this, and nothing else. αὐτὴν is ἵνα in the sense of solam. Cf. 477 D, where it is shewn that δύναμις should be classified on this same principle: also 478 A ἐφ' ἐτέφρω ἀρα ἐτερν το δύναμιν ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκε. The reading κατ' τὴν αὐτὴν—see cr. n.—gives precisely the wrong sense. Schneider and others—perhaps rightly—omit αὐτὴν (with Vind. F), while Baier adopts Hermann’s ἄλλην—a very improbable correction. It is best, I think, to follow Schmidt, supposing that αὐτὴν was accidentally omitted, and afterwards wrongly replaced.

13 μᾶλλον δε κτλ. Socrates had somewhat awkwardly called δόξα a δύναμις, and at the same time spoken of it as possessing a δύναμις. The present sentence introduces a sort of πάρεργον in which the notion δύναμις is more accurately defined. We may infer that δύναμις in the sense of (the intellectual) ‘powers’ was unfamiliar at the time when this section was written. It was perhaps—like ποιτῆς for example—one of Plato’s experiments in language. ‘Faculties’ is, I think, too concrete to be a right translation.

477 D 28 αὐτὴν is difficult. It is not quite easy to understand the word as ἵνα, especially as it is so far from ἐπιστήμην. Had Plato written αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, or ἐπιστήμην—καὶ αὐτὴν there would have been little or no difficulty. As it is, if the text is right, we should probably (with Schneider and others) regard αὐτὴν as tautological: cf. IV 428 A n.
Should we perhaps read Δεύρω δὴ πάλιν, ἤν δ' ἐγὼ, ἢ ἄριστε, <ἐπὶ> ἐπιστήμην. πότερον κτλ.? The conjecture is not convincing, although it was at ἐπιστήμην that the digression began in 477 B. "If I were to make any change" says Jackson "I would put αὐτὴν before or after τίθης."

477 E 30 οἷσομεν. Θ with two Vienna mss reads θῆσομεν, which is also a correction in Cesenas M. θῆσομεν was likewise conjectured by Cobet. A precise parallel is hard to find; but φέρειν is used elsewhere of the operations of the mind (cf. 478 B), and θῆσομεν would not be likely to suffer corruption, especially as εἰς τί γενός τίθη occurs just before. 31 δόξα. Instead of δόξα O. Schneider (Vergleich ein. genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἐγνώκαν p. 131) would read δυνάμει, but δυνάμεια should of course be taken in its full etymological sense. 32 πῶς γὰρ ἄν—τίθησιν. The infallibility of knowledge is a cardinal principle with Plato: cf. Gorg. 454 B and Thaet. 153 C, 186 C ff. See Zeller, 111 p. 591. 478 A 4 δοξάζειν. See cr. n. The same conjecture had occurred to Jackson. δοξάζειν is in itself defensible and seems at first sight required by the balance of clauses ἐπιστήμη μὲν γε τοῦ—δόξα δὲ. But the introduction of φαμέν breaks the balance, and suggests a new departure. The real reason for writing δοξάζει is the occurrence of ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζει (sc. δόξα): in 478 B. Unless δοξάζει is read here, it is very difficult to supply the subject of δοξάζει there. Reading δοξάζει, again, we supply after ἡ ταύτων not δοξάζειν (as must be done if the infinitive is read), but δοξάζει. This too is an improvement, because it provides an exact balance to γινώσκει. If Plato had meant ἡ ταύτων δοξάζειν, we should expect him to have written not γινώσκει, but γινώσκει. On the corruption see Introd. § 5.

7 ἄμφοτεραι ἑστον. The union of a plural subject with a dual verb is tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. Enthyd. 278 E, 303 C. These and other examples are quoted in Roepel de dualis non Plat. p. 30. 478 B 10 ἄρ' οὖν—δοξάζει. J. and C. understand ὃ δοξάζων: but δόξα is more appropriate in itself, and much more easily supplied, especially if δοξάζει is read in 478 A: see note ad loc. 11 ἡ ἄδυνατον κτλ. Cf. Thetet. 189 B οὖν ἄρα οἶνῳ τε τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζειν, odre
better to regard the expression as a step in the argument, leading to the conclusion μεταξὺ ἃρα κτλ.

๔๗๘ D ๒๓ οἴον—δν. οἶον is adverbial; if it were an adjective the infinitive would follow. The qualification suggests that in the ultimate analysis it is inaccurate to say that phenomena 'both are and are not': the truth is that they lie somewhere between being and not being. Hence also οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι in ๔๗๗ A. See also on καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. in ๔๗๗ C. It should be noted that Plato now adds ἀμαίνα: in ๔๗๗ A it was absent. See on ๔๗๙ A τούτων γὰρ δὴ κτλ.

๔๗๙ A ἃ ἥχηστος. Antitheses is perhaps in Plato's mind (Dümmler Antith. p. 42). Others have thought of Isocrates, but with less reason. λεγεῖν μοι, φήσω, καὶ ἀποκριέσθω certainly sounds like a personal challenge. See also on ๔๗๖ D and ๔๘๐ A.
οί αυτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἵδεαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμιᾶν ἤγεται ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὡσαυτῶς ἐχοῦσαι, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῆ ἀνεχόμενος, ἂν τις ἐν τὸ καλὸν 5 φη εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ τἀλλα ὀὕτω. τούτων γὰρ δῆ, ὃ ἀρίστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μόν τι ἔστω, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαιῶν ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνύσιον; Ὁυκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἑφη, καὶ καλὰ πως αὐτὰ ἦν καὶ αἰσχρὰ Β φανήσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ ἑρωτᾶς. Τὶ δὲ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἦπτων τοῦ ἡμίσεα, ἡ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Ὁυδέν. Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τί μᾶλλον, ὃ ἀν φήσωμεν, τάυτα προσφηγήσεται, ἡ τάναντία; Ὁυκ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ, ἑφη, ἐκαστὸν ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται. Ποτέρον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν τούτο, ὃ ἂν τις φη αὐτὸ εἶναι; Τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιαί- 3. δὲ II: δὲ μὲν Α.

2 ἵδεαν τινὰ. ἵδεα has not yet been used in the Republic of the Idea; hence τινὰ. Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 64, 96) has pointed this out, but makes too much of it. In ἵδεα, as Cohen remarks (Platons Ideenlehre u. d. Mathematik p. 12), “das ἴδεν pulsiert”; cf. 475 E τοῦ τῆς ἀλήθειας—φιλοθεάμονας, VI 486 D and Symp. 211 D.

3. ἀεὶ—νομίζει. μὲν after ἀεὶ—see cr. n.—is retained by Schneider and others. It is however much harsher than the ordinary cases of μὲν without δὲ (see on 475 E), and the majority of MSS agree with II in omitting it. Madvig would delete the article before καλὰ; but its retention provides a better antithesis to ἂν τις ἐν τὸ καλὸν φη εἴναι. τὰ καλὰ is here the plural, not of καλὸν τι, but of τὸ καλὸν; and Plato means that the φιλοθεάμων has many standards of beauty: cf. 479 D mm.

4. ἐκεῖνος—καὶ. These words are certainly genuine, though omitted in Σ, and supposed by Hartman to be a marginal note on ὁ χρήστος. οὐδαμὴ ἀνεχόμενος by itself would be comparatively tame.

5. τούτων γὰρ δὴ κτλ. The many καλὰ ‘are' and ‘are not,' because they are beautiful and not-beautiful. We may infer, on the other hand, that the αὐτὸ καλὸς always 'is,' because (among other reasons) it is always beautiful. In other words, the essence of an Idea consists in its eternal unity and identity with itself. Cf. Symp. 211 A, where the αὐτὸ καλὸν is said to be ὁ τῇ μὲν καλὸν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρὸν, οὐδὲ τότε μὲν, τότε δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλὸν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλὸν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρὸν, ὃς τις μὲν ἐν καλῶν, τις δὲ αἰσχρῶν. This passage will explain what Plato means by saying that there is not one of the πολλὰ καλὰ which is not also αἰσχρῶν. Cf. also Bosanquet Companion pp. 213 f. Krohn (Pl. Fr. p. 73) argues that this passage is inconsistent with the Maxim of Contradiction as laid down in IV 436b. But Plato does not mean that τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ are αἰσχρὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν, nor should άμα in 478 D be interpreted in this sense. A particular καλὸν is ἰμᾶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, ὃς τις μὲν ἐν καλῶν, τις δὲ αἰσχρῶν. Cf. Zeller II 1, p. 627 n. 2.

479 β 9 τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια are πρὸς μὲν τὸ διπλάσιον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἡμίσεα, whereas the αὐτὸ διπλάσιον is always and in every relation διπλάσιον: see last note and VII 523 £ ff., Phaed. 102 b, c. The examples of διπλάσια, μεγαλά, βαρέα are examples and nothing more; the others, καλὰ, δίκαια, δεικτικά, are relevant in a wider sense, for the aim of the philosopher-king is to frame his καλλιτέλοις on the model of the αὐτὸ ἄγαθον. See on 476 A.

13 ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται: “utrisque adhaerescat” Stäffbaum.

14 τοῖς ἐν τοῖς κτλ. ἐναμφωτηρείζοντι is certainly neuter, as Schneider shews, and not masculine: cf. ταῦτα ἐναμφωτηρείζει. The word is very frequently used in agreement with neuter or inanimate subjects; see Stephanus-
C sesv, ἐφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἑοικει, καὶ τῶν παῖδων αἰνήγματι, 15 τοῦ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου, τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, καὶ ἐφ' ὡς αὐτῶν αὕτην αἰνίττονται Βαλείων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζει,
καὶ οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατῶν παρῴκειν νοῦσαι οὔτε ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. "Ἐχεις ὁν τούτοις, ἵνα ἐγώ, ὅ τι χρῄζει, ἢ ὅποι θήσεις καλλιώθεν τῆς μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ μη εἶναι; οὔτε γάρ που σκοτωδέτερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μάλλον ἔνει.

'Αληθέστατα, ἐφη. Ἡφίκηκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἑοικει, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν
17. ἐπαμφοτερίζει Βινδ. Ε et corr. q: ἐπαμφοτερίζειν ΑΠΕΞ."-

Hase Thees. s.v. The 'children's riddle' is (according to one of the two versions given by the Scholiast) ἄνδρι τις ἥταν ὃς ἄνδρι τε κοῦν ἄνδρι | ἄνδρα κοῦν ἄνδρα | ἄνθρωπος. This riddle was used as an exercise in logic among the Stoics (Dümmel Antisth. p. 43), but that is not a sufficient reason for supposing (with Dümmel) that they took it from Antisthenes.

479 c 16 τῆς βολῆς πέρι κτλ. The MSS apparently read περὶ: περὶ is due to Benedictus. Stephanus wishes to delete the second, Richards the first concession, as a mere child's riddle was not worth remembering or dwelling on: the children's riddle about the eunuch, don't you know, about hitting the bat, what it was the riddle says he struck it with, and on what it was sitting, ὃ and not ὃς (as Baiter supposed) is the reading of A.

17 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. ταῦτα is of course τὰ πολλά, as Jowett and others rightly explain. Campbell appears strangely to take it of the children's riddle. I agree with Ast that ἐπαμφοτερίζειν—see cr. n.—must be wrong. It is usual to supply ὥσκε, but this is very difficult, and the categoric affirmative is much more to the point. For the error see Introd. § 5. Hartman hastily pronounces ὃς' ἀμφότερα ὃςτε οὐδέτερον spurious on the ground that ἡ ἑρακτικά ὃς ὃςτε οὐδέτερον esse modo ὃτε εἶναι—νοῦσαι dictum est," and that "non verum est illas res non esse ἀμφότερα." The text is perfectly sound. Phenomena, says Glauco, cannot be 'fixedly conceived of' as either (a) being or (b) not being, nor yet as (c) neither of the two. The fourth alternative is to 'fix them in the mind' as (a) both being and not being. This too is impossible, although we may say that they 'both are and are not' (477 A, 478 B). The reason is that they are not, in the last analysis, 'both being and not being,' but something between the two, as Socrates presently points out. (See also on oLov in 478 D.) Phenomena cannot be fixedly conceived (παγὼς νοῦσαι) in any kind of way, because they have no fixity themselves. They are in a constant state of Heraclitean flux: cf. κυλωδεῖται, πλανῶντοι in D and (for παγώς) IV 434 D n.

479 D 23 τὰ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ.: "the multitude's multidimensional formulae" Bosanquet. The words refer to general rules, standards, canons, believed in by the multitude (cf. τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα VI 493 A), who have on every single subject many such standards (πολλὰ νόμιμαι), mutually inconsistent and uncoordinated, because they do not know that τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν etc. are each of them ὅτε. They say, for example, τὸ ἱδίον is καλὸν, τὸ συμφέρον is καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν is καλὸν, and so on. Such assertions give the appearance of plurality to τὸ καλὸν, by connecting it, not indeed with the objects of sense, but with other ἐνδο (cf. 476 A, 476 c nn.). The form in which Plato expresses his conclusion (τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλὸν περὶ and not simply τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ) prepares us for VI 484 C, where the whole purpose of this enquiry is disclosed. It is the business of the philosopher-king to bring order out of chaos by remodelling
the νόμιμα of the many in conformity with the Idea. He must not allow them to predicate κοινωνία of εἶθη unless the εἶθη really intercommunicate.

28 πολλὰ καλὰ. Is καλὰ the plural of 'the beautiful,' or of 'a beautiful'? This question is raised by Bosanquet, who answers it thus: "the sentence about formulæ leads me to interpret it in the former sense = 'many standards,' or cases accepted as standards, 'of beauty.'" Cf. 479 λ, where however we have πολλὰ τὰ καλὰ, and its antithesis ἐν τὸ καλὸν.

The expression πολλὰ καλὰ must, I think, be taken in its usual sense, as the plural of καλὸν τι; but it includes not only the objects of sense, but also νόμιμα περὶ καλῶν, which are themselves πολλὰ καλὰ, because they connect αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν with another eidos. See last note.

479 ε 32. αὐτὸ ἑκάστα: the generalised expression including αὐτὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ δίκαιον and all the Ideas. Cf. vi 507 β. n.

480 Α 2. ἑφαμέν. 476 β.

5 ἀρὰ—λέγωμεν; See Isocrates de Soph. 8 πλεῖον καταρθοῦντα τῶν τα'ς δόξας χρωμένων ἤ τῶν τὴν πρὸς τήμαν ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένων. To this (according to Teichmüller Lit. Fæd. 1 p. 103) Plato here replies, and the retort is supposed to be the more telling, because Isocrates, in spite of the sentence just quoted, aspired to the name φιλόσοφος: see Spengel Isocrates u. Platon pp. 13, 22 ff. Dümmler, on the other hand, supposes that Antisthenes is meant, as before (see on 476 δ). I can see no sufficient reason for holding that Plato is here thinking specially of either, although the cap fits both.

4 φιλόσοφοι. The connotation of φιλόσοφος has greatly altered or developed since Book 11; see II 376 β. n., and cf. Krohn Pl. St. pp. 9, 20, 102. Krohn is fully justified when he calls the concluding part of Book ν "the turning-point" of the Republic (ib. p. 107). Plato's hitherto 'Hellenic city' is now well on the road to become an 'ensample in the Heavens.'
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

I.


That there is some kind of connexion or interdependence between the Aristophanic and Platonic descriptions of a communistic ideal, is a theory which has been strenuously advocated by a succession of distinguished scholars from the middle of the 18th century to the present day. The author of the suggestion was apparently Bizet, who, as I learn from Tchorzewski (de Politia, Timaeo, Critia 1847 p. 150), appended to his argument of the Ecclesiazusae the note ὁ δ’ Ἀριστοφάνης διὰ τοῦτον τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἷς ἐχθρὸς ἦν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος περὶ πολιτείας βιβλία ψέχειν σκάπτειν καὶ κωμῳδεῖν δοκεῖ. An attempt to establish the connexion was made by Lebeau in 1760 (Tchorzewski l.c.), but the first to advance any serious arguments in its support was Morgenstern (de Plat. Rep./comment. prima 1794 pp. 74—78). In one form or another, the theory received the support of, among the older generation of scholars, Boeckh (de simulata Xen. et Plat. 1811 p. 26), Bergk (Comment. de rel. com. Attic. antiqu. 1838 pp. 81, 404 n.), Meineke (Hist. crit. com. Graec. 1839 pp. 287 ff.), and Tchorzewski (l.c.); see Susemihl Gen. Entwick. i11 pp. 296 ff., where the author mentions the most important writings on the subject down to 1857. The original theory has undergone some new and remarkable developments since the efflorescence of the chorizontic school of criticism, in whose hands the apparent connexion between the Ecclesiazusae and the Republic has formed a useful weapon for attacking the unity of Plato’s dialogue. Foremost of these critics is Krohn (Pl. St. 1876 pp. 72—83, and Pl. Frage 1878 pp. 36 ff.); among the others, we may refer in particular to Stein (de Ar. Eccles. arg. e quarto reip. Plat. lib. sumpto 1880), Teichmüller (Lit. Fehden i 1881 pp. 15 ff. and ii 1884 pp. 41 ff.), Bergk (Gr. Literaturgesch. 1887 iv pp. 85, 462 ff.), Usener (in Brandt’s zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelenheiten 1890 p. 6), and above all Chiappelli (in Riv. di Filologia etc. xi pp. 161—273 and xv pp. 343—352), to whom we owe what is in my opinion by far the most interesting and valuable discussion on the whole subject. A few distinguished writers still maintain that the philosopher and the comedian are probably independent of one another, notably Zeller (Phil. d. Griechen4 ii 1, p. 551 n. 2) and on the whole also Hirmer (Entst. u. Komp. d. Plat. Polit. pp. 655—660), but the balance of published opinion is in favour of recognising in
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some shape or other a historical connexion between the socialistic burlesque of Aristophanes and the serious communism of Plato.

In reviewing the available evidence, it will be convenient to consider, in the first place, any external indications which may be supposed to have a bearing on the theory; secondly, any alleged or possible references to Plato himself in the *Ecclesiazusae*, or to Aristophanes in the fifth book of the *Republic*; thirdly, the general similarity between the two writings; and finally, such particular resemblances of language and idea as have been adduced in support of the allegation that Plato has in view Aristophanes, or Aristophanes Plato.

I. Alleged external evidence.

According to Aristotle (Pol. B 7. 1266a 34 ff.), οὐδεὶς—οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καί τὰς γυναίκας ἄλλος (i.e. other than Plato) κεκαινοτόμηκεν οὔτε περὶ τὰ συνστίτα τῶν γυναικῶν, and Plato himself in the *Timaeus* 18c remarks, with reference to the communism of the *Republic*, ἢ τὸ τοῦτο μὲν διὰ τὴν ἀνθρεῖαν τῶν λεχθέντων εἰμημῶντον, ὧτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν γάμων καί τὰ τῶν παιδῶν πάσιν ἀπάντων ἵπτθεμεν κτλ.; On the strength of these passages Teichmüller (l. c.) has argued that the fifth book of the *Republic* must have preceded the *Ecclesiazusae*. The argument is, however, as Zeller points out (I. c.), altogether inconclusive; for Aristotle does not assert that Plato was the first, but that he was the only authority, who introduced this innovation. It is therefore clear that Aristotle, who must have known the *Ecclesiazusae*, is excluding the fantastic creations of comedy from his survey. This inference is further supported by another passage in the *Politics* (ib. 12. 1274b 9—11), where ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καί παιδῶν καί τῆς οὐσίας κοινότητι καί τὰ συνστίτα τῶν γυναικῶν are said to be ἐδια Πλάτωνος. See also Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Vol. II p. 282. It has been maintained on the other hand that the *Ecclesiazusae* is earlier than the *Republic*, because Aristophanes declares his proposals to be μὴ τε δεδραμένα μὴ τε ἐρημμένα πω πρότερον (Eccl. 579), but, in point of fact, the educated Greeks of Aristophanes' time probably knew that communist societies had already existed (see on v 451 c, 457 b), and Zeller takes the comedian much too seriously when he supposes this line to demonstrate the priority of Aristophanes' play even to the proposals of the philosopher. No ancient writer, so far as I am aware, has suggested either that Aristophanes refers to Plato, or that Plato refers to Aristophanes; and there is no other external evidence of any kind, if we except certain chorizontic conjectures which are in harmony, so far as they go, with the well-known statement of Gellius (*Not. Att. xiv 3*) about the separate publication of part of the *Republic*. See *Intro. § 4*. The question must therefore be decided, if at all, on other grounds.

II. Alleged or prima facie possible allusions either (a) to Plato in the *Ecclesiazusae*, or (b) to Aristophanes in the fifth book of the *Republic*.

(a) The name of Plato does not occur in the *Ecclesiazusae*. This fact has sometimes been used as an argument against the theories
connecting the *Ecclesiaizaeae* and the *Republic*: see for example Zeller\(^1\) ii 1, p. 551 n. But, as Bergk\(^1\) (*Gr. Literaturgesch. iv* p. 86) and others have pointed out, the later comedies of Aristophanes comparatively seldom attack contemporaries by name\(^1\), and in any case Aristophanes was quite at liberty, if he thought fit, to caricature the scheme of Plato without specifying its author. Cf. Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 76. Is Plato present in disguise in any portion of the play? Some critics have detected an allusion to the philosopher in the words with which the Aristophanic chorus introduces the communism of the *Ecclesiaizaeae*:

\[\textit{νῦν δὴ δεῖ σε πυκνὴν φρένα καὶ φιλόσοφον ἐγείρειν φροντίδα ἐπισταμένην ταῖς φίλασιν ἀμύνειν (vv. 571—573).}\]

The reading of the mss is φιλόσοφον, and there is no sufficient justification for the conjectures φιλόδήμον or φιλόκουνον, for the dactylic measure may easily pass into the trochaic, as in *Frogs* 884 (quoted in Blaydes' note). It is of course possible, on the face of it, that Plato is in Aristophanes' mind, and the possibility becomes still more evident if we read φιλόσοφον, which Bergk declares—somewhat hastily, I think—to be necessary on metrical grounds (*Gr. Literaturgesch. iv* p. 403 n. 135). But φιλόσοφον gives the better construction and sense, and the words of Aristophanes as they stand in the mss do not in themselves suggest a reference to the theories either of Plato or of any other philosopher. The adjective φιλόσοφον is merely an amplification of πυκνὴν. Cf. Hirmer l.c. p. 659 n. 2. Others may be inclined to recognise Plato in the ἐπιρρητικὰ νεανία who proposes the γυναικοκρατία of Aristophanes' play:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{μετὰ τὸῦτο τὸύνν ἐπιρρητικὰ νεανίας} \\
\text{λευκὸς τὸς ἀνεπήγαγός ὁμοίος Νικία} \\
\text{δημιουργητῷ, κἀπεξείρησεν λέγειν} \\
\text{ὥς χρῆ παραδοῦναι ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὴν πόλιν κτλ.}
\end{align*}\]

(vv. 427—454.)

But in this instance also the identification would be purely speculative, and much the same may be said of Bergk's conjecture (*Comm. de reliq. Com. Att. ant.* p. 404 n.) that τὸν τῶν γραφεῶν ἄριστον in verse 995 refers to Plato:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Neat.} & \quad \text{ἀλλ' ὃ μᾶλ' ὀρρωδὸ τὸν ἔραστήν σου.} \\
\text{Γρ.} & \quad \text{τίνα;} \\
\text{Neat.} & \quad \text{τὸν τῶν γραφεῶν ἄριστον.} \\
\text{Γρ.} & \quad \text{οὕτος ὃ ἔστι τίς;} \\
\text{Neat.} & \quad \text{ὅς τοῖς νεκρῶσι} \ ζωγραφεῖ διὸς λῃσθοῦν,} \\
\text{ἀλλ' ἄπιθ', ὅπως μὴ σ' ἐπὶ θύρασιν ὄφεται.}
\end{align*}\]

(vv. 994—997.)

There remains a single passage in which the fertile imagination of
the same scholar discovered a precise and positive allusion to Plato.
It is a tolerably well established tradition that Plato was originally
called Aristocles (D. L. iii 4, and other evidence in Zeller's
ii 1, p. 392 n. 1), and Aristyllus is a diminutive or hypocoristic form of that name.
See Etym. M. p. 142. 55 ff. 'Αριστεύλλος; óνωμα παρά 'Αριστοφάνει.
είρηται δε υποκοριστικώς ο 'Αριστοκλής, and Eustath. ad Il. p. 989. 45
υποκεκόμισαι ο 'Πρυλλός έκ του 'Ηρακλής ώς έκ του 'Αριστοκλής ο
Now in the Ecclesiazusae 646 ff., after Praxagora has described
the advantages of domestic communism in language very like Plato's, we
read:—

Πραξ. πολὺ μέντοι δεινότερον τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἔστι,—
Βλεπ. τὸ ποίον;
Πραξ. εἰ σε φιλήσειεν 'Αριστυλλος, φάσκων αὐτὸν πατέρ' εἶναι.
Βλεπ. οἰμάξω τάν καὶ κωκύιοι.
Πραξ. σὺ δέ γ' ὄζως ἄν καλαμίνθης, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν πρότερον γέγονεν πρὶν τὸ ψήφισμα γενέσθαι, ὡς' οὖχ' δέος μή σε φιλήσῃ.
Βλεπ. δεινὸν μένταν ἐπεπόνθη.

Why should not Aristyllus be Plato? Bergk had the boldness to
suggest their identity (l.c. p. 403 n.), and in the following year Meineke
upheld the same view by the citations which I have given. The con-
jecture deserves the praise of ingenuity, but is far from probable in
itself, and has met with little favour at the hands of recent writers. If
Plato is personated by Aristyllus, we can only say that his features are
distorted beyond the possibility of recognition both here and in the
Phatus

μυθώσομεν θ' ὅπερ τράγον
τὴν μίνα· σὺ δ' 'Αριστυλλος υποχώσκων ἓρεις
ἐπεσθε μητρὶ χοῦροι (vv. 313—315):

nor is it at all likely that Aristophanes, even in a late comedy like the
Ecclesiazusae, would have had recourse to so far-fetched a cryptogram.
We meet with Aristyllus as a distinct and separate proper name
before the archonship of Euclides (CIA i 299, CIA i 447 col. 1, quoted
by Hirmer l.c. p. 659), and we have no reason for disbelieving the
Scholiasts when they remark that this particular 'Αριστυλλος was only
some αἰσχροποιός or other whom Aristophanes wished to deride. To
judge from his posthumous history of Greek literature (iv pp. 86, 463),
Bergk himself afterwards abandoned the idea that Aristyllus stands for
Plato.

It will be seen that the available evidence under this head is quite
insufficient to establish the probability of any kind of connexion
between the Ecclesiazusae and the Republic.

(b) It has been maintained by Chiappelli (l.c.) and other writers
that Plato makes frequent reference to Aristophanes in the course of
Book v. The expressions in question have been separately dealt with
as they occur: but it will be easier to estimate the cumulative value of their evidence if we bring them under the compass of a single survey.

The following passages claim consideration:

(1) οὐκ ἔστε ὅσον ἐσμον λόγων ἐπεγείρετε· δι' ἐγὼ ὅρων παρῆκα τότε, μὴ παράσχοι πολὺν ὅχλον 450 B.

(2) ἀπυστούντα δὲ καὶ ἔφησυντα ἀμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ ὅη ἐγὼ ὅρων, φοβερὸν τε καὶ ἀφαλερὸν, οὐ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν κτλ. 450 E.

(3) τὰχὰ δὲ οὕτως ἀν ὅρθος ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρεῖον δράμα παντελῶς διαπερανθὲν τὸ γυναικείον αὐτοῖς περαίνειν 451 B C.

(4) οὐ φαβρητών τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκόμματα, ὡστα καὶ οία ἂν ἔποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μονοικίαν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἐπιπώ ὁχύρεσις 452 B C.

(5) μᾶταιος δὲ γελοιὸν ἄλλο τι ἢγεῖται ντο κακών, καὶ ὁ γελοιοτομεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὑφὺς ἀποβλέπον ὡς γελοῖόν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφροισ τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλόν ἀν σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοτών στραγμένος ἢ τὸν τὸν ἀγάθον 452 D. Cf. also διηθείσι τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν πρᾶττεν, ἄλλα σπουδάζει 452 C.

(6) τῶν τὰ ἐναίτια λέγοντα 454 E and τοῦ τοῦ τοιαύται ἀντιλέγοντο 455 A.

(7) ὃ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναίς γυναιξίν, τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμνα-ζομέναις, ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίον [σοφίας] δρέπων καρπῶν, οὐδὲν οἴδειν, ὡς ἠσυχεν, ἐφ᾽ ὡς γελὰν οὗτο 5 τι πράττει 457 B.

(8) καὶ μὲν ὅη καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν 464 B.

(9) ὁ Σωκράτης—τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ῥήμα τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἤγου ἐπὶ σὲ παῦν πολλοὺς τε καὶ ὦν φαίλους—θεῖν διατητικέον ὡς θαυμάσια ἐργασομένον 473 E f.

In nearly all these places Chiappelli (l.c.) suspects that Plato has Aristophanes in view. As regards the first, it is tolerably clear from Plato's choice of the word παρῆκα that the ἐσμὸς λόγων means the swarm of subjects which Socrates will now have to discuss, and not the hostile criticism which he will encounter: see note ad loc. The notes on (2) and (3) will shew that neither of these passages warrants the conclusion that either Aristophanes or any other representative of Athenian comedy is intended. It would be almost equally rash to identify τῶν τὰ ἐναίτια λέγοντα in (6) with Aristophanes, and in (9) Plato is manifestly thinking of a coalition of antagonists, not to mention the fact that the subject of the philosopher-king, which evokes this exclamation from Glauco, is nowhere hinted at in the Ecclesiazusae. If the imperfect ὁμολογοῦμεν is to be retained in (8), the sentence becomes more pointed on the supposition that Plato is replying to some criticism or caricature of his communistic theories; but even without such a hypothesis, the meaning is satisfactory enough. In the other three passages, viz. (4), (5) and (7), it is difficult to resist the impression that Plato's vigorous invective, though professedly general, has also a personal application. There are several places in the Republic where
Plato has with much probability been supposed to be thinking of an individual in describing the type, as, for example, when he pours contempt on the epideictic rhetorician in the person of Isocrates (vi 498 e. u.); and it is quite possible that he thought of Aristophanes when he wrote these words. But there cannot be any reference to the Ecclesiazusae in particular, for the Ecclesiazusae does not touch upon any of the special topics which Plato here mentions, such as the athletic and military exercises of women. The most that we can reasonably affirm is that, if the Ecclesiazusae can be shewn on other grounds to be an attack either on Plato’s own theories, or on views with which he sympathised, the personal tone of (4), and especially of (5) and (7), is most easily explicable on the hypothesis that they are a sort of counter attack on Aristophanes by Plato.

III. The general resemblances between the two works in respect of subject-matter and content.

The Ecclesiazusae falls into two well-marked divisions (1—876, and 877—1181), the second of which merely elaborates and illustrates the idea expressed in vv. 615—618, and contains nothing which can fairly be quoted in this connexion. It is otherwise with the first half of the play. There Aristophanes deals with a number of subjects which are treated also by Plato, viz. Community of Goods (590—594, 597—610, 673—692), Community of Women (611—634), Community of Children (635—650), the absence of every kind of δίκαι (657—672), and the establishment of ἔσωσία (715 f.). The coincidence is remarkable and certainly requires explanation.

IV. Specific parallels in idea, or in language, or in both idea and language.

These are more numerous and sometimes, perhaps, more remarkable than is generally supposed. We may tabulate them as follows:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Plato & Aristophanes \\
(1) τὰς γυναικὰς ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῦτον πάντον πάσας εἶναι κοινὰς, ἵδια δὲ μηδεὶς μηδεὶς αὐτὸν συνοικεῖν & καὶ ταύτας γὰρ κοινὰς ποιοῦ τοῖς ἀνδραῖσι συγκατακινεῖται καὶ παιδο-
& ποιεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ (614 f.)
(2) ὅτι πάντων ἐμφανώτατ' ἄν εἴη πρακτόν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φίλοις 458 B. & καὶ μὴν ὅτι μὲν χρηστὰ διδαξέω πιστεύω (583).
(3) πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας καὶ & πῶς οὖν οὕτω ἔσωτον ἡμῶν τοὺς αὐτοῦ παιδὸς ἔκαστος ἢ ἐσται δυνατὸς διαγεγοροῦσθαι; Τὴ δὲ δὲ; πατέρας γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοῖς χρόνοιςν νομι-
& νοῦσιν (635—637).
\end{tabular}
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(4) ἔχομεν οὖν—μετέξον ἁγαθὸν τοῦ δ' ἄν ἐνδοθε τε καὶ ποιῆ μιᾶν (sc. τὴν πόλιν); Οὐκ ἔχομεν 462 A f.

(5) τί δέ; δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἰσχύεται εἰς αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐποίειν κτλ.; 464 D.

(6) καὶ μὴ ὅτι γε νεότερος πρεσβύτερον—οὔτε ἄλλο βιαζέσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτέ, οὔτε τύπτειν ὡς τὸ εἰκός· οὕμα δ' οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἵνανω γὰρ τὸ φύλακε κωλύσοντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν ὡς γονέων μὴ ἀπεσταλίσατε εἰργονον, δέος δέ τὸ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἀλλοὺς βοηθέσειν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς υἱῶς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας 465 A f.

(7) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ’ ὁμηρον τοὺς τοιούτους δίκαιον τιμᾶν τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἁγαθοὶ· καὶ γὰρ ὁμηρος τὸν εὐδοκίμοσαν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νυντοῖν Αἰώνα ἐφὴ διηνεκέσσα γεραιρεσθαι, ὡς ταῦταν οἰκειὰν οὐσαν τιμήν τῷ ήβιοτὶ τε καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἐξ ἡς ἀμα τῷ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ινχυν αὐξησεῖ. Ὄρθότατα, ἐφη. Πεισόμεθα ἀρα, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτα γε ὁμῆρον 468 C f.

καὶ μαθωδέν ἐσται τοῖς παδαράσσων καὶ τοῖς ἀνδρείσιν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, κεῖ τις δειλός γεγένηται, ἵνα μὴ δειπυνως αἰσχυνομενοι (679—681).

I have drawn attention to the Aristophanic parallels in commenting on each of these passages of Plato individually. The impression which they produce as a whole will vary according to the observer’s bent and attitude of mind. To Zeller and Hirmer they appear for the most part only accidental coincidences natural enough in the independent exposition and development of the same fundamental idea. By way of illustration Hirmer reminds us that one of the reasons which Plato assigns for domestic communism finds an echo in the motive to which Herodotus had already attributed the community of wives among the Agathyrsi: see note on 463 c. Susemihl on the other hand seems to think that the resemblances are too striking to be merely accidental (Gen. Entwick. ii p. 297). Experience has shewn that it would be rash to limit the possible degrees of approximation between two writers of ability discussing the same or similar subjects; but for my own part I am disposed to think that we should give the preference to an ex-
planation which, while it is probable on other grounds, leaves room for the possibility that some at least of these coincidences are not altogether fortuitous.

On a retrospect of the foregoing discussion, we see that the residue of solid fact awaiting explanation is first, the general resemblance of subject and treatment between the fifth book of the Republic and the Ecclesiazusae, and secondly, certain particular coincidences of idea and phraseology. No very great stress should be laid on the personal and polemical tone which seems to make itself felt in some of the passages cited under heading II (b); but it may be found that a solution which explains the other phenomena will provide a reasonable account of this matter also.

What explanations may be, or have been, offered?

It may be suggested, in the first place, that Aristophanes and Plato are borrowing from the same literary source. According to Aristoxenus ap. D. L. III 37 and Favorinus ib. 57 the Republic of Plato was found almost entire in τοῖς Πρωταγόρον Ἀριστολογοίσι, but the fable is unworthy of serious discussion, and has not been accepted by any responsible critic (cf. Frei, Quaestiones Protagoreae p. 187). Apart from this testimony, there is no evidence to support the view that the resemblances between Aristophanes and Plato are due to imitations of the same original.

Secondly, it has been held that Aristophanes copies from Plato. According to this theory, the Ecclesiazusae caricatures the Platonic community of goods, wives and children, referred to or expounded in the end of Book III, in IV 423 e f., and especially in Book V of the Republic. Zeller and others have endeavoured to refute this view by urging that communism in the Ecclesiazusae is represented rather as an extreme development of democracy and the democratical spirit than as "das Hirngespenst eines aristokratischen Doctrinärs" (Zeller i.c. p. 552 n.); that Aristophanes depicts a γυναικοκρατία, and exhibits in fact "a bill in Parliament for the putting down of men" (Merry Wives of Windsor II 1), whereas in Plato we have an ἀριστοκρατία in which the best women and the best men are on an equality; and that there are many proposals in the fifth book of the Republic to which there is no analogy in the Ecclesiazusae, although they would have formed an admirable subject for Aristophanes' peculiar kind of wit, such as the κληροὶ τίνες κομψοί (460 a), the gymnastic exercises of the female guardians (452 b c al.), and their presence on the field of battle (471 d al.). These observations are certainly true, and conclusive against the theory that the Ecclesiazusae was intended by Aristophanes as an exhaustive polemic against Plato's communism, and nothing more; but such a theory is quite indefensible and betrays a complete misapprehension of the genius of Comedy. The primary object of Aristophanic Comedy, when all is said and done, was to amuse (452 b c, 457 b), and the accurate and complete recapitulation of Plato's theories would not only be slavish and pedantic, but also much less amusing than a partial and distorted view. "Dass Aristophanes nicht naturgetreue Farben liebt, wenn er seine Opfer der Bühne überantwortet, braucht
nicht besonders gesagt zu werden; er hat am Sokrates eine wahrhaft thersiteische Rolle gespielt. Also soll Niemand behaupten, er habe den Wortlaute der Politie vor Augen seine Komödie gedichtet, bedacht dem Verfasser kein Unrecht zu thun. Er nahm, was seinem Zwecke diente; für seine Extravaganzen muss man zunächst das Wesen der Komik verantwortlich machen" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 79). The real question is whether the actual points of contact between the Republic and the Ecclesiazuse are sufficiently numerous and of such a kind as to shew that Aristophanes had the Republic in view in any part of his play. If we confine ourselves to the internal evidence, the possibility of such a direct and immediate reference to Plato's dialogue cannot be denied; but it is impossible for many reasons to believe that the whole of the Republic is earlier than 393—390 B.C., between which dates the Ecclesiazuse falls.

It is at this point that the separatist critics step in. In discussing the relationship between Aristophanes and Plato, Morgenstern (l.c. p. 83) had already made the suggestion that the Republic as we have it now is an editio aucta et emendata of an earlier Republic, and that Aristophanes had before him this preliminary treatise; and Teichmüller for his part places the first five books of the Republic in 392 or 391, and the Ecclesiazusae in 390 B.C. (l.c. i pp. 15 ff.). But the resemblances between the two works can be explained without having recourse to the hypotheses of the separatists, and the question whether the different books of the Republic were published together or not should be kept distinct from the present enquiry. See Introd. § 4, where I have tried to shew that the χωπίλουτες have hitherto failed to prove their case.

Thirdly, Plato may have had the Ecclesiazuse in view when he wrote the fifth book of the Republic. This opinion was first, I think, expressed by Boeckh, who remarks "Plato quinto Reipublicae lepidorum hominum facetis perstricta haec placita significans Aristophanis comoe- mediam videtur respicere" (l.c. p. 26). Boeckh's view seems to be regarded as possible both by Zeller (l.c.) and Hirmer (l.c.), the latter of whom reminds us that Plato alludes to Aristophanes also in other parts of the Republic (see on vii 529 B, c, and cf. vi 508 B n.); and, among the separatists, Krohn, Stein, Usener and Chiappelli, in one form or another, hold what is fundamentally the same belief. According to Krohn (Pl. St. l.c.), the order of publication was Republic i—iv, Ecclesiazuse, Republic v. In the Ecclesiazuse Aristophanes ridicules the Platonic community of wives and children alluded to in iv 423 ff., and doubtless familiar enough as a topic of conversation in the more cultivated circles of Athenian society; while the first half of Republic v reiterates, in view of Aristophanes' travesty, the principle of κομά τὰ φίλων, adding new and well-considered arguments in its support. Stein and Chiappelli (l.lc.) agree pretty closely with Krohn, except that Stein thinks the remark of Socrates in iv 423 ff. was enough by itself to inspire the author of the Ecclesiazuse, without any assistance from the oral diffusion of Plato's paradoxical innovations. The hypothesis proposed by Usener (ap. Brandt l.c.), regarded merely as a work of art,
is singularly perfect and complete. Starting from the thesis that the recapitulation of the Republic in the Timaeus (17 c ff.) refers to a preliminary draft of a portion of the dialogue published before the production of the Ecclesiazusae, Usener maintains that in Republic II c. 15—IV c. 5 inclusive we have the substance of that earlier treatise, which included also a sketch of the community of wives and children, afterwards compressed into the single sentence IV 423 e f. Aristophanes' travesty of this forerunner of the Republic is contained in the Ecclesiazusae, which was put on the stage, according to Usener, in 393 B.C., and in Book v of the Republic Plato treats the whole subject afresh in view of Aristophanes' attack.

So much for the most important and representative theories which have been advanced on the question. In an enquiry of this kind, we cannot hope to attain the certainty of absolute demonstration; but I am strongly inclined to admit the probability that Plato had the Ecclesiazusae and its author in his mind when he wrote that part of the fifth book which deals with the subject of women and children. Granted that the Ecclesiazusae is earlier than Book v of the Republic, Plato must have known the play, and the subjects treated of in the two writings are so closely allied that it would have been difficult to ignore the comedian altogether in traversing what is nearly the same ground. The positive coincidences, again, both general and particular, though they do not perhaps compel us to assume any connexion between the two works, are, at all events in some cases, most readily explicable on that hypothesis. A similar remark will apply to the instances already cited of personal or apparently personal references to some representative of the comic stage in more than one passage of Book v. But there is nothing in this admission which lends support to any of the chorizontic hypotheses, and the separatists, with few exceptions, take much too narrow a view of the question at issue. No doubt Aristotle asserts that the community of wives and children and the ὑποστία γυναικῶν were novelties peculiar to Plato among all the authors both of theoretical and of practical politics (Pol. B 7. 1266a 34 ff.). As far as concerns actually existing States, Aristotle's remark is demonstrably incorrect, if the word 'polity' is held to include barbarian as well as Hellenic constitutions¹; and though what he says may be true of the πολιτείαι τῶν φιλοσόφων, there is a considerable body of evidence to shew that the community of wives and children as well as of property was an idea freely mooted in Athenian speculative circles, even when it was not embodied in a formal πολιτεία like that of Plato, or that of Diogenes² after him. The attitude of Euripides is highly significant in a question of this kind; and Dümmler (Proleg. zu Platons Staat p. 55) has drawn attention to a fragment of the Protesilaus where Euripides forestalls the Platonic conception in the words κωνὼν γὰρ εἶναι χρήν γυναικείον γένος (Fr. 655 Dindorf. Cf. also Fr. 406, Med. 573 ff. and Hipp. 616 ff.). The wide-spread desire in Plato's age to break

¹ See on v 457 b, 463 c.
² See Zeller² II 1, pp. 321—326.
with ‘convention’ and reorganize society on a ‘natural’ basis, with the frequent appeal to the analogy of the dumb creation (see on 451 c), in which the ‘vox Naturae’ was supposed to be most plainly audible, points towards the same conclusion; and I do not think that Dümmler overshoots the mark when, in reviewing the available evidence, he affirms—"Es ist kein Zweifel, Weiber- und Gütergemeinschaft liegen auf dem Wege der Weltbeglückungspläne des fünften Jahrhunderts" (l. c.). See also Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie III p. 458 f., where Diels remarks ‘berühmte Gedanken, deren schulmässige Fassung uns erst aus dem Anfang des vierten Jahrhunderts vorliegt (z. B. Sclavenemancipation und Weibergemeinschaft), bereits im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung geboren sind." That such aspirations commanded a large measure of sympathy and support among some of Socrates’ followers, including of course Plato, may be easily believed, both on account of the views which were afterwards promulgated by Plato and the Cynics, and also because there are signs that such an innovation would not have been altogether repugnant to the historical Socrates, whose attitude on sexual questions is almost repulsively utilitarian: see Xen. Mem. I 3, 14, II 1, 2, 4. It is from political and social ideas of this kind that Aristophanes, who everywhere shews himself familiar with the intellectual movements of his day, derived the materials of his comedy. Everything else had been tried in Athens; why not have recourse to the remedy offered by the so-called ‘natural’ state of society? έδοκε γάρ τούτο μόνον εν τῇ πόλει οὗτο γεγενήσθαι (Eccl. 456 f.). Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae is thus a satire both on Athenian democracy and on the socialist theories of his age. The philosopher may well have been dissatisfied with the comedian’s unscrupulous travesty of views with which he had himself no little sympathy. In the fifth book of the Republic Plato touches with serious purpose on nearly all the proposals which Aristophanes had tried to make ridiculous, sometimes expressing himself as if he were the self-nominated champion of the ideal so licentiously burlesqued upon the stage, and even appears to carry the war into the enemy’s camp by a vigorous onslaught upon the principles and practice of Athenian comedy (452 c f.).

II.

V 452 D, E. μάρταιος δὲ γελοιόν ἂλλο τι γιγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὃ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὅψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοῖον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐτοῦ στοιβάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν ὀφθαλμίνως ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

With this text (that of Paris A) II agrees, except for the trifling error τινὰν ὅψιν for τινὰ ὅψιν. The words καὶ καλοῦ αὐτὸ are omitted in Ε and a few late mss: in γ they are replaced by καὶ σοῦ καλοῦ αὐτ. There is no other variant of any consequence in the mss.

The explanation which I have given agrees with that of the Oxford editors except that they do not make ὃ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν subject
to σπονδάζει, but to μάταιος, which will therefore have a threefold subject, viz. (1) ος—κακόν, (2) ο—κακοῦ, (3) ος (understood) καλόν αὐτοί σπονδάζει κτλ. I think the view taken in the notes is both grammatically easier and better in point of sense. In any case, however, the sentence must be allowed to be ill-constructed and awkward, although that in itself is not enough to justify us in accepting emendations which are far from probable or satisfactory.

The difficulties connect themselves (1) with ως γελοίον, (2) with καὶ καλὸν αὐτοί, (3) with πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στηρίζομενος. ως γελοίον is cancelled by Cobet and Herwerden, and may of course be a gloss on ἀφρονὸν τε καὶ κακοῦ. The omission of these two words improves the style, but, as they are in all the mss, it is safer to retain them as a Platonic pleonasm.

As regards καὶ καλὸν αὐτοί, the introduction of καλὸν (‘beauty’ or ‘taste’) as apparently a sort of duplicate of ἀγαθὸν seems at first sight unnecessary and irrelevant. But καλὸν appears in the sister passage below (457 B), and I think that καλὸν here makes Plato’s allusion to the Old Comedy somewhat more pointed and telling, for Comedy, like every form of Greek art, might be supposed to aim at τὸ καλὸν. It cannot however be denied that καὶ καλὸν may be an erroneous duplication of καὶ κακοῦ, and in that case the meaning will be ‘and he who attempts to raise a laugh etc. aims seriously also at another goal’ etc., Δ ἑλπιστορεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν being the nominative to σπονδάζει. I formerly felt disposed to take this view.

The expression πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στηρίζομενος has been taken by Jebb to mean ‘having set himself to some other aim’: cf. Soph. Ant. 299 πρὸς ἀλφρα πράγμα πιστάσαθαι. The Sophoclean line might justify στὰς, but surely not στηρίζομενος, which is always I think—except of course where it means ‘having stopped’ (desisto, desino, φευόμαι: see Stephanus-Hase s.v.)—transitive in good Greek. My explanation of στηρίζομενος is due to J. and C.: it receives some support from the parallel idiom in 450 B (μέτρον—τοιούτων λόγον ἄκουεν), where see note: but at best we must allow that the participle is somewhat awkward. W. H. Thompson and others expunge the preposition πρὸς.

The other proposed solutions are as follows: (1) μάταιος ως γελοίον ἄλλο τε ἡγεῖται—κακοῦ, ἢ σπονδάζει κτλ. (Bekker, Schneider. There is however no mss authority for ἢ. Schneider also favours Stephanus’ conjecture σπονδάζειν for σπονδάζει). (2) μάταιος—κακοῦ, καὶ αὐτοί σπονδάζει (Stallbaum). (3) Hermann bracketed ὃ γελιωτοποιεῖν—κακοῦ, καὶ, and (4) Cobet desired to cancel ὃς γελοίον—κακοῦ, καὶ, as well as ως γελοίον and καὶ καλὸν αὐτ, reading, after κακοῦ, ἢ σπονδάζειν [πρὸς] ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν <πρὸς> στηρίζομενος κτλ. (5) μάταιος—κακοῦ, καὶ γελιωτοποιεῖν—ἀποβλέπει [ως γελοίον]—κακοῦ, καὶ [καλὸν] αὐτοί σπονδάζει [πρὸς] ἄλλον κτλ. (Herwerden).

There is, it will be observed, a general tendency to omit καὶ καλὸν αὐτ, or at least καλὸν. The presence of these words both in Α and in Β carries great weight. I have thought of suggesting μάταιος—κακοῦ καὶ καλὸν αὐτοί σπονδάζει πρὸς <ἄλλο>, ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν κτλ. (‘aims
seriously also at another standard of taste, having set himself another goal’ etc.), or καὶ καλὸν αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν, <ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν> στηριχέως κτλ.

III.

V 457 ε ἀτελή τοῦ γελοίου [σοφίας] δρέπων καρπῶν.

The word σοφίας is in all the mss, but there is no consensus of opinion as to how it should be explained. Schneider translates “die Weisheitsfrucht des lächerlichen,” explaining this to mean “fructum sapientiae, quem risor iste quasi de arbore sapientiae suae decerpere, h.e. sapientia sua invenisse sibi videtur.” “Plucks from his laughter an unripe fruit of wisdom” is Campbell’s translation. Each of these editors therefore understands one of the two genitives as representing the tree—Schneider σοφίας, Campbell τοῦ γελοίου; but neither alternative is satisfactory, although Schneider’s gives the better sense. A third possibility would be to make τοῦ γελοίου depend on the negative idea contained in ἀτελή (cf. ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὑπὸς βέας Phaedr. 248 v), the sense being that their wisdom or art falls short of τοῦ γελοίου, and so does not attain the end at which Comedy should aim. If the ms reading is to be retained, this explanation seems to me the best, but the relation of the two genitives still remains difficult and obscure. Jackson suggests that the expression may mean “a witcrop of ridicule.” To me it appears most probable that σοφίας has been added by some scribe desirous of completing the quotation. See Introd. § 5. Others (Ast, Stallbaum, Herwerden, Hartman) retain σοφίας and omit τοῦ γελοίου, but the interpolation of these words is less easy to explain, and μάταιος δὲ γελοίου ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἡ το κακὸν in 452 D is strongly in favour of keeping τοῦ γελοίου here. The object of Plato’s strictures in both passages is a particular view of τοῦ γελοίου with which he has no sympathy: see on 452 D.

IV.

On Infanticide in the Republic.

The disputed passages are as follows:—

1) V 459 D, ε δεῖ μὲν, εἴπον, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων τούς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνονται ὡς πλειστάκις, τούς δὲ φαινότατους ταῖς φαινόταται τοῖς τοινυντίοις, καὶ τῶν μὲν τα ἐγκροτείνων, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ μέλλει το ποίμνῳ ὁ τι ἀκρόπατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γεγονόμενα λαβαίνει πλῆθος αὐτῶν τῶν ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὐτῇ ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀστασιάστος ἔσται.

2) V 460 c τα δὲ τῶν χειρόων, καὶ ἐὰν τὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρου γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδηλῷ κατακρύβουσιν, ὡς πρέπει.

3) V 461 B, C ὅταν δὲ δή, οὔμαι, αἱ το γυναικεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖς τοῦ γεννῶν ἐκβιώσαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, αἱφίσομέν τον ἐλευθέρους αὐτῶν συγγίγνεσθαι

23—3
From these passages it would seem undeniable that Plato contemplates in Book V the exposure of (A) the offspring of inferior guardians, (B) any deformed offspring produced by guardians of the better sort, (C) the offspring of guardians who have passed the limits of age laid down for those who are to produce children for the State 1. We have no right on linguistic grounds to suggest that τρέφειν in (A) and τροφή in (C) are "used in the emphatic sense of educating as Guardians and Auxiliaries" (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 174 n. 3. The same explanation has been advanced by others).

Nevertheless, a number of critics, from Morgenstern (de Pt. Rep. p. 228 n. 141) onwards, have taken a different view, and that for two reasons. It is desired, on the one hand, to acquit Plato of sanctioning "a practice so repugnant to modern Christian notions." The argument is irrelevant; and it is a sufficient reply that the practice was widely prevalent in ancient Greece (see Blümner, Privatalterthümer p. 77 n. 1), and expressly enjoined in Sparta on precisely the same grounds on which Plato prescribes it in the Republic (Plut. Lyc. 16. 1). Aristotle also permits infanticide in the case of deformed offspring (Pol. H 16. 1335 b 19 ff.). In point of fact, Plato's abolition of marriage would strike the Greeks as far more revolutionary and offensive than his tolerance of infanticide; nor would a legislator who is bold enough to overthrow the institution of marriage, as it is commonly understood, be likely to prohibit the exposure of weaklings, if it seemed to him conducive to the welfare of the State.

The second objection is at first sight more serious. When ἡ is recapitulating the leading features of the Republic in the opening of the Timaeus (19 a), Plato writes: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἁγαθῶν θερητῶν ἐφαμέν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάβρα διαδοτέον τόλιν ἐπανάγομεν δὲ εἰς ταῖς ἀνέξους τάλιν ἀναγέν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφιών ἀνέξους εἰς τὴν τῶν ἑπανότων χώραν μεταλαίπειν; Οὔτως. This sentence, taken strictly, asserts that the offspring of inferior guardians in the Republic were to be distributed among the lower classes, but says nothing about the other two classes enumerated above, viz. (B) and (C). The apparent contradiction has been variously explained. Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. 111, p. 909 n. 2) and others suppose that Plato had changed his view when the Timaeus was written, and this is doubtless possible, especially as nothing is said about the exposure of children in the Laws. The suggestion made by Jowett, that Plato "may have forgotten," surely lacks every element of probability.

A recent choralistic theory on the subject is deserving of mention. According to Usener and Brandt, the earlier books of the Republic, as

1 Aristotle also understood infanticide to be intended, when, in criticising Plato's community of children, he wrote ἀδηλὸν γὰρ ὃς συνέβη γενέσθαι τέκνων καὶ σωθήσαι γενόμενον (Pol. B 3. 1262 b 5).
we know it now, contain material which was originally published separately, and it is to this earlier edition that Aristophanes alludes in the *Ecclesiazusae*. It is further supposed that Plato's recapitulation in the *Timaeus* refers, not to the existing *Republic*, but to the original publication, in which, therefore, Plato did not countenance infanticide, but was content merely to degrade the offspring of the inferior guardians. The bulk of the present Book III, according to Usener, formed part of the first edition. Now, in III 415 b. c Plato does actually propose to deal with unsatisfactory offspring by the method described in the *Timaeus*. His words are ἐὰν τε σφέτερος ἐγκυνος ὑπόκαλκος ἤ ὑποσίδθρος γένηται, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελείψωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προστίκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδώντες ὄσκουσιν εἰς δημιουργοὺς ἢ εἰς γεωργούς, καὶ ἂν αὐτῇ τοῦτον τις ὑπόχωρος ἢ ὑπάρχων φυᾷ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξονοι τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακῆς, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίας. The cases of deterioration referred to in ἐὰν τε σφέτερος—γένηται do not exactly coincide with any of the three cases for which Plato prescribes infanticide in the *Republic*; but he may have originally applied the milder remedy in dealing also with the offspring of inferior parents (A), as he tells us in the *Timaeus* that he did (ἴφαμεν). The difficulty of keeping down the population may have afterwards induced him to recommend the more drastic course. In the *Law*, colonization provides an outlet for the surplus inhabitants (740 B); but this expedient is unknown in the *Republic*.

So much for Usener's theory. This is not the place in which to discuss it at length, but we may admit that it provides, though at tremendous and quite unjustifiable cost, an ingenious explanation of the particular difficulty with which we are here concerned. For my own part, I do not think sufficient stress has been laid upon the fact that the reference in the *Timaeus* is not to Book v of the *Republic*, but to III 415 B, C. That this is so, appears clearly from the words ἐπαναγομένων—μεταλλάττειν, which correspond to ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προστίκουσαν τιμήν—ἀνάξονι in Rep. III 415 C, but are not echoed anywhere in Book v. It is true that the reference is inaccurate, for 'the offspring of inferior parents' (τὰ τῶν κακῶν) is not quite synonymous with the ἐγκυνος ὑπόκαλκος ἤ ὑποσίδθρος of Book III; but it is not more inaccurate than Plato's cross-references often are, even within the limits of a single dialogue. The difficulty which calls for explanation is therefore Plato's silence on the subject of the exposure of children in the summary of the *Republic* which he prefixes to the *Timaeus*, rather than any positive contradiction—if we make allowance for the inaccuracy which I have spoken of—between the two dialogues. How is that silence to be accounted for? Plato may no doubt have altered his views; but his recapitulation in the *Timaeus* is by no means complete even in other respects (see Archer-Hind on 17 B), and I think it much more likely that he omitted this point because it seemed to him, as in point of fact it would have seemed to many, if not most, of his contemporaries, by no means one of the most peculiar and distinctive features of his common-

wealth. Although Plato says nothing about the exposure of children in the constitution of the Laws, that is only a second-best polity, and he nowhere surrenders his earlier ideal (see Laws 739 c ff.). In any case, we must interpret the Republic by itself: and none of Plato's own contemporaries could possibly have read the sentences printed above without supposing that he meant Infanticide.

V.

V 462 c, d ὅταν ποι ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ή κοινωνία ή κατὰ τὸ σώμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταγμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ῥηθέτο τε καὶ πᾶσα ἀμα ἐνυψηληγέταν μέρους ποινῆσαις ὀλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεί.

The difficulties of this passage have not received sufficient attention at the hands of editors.

The only textual question is whether we should read τεταμενή or τεταγμένη. τεταγμένη occurs in one ms of Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 102), and also in Θ and Vind. E, as well as in Ε. τεταμενή is much better supported, and has been preferred by former editors.

Schneider, Davies and Vaughan, and Jowett respectively translate as follows: “die ganze durch den Leib nach der Seele zur Einheit der Zusammenordnung unter das regierende in ihr” (i.e. der Gemeinschaft)” “sich erstreckende Gemeinschaft,” “the whole fellowship that spreads through the body up to the soul, and then forms an organized unit under the governing principle”; “the whole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein.” They apparently agree in taking τεταμενή both with πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν and with εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν, although the English translators evade the difficulty by a paraphrase which can hardly be elicited from the Greek. It is, I think, difficult, if not impossible, to connect τεταμενή with both πρὸς and εἰς, and as it cannot be separated from εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν, I take πρὸς with κοινωνία as in Symp. 188 c. If τεταμενή is right, it should probably be separated from πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν and understood as ‘strung into a single organization,’ an expression which suggests the Stoic theory of τόνος (see Stein, Psych. d. Stoa i pp. 73, 74 n.). Jowett's ‘forming one kingdom’ shews an instinctive sense of what the meaning ought to be. The ambiguity in τεταμενή is however perplexing, especially in view of ix 584 c α' γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνονται—ἡδοναί and Theaet. 186 c ὡσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, although the general sense of these passages is somewhat different. Partly for this reason, but more for that mentioned in the notes, I now prefer τεταγμένη. The translators agree also in their view of τοῦ ἄρχοντος, which they apparently take as a sort of possessive genitive, the σύνταξις belonging to the ἄρχων as a kingdom belongs to its ruler. It is grammatically easier and more natural to regard τοῦ ἄρχοντος as a genitive of definition; and the sense also—see note ad loc.—favours this view. If Stallbaum is right in understanding ἐν αὐτῇ as ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, the Stoic parallel is remarkably
close. τοῦ ἀρχόντος would then correspond to the ἄγγελονκών, or ruling part of soul, from which the various psychological activities radiate 'like the arms of a cuttle-fish': see Zeller' iii 1, p. 199 n. 1. But it is more natural to refer αὐτῷ to κοινονία. In view of 464 b, where Plato speaks as if he had merely compared the body with its parts, and not the whole man, consisting of body and soul, I have sometimes suspected that πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν and τῇ τοῦ ἀρχόντος ἐν αὐτῷ are from the pen of some Stoic, who may also have altered τεταγμένη into τεταμένη: but the reference is precise enough for Plato's purpose, and ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν δάκτυλον ἀλγεί makes it probable that room was made for the ψυχή in working out the illustration.

VI.

V 473 c εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωσι τε ἀτεχνώσ ὦσπέρ κῦμα ἐγκέλων καὶ ἀδοξά κατακλύσειν.

These words have given rise to much discussion. The literal translation is: 'said, however, it shall be, even although it is likely to drown me in laughter—just like a wave that laughs outright—and disgrace.' ἐγκέλων should be compared with "leviterque sonant plangore cachinni" (Cat. 64. 273), and not with Aeschylus's ποντίων τε κυμάτων ἀνήρθημον γέλασμα and similar expressions, which refer rather to the rippling of the sea's surface than to the sound of its waves: cf. Arist. Probl. xxiii i. 931a 35 ff. Thus understood, κῦμα ἐγκέλων is, I think, taken by itself, an intelligible expression, although no exact parallel to it has yet been found in Greek. (In Euripides Troad. 1176 ff. ἐγκέλω refers, as Paley has pointed out, 'to the open lips of a wound' through which the mangled flesh is seen. So also E. S. Thompson in Proceedings of the Camb. Philol. Soc. 1889 p. 13.) The simile of the wave runs riot throughout the fifth Book, and when the last and greatest wave is about to break, and deluge him with ridicule, Socrates may be pardoned for a little extravagance of language. The sound of the wave was also hinted at in 472 Α (ἀκούσῃ).

Whether the simile is applicable in all its details may be doubted. The wave is the proposal which Socrates is about to make; the laughter is that of derisive opponents. On a strict interpretation, Plato personifies the wave, and makes it laugh at itself. But a simile should not be hounded to death in this fashion; and the same difficulty is already implicitly involved in γέλωσι κατακλύσειν. The general idea is merely that the proposal dissolves in laughter as a wave in spray. For these reasons, I am inclined, on the whole, to believe that the text is sound. Numerous corrections have been proposed. The reading of ἐ—εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωσι τε τις ἀτεχνώσ ὦσπέρ κῦμα καὶ ἀδοξά κατακλύσειν—is doubtless one; it is comparatively tame, but unobjectionable, and was formerly adopted by Stallbaum. Herwerden's proposal is on the same lines: εἰ καὶ μέλλει ἐγκέλως γέ τις καὶ ἀδοξά ἀτεχνώσ ὦσπέρ κῦμα κατακλύσειν. (The word ἐγκέλωσ is mentioned by Pollux vi 199, but it is not, clear that he meant to attribute it to
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

Plato.) Few will feel themselves able to assent to this; nor is Richards' \( \epsilon k\tau ' \rho \delta \nu o \) for \( \epsilon k\gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu \) probable or satisfactory in point of meaning. Excision has also been freely resorted to. In his second edition Ast was disposed to bracket \( \delta \alpha \psi \tau \rho \; \kappa i\mu a \; \epsilon k\gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu \), and Hartman applauds the proposal. E. S. Thompson (l.c.) would eject \( \epsilon k\gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu \); but it is difficult to see why such a word should have been added by itself. If excision is necessary, it would be better to cancel the whole phrase \( \alpha \tau \epsilon x\nu \omega s-\epsilon k\gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu \) as a marginal explanation of \( \gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \tau i \; k a t a k l \lambda \upsilon -\sigma e i n \). This suggestion was made in my edition of the Text, and I still hanker after it at intervals. Another solution has recently occurred to me. If we transpose and write \( e i \) καὶ \( \mu \epsilon \ell \ell \iota \; \alpha \tau \epsilon x\nu \omega s \; \omicron \gamma \psi \tau \rho \; \kappa i\mu a \; \gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \tau i \; \tau e \; \epsilon k\gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu \) καὶ \( \alpha \delta o \zeta \iota a \; k a t a k l \lambda \upsilon -\sigma e i n \), the whole sentence might be translated 'Spoken, however, it shall be, even although it is likely to swamp us beneath a wave of roaring laughter'—lit. 'roaring with laughter'—'and disgrace.' On this view \( \kappa i\mu a \) is the object of \( k a t a k l \lambda \upsilon -\sigma e i n \), as Ast in his third edition wished it to be, although his emendation \( \gamma \epsilon \lambda \omega \nu \) \( \tau i s \; \alpha \tau \epsilon x\nu \omega s \; \omicron \gamma \psi \tau \rho \; \kappa i\mu a \; \alpha \delta o \zeta \iota a \; k a t a k l \lambda \upsilon -\sigma e i n \) can hardly be right. (Benedictus' change of \( \mu \ell \ell \iota \) into \( \mu \ell \ell \iota s \) gives the same construction to \( \kappa i\mu a . \)) But it is not possible, I think, to extract this meaning from the Greek without transposition, and such a double transposition is very improbable. On the whole I believe the text is sound.

VII.

V 476 A καὶ \( \pi e \rho i \; \delta i k a i \ova \) καὶ \( \alpha \delta i \kappa o \) καὶ \( \alpha \gamma a \theta \o u \) καὶ \( k a k o \o u \) καὶ \( \pi \alpha \tau \tau o \omega n \) τῶν \( \varepsilon i \delta \o n \) \( \pi e r i \) ὁ \( a \theta i o s \; \lambda \gamma \o u s \), \( a \theta i o s \; \mu e n \; \varepsilon n \; \varepsilon k a s t o n \; \varepsilon i n a \), \( \tau \eta \; \delta e \tau o n \) \( \pi r \alpha \zeta \e o n \) καὶ \( \sigma o m \mu a t o n \) καὶ \( \alpha l l \o h \o l o n \; k o i n o n i a \) \( \pi a n t a x \o u \; f a n t a z \o m e n a \; \tau o l l \a \) \( f a \i \nu e \nu s \tau a i \; \varepsilon k a s t o n . \)

The words καὶ \( \alpha l l \o h \o l o n \) are in all the mss. They present no difficulty in point of construction; for it is an error to suppose, as Hartman does, that the subject of \( f a \i \nu e \nu s \tau a i \) is \( \varepsilon k a s t o n \). The subject is \( \pi a n t a \) τὰ \( \varepsilon i \delta \eta \), with which \( \varepsilon k a s t o n \) is in 'distributive apposition,' as usual with this word: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 245.

If καὶ \( \alpha l l \o h \o l o n \) is genuine, there can be no doubt that Plato is speaking of the \( k o i n o n i a \) of \( \varepsilon i \delta \eta \) with one another. It is impossible to take \( \alpha l l \o h \o l o n \) in the sense of \( \varepsilon a t o \nu \), and interpret 'by the partnership of actions and bodies and' i.e. 'with' themselves' viz. \( \varepsilon i \delta \eta . \) Nor can the words be explained by 479 A, B, for there it is not the \( \varepsilon i \delta \o s \) Beautiful which becomes ugly, but τὰ \( \tau o l l \a \; k a l \a \). It is thought by Stumpf (Verhältniss d. Pl. Gottes zur Idee des Guten p. 49) that Plato means the \( p a r o n o \i a \) of two \( \varepsilon i \delta \eta \) in one object, as when a man is both beautiful and just. In such a case there is, no doubt, a sort of \( k o i n o n i a \) between the two \( \varepsilon i \delta \eta \), but the juxtaposition of \( \alpha l l \o h \o l o n \) with \( \pi r \alpha \zeta \e o n \) and \( \sigma o m \mu a t o n \) shews that the kind of \( k o i n o n i a \) between \( \varepsilon i \delta \eta \) which Plato has here in view is analogous to the \( k o i n o n i a \) between an \( \varepsilon i \delta \o s \) and a \( \pi r \alpha \zeta \e o s \), an \( \varepsilon i \delta \o s \) and a \( \sigma o \mu a \), etc. He is thinking, for example, of sentences like 'The Beautiful is good,' in which there is \( k o i n o n i a \).
between the two Ideas, Good and Beautiful, just as ‘Simmias is tall’
is an instance of *kounonía* between a particular body and the Idea of
Tallness.

The *kounonía* of *eíðη* in Plato’s philosophy has been discussed by
Müntz, *Plat. Stud.* pp. 200 ff., by Jackson in the *Journal of Philology*
IV pp. 212—218, by Zeller4 II 1, pp. 673 ff., and by many other
critics. The doctrine in question is sometimes supposed to be a later
development, or at all events a ‘Weiterbildung,’ of the Theory of Ideas.
It is explicitly laid down in the *Sophist* (251A ff.), a large section of
which dialogue is an attempt to prove the intercommunion of certain
*eíðη*. (Of course all *eíðη* do not communicate with one another, other-
wise every general statement would be true: it is the business of the
philosopher to discover which do and which do not unite: *Soph.*
253 C ff. We should therefore distinguish between real or ontological
*kounonía* *eíðων* and the *kounonía* which we attribute to *eíðη* when we
predicate one general notion of another: see on 479 D. The former is
true *kounonía* *eíðων*: the latter may be either true or false.) Unless
καὶ ἄλληλον is corrupt or spurious, the *kounonía* of *eíðη* must be
attributed also to the *Republic*.

In point of fact, according to the Platonic theory of predication, the
real and ontological *kounonía* of one *eídos* with others is inevitable, if
any true proposition of any kind is to be predicated of the Ideas.
And Plato constantly throughout the *Republic* describes the Ideas by a
variety of predicates, such as ὅν, αὑτό καθ’ αὑτό, ἀἐι κατὰ ταύτα ὑπαντῶς
ἐχὼν etc. Moreover, the *kounonía* of the Idea of Good with the other
Ideas is surely implied in the description of the Good as the cause of
Truth and Being in vi 508 ff., although Plato does not himself
express the relationship in this way. Such a statement as that ‘the
*eídos* of δικαίων is good’ is not merely admissible, but necessary, in the
metaphysical theory of Books V—VII. And no such statement can be
made, unless there is *kounonía* of the Ideas of Justice and Goodness.
If it be urged that such a communion of Ideas is open to the objection
known as τριτός ἀνθρώπος, it may be replied ‘So is the communion of
Ideas and particulars, which Plato certainly maintains in the *Republic*.’
If he was not aware of this objection in the one case, or deliberately
ignored or overruled it, why not also in the other? Similarly with the
unity of the Idea. The communion of Ideas with Ideas affects their
unity just as much or as little as the community of Ideas with par-
ticulars. Compare Fouillée *La Phil. de Platon* 1 pp. 202—211, and
Chiappelli *Della Interpretazione panteistica di Platone* p. 119. There
is accordingly, I think, no reason whatever for holding that Plato in the
*Republic* denied the possibility of *kounonía* between *eíðη*, although the
full exposition of this difficult and important subject is reserved for the
*Sophist*. We should therefore hesitate before regarding the words
ἄλληλον *kounonía* in our dialogue as either spurious or corrupt. Nor
can it be said that any of the attempts at emendation is in the least
degree convincing. The most elegant, I think, is Badham’s ἄλλη
ἄλλον (accepted by Schmitt *Die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl.
Rep. und Philebus* p. 3), though ἄλλη is somewhat unpleasing. Hart-
man proposes ἀλλων, Bywater (J. Ph. v p. 123) ἀλλ᾽ ἀλλων (surely a doubtful piece of grammar), Voegelin the excision of καί, Liebhold ἀλλων πολλῶν. Others will no doubt think of cancelling καί ἀλλήλων altogether, regarding it as a confused attempt to indicate that the κοινωνία in question is a κοινωνία between ‘one another,’ i.e. between Ideas on the one hand, and πράξεις or σῶματα on the other. I have myself no doubt that the text is sound. Jackson writes as follows: “I believe the text to be right. Plato realizes that Ideas must carry predicates: e.g. μεγάλη σοφροσύνη is a possible phrase. But it has not yet occurred to him that there is any difficulty in thus making one idea ‘contain’ other ideas. That there is a difficulty in this immanence is not perceived before the Parmenides.” I do not feel sure that Plato was unaware of the difficulties involved in this conception even when he wrote the Republic: he may have known but passed them by: nor do I think that the Parmenides is certainly later than the Republic: but I am glad to find that Jackson also holds emphatically that ἀλλήλων κοινωνία was written by Plato in this passage.

END OF VOL. I.
Plato
The Republic.

v. 1

NAME OF BORROWER

DATE